Terrorism Studies as a Site for Moral Learning - On barriers to knowledge and how to overcome them

Submitted by Sophia Maria Zeschitz,
to the University of Exeter as a thesis for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in
Arabic and Islamic Studies

September 2017.

I certify that all material in this thesis which is not my own work has been identified and that no material has previously been submitted and approved for the award of a degree by this or any other University.

(Signature) ……

Abstract

The thesis follows a critical theory approach and suggests, that the academic study of terrorism would benefit from incorporating into its methodology an approach, which actively seeks to guide ethical discourse and policy making. The thesis asks how Terrorism Studies, in light of its proximity to policy-making and the policy-relevance of its object of research, can utilise its expertise to encourage moral learning and shape the public discourses around terrorism. It does so to problematises the marginalisation of normative theorising in Terrorism Studies.

The thesis shows, that Terrorism Studies mirrors public discourse around terrorism in so far as it focuses on the instrumentality of violence, which necessarily invokes questions of values and consequentialist morality. These questions are shown to be central to the wider political, social and cultural contestations in modern societies. Treating normative questions as merely tangential in the study of terrorism therefore, renders Terrorism Studies intellectually vulnerable, if it cannot provide its expertise from an empathetically reasoned normative basis. This is the case, because the study of terrorism cannot overcome its own participation in perpetuating and indeed reifying exclusionary social practices within the hegemonic power-relationships provided for by the state.

The thesis demonstrates, that any claim to neutrality in the study of terrorism is illusive and therefore, demands that Terrorism Studies must provide its expertise based on an explicit normative framework that enables critique beyond a focus on the nation state. It suggests, that Terrorism Studies must shift its focus from the ‘problem of terrorism’ to the ‘problem of misrecognition’. In doing so, the thesis not only identifies moments of implicit normative bias, particularly in relation to preventative counterterrorism, but furthermore, allows Terrorism Studies to treat terrorism as a social phenomenon, which carries with it opportunities for moral learning.

The thesis therefore, provides an intervention in the form of an explicitly normative framework for the study of terrorism. This framework places Terrorism Studies in a normatively grounded position to self-reflexively critique the social, cultural and political manifestations of hegemonic power relationships in modern societies in which it participates. This equips Terrorism Studies with the methodological tools to provide concrete ethical guidance to make sense of, relate to and navigate the incoherences of the questions raised by terrorism and take the social embeddedness of the actor, and not the nation state, as its point of reference. It thereby encourages Terrorism Studies to participate in broader emancipatory truth claims, because it can identify barriers to, and opportunities for, moral learning.

Table of Contents

Abstract ... **3**

Table of Contents ... **5**

Acknowledgements ... **9**

Introduction ... **11**

1 The purpose of the academic study of terrorism ... **21**

1.1 What Terrorism Studies is not telling us: Defining the research problem ... **24**

1.1.1 On the dominance of positivist research approaches ... **25**

1.1.2 And implicit normative positions ... **26**

1.2 And what it should be telling us: Contribution and scope ... **28**

1.2.1 Explicit normative theorising in Terrorism Studies ... **28**

1.3 Methodology - Critical theory and limitations ... **30**

1.3.1 Critical theory and the socially embedded researcher ... **31**

1.3.1.1 Critical Theory and the centrality of power ... 33

1.3.1.2 Logic-in-use and mediating practises of knowledge ... 34

1.3.2 On the role of values in the production of knowledge ... **35**

1.3.2.1 On the persuasive appeal of normative reasoning and misunderstanding ... 36

1.3.3 Approach and limitations ... **37**

1.3.3.1 On cognitive skills and dialectic reflexivity ... 38

1.3.3.2 Cognitive fallacies, consequentialist moralising, and moral bubbles ... 38

1.4 Contribution to (Critical) Terrorism Studies ... **39**

2 Losing sight of subjectivity: Why Terrorism Studies cannot (and ought not) tell us what leads a person to turn to political violence ... **42**

2.1 Terrorism Studies ... **46**

2.1.1 Definitional debates ... **48**

2.1.1.1 Academic neutrality and responsible theory building ... 49

2.1.1.2 Security threat and the illusion of academic neutrality ... 50

2.1.2 Extraordinary political violence and the banality of terror ... **52**

2.1.2.1 Terrorism expertise ... 56

2.1.2.2 Disciplinary boundaries ... 60

2.1.2.3 Disciplinary fragmentation ... 61

2.1.3 The Terrorism Studies Agenda ... **65**

2.1.3.1 Desire and meaningfulness in excess ... 67

2.1.3.2 Implicit moral judgements, social realities and problem solving ... 70

2.1.3.3 Social realities, representations and alternative voices ... 74

2.1.3.4 Homogenisation and marginalisation ... 74

2.1.3.5 Prevailing frames of representing women in terrorism ... 75

2.1.3.6 Agency but not subjectivity ... 76

2.1.4 Critical Terrorism Studies or the critical study of terrorism ... **78**

2.2 Taking a normative stance in Terrorism Studies 81

3 On the promises of a liberal democracy and the politics of counterterrorism 86

3.1 The politics of (counter-) terrorism and the need for action 89

3.2 Relating to the threat of terrorism and 'radicalisation' 91

3.2.1 Home-grown terrorists and policy challenges 93

3.2.2 Radicalisation and the logic of preventing terrorism 96

3.2.3 Shared values and partnership 103

3.2.3.1 Partnership in defeating extremism and broken promises 106

3.2.3.2 Suspect community, Islamophobia and hegemonic narratives 111

3.3 The responsibility to pierce moral bubbles 118

3.4 Conclusion 123

4 On the centrality of violence and its socio-moral function 124

4.1 The centrality of violence in Terrorism Studies 127

4.1.1 Instrumentality of Violence and the privilege of power 129

4.1.2 The experience of violence 130

4.1.2.1 Moral sense, affect and social action 132

4.2 Descriptive morality, social stability, and violence 136

4.2.1 Virtuous Violence Theory and Relational Models Theory 136

4.2.1.1 Organising social relationships and the normalcy of violence 137

4.2.1.2 Cultural variability, moral motives and social stability 141

4.2.1.3 Individual at crossroads: group guidelines and ambiguity 144

4.2.1.4 Religion as vehicle for individual moral action and social order 148

4.2.1.5 Sacred values, taboo, and identity 150

4.2.1.6 Philosophical interjection - constitutive pervertibility of religion 152

4.3 Getting violence 'right' 154

4.4 Conclusion 159

5 On the tragic of moral bubbles and the persistence of exclusionary practises 160

5.1 Locating oneself in a *social* universe of meaning 163

5.1.1 Tragic moral bubbles and emancipation 164

5.1.2 Dialectic construction of social reality and reality maintenance 165

5.1.3 Accessible cultural knowledge and the inability of perspective-taking 167

5.1.4 On the function of ideology 170

5.1.5 Alternative discourse and the limitations of understanding others 172

5.1.5.1 On radicalisation as occupational change 175

5.1.5.2 Occupational change and perceived social approval 176

5.1.5.3 Radical interpretative frames, resonance and reason 177

5.2 Cognitive heuristics, conflict and reason 181

5.2.1 Potential for conflict and violence 183

5.3 Multiculturalism, human dignity and recognition 185

5.3.1 The pressure on multiculturalism **188**
5.3.2 Identity and Recognition **191**
5.4 Terrorism Studies and the need for emancipatory truth claims **194**
5.5 Conclusion **196**
6 Stretching Moral Bubbles - Existential struggles for recognition and emancipatory research **198**
6.1 Moral indistinguishability and the essence of terrorism **203**
6.2 From existential explanations to consequentialist morality **210**
6.2.1 Struggle for Recognition and the quest for full moral subjectivity **211**
6.2.2 Conditions for individual identity-formation and the good life **214**
6.2.2.1 Love and self-confidence - the individual as focus of concern 216
6.2.2.2 The individual as a morally responsible member of society 217
6.2.2.3 The individual as valued contributor to shared projects 219
6.2.3 Misrecognition and the struggle for recognition - towards a normative position for Terrorism Studies **221**
6.2.3.1 Violence and the struggle for recognition 226
6.3 A normative framework to relate to terrorism **227**
6.4 Recognising shared humanity and emancipatory research **230**
Conclusion **235**
Bibliography **243**

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Jonathan Githens-Mazer and Omar Ashour for agreeing to supervise this thesis and their flexibility in accommodating the turns this project has taken. I am grateful for their pragmatic approach and recognition of the constraints of a self-funded PhD, which allowed me to dabble into a variety of little projects and work experiences. I would also like to thank Bice Maigushca for the opportunity to teach on her modules and the memorable de-briefs at the end of each term, which provided valuable advice and mentoring.

I am grateful to the Student Support and Academic Services across the University of Exeter, which besides offering guidance and assistance throughout this project, provided opportunities for employment and escapism, personal and professional growth, and friendship and love.

That said, I could never have persevered with this project had it not been for my friends who offered support, joy, distraction, and perspective over all these years. Special thanks go to Katrin Zink, Katharina Beuerlein, Esther Hornung, Julia Stumpf, Elisa Grabbe, Maya Wodnicka and Mariam Patel for their friendship and the open invitations they extended, which let me share in their milestones, be at their weddings and hold their new-borns, despite geographic distance. I am also grateful for the friendships I forged during this project, and particularly thank Maria Blanco Palencia and Morgane Colleau, whose personal and professional companionship made this journey much more enjoyable.

Finally, I am indebted, not only to my friends but also my family, especially to my parents, my sister Juli, my brother Max, and my love Janie, who, in their own loving and crazy ways have been supportive, patient, and cheerfully optimistic for all these years.

Introduction

Terrorism Studies has since its inception grappled with a discourse of failure (Stampnitzky, 2013) and following Mark Sageman's assertion in 2012, that Terrorism Studies stagnated, the question as to the health of academic research of terrorism regularly recurs in scholarly exchanges at conferences and beyond. (Morrison, 2017) While this thesis starts with the conviction, that Terrorism Studies, because of its disciplinary and methodological openness, contributes enormously to the generation of a rich, diverse, and innovative body of research, it is particularly interested in the disciplinary fragmentation of Terrorism Studies and the possibility of formulating, what Chenoweth (Morrison, 2017a) calls a 'collective story'. In this, the thesis agrees with her observation, that the intellectual distance between Orthodox Terrorism Studies, that is the more empirical, dataset-based study of terrorism, and Critical Terrorism Studies is overstated, and indeed at times counterproductive. Chenoweth notes, that discoveries and insights from both orientations align in their scepticism in relation to state-centric policy intervention and in their broader concern for the moral and ethical implications of making certain empirical claims. This proximity however is lost, if the question 'what leads an individual to participate in political violence' comes to be understood as the decisive moment in the determination of success or failure of Terrorism Studies, as is suggested by Sageman (2012) but which also constitutes the point of entry for popular discourse around terrorism.

Against the tempting simplicity of Sageman's question, this thesis juxtaposes Lisa Stampnitzky's observation, that a foundational pursuit in Terrorism Studies is the idea of fixing the concept of terrorism, so as to depoliticise the definition. The idea here lies in the notion, that a purely analytical conceptualisation can isolate the academic study of terrorism from having to engage with the morality of it. Stampnitzky however emphasises, that even the most analytically pure concept [of terrorism] re-enters engagement with the practical realm. The political construction of terrorism, through counterterrorism practise, she argues, will necessarily act back upon the momentarily de-politicised and analytical concept, which experts will introduce. (Stampnitzky, 2015a) It is through this practise that inconsistencies surface. Stampnitzky comes to the conclusion, that the fact that the problem of the definition of terrorism has not been resolved hints at 'the struggles of the state and public discourse to provide answers to questions at the

center [sic.] of the contestation of the definition of terrorism, namely on the identity of the enemy, the question of the legitimacy of violence as well as the delineation between political and private.' (Stampnitzky, Forthcoming)

The thesis follows Stampnitzky's observation that the contestation of the definition of terrorism tells the story of what is central to contemporary politics, thus making the key questions for Terrorism Studies to be answered not what drives an individual to commit acts of political violence but rather: who is the enemy?, when is violence legitimate?, and, what is political? such that it could be argued, the essence of terrorism - and therefore the focus of Terrorism Studies - ought to be how and why boundaries are being drawn as well as what 'life looks like from the other side of the boundaries.' (Stampnitzky, Forthcoming) The thesis expands on Stampnitzky's observation by relating these questions to their implications for the academic study of terrorism. While Stampnitzky, importantly and rightly points out, that the concept of terrorism invokes, what Ugilt (2015) terms 'meaningfulness-in-excess'[1], this thesis is driven by a concern, which stems from the idea that what becomes meaningful in the social world is the *analyst's desire.* Zuleika and Douglas (2008, p. 32) argue, that it is this desire, which determines what constitutes successful research and what the meaningful social reality of terrorism 'is'. They argue, that implicitly or explicitly, researchers and analysts alike, seek to explain why ordinary men engage in acts that the public discourse widely perceives and describes as 'utterly senseless nihilism'. (Zuleika, 2008, p. 32) Analysts and researchers thereby mute, that these acts are social actions to which normative judgement applies. Recognising that terrorism scholars are forced to make a choice when they study terrorism as an object of knowledge to stabilise their approach, even when the object of knowledge is unbounded and incoherent, it must not be forgotten however, that they also embark on a journey, that has crucial political, social and cultural implications. The questions scholars chose to ask and answer, serve a normative purpose precisely because terrorism operates within existing hegemonic power relations.

Against this background, the question this thesis wishes to answer is what methodological tools Terrorism Studies ought to employ in order to participate responsibly in shaping the *wider* debates that terrorism raises. In addressing this question, a key task of this thesis therefore, is to demonstrate, how the

[1] On the notion of meaningfulness-in-excess see Chapter two.

conceptualisation of terrorism and its focus on the instrumentality of violence represents a defensible, yet *arbitrary choice*, which *invokes a distinct normative position* that is, methodologically speaking, *never made explicit.* This focus has been chosen to show Terrorism Studies' reliance on an unspoken invocation of a positivist research methodology. This in turn displays a belief in the possibility of objectivity and neutrality in terrorism scholarship. The thesis argues however, that such a research methodology cannot provide a framework, which confronts the fact that even the most genuinely analytical and neutral conceptualisation of terrorism, cannot remain in the exclusive control of its scholarly creator.

By contrast, the thesis endorses a critical theory approach and contributes to the study of terrorism by highlighting the importance of moral reasoning in maintaining intellectual and structural barriers to knowledge and subsequently demonstrating the potential, which explicit normative theorising entails in navigating social, cultural, political and moral inconsistencies that are raised by terrorism. The thesis argues, that normative grounding provides the explicit point of departure for critical-dialectic reasoning in Terrorism Studies, because as a discursive practise, 'normative argumentation is so very pervasive that we rarely stop to consider that it is a rational technique of *persuasion*.' (emphasis added, Morrow and Brown, 1994, p. 239, Habermas, 1973) Explicit normative theorising as a methodological tool within Terrorism Studies recognises the persuasive appeal of normative reasoning in generating and maintaining taken-for-granted social realities. Such a methodological position recognises, that it is the unquestioned social realities, which inhibit empathetic perspective-taking and with it, the pursuit of emancipatory knowledge. Explicit normative grounding then equips critical social science and Terrorism Studies with a methodology, which counteracts any unconscious reinforcement of the existing society's hold over thinking and knowledge production.

Critical self-reflection from an explicitly normative position however, by itself has a very limited emancipatory purpose but rather tries to prevent the researcher form contributing to dominance by recognising, that the researcher works in an ideological-political context where research is embedded in a field of tensions between reproducing the existing social order and challenging it. (Alvesson and Sköldberg, 2009, p. 166-177) Emancipation then follows from the attempt to identify sources of misunderstanding and ideological workings that inhibit

empathetic perspective-taking and is achieved through knowledge that provides the inspiration for ‘actions aiming at the negation of pseudo-natural constraints’. (Habermas, 1972, p. 176) In this context, it is for scholars to utilise a strategic position as public intellectuals by orienting their social criticism in such a manner, that it provides practically contextualised, empirically informed normative claims with concrete political implications (Morrow and Brown, 1994, p. 318) and it is this orientation that this thesis shows to makes a critical theory approach particularly suitable for responsible academic expertise on terrorism.

The central argument of this thesis, follows in the spirit of Critical Terrorism Studies in its self-reflective orientation. It posits that Terrorism Studies requires an explicit normative framework, from which to exercise its expertise, because it needs to confront ethical questions, which lie at the heart of how modern societies draw political, social and cultural boundaries when they relate to terrorism. It requires a formalised methodological approach, because at a point of (perceived) crisis, a normative frame can inject a moment of critical self-reflection, which moderates the (perceived) need for action. This position recognises the fact, that Terrorism Studies participates in the production of knowledge and serves to stabilise hegemonic power relations in civil society. As it follows a critical theory approach, it also suggests, that inherent inconsistencies in the object of knowledge and the concomitant arbitrary, but ultimately normative choices, cannot be bracketed from the knowledge production on terrorism. The thesis expands on Critical Terrorism Studies however, by proposing a move of the focus in Terrorism Studies from ‘the problem of terrorism’ to ‘the struggle for recognition’. By introducing the struggle for recognition, the thesis gives to hand an emancipatory framework, which allows to understand ‘terrorism’ as a crucial site of political struggle over boundaries and inclusion, at the heart of which lie normative questions and values. This framework lends itself for contextual application, by encouraging a focus on subjectivity and perspective-taking geared towards inclusivity and the recognition of the individual as interested in participating as an equal, valued, trusted and reasoning subject in the realisation of a shared ‘good life’ of society.

The thesis therefore, ultimately makes the case that critical social theory in the form of the struggle for recognition provides for the methodological tools, which enable the identification of cognitive and structural barriers to knowledge,

while at the same time, recognising these as providing important moments for critical self-reflection and thus moral learning and emancipation. In other words, this framework requires Terrorism Studies to participate in, at times, emotion-driven public discourse and policy making, on the basis of an explicit normative foundation and a commitment to critical self-reflection to give concrete ethical guidance in addressing the incoherences, which terrorism as an unbounded object of knowledge raises. Establishing a normative framework, which offers a contextual commitment to the idea of empowerment of individuals and emancipation in the form of a struggle for recognition, such a perspective makes visible, how these inconsistencies impact on how we relate socially in modern societies, where the reality of different social universes disrupts the inevitability and stability of our individual social realities. Such a methodological position also addresses the difficulty at the heart of the production of neutral knowledge on terrorism and therefore makes an important contribution to the knowledge in the field.

This thesis is sympathetic to the idea that multiple realities can be true at the same time, and indeed, that one man can be someone's terrorist and another's freedom fighter. The task of terrorism scholarship as this thesis understands it, is to make contextual emancipatory truth claims, which encourage critical self-reflection in order to navigate the logics and exclusionary practises that underlie social inconsistencies and the concomitantly experienced social injustices. For the context of the study of terrorism, it is the position of this thesis, that it is the task of Terrorism Studies to enable *reflexive, critical-dialectic and empathetic knowledge* of the terrorist actor on the basis of an explicit normative framework and that such a framework can be found in the struggle for recognition and the commitment to equality and inclusion as its emancipatory basis.

The original contribution of this thesis therefore, lies its understanding of the intellectual task of Terrorism Studies to explicitly confront questions of normative significance. This is done by providing a methodological orientation, which gives weight to non-empirical, normative claims that go beyond the immediate concern with the violent act. Anchoring Terrorism Studies within an explicit normative framework, which follows a critical theory approach, provides a position for the practically contextualised and empirically informed exercise of its intellectual expertise. It moreover, fully and explicitly recognises and addresses the

unboundedness of its object of knowledge and the deeper implications its expertise can and ought to have for critiquing and shaping self-reflective social relationships. Ultimately, this thesis argues, that the collective story of Terrorism Studies, is one of critical self-reform that confronts taken-for-granted normative positions and boundaries, that serve to mask exclusionary practises by utilising incoherence, contradictions and absurdities as springboards for moral learning and emancipation.

This thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter one 'On the purpose of the study of terrorism' anchors the thesis within Terrorism Studies and critiques the field's positivist orientation, while also positioning itself within Critical Terrorism Studies broadly conceived. Driven by the compellingly interesting question of 'what leads a person to participate in political violence', it demonstrates, that despite the emergence of Critical Terrorism Studies and its focus on critique, the dominance of positivist research approaches in the field has not been overcome. The chapter justifies this position by pointing to the lack of an explicit normative framework, which could relate terrorism to wider questions of social, political and cultural relevance. The chapter argues, that a contribution to knowledge in Terrorism Studies can be made through the application of a critical theory perspective, which not only identifies barriers to knowledge and sources of misunderstanding, but importantly, also provides for a normative basis from which Terrorism Studies can exercise responsible expertise. It is on the basis of such a position, that Terrorism Studies can challenge and participate in the culturally sensitive framing of terrorism and consequently counterterrorism. This, the thesis argues, puts Terrorism Studies in a stronger position to exercise its expertise on terrorism by taking seriously its scholarly ability and role in confronting exclusionary practises and hegemonic power-relationships beyond the state. It is important that Terrorism Studies can take on this role, because in light of a fast-paced, emotional, and dynamically evolving coverage of incidents of terrorism, partial information, uncertainty and ambiguity have not and cannot provided adequate restraint when it comes to the social and cultural framing of terrorism. An explicitly normative framework however, allows to engage with terrorism and the limitations of expertise and knowledge more generally. It can emphasise the social embeddedness of our understanding of terrorism and the implications thereof for counterterrorism practises and policy making.

Chapter two ‘Losing sight of subjectivity: Why Terrorism Studies cannot and should not tell us what leads a person to turn to political violence’, primarily engages with the literature in Terrorism Studies in order to, firstly show that the definitional debate of Terrorism Studies stands in place and indeed in the way of a clarification of the normative commitment of Terrorism Studies, because in spite of pointing at the contestability of the concept, it does not address its inherent and reifying power dynamics. By introducing the analogy of the limits of legal reasoning, the chapter can show that complexity, ambivalence and subjectivity need not be determinants of the limitation of responsible scholarship but rather its opposite. The example shows, that it is indeed a recognition of the need for self-reflection, restraint and caution that lends both credibility and legitimacy to expertise, particularly when expertise is enmeshed in hegemonic power-relations backed by the state. Secondly, sketching the debate on the disciplinary home for Terrorism Studies, the chapter notes the difficulty of locating Terrorism Studies in a disciplinary tradition and concedes that, particularly in relation to the question of representation of terrorism and terrorist actors and the notion of agency, questions of power relationships are being problematised. However, the chapter also observe that violence remains the determinant for locating terrorism within an established academic discipline and concomitant research methodology. To conclude chapter two, it looks at Terrorism Studies and particularly the role of the expert in Terrorism Studies more closely. This is done in order to demonstrate that expertise on terrorism is indeed reflective of a positivist research tradition in its declared commitment to produce neutral, objective and truthful knowledge about terrorism, while at the same time overlooking the implications of its failure to explicitly reflect on their own foundational biases which importantly lead to an *implicit* normative leaning that is never made explicit and therefore, prevents emancipatory critique.

Chapter three ‘On the promises of a liberal democracy and the politics of counterterrorism’, demonstrates that the implicit normative leaning in Terrorism Studies, which has been the focus of chapter two, becomes part of preventative counterterrorism approaches in Western societies. Chapter three uses the context of the United Kingdom’s PREVENT strategy, to show the contextual manifestation of the silence on the *implicit* normative claims in relation to terrorism. The chapter demonstrates not only that this silence leads to a *selective*

focus in preventative counterterrorism approaches, but moreover, that these approaches work against the background of wider cultural and political debates that reach to the core of communal life and hegemonic power relationships that manifest most palpably for minorities in a liberal democracy. Ultimately, the chapter shows that, while normative theorising may appear to be of remote practical value, the implications of its lack are clearly experienceable in everyday life. The chapter concludes, that responsible academic expertise on terrorism would be well advised to provide ethical guidance for questions raised by terrorism and assist in navigating the wider social and cultural debates, which become implied in the debates, and incoherences experienced as injustices, around preventative counterterrorism.

In chapter four 'On violence and its socio-moral function', the chapter provides an alternative understanding of violence, that moves from its instrumentality to its social function and thereby demonstrates that, form the perspective of moral psychology, descriptively there is no need to morally condemn violence. This move serves as an important step towards de-exceptionalising violence and terrorism by encouraging empathy with the individual actor. This serves as the first step in reorienting the study of terrorism because on the one hand, it manages to analytically relegates the question of the morality of violence to explicit normative theorising while on the other hand, it also draws attention the individual's commitment to participate in the sustenance of a social order which she subjectively understands to be moral and opens up the avenue to see violence form the perspective of the individual rather than the state. Importantly this chapter allows us to see that the analytical categorisation of terrorism as instrumental violence invokes moral intuitions that serve to limit methodological empathy with the individual and thereby serve to sustain hegemonic power relationships centred on the state. This understanding importantly stands in the way of emancipatory self-reflection because moral intuitions become taken-for-granted and provide powerful means of persuasion in communication of legitimacy.

Chapter five, 'On the tragic of moral bubbles and the persistence of exclusionary practises', shows how fallacious cognitive heuristics and social practises provide mechanisms that inhibit fully actualised empathetic perspective taking by disguising normative *choices* as taken-for-granted positions that limit

the pursuit of emancipatory truth claims. Showing that these mechanisms serve to not only selectively disguise violence but moreover shape social reality in a manner that serves to sustain exclusionary hegemonic power relationships, the chapter not only points to the arising and sustained universal moral bubbles, but moreover to difficulty in overcoming them. It is in recognition of this 'tragedy' that the chapter, in line with the overall argument of the thesis, encourages Terrorism Studies to not only account for said tragedy but furthermore to utilise this as the basis for injecting reflexivity and the normative claims it should advance, because it understands the academic study of terrorism to be entrusted with the methodological sensitivity and responsibility to expand moral bubbles through emancipatory critique.

Chapter six 'Stretching Moral Bubbles - Existential struggle for recognition and emancipatory research' then carves out a normative position for Terrorism Studies with an explicitly normative framework that takes the individual, rather than the state, as its focus of concern. The chapter problematises the nexus between terrorism expertise and terrorism as an unbounded object of knowledge and demonstrates the social embeddedness of normative reasoning. It does so by demonstrating that different acts of violence are morally indistinguishable. Within this framework it is possible to reflexively engage with the terrorist actor in spite of, and yet with reasoned recognition of the origins of the moral valence of the actor's violence and the observer's evaluation. This is the case because the moral framing of the motivation that is the actor's justification for activism within the framework of a struggle for recognition, is anchored in the self-understanding of the individual activist. Their struggle is moral because the very self-understanding of violence originates from an appeal to a universalised and shared, that is taken-for granted, moral grammar to which the individual can lay claim. It is such a framework, which provides Terrorism Studies with a normative position that enables it to act as a point of reference to confront the exclusionary practises, which hide behind the contestation of terrorism and allows Terrorism Studies a claim to emancipatory critique. This provides for the foundation for the field's participation in the confrontation of questions more central to contemporary political life, which positivist leaning methodologies problematically remain silent on. It is in the identification of the scarcity of explicit normative theorising and the consecutive suggestion of a normative framework in the form of a struggle for

recognition, where the thesis offers a contribution to Critical Terrorism Studies approaches and an original contribution to the knowledge of the field. The thesis then is an explicit recognition of the fact, that ethical questions (such as the ones raised by Stampnitzky (Forthcoming)) cannot be bracketed from terrorism scholarship or policy making, however an explicit engagement with normative theory and ethical questions from within Terrorism Studies remains rare. This of course is no surprise, as it is widely acknowledged, that Terrorism Studies is not a discipline in its own right[2] but rather a collection of researcher that come to the topic from a variety of disciplines and backgrounds. This thesis should however not be misunderstood as a dismissal of individual contributions, but rather wishes to suggest by means of an intervention, that a permeable field that engages with a topic as accessible to the public imagination and discourse as terrorism, ought to invest further resources in exercising its expertise on the basis of an explicitly formulated methodology that enables addressing questions of normative concern, so as to provide concrete and measured ethical guidance for counterterrorism practitioners, policy makers and everyone who participates in the debates and practices triggered and implicated by terrorism. The strength of the struggle for recognition as a normative framework for the study of terrorism, lies in its potential to navigating the inconsistencies and absurdities of modern life, by recognising the barriers to moral learning as well as locating the impetus for moral learning within the existing moral order. This position encourages self-reflection and empathy because it understands the identity formation of the individual to be dependent on the experience of being recognised as a valuable contributor to shared projects. This framework therefore, can provide ethical guidance to confront the questions central to contemporary political, social and cultural life that are being raised by terrorism, with the individual and not the state as its central concern. With its explicit normative framework, this thesis offers a methodological approach so that Terrorism Studies can provide concrete ethical guidance to navigate the incoherences of modern political, social and cultural life by treating the contestations over terrorism as a site for moral leaning and emancipation.

[2] See for example: (Stampnitzky, 2012); also (Morrison, 2017).

1 The purpose of the academic study of terrorism

Marc Sageman, initially in the wake of the 2013 Boston Marathon bombings and in the exchange with terrorism researchers in the March 2014 issue of Terrorism and Political Violence, attested the stagnation of terrorism research. He attests that, 'despite over a decade of government funding and thousands of newcomers to the field of terrorist research, we are no closer to answering the simple question of 'What leads a person to turn to political violence?'' (Sageman, 2014b, p. 565) Noting that many researchers have been attracted to the field by the availability of government money, rather than a genuine interest in the study of terrorism per se, he primarily takes issue with the scarcity of the generation of purposeful data and the symptomatic separation of the academic from the strategic study of terrorism. It is the over-classification of data available to government intelligence practitioners and the restricted access to huge datasets, which go widely unutilised by academics with rigorous methodology training, who rely on comparatively weak data and secondary sources. The intelligence community however, lacks said methodological rigour to generate *new* insights from huge, yet classified datasets. Despite the wave of interest in terrorism research triggered by 9/11, Terrorism Studies '*failed to generate any sort of consensus about the process through which people turn to political violence*.' (emphasis added Sageman, 2013) Acknowledging practical obstacles of access to primary sources, John Horgan and Jessica Stern (2013) in response stress the contributions and importance of qualitative and ethnographic studies in addressing 'how, why, and where individuals have turned to terrorism'. They concede, that there is indeed no consensus on the question raised by Sageman. In turn, they suggest that the large number of disciplines, which contribute to terrorism research, is essential to understanding terrorism. Rather than the stagnation of terrorism research, they see a gradual accumulation of contributions, but note that these approaches would benefit from being made into a more formal field of study. (Horgan and Stern, 2013)

Lisa Stampnitzky (2013) on the other hand thoughtfully problematises the discourse of failure in Terrorism Studies and notes the pervasiveness of it as one of the key constitutive elements of the discipline of Terrorism Studies. She observes, that at the heart of the discourse of failure, lies an ongoing contestation of the concept of terrorism, a 'problem' that the discipline fails to be able to

resolve. Stampnitzky concludes, that terrorism is an unbounded object of knowledge. She notes, that at the core of the contestation of the concept of terrorism for the discipline of Terrorism Studies, lies a pursuit to 'fix' the concept in order to arrive at a *coherent, analytical and stable definition*, that is to de-politicise the definition[3] and thereby remove the accusation of the arbitrariness of its application. Stampnitzky (Forthcoming) notes however, that 'the problem of definition' importantly is not one of the 'corruption of an otherwise neutral term' or an issue of the selective or hypocritical application of the term. (Illing, 2015) It is rather a reflection of the fact, that 'the political is baked into the concept from the start' because the term becomes meaningful only through interaction with the state. Terrorism is encountered *in practise* through interaction with the state. It is the state, who determines what it treats as terrorism and it does this through its counterterrorism practises. The inconsistencies of the term do not therefore, stem from the reality of these acts or the discourse around them, but from the fact that it is not possible to tear away definitions of terrorism from counterterrorism practise. In other words, because even the most analytically pure concept [of terrorism] re-enters engagement with the practical realm, inconsistencies surface, because the political construction of terrorism through counterterrorism practise will act back upon the momentarily de-politicised and analytical concepts that experts will introduce. (Stampnitzky, 2015a)

Terrorism then is best approached as an unbounded object of knowledge that is *characterised by its inconsistencies* and shaped through interaction. By suggesting, that the core logic of terrorism lies in its inconsistencies, understanding terrorism necessitates a perspective in reverse, that is by looking at those that are being subjected to practises of counterterrorism (Stampnitzky, 2015a) and conceptualising terrorism as 'violence out of place'.[4] Looking at counterterrorism practises enable the identification of terrorism in reverse. From this however importantly follows also that terrorism serves to work back on and thereby define, other central aspects to political and cultural life, which determine

[3] See for example Schmid (2005) who notes that Terrorism Studies has failed at its foundational step in providing for a neutral, stable and universally accepted definition of the phenomenon under study and this being the key impediment to turning 'terrorism' into a useful analytical term.

[4] Stampnitzky (2015a) understands 'place' relating primarily to geographical location, but notes that 'place' invokes a notion of 'innocence' or 'politics' in determining the expectation as to when violence is 'out of place'.

our expectations as to when violence is thought fit or to be out of place respectively. (Stampnitzky, Forthcoming)

This of course raises questions that are by far more central to social and political life in general and necessities and engagement with the different dialectical logics that not only inform our expectations, but which further serve to (re-)politicise even the seemingly most neutral of analytical conceptualisations of terrorism. What becomes apparent, is that the inconsistencies that surface in the conceptualisation of terrorism and the logic behind it, provide an interesting route for exploration by terrorism researchers.

However, it is against the background of the recurring centrality of the debate of the stagnation of Terrorism Studies, the unboundedness of its object of knowledge, and in acknowledgement of the overpowering interest and simplicity that Sageman's question of why people turn to political violence has beyond academia that the question arises what the purpose of Terrorism Studies should be. Especially because we have just seen that inner workings of the incoherences in the conceptualisation of terrorism highlight inconsistencies which are central to *social relationships* and raises more fundamental social, political and cultural questions. In spite of the intuitive appeal that Sageman's question undoubtedly has, it is in recognition of the inherent inconsistencies of the concept that necessarily makes Terrorism Studies intellectually vulnerable, that this thesis argues, that the purpose of the study of terrorism actually must lie in the confrontation of exclusionary practises that provide for the normative background noise against which Terrorism Studies attempts to stabilise the inconsistencies inherent but not necessarily visible in the translation of the concept of terrorism into the questions it seeks to answer.

This is not to dismiss approaches particularly from Critical Terrorism Studies that have repeatedly criticised (Jackson, 2007b), and consecutively tried to address, the state-centricity and problem-solving approach (Jackson, 2016) of Terrorism Studies in an attempt to explain how a relatively marginal phenomenon generate so much interest and how 'transformative the terrorism discourse would be of society and culture'. (Jackson et al., 2017, p. 197) In spite of the stated commitment to 'transparency about its own values and political standpoints' and 'a broadly defined notion of emancipation' (Smyth et al., 2008, p. 2), Critical Terrorism Studies in spite of its head-on confrontation of the status-quo

privileging and problem-solving state centricity of which it criticises Orthodox Terrorism Studies, has not taken sufficient time to articulate a compelling methodology or normative agenda.

It is the purpose of this thesis to address this shortcoming of (Critical) Terrorism Studies in a manner that not only recognised the inherent inconsistencies in the conceptualisation of terrorism by demonstrating how violence (selectively) comes to be understood as 'out of place'. The thesis suggests that the question of the morality of violence plays a central role in this and seeks to provide for an emancipatory framework from which Terrorism Studies can exercise its expertise. It is such a framework that can provide for the basis for critiquing the subtle practises that flow out of the inherent inconsistencies that are baked into the practise of counterterrorism and which are s*ubjectively experienced as injustices.* This thesis continues in the spirit of Critical Terrorism Studies in so far as it is sensitive to status-quo privileging state-centricity of the study of terrorism. However, it goes beyond the state of the field of Critical Terrorism Studies in so far, as it understands emancipation indeed as a problem-solving approach, whereby the solution of the problem however lies in a normative position based on a critical theory framework from which it confronts exclusionary practises, rather than the immediate confrontation of the problem of terrorism by means of counterterrorism with the state as its primary point of reference.

1.1 What Terrorism Studies is not telling us: Defining the research problem

The problem that this thesis wishes to address finds its scholarly expression in the juxtaposition of the compelling clarity of Sageman's question. It is this juxtaposition which epitomises how Terrorism Studies treats terrorism as an analytical object of inquiry against the pervasive complexity that Stampnitzky's observation of terrorism as an unbounded object of knowledge entails. Indeed, this thesis is sympathetic to the notion of terrorism as an unbounded object of knowledge and concerned about the implications of positivist research approaches that treat terrorism as a mere object of analytical inquiry. I see the compelling simplicity of Sageman's question as paradigmatic of a failure of Terrorism Studies to provide for a methodological framework, which could

encourage a more reflexive, and indeed critical approach to terrorism as an unbounded object of knowledge.

What I intend to demonstrate throughout this thesis is, that embedded in Sageman's question, lies a taken-for granted methodological *belief* in the possibility to suspend the inherent inconsistencies of terrorism as an object of knowledge in order to enable objective and neutral analysis of terrorism as a socio-political phenomenon. In this sense, Sageman's question embodies all the virtues of a positivist research tradition that assumes research to be an objective activity, which is dispassionately carried out at the 'highest level of de-contextualisation and formalisation' (Morrow and Brown, 1994, p. 235) and is able to offer a value free position. It is this positivist research tradition that will be shown to permeate Terrorism Studies more generally.

1.1.1 On the dominance of positivist research approaches

What this belief and research position misses however, is that even the most genuine analytical and neutral conceptualisation of terrorism, cannot remain in the exclusive control of its scholarly creator. Rather terrorism takes shape against the backdrop of the real-life manifestation of a social and/or political phenomenon in interaction with the state and its organs to which social, political, legal and/or cultural judgement applies.

In other words, this thesis seeks to confront the dominance of positivist research approaches by addressing the methodological silence on the normative orientation in Terrorism Studies, based on which the scepticism in relation to objectivity and neutrality in the research of terrorism becomes cast as a merely preparatory step that can be 'fixed' through diligent conceptualisation. I argue that based on this understanding, Terrorism Studies loses sight of the subjectivity and social embeddedness of its object of inquiry. In doing so, Terrorism Studies participates in the production of knowledge that serves to stabilise hegemonic power relations in civil society, because it suggests that inherent inconsistencies in the object of knowledge and the concomitant arbitrary, but ultimately normative choices, could be bracketed out from its knowledge production. This thesis ultimately asks, how Terrorism Studies can participate better in the responsible production of knowledge on terrorism.

1.1.2 And implicit normative positions

A key task of this thesis is to demonstrate that indeed even the most innocent conceptualisation of terrorism represents a defensible, yet arbitrary choice, which *invokes a distinct normative position* that is, methodologically speaking, *never made explicit*.

I do this in chapter two by tracing the contestation of the definition of terrorism as well as the debates surrounding the disciplinary location of Terrorism Studies in order to show that, without having made this explicit, the production of knowledge in Terrorism Studies serves to locate terrorism within hegemonic power relations that are primarily *defined* by the nation state. This of course is already indicative of the fact that the object of knowledge cannot be, strictly speaking, neutral. As Terrorism Studies however remains silent on the methodological implications of this foundational relationship with the state, I show in chapter three that the real-life consequence is that hegemonic power relationships facilitate a politics of terrorism that work on a basis of stability and predictability of inherently ambiguous, dynamic and contestable social relationships, thereby sacrificing *self-reflexive* dialogue and equal citizenship within the nation state. Terrorism Studies thereby surrenders its position as a facilitator of self-reflexive critique and a participant in the responsible production of *emancipatory* knowledge by locating its object of knowledge with primary reference to the nation state and the political instrumentality of violence. In chapter four then I demonstrate that in the way of a more reflexive approach in Terrorism Studies stands the pervasive focus on the instrumentality of violence. I demonstrate that it is this focus on instrumentality, that *necessarily* leads to the *negative* normative judgement of any act of violence that is exercised outside the state's monopoly of violence. Emphasising, that violence importantly serves a *subjective social-moral function in social relationships* however, I show how violence is ubiquitous in social relationships and does not have to result in negative normative judgement. In other words, chapter four demonstrates not only the social embeddedness of violence but also that negative normative judgement does not necessarily have to follow from the mere utilisation of violence. This recognition of the social embeddedness of violence allows us in chapter five to look at the dynamics behind the selectivity of negative normative judgement and indeed to demonstrate that fallible cognitive heuristics and their

collective social manifestation sustain moral bubbles that serve to selectively but systematically disguise violence from ourselves. In other words, the chapter traces the cognitive and social mechanisms that lead to a moral embubblement[5] which lies at the heart of the *selective* disguise of inconsistencies and an *inevitable normative* position born out of hegemonic power relationships. These privilege social stability and predictability over emancipatory truth claims. Chapter six then, not only problematises the inevitability of moral consequentialist reasoning by demonstrating that such reasoning is born out of an existential struggle for recognition, but further shows how a framework based on the struggle for recognition can serve to provide for a normative basis for the *critical-reflexively engagement with inconsistent social practices that are subjectively experienced as misrecognition and thus as an injustice*. The chapter does not only provide for a framework to conceptualise the struggle to rectify instances of recognition as moral, but also provides for a normative-theoretical framework to addresses the inherent inconsistencies in the production of knowledge on terrorism that takes the individual as its main point of reference.

In other words, at the core of this thesis lies the suggestion for the need of an explicitly reflexive critical-dialectic perspective, that addresses the struggle over the inherent inconsistency that terrorism as an unbounded object of knowledge brings with it and understands Terrorism Studies as a participant in the construction of everyday knowledge around terrorism. By establishing a normative framework that offers a contextual commitment to the idea of empowerment of individuals and emancipation in the form of a struggle for recognition, such a perspective makes visible how these inconsistencies impact on how we relate socially in modern societies, where the reality of different social universes disrupt the inevitability and stability of our individual social realities and consequently the possibility for the production of neutral knowledge on terrorism.

---

[5] Magnani (2011) introduces the concept of 'moral embubblement' to analyse and explain 'why so many kinds of violence behaviour in the world today are treated by observers *as if* they were something else' and suggest that 'moral embubblement' renders invisible and condones both the disengaged (or 'reengaged') morality and the related violence. The *disengagers* are entrapped in a *moral bubble*, which systematically disguises their violence to themselves. (…) Lack of awareness of our disengagement of morality - or reengagement of another moral framework - is very often accompanied by lack of awareness of the deceptive/aggressive character of consequent verbal interactions (and behaviours), because the new moral assumptions which motivate violence and punishment are rarely seen and acknowledged as actually "violent".' (2011, p. 178).

This thesis, is sympathetic to the idea that multiple realities can be true at the same time, and indeed, that one man can be someone's terrorist and another's freedom fighter. The task of the critical scholars of terrorism as this thesis understands it, is to make contextual emancipatory truth claims, which encourage self-reflexivity in order to navigate the logics and exclusionary practises that underlie social inconsistencies and the concomitantly experienced social injustices. For the context of the study of terrorism, it is the position of this thesis that it is the task of Terrorism Studies to enable *reflexive, critical-dialectic and empathetic knowledge* of the terrorist actor on the basis of an explicit normative framework and that such a framework can be found in the struggle for recognition and the commitment to equality and inclusion as its emancipatory basis.

1.2 And what it should be telling us: Contribution and scope

The overarching task of this thesis and the original contribution to the field of Terrorism Studies, lies in the development of a methodological position in the form of an explicit normative commitment for Terrorism Studies. Such a framework must engage with the barriers to, and nature of, knowledge about terrorism in order to enable Terrorism Studies as a responsible site of knowledge production. The thesis shows that Terrorism Studies, by and large, relies on a positivist methodology whereby normative theorising is at best treated as a tangential question without confronting larger ideological implications of the research and at worst its significance bracketed from the 'true' questions Terrorism Studies is meant to confront.

1.2.1 Explicit normative theorising in Terrorism Studies

Demonstrating how a normative position that treats terroristic violence *a priory as morally tainted*, becomes *implicitly* embedded in terrorism research shows that Terrorism Studies needs to break with positivistic approaches and *make normative-theorising the central concern of Terrorism Studies*. Such a position reflects the unbounded nature of terrorism, and problematises how Terrorism Studies becomes embedded in the workings of status-quo hegemonic power relationships. Drawing attention to this dilemma, tracing the positivist tendencies and their implications throughout the best parts of chapters two till five, is central

to this thesis and primarily represent a distinct reading of the existing knowledge of the field. The thesis thereby contributes to the knowledge of terrorism scholarship by demonstrating and critiquing the *implicit* normative positioning within Terrorism Studies and the consequences this has for preventative counterterrorism practises.

The original contribution of this thesis however lies in the suggestion of a reorientation of the actual intellectual task of Terrorism Studies to explicitly confront questions of normative significance and thereby to give weight to non-empirical, normative claims that go beyond the immediate concern with the violent act. Chapter six, by drawing on the struggle for recognition as a normative framework for Terrorism Studies that understands an individual's motivations to utilise violence with reference to an existential and consequentialist moral reasoning, encourages such a reorientation and provides the methodological framework for it. Anchoring Terrorism Studies within an explicit normative framework which follows a critical theory approach provides a position for the practically contextualised and empirically informed exercise of its intellectual expertise. Moreover, this framework also fully recognises and addresses the unboundedness of its object of knowledge and the deeper implications its expertise can and ought to have for critiquing and shaping self-reflexive social relationships. It is the hope that this thesis, in bringing together an eclectic selection of research approaches consistent with a critical theory methodology, can be applied as a frame for Terrorism Studies and thereby contribute to shape critical but engaged and empathetic but responsible scholarship that focuses on emancipatory social relationships rather than violence.

Importantly however, this thesis does not argue that a more authentic truth or more accurate insights on terrorism as a violent act can be found in normative theorising alone, but its purpose is merely to remind the academic scholarship in Terrorism Studies that it must afford the time to engage in normative theorising in order to produce responsible knowledge as well as self-reflexive social criticism, for it is the position of this thesis that the central scholarly concern of expertise on terrorism ought not only to be publicly available but oriented towards practically contextualised and empirically informed normative claims with political implications. (Morrow and Brown, 1994, p. 318) Ultimately, this thesis follows a critical theory approach and takes terrorism as the contextual field to demonstrate

how established modes of thought in relation to (political) violence and its moral valence contain, reify and maintain contradictions, inherent restrictions and irrationalities that inform, restrict and distort how we communicate (Habermas, 1984) and consecutively relate to one another in modern, post-migration societies.

1.3 Methodology - Critical theory and limitations

In its orientation, this thesis follows a tradition that is deeply disturbed by the simplicity and clarity with which Sageman's question not only arises in the academic debate on the failure and/or stagnation of the study of terrorism, but furthermore, the predictable regularity with which experts rise to the occasion to answer the question following a terrorist event and a seeming disregard for the responsibility that answering the question has real-life implication for the way in which individuals, societies and nations interact with one another. While I can, and do, recognise the compelling reflex to answer the question, my concrete scepticism vis-a-vis its simplicity is born out of the humbling experience of having worked on the UK government's PREVENT strategy with diverse stakeholders, ranging from Muslim community representatives to front-line prison and police staff. Here I observed first hand that, what *I* (and some stakeholders) took the strategy's goal to be unproblematically worthwhile, for its *declared* goal was after all to stop people from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism (Home Office, 2011, p. 6), my work and involvement with it was treated with deep suspicion and at times outright rejection by others, who felt unfairly targeted by the focus of the strategy, a sentiment that was later picked up in the review of the PREVENT strategy in 2011. (Home Office, 2011, p. 26) My personal naivety, that working with a small Muslim-led consultancy as a declared atheist and white, yet non-British gay female would be enough to demonstrate my bona fide good intentions, my neutrality, my personal commitment to equality and justice in a non-biased and fair manner for the purpose of supporting people who are vulnerable to radicalisation, even when the work was focused on Muslim youth, woman, imams, mosques and community representatives, the opportunistic cynicism with which we, as a Muslim-led consultancy, pitched the need for 'Islam awareness training' was not lost on me. I realised that, in an attempt to declare my neutrality vis-a-vis the PREVENT strategy, its implicit bias and unintended consequences,

lost to me at the beginning, necessitated for me to take an explicit stance on my beliefs, my values, and my subjectivity in order for others to recognise my empathy for their humanity because something deeper, more fundamental and not immediately accessible from my subject position was taking shape in the context of the application and operationalisation of a counterterrorism strategy that my association with it represented.

It is a humility born from my own experienced naivety that informs my scepticism of the compelling simplicity that Sageman's question invokes. Indeed, what the reflex to answer the question overlooks, is the fact that terrorism experts are active participants in the shaping and creation of social reality through the questions it asks, the discourses it participates in, the foci it chooses. These in themselves carry values and moral truths, which on the surface appear innocent and well-meaning, but which can and do take a disparate shape when encountered from a different subject position. Terrorism Studies, as an academic discipline and as an intellectual project must go beyond the surface manifestation of terrorism as a violent act and must aim at understanding and mediating disparate perceptions of the phenomenon, because it is the disparate perceptions of it that create and construct subjective reality and motivations to act. But it must do so in explicit recognition of its embeddedness and participation in the construction of social reality for otherwise the intellectual contribution of Terrorism Studies will remain limited. Insisting on the neutrality of positivist research fails to recognise that even the most well-meaning researcher is embedded in a social world that is constructed through people manipulated by power, whereby hegemonic ideology creates blind spots, for researchers and the lay public alike.

In contrast, this thesis follows a critical theory approach that recognises the interactive and iterative nature between values and facts in interpreting and understanding the social world that also mediate disparate perceptions of terrorism and is committed to 'emancipatory knowledge' by trying to identify *sources of misunderstanding* and ideological *options* to show how ideas, perceptions, fantasies exploit psychological barriers that restrict man's potential to reach emancipatory knowledge. (Habermas, 1973)

1.3.1 Critical theory and the socially embedded researcher

In its recognition that, despite the aspiration for 'value-free' social science, value questions have always been central to the research process of social

phenomena. This thesis follows an approach that wishes to make normative theorising a central concern for the context of the academic study of terrorism. From a strictly scientific, that is positivistic epistemology however, normative knowledge 'is not knowledge at all, merely a type of non-rational belief' (Morrow and Brown, 1994, p. 50) precisely because normative theorising does not admit to various degrees of rational argumentation. Critical theory in contrast draws attention to the political dimension in social research and posits that social science cannot maintain neutrality and objectivity in relation to social phenomena, not least because researchers, as members of a particular society, can and do pass on its fundamental values *unconsciously.* Central to a research process informed by critical theory is self-reflection and the maintenance of restraint in order to counter-act the tendency to interpret existing social reality from taken-for-granted cultural stances. (Alvesson and Sköldberg, 2009, p. 175)

Critical theory, critiques and stands in juxtaposition to positivist research traditions and is deeply suspicious of the objective observer who carriers out his activity 'at the highest possible level of de-contextualisation and formalisation' (Morrow and Brown, 1994, p. 235) in order to reach a value-free position. While positivist approaches concede that there are some tangential value questions relevant for social research - mainly those relating to the question of research ethics understood as the rights of the investigated subject - the larger ideological implications of research are by and large excluded from its methodology because it follows the basic premise that 'good research' in this context cannot be combined with value concerns of the researcher. (Morrow and Brown, 1994, p. 235) Central then to a research programme informed by critical theory are normative questions, solving narrowly defined societal problems without regard to wider political 'meaning contexts' not only reflects a narrow positivist view of science, but also undermines people's ability to take up an independent political or ethical stance. (Habermas, 1972) This is the case because at the heart of critical theory lies a specific focus on the substantive problematic of domination based on a concern with the ways power pervades and mediates all social relationships. (Howell, 2013) Concealed beneath a conception of goal-oriented political solutions, not only lies a too narrow means-end-logic but moreover taken-for-granted systemic constraints imposed by structures of power which have the effect of colonising social relationships. (Habermas, 1971)

1.3.1.1 Critical Theory and the centrality of power

At the point of departure, critical theory is concerned with philosophical questions about the nature of types of knowledge and the strict logical, that is positivist, distinction between empirical and normative questions. While the former can be constructed and validated in a scientific way, strictly speaking, the latter cannot. Critical theory then is focused on the false separation between conceptual knowledge and facts, because it understands the researcher as always part of the object under study, an object that is always mediated through social relationships and is inextricably linked to values, action, knowledge and theory generation. (Howell, 2013) The goal for critical social science is to overcome the subjectivist-objectivist split by developing a research programme that combines empirical and normative theorising with the ultimate goal of identifying the potential for change, through the empowerment of people and a challenge to injustices in social relationships through the accumulation of knowledge as well as political activity and social transformation. (Howell, 2013) In order to analyse the interplay between meaning and structure, a methodological approach to social determination is required that focuses on the nature of social relations as shaped through and by power and thereby overcomes the subjectivist-objectivist polarisation.

Where positivist approaches would largely ignore questions of power, (Morrow and Brown, 1994, p. 59) critical theory not only draws attention to the relations of power that shape social reality but moreover does this with the explicit practical interest in emancipation. Logic, is located and understood dialectically and from the perspective of logical practises (Morrow and Brown, 1994, p.230) that allows for the possibility to analyse agency and structure as intertwined and mutually implicating one another. Logic in this dialectical sense is best understood with reference to context-dependent logical, but most importantly not universal, criteria. This 'logic-in-use' as part of a set of heuristic devices not only draws attention to the multiple social realities but precisely to the social embeddedness of the critical researcher.

Habermas (Habermas, 1984) writes of the lifeworld as those contexts of meaning through which people seek to interpret and understand their situations and their environment. In order to make sense of their concrete experiences, values, norms and language provide for important media for control and

coordination, precisely because domination can no longer be reduced to an effect of a dominant ideology but because there is an expectation of active legitimation through the use of argument. (Forst, 2011, Delanty, 2005) While critical theory accepts that power relations infiltrate the communications process, it aims at confronting taken for granted assumptions only in so far as it asks whether social norms which claim legitimacy are genuinely accepted by those who follow and internalise them, or whether they merely stabilise relations of power'. (Likes, 1982, p. 137 quoted in Alvesson, 2009, p. 152)

1.3.1.2 Logic-in-use and mediating practises of knowledge

Critical theory demands an existential reflexivity in the sense that understands scientific knowledge to be grounded in lifeworld, common sense and everyday life precisely because interpretive skills originate and become possible only through our experiences, prejudices and taken-for-granted beliefs which in turn informs our 'logic-in-use'. Acknowledging one's standpoint, is paramount as a resource and claim for any social group that mediating practises of knowledge become necessary for a comprehensive understanding of social life across existential differences. (Harding, 2004, Morrow and Brown, 1994, p. 238) What follows is an interpretive character of knowledge which precludes any absolute corrects.

At the same time, however, this recognition of interpretative difference does not prevent a fusion of a shared horizon of understanding, albeit a fragmented one, which while being inconsistent with a positivist ideal of ahistorical, de-contextualised and formal social theory reflects the essentially historical character of social inquiry that critical theory purports. Indeed, critical inquiry supports consensus achieved through communication (Habermas, 1984) because this logic-in-use does not admit to various degrees of rational argumentation that it can be a central aspect to critique that goes beyond simple ideological polemics. From this perspective it is possible to subject questions about justice, freedom and equality to critical scrutiny (Morrow and Brown, 1994, p. 52) by identifying sources of misunderstanding, structural and unconscious sources of social and psychological phenomena that sustain ideas, perceptions, fantasies and so on, that sustain psychological barriers and stand in the way of 'explanatory understanding' and emancipatory knowledge. (Habermas, 1973)

In summary, critical theory is characterised by an interpretive approach combined with a pronounced interest in scrutinising actual, taken-for granted social realities and norms and is guided by an emancipatory interest in knowledge. However, in recognition of the illusiveness of the 'neutral, objective researcher who follows specified methodological rules for acquiring knowledge about limited and testable causalities, with the independent, critical and socially and politically committed intellectual' (Alvesson and Sköldberg, 2009, p. 145) critical theory does so without making its claims from rigid frames of reference. However, central to critical social science is not only to distinguish what is socially and psychologically invariant from what is, or can be made to be, socially changeable, but indeed to concentrate upon the latter in order to call attention to contradictions in the way society functions (Alvesson and Sköldberg, 2009, p. 144) and encourage emancipatory knowledge. Critical theory makes normative theorising a more systematic part of its endeavour and the dialectic-interpretative approach should be coupled with an explicitly normative framework that thereby explicitly discloses what normative or value propositions the researcher purveys or reinforces.

1.3.2 On the role of values in the production of knowledge

For Habermas, central to critical social theory is its normative foundations because he stresses that communicative rationality provides a framework for an evaluation with regards to strategic distortion of communication and the interests of various forms of control and domination. (Habermas, 1984) Critical theory can be understood as a discursive practise in the sense of an explicit normative argumentation. Critical theory purports normative theory, because it is troubled by that fact, that in the context of practical reasoning, we continuously uphold normative or value propositions that *seem* entirely unproblematic and without doubt. But, because critical theory understands knowledge to be inherently interested and normative and empirical reasoning to be inevitably intertwined, values and normative propositions must be confronted directly rather than suggesting abstractly the impossible exclusion of normative questions, a move all too familiar as we will see, when it comes to the definition of terrorism. (Morrow and Brown, 1994, p. 238)

Indeed, it is this positioning that I consider particularly useful for the academic study of terrorism. Critical theory after all provides a basis to conduct research

from an emancipatory cognitive interest which critically interprets various empirical phenomena with the stated purpose of stimulating self-reflection and overcoming the blockages of established institutions and modes of thought, that can be found in institutions, ideologies and identities that are central and often assumed to be good, self-evident and neutral, in order to shed light on some of the absurdities of contemporary social life. (Alvesson and Sköldberg, 2009, p. 159) At the same time however, it must be noted that it is difficult to avoid reinforcing established social institutions and dominant interests if one concerns oneself with socially important issues, because the researcher's knowledge after all is and always remains socially embedded. It is for this reason that critical theory holds that normative theorising should be a more systematic part of social science programs not only in order to unveil ideological mystifications in social relationships but also in order to live up to its own emancipatory commitment. In making normative theorising explicit, the researcher attempts to counterbalance any tendency to get trapped by the empirical data and an important method in critical theory consists in the meticulous examination of existing research in order to uncover positivist thinking and taken-for-granted presuppositions. (Alvesson and Sköldberg, 2009, p. 176)

1.3.2.1 On the persuasive appeal of normative reasoning and misunderstanding

Normative grounding provides the explicit point of departure for critical-dialectic reasoning because as a discursive practise, 'normative argumentation is so very pervasive that we rarely stop to consider that it is a rational technique of persuasion.' (Morrow and Brown, 1994, p. 239, Habermas, 1973) Explicit normative theorising recognises the persuasive appeal of normative reasoning in generating and maintaining taken-for-granted social realities, which inhibit emancipatory knowledge. This equips critical social science with a methodology that counteracts any unconscious reinforcement of the existing society's hold over thinking and knowledge production.

Critical self-reflection from an explicitly normative position however by itself has a very limited emancipatory purpose but rather tries to prevent the researcher form contributing to dominance by recognising that the researcher works in an ideological-political context where research is embedded in a field of tensions between reproducing the existing social order and challenging it. (Alvesson and

Sköldberg, 2009, p. 166-177) Emancipation then follows from the attempt to identify sources of misunderstanding and ideological workings that inhibit cognitive interests and is achieved through knowledge that provides the inspiration for 'actions aiming at the negation of pseudo-natural constraints'. (Habermas, 1972, p. 176) In this context, it is for academics to utilise a strategic position as public intellectuals by orienting their social criticism in such a manner that it provides practically contextualised, empirically informed normative claims with concrete political implications (Morrow and Brown, 1994, p. 318) and it is this orientation that I believe makes a critical theory approach particularly pertinent for responsible academic expertise on terrorism.

1.3.3 Approach and limitations

This thesis follows an approach that can securely be anchored in critical theory methodological techniques, not least so because it has regularly been noted that its methods are eclectic. Rather than suggesting a set of methods, Morrow emphasises that critical theory is best characterised by its

> *'methodological pragmatism coupled with an explicit research programme whose critical realist ontology sets an agenda and priorities with respect to research problems that do tend to privilege some methods over others as part of the research process.' (Morrow and Brown, 1994, p. 228)*

In its problem-solving orientation - importantly, however broadly understood as solving the problem of identifying and overcoming the circumstances that enslave humans (Horkheimer, 1993) - methods and theory are chosen with regards to their effectiveness and choices about linking theories and methods are an ongoing process that is contextually bound rather than a technical decision that can be taken for granted through reference to the 'logic of science'.

Central to the unique methodological approach in critical theory is its reflexive and dialectical character based on an agent-structure dialectic and the interpretative structural approach to historical explanation. This means of course that critical theory suggest a reflexive sociology that involves meta-theoretical reflections as a form of inquiry in its own right and reflexivity as an applied practice in the overall research process. (Morrow and Brown, 1994, p. 228-229)

1.3.3.1 On cognitive skills and dialectic reflexivity

Appropriate methods include approaches that bring to the foreground background features that can be understood to make possible and thereby constitute the existential essence and workings of a particular social phenomenon or political practise. Methods in critical theory focus primarily on the development and application of cognitive skills pertinent to the production and evaluation of research and their being made explicit as rational procedures of scientific research. (Morrow and Brown, 1994, p. 231) It is for this reason that non-empirical methods form a central pillar of critical theory which, of course, follows from the dialectic reflexivity that critical theory encourages. As the basic premise of critical theory is an interest in the processes that lead us to adopt particular ideas and take things for granted, it also enables an essentially open attitude towards empirical material and theoretical approaches.

For the context of this thesis this means that I have indeed eclectically selected a wide array of theoretical and disciplinary approaches for the purpose of identifying firstly that normative claims pervade *all* aspects of the study of terrorism without being made explicit. This approach is entirely consistent with critical theory which refuses to situate itself within arbitrary and conventional disciplinary boundaries but rather stresses the interconnections between disciplines. (Morrow and Brown, 1994) I have done this to show that the move to bracket out normative questions encourages a silence on the normative orientation of the study of terrorism has the important consequence that wider questions central to social, political and cultural life of societies are unproblematically being implicated in, and polarised through, the combination of security and 'value debates'. In essence, I not only draw attention to the origins of the background workings of the taken-for-granted moral condemnation of terrorism, but moreover am interested in its implications, because I consider this, in the spirit of critical theory, to be the problem to be addressed via a more self-reflexive understanding of the oppression sustained by positivist research approaches that unwittingly reproduce social power relationships.

1.3.3.2 Cognitive fallacies, consequentialist moralising, and moral bubbles

This thesis investigates the processes though which the negative moral valence of terrorism becomes taken-for-granted, both in the academic study of terrorism as well as in the vernacular and political discourse and relies primarily

on non-empirical methods and is then focused on the development of a meta-theoretical position for Terrorism Studies. With this goal in mind, the thesis utilises insights from political philosophy and social and moral psychology notably in chapters four and five in order to show universal psychological and social mechanism and cognitive fallacies at the level of the individual, group and society that explain the tragic of the maintenance of moral bubbles that strategically prevent individuals and groups from seeing their own violent actions as morally tainted or objectionable. This perspective and the recognition of the tragedy herein sensitises the researcher to the necessarily consequentialist moral reasoning in relation to violence and the inherent contradictions in the normative condemnation of terrorism. This holds particularly true as the thesis, in the spirit of critical theory persistently will point to how the notion of morality is utilised to structure social relationships in a manner that privilege the maintenance of hegemonic power relationships and indeed to demonstrate the absurdities of the contemporary perspective on terrorism.

1.4 Contribution to (Critical) Terrorism Studies

It is in the identification of the silence of the normative dimension of the construction of terrorism, and the consecutive suggestion of a normative framework in the form of a struggle for recognition, where I see my most apparent contribution to Critical Terrorism Studies approaches and my original contribution to the knowledge of the field. While I indeed acknowledge that critical theory under-utilises the potential of empirical material, particularly through placing an exaggerated importance on the critical element, and there is 'the risk of being caught in the negative binding to the targets of critique and that 'the usual suspects' are accused, assessed and condemned without open-minded inquiry' (Alvesson and Sköldberg, 2009, p. 167) this thesis is by no means an exception to this. I suggest however also, that Critical Terrorism Studies, while certainly reorienting the reading of empirical material, falls into this trap of negative binding 'the usual suspects', while not engaging enough with the provision of an explicit normative basis for its critique and thereby closing interesting avenues of inquiry, an avenue that this thesis explores.

While I would love to argue that this thesis has arrived at a conscious use of non-empirical methods, I must acknowledge that this approach is no less the

result of a pragmatic turn half-way through this project. While I would have loved to engage empirically with the lived experiences and contextual workings of terrorism and counterterrorism discourses in order to gain a deeper understanding of logics-in-use, particularly in relation to the conceptualisation and justification of violent acts as well as the contextual perception and workings behind counterterrorism measures, practical and monetary concerns necessitated a more abstract, removed and isolated approach, whereby reflexivity was primarily encouraged through insights from unrelated research-projects, personal conversations and work experiences. While it was these circumstances that provided the impetus for self-reflexivity and a challenge to my taken for granted world view, values and perceptions, these experiences were incidental, cursory and unstructured rather than a conscious attempt of achieving greater reflexivity, they did however provide for the ruptures to my own social realities that prove to be very useful in encouraging the taking of different standpoints and perspectives and taken-for-granted worldview.

Moreover, this thesis cannot escape the limitation inherent to a critical theory approach and the criticism that critical theories of society are closely related with ideologies, precisely because it emphasises subjectivity, normatively in context and the limitations to the objective knowability of social phenomena. However, the task for critical theory is not to defend some kind of abstract objectivity but rather 'to affirm the basic autonomy required for any intellectual enterprise' (Morrow and Brown, 1994, p. 54) and to identify the potential for transformative practise. I must however also acknowledge the limited practical relevance of this thesis to contribute to said transformative practise, precisely because my limited public engagement thus far, has prevented me from participating in public debates around the construction and power relations inherent in terrorism and I must concede to the charge that my particular utilisation of critical theory indeed may appear elitist and removed form immediate practical relevance. However, within the confines of this thesis the purpose is precisely not to argue that a more authentic understanding of terrorism can be achieved via normative theorising or abstract philosophising but rather, that hidden behind the workings of terrorism expertise, that is in well-conducted, innovative and informative research on terrorism, lie *meta-theoretical* questions and hegemonic power relationships that are much more central to public social,

political and cultural life which, while viscerally experienced, have not become a key concern in Terrorism Studies. It argues that any responsible debate around terrorism must take these meta-theoretical workings more seriously in order to navigate terrorism as an object of study as well as a mediator of social, cultural and political life.

2 Losing sight of subjectivity: Why Terrorism Studies cannot (and ought not) tell us what leads a person to turn to political violence

In this chapter, I want to show that a crucial gap in Terrorism Studies lies in the failure to explicitly address the intellectual impasse, which the centrality of the demand of an answer to Sageman's question produces. This is the case because *stabilising* the study of terrorism *through consensus* - initially on a definition as the very first step to facilitate a comprehensive framework of study – in order to attempt to answer Sageman's question[6] marginalises an understanding of terrorism as meaningful, and most importantly multifaceted social action to which judgement applies.

The conceptual contestation of terrorism with a concomitant demand for clarity however, is merely illustrative of a more general and central contestation of boundaries in contemporary political and cultural life. (Stampnitzky, 2016) This becomes apparent when considering that terrorism, as an object of knowledge has been situated, defined, and studied in the context of amongst many others crime, war, politics, propaganda, and religion (Schmid, 2004) but generally not in a civil society context.

At the same time, terrorism expertise as a site of knowledge production exists on the boundaries where academia, the media, the state and civil society meet and could legitimately be conceptualised in a civil society context. According to Stampnitzky, the 'rhetoric of failure' or stagnation in Terrorism Studies, ought to be understood as a symptom of an 'intellectual production that does not fit the expectations of traditional boundedness' of more established academic fields, because rather than 'being a purely political or purely analytical concept, expert discourse on terrorism exists *between* the realm of politics and science.' (Emphasis added Stampnitzky, 2010, p. 16)

[6] The superficial simplicity of the question of course is acknowledged by Sageman (2014a) himself despite his hope for an 'elegant and cogent explanation of why individuals take up political violence; I therefore do not wish to suggest that Sageman's approach to terrorism is simplistic in any way but rather that his approach to understand terrorism is primarily geared to provide useful and efficient advise to enable 'good' counterterrorism approaches. See in Sageman (2017); For a critique of the simplicity however, see for example: (Stern, 2014).

In other words, I argue that the ultimate purpose of Terrorism Studies must be epistemological because demanding a stabilisation of the study of terrorism through consensus in form of a neutral definition, or 'a unified, systematic, and comprehensive framework within which to combine these studies [on terrorism] in a way that can integrate the individual, the group, and the society together in a research context' (Vallis et al. quoted in Ranstrop, 2009, p. 22) in an attempt to answer Sageman's question merely highlights, yet does not overcome, the crucial intellectual impasse of Terrorism Studies. Of course, Sageman's question naturally drives the study of terrorism, however without explicitly acknowledging, indeed cautioning against the concomitantly suggested simplicity of an answer, Sageman himself suggests that few creative and new insights are to be gained. Instead 'the same old tiresome and irrelevant arguments' are rehashed. (Sageman, 2013) However, where Sageman locates the stagnation in Terrorism Studies in the insurmountable barrier between the intelligence community and academia due to the restriction of access to available data, I suggest the impasse to lie in the fact that, Terrorism Studies marginalises normative theorising of terrorism as meaningful social action. In doing so, it fails to address the challenge of responsible knowledge production beyond in an area where the expectations of traditional academic boundedness do not apply.

I broadly base my observation on Stampnitzky's (Stampnitzky, 2013) position that Terrorism Studies as an academic discipline struggles with its own unboundedness and location between academia, policy, the media, and indeed public perceptions of terrorism, making the 'discourse of failure' a key constitutive element of Terrorism Studies. Building on this position, in this chapter I wish to show that its attempts to come to terms with this *intersitial* position through stabilisation and consensus, Terrorism Studies fails at its inception to understand terrorism as anything but exceptional, for the limited consensus of terrorism as an incarnation of political violence delineates, and creates a boundary, between terrorism and other non-exceptional, meaningful social action. However, the 'problem of definition' will be argued to open an avenue to explore terrorism as meaningful social action, because it highlights exactly the contestation of boundaries that contemporary politics and cultural life is consistently confronted with. Stampnitzky for example argues that

> *the fact that the problem of the definition of terrorism has not been resolved hints at 'the struggles of the state and public discourse to provide answers to questions at the center [sic.] of the contestation of the definition of terrorism, namely on the identity of the enemy, the question of the legitimacy of violence as well as the delineation between political and private. (Stampnitzky, Forthcoming)*

I have great sympathy for this position and will draw and build on this through this thesis. As the contestation of the definition tells the story of what is central to contemporary politics, thus making the central questions for terrorism studies to be answered not what drives an individual to commit acts of political violence but rather: who is the enemy?, when is violence legitimate?, and, what is political? such that it could be argued, the essence of terrorism - and therefore the focus of terrorism studies - ought to be how and why boundaries are being drawn as well as what 'life looks like from the other side of the boundaries' (Stampnitzky, Forthcoming)

Ugilt (2015) makes a similar point and argues that 'terrorism' as a concept is overloaded with meaning ('meaningfulness-as-excess') and making concepts of terror crucial sites of political struggle. And at the heart these political struggles over boundaries lie normative questions and values, even if not made explicit.

This chapter will engage with the current state of Terrorism Studies and will take the debate on the definition of terrorism as a starting point to highlight the fields attempt to stabilise its objects of knowledge. In doing so, it will be suggested that such attempts of stabilisation presuppose a boundedness of the academic study of terrorism and reflects a positivist research tradition. Such a position however, is untenable due to the permeability of the claim to terrorism expertise, as well as the fundamental contestation of the concept of terrorism. Where more traditionally bounded fields are in a position to exercise caution and consider wider implications of their expertise, only through the characterisation of terrorism as exceptional or unique can Terrorism Studies currently manoeuvre its interstitial space between multiple academic fields and spheres of interest. This then finds translation in the multiple typologies of political violence and contextual studies, that are generally characterised by a focus on the dependent variable, that is the contexts in which terroristic violence has been employed. Ultimately, what is missing in the contemporary study of terrorism is a normative framework with an explicit point of reference that allows emancipatory truth claims. This thesis aims to address this lacuna by proposing a moral consequentialist position from which

Terrorism Studies can provide its expertise. It is such a framework that allows for the academic study of terrorism to go deeper and thereby aid in the provision of a more responsible understanding of terrorism as an unbounded object of knowledge. This implies that, rather than searching for greater understanding in ever-more contextual analysis - in a search for a generalisable core grand narrative that merely covers a lack of coherence - Terrorism Studies initially needs to make an epistemological claim to an abstract universalism that accounts for contextuality and universalism *at the same time*. In other words, Terrorism Studies must explicitly and responsibly be able to account for that fact that terrorism as an *unbounded site of contestation* is overloaded with meaning and raises normative questions of social, political and cultural relevance, that, while having implications for national security also shape contemporary social and cultural life which forms the backdrop for the individual and her subjective narrative and motivation. Ultimately, Terrorism Studies must build on its disciplinary unboundedness in order to create a responsible position for addressing contestation and the concomitant uncertainty, ambiguity and subjectivity. While the floating nature of the study of terrorism can be argued to be a key weakness for the traditional and formal development of the field, it will be argued to open the 'field' for a shift in the study of terrorism that both, adequately understands and incorporates the exceptionalism and concomitant boundedness of Terrorism Studies, and, as Stampnitzky argues, 'ought to expand our vision to incorporate the many arenas of expertise that occupy interstitial spaces, moving and travelling between multiple fields.' (Stampnitzky, 2010, p. 17) And in doing so provides an important context and opportunity for critical theory approaches.

It will be shown that there is a significant need for an epistemological grounding of the study of terrorism to provide anchorage and address the unboundedness in an academically viable manner, which will need to be supported by a methodology that accounts for that unboundedness and permeability of the field's object of knowledge and its production. It will be suggested that such anchoring needs to start with an epistemology that enables an empathetic commitment to the moral subjectivity of the actor and that such a perspective necessitates a departure from positivist research approaches in the form of explicit normative theorising.

2.1 Terrorism Studies

Conceptually, terrorism as an object of academic inquiry began to take shape in the early 19070s. According to Stampnitzky, it is then, when a shift occurred away from understanding acts of political violence primarily through a discourse of insurgency to understanding terrorism beyond the warfare paradigms that dominated the research on insurgencies. While prior to this shift, political violence could generally be understood as rational, purposeful and even justifiable, with the conceptual shift towards terrorism, attempts to understand the meanings and motivations of those labelled terrorists at the discursive level were marginalised. As an academic discipline, Stampnitzky notes that ideally, Terrorism Studies ought to be apolitical as well as amoral, that is, it should apply a neutral definition and only then make value judgements about different cases and would avoid, taking a top-down perspective, which looks at the phenomenon 'from the perspective of the power-holder'. (Stampnitzky, 2013, p. 134)

Terrorism Studies, a field that has not taken shape as an ideal-typical academic discipline, has been criticised for its reliance on relatively weak research methods and data, with an over-reliance on qualitative and journalistic approaches (Silke, 2004b), often of occasional or peripheral contributors (Horgan and Stern, 2013) with 'a rather mercenary interest in the field'. (Sageman, 2014b, p. 5) Stampnitzky (2010) shares this sentiment and observes that there are - at least compared to other academic fields - few barriers to entry and notes the high proportion of one-time authors with no significant background in the field amongst peer-reviewed journal contributors as well as authors of monographs as indicative of the fields permeability. However, as the 'problem of terrorism' took a focus on a 'terrorist identity' not only made it necessary to establish distance between the expert and the 'object of expertise', but required of the researcher to take a moral stance for 'the credibility of experts on terrorism is dependent on their taking a moral stance against the very object they study, and maintaining a critical distance from it'. (Stampnitzky, 2013, p. 191)

Others have critically noted the a-historicity of the study of terrorism (English, 2009, Silke, 2005), which is but another example of the opportunism as well as unboundedness that the terrorist event enables. Indeed, it is observations like these that are the basis for accusations of the event-driven nature of Terrorism Studies. (Ranstrop, 2009) In the main, it can be argued that it is the terroristic

event - or the threat thereof - that lies at the very core, which prompts the questions of ‘what leads a person to turn to political violence’ around which ‘knowledge’ on the subject is organised. Insights and findings of neighbouring, more traditionally organised fields and disciplines, then provide the explanatory framework within which the ad-hoc explanation, or indeed answer to Sageman’s question is couched and the event made sense of.

At the same time, terrorism being not merely an object of academic knowledge but a phenomenon that plays out in political, media and vernacular perception and discourse, expert analysis of the context of the terroristic event caters to all these various audiences. Rather than being a problem to be made coherent by or for academic analysis the urgency of diagnosis in the light of an event and clarity of response expected to a terroristic event works to undermine an opportunity for academic terrorism experts to exercise, let alone consolidate control over the production of genuine expertise and knowledge on their subject in an academic field. The public focus on the terroristic event and concomitantly the focus on the terrorist actor and their violence then functions as the glue that crudely connects Terrorism Studies to more formally organised academic fields.

Additionally, the perceived political and public urgency for response that comes with the terroristic event keeps its analysis from the rigour of the academic field. It is the perceived urgency of the event augmented by the fast-paced turnaround of the 24/7 news cycle, that leads to a need to tolerate opportunistic or unscrutinised expertise flaring up as and when events demand. (O’Laughlin, 2017, Awan et al., 2011) By mirroring as well as not curbing a degree of exceptionalism prevalent in media and government accounts of terrorism, Terrorism Studies fails to carve out a more traditional bounded space within which to rigorously and methodologically develop into a formal academic field because it is (prematurely) forced into participating in a public discourse.

Despite this observed unboundedness, however Jarvis contends that Terrorism Studies is primarily concerned with three issues that are indeed reflective of what Stampnitzky observes as the sites of contestation contained in the problem of defining terrorism. These are the definitional debate, the question of causation, and the question of how to do counterterrorism. While Jarvis points at these three issues to serve as his organising principle and the foundation for his critique of what then becomes Orthodox Terrorism Studies, he takes particular

issue with the fact that the orthodox study of terrorism is characterised by a problem-solving approach as a preparatory step for successful counterterrorism (Jarvis, 2009) which has since been taken up as one of the key points of critique by Critical Terrorism Studies. Jarvis' critique, while commendable in motive introduces a moment of reflection on the politicisation of the outputs of terrorism research. It however merely introduces yet another facet of the core contestation already presents in the 'problem of definition' leading to a rather unhelpful polarisation of the study of terrorism through the introduction of an Orthodox versus Critical Terrorism Studies debate. It does however not address the underlying issue of 'unboundedness' and misses an important opportunity to for emancipatory critique.

2.1.1 Definitional debates

At the core of Terrorism Studies lies the ongoing debate on the definition of terrorism. Even within academic circles, that fully recognise the fact that the way a concept is defined has profound implication for and determines what kind of data is deemed relevant for collection and analysis (Stern, 1999, p. 12) and further for responsible theory building, terrorism remains an essentially contested concept. (Sinai, 2008, p. 9) The difficulty to agree on a definition of terrorism continues to pose a foundational obstacle to achieving a common conceptual framework for and has, so it is argued by some (for example: Schmid, 2011b, Schmid 2005, Silke, 2004, Crenshaw, 2000, p. 406) hindered, not only analysis of - but also and very strikingly, the response to - the phenomenon since the inception of the study of terrorism in the 1970s.

In spite of over 200 definitions of terrorism from which scholars and practitioners can chose, and Schmid et al.'s (Schmid, 2011, Schmid, 2005, Schmid, 2004, Schmid and Jongman, 1988, Schmid and Jongman, 1984) ongoing work in relation to an academic consensus definition of terrorism, while widely received and debated, their consensus definitions do not manage to overcome continued contestation of the concept. Indeed, Weinberg et al. (2011) accumulated 73 definitions of terrorism in use in academic research, and thereby confirmed that scholars preferred to use their own definition over that of others in the field.

In spite of this diversity, Weinberg at al. (2011, p. 84) contend that it is possible to discern a certain degree of consensus amongst those who study terrorism in

so far as terrorism is understood as 'a politically motivated tactic involving the threat or use of force or violence in which the pursuit of publicity plays a significant role.' While such a broad definition has raised objections,[7] they maintain the appropriateness of this broadly aggregated consensus definition, precisely with reference to the fact that it bears 'relatively strong resemblance to the way states, and law enforcement agencies, in particular, regard the phenomenon.' (Weinberg et al., 2011, p. 84)

2.1.1.1 Academic neutrality and responsible theory building

Against Weinberg's et al. suggested appropriateness of the definition of terrorism due to its convergence with legal and political conceptualisations it must be noted however that the aim of academic attempts at the definition of terrorism and indeed the very core of much of the contestation of definitions of terrorism, is the perceived academic imperative to depoliticise the concept through a commitment to neutrality, universality (Crenshaw, 1990, Crenshaw, 1995), and stability (Bryan, 2012). This foundational epistemological commitment to neutrality, universality and stability is seen as interconnected and each necessary for the other not only to proceed to the analytical study of terrorism (Stampnitzky, 2010, p. 11) but further in an attempt to remove terrorism from the realm of subjectivity (Wilkinson, 2006; Halliday, 2002, p. 47) and clearly reflects a positivist research paradigm.

Amongst others, Crenshaw argues for the importance of a *neutral* definition that 'transforms 'terrorism' into a useful analytical term rather than a polemical tool' (Crenshaw, 1995, p.7). Similarly, Schmid et al. (1988, p.3) argue for a definition that is universally applicable, and therefore, one which enables the development and use of typologies of political violence to define the parameters of study and then look at the 'borderline' cases to test their robustness. (Horgan and Boyle, 2008, p. 57) Without isolating the definition of terrorism from other forms of (political) violence, there can be no uniform data collection and no responsible theory building. (Schmid et al., 1988, p. 3) Too broad a consensus,

[7] On the argument to reserve the label terrorism exclusively for violence against civilians because this finds a foundation in international law see for example (Goodwin, 2009, 392, Richardson, 2006, Ganor, 1998,). Held (2004) however points out that it is unpersuasive to make the deliberate targeting of civilians a defining feature of terrorism, while Schmid (2011a) describes the limited analytical suitability of such a broad definition for the inclusion of too many diverse practitioners of violence.

Schmid warns ‘turns more practitioners of violence into terrorists’ and summarises ‘myriad forms of violence’ that are ‘neither a causally nor ontologically coherent phenomenon.’ (Schmid, 2011a, p. 94). It is of course here, where we can once again see how deeply positivist research methodologies are embedded in the academic study of terrorism.

2.1.1.2 Security threat and the illusion of academic neutrality

In the real world, terrorism is by its nature, first and foremost experienced as a security threat[8], which since 9/11 has emerged as the single most important national security issue. (Jackson, 2007) Declaring, that is defining something as terrorism in the real world, has tangible consequences (Shanahan, 2010), so much so that Staun (2010) argues that the declaration of something as terrorism is a performative utterance that lifts an act out of the normal criminal sphere into the national security context, which of course has further implications for the types of actions deemed acceptable to confront the threat.[9] From this follows that terrorism is not an objective phenomenon, that is an objective threat to national security, nor something subjective, which can be done by everyone. Instead, what terrorism is, cannot be detached from the question of who the defining agent is, or to which purpose the concept is being put. Indeed, those acts that are labelled terrorism are those that are ‘out of place’. In other words, terrorism is neither something objective nor something subjective (a matter of individual perception), but something that is inter-subjectively constituted and inherently institutionalised (Staun, 2010) both politically and academically.

This means that terrorism *is* terrorism only within the context of power relations, and those are being provided primarily by the state. Indeed, successfully applying the term terrorism to an act not only defines the action as ‘out of place’ but also suggests a moral judgement backed by hegemonic power. While the basis for this moral judgement is hardly made explicit, it is the persuasive appeal of this normative reasoning that functions to reinforce hegemonic power relationships because some groups have a greater ability to construct reality for less influential groups, and the former tend to control the process by which (social) meanings are assigned. (Greisman, 1977, p. 303)

---

[8] On the understanding of terrorism as a security threat in International Relations see eg: (Booth, 2008, Schmid, 2011, Horgan and Braddock, 2011).

[9] See for example the notion of ‘supreme emergency’ for the context of terrorism in: Coady (2004).

Indeed, when Weinberg et al. observe that it is possible to discern consensus among those who study terrorism and emphasise the strong resemblance with law enforcement agencies' conceptualisation of the phenomenon as indicative of this consensus, they in fact render useless the principle of neutrality, to lend greater credibility (and thus stability) to their conceptualisation of terrorism but in fact demonstrates carelessness at best. At worst, like the TTSRL, a research consortium initiated and funded by the European Commission, which prepared a study that 'should serve as an overview of how people, states and international organisations define terrorism' miss entirely how the production of knowledge is enmeshed in hegemonic power relationships when they note 'common attributes that scholars ascribe to terrorism' but then emphasise that 'academic discourse is important for our understanding of terrorism and for imbedding it in the theory (…) *academia reflects, but does not constitute reality*. (TTSRL, 2008, p. 5-6)

Acknowledging that practitioners of counterterrorism need to confront and contain the dangers of terrorism not only acknowledges the need to operationalisation the concept. Furthermore, such operationalisation takes place in concrete contexts - and indeed in lived realities and power relationships - confirming Schmid's observation that terrorism has been defined as crime, war, politics, propaganda, and religion which highlights that each of these context provides for the utilisation of a specific (epistemological and analytical) framework which not only exposes, but also cloaks aspects of the phenomenon. (Schmid, 2004) It is no surprise that Pillar observes that for the context of US foreign policy,

> *'good policy on terrorism does not require hand-wringing about how exactly to define it. For the great majority of counterterrorist activities, the late Justice Potter Stewart's approach toward pornography will suffice: that it is unnecessary to go to great lengths to define it, because one knows it when one sees it.' (Pillar, 2001, p. 16-7)*

What these examples illustrate is the more general implications of unboundedness and permeability, whereby academic research, explicitly or implicitly, lends credibility to policy making by imbedding understanding in theory, while theory building takes place on the basis of contested, yet conventionally agreed upon conceptualisations of terrorism. Despite the awareness of academic responsibility and indeed the intersitial position of Terrorism Studies, the debates on the contestability of the concept of terrorism

do not only allude to the dangers of a slippery complicity in the operationalisation of theory but indeed the relationship between the production of knowledge and hegemonic power relationships.

It is with attention to the implications that static and illusionary objective definition of terrorism entails, that Staun cautions against studying terrorism as having a fixed and stable content, independent of the observing and defining researcher and the use to which the concept of terrorism is put. (Staun, 2010, p. 405) This is very much reflective of proponents of Critical Terrorism Studies, where Jarvis concludes that (Orthodox) Terrorism Studies is being constituted around the pursuit to 'solve the problem of terrorism' (Jarvis, 2009a, p. 7). According to him, the recurring and unsettled question of the definition of terrorism is indicative of 'an unambiguous desire for ontological certainty and policy relevance'. (Jarvis, 2009a, p. 8) He suggests that in order to overcome the analytical limitations of Terrorism Studies, it is paramount to engage with the meaning of terrorism to rethink the politics of violence. This, he suggests can happen via a definitional expansion of the study of terrorism to include state actors and further by employing an interpretivist approach focusing on *terrorism as performance* that reflect on the enabling and disciplinary functions performed by constructions of this behaviour, identity and threat. (Jarvis, 2009a, p. 7) Jarvis, in advocating for a more critical and indeed reflexive study of terrorism, suggests substituting attempts at a more accurate definition of terrorism with an exploration into the construction, representation, and performance of terror so as to address the normative and analytical limitations of (Orthodox) Terrorism Studies. (Jarvis, 2009a, p. 18)

2.1.2 Extraordinary political violence and the banality of terror

The definitional debate then is revisited by orthodox and critical scholars of terrorism alike.[10] While both camps vary in the stated purpose and scope of their

[10] Incorporating the abundance of literature discussing the definition of terrorism would go beyond the scope of this thesis, by means of example see in alphabetical order to illustrate the variety of disciplinary origins and orientations found in the debate: Appleby, 2010, Bakker, 2007, Bjørgo, 2005, Booth, 2008, Bryan, 2012, Crenshaw, 2000, Fletcher, 2006, Fullinwider, 2003, Ganor, 1998, Gibbs, 1989, Goodwin, 2009, Greisman 1977, Held, 2004, Jackson et al. 2009, Jackson, 2011, Jarvis, 2009a, Jenkins, 1980, Juergensmeyer, 2003, Moskalenko, 2009, Oliverio, 1997, Ranstrop, 2009, Raphael, 2009, Rapin, 2009, Schmid 1984, Schmid 2011a, Schmid, 2013, Shanahan, 2010, Silke, 2001, Sinai, 2008, Sorel, 2003, Staun, 2010, Stern, 1999, Stump, 2013, Weinberg et al., 2011, Whittaker, 2007, Wilkinson, 2006, Wolfendale, 2006.

definitions, even as broad a conceptualisation as Booth (2008, p.73) suggest, reifies 'terrorism as an extraordinary and violent event' (Stump, 2013, p. 219). Here, Stump attests Orthodox Terrorism Studies as well as Critical Terrorism Studies a limited 'empirical and explanatory scope' (Stump, 2013, p. 219) since both do not ultimately differ in their reifying effect. In other words, the definitional debate continues the field's doomed attempts to stabilise its foundational concept and thereby fails to move on to investigate how 'debates over 'terrorism' define other central aspects of political and cultural life' and continue to operate *within* the confines of hegemonic power-relations and fall short of truly emancipatory critique.

For example, Jackson, in order to

> *'find a middle way between dualist and monist approaches to the study of terrorism tentatively suggests a set of definitional anchorages' that allow a definition that 'charts a course between the extremes of ontological essentialism (…) and radical contingency'* (Jackson, 2013, p. 225) *and suggest to redefine terrorism as 'violence or its threat intended as a symbolically communicative act in which direct victims of the action are instrumentalized as a means to creating a psychological effect of intimidation and fear in a target audience for a political objective.'* (Jackson, 2011, p. 118).

Stump (2013, p. 220) however takes issue with the fact that this definition 'reif[ies] terrorism as a particular type of violence' as it follows a similar, albeit expansive ontological understanding, as do the 200 odd other more or less orthodox definitions of terrorism.

Indeed, the argument put forward with this project follows Stump in that the definitional debate around terrorism stands *in place of or maybe even in the way of* an overdue clarification of an epistemological commitment, which thus far has not come to fruition in either Critical Terrorism Studies or Orthodox Terrorism Studies. What remains central in the debate around the definition of terrorism is the focus on terrorism as a particular type of violence. This perspective assumes that some modes of *violence* are terrorism, rather than initially problematising the notion of violence. This we will see in chapter four, closes down areas of study and explanation that must at least be open for exploration. It is in fact, and so Stump argues, the definitional exclusion of 'the many empirical examples of nonviolent, ordinary terrorism that constitute the flow of everyday life' (Stump, 2013, p. 220) that is problematic, because it certainly excludes from the analytical focus the subjective experience and concomitant evaluation of violence and

thereby exceptionalises terroristic violence and implicitly suggests other than ordinary explanations and motivations.[11]

In this vein then, salient and very ordinary examples of non-violent everyday 'terrorism' and counterterrorism are missed, which is all the more problematic since 'the meanings given to the observable characteristics of terrorist violence are the product of a particular social scientific and broader historical-cultural context' that will never capture all cases in a single category. (Stump, 2013, p. 221) A reified definition of terrorism however makes invisible the contingency and excludes alternative, equally possible understandings of the event. (Jarvis, 2009a)

Stump then suggests that understanding

> *'[T]errorism as a practice entails that researchers withhold making claims about what counts as 'real' descriptions and characteristics of terrors, and, instead, closely and systematically examine the empirically available practices through which some community of people concretely build up and sustain the danger of terrorism and the various identities and security policies associated with that construction of danger. Treating terrorism as a practice enables researchers to avoid reification and, simultaneously, to systematically study how the practice of terrorism works.' (Stump, 2013, p.222).*

Revisiting then the suggested need for a 'coherent and consensual definition as essential foundation for better understanding (…) specific acts', an attempt often criticised by in the Critical Terrorism Studies camp (Jarvis, 2009, p. 7-8) would not only remove terrorism from the realm of subjectivity. This criticism has been voiced against the so-called Orthodox Terrorism Studies definitional debate - but would indeed undermine the understanding of terrorism through the exclusion of non-extraordinary, non-violent practices that constitute everyday-life experiences. Moreover, analytically, it would miss benign, banal, and 'innocent' practises that nonetheless give meaning to terrorism as social action, or practice as Stump suggests, performed by individuals and communities.

What is needed then is an examination of 'the empirically available practices through which some community of people concretely build up and sustain the danger of terrorism and the various identities and security policies associated with threat construction of danger'. (Stump, 2013, p. 222) Going even further than Stump, Magnani (2011) argues, that our own moral embubblement prevents us

[11] A very recent shift in this can be seen in the expansion of focus and the inclusion everyday and intimate partner violence in: Critical Studies on Terrorism (2015) Volume 8, Issue 3.

from seeing our own violence, it is the position of this project that there is a need for an epistemological commitment that enables empathetic perspective-taking and to include ordinary practices in order to understand terrorism as a meaningful social practice. This must allow for the subjective perspective of an actor that is rational, reasonable and morally responsible and chapters four and five will focus on this perspective in particular. It is the task of Terrorism Studies, to not only inject subjectivity in the debates over terrorism against the various reifying disciplinary dynamics that marginalise if not exceptionalises terrorism and provide for the normative counterweight to balance and indeed guide the implication these dynamics have on defining other central aspects of political and cultural life.

At the heart of the problem of definition are attempts to stabilise the analysis of terrorism as an academic object of knowledge by removing the phenomenon from the realm of subjectivity. (Wilkinson, 2006, Halliday, 2002) Stabilising the concept through academic consensus however has not been achieved, so much so that some emphasises that trying to define terrorism was indeed pointless since the only general characteristic of terrorism generally agreed upon is that terrorism 'involves violence and the threat of violence'. However, in the pursuit of responsible theory building the problem of definition continues, not because terrorism cannot be defined, but rather because the problem of definition is paradigmatic of on the one hand the disciplinary unboundedness of Terrorism Studies but on the other hand stands in lieu of a contestation of the hegemonic power-relationships that permeate civil society that only a normative orientation can attempt to address.

The academic attempt to remove Terrorism Studies from an unbounded subjectivity in a struggle to stabilise it as an academic discipline aims however to control the production of knowledge akin to more traditionally bounded academic fields. What this dynamic embodies indeed appears to be a genuine academic commitment to *responsible* theory building and understanding of terrorism as a phenomenon from within positivist research paradigms. However, struggling with the intersitial position of Terrorism Studies between academic, public policy, national security, social, cultural and vernacular discourse, even conceptualising terrorism in an academic context falls prey to the permeability of its academic

boundaries and the lack of control over its knowledge production and the purpose to which knowledge is put.

2.1.2.1 Terrorism expertise

Terrorism then must be represented and approached methodologically as a product of socially constructed realities. Any rhetoric of objectivity, inevitability and certainty thereby denies not only the complexity of the problem, but moreover preserves the institutional authority of the security actor and importantly misses the problematic manifestations of power that sustain hegemonic social and political relationships. Rather than being merely a reflection of a 'lively debate appreciating the fluidity of the concept' as Horgan and Boyle (2008) would like to see it, but it engenders much more, namely the insistence of an unsustainable, for *illusionary objectivity* of defining terrorism as independent of the defining researcher or the use to which the concept is put, and the unproblematic perpetuation of positivist methodologies, which necessarily fail to responsibly account for the fact, that concepts do not merely reflect but in fact shape how reality is made sense of. Moreover, as Jarvis points out that an unduly objective and essentialist framework, 'neglects the process of terrorism's construction' and 'reduces the space available for discussing the (il)legitimacy of particular violences.' (Jarvis, 2009, p. 15)

What starts off as a scholarly debate on the most appropriate conceptualisation of terrorism for the purpose of analytical stability, comparability and objective research cannot, and does not, remain bounded within the academic realm. The conceptual unboundedness is exacerbated by the way expertise is organised when it comes to terrorism. In mapping clusters of terrorism expertise, Reid and Chen (Reid and Chen, 2007, p. 53), note that the intellectual structure of contemporary terrorism research points towards the existence of several subfields of research, which reflects the influence of several social science disciplines. They attest further that terrorism research has mainly attracted attention from a very narrow section of the social science disciplines. In addition, Stampnitzky confirms that terrorism expertise emerges from 'vastly different sorts of individuals, with varying training and differing institutional bases.' (Stampnitzky, 2010, p. 16) A situation that Ranstrop (2009, p. 31) ascribes to the relative lack of barriers of entry and professionalism of Terrorism Studies, where a significant proportion of those publishing on the topic are one-time authors that

lack background in the topic, a situation which leads to a high degree of a-historicity[12] and exceptionalism (Toros, 2009) of the study of terrorism. To some degree, this can be seen as captured by the debate on 'new' versus 'old' terrorism[13], and the ease with which the notion of 'new terrorism' has entered not only mainstream political discourse but also academia and teaching, especially in International Relations. (Baylis, 2011)

Indeed, as Stampnitzky (2010, p. 6-7) observes, 'there is little regulation of who may become an expert, as the key audience for terrorism expertise is not an ideal-typical scientific community, but rather the public and the state'. She notes further, that it is not unusual for terrorism experts to have hybrid careers in between government and academia, whereby privileged access to government information may confer legitimacy in the academic realm. (Stampnitzky, 2010, p. 16) Moreover, Silke (2004, p. 9) for example, remarks the shortage of experienced researchers, particularly in relation to actor-based research. He observes that actor-based research is largely left to 'a handful of individuals who encounter the terrorists as part of their professional work' whose 'research is both a peripheral and generally sporadic activity'.[14]

Where the shorthand of 'I know it when I see it' in the context of a Supreme Court judge's opinion can fall back on the pedigree of the Supreme Court judge within the legal profession and further evokes a degree of legitimacy and authority through the court's broader ability to generate agreement *backed by state power*, no such vetting and indeed recognition of backing by state power occurs for Terrorism Studies scholars, while practitioners of counterterrorism or experts with the privilege of classified access may indeed benefit from leaning on state power.

Where the judge in Jacobellis (1964) *can* openly acknowledge the limits of legal reasoning and the difficulty of capturing a complex reality in legal rules and definitions, where he communicates that pornography is something that produces a certain direct and immediate effect in its audience that is knowable through an

---

[12] On the critique of the generation of expertise in Terrorism Studies see for example: (Silke, 2004a, Silke 2004b, Silke, 2005, Smyth, 2007, Jackson et al. 2009, Jackson et al. 2008).

[13] While there is very little understanding what should actually constitute the novelty of the 'new' terrorism, the notion is easily adopted as necessitating 'new' responses and thus contributes to the observation of the a-historicity of the study of terrorism; for examples of the adoption of notion of 'new terrorism' see: (Baylis et al. 2011, Crenshaw, 2011, Hoffman, 2006, Laqueur, 2003, Wilkinson, 2006, Kaldor, 2006).

[14] Horgan and Stern (2013) emphasise the value, yet by and large sporadic exceptions, of insightful first-hand contextual and actor-based research approaches and thereby recognise testament to the difficulty of gaining access to actors and thus generating useful or novel data.

automatic process that equates sight and knowledge, he at the same time acknowledges, yes makes explicit, complexity, ambivalence, and subjectivity. (Gewirtz, 1996, p. 1041-1042) With this recognition the judge exercises caution in light of the responsibility to persuasively safeguard constitutionally guaranteed freedoms from limitations imposed if he were to determine objective boundaries that are backed (and thus enforceable) by state power. The judge's position and the basis for his argument, follow from a recognition that his authority flows from the power and legitimacy invested in him by the state; he becomes a representative of hegemonic power-relations. What distinguishes Judge Steward's opinion, which equates what we know with what we see, from experts of terrorism, is not only the accumulated scholarly wisdom and its institutional anchoring, but further the legal practitioner's awareness, reflexivity, and explicit caution in relation to the real-life social implications and consequences, as well as institutional commitment of his expressed legal opinion. In other words, the judge - in not stabilising the concept of pornography - recognises the fact that his position of authority backed by the power of the state has the power of shaping, and indeed determining, the reality of pornography in civil society relations, albeit be it here merely for the context of obscenity laws.

Discussing the process of legal reasoning in Jacobellis (1964), Gewirtz (1996, p. 1044) observes critically that the legal academy nowadays is characterised by an excessive rationalism, based on 'extravagantly unreal assumptions' about the degree to which *individual human action* is based upon rational calculation as well as an excessive abstraction from real law made in real institutions; He notes that 'judicial opinions, gain in persuasiveness from self-criticism, or from an admission of uncertainty, or even from an acknowledgement of limited authority' (Gewirtz, 1996, p. 1042) because realities are more messy than are predictable via law making.

In a similar vein, terrorism expertise is constantly confronted with critique which oscillates between academic analysis and operationalisation; it exists in between politics and science and constitutes an unbounded intellectual field oriented between and towards multiple arenas of knowledge production, consumption, and legitimation, including academia, the media, and the state. (Stampnitzky, 2010, p. 3) However, what is underdeveloped in Terrorism Studies is the epistemological translation of a comparable degree of caution, indeed

recognition of responsibility, in relation to the real life implications of terrorism expertise, that only the admission of uncertainty and limited authority backed by rigorous methodologies and an explicit responsibility and commitment to something akin to constitutionally guaranteed freedoms can counter-balance which follows from the adherence to positivist research methodologies.

When Booth (2008, p. 73) argues for a broad conceptualisation of terrorism, and counters the claim that, too broad a definition of terrorism would encompass anything from ‘a suicide bomber to a Trident missile’, a conceptualisation, that Schmid (2011a, p. 94) argues turns more practitioners of violence into terrorists’ and summarises ‘myriad forms of violence’ that are ‘neither a causally nor ontologically coherent phenomenon’, this approach is indeed Booth attempting to account for reflexivity. This can be seen as an implicit attempt at confronting the continuing struggle with the unboundedness of Terrorism Studies. As academics, he argues, ‘we must understand ourselves as historically and socially situated, we should recognize that the distance between the subject and the researcher is closer than first appears.’ (Booth, 2008, p. 73) Yet, he states that terrorism is a real thing (even when imagined); we are talking about specific strategies and a specific form of political violence, and specific human feelings. ‘Acts of terror will not go away if we abolish the word ‘terrorist’’ however, scholars must be sensitive to the ‘politics of naming’ while avoiding having the meaning sucked out of highly charged but necessary words. (Booth, 2008, p. 72)

It is here, where we observe a parallel with judge Steward’s acknowledgement of the limits of legal reasoning in capturing complex realities. Through the introduction of what Stampnitzky calls a ‘rhetoric of failure’ (Stampnitzky, 2010, p. 17), academics studying terrorism introduce and make explicit a process of reflexivity in an attempt to negotiate a struggle over the nature of terrorism expertise. This provides for an illustration of the ‘linkage between forming the object of terrorism and the production of Terrorism Studies’. (Stampnitzky, 2010, p. 11-12) Terrorism Studies however lacks a position akin to a constitution that works as a normative backdrop from which to make responsible for authoritative claims to knowledge and expertise, which is cautious and cognisant of the implications and consequences of participating in the wider media and policy

discourse around terrorism. This, we will see in the next chapter however becomes most relevant for the context of preventative counterterrorism.

2.1.2.2 Disciplinary boundaries

The persistence with which terrorism has been organised around the concept of political violence has lead academics to suggest that International Relations was uniquely suited as the natural home for Terrorism Studies due to its foundational relationship with the study of political violence. (Booth, 2008, p. 68) At the same time, the definitional debate has demonstrated that the field has not been able to stabilise the definition of terrorism and by extension, the production of barriers to enter a claim to expertise of terrorism. In fact, what the definitional debate demonstrates is a diffuse and at times, opportunistic practise that caters to many audiences. In the attempt to capture the scope of inquiry - the object of knowledge so to speak - Terrorism Studies is caught up between a commitment to positivist academic standards of neutrality, universality, and stability on the one hand, with the problematic exclusionary implication that conceptual reification brings with it, but that cannot at the same time rely on the backing of its expertise and authority by the state or a commitment to principles akin to constitutional principles. And all this in a context where the state and its apparatuses' need to operationalise a multi-faceted and politicised concept. In other words, Terrorism Studies struggles to reconcile the need to be recognised as a responsible - rather than opportunistic - academic discipline while it cannot generate the stability and boundedness that terrorism as an object of knowledge would appear to demand to curb said opportunism.

When Stampnitzky (2010, p. 16) argues that terrorism expertise allows us to observe how objects of knowledge and claims to expertise are constituted at the boundary between scientific expertise and the state, she does in fact problematise an issue that goes beyond Terrorism Studies. For social phenomena, expert discourse exists in between the realms of politics, the media, and science and cannot be confined to neat academic disciplines or social/political spheres. In fact, she argues that terrorism more than anything else *define*s other central aspects of political and cultural life, by raising questions of the identity and location of the enemy, the legitimacy of violence and the boundaries between that which is political and that which is private. As the observation on the caution on legal reasoning in Jacobellis (1964) indicates

however, Terrorism Studies is not unique in this position. With Stampnitzky (2010, p. 17) we can conclude therefore, that 'we ought to expand our vision to incorporate the many arenas of expertise that occupy interstitial spaces, moving and travelling between multiple fields'.

2.1.2.3 Disciplinary fragmentation

In spite of this, Booth has made a case for the suitability of International Relations as the natural home for Terrorism Studies, precisely because he emphasises the uniquely interdisciplinary nature of International Relations. (Booth, 2008) Crenshaw has consistently described early the study of terrorism as being organised around three dominating questions: why terrorism occurs, how the process of terrorism works, and what its social and political effects are. (Crenshaw, 1981, Crenshaw, 1990, Crenshaw, 1995, Crenshaw, 2000, Crenshaw, 2011) Acknowledging these foci, she moreover called for an integration of the study of terrorism within the wider context of political violence in order for the discipline to gain greater theoretical scope. (Crenshaw, 1995) From the very early stages when it comes to the study of terrorism, academics have attempted to anchor the study of terrorism within the wider academic context of political violence in an attempt to define boundaries and delineate terrorism from related phenomena. Crenshaw for example, has been advocating an approach to the study of terrorism as a form of political behaviour resulting from the deliberate choice of basically a rational actor (Crenshaw, 2011, Crenshaw, 1981) with a focus on the formation and considerations of the terrorist organisation. This approach, she argued 'must also take into account the environment in which terrorism occur and address the question of whether broad political, social, and economic conditions make terrorism more likely in some contexts than in others' and requires a consideration of 'the psychological variables that may encourage or inhibit individual participation in terrorist actions'. In other words, she suggests a rational actor model that captures the decision-making process of individuals as well as organisation in light of their personal, strategic and political environment and thus aims ultimately at providing a framework for processes that analysts can approximate. (Crenshaw 2012, p. 100; Crenshaw, 2011) It is however not strictly focused on the motivations of the individual actor and their behaviour but still reflects her understanding of terrorism that focuses on sub-state actors operating within the opportunities and limitations

provided by the state. Such a framework heavily relies on typologies of political violence, which delineates terrorism from other types of political violence on the one hand, and provides the framework for an analytical approach for terrorism on the other hand.

Masden and Schmid then, in their overview of typologies of terrorism point out however, that 'there is great variety both in the approaches and the conceptual lenses utilised' and argue that this is due to 'the range of contexts in which terrorism occurs'. (Schmid, 2011b, p. 191) In an attempt to systematise these typologies on terrorism they identify four frameworks around which typologies of terrorism can be arranged. These frameworks attempt to conceptualise and provide for an analytical framework of the motivation (why do terrorists act), the location (where do terrorists operate), the dynamics of the phenomenon (when does terrorism change), and the operational question (how does terrorism operate). Overall, they note however, particularly with regards to a review of the literature on the motivations of terrorists, that the identification of variables and the concomitant possible thoroughness may make it unwieldy for analysts. (Schmid, 2011b, p. 179) Ultimately, Schmid's (2011b, p. 191) call for a 'layered approach allowing the exploration of different levels of analysis within a unified framework of hypothesised causes and justifications for terrorism' may be unduly optimistic in light of the ongoing fragmentation in research foci and often contradictory and/or ambiguous findings. (Vallis et al, 2007; Crenshaw 2004)

In fact, it appears that attempts to delineate terrorism from other types of political violence is merely another starting point in an *attempt to bring order* into the myriad of studies that look into 'terrorism'. Moreover, in spite of this fragmentation, Schmid (2011b, p. 162) who sees the fluidity in typologies as academically disturbing, does not fail to note its usefulness 'given the interaction of uses and users of terrorism in a dynamic real-world context.' It must be cautiously observed however, that not only does such a fluidity reveal and/or emphasise and consequently downplay particular aspects of a phenomenon (Schmid, 2004), but the real-life utility of the fluidity introduces specific sets of biases, particularly in aiding policy makers to determine what is causally significant and what can be downplayed.

Yet, emphasising the training in peace and conflict studies that particularly critical terrorism scholars have undergone, Toros and Tellidis (2013) investigate

the crossroads between terrorism and peace and conflict studies. They point towards the key epistemological and ontological questions on terrorism and political violence, such as an (not undisputed) understanding of terrorism as an aberration, rather than a particular form of conflict, that cannot be investigated using conflict analysis frames; with this comes, so they argue a (not universal) scholarly refusal to engage with conflict management, negotiation and resolution frameworks to investigate responses to terrorism; overall, a cross-fertilisation between Terrorism Studies and Peace and Conflict Studies, particularly with an eye on the role of power-asymmetries is understood to provide for beneficial insights, frameworks and exchange between terrorism and Peace and Conflict Studies. This integration on the one hand is interesting because it attempts to widen the understanding of terrorism, albeit with the particular interest in providing more creative and/or effective approaches to counterterrorism. On the other hand, however, the integration into peace and conflict studies continues with terrorism being positioned within war/conflict, that is within a more orthodox understanding of conflict as *political*. It is the position of this thesis however, that terrorism tells us more about civil society relations and the power relations as experienced by individual more generally and an even wider approach to couch Terrorism Studies appears to be more appropriate.

Horgan and Taylor (2001) then, make the case for couching the study of terrorism in behavioural psychology. Horgan's work more generally suggests that a useful starting point for the research into the motivation of individuals engaged in terrorism is the assumption that terrorists are ordinary people who make meaningful choices in the contexts in which they find themselves. Horgan's research within behavioural psychology (Horgan, 2005, Taylor and Horgan 2011) builds on a rational actor model that explicitly challenges characterisations and common misconception of terrorists as evil, monstrous and/or emotionally disturbed; (Ruby, 2002) They emphasise the need to acknowledge that the individual involved has the opportunity (and capacity) to make the choice to engage in terrorist behaviour and acknowledge that understanding the motivation of a person that becomes involved in terrorism is 'central to addressing the problem of terrorism'. (Taylor and Horgan, 2011, p. 133) While this agenda, with its focus on the individual continues to provide important insights into his or her concrete behaviour and motivation (Williams, 2015, Gill, 2015, Gill, 2014), it does

not even attempt to integrate its approach into anything beyond and understanding of terrorism as something that people do, and widely ignores the dynamics and politics of terrorism and its construction within existing, hegemonic power relations.

When the focus on rational actors and terrorist organisations is criticised for its relative disregard of social and political conditions (Raphael, 2009, p. 60), which sustain both, the static conception of capabilities of non-state actors in conflicts (Findley and Edwards, 2007), the relative disregarding the social, as opposed to political utility of terrorism, and the failure to include the values and incentive structures of actors (Davis and Cragin, 2009), we see other disciplines and research frameworks to be appropriated and applied to the context of the understanding of terrorism. This means that for the purpose of understanding terrorism, it needs to be both contextually posited in a framework that allows for terrorism as a particular form of *social* conflict, as well as an agent-centred understanding of terrorism as a specific form of social action.

However, the punctuality and breadth of interest, rather than contributing to an accumulation of knowledge and a move towards systematising and uniting different approaches into a comprehensive framework contributes to a fragmentation of Terrorism Studies without confronting the intellectual impasse that the positivist leaning inclination of Terrorism Studies implicates. We observe that it is not possible to bring together different studies in a way that can integrate the individual, the group, and the society together in a research context, precisely because no such bounded context exists to start with. The move towards integrating Terrorism Studies, as exemplified by Torros and Tellidis' discussion on the integration with peace and conflict studies, demonstrates the need to revisit the key methodological issue that has already been highlighted with reference to the debate on the definition of terrorism. Indeed, a focus on the actor, as exemplified by the accounts of Horgan, currently comes with a different ontological, epistemological and methodological focus than an understanding of terrorism as an aberration within a conflict yet delivers very helpful insights into an actor's behaviour and motivation even when they tend to follow positivist paradigms.

The diversity in research agendas and disciplines within which the various studies on terrorism are couched, are once again reflective of the

unboundedness of the field and its ontological, epistemological, and methodological implications. As Schmid and Marsden point out, there is an ongoing circularity because,

> *'in the absence of a universally accepted definition of terrorism and with the lack of a general theory of terrorism, typology construction can nevertheless be a useful instrument to advance our understanding of terrorism – provided it is embedded in a framework that looks at the conflict behaviour of the opponents of the terrorists as well and takes into account additional contextual factors. Theoretical progress in the field of Terrorism Studies will have to be based on typological progress, which, in turn, is based on conceptual progress.' (Schmid, 2011b, p. 193)*

What this assessment misses however, is the fact that terrorism expertise, despite the contestation over the object of knowledge and the very humble claims from within the field, operates within existing hegemonic power-relations that. Because Terrorism Studies lacks a clear normative position from which it can argue and make reliable claims to expertise in the form of emancipatory truth claims, it cannot confront irresponsible, that is exclusionary, voices from participation in the 'expert' political discourse that shapes the vernacular understanding of terrorism and concrete counterterrorism policies and this has, as we will see in the next chapter, detrimental implications for how societies relate not only to the (real) threat of terrorism but further to each other.

2.1.3 The Terrorism Studies Agenda

Reflective of the need for an encompassing study of the micro-, meso- and macro processes in order to explain why individuals turn to political violence the study of terrorism encompasses foci from individual to group to societal, biographic to historic, strategic to tactical, state to non-state, contextual to global covering all academic disciplines. (e.g. Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010) Jarvis notes that despite the lack of a stable definition, the question of causation has remained central to Terrorism Studies and is indicative of a 'remarkably coherent research agenda.' However, he also critically observes that the engagement with 'root causes' and the question why individuals turn to political violence are merely a preparatory move in order to develop effective responses to the threat posed by terrorism. He concludes, that the agenda of Terrorism Studies is to provide policy-relevant research that offers very limited space for reflecting on the historical and

social processes through which identity, behaviour or threat has been constituted. (Jarvis, 2009a, p. 11-14)

Indeed, even a cursory look at the concluding sections of academic journal articles on terrorism, a counterterrorism or policy focus is more often than not explicitly acknowledged[15] even when the initial orientation of the article would suggest otherwise and thereby locates Terrorism Studies within state power relationships. This tendency is not lost and from a definitional perspective, a major bone of contention remains the conventional exclusion of state violence from the definition and remit of the research agenda. Bittner is very explicitly critical of this and points to the fact that '[S]tates do not use terrorist means - mind you, not thanks to their virtue, but thanks to [the] concepts: state terrorism is, on my understanding of the word, a square circle'; (Bittner, 2005, p. 207) While some have pointed to the necessity to allow for the logical possibility of states engaging in terrorism (Shanahan, 2010, p.186) others insist that 'by definition terrorism is the behaviour of sub-state groups.' (Richardson, 2006, p. 50). Here we are well advised to recall Schmid who emphasises that there is no analytical gain in summarising myriad forms of violence that are neither causally nor ontologically coherent and thereby turning more practitioners of violence into terrorists. (Schmid, 2011a, p. 94)

However, what happens here then is the abstraction, indeed isolation of terrorism from its wider contexts and a zeroing in on terrorism as a particular form of political violence, namely sub-state violence. In applying such a restrictive conception of terrorism, the analyst *pre-determines* what can count to be causally or ontologically coherent and indeed presupposes a specific normative constellation. This determinism of course fails to account for the terrorist act being a performative event whose symbolic meaning is dependent on its perception by both, actor and observer. It must be remembered that the perception we privilege has implications for our ability to understand terrorism. The power and meaning of the act after all is rooted in social reality and the laws and customs that stand behind it. (Juergensmeyer, 2003) Terrorism as a national security threat to be confronted by counterterrorism measures of course takes shape against a very

[15] see for example: (Abrahams, 2008, Davis and Cragin, 2009, Spencer, 2006, Stern, 1999, Schmid, 2011a); for a critique of this focus see: (Appleby, 2010, Booth, 2008, Jackson, 2007b, Jarvis, 2009b, Richmond, 2009, Shanahan, 2010, Smyth, 2007, Stephens, 2009, Wolfendale, 2006).

particular reading of the phenomenon and its social context, namely that of national security and only that social context gives credibility to the act, (Bourdieu and Thompson, 1991) for it provides the framework that makes attainable the threat. Violence however, we must not forget, 'exists in a complex political and historical context and in a landscape of meaning'. (Bryan, 2012, p. 23)

What becomes meaningful in the social world is the *analyst's desire* that has in large parts shaped the research agenda in Terrorism Studies and determines what constitutes as successful research and tells us what the meaningful social reality of terrorism 'is'. Implicitly or explicitly, researchers and analysts alike, seek to explain why ordinary men engage in acts that the public discourse widely perceives and describes as 'utterly senseless nihilism' (Zuleika, 2008, p. 32) and thereby mute that these acts are social actions to which normative judgement apply.

2.1.3.1 Desire and meaningfulness in excess

The desire to explain the extraordinary, the unspeakable, the horror, and erotics of terrorism epitomised by Sageman's question lies at the heart of the inability to adequately understand terrorism, because it divorces explanations of terrorism from the mundane and ordinary features and experiences of social life as it relies on a conceptualisation of terrorism that originates from the context of national security. The actor and her motivations feature in terms, that confirm the observer's desire; this observer is *not* merely an academic observer but a researcher that caters to the intersitial place of his object of knowledge, by translating questions of subjective motivations into questions of generalisable motivation and causality with the, often merely implicit, focus on providing insights for counterterrorism approaches.

Yet, whatever is subjectively enacted by the terrorists is, and remains, inaccessible. (Zuleika and Douglass, 2008) It is exactly because the motivations from the perspective of the individual terrorist do either not feature at all in the general discourse around terrorism, or in deterministic terminology that 'our' own desires supplant and socially reconstruct the terrorists' subjectivity. It is for this reason that positivist research approaches that do not incorporate the subjectivity of the terrorist actor, render Terrorism Studies intellectually vulnerable. The terrorist as the 'perpetrator' does only feature through representation, that is through a lens that applies - without making

explicit - its own agenda, an agenda which is born out of the conceptualisation of terrorism that originates in the national security, rather than civil society context. For example, Schmid argues that ideally, the scientific literature of terrorism should be *apolitical and amoral*. (Schmid, 2011b, p. 466) Aiming to produce neutral, objective, and truthful knowledge about terrorism. Ironically however, earlier in the same volume, he points out that 'most terrorists *are normal in a clinical sense (albeit not in a moral one*)' (Schmid, 2011b, p. 191) and thereby injecting, inadvertently and in passing, a normative position that would of course need justification via the application of a particular moral theory, rather than a mere, albeit understandable, gut-feeling, and thereby laying bare that positivist research methodologies cannot but fail to generate knowledge which is sensible to its own inherent biases.

While Schmid makes a case for the need to produce objective knowledge, the claim to such is illusionary. Not because terrorism experts with security clearances necessarily have a political agenda due to state influence on academics, but rather because a *foundational* conceptual *bias* in the study of terrorism invokes positivist research paradigms and is not problematised. Schmid is unusual in explicitly mentioning, albeit in passing, the amorality of terrorists, while he fails to see and engage with the inherent bias and foundation of this claim. It is inconsistent and indeed fallacious to require an amoral and apolitical production of knowledge on terrorism if at the same time the notion of immorality is invoked, precisely because the object of knowledge is located in between academic analysis and political realities, with neither able to neutrally conceptualise terrorism. In passing, Schmid falls prey to the implications of the ontological fluidity of the object of knowledge, by incorporating a taken-for-granted moral judgement into his basic understanding of the actor while arguing at the same time for the need of neutrality and objectivity. Indeed, as we will see in chapter five, it is psychologically speaking quite normal to engage in such automated moralising, for individuals generally engage in post-hoc, that is consequentialist, moralising which is based on pre-existing moral learning and intuition but cannot necessarily express the grounds for their moral intuitions. It is this consequentialist moral reasoning that will be demonstrated in chapter six to constitute a universal feature of social life and must form part of the normative position from which Terrorism Studies exercises its expertise.

In this context, it is interesting to consider Ugilt's observation of terrorism as meaningfulness-in-excess. He suggests that terrorism is an empty signifier and that by 'using this concept in discourse one is effectively applying zero meaning'. (Ugilt, 2012, p. 84) By this, he is not implying that terrorism does not have a meaning, rather that invoking the term terrorism always implies 'a more' that is never made explicit and that this more is 'at work'. Taking both observations together he stresses that 'by producing zero meaning, one is effectively doing something excessive' because one is making sense of something beyond the sense that can be expressed. He suggested that when we are not-saying something, 'we are marking out an empty spot in language, where something could have been clearly said, but was not. This is precisely what characterizes the signifier 'terror'.' (Ugilt, 2012, p. 85) The reason why this observation is interesting and indeed important is because it has practical implications for terrorism researchers.

Terrorism scholars are forced to make a choice when they study terrorism as an object of knowledge to stabilise their approach even when the object of knowledge is unbounded and incoherent. Making this choice it must be clearly stated however, is also embarking on a journey that has crucial political implications and serves a political and moral purpose precisely because the signifier terrorism has zero-meaning but operates within existing hegemonic power relations and produces meaningfulness-in-excess, an excess which is open and can be filled by the individual perceiver, with their subjective desire (and power interests) as well as the discourses, representations and opinions readily available via media and public discourse.

From both observations, Schmid's scholarly call for objective research and Ugilt's caution of terrorism as an empty signifier that produces excessive meaning, a meaning which by and of itself renders impossible the claim of neutrality, objectivity and stability we need to conclude that expert discourse on terrorism represents a particular *choice* for the purpose of analysis that manoeuvres an interstitial space between the realms of politics and science. By making this choice, alternative but initially equally valid choices, other choices are not made and excluded from focus. This has significant consequences for the sorts of expert discourses that tend to be produced and disseminated. Those who would address terrorism as a rational object, subject to scientific analysis and

manipulation, produce and contribute to a discourse which they are unable to control, precisely because terrorism as an empty signifier produces meaningfulness in excess, an excess that rest itself in the inconsistencies of lived experiences and contradictions of modern life. Such attempts at a stabilising scientific discourse are continually incorporated into the taken-for-granted normative discourse of the public sphere by calling upon experts to explain contemporary events in which terrorism is conceived as a problem of evil and pathology. (Stampnitzky, 2008, p. 3). As has been seen, not even seasoned and generally thoughtful and cautious academics are immune to the uncritical adaptation of a moralising perspective on the topic that perpetuate arbitrary but taken-for-granted normative positions and hegemonic power-relationships.

2.1.3.2 Implicit moral judgements, social realities and problem solving

What becomes crucial then, is initially the recognition that the use of the term terrorism invokes excessive meaning that, among many other things, invokes and *implies* a moral judgement and functions a means of persuasion of the moral point of view of the side that successfully applies the label. (Jenkins, 1980) However, while various authors point to the moral valence of terrorism,[16] it also is very clear that the moral status of terrorism refers primarily to kinds of acts (of violence) about whose moral permissibility people can - and do - reasonably disagree. (Shanahan, 2010, p. 185) So much so that Baumann (2013) argues that understanding terrorism first and foremost, necessitates a focus on the ethics invoked from the perspective of the one that utilises violence, that regulates, limits and permits particular kinds of (terroristic) violence. This is an ethics that invokes a *duty to provide reasons* for specific acts of violence, for he concludes that any act of violence *de facto* becomes justifiable.[17] Arriving at the conclusion that an act of terrorism in particular or terrorism in general is morally wrong however, first and foremost needs to derive from the application of a specific moral theory. In

[16] See for example: (Baumann, 2013, Coady, 2004; Devji, 2005, Held, 2008, Stampnitzky, 2013).
[17] This follows from Baumann's (2013) very clear emphasis on the moral redundancy of the notion of the victim and his critique of the primacy of taking the perspective of the victim. He argues that, analytically and ethically speaking, everyone is a victim at some point in the analysis and therefore there no longer is a perpetrator. Moreover, he argues that maintaining the notion of 'the victim' merely serves the purpose to sustain collective memory; Baumann reaches this conclusion because he points out that, differentiating between legitimate, illegitimate and particularly through the notion of 'collateral damage' even the doctrine of just-war merely offers a framework to justify any act of violence and thus, a priori there cannot be a moral difference between different kinds of 'killing' and violence.

other words, it needs to follow from a theory which makes explicit a particular understanding of rights and wrongs rather than from the very meaning - and be it through the workings of the excess of meaning - of the concept itself. Indeed, the application of a different moral theory might yield the same or even a different moral conclusion, (Shanahan 2010, p. 184) yet must not be foregone because of the conceptual categorisation of an act as terrorism. Greisman (1977, p. 311) points out that when 'people identify with the victim of a terrorist act the act becomes terrorist. If they identify with the perpetrator, it becomes something more justified, plausible, or praiseworthy.'

If however, social reality is constructed in such a manner as to marginalise the perpetrator, through a process founded upon a constructed clarity of immorality, certainty of threat and objectivity in definition, the validity of conclusions that are being drawn from the explanations need to be questioned or at least consumed with caution and consideration of their social impact and a recognition of the hegemonic power relations embedded in the social reality, thus constructed. Indeed,Horgan and Taylor question whether the non-state *political instrumentality*, which is so crucial in identifying one of the qualities of terrorism, actually comes before an engagement in terrorism as a *distinct feature* of terrorist violence as opposed to the instrumental value of 'ordinary' violence. (Taylor and Horgan, 2011, p. 133) However, as Jarvis (2009a, p. 14) remarks, the predominant conceptualisation of terrorism as a coherent object of knowledge leads to an unfortunate essentialist orthodoxy by 'attributing terrorism an objective existence' with limited space for a reflection on 'historical and social processes through which this identity, behaviour or threat has been constituted.' This renders the explanatory value of studies of the causes of terrorism not only incomplete but also intellectually vulnerable because they do not capture the epistemological question raised by Horgan and Taylor. In this context, Gunning's criticism that Terrorism Studies has primarily functioned as a problem solving pursuit (Gunning, 2007), that takes the world as it finds it, in order to provide policy-relevant research (Jarvis, 2009a) becomes relevant. Gunning, following Cox posits that this approach accepts the current

> *'social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organised, as the given framework for action' with 'the general aim of … make[ing] these relationships and institutions work smoothly by dealing effectively with particular sources of trouble.' (Cox and Sinclair, 1996, p.88)*

Silke remarks, that in spite of, or arguably maybe precisely because of these manifold efforts to identify the causes of terrorism, the field of Terrorism Studies so far failed to develop a matured and critical explanatory framework (Silke, 2004b) let alone carved out a normative position from which it can develop and assess responsible expertise.

It is through an exploration of the construction, representation and performance of terrorism, that Jarvis then suggest that analytical and normative shortcomings of Terrorism Studies could be overcome. (Jarvis, 2009a) Rather than a focus on the national security threat posed by terrorism and an endeavour to understand terrorism for the purpose of confronting a security threat more effectively, the study of terrorism needs to address exclusionary practices that underlie discourse, knowledge and representation (Jackson, 2007b), albeit not exclusively. Engaging with the definition or causes of terrorism primarily for their strategic logic, posits an understanding of the terrorist as a rational actor but at the same time underestimates the significance of terrorism as an unbounded phenomenon. By taking into account the discursive, interpretive, and symbolic processes of the creation of terrorism and the manner in which these originate, not only can social judgement, if not avoided so at least made explicit (Sorel, 2003, p. 370) and further can the causes of terrorism and its definition be looked at in conjunction with the process of its socio-moral construction and the inherently embodied power relations therein.

However, when for example Jarvis (2009) critiques the orthodox academic scholarship on terrorism for its perceived focus on solving the problem of terrorism and an obsession with security from the perspective of the nation state as the main motivation for the study of terrorism and suggest that a more mature understanding of terrorism necessitates an engagement with exclusionary practises and institutionalised power-imbalances, they also and unnecessarily polarise the study of terrorism. This polarity once again is indicative of an attempt to come to grips with the fact that Terrorism Studies is caught up and ‘becomes real’ in the interchange between (scholarly-) philosophical and (scholarly-) practical debate. Indeed, for the time being, it appears to be the multifaceted social construction of terrorism and the various avenues of engagement therewith, ranging from an explicit focus on counterterrorism to the engagement with exclusionary practises that leads to a multipolar claim to scholarly authority

or mature comprehension. In this context we can argue once again that the unboundedness of the object of knowledge, and indeed its dependence on the interaction between the research agenda of academics and practitioners, rather than a claim to authority, maturity, or comprehensiveness by one or the other, constitutes the field of Terrorism Studies, but at the same time highlights a crucial lacuna in the field in not declaring a normative commitment. This lacuna crucially needs to be filled because it perpetuates polarities, particularly in a civil society context, as will become clear in the next chapter. This project proposes, that a crucial exclusionary practise is to be found in the automatic moral valence of (political) violence generally and of terrorist violence specifically and goes on to propose a more critical, epistemological stance on morality and violence that enables a normative position for Terrorism Studies as a point to argue from and develop responsible expertise and guidance for counterterrorism policy, as well as civil society relations.

What is in fact needed, is an explicit engagement with the understanding of rights and wrong - that is the ethics of violence - from the perspective of those that chose terrorism as their modus operandi, which in turn necessitates an approach from within Terrorism Studies that facilitates such an ethics and this needs to be based on a methodology that encourages self-reflexivity and explicit normative claims. At the same time, this is what remains problematic in Terrorism Studies, because ‘a great deal of the recent discussion of terrorism is that terrorism is so morally unacceptable as a means that we do not need to even consider the political objectives of those who engage in terrorism’. (Held, 2008, p. 68)

Indeed, because the construction of realities reflects hegemonic power relationships, groups at the margins enjoy little control over the process by which social meanings - and particularly those of right and wrong - are assigned. In other words, those at the margins who are the ones utilising violence against the hegemony of the state are also the ones who subjectively and contextually perceived their action as moral, because it is entirely consistent to subjectively perceive morality. The ethics of violence equips the actor with their own set of social meaning of their violence - and indeed of the violence of others - this social meaning is not isolated but rather woven into, reflective and at times derived in opposition to hegemonic realities. At all

times however, hegemonic realities feature in shaping the meaning of the (violent) action for they provide the framework and indeed categories within which subjectively perceived reality is being made sense of socially. It is in recognition of this social subjectivity that Terrorism Studies must develop a normative position from which it can develop its expertise that allows on the one hand for the subjectivity of the individual actor but is further receptive to their social and political embeddedness.

2.1.3.3 Social realities, representations and alternative voices

In an attempt to make explicit hegemonic power relationships and the manner in which the meaning of violent action is being made sense of socially, two interesting research foci should be noted here as exemplifying that indeed, terrorism does bring to the fore and accentuates questions of far wider cultural and political importance. While generally relatively little research on terrorism focussed on the representation of the individual actor and the context from which they originate, two interesting exception to this can be noted. Firstly, we can see a relative interest in the representation and participation of women in terrorism and secondly, ethnic and religious minorities implicated in questions surrounding radicalisation and preventative (counter-)terrorism approaches in a Western context.

2.1.3.4 Homogenisation and marginalisation

While Sylvester and Parashar (2009, p. 181) note that women are ‘nearly absent from investigations of terrorist participation and where visible are marginalised from agency’, they observe that women are everywhere in the terror moment in international relations not only in appointed gender roles but also roles that counter social norms. They criticise however, that their voices rarely feature in Terrorism Studies.

On the other hand, Appleby observes that ‘the Muslim community’ features prominently, particularly in the counterterrorism discourse. His analysis in the context of the United Kingdom shows that rather than creating its own neutral discourse and referring to people who conduct acts of violence without the use of labels or religious affiliation, the literature and particularly ‘research inspired’ policy papers, in multiple instances links the terrorist label to Islam. (Appleby, 2010, p. 431-2) The strategy and discourse thereby throws together a diverse

group of people under the single banner of ‘Muslim community’ and moreover identifies a problem of political extremism and terrorism as originating from within that group’. (Appleby, 2010, p. 431-2) Similarly, Staun shows that the discourse amongst the Danish security and intelligence elite and the Ministry of Integration, lead to conflating issues of integration and a perceived lack of Danish identity with concerns relating home-grown terrorism and radicalisation. (Staun, 2010) He argues that this is symptomatic of a securitisation strategy that necessitates a referent object that make it a collective that is distinct from other collectives. (Staun, 2010, p. 143) The heightened levels of discourses surrounding community cohesion and so-called mainstream British values in the context of the United Kingdom’s PREVENT Strategy seem to be emblematic of Staun’s description.

2.1.3.5 Prevailing frames of representing women in terrorism

At the same time, however, for feminists, women’s role in violence in general and as participants in terrorism in particular, has been difficult to conceptualise. Even amongst proclaimed feminists, there has been a tendency to revert to a stereotypical characterisation of women as ‘peace loving’ and consequently primarily as victims of political violence or actors that have been driven towards violence due to their emotional ties to a male activist (Morgan, 2001), or because socio-cultural and religious circumstances did not allow for an alternative manifestation of their activism (Bloom, 2005, Bloom, 2010, Bloom, 2011) or alternatively because the considerations of specific terrorist organisations appreciated the tactical and/or strategic advantage or necessity of the use of female terrorists. (Gentry, 2012, Hamilton, 2007, Gentry, 2003)

A critical contribution to the understanding of the representation of women in violence has been made by Sjoberg and Gentry (2011). They show that, rather than recognising women’s participation as a significant demonstration of their political agency, discourses of violent women replicate gendered identities and ultimately, replicate hegemonic power relationships. Their exploration of violent women uncovers the use of ‘mother’, ‘monster’, and ‘whore’ frames as predominant modes of the representation of their violent activism and by extension provided predominantly for an explanation of their (political) violence. Furthermore, Ahall (2011) identifies ‘heroine’, ‘monster’, and ‘victim’ frames as well as the ‘myth of motherhood’ as central frames in the representation of female

participation in political violence. Ahall thereby affirms Sjoberg and Gentry's observation regarding the frames of representation and agency accepted in the engagement with female political violence that share the characterisation of 'violent women as having been incapable of choosing their violence, and imply that, had they a choice, women would not have chosen the violence'. (Sjoberg and Gentry, 2007, p. 190)

The persistence of these representational frames leads Sjoberg and Gentry to conclude that terrorism is inherently gendered as both, terrorist organisations as well as governments operationalise gender. (Sjoberg and Gentry, 2007, p. 136) They posit that, because discursive paradigms consists of intersubjective systems of representations and representation-producing practice, discourses are a feature of reality both in a constitutive and a representative sense and reiterate that it needs to be appreciated that 'discourse exists *not in egalitarian community* but in hierarchical competition' (emphasis added: Sjoberg, 2007, p. 56) and ignoring this leads to an incomplete, if not incorrect, understanding of terrorism. At the same time, however, through the focus on questions of agency as *the* tool to achieve meaningful political participation and action, an enquiry into how terrorism as a tool is contextually and socially meaningful to the individual activist becomes marginalised.

2.1.3.6 Agency but not subjectivity

While the question of the nature of agency of the individual (female) activist ought to be problematised, this should not be done to the exclusion of the meaning that terrorism has for the individual subject in different socio-political and cultural contexts. A mature understanding of terrorism necessitates an inquiry into the meaning of terrorism, that pays attention to the question of agency and representation and the gendering that is taking place in this context. However, it should not primarily focus on how much choice individuals exercise in their decision but look into the question of how terrorism becomes meaningful for the individual female activist.

Where agency however remains *the* attribute that marks entrance into the legitimate political community it reduces subjectivities to their political practices. Following Butler, Auchter suggest that 'only by considering the notion of an open subject enacted through performativity can we begin to engage in a debate over what an open conception of agency might look like'. (Auchter, 2012, p. 121-5)

Certainly, the bone of contention in this context is a critique of foundationalist notions of agency. Hereby those who write about women terrorists are crafting a narrative of agency to explain their behaviour, inscribing in their behaviour a larger context of agency in the face of exclusion from that agent status 'agents' are not crafting their own narratives. (Auchter, 2012, p. 131) Indeed, this is what lies at the core of the feminist critique of the notion of agency and furthermore points towards a more general contestation regarding the notion of 'the political' and hegemonic power-relationships.

It is possible to explore the motivations of female terrorists not in an attempt to 'restore' their agency by arguing that they are coerced into violence or that their agency is to be found in their violence, but rather in an attempt to understand the actions themselves. (Auchter, 2012, p. 134) By positing a performative conception of subjectivity, can we begin to re-situate and redefine the subject independent from being behind the deed and account for the fact that women's violence is not any different than that of men in terms of terrorist recruitment, motivation, fervour and brutality, (Nacos, 2005, 436) rather it is the social context and *gendered discourses in which they operate that differs and affects how we conceive of them and how they conceive of themselves*.

Hereby some facts are there. They take shape against a background of threats and fear that then become constitutive of the events themselves. All of this points to the rhetorical dimension of terrorism discourse, a dimension that we shall see in chapter six, is crucial in making accessible the notion of reason in Islamist discourse. It furthermore constitutes the link between actions and goals, which are mediated by interpretations and the desire of the observer. (Zuleika and Douglass, 2008, p. 29)

The 'women' question serves to exemplify not only how we think and write about women, but more generally of the terrorist subject. Where Auchter remarks that 'voices of women should be contextualized and historicized as the experiences and iterations of their subjectivities', the same needs to hold true for the terrorist subject more generally. For the context of female terrorists Auchter point out that 'we must examine the ways in which we attribute subjectivity to them. It becomes impossible to speak of universal motivations for all women terrorists, in the same way as it is impossible to speak of universal motivations for all male terrorists or all terrorists in general.' (Auchter, 2012, p. 135)

In researching terrorism, we necessarily make certain assumptions about subjectivities and need to recognise, that in our research we participate in their performative creation. Indeed, it appears that at the heart of dealing with the unboundedness of Terrorism Studies lies performative creation, where Zuleika cautions that desire fills the gaps in our analysis (Zuleika and Douglass, 2008) and Auchter suggest that 'we must avoid filling the openness with definitive content by avoiding the presumption that certain characteristics are associated with clearly defined categories such as woman and terrorist' (Auchter, 2012, p. 135-6) or morality, that must, but currently does not, generously allow for the fact that our cognitive heuristics function so as to embed ourselves in perceptive and moral bubbles that disguise our own biases from ourselves.

The plethora of definitional issues surrounding terrorism, but also a research agenda that does not *explicitly* problematise but leaves a gap to be filled by 'desire' specifically with reference to the immorality of terrorism, but relies on a rhetoric of certainty, inevitability and claimed objectivity that does not do justice to the subjectivity of terrorism. Consequently, such an agenda fails to account for the ambivalence of terrorism by suggesting a determinism that does not take the inherent injustice and inequality in the construction of realities into account. Indeed, responsible research into terrorism needs to account for both, how people impact on global politics, for the impact of narratives others construct for and about them (Sjoberg and Gentry, 2007) and seek to understand how terrorism plays a role in the size and type of influence a persona perceives to have on their social and political life and how they and others perceive to be able to relate to one another in society.

2.1.4 Critical Terrorism Studies or the critical study of terrorism

The Critical Terrorism Studies project then, which developed out of a dissatisfaction with, and scepticism of what became to be seen as Orthodox Terrorism Studies was primarily a response to what Smyth at al. (2008) identified as the key shortcomings in the contemporary study of terrorism. In launching the *Critical Studies on Terrorism* Journal those dissatisfied wanted 'to foster a more self-reflective, critical approach to the study of terrorism.' The editors posit, that

> *Critical Terrorism Studies is understood as a research orientation that is willing to challenge dominant knowledge and understandings of terrorism, is sensitive to the politics of labelling in the terrorism field, is transparent about its own values and political standpoints, adheres to a set or responsible research ethics, and is committed to a broadly defined notion of emancipation.* (Smyth et al., 2008, p. 2)

Yet, Jackson (2015b) acknowledges that the failure to develop and the lack of an explicit normative framework for (Critical) Terrorism Studies remains a problem for a truly emancipatory research framework.

Critical Terrorism Studies in its foundational orientation makes an attempt to explicitly confront political as well as ideological bias in favour of Western States and intends to provide a welcoming environment for scholarly discontent with terrorism research. (Heath-Kelly, 2010, p. 236) On its surface, this orientation of the study of terrorism proclaims to explicitly address the inherent danger in the study of terrorism that is that the naming of an event as terroristic, orienting concomitant research accordingly defines it as such, while its contingency is - if not disregarded - at least marginalised from an equally possible understanding of events. (Jarvis, 2009a)

Booth notes that he expects the study of terrorism to best flourish in the context of academic International Relations, seeing 'the logic of the situation, given the globalized manifestations of terror and counter-terror in the present historical era, and the uniquely global remit of International Relations. Moreover, he notes that International Relations', albeit not unique in academic disciplines, has a synergistic relationship between study/reality, interpreting the world/changing it, theory/practise, and has the advantage of its foundational relationship with the study of political violence. (Booth, 2008, p.68) Noting that 'the most fundamental questions that confront us are political' anchoring Critical Terrorism Studies in International Relations was to allow for an approach to terrorism that engages 'with the particular dynamics of the political world, and especially the condition of anarchy with defines the international dimension.' (Booth, 2008, p. 70)

While Critical Terrorism Studies demonstrates a commitment to marginalised, 'other' understandings of events, MacGinty (2013, p. 2) aptly comments that the Critical Terrorism Studies paradigm risks becoming complicit in a wider discourse and highly politicised - and thereby polarising - epistemology because even though the ultimate referent for the proposed emancipatory project is the security

of human beings rather than the state, it continues to operate within a framework of security that posits terrorism in the sphere of national security politics and ties Terrorism Studies in a framework that is dominated by paradigms, definitions, research questions, and frameworks with an explicitly political, rather than civil society orientation. It is not surprising, that in such a framework, a focus on the individual is credited with limited benefit only, in so far as the individual is not first and foremost conceptualised with reference to their political agency. It is worthwhile remembering the feminist objection in relation to the focus on agency as *the* tool for crafting one's own narrative and the contestation of the demarcation between what is understood to be political.

Indeed, what we can see exemplified by Booth, and indeed then by the Critical Terrorism Studies project in its political-science incarnation, is an attempt to capture intersubjective, fluid, and multi-focused research in a framework, that while allowing for easier penetration due to its international and interdisciplinary hospitality, does not adequately account for, and deal with, the unbounded nature of the object of knowledge. At the same time however, what boils below the surface, is aptly expressed by Booth when he states that the death wish is less significant politically than the apparent endless human willingness to fight for a better life. (Booth, 2008, p. 70)

It remains to be argued that such a willingness to fight for a better life may not necessarily be primarily political - narrowly understood - or at least not so much so, as to justify anchoring the study of terrorism within the premises of the anarchic International System, its research paradigms, foci and methodologies. As Zuleika and Douglas (2008, p. 30) point out, dialectics of reality and threat are a key ingredient of terrorism discourse and performance and the very meaning of the act that constitutes the threat is entwined with perceptions of it.

Such a perspective however, requires that we take the terrorist subject herself as a primary and autonomous subject investigation, one that shapes and is shaped by their social environment and whose actions are understood as meaningful social action, rather than primarily for its political instrumentality. It is because the contemporary Critical Terrorism Studies orientation, albeit welcome in its critical stance particularly in relation to challenging the privilege of the perception of the victim's audience in determining the meaning of the terrorist act

and a commitment towards emancipation[18], fails to provide for an explicit normative commitment that takes into account the terrorist *moral subjectivity* that it cannot provide for the ultimate framework within which a deeper understanding of terrorism is possible that accounts for the unbounded nature of terrorism.

In other words, what we see replicated in the Critical Terrorism Studies project is an attempt, albeit with the intent of widening and broadening of the research agenda, to firstly navigate the interstitial space of Terrorism Studies, and secondly to problematise the research agenda of Terrorism Studies by embedding a critique of the purpose of the research and demanding open and reflexive methodologies. At the same time however in order to escape its political instrumentalism, the study of terrorism must try to conceptualise it as meaningful, moral and social action and enable a concern with wider questions around the 'pursuit of the good life' (Heath-Kelly, 2010, p .239) that moves beyond critique (Toros and Gunning, 2009, p.92) and contributes to a normative framework that offers alternative explanations and thereby can make emancipatory truth claims from a position that provides responsible expertise yet, it is precisely these latter two aspect that both Orthodox as well as Critical Terrorism Studies remain silent.

2.2 Taking a normative stance in Terrorism Studies

This chapter, in sketching the key constitutive debates within the field of Terrorism Studies has demonstrated that, the academic study of terrorism does not manage to carve out a stable position from which it can provide responsible expertise, that is reflective of the recognition of the unbounded nature of terrorism as an object of knowledge and its interstitial position. The lacuna in Terrorism Studies is not necessarily one of substance strictly speaking, but rather one of essence. We see this lacuna manifest itself in the exchange following Sageman's declaration of the stagnation of Terrorism Studies and the various responses that, rightly, emphasise the valuable individual contributions to knowledge in the field of Terrorism Studies. It is not the purpose of this thesis to challenge the value of contributions by scholars that provide in-depth analysis and insights into specific instances and actors of terroristic violence, conflict dynamics, communicative strategies, ideologies, quantitative datasets and distributions and many more. It

[18] Albeit vaguely defined, see: (Jackson, 2016, McDonald, 2007).

is also not the intention of this thesis to suggest that a more authentic truth in understanding terrorism is to be found in abstract normative arguments rather than ethnographic first-hand accounts or anthropological fieldwork. Rather, when speaking of essence, the lacuna that this thesis wishes to address is essence understood as the very *working of incoherence* at the heart of *terrorism research* and the need to emphasise how this incoherence stands in the way of emancipatory and more *responsible expertise.* For this purpose, we have seen in this chapter how terrorism research is quick to challenge the prevailing wisdom on definitions, typologies, motivations, representations and the likes by offering, a generally more academically-neutral and inclusive, bona fide alternative. However, we have also seen that academic neutrality is illusive because even a more inclusive alternative merely represents another, legitimately challengeable choice[19], which emphasises a particular aspect that another choice might not have revealed. While such a mosaic of choice does indeed contribute to a richer picture when it comes to understanding terrorism, it does so in the context of very diverse research contexts, yet generally on the back of positivist research paradigms.

The consequence of the necessity to choose however remains unarticulated, because terrorism is an unbounded object of knowledge which takes shape in a discourse in which academics are but one (and not necessarily trusted or powerful) participant. And this choice, as uninterested and detached it may be presented, is but an arbitrary choice in need of justification, and this justification does not take place merely within an academic ivory tower. While this thesis does by no means wish to argue that terrorism studies ought to detach itself from the 'real world out there', it does want to highlight that as long as Terrorism Studies cannot carve out a space from which to utilise the incoherence at the heart of its expertise, academics will not be able to responsibly navigate the vernacular discourse that necessarily follows from the unboundedness of terrorism.

For the purpose of the research of terrorism, understanding essence means more than understanding the underlying motivations that lie behind the articulated first-hand accounts of individuals that participate in terrorism and giving the actor space to articulate her 'authentic voice', but further essence refers to the inarticulable incoherences that both, the actor as well as the researcher

[19] Not all choices are equally defensible; see for critique (Kahl, 2017).

experiences, because terrorism takes shape in an intersitial and inherently contestable space. Terrorism researchers must recognise the responsibility that and how terrorism shapes civil society relations beyond an immediate national security context and establish a position, from which to contribute and navigate an informed and responsible approach to terrorism, which does confront, rather than build on or worse foster exclusionary practises.

A critical research agenda that builds on an explicit normative framework and starts with the possibility to understand terrorist means as an attempt to construct an alternative discourse reflective of the individual's own morality and social relationships yields promising results because it appreciates the personal decision to engage in such violence as a route worthy for the exploration of the *actor's desire* as well as their recognition of their moral and social embeddedness rather than as an individual that exercises mere political agency. It starts form the premise that the desire to 'eschew survival in order to realise a higher goal' is not only culturally conditioned but subjectively performative and not necessarily amoral. Moreover, as will become clear particularly in chapter four and five, understanding terrorist means as on the one hand an attempt to bring to the fore an alternative discourse that invokes an existential dimension that can be understood with reference to a struggle for recognition wherein moral consequentialist justifications are central and on the other hand as meaningful social, moral action can provide for an epistemological starting point that equips Terrorism Studies with an emancipatory conceptual framework that is currently lacking. It is this framework that will accommodate the need to explicitly and emotively evoke normative force to legitimate emancipatory concerns (Heath-Kelly, 2010, p. 251), because the relative advantages of the academic study of terrorism over other forms of enquiry is that tactical questions 'are best answered by experts in face-to-face confrontations.'

Academics however are relatively better placed to try to *understand* the most fundamental question of why a fellow human being would want to commit an act of terrorism in the first place and consider this question *with the referent of our common humanity in mind*. (Booth, 2008, p. 73) Taking an explicit normative stance moreover mitigates the exclusionary practices that the suggestion of an uninterested, neutral and amoral imply because it forces a conversation on those

aspects of social, political and cultural life that the discourse on the failure of the definition of terrorism so decidedly shapes and defines.

In order to understand the subjectively symbolic meaning of the act - and the motivations behind it - and do so with the referent of our common humanity in mind, Terrorism Studies must be able to rely on a responsible approach that comes to terms with the unbounded nature of the object of knowledge and the very real implications thereof for everyday social, political and cultural life. And because research into terrorism must recognise that the object of knowledge is unbounded and invokes meaningfulness in excess - particularly when it comes to questions of morality - Terrorism Studies cannot afford to remain silent on questions that go beyond its object of knowledge and claim a universal, normatively detached amoral perspective for its production of knowledge but must actively seek to engage with the fact that debates over terrorism replicate and reify exclusionary practises and define other central aspects of political and cultural life, such as questions as to the identity of the enemy, the nature of the division between what is public and what is private as well as questions as to the nature of violence. Failing to explicitly engage with these questions that are so central to lived social realities and social relationships not only continues disciplinary fragmentation but further perpetuates exclusionary practises that prevent asking more fundamental and emancipatory questions. In other words, the attempt to answer the question 'what leads a person to turn to political violence' that has been declared so central to the study of terrorism, perpetuates a research agenda that attempts to locate the 'root causes' of terrorism in 'special' explanations and that not only dismisses the possibility that terrorism may have its origins in relatively mundane, every day and seemingly unrelated activities and practises that are however more central, and indeed existential in shaping political and cultural life and the individual's position therein, than the focus on the decision to 'take up political violence' but further that it might be social relationships rather than violence that is central to terrorism. First and foremost, this chapter has shown that Terrorism Studies lacks a position from which to responsibly carve out legitimacy and authority for its expertise. Because, as has been further shown in this chapter, terrorism moreover invokes representations and assumptions even within the academic study of terrorism, this crucially leaves a space to be filled by fantasy and desire without the checks provided by

emancipatory truth claims. Terrorism Studies must develop a normative position. It is this position that carves out a responsible space to not only develop expertise on terrorism but moreover to manoeuvre the unbounded public and political discourse that necessarily follows from terrorism as a crucial frame that shapes how we relate to one another in diverse, modern societies. Terrorism Studies must give recognition to the fact that terrorism functions as a frame to relate to these wider issues. Thus far, it does not recognise the subjectivity and implications of the unboundedness of the object of knowledge and the real-life implications that counterterrorism policies have on individuals caught up in the dynamics, which ambiguity, subjectivity and unboundedness facilitate. Terrorism Studies must offer its expertise from a normative position on the basis of emancipatory truth claims because it is this perspective that can provide for the anchor point to confront exclusionary practises that are tragically but intimately implicated in terrorism and the manner in which societies relate to these core questions. It is these questions that are important to the individuals who make up societies, rather than the immediate relationship of terrorism with the state.

I argue that it must be the responsibility of Terrorism Studies to take on this task of normative guidance through the incoherencies and ruptures of modern life because, as we will see in the next chapter, the discourse around preventative counterterrorism not only relies on academic expertise but crucially relies on an invocation of values that lead to the persistence of exclusionary practises. It is this context that the next chapter will focus on.

3 On the promises of a liberal democracy and the politics of counterterrorism

In the previous chapter, I have argued that the conceptual contestation of terrorism and the attempts to delineate terrorism as a bounded object of knowledge prevents Terrorism Studies from more responsibly, for explicitly, engaging with the questions raised by terrorism. I have argued that the conceptualisations thus far preclude an explicit recognition of terrorism as moral and meaningful social action. This is the case because the study of terrorism is located in the realm of national security and international conflict within hegemonic power-relationships delineated by the state as its main point of reference. The inability to locate terrorism academically within civil society and social relations precludes a more empathetic understanding of the terrorist actor as socially embedded. In other words, as terrorism is conceptually always implicitly understood within the national security context, terrorist violence becomes conceptualised as politically instrumental. This in turn invokes notions of an infringement of the state's monopoly to legitimate violence and is considered implicitly morally wrong. It is my contention that this orientation taints the analytical ability to empathetically understand an individual's decision to engage in terrorism, because the choice to participate in political violence is a choice to engage in something *implicitly* morally wrong and in opposition to the state's monopoly to force. We have seen however, that the moral status of the act is contestable for it is indeed *always* determined utilising a consequentialist reasoning. Due to the unbounded nature of terrorism however, the academic inability to understand terrorism as *moral and meaningful social action* and central to the individual's ability to relate to others socially, moreover precludes an empathetic understanding of the actor beyond the confines of academic analysis. Epistemologically, Terrorism Studies has yet to redress this moral dimension of the unboundedness of its object of knowledge. This need becomes particularly striking when looking at preventative counterterrorism approaches that heavily rely on civil society for its success.

Where we have seen that conceptual clarity, neutrality and impartiality remains posited as paramount for the analytical study of terrorism (and ultimately for understanding motivations of individual actors), this chapter intends to

demonstrate how contextually and politically such distinctions cannot be maintained. This is precisely because terrorism is an unbounded object of knowledge that can and does define how other central aspects of political and cultural life take shape. It is precisely because terrorism defines how other aspects of political and cultural life take shape, and indeed what values are at stake, that this chapter seeks to highlight, with reference to how in Europe, the question of radicalisation is seen in the context of the broader social problem of integrating Muslim communities and indeed debates on the place of Islam in Western nations, It is within the context of this analysis that an argument can be made, that it is academically irresponsible and indeed unethical to claim an uninterested and neutral analytical position. It is necessary for Terrorism Studies, to explicitly embrace the conceptual moral ambiguity and unboundedness of its object of knowledge while at the same time contributing to providing ethical aids and a moral compass that help in the empathetic understanding of subjectivities, In doing so, Terrorism Studies can proactively shape those wider debates that terrorism raises and ultimately explicitly confront those wider practises that exclude individuals from full and responsible participation in 'the good life' of society. Such is the moral responsibility of Terrorism Studies that recognises its own limitations and reflects such recognition of its unbounded object of knowledge in its epistemological commitment and public engagement in the form of an explicit normative framework as the position to argue from.

Nowhere does the impossibility of the claim to uninterested analytical neutrality become more apparent than in the context of counterterrorism, for it is here where the concept not only becomes operationalised, but moreover where academic research lends an air of credibility to policy making. This holds particularly true in times where uncertainty has become the new security paradigm. (Prins, 2008) Jackson (2015a) for examples contemplates an epistemological crisis at the centre of counterterrorism which de Goede (de Goede, 2011, p. 9) suggests to drive the imperative that 'uncertainty and lack of knowledge can no longer be regarded as an excuse for inaction in the face of a potentially catastrophic threat' meaning that 'the counterterrorist must instead act upon what is unknown as *projected through imagination and fantasy*' (emphasis added Jackson, 2015, p. 36) making pre-emption and prevention central pillars of counterterrorism policy.

While the importance of imagination and fantasy in projecting what is unknown will be the focus of the next two chapters, which look at moral psychology in general and social psychology mechanisms and cognitive heuristics in particular, in an attempt to recognise the limitations in understanding another's motivations and intentions, this chapter takes the example of UK counterterrorism in general, and the debates around the PREVENT strand with its focus on radicalisation in particular, to demonstrate that the preventative logic in counterterrorism practise significantly contributes to wider questions of 'values' and morality to become central to the manner in which wider society relates to the threat of terrorism. It is the intention of this chapter to show that the insistence on analytical clarity within Terrorism Studies leaves a space in the imagination of the counterterrorism practitioner, politician and citizen which is filled by the dynamics of the preventative logic of counterterrorism - and imagination and fantasy - that ultimately contributes to (the maintenance of) exclusionary practises. Here it will be important to investigate the challenges that so called 'home-grown terrorists' pose, because the issue highlights how the understanding that the 'ideology of extremism lies at the root of terrorism' and is 'the centre of gravity of jihadist and radical Islamist movements' (Rabasa, 2015, p. 170-173; p. 28) serves for Europe to see radicalisation and terrorism in the context of the broader social problem of the integration of Muslim communities. (Rabasa and Benard, 2015, p. 1) Despite having seen in the previous chapter that Terrorism Studies does generally not locate terrorism in the context of civil society, preventative counterterrorism policy approaches do. This appears to miss an important dimension of how societies relate to terrorism in general and provides for the impetus to appeal to Terrorism Studies to play an active role in normatively guiding societies as engaged social researchers.

With the focus of preventative counterterrorism practises on the process of radicalisation, the notion of extremism and on ideology, it will be shown that terrorism does indeed serve to shape how wider questions of cultural and political life are being framed and importantly, where and how boundaries are defined and contextually experienced. Because there is an inherent tension between the necessarily bounded preventative logic of counterterrorism policy that relies on relative knowability and the concretely lived experiences of citizens, it is individuals who inadvertently, yet negligently, get caught up in the exclusionary

tension that lies at the very heart of the preventative counterterrorism approach, which is recognised to crucially rely on, indeed its success to depend on, trust, openness and dialogue. Concrete policy making needs a fundamental awareness, as well as recognition of the core exclusionary tension, which preventative counterterrorism policy evokes. The position that this thesis wishes to advance is that, it if for the academic field of Terrorism Studies to provide for the normative and ethical guidance to responsibly manoeuvre this tension. In order to do so, it must provide for a basis, which empathetically recognises the essentially unbounded nature of terrorism and thus the contestable, for subjective values at the core of the debates and policies on terrorism.

3.1 The politics of (counter-) terrorism and the need for action

Ugilt argues that terrorism works because it is at its base is about potentiality. Terrorism as an empty signifier works

> *'when every train and every airplane and every public gathering is experienced as a potential terrorist attack, which is not-occurring'* because *'what concerns us about terrorism are never the actual attacks that have already happened, but rather the potential future ones.' (Ugilt, 2012, p. 63, p. 88)*

In other words, the manner, in which we relate to terrorism is always by invoking the potential danger of the next attack rather than the actuality of the event that has already taken place. The politics of potentiality that follow from the perceived need for preventative action in light of the anticipate actualisation of a future terrorist event, then becomes the vehicle for relating to the threat (of terrorism), for terrorism as an empty signifier after all always marks out 'an empty spot in language where something could have been clearly said, but was not'. (Ugilt, 2012, p. 85)

The politics of potentiality however, are not about reality being confronted and an event of reasonable certainty, but about action. Crucial in the logic of prevention is that, because of the futurity of the threat, these degrees of certainty are entirely manageable. As Ugilt (2012) makes clear, the epistemological condition of prevention is one of knowability, in other words, threats that *can* be known, albeit they not need to be known with absolute certainty. The logic of prevention is propelled by a notion of relative knowability, which suggests that it

is possible to identify and indeed anticipate what constitutes the (non-) actualisation of a threat and prevent the actualisation of the event, because terrorism precisely marks 'something that could have been clearly said, but was not.' (Ugilt, 2012, p. 54) When relying on the logic of prevention, the crucial aspect then is the manageability of the potential future threat. Albeit not with absolute certainty, it becomes about the knowability with relative certainty of future *potentialities*, potentialities that could actualise but may just as well not actualise or alternatively even actualise by not taking place. Ugilt concludes, that potentiality in this context is 'never about reality being confronted, but merely about (preventative) action filled by imagination.' (Ugilt, 2012, p. 57)

Where Ugilt arrives at his conclusion from a metaphysical and indeed ontological angle, Jackson (2015a) looks at counterterrorism practices and observes analogously an epistemological crisis in counterterrorism that in addition to flowing from uncertainty as the new security paradigm - effectively mirroring Ugilt's treatise on the politics of potentiality and relative certainty as its concomitant epistemological condition - moreover emphasises the silence on the 'gaps in knowledge about the production of terrorism' (Heath-Kelly, 2012, p. 70) and indeed, the 'politics of anti-knowledge'. (Nichols, 2017, Stampnitzky, 2013, p. 194) Jackson points out, that following from the epistemological crisis at the centre of counterterrorism most poignantly, is the imperative that 'uncertainty and lack of knowledge can no longer be regarded as an excuse for inaction in the face of a potentially catastrophic threat' (de Goede, 2011, p. 9) meaning that 'the counterterrorist must instead act upon what is *unknown* as *projected through imagination and fantasy*' (emphasis added Jackson, 2015, p. 36) making pre-emption and prevention central pillars of counterterrorism policy.

The problem however, lies in the fact that the actor and their motivation can merely feature in terms that build on taken-for-granted beliefs and confirm the observer's desire and (unconscious) biases, who in himself also reflects hegemonic power relationships. Because the terrorist actor engages in an activity that *appears* to lack the immanent feedback whatever is subjectively enacted by the terrorists is inaccessible (Zuleika and Douglass, 2008) and leaves the gaps to be filled by *our* - that is the observer's - imagination and fantasy. As the construction of this reality however also reflects hegemonic power relationships whereby groups at the margins enjoy little control over

the process by which social meanings are assigned, the politics of potentiality serve to reify taken-for-granted and privilege, status-quo narratives on morality and values, causation and objectivity that contribute to an ever more closing public discursive space particularly in an epistemological climate where not knowing, rather than encouraging caution or deferral to expertise, encourages action.

It is a further purpose of this chapter, to show how these projections driven by imagination and fantasy build on and augment pre-existing exclusionary dynamics of hegemonic power relationships that betray the very promises and values that become so central in genuinely well-meaning counterterrorism discourses and policies. It is this unintended consequence that highlights that terrorism as an unbounded object of knowledge does indeed contextually contribute to the establishment of boundaries and the inadvertent betrayal of the promises of the dignity and value of the individual and serves to exemplify how counterterrorism policy raises questions more foundational to the identity of Western democracies than the apparent questions of national security. Primarily however, it is the purpose of this chapter to demonstrate how the preventative logic of counterterrorism not only constitutes an unjust, for exclusionary, practise, but that it in fact follows from the unbounded nature of terrorism and on untenable positivist research methodology. Concrete preventative counterterrorism practises contextually show, where and how the boundaries that are defined and shaped by terrorism are being drawn and the (counterproductive for exclusionary and thus perceptually unjust) experienced consequences this can have.

3.2 Relating to the threat of terrorism and ‘radicalisation’

Ugilt (2012, p. 53) notes that when acting preventatively, it is the possible future formation of a threat that is being acted upon. When terrorism essentially becomes about the potentiality of a future event, which may or may not actualise, it is no surprise that the notion of radicalisation - as disputed as its utility and causal relationship to terrorism may be[20] - has received a great deal of attention and traction, both in academia and policy circles in an attempt to lend credibility and direct preventative counterterrorism efforts.

[20] see for example (Gill and Horgan, 2014, Horgan, 2012, Horgan 2008).

According to Neumann, radicalisation entered the study of terrorism following 9/11, when it became increasingly difficult to talk about 'the roots of terrorism' as this was perceived to 'excuse and justify the killing of innocent civilians.' (ICSR, 2008, p. 4) Popularly described, radicalisation is what happens before the bomb goes off and is of particular interest for preventative counterterrorism measures, because it suggests the knowability and manageability of the origin of the actualisation of a terrorist threat.

However, radicalisation in fact is as contested a concept as terrorism. Conceptually, Sedgwick traces the confusion to three distinct yet overlapping contexts within which the notion of radicalisation is encountered, namely: national security, immigration, and foreign policy. (Sedgwick, 2010) Even though thoughtful analysis emphasises, that in the course of history, 'radicalism' as a concept has changed much of its meaning[21] and Pisoiu for example notes that

> *'[...] by looking at the historical emergence and use of radicalism, it appears that for a significant period of time, radicalism was very much part of 'regular' political life. What is more, more often than not, radical movements militated for democracy and democratic principles rather than against them. Radical ideas referred, among others, to the progress and liberation of humankind, based on the principles of human rights and democracy' (*Pisoiu, 2012, p. 13-14*)*

a more static, status-quo defending understanding has become dominant. Sedgwick (Sedgwick, 2010, p. 482) demonstrates that this understanding appears to be particularly relevant for policy contexts where 'mainstream political/religious/cultural values' are being constructed as fixed and the notion of extremism has become part of the radicalisation discourse. Extremism is distinguished from radicalism in its relative sense by its ideological fixation and orientation towards rigid, dogmatic ideological tenets aimed at homogenisation, however virtually indistinguishable from radicalism in its absolute sense. It becomes clear however, that extremism necessitates an understanding of the individual mind-set, a mind-set which crucially however, is inaccessible bar deductible by a normative evaluation of a designated relevant activity based on goals and means employed. As Schmid (2013, p. 10) suggests, 'extremists generally tend to have inflexible 'closed minds', adhering to a simplified mono-causal interpretation of the world where you are either with them or against them,

[21] For more in depth perspective of the radicalisation process see: (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2017, Schmid, 2013, Pisoiu, 2012, Sedgwick 2010, Moskalenko and McCauley, 2009)

part of the problem or part of the solution.' Schmid, after extensively engaging with the literature on radicalisation and radicalism for example suggests that

> *'[A]dvocating sweeping political change, based on a conviction that the status quo is unacceptable while at the same time a fundamentally different alternative appears to be available to the radical; The means advocated to bring about the system-transforming radical solution for government and society can be non-violent and democratic (through persuasion and reform) or violent and non-democratic (through coercion and revolution).' (Schmid, 2013, p. 8)*

Importantly, Rabasa and Benard (2015) observe that Europe see radicalisation and (home-grown) terrorism in the context of the broader social problem of the integration of Muslim communities. To illustrate this dynamic, this chapter will focus - albeit not exclusively for the preventative logic of (counter-) terrorism indeed is epistemic - on the context of terrorism in the United Kingdom where the concern in relation to the radicalisation of co-citizens in particular highlights the exclusionary consequences that the lack of normative commitment allows in the light of unboundedness of the object of knowledge. This has contributed to a blurred understanding of terrorism as a social problem as well as a national-security issue, whereby the ideology of 'extremism lies at the root of terrorism' and is 'the centre of gravity of jihadists and radical Islamist movements'. (Rabasa, 2015, p. 170-173; p. 28)

3.2.1 Home-grown terrorists and policy challenges

This section sketches how relating to the threat of terrorism has increasingly become problematically embedded in civil society with the conception of the 'home-grown' terrorist in a post-9/11 security climate. While the event narrative evoked by 9/11 could coherently and persuasively externalise the threat as the individuals responsible were Saudi, UAE, Lebanese and Egyptian citizens and indeed, as Jackson notes, through the employment of vaguely defined and culturally loaded labels and 'dramatic oppositional binaries such as the West versus the Islamic world, extremists versus moderates (…).' (Jackson, 2007a, p. 401) no such geographical and compelling externalisation is available if the acts of terrorism are perpetrated by co-citizens or those that live amongst us.

Since the July 7 London underground and bus bombings and the foiled liquid bomb plot in 2005 it has been second-generation British Muslims of

Pakistani origin that are responsible for the majority of terrorist attacks and foiled terrorist plots in Great Britain. All three of the British-born July 7 London underground and bus bombers, as well as the transatlantic aircraft liquid bombing plot suspects moreover appear to have been well integrated into British society.[22] (Rabasa and Benard, 2015) And the same appears to hold true for the most recent perpetrators in of terrorist attacks in London and Manchester respectively. (Evans, 2017, BBC, 2017) The individuals responsible were co-citizens and constitutive parts of the fabric of a multicultural Britain and similar observations can be made across Europe. This is what leads Rabasa and Benard (2015) to conclude, that terrorism in Europe is an issue that takes shape within a broader context of social policy and integration, while others argue, that it is a too tolerant multiculturalism that provides for a safe-haven for violent extremists. (May, 2015, Phillips, 2006)

Indeed, grappling with instances of home-grown terrorism and the inability to externalise the threat, have led to a convolution of national security with social policy measures, not only in Britain but across Europe.[23] Terrorist activity by co-citizens poses a politically different problem for policy makers as the response cannot remain driven by an outward looking foreign policy and increased border security as a means to enhance national security. In fact, in an increasingly mobile and globalised world, such attempts at externalisation become more and more elusive. Oppositional discursive binaries, which made their way into academia and policy circles post 9/11, most notably in the notion of 'Islamic terrorism' (Jackson, 2007a), require much more nuance in a context of a 'threat from within'. With moments of home-grown terrorism, responses to terrorism become about the need of precautionary risk-management and the identification of potential (future) terrorists (Hörnqvist and Flyghed, 2012) at home.

As Ugilt (2012) points out, terrorism is about potentiality and prevention relies on the manageability of the potential future threat that needs to be identifiable with relative certainty. He importantly however cautions, that potentiality finds its best expression in being *inactive*, that is, in the terrorist event that is not taking place. It is here, where the threat does *not* disappear but remains

[22] For comprehensive profiles of the individuals involved in instances of terrorist plots where second-generation British Muslim have been (allegedly) involved see (Rabasa, 2015).
[23] For example, see generally: (El Difranou and Uhlmann, 2015, Hamid, 2015); for the Netherlands: (Mondon, 2016, Fowler, 2010, AIVD, 2006).

lingering in the background for it always *could* actualise - every forgotten backpack, raises suspicion, or as Hickman notes, 'the possibility of a terror attack lies in the background everyday reinforced every time someone walks through detecting gates.' (Hickman et al., 2012, p.102) Where Ugilt then comes to conclude, that ontologically terror is meaningfulness-in excess, because the word or event invokes a nothingness (the potential of a future attack) that actually does something (for example, raises suspicion). Importantly however, as long as terrorism is conducted by a well-defined enemy, it leaves ordinary lines of orientation, and with it knowability as driving the logic of prevention, intact. This allows for the manageability of the potential future threat with relative certainty.

However, with the inability to geographically externalise the threat of *home-grown* terrorism, where the profiles of the individuals responsible give clues to these individuals being precisely 'one of us' our ordinary, taken-for-granted lines of orientation, which have thus far served to relate to or distance from the threat of terrorism, deteriorate and new lines of orientation need to be drawn for this is the logic behind precautionary risk-management. As Ugilt (2012) demonstrates, preventative counterterrorism necessitates that vagueness and uncertainty must give way to *relative* knowability so as to enable precautionary risk-management. In the attempt to re-establish lines of orientation, and indeed in a move resembling the externalisation of the threat, what can be observed then is an acceleration of the move away from multiculturalist approaches[24] and a renewed confidence in the insistence on our 'way of life' as well as a solidification of our 'self-indulgent belief in our own moral, legal and political superiority' (Ugilt, 2012, p. 151) towards integrationist-assimilationist policies not only in the United Kingdom but across Europe and 'the West' more generally with an explicit focus on the ideological foundation that is said to lay at the root of violent extremism and the process of radicalisation towards terrorism.[25] Irresponsible political rhetoric then expands the threat to 'Islamic radicalisation' leading to terrorist violence from a momentary strategic danger to an existential threat to values, freedom, and the British/European/Western way of life (Lynch, 2013, Gad, 2012b), while in the public sphere, terrorism, radicalism and extremism become

[24] See for example: (BBC. 2011).
[25] See: (May, 2015), and for the lack of evidentiary base regarding the link between ideology can radicalisation see for example: (Kundnani, 2015, Horgan, 2015); also critical of the connection are (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2017McCauley and Moskalenko, 2014).

entangled with notions of integration, segregation and multiculturalism. (Lynch, 2013, p. 2-3)

The focus on foundational national/Western values on the one hand and extremist ideology on the other come to serve as approximations of 'what goes and what doesn't go in a liberal democracy' (May, 2015) that provide for a new orientation for relative knowability and the suggestion of certainty and predictability that once again rests on the construction and drawing of boundaries, binaries, clear-cut social, political and religious identities and loyalties that have been drawn public authorities and the media, (Awan, 2016a, Hickman et al., 2012, p. 102-3) and that have come to form the core of the preventative approach of the UK government's PREVENT counterterrorism strand. These crude lines of orientation, as we will see in the next chapter, more often than not however rely on cognitive heuristics and unconscious biases that rear themselves in the context of the concrete government policy and exclusionary practises that remain systematically disguised, which importantly are however perceivable from a different standpoint and demonstrate the arbitrariness of taken-for-granted values and boundaries.

3.2.2 Radicalisation and the logic of preventing terrorism

This section looks at the UK government's specific emphasis on the pre-emption and radicalisation and its PREVENT counterterrorism strand. It should be noted however, that the UK government is neither in its approach nor in its rhetoric unique.[26] Rather, the policy-move towards pre-emption rests on a specific reading of the academic understanding of the radicalisation process and its causal link to terrorism as well as, at its core, the political translation of the notion of *potentiality at work*.

While the radicalisation process is poorly understood and academically highly contested,[27] pre-emptive policy approaches are based on supposed mechanisms that lead individuals to engage in violent extremist activity where the ideological component is crucial. In the current security climate this identifies the primary threat to national security stemming from international terrorism (MI5, 2017), which is understood to be primarily inspired by an ill-reading of Islam.

[26] See for example Gad (2012b).
[27] See for example: (Horgan, 2012, Githens-Mazer and Lambert, 2010, Githens-Mazer, 2009, Horgan, 2008).

(Kundnani, 2015) Central to this policy understanding are models of radicalisation that see ideology as a key element in turning people into terrorists as for example expressed by the Home Office that holds that

> *'preventing terrorism will mean challenging extremists (and non-violent) ideas that are also part of a terrorist ideology. Prevent will also mean intervening to try to stop people moving from extremist groups or extremism into terrorist-related activity.' (Home Office, 2011, p. 23)*

The aim of the PREVENT strategy is clearly preventative in its declared goal to 'stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism' (Home Office, 2011, p. 6) and forms an integral part of the Government's four-pronged CONTEST counterterrorism strategy. PREVENT 'draws on counterterrorism funding, legislation and on counterterrorism resources' (Home Office, 2011, p. 24) and more recently requires certain statutory bodies to have 'due regard to the need prevent people from being drawn into terrorism'[28]. The Home Office also makes clear that while

> *'Prevent will address all forms of terrorism' it would also 'continue to prioritise according to the threat they pose to our national security. At present, the majority of our resources and efforts will be devote to preventing people from joining or supporting Al Qa'ida, its affiliates and related groups' (Office, 2011) and in light of a continuing high threat level and the risk posed by individuals who have travelled to areas such as Iraq or Syria to 'stop people travelling overseas to fight for terrorist organisations or engage in terrorism-related activity and subsequently returning to the UK' in an attempt to 'combat the underlying ideology that supports terrorism.'(Home Office, 2011, p. 24)*

PREVENT in principle clearly acknowledges the broad ideological spectrum of underlying ideologies, which support terrorism. Indeed, it has been noted that one third of PREVENT referrals relate to far-right extremism. (Dodd, 2017) As controversial and indeed complex the link between ideology and terrorism might actually be[29], there remains an explicit focus, declaredly driven by and reflective of the threat assessment of the independent Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre, on 'Islamist extremism'. This is understood to be the ideology that drives Al Qa'ida and its affiliates and is thought to be the cornerstone of its recruitment and plays a key role in the radicalisation process. (Home Office, 2011) The global rise of violent Islamist extremism, most notably observable in

[28] See: Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 - Part 5.
[29] See for example: (Sageman, 2017, Qureshi, 2017, McCauley and Moskalenko, 2017, McCauley and Moskalenko, 2011).

the violence of Al Qa'ida and its affiliates and more recently by Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) clearly shapes the government's framing of its national security priority, while the focus on ideology triggers a move away from observable violent behavioural characteristics to a more thought and value-based approach.

This value-focused approach manifests in a commitment to 'counter non-violent extremism' and the 'underlying problem of segregate and isolated communities that can provide an environment in which *extremism can take root*, and allow the continuance of illegal violence, *cultural* practices such as FGM'. (National Security Council, 2015, p. 17) Countering violent and non-violent extremism is understood as directly linked to countering the terrorist threat the UK faces, because even though the government recognises that

> *'[T]here is no single model of radicalisation: the process is unique for each individual' it develops its counter-extremism strategy based on an understanding that in general terms three elements present: 'a vulnerable person will be introduced to an extremist ideology by a radicalising influencer (typically an extremist individual) who in the absence of protective factors, such as a supportive network of family and friends, or a fulfilling job, draws the vulnerable individual even closer to extremism.' (National Security Council, 2015, p. 21)*

Importantly, the strategy is very clear in its presupposition that

> *'Islamist extremists are driven by a core ideological need to overthrow the foundations of modern society and rid it of what they perceive to be un-Islamic elements, not only non-Muslims, but also Muslims who do not conform to their warped interpretation of Islam. There is a clear distinction between Islam – a religion followed peacefully by millions – and the ideology promoted by Islamist extremists. In order to understand and therefore defeat the ideology of Islamist extremists, it is important to understand how it draws on and distorts particular elements of Islamist thinking.' (National Security Council, 2015, p. 21)*

The government spends the best part of its counter-extremisms strategy elaborating on the Islamist extremism and its 'warped interpretation of Islam', and while not failing to mention that

> *'extreme right-wing and neo-Nazi groups use their ideologies to drive a core hatred of minorities or to promote Islamophobic or antisemitic views' which can be traced back to 'ideologies that are typically based not the superiority of one racial and religious group to the detriment of all others' (National Security Council, 2015, p. 22)*

this observation lacks in clarity in relation to the establishment of a link between the ideology and its incompatibility with Western liberal values such as

democracy, the rule of law and equality, which is explicitly acknowledged in relation to Islamist extremism. (National Security Council, 2015)

If we were to phrase this in Ugilt's terms, it is in the PREVENT policy's understanding of radicalisation where we can observe the logic of prevention and relative knowability manifest itself. It is the idea that we can identify 'drivers of radicalisation, the characteristics of people who have been radicalised and who have joined terrorist groups, and the specific pathways to support for, and participation in, terrorist acts' (Home Office, 2011, p. 17) Moreover, the belief that radicalisation

> *'in this country - is driven by: an ideology that sets Muslims against non-Muslims, highlights the alleged oppression of the global Muslim community and which both obliges and legitimises violence in its defence; (…) and by specific personal vulnerabilities and local factors which make the ideology seem both attractive and compelling.' (Home Office, 2011, p. 18)*

While the idea that radicalisation causes violence is highly contested[30] and John Horgan goes so far as to argue that it is one of the greatest myths in terrorism research (quoted by Knefel, 2013), the logic of prevention and relative knowability identifies fixtures as starting points to provide lines of orientation in the form of radicalising extremist ideologies, spurious processes of radicalisation or individual and/or group vulnerabilities upon which a policy of prevention comes to rest. Most importantly however, in the focus on Islamist extremist ideology that flows from a misreading of the 'peaceful religion of Islam', as the environment conducive for radicalisation and ultimately terrorism and the recurring invocation of British or liberal values in relation to counterterrorism strategies and policy, the government fills the empty spot left that is necessarily left by uncertainty as the central security paradigm in spite of a recognition that radicalisation is an individual process and suggest that it can make knowable, via conformity with those abstract values and indeed usually by means of examples of non-conformity, that which it itself recognises as ubiquitous.

> *'In assessing drivers of and pathways to radicalisation, the line between extremism and terrorism is often blurred. Terrorist groups of all kinds very often draw upon ideologies which have been developed,*

[30] See for example: (Pisoiu, 2013); for a systematic analysis of processes of radicalisation see: McCauley and Moskalenko, 2017, McCauley and Moskalenko, 2014, McCauley and Moskalenko, 2011, McCauley and Moskalenko); For the ubiquity of the term radicalisation and thus conceptual lack of clarity leading to poor analytical categories see: (Sedgwick, 2010).

> *disseminated and popularised by extremist organisation that appear to be non-violent (such as groups which neither use violence nor specifically and openly endorse its use by others).' (Home Office, 2011, p. 19)*

Building on this understanding however, and in blurring the line between (non-) violent extremism and terrorism and the centrality of ideology understood to 'draw on and misrepresents theology' (Home Office, 2011, p. 20), where a 'search for identity, meaning and belonging' (Home Office, 2011, p. 17) corroborated by the 2010 Citizenship survey, leads the Home Office to conclude that successful Prevent work depends on developing a 'sense of belonging *to this country* and on a perception of the importance and legitimacy and integration', (Emphasis added Home Office, 2011, p. 18) the government outlines where it draws the line and makes clear that 'not everything goes'. As much as the government reiterates Britain's 'increasingly inclusive identity' and points out that it is not attempting to securitise the integration strategy, it is explicitly noted that PREVENT depends on a successful integration strategy (Home Office, 2011, p. 24) and it must be noted that, in spite of acknowledging the danger of far-right extremism and/or terrorism, the importance of fostering a 'sense of belonging' via British or liberal values clearly invokes connotations of national identity, which is not as inclusive as it makes itself out to be, and which at least fuels the subtext that gives credibility to the perception to run counter the inclusion of all types of extremism.

At the same time, it simplifies the complexity of the role of ideology to introduce and operationalise binary identity categories and simplistic proscriptions of actions and thereby excludes from its understanding a notion that ideology may give post-hoc and therefore, consequentialist coherence to a group of individuals who already engage in terrorism. As della Porta (2009, 2008) argues, radicalisation is a relational and constructed process that is not only about beliefs and actions of opposing groups but also about states and their responses. Kundnani (2015) emphasises that, religious ideology provides a vocabulary and a cohering identity but politics provides the impetus, a possibility that is, while not ignored, necessarily omitted from the administrative logic of the politics of prevention.

Problematically, the concept of radicalisation is being employed in three different, yet overlapping contexts: the security context, the integration context,

and the foreign-policy context. (Sedgwick, 2010) However, the relative knowability necessitated by the logic of prevention, requires the complexities and nuances for each of these contexts to make way for the relative clarity that the concept seems to enable. By providing what appears to be clarity, we have politically provided orientation with a focus on abstract conceptions of values, a sense of belonging, and national identity that is thought to foster cohesive communities where extremism cannot gain hold. By thus providing an interaction between taken-for-granted grand social narratives propped by the notion of British values and specific analyses of terrorism and terrorist radicalisation, as for example the misreading of a peaceful religion, 'radicalisation becomes a *cultural construct* with an *administrative logic'* that 'focuses on opinions, views and ideas which *could* lead to terrorism.' (emphasis added Hörnqvist and Flyghed, 2012, p. 320-321)

What cannot and does not feature in this logic, for obvious reasons of complexity, are the contradictions and ambiguities of modern life that play out in the lived realities of actual individual or group of individuals who negotiate their identity, subjectivity and sense of belonging *with the knowledge (and experience) of the workings of the logic of prevention*, that relies on oppositional binaries and an administrative, yet seemingly clear, understanding of core values to mitigate for uncertainty and vagueness of the 'known unknowns.' However, this administratively suggested relative knowability of who is at risk of being radicalised by extremists to commit acts of terrorism, in practise cannot translate into anything tangible, for processes of radicalisation are individual, relational and multiple and thus far, hardly understood. Administrative front-line staff and the public are left to guess, and fill uncertainty with imagination and unconscious biases, merely oriented by the unproblematically taken-for-granted clarity of shared British values who poses a risk and who does not. While not attempting to securitise integration, combining questions of national security with integration however, scrutinises differences and inadvertently serves to construct some communities as suspect. (Hickman et al., 2012, p. 102) This of course helps the state and its policy and security wings to demarcate, or establish lines of orientation to identify 'the enemy', and serves the important tactical purpose of boundary maintenance (Cherney and Murphy, 2016, p. 163) which operates on the basis of hegemonic power relationships and exclusionary practises.

Such a process of 'suspectification'[31], built upon a preventative logic of relative knowability and orientation provided by a preventative policy based on 'our' values, operates with a notion of 'bounded communities'. In a post 7 July 2005 climate, where home-grown international terrorism inspired by Al Qaeda and its affiliates is identified as the top priority for national security and a renewed focus on Islamist extremism in the context of ISIS, this policy discourse serves to *make knowable* and at the same time externalise, via the understanding that what makes us 'us' is the agreement on our shared values, which of course means that those that do not agree on these values, are not 'us'.

At the same time, however it reduces individually experienced processes of dynamic identity formation and subjectivity to static and implicit grand social narratives centred around national security and thereby excludes and/or marginalises challenges on the meaning, interpretation and in fact lived implementation of abstract values particularly by minorities that do not share or share differently, the hegemonic understanding of abstractly defined national values.

In a thus securitised climate, where a general circulation of discourses of suspicion is sustained by other social structures and processes in particular the media (Cherney and Murphy, 2016, Gillespie, 2016, Hickman et al., 2012, Pantazis and Pemberton, 2012, Hickman et al., 2011, Pantazis and Pemberton, 2009), difference becomes to be viewed with suspicion and a (perceived) lack of allegiance to British values and creates a cultural narrative in which extremism is thought to be more likely. It is a climate where multiculturalism and questions of values and identity are linked to social division and a one-sided demand to assimilate to ill-defined British values as a matter of national security. (Kundnani, 2015, Kundnani, 2009) PREVENT contributes to an atmosphere, where radical criticism of political issues and challenges to the hegemonic distribution of power have become suspect, (Kundnani, 2009, p. 23) or at least, where this is perceived to be the case. (Breen-Smyth, 2014, Lynch, 2013, Mcdonald, 2011)

Because we can observe how the notion of radicalisation and (non-) violent extremism are employed to invoke values and thereby touch upon

[31] Hickman (2012, p. 93) introduces the concept of 'suspectification' to refer to the process of 'the full range of everyday encounters in which an individual might become aware of being 'suspected'. See also: (Hickman, 2011).

fundamental issues of identity, meaning and a sense of belonging cast as a matter of national security and at the same time explicitly refraining from making integration the focus of its preventative counterterrorism approach, the government appears at best confused, and at worst hypocritical in its preventative approach. Integration, via the detour of shared values and their worrisome, for deemed security relevant, incompatibility with those espoused via the ideology of Islamist extremism becomes, de facto linked to national security. (Vermeulen, 2014, Extremism Taskforce, 2013, Gad, 2012a) And because values are so very central in this preventative counterterrorism approach, the focus on belonging is, as will shortly become apparent, at least subjectively perceived as unjust by those that bring to the table values that are different from the hegemonic ones already available but who nonetheless rely on the promise to equal citizenship guaranteed by the open liberal society.

Overall then, the UK government's strategies to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism in both of its iterations, the PREVENT strategy as well as the Counter-Extremism strategy, tie together - via a loosely understood process of radicalisation - the national security context with the civil society context of integration, which each make different promises to the individual. Thereby preventative counterterrorism serves to orient and indeed scrutinise through the conformity with abstract values, the individual's sense of belonging as well as complex identity and meaning-giving processes as a matter of national security. Paradoxically in this bounded (and indeed hegemonic) understanding of values, identity and belonging, is the explicit recognition that any successful preventative counterterrorism approach relies on inclusivity (openness), *shared* values and *equal* partnership, a contradiction that cannot easily be overcome unless introspection and self-reflexivity are explicitly encouraged as part of a moral learning process.

3.2.3 Shared values and partnership

Thus far, we have seen that, as a policy built on the logic of prevention, the United Kingdom's PREVENT strategy, as part of its counterterrorism approach, communicates relative knowability via the establishment of lines of orientation focused on values in an attempt to identify those on the path towards becoming a terrorist, even though the academic and empirical base for this communicated knowledge remains spurious and disputed, so much so that

Sageman (2013) declared the failure of Terrorism Studies precisely because it had made no authoritative progress in answering what leads a person to become take up political violence. The academic study of terrorism remains acutely aware that there is no singular profile for a terrorist. The role of ideology as well as religion in terrorism remains disputed,[32] and the manner in which a person choses to become a terrorist is best understood as relational, contextual, and individual. Arguably, it is much less coherently expressible than the logic that underlies the United Kingdom's PREVENT strategy, with its focus on a misguided reading of theology and its utilisation as a mobilisation tool for terrorist activity, suggests. Rather, the attempt to focus on ideology and a misreading of theology scrutinised by its compatibility with 'our shared values' merely works to suggests that we are in a position to distinguish between those that pose a threat to our security and those that are respected as equal citizens in spite of their difference and in fact demonstrates the driving momentum of potentiality and relative knowability in the politics of prevention and counterterrorism which Ugilt describes.

Not only however, does this reading rest on a tension in between the clarity of the identifiability of those that do not share our values and pose a national security threat and the ambiguity of identity processes shaped by individualised or communal readings of values, but further is it difficult to neatly map and disentangle lived experiences of individuals that fall onto the boundaries where national security and civil society in the form of the demands placed on integration via shared values meet and play out in the course of everyday life.

Counterterrorism in general, but PREVENT in particular, demonstrates that the debates around terrorism indeed stand in lieu of more central questions that society asks in relation to belonging, identity, who the enemy is and where the line ought to be drawn between that which is public and that which is private, and ultimately, that which is political. What we see in PREVET then is the contextual manifestation of the core dynamics the lie behind terrorism as a reiteration of exclusionary practises that casts abstractly defined values as the 'founding stone' in the proud promotion of British values'. (May, 2015)

This of course can be perceived as an exclusionary approach because those that bring new values, a new understandings of the good life, and new priorities for participating in fair recognition of the promise of liberal Western

[32] See for example: (Francis, 2016, Cottee, 2016, Gottschalk, 2013, Jackson, 2007).

societies of the individuals' dignity which expresses itself amongst many others, in being entrusted with the responsibility of shaping *our* abstractly defined values and what 'regard for the rule of law, participation in and acceptance of democracy, equality, free speech and respect for minorities' concretely mean, rather than via the demand for the explicit declaration of loyalties with abstractly conceived national values.

It is in the affirmation of the centrality of dialogue and inclusivity, which is repeatedly and emphatically declared in the government's PREVENT and Counter-Extremism strategy - yet, remains empty - that preventing violent extremism and community cohesion policies, integration and PREVENT could be complementary for cohesive communities free of extremism rely on trust and dialogue, that PREVENT could have its greatest strength if only it were to allow for a reading that were not to reduce individualised choices to a generalised understanding of a radicalisation process that significantly builds on a bounded understanding of values as enabling lines of orientation in preventative counterterrorism. In other words, if the strategy could navigate uncertainty and ambiguity and the toleration of risk. As Zuleika notes, 'those in charge of preventing terrorism are likely to be genuinely concerned, responsible individuals acting in what they perceive to be in the best interest of society'. (Zuleika, 2012, p. 52) In a climate where uncertainty and lack of concrete knowledge meets the omnipresent potential of a terrorist attack, the uncertainty of who, when, where, how, and why however makes way for the moral imperative to do something to prevent that possibility from materialising, because officials have come to believe that society expects them to adopt a zero-risk approach to public safety, (Jackson, 2015a) the space for navigating a genuine dialogue and partnership are limited, because the motivating logic behind preventative counterterrorism approaches revolves around action rather than dialogue. Despite the best intentions and a declared commitment to not securitise integration (Home Office, 2011), the need provide for lines of orientation to enable relative knowability for preventative counterterrorism measures and policy making that explicitly focuses on abstract national values, will necessarily need to emphasise and securitise difference.

This puts an ontological tension at the very heart of the UK's preventative counterterrorism approach, because ultimately 'our shared values' and promise

of inclusivity in a national security context leads to a paradoxical need for openness for dialogue *with* 'the Other'. However the parameters of dialogue are rigidly enclosed so as to provide a secure space *from* 'the Other'. (Gad, 2012b, p. 396) It is however precisely this space, that is meant to be equally shared and available *to* the Other and it is this tension, that of course, is not lost on 'the Other'. It is this abstract paradox of the need for permeability yet closure at the same time that is contextually experienced as a disingenuous injustice and indeed a broken promise of a liberal Western democracy, for it is the government and majority society that unilaterally sets the parameters of what constitutes 'our shared values' within which openness and closure, and security and insecurity, are to be exercised by all citizens, including those of a minority that are de fact excluded in the contextual shaping of the meaning of abstractly understood, yet hegemonically pre-determined, nationalised values.[33]

3.2.3.1 Partnership in defeating extremism and broken promises

With the political recognition for the need to form 'new and real partnerships' to defeat extremists, Theresa May reiterates precisely that not anything goes in a liberal democracy like Britain but that any strategy to defeat extremism rests on the proud promotion of British values by which is understood:

> *'regard for the rule of law, participation in and acceptance of democracy, equality, free speech and respect for minorities and understood as the foundation for success of a multi-racial, multi-cultural, multi-religious Britain, for these are the values that unite.' (May, 2015)*

It becomes very clear, that at the heart of this understanding lies on the one hand a very distinct and seemingly open conception of what it is that makes Britain a successful liberal democracy which emphasises an active commitment towards inclusivity, while on the other hand it cannot overcome the boundedness of this connection in reiterating that this very inclusivity comes with the responsibility of respect for these uniting principles as well as the institutions and laws that make such respect possible. What is emblematic in this reading of course, is a paradox that calls for inclusivity, openness, partnership and dialogue on the one hand, yet on the other hand, pre-defines the principles, and indeed

[33] Awan (2016b) makes a similar argument for the context of the importance of religious identity in France in the aftermath of the Charlie Hebdo attacks.

institutions upon which such a partnership must rest in a liberal democracy like Britain. In fact, the very wording of PREVENT 2011 that mentions its reliance on a successful integration while at the same time not wishing to securitise integration (Home Office, 2011) invokes relative knowability in the form of immigration in the context of preventative counterterrorism and precisely *fills the blank* that uncertainty as the new security paradigm had initially occupied. Because we now 'know' that the primary threat to our national security currently stems from international terrorism associated with and influenced by Al Qa'ida and more recently ISIS, the official understanding is that ideology that distorts religion is the problem[34] and indeed lies at the basis of (non-) violent extremism, we know, at least roughly where to look, especially in a political climate that is more and more polarised, with reductionist tendencies and fringe prejudice entering into the mainstream as we will shortly see when we look at the notion of the suspect community.

Consequently then, partnership in the civil society context, as indicated by May, remains discursively circumscribed as a security problem, even for those with whom dialogue or partnership is sought, there is no place of 'a-security'.[35] Gad notes that the point the government is making in Denmark for example, is to 'affirmatively include Muslims to avoid their self-radicalising exclusion,' in a similar vein as is argued by the UK government for an inclusive society founded upon the proud promotion of British values, as the foundation of its fight against extremism. We observe that counterterrorism policy based on dialogue, and partnership do *de facto* end up reconstructing an integration narrative (Gad, 2012a), a narrative that has been criticised for being a 'one-way street of Their adjustment to Our ways.' (Emerek 2003) Similarly, Abbas notes that nation states offer minorities negotiated spaces where they are 'expected to adapt to pre-determined sense of belonging.' (Abbas, 2012, p. 349)

But this is not a space for radical discourse or critical self-reform of the hegemonic majority, because 'in a context of national security the less than

[34] A mantra that seems to be reiterated in the rhetoric of politicians in the aftermath of terrorist incidents, see for example: (Swinford, 2015a, Wintour, 2011).
[35] See for example: Alamy and Husband (2013), who note government approaches to community cohesion and counterterrorism to be mutually contradictory in practice and therefore resulted in a breakdown of trust between sections of the British Muslim population and agents of the state.

radical other ends up discursively as part of the existential threat to Our identity.' (Gad, 2012a, p. 161) Because even though

> *'less-than-radical Others are relatively de-securitised in comparison with the highly securitised radical Other (the terrorist). But they are not transferred to a space of 'a-security' because 'we' have a strategy for partnerships with 'them' so as to prevent 'them' from becoming 'the radical Other.' (Gad, 2012a, p. 161)*

What happens is that 'the burden of reforming the Other is moved from the shoulders of the Self to the shoulders of the other', and dialogue and partnership become a narrative about the self-reform of the Other'. (Gad, 2012a, p. 163) it is a narrative that plays into nationalist, exclusive sentiments and thus, while potentially well-intended is mainly 'theatre' that is hardly manageable in a mediated society.

The role then for engagement awarded 'the Other' in a securitised narrative is clear, yet circumscribed, reduced and pre-determined by the reference to the proud promotion of shared values, which form the basis for engagement in the first place. What is at stake, is not merely partnership for the purpose of preventative counterterrorism in a national security context, but actually, *equal citizenship* and the process of negotiating the ambiguity of the meaning and content of these shared values and the meaning of citizenship within modern civil society.

This dynamic in turn is not lost on those, whose partnership is sought. As Lynch (2013, p. 11) notes, the failure to understand the emergence of fluid identities particularly among Muslim youth in the UK as a reaction and consequence to both 9/11 and 7/7, the 'increased use of the label Muslim constructs a community to the exclusion of all other aspects of identity which situates Islam as a definitive and static identity option and as protective and unifying ideology and even identity to be positioned both in opposition to the mainstream but also as right to be British and fit in'. Neither is this dynamic lost to those, who may, for one reason or another, form the so-called pool of potential recruits, because (potential) extremists/radicals/terrorists/ do not exist in a social or political vacuum, because in a mediatised environment, 'meanings meander and evolve through a string of staged performances at a variety of interconnected settings' (Hajer, 2009, p. 170) and thus, internal identity politics and external identity politics are mediated and negotiated, yet communicated and incorporated

with an inadequate clarity that politically glosses over contextual uncertainty and ambiguity and with undue focus on action, conceptually fails to address the ontological lacuna at the very heart of (counter) terrorism.

Moreover, what gets lost in this context is not only the complexity of identity theory from psychology and sociology, but further the subjectivity of the individual at the centre of the debate who acquires, learns, creates, modulates, negotiates, rejects, formulates and re-formulates motivations and meanings against the background of both, internal and external identity politics. Such a superficial approach and understanding has as a consequence the failure to take responsibility for and uncouple abstract political integration from the ethical integration of groups and subcultures with their own collective identities and fails to do justice to *all* citizens. As Habermas (1994, p. 129-134) stresses, political integration is rooted in historical experiences which determine the interpretation of constitutional principles and *cannot be ethically neutral*. These principles merely reflect a common horizon of interpretation within which current issues give rise to public debate about the citizens' political self-understanding. However, it is thorough a socialisation process in an ascriptive network of cultures and traditions of intersubjectively shared contexts of life and experiences that form the horizon within which all citizens conduct the ethical-political discourse in which they attempt to reach self-understanding. And from a normative point of view, the integrity of the individual legal person (the individual citizen) cannot be guaranteed without protecting intersubjectively shared experiences and life contexts in which the person has been socialised and formed their identity.

Such an ethical-political discourse necessitates co-existence with equal rights and mutual recognition of the *different* cultural membership that recognises members as belonging to ethical communities around different conceptions of the good and *cannot be independent of an introspective self-critique to take place within the majority*. Ultimately, if only rhetorically, organising counterterrorism around a supposedly shared understanding of shared values, while at the same time not creating a space of a-security for Muslims, fails to keep apart political and ethical integration, and does injustice to those whose departure from the social norm, whose (religious) difference is important to their bearer. (Modood, 2007, p. 66, Galeotti, 2002 Galeotti, 2002) It is this injustice, embedded in a dynamic that current counterterrorism policy and rhetoric fails to navigate, that

has rightly been pointed out as not only counter-productive to counterterrorism efforts and the battle for the 'hearts and minds' but further, is an injustice that must be rectified.

It is here, where I argue that Terrorism Studies has the academic responsibility to create the space for a terrorist subjectivity in order to not only enable better understanding of an individual involved in the act, but to contribute to a more inclusive, self-reflective and emancipated understanding of security and society, which will help address the epistemic crisis at the heart of counterterrorism that contributes to a flawed policy paradigm and moreover can integrate a subject-centred, ontologically deep understanding of terrorism with contemporary policy approaches.

In an attempt to defeat extremism then, the government initially around David Cameron and now Theresa May focuses on the proud promotion of British values as a key foundation of its counterterrorism strategy. While in rhetoric notably vague and ostensibly open and flexible to accommodate a variety of interpretations of the values in a multi-religious, multi-cultural Britain, these values remain abstract and open to be filled by the hegemonic meaning as understood by the majority rather than through self-reforming and self-questioning partnership with the minority. However, the administrative logic and appeal to a lingering nationalistic sentiment and emotions of belonging, necessitate - albeit not explicitly - a concretised understanding of not only what makes a British value, but further what actual, concrete and practised values are 'un-British', 'extreme' or potentially dangerous.

With an inability to control the meaning of the 'British values' from raw political rhetoric into concrete and tangible guidance for those charged with statutory duties to participate in the governments PREVENT strategy it becomes impossible to keep apart the securitised logic of prevention where uncertainties become filled by generalised lines of orientation filled by fantasy and desire. It is the everyday negotiation of these values in the exercise and negotiation of personal and communal identity, and citizenship, propped by fallible cognitive biases and heuristics, and integration that, not only in the United Kingdom, focuses disproportionately on Muslims. In the aftermath of the Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris, Prime Minister Cameron went so far as to agree with Culture Secretary Sajid Javid, who voiced that 'the Muslim community has a 'special

burden' and that it is 'lazy and wrong' to say that the attacks have nothing to do with Islam, for the perpetrators 'call themselves Muslim.' (Swinford, 2015a, Swinford, 2015b) Stephen Greer (2015, p. 144) asks then, what kind of effective counterterrorism measures would not turn Muslims into a securitised community if 'any serious law enforcement initiative against jihadi terrorism must necessarily focus disproportionately upon some Muslims, since only Muslims (and very few at that) are likely to be involved in it.'

3.2.3.2 Suspect community, Islamophobia and hegemonic narratives

Although the institutional creation of a securitised suspect Muslim community is disputed, (Greer, 2014, 2010, 2008) particularly with reference to an 'objective, deliberate, state-managed process' of securitisation, (Greer, 2015, p. 400) that is said to have to go beyond a mere social process of 'suspectification', the subjectively experienced, perceived, and felt instances of 'being suspect' have been widely documented.[36]

Heath-Kelly (2013) for example observes that, particularly PREVENT's focus on anticipatory risk-management constitutes Muslims as sites of interventions and as populations both at risk of becoming radical and potentially risky. Mythen et al. (2009, p. 736, 739-740) note, that the discourse of insecurity in Britain has defined the British Muslim population 'en bloc as a risky, suspect population', whereby the 'perceived 'riskiness' operates mundanely as a threat to the fabric of predominantly white British culture' and is experienced as a pressure to declare loyalties. Lynch (2013, p. 4) moreover argues that the creation of binary, security-driven narratives of in-group and out-group, limits options for identity negotiation and flexibility but uses identity interchangeably with loyalty, and has contributed to making a Muslim identity 'a public commodity that now features in a top-down security driven policy' as well as 'political electioneering'. Ragazzi (2016) goes even further and argues, that what can be observed in relation to preventative counterterrorism policy in general and PREVENT in particular is indeed a 'securitisation of social policy' which builds on a future-oriented managerial conception of policing and a racialised conception of the social order. Mythen et al. (2016) then show how the concept of radicalisation

[36] See for example: (Perice, 2008, Anwar, 2008, Pentazis and Pemberton, 2009, Smyth, 2009, McDonald, 2011, Hickman, 2011, Awan, 2012, Hickman, 2012, Lynch, 2013, Breen-Smyth, 2014, Vermeulen, 2014, Kudnani, 2015).

justifies the logic of 'indicators' and 'signs' which cannot be anchored in a scientific understanding of a radicalisation process. This observation leads Ragazzi (2016, p. 9) to conclude that PREVENT establishes official categories of suspicion, (…) [that] are bound to produce *arbitrary categorisations, orienting repressive practices towards racialised categories'.*

At the same time, Mondon and Winter importantly point to the hegemonic universalism that renders whiteness invisible and non-racialised and a white person who commits and act of terrorism is represented as an individual with a biographical, political, and psychological narrative that causally explains him or her as a 'bad apple, aberration, or deviant psychopath, but when 'a Muslim commits an act of terrorism, he or she is seen as representative of the faith and community.' (Winter, 2015) The fact that mainstream politicians suggest, that the Muslim community has a 'special burden' and that it is 'lazy and wrong' to say that the attacks have nothing to do with Islam, for the perpetrators 'call themselves Muslim' (Swinford, 2015a, Swinford, 2015b) not only enables subtle forms of Islamophobia but further are reflective of silent hegemonic categories, rather than truly arbitrary.

In this context Mondon, writing of liberal Islamophobia refers to the construction of a 'pseudo-progressive binary and narrative' that defines

> *'Muslim culture and community as inherently opposed to some of the core values espoused in a mythical, essentialised, culturally homogenous, superior and enlightened West, or specific western nation, based on specific examples where the West embodies progress, such as democracy, human rights, free speech, gender and sexual equality and rights, and ironically tolerance.' (Mondon and Winter, 2016)*

What is interesting here of course is that in appealing to freedom of speech as the accomplishment of Western democracy is utilised by opportunistic demagogues as the vehicle to break with taboos and political correctness that serves to stigmatise Muslims and Islam. Melanie Phillips for example makes clear that

> *'Islamists are exploiting our chronic muddle of well-meaning tolerance and political correctness (backed up by the threat of more violence) to put Islam on a special - indeed, unique - footing within Britain' and points out that '[B]elieving that Islamic terrorism is motivated by an ideology which has 'hijacked' and distorted Islam, it [the government] will not acknowledge the extremism within mainstream Islam itself. Defining 'extremism' narrowly as supporting violence against Britain, it*

> *makes the catastrophic mistake of testing the aim of Islamising Britain as an eccentric but unthreatening position and not one to be taken at all seriously. (Phillips, 2006, p. viii)'*

She goes on to warn that Islamism, that is the 'attempt to take over our culture (…) will only be repulsed if Britain once again regains the confidence of its own culture, heritage and traditions. And these are based on Christianity.' (Phillips, 2006, p. xvi) Even though Phillips acknowledges that

> *'in the wake of such atrocities [like the 7/7 London Bombings] it is certainly important not to demonise an entire community for the misdeeds of a few' (Phillips, 2006, p. 134)*

but follows this by focusing on relying on a distinction between moderate and extreme Muslims. In her estimation,

> *'it is unfortunately not so easy to agree that British Muslims are overwhelmingly moderate in their views, and that those holding extremist views are so small in number as to be statistically insignificant' because 'if 'moderation' includes reasonableness, truthfulness and fairness, the reaction by British Muslims to the London bombings was not moderate at all. Yes, they condemned the atrocities. But in the next breath they denied that these had had anything to do with Islam. Thus they not only washed their hands of any communal responsibility but - in denying what was a patently obvious truth that these attacks were carried out by adherents of Islam in the name of Islam - also indicated that they would do nothing to address the roots of the problem so as to prevent such things from happening again.' (Phillips, 2006, p. 134)*

While Phillips does appear to 'moderate' her own assessment on occasion, for example when she acknowledges that

> *'the Muslim community in Britain is extremely diverse, consisting of many sub communities with different geographical and cultural antecedents and views as well as different positions on the religious spectrum. Many British Muslims just want to get on with life and have no leanings towards religious extremism, let alone violence.' (Phillips, 2006, p. 141)*

she repeatedly concludes that

> *'it would appear that there is something particular to Islamic culture at this present time that makes it vulnerable to this kind of extremism (…) although many in Britain lean over backwards to deny this, the case that the cause lies in the religious culture itself is overwhelming.' (Phillips, 2006, p. 141)*

For Phillips

> *'[T]he essence of a moderate attitude among a minority is that it is prepared to live as a minority, to subscribe to the overarching values and institutions of the state while practising its own culture in the private sphere. British Muslims, however, are increasingly pushing for their culture to be highly visible and given parity in the public sphere' (Phillips, 2006, p. 154)*

and follows this with examples where British institutions commonly accommodate the minority demand

> *'for such privileges' that 'run counter to the normal relationship between British society and its minority groups. While minority groups are free to pursue their own customs, they do not expect public services available to all to be adapted to their requirements, let alone encourage a form of separate development.' (Phillips, 2006, p. 155)*

Phillips' very broad understanding of extremism and her focus on the particularity of Islamic culture that makes it vulnerable to extremism and at the same time pointing towards the preparedness to 'live as a minority, to subscribe to the overarching values and institutions of the state while practising its own culture in the private sphere' (Phillips, 2006, p. 154) as a marker of moderation, is not only indicative of what Mondon calls liberal Islamophobia, but more importantly is not limited to the political fringes. Lee (2015) for example points towards the counter jihad online scene as being comprised of 'a loose collection of parties, organisations and associated pundits and talking heads united by their belief that they are witnessing an attempted Islamic takeover of the West. For Lee, groups and individuals can be considered 'part of the counter-jihad scene only by their shared ideas and sentiments'. These ideas and sentiment, loosely speaking, 'for the counter-jihad scene, Europe and the United States are under threat from an aggressive and politicised Islamic world that is attempting to take over Europe through a process of 'Islamification' with the eventual aim of imposing Sharia law' does find its way into the mainstream political rhetoric.

The government, in putting British values at the heart of tackling extremism, a notion that is broadly understood as

> *'vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. Extremism also includes calls for death of members of the armed force' (National Security Council, 2015, p. 9)*

echoes the concerns expressed by the likes of Phillips in that it understands 'extremist activity of any sort' to 'create an environment for radicalising individuals and could lead them to a pathway towards terrorism.' (Extremism, 2013, p. 1) In addressing the National Security Council, then Prime Minister Cameron emphasises that

> *'[F]or too long, we have been a passively tolerant society, saying to our citizens: as long as you obey the law, we will leave you alone. It's often meant we have stood neutral between different values. And that's helped foster a narrative of extremism and grievance (…) Freedom of speech. Freedom of worship. Democracy. The rule of law. Equal rights regardless of race, gender or sexuality. We must say to our citizens: this is what defines us as a society. To belong here is to believe in these things. And it means confronting head-on the poisonous Islamist extremist ideology. Whether they are violent in their means or not, we must make it impossible for the extremists to succeed.' (Home Office et al., 2015)*

It is via this combination of British values, a focus on extremism and extremist ideology in opposition to said values that liberal Islamophobia finds its way into the mainstream political and popular discourse even though it appears that the terminological vagueness and meaning of extremism and British values has proven to be 'confusing' and too difficult to resolve for Parliament to proceed with the proposed Counter-Extremism Bill.

The attempt at legislating a muscular liberalism in the form of a Counter-Extremism Bill and discursively breaking with established precedent and taboos with reference to freedom of speech embodied by the insistence on provocative terminology such as 'radical Islamic terrorism'[37] and thereby peddling the 'clash of civilisation and values narrative' (Mondon, 2015) feeds a hegemonic narrative upon which the illiberal type of Islamophobia, that is the type that is 'closest to traditional racism based around exclusivist, essentialist notions and concepts of race, ethnicity, gender, sexuality and religion, as well as identity itself' (Mondon

[37] See: (Toosi, 2017, Dilani, 2017).

and Winter, 2016) can and does find cover. However, where liberal Islamophobia at least on the surface appears to fall within the confines of what is acceptable in the hegemonic discourse, because it can rely on invoking values such as freedom of speech, the rule of law or tolerance, illiberal Islamophobia then merely serves to delineate the extreme from that which is normalised when liberal Islamophobic polemic by public actors that break with taboos is allowed to gain disproportionate media visibility.[38] At the heart however lies a hegemonic power differential in terms of access to public discourse and the capacity of individuals to impact the hegemonic narrative. (Mondon, 2016)

It is the social process as consequences of preventative counterterrorism and its manifestation in social policy and public discourse therefore, rather than an objectively institutionally orchestrated 'suspectification' of minority communities, which has been empirically observed. Nonetheless, it impacts (disproportionately) on the individual from a minority background for they perform their subjectivity in response and 'anticipation of the expectation of the suspector', for example in form of the performance of 'safe identities'. (Mythen et al., 2009, p. 747) This is problematic because, as Breen-Smyth (2014) observes, one does not actually express oneself, but conforms to the construction of one's projected community by others. At the same time however, Jarvis and Lister emphasise that 'ordinary' individuals claim a range of different subject-positions even in their effort to make sense of counterterrorism powers and the effects thereof; moreover and importantly, many individuals believe that counterterrorism powers 'work to position or identify them as particular types of political, gendered, religious or other subjects' and demonstrate how certain subject positions are co-constitutive in the counterterrorism-identity discourse (Jarvis and Lister, 2016) What remains then is a subjectively perceived and consequently experienced and felt pressure to declare loyalties which makes it problematic to relate to an undifferentiated construction of a national identity (Lynch, 2013), a need to interact with ascriptive identities and conflicting expectations of belonging, loyalty and duty as Muslim (McDonald, 2011), an awareness of being depicted as a high-risk group (Mythen et al, 2009) particularly by the media (Poole, 2011, Poole 2006) and a feeling that one must stake a claim in the growing Muslim identity (Modood, 2007), which leads to a formation of identity that takes place in the

[38] See: (Dabashi, 2017).

context of knowing that one is being perceived as 'Other', and/or belonging to a 'suspect community'.

What this process ultimately shows, is an inability of the state to independently and authoritatively delimit the space of security. In other words, the state in unable to provide a bounded space for security and counterterrorism policy sets in motion a dynamic, or theatre, whereby government is necessarily incapable to control its *perceived* meanings and *felt* consequences. Rather than addressing the real problem of terrorism through *extending* equal citizenship through partnerships and dialogue as part of counterterrorism initiatives PREVENT shows the irresponsible and short-sighted operationalisation of an untenable vagueness, fluidity and uncertainty of 'British values' as the benchmark against which extremism and radicalisation are to be evaluated. This approach misses, rather irresponsibly, real concerns of negative stereotyping and Islamophobia, of observed and felt experiences, that are negligently, if silently, tolerated by an operationalised vagueness of at the core of the government's understanding of the role of ideology in the radicalisation process and the display of 'British values' as the indicator and/or sign by which the bureaucratic-managerial apparatus may decide on the safeness of an expressed identity.

In attempting to solve the real problem of terrorism however, the government must recognise and explicitly address the inherent power differential between the hegemonic and minority discourse and take responsibility for its own participation in the meandering of meanings that evolve through staged performances at a variety of interconnected settings. (Hajer, 2009, p. 170) Particularly in light of a preventative logic of counterterrorism, where the operational policy-paradigm of relative knowability of the intent to harm us, rests on the moral imperative to pre-empt a potentially catastrophic terrorist event, whose time, place and perpetrator are unknown, government fails to manage the epistemic crisis at the heart of counterterrorism responsibly, but fills the ontological blank with hegemonic and racialised categories (Ragazzi, 2016) in an attempt to operationalise uncertainty and in the well-meaningly perceived best interest of a society confronted with an uncertain threat to its national security.

Applying Gad's (2012a) observations for the context of the United Kingdom, it seems most compelling to speak of Muslims in Britain as not having been awarded a space of a-security, rather than being institutionally suspect.

While it can indeed not be argued that the state is responsible of an objective, deliberate and managed process of 'suspectification', it sets in motion a dynamic - a theatre of sorts - that it cannot but fail to responsibly manage in a mediatised, socially-negotiated, interconnected and ultimately contested and unbounded political arena where government fails to navigate the unboundedness of terrorism. What is more, it fails to establish trusting and reflexive, *self-reforming* relationships with *all* its citizens in recognition of the hegemonic power differentials that do exist in a post-migration society like Britain. In other words, while the liberal democracy promises the equality of all its citizens, dialogue and partnership retreat to bounded lines of orientation in order to manage the threat of terrorism in times when national security is dominated by paradigms of uncertainty. What follows is preventative risk-management enacted by state institutions whose operational logic fails to be able to accommodate for the promise of the preservation of human dignity for all citizens in a liberal democracy but instead, as Sabir (Sabir, 2017, p. 4) passionately argues, '*in practise*, […] dictate the governance of 'others' based on essentialised understandings of race, gender, and ethnicity' and the 'institutionalisation of a policy that claims to be about social inclusion and 'safeguarding' but is, in practice, disciplining, excluding, and preventing individuals from articulating a distinctive Muslim agency and identity.'

3.3 The responsibility to pierce moral bubbles

The attraction of co-citizens to (violent) extremism abroad captures the attention of those in charge of national security with recurring frequency and across different nation states. The concern that vulnerable, impressionable and young men and women, and even entire families are attracted to join ISIS and their likes in their cause with the potential of returnees waging jihad 'at home' brings with it the inability to geographically externalise the potential threat of violent extremist activism at home and appears to have necessitated a renewed scrutiny in focus on the 'drivers of radicalisation' in general, and a misguided interpretation of Islam, in particular. Augmented by the realities of a civil war and refugees (temporarily) settling in Europe, the question as to the place of Islam in the West as well as its compatibility with Western values, continues to raise both questions of integration as well as national security. It is not unusual for both

debates to become conflated. The focus on signs of extremism, ideology and British values at least suggests knowability and gives direction in a context where national security threats are marked by uncertainty and the dissolution of traditional lines of orientation. A seemingly clear-cut, muscular liberalism affirming British values provide for a new orientation has been shown to form the bureaucratic backbone of the preventative approach of the UK government's PREVENT counterterrorism strand.

Our 'shared values' and inclusivity in a national security context lead to a paradoxical situation where we depend on the one hand on openness for dialogue *with* 'the Other' to forge partnerships in the fight against extremism and misguided ideology, while on the other hand there is a true concern about the closure of this dialogue to pre-set parameters in order to secure space *from* 'the Other' (Gad, 2012b, p. 396) while this notion of dialogue even though couched within a national security context touches the core of civil society relationships and equal citizenship. It is this abstract paradox that is contextually experienced as disingenuous, hypocritical, exclusionary and ultimately unjust in the light of the moral promise to equal citizenship by the liberal democratic state and its institutions. Indeed, it is paradigmatic of our own moral embubblement that prevents us from recognising and confronting our own exclusionary practises while at the same time expressing genuine concern regarding the incompatibility with liberal values on the other hand.

The preventative logic of counterterrorism policy then finds its manifestation in addressing the ideological component of radicalisation, that 'while not involving actual violence fosters and justifies violence.' (Rabasa and Benard, 2015, p. 174) As extremists and terrorist groups do not exist in a vacuum, reaching out to Muslim communities has become a major component of European Counter-Radicalisation efforts (Rabasa and Benard, 2015) and subscribing to liberal political values has become the qualifying criterion for dialogue and partnership. (May, 2015, Home Office, 2011) Where the notion of radicalisation touches upon issues of identity, meaning and a sense of belonging as a matter of national security, bureaucracy via the concept of radicalisation ties together and forms the context within which institutional power relations meet individual identity processes, or in other words, where the national security context interweaves with civil society relations. Values that form the core of a

privately lived identity spill over - via privately exercised and embodied choices - into the public realm, become sites of public, collective scrutiny and contestation. In a climate, however, where a narrow understanding of security is driven by a preventative logic geared not towards knowing, reflexivity or critique but towards action, the institutional bureaucracy charged with operationalising the remaining vagueness, coloured in by fantasies and imagination, fails to provide, and indeed closes a space for equal participation in shaping the meaning of citizenship and belonging.

The individual's 'homing desire' is shaped in the context of social interactions and (institutional) power relations and contemporarily against the background of counterterrorism efforts. In such an environment, internal and external identity politics, the subjectivity of the individual who acquires, learns, creates, modulates, negotiates, rejects, formulates and re-formulates motivations and meanings - which must lie at the centre of any analytically sound understanding of the motivations of terrorism - gets lost. In attempting to solve the real problem of terrorism, it is not only governments who must take responsibility for their participation in the meandering of meanings that evolve through staged performances at a variety of *interconnected settings* (Hajer, 2009, p. 170), but also academics. Such is the political climate and with a significant shift in the development of self-perception of national and European identity as based on values rather than race or birth forms the context within which individual and collective identity are negotiated and ultimately, individual aspirations and motivations, *amongst so many others* but also the one to participate in violent Islamist activism, are formed and formulated. It is for Terrorism Studies, to dispassionately investigate the subjectivity of the actor and investigate security from the perspective of the individual subject in civil society context rather than through the lens of national security. Terrorism and the motivation to participate in it, are shaped and take place in *individually experienced and lived contexts*.

It is these contexts that give shape to the expression and performance of individual subjectivity and instilling a negotiated sense of meaning and belonging and ultimately security. This sense of security lies in the confirmation of the moral promise of equal rights and dignity in return for a deferral of unique individuality that brings into harmony subjectivity with meaning giving narratives of collective identities. It is to the moral psychological and philosophical foundations as well

as the implications of the failure to live up to this promise that the next two chapters will turn, in order to emphasise the responsibility of Terrorism Studies to challenge the insisted clarity with which the supposed understanding of either the meaning of terrorism or the process that leads to terrorism is communicated, because it makes the actual individual and their motivations disappear in all their multifaceted manifestations. The more terrorism (its supposed understanding but particularly the response to it) takes shape in a policy and social context, the less nuanced the individual engaged in it becomes. Messy realities make space for clear-cut boundaries and polarities that fail to enable understanding of terrorism or individual's subjective motivations. In this chapter, I have shown that UK government's specific emphasis on preventative counterterrorism measures and debates which focus on notions of extremism, beliefs and British values has turned its focus on Islam and Muslim communities in the UK, who factually enter the spotlight in the pre-emptive policy approach to countering terrorism, through a supposed link between a rejection of fundamental British values and radicalisation, exacerbated by a discourse around the failure of multiculturalism and the question of loyalties of Muslim citizens critical-radical space of dissent is closed based on the logic of pre-emption.

Lived experiences of Muslim individuals as 'suspect communities' are indicative of the creation of polarised, closed spaces for potential dialogue, whereby identity processes are communicated as static and dichotomous and lead to the disappearance of subjectivity. Such a limitation of individual expression to a publicly sanctioned performance of one's ascribed identity has been shown to not only undermines recognition of equal citizenship for the individual and further sanitises and polarises messy realities to such a degree that the needed complexity to understand terrorism as a social problem makes way for a primacy of a bounded, securitised approach to terrorism understood as a threat to national security, with the social dimension of terrorism merely caught up in the power dynamics around which the national security threat is conceptualised.

Ultimately, it has become clear that preventative counterterrorism policy that takes the promise of equal citizenship rather than national security as its point of reference is in a morally stronger and *perceptually* more genuine position to bridge its understanding of terrorism as a security issue with its contextual

understanding of terrorism as a social problem, because it is in a position to navigate recognition of individual subjectivity and identity on the one hand and common ownership for human security considerations on the other. It avoids drawing boundaries within society through the creation of bounded spaces within which individuals may explore their subjectivity in a politically and socially sanctioned manner but invites genuine reflexive dialogue on the constitution, interpretation and application of concretely lived shared values. It is for Terrorism Studies, to provide for a foundation that enables an understanding of terrorism as a social problem and its actor as a socially embedded, cognisant and non-exceptional subject in order to shift the policy debate in relation to terrorism in general and radicalisation as a causal precursor to terrorism in particular. So as to enable genuine and open, even radical self-reforming dialogue on the values that a society of equals choses to recognise as contributing individually and collectively to the common good of that society, while at the same time enabling an understanding of terrorism that enables law enforcement and counterterrorism to protect all individuals in society.

Because of these contextual observations, Terrorism Studies must take on the responsibility to account not only for the strategic security threat that emanates from terrorism, but further from the civil society moral implications that the unduly bounded debate on causation, motivations and origins of terrorism has for the discussion of wider social values and indeed the place of individuals and their lived social, cultural and political realities. Ultimately, Terrorism Studies needs to provide aids for policy making to self-reflexively interrogate its own exclusionary practises and moral bubbles and consecutively reconcile the prevalent discourse on national security with that of the civil society's moral promise of Western liberal democracies and human dignity. It must find a way to proactively take responsibility in navigating the intersectionality and interstitial position of terrorism and Terrorism Studies must play its part in demonstrating, where and how taken-for-granted normative positions stand in the way for truly *self-reforming* dialogue in order to enable *moral learning* and *emancipation*.

3.4 Conclusion

Contextually we have seen in this chapter, that a key dimension in the logic behind preventative counterterrorism policy and debate has brought to the fore very distinctly, a focus on the ideological dimension of terrorism and concomitantly on an affirmation of morality and values in an attempt to make knowable that which merely exists as a potentiality. Having designated those Western liberal values a bulwark against (violent) extremism and terrorism, the chapter has shown that at the core of the invocation of values in preventative counterterrorism remains the maintenance of a hierarchical citizenship through exclusionary practises as to who may shape and challenge those values and therefore operates within circumscribed power relationships. It is through the example of preventative counterterrorism policy that the chapter has contextually shown that the contestation of the concept of terrorism, that takes place in the context of national security rather than civil society, does indeed occur *in lieu of* a wider social, cultural and political debate on (national) identity including the identity of the enemy, the boundaries between political and private life, and ultimately the legitimacy of violence and therefore, it is the argument of this chapter that a different conceptualisation of violence as other than instrumental can provide the basis for focusing on the function of violence and thereby allow a more explicit focus on the manner in which morality becomes invoke to maintain exclusionary practises and status-quo assisting explanations of motivations to engage in terrorism, because it takes seriously the position that normative reasoning invokes a compelling logic and persuasive appeal to greater for seemingly deontological authority.

4 On the centrality of violence and its socio-moral function

It is against the background of the observations of the previous chapters, that this chapter, with reference to Virtuous Violence Theory (VVT), will establish the need to recognise the centrality of moral motivations in social action and understand terrorism as a social moral action. A moral psychological understanding of the motivations to turn to violence moves beyond the instrumentality of violence that lies at the heart of so much of terrorism research. This chapter will look at moral psychology generally and Virtuous Violence Theory specifically in order locate individual motivations for violent actions in the *socio-moral functions violence serves pertaining to social relationships and their predictability*. The motivation to utilise violence is not only understood to be a moral one, but is furthermore and crucially, intended to function as creation, management or dissolution of a particular social relationship. In this context, it must be noted that moral psychology points towards a human moral sense that motivates individual actions and morality thus understood, is merely descriptive. This descriptive moral starting point enables an understanding of the motivations for violent action that relates to the social function of violence with regards to specific social relationships and must be clearly distinguished from a prescriptive morality encountered in moral philosophy.

This chapter then, aims to demonstrate that moral motivations are crucial in understanding motivations to participate in violence in the sense that *violence fulfils a social function* in creating, confirming, altering or ending social relationships. Violence initially becomes graspable as common and non-spectacular and even constructive in human affairs. Virtuous Violence Theory allows to place the individual at the centre of the investigation and enables a relational understanding of their subjective (and always consequentialist) moral motivations to commit acts of violence. It provides for a crucial link between merely subjective motivations and the social-relational context within which these are formed. Furthermore, it offers a reflexive-relational dimension that helps to critically engage with the role of contextual factors and commonly invoked ‘frames’ such as gender and religion and methodologically forces an empathetic engagement with the individual violent actor.

For the context of Terrorism Studies, the important take away of this chapter will be the understanding that because the individual is motivated by the socio-moral function violence serves, this motivation is paramount to understanding the terrorist actor. This is the case because it frames the way in which she subjectively makes sense of her violence. By firstly, moving away from an instrumental to a functional understanding of violence, this chapter provides the basis for a purely ethical weighing process in relation to specific 'goods' which have a social-relational significance for the individual. Invoking moral psychology, which stresses the importance of descriptively relating a subjectively enacted, yet socially acquired, desire to navigate social relations furthermore enables empathy with the individual actor. Such an empathetic approach is paramount because it is the foundational basis for a critical engagement with the subjectively perceived motives and intentions in relation to the creation, confirmation, alteration or end of social relationships that centre on the perspective of the individual rather than that of the analyst and make accessible unfamiliar and diverse notions of right and wrong thereby learning to recognise the less than inevitability of negative moral judgement of particular instances of violence.

Secondly, and maybe more importantly for the overall thesis, moving away from an instrumental perspective on violence moreover allows to analytically relegate rather than conflate questions of moral philosophical valence which necessitate an explicitly incorporation of the question of morality in order to analyse political violence more critically and reflexively. It further shows however, that questions of morality form part and parcel of any social relationship and that normative questions are necessarily implied and must be embedded in the analysis of social actions. Absent explicit normative theorising, analysis must remain intellectually, and as this chapter will show, cognitively, vulnerable and incomplete.

Thus far, this thesis has established, that even though contested with regards to what constitutes its specific elements, important to Terrorism Studies both in its critical as well as orthodox inclination, is the centrality of (political) violence. By means of emphasis, the definitional debate visited in the chapter two has demonstrated that violence, provides a crucial anchor point for the study of terrorism and hereby particularly the framings of concomitant research foci as demonstrated by Sageman's declared stagnation of Terrorism Studies. We have

also seen that Critical Terrorism Studies is quick (and rightly so) in critiquing and attempting to rectify the one-sided focus on political violence perpetrated by non-state actors principally by means of offering expanding the definition of terrorism and problematising explicitly interest and ideology driving research agendas. With the expansion of what is deemed to be considered as pertaining to *political* violence, and in an interesting move through the inclusion of a special section in 2015 in Critical Studies on Terrorism of everyday terrorism and intimate partner violence (Sjoberg and Gentry, 2015, Sjoberg 2015), spectacular instances of political violence however remain the generator of most interest and research across the field. Sageman's (2013) question *what leads a person to turn to political violence?* and the way violence generally and terrorism specifically is dealt with in the social sciences maintains an - so this chapter will argue - undue focus on the political *instrumentality* of violence. Through this focus on the instrumentality of violence, the means/end relationship of violence becomes the central lens for attempting to understand individual motivations. This instrumental focus however on the one hand misses how political instrumentality may only come as a secondary, that is justificatory step in conscious moral reasoning and moreover misses how common violence is in human affairs more generally and that it serves a social function and on the other hand that human affairs overall are mostly conducted without utilising *instrumental* violence strictly speaking.

Moreover, the political instrumentality of violence takes for granted a means-end relationship common in the understanding of violence amongst political philosophers. Arendt for example emphasises that 'violence being instrumental by nature is rational to the extent that it is effective in reaching the end that must justify it.' (Arendt, 1970, p. 79) It is however the contention of this this chapter, that with such a framing, not only do we marginalise the constitutive dimension of (non-spectacular) violence but, at the same time the political-instrumental means-end understanding of violence enables, indeed linguistically invokes not only a moralising valence in the form of a clearly consequentialist logic whereby particular (political) ends justify the use of violence, but this framing also locates the use of violence in the political rather than the civil society realm and cannot but be embedded in hegemonic power relationships. What follows from an academic perspective is that such a framing facilitates the analytical inclusion of selective instances of violence that reflects particular disciplinary

understandings of violence, as well as the invocation of a moral position which sees violence in ultimate reference to its intended aims within generally set constellations of power relationships. For the purpose of the study of terrorism this of course also means that because the monopoly of force lies with the state, the utilisation of force by anyone but the state and its duly appointed organs, becomes morally tainted.

4.1 The centrality of violence in Terrorism Studies

From the definitional debate in Terrorism Studies outlined in chapter two, we have seen that central, indeed a constitutive feature of the analytical study of terrorism is its violence, and most academic energies are being devoted explaining its causes and context. It is noteworthy, albeit not surprising, that the manner in which violence is conceptualised within Terrorism Studies mirrors the approach taken to violence more generally, and as Magnani (2011) notes violence is seldom a topic for philosophical enquiry. However, as the entanglement of violence with wider questions of morality, the question as to what is experienced as violence, the social function of violence and indeed the constitution of social relationships more generally, cannot analytically be separated from its social, functional and historical context (Erlenbusch, 2014, Erlenbusch 2010) the lack of a philosophical perspective on violence has implication for the insights generated, but particularly the limitations of these insights.

While it is not my intention to challenge the fact that terrorism constitutes a challenge to (peaceful) social relationships and national security per se, the argument that I am trying to pursue throughout this thesis relates to the fact that, however conceptualised, political violence and terrorism is first and foremost an individual's subjective and moral choice to act in their social world. It is as such that the methodological approach to violence for the purpose of Terrorism Studies must reflect its, that is the social actions wider moral and social entanglements and must provide for an approach that explicitly and responsibly accommodates the normative conflation of the analytical conceptualisation of terrorism as a moral and social action. In other words, and taking seriously the perspective of Devji (2005, p. xvi) who has noted that setting Al-Qaeda's violence within beliefs and practices allows to move 'beyond narrow concerns of strategy and security' and

Baumann (2013) who points out that disqualifying violence as categorically irrational or evil derails an empathetic and socially embedded understanding of violence, the argument that this thesis advances relates to the responsibility of the academic discipline of Terrorism Studies to enable a deep, empathetic understanding of an individual's decision to utilise terroristic violence and this academic responsibility entails the need to explicitly highlight how and where imagination and fantasy fill the space that terrorism as an empty signifier leaves for the observer. It is the contention of this thesis that an unproblematic invocation of morality and the seemingly automatic moralisation of the terrorist act deserves special attention because it is this that has been demonstrated to have very tangible implications for lived, yet subjectively divergent social realities.

Despite the recognition of the socially embeddedness of our understanding of violence, there appears to be a familiar consensus that central to violence is its physicality (Magnani, 2011), for it is its physicality that translates into observable and corporeally experienceable effects. At the same time however, violence is not a single kind of activity and Magnani (2011, p. 8) contends that human beings are 'prisoners of moral bubbles' which 'systematically disguise their violence to themselves' and as such preclude certain actions from being understood and treated as violence in the first place. As frames for understanding violence emerges in tandem with its experience and 'the frame works both to preclude certain kinds of questions, certain kinds of historical inquiries, and to function as a moral justification.' (Butler, 2006, p. 4-5) Indeed, as the experience of violence relates to specific instances of violence, and as particularly political philosophy points out, violence is generally addressed in relation to the wider workings of authority and power, the conceptualisation of violence in terms of means and ends - ultimately of its instrumentality - moves the (subjective) experience of violence to a question of its justifiability. (Arendt, 1970) It is as a consequence of this understanding that the 'full violent potential of structures, artefacts, institutions, cultures, and ideologies is marginalised and disregarded.' (Magnani, 2011, p. 4) Counterterrorism policies as we have seen in chapter three become perceived as not only as such violent structures but also as reifying exclusionary practises and inherently problematic rather than a merely welcome approach to deal with the real problem of terrorism.

The systemic disguise of violence is facilitated by a jump where initially only certain types of violence are registered as such in the first place, and even the remaining visible violence must never be understood as an end in itself. The focus shifts from the experience of violence to its moral and indeed moralising framing. The implication of this is of particular significance for the study of terrorism, the conceptualisation of which, strongly emphasises both the political and the violent dimensions. This is reflective of hegemonic power relationships that take the state, rather than the socially embedded individual as its point of reference and thereby, *selectively* make visible certain acts as both political and violent, while disregarding others.

4.1.1 Instrumentality of Violence and the privilege of power

Political philosophy posits violence as first and foremost instrumental (Arendt, 1970, Coady 2008), which according to Benjamin (1979) is the necessary result of the relationship between violence and the law. Conceptualising violence as a *means* to achieve particular ends results in an e*valuation of violence* with regards to different instances of its use and the just or unjust ends being pursued, *never however as a judgement of violence itself as a principle*. Where Benjamin constructs the state as the effect of power through legal and legitimate violence (law-creating violence) he demonstrates the performative character of violence as the guarantor and reinforcer of power. Power becomes the true end of the law. Being the instrument of guaranteeing and reinforcing power, the link then between the law - providing for the legitimacy of violence - and violence is crucial for it provides the foundation upon which rests, not only the state's monopoly of legitimate violence, but also its guarantee of power. Arendt (1970) rightly observes the circularity and short-lived utility of violence in establishing power and thus ultimately, its limited instrumental utility.

As violence (outside the law) threatens power itself however, the law disallows violence as a means to achieve individual ends but creates a (non-violent) system within which these ends can be pursued. (Erlenbusch, 2010, p. 168-170, Benjamin, 1979) The law curtails individual power. Ultimately then, *legal* violence always plays in the hands of the powerful and becomes *ethically hollow* for being *self-referential*. Indeed, Baumann (2013) concludes that, from a moral philosophical perspective, violence always has to be illegitimate because an ethics of violence can never be firmly limited outside the ends pursued. After all,

it is the state that practically constructs, at times ad-hoc and ex-post, the justification for the exceptions to the laws that limited violence in the first instance. In other words, terroristic violence is ethically no different to any other instance of violence. However, terroristic violence falls outside the readily available, taken-for-granted and therefore *accepted* justification and can be understood only as an instance of violence that has no place in politics as conceived from within the horizon of hegemonic power relationships.

As much as we can observe the arbitrary moral condemnation of terroristic violence, because 'violence is constitutive of politics, of thoughts and of knowledge because all these practices are based on and justified by moral *options*' (emphasis added Magnani, 2011, p. 66) the fact remains: if violence is always already understood with reference to its instrumentality and activates a latent, taken-for-granted notion of morality that privileges the exercise and indeed definition of violence by those in power as legitimate for being within the framework of the law, experiences of violence that fall outside this framework will either conflate the normative and descriptive dimension of violence or alternatively mute those experiences that are not understood as violence for they do not directly threaten state power. It must however be noted that this does not represent an ontological necessity but rather reflects an (arbitrary) choice, the arbitrariness of which becomes visible to and through those that utilise violence and present alternative justifications for it and thereby disrupt the hegemonic, taken-for-granted power relationships.

4.1.2 The experience of violence

We have seen that violence emerges in tandem with its experience (Butler, 2006, p. 4-5), yet the previous section has also highlighted the fact that, particularly in political philosophy and political sciences, it is the state's perspective of violence and the instrumental understanding of violence that has found its way into Terrorism Studies. As the definition debate presented in chapter two has demonstrated, terrorism predominantly is conceptualised with the state as its point of reference and instrumental violence as a key analytical feature. While the debate on the definition has highlighted the arbitrariness of choice of the analytical focus on state violence particularly by proponents of Critical Terrorism Studies, the instrumentality of violence has generally not been problematised. For the purpose of the study of terrorism, even though the mere

terminology of ‘terror’ suggest the importance of the subjectivity of the experience of violence, its (political) instrumentality has remained crucial.

Analytically zooming in directly on the (political) instrumentality of violence represents a choice that isolates this dimension’s explanatory importance and from there on has the potential to distort the constitutive elements of violence. Not only does investigating the individual actor with reference to their merely instrumental choice to use violence lead to their isolation from a broader explanatory framework of events, but at the same time *normatively*, the centrality of the means-end-relationship of instrumental violence leads to a moralisation of the violence. Taken together, these *choices* lead to an unduly bounded framing of political violence in general, and terrorism in particular that fails to address the fact that the debates surrounding terrorism stand in lieu of wider cultural and political questions that societies are being confronted with including a very challenge to the hegemonic distribution of power.

Be it because of ‘moral bubbles’ that preclude from our view specific instances of violence as violence or a preoccupation with the utilitarian, rational aspects of violence, *descriptively* we ‘suffer from crucial blind spots not only about what violence signifies or expresses’ (Coker, 2002, p. 6) but also what, how and when the individual perpetrator experiences violence. But it is the very experience of violence which necessitates to take the individual to the centre of the investigation, because it is the individual that experiences herself as the actor, if not agent, and alternatively recipient at the centre of subjectively experienced and expressed instances of violence that make up the narrative of her life. It is these subjective experiences that provide the individual with her place, with her choices, with her opportunities within broader events and social relations. It is her subjective everyday experiences, the collective and institutional context and the frames provided by public narratives, rhetorical commonplaces, and cultural frames, that are utilised in the (subjective) *construction of knowledge* and beliefs about political events and violent phenomena (Jackson and Hall, 2016, p. 11) that make meaningful for the individual their position and choices within a wider framework of social forces, historical events and social relations.

It is such a narrative, anthropological understanding of violence - and understanding that investigates the socio-relational function that violence serves - that allows to make visible how various large-scale social forces and incidents

of subjective violence, that is violence that constitutes the subject position (Dodd, 2011), become to be translated into personal experiences that can provide for the impetus and opportunity for self-reflection, moral learning and emancipation.

Moreover, it is such an approach that allows for a radical empathetic, for subject-centred, understanding of the motivation to utilise violence that avoids (for it explicitly relegates) a priori *normative* moralising, albeit always recognising the dynamics of descriptive, indeed experiential moralisation. If we do not 'begin the story with the experience of violence *we* suffered' (emphasis added Butler, 2006, p. 6), we cannot only begin to see that subjectively perceived instances of violence, such as structural violence or verbal interactions, are rarely seen and acknowledged as "violent", but also that actual perpetrators of violence think of *their* actions as morally justified. Indeed, Magnani points out that it is precisely through this moral disengagement and moral embubblement that structural violence is often seen as morally legitimate. He goes as far as to note that even if state agents for example inflict physical or invisible violence on the basis of legal and/or moral reasons, these reasons do not cancel the violence perpetrated and violence does not have to be condoned; Structural violence then, becomes systematically disguised as something other than violence. (Magnani, 2011, p. 178-182) This moral sense, which needs to be clearly and explicitly distinguished from a prescriptive, normative morality, is a *distinctive mode of experiencing and thinking about any action* and is paramount in understanding the individual's motivation to act violently. And it is the attempt to understand this psychological dimension of a moral sense, that this chapter now wishes to focus on.

4.1.2.1 Moral sense, affect and social action

Social psychologists have come to the insight that, close to it being a universal feature in human behaviour, individuals possess a moral sense which suggests to themselves what actions and behaviours are morally justified. Haidt (2007, p. 998) reiterates the insight from evolutionary psychology and emphasises that the *building blocks for human morality are emotional - not rational* - while the ability to engage in conscious moral reasoning (moderated through language) came much later. Haidt clarifies the insistence on the separation between moral intuition and moral reason to be too stark and he suggests a new synthesis in moral psychology - the Social Intuitionist Model. This model maintains the primacy of affect-laden, automated evaluative processes of

good-bad, like-dislike which happen without the conscious awareness of the individual but adds to this the recognition that the engagement in conscious verbal reasoning is *often* influenced by the initial moral intuition and temporally only takes place *after* the affective response has happened. He posits then, that conscious moral reasoning when it occurs is 'usually a post-hoc process in which individuals search for evidence to support their initial reaction.' (Haidt, 2007, p. 998) He finds evidence for this in studies that show on the one hand nearly instant implicit reactions to scenes or stories of moral violations, the fact that these initial affective reactions are usually good predictions of moral judgements and behaviours and maybe most interestingly, by studies that show that individuals can be 'morally dumbfounded'. In other words, individuals know *intuitively* that something is wrong even when they cannot explain, that is provide processed reasons, why this is the case. He reaches the conclusion that conscious moral reasoning is a bias-confirming process by incorporating insights of studies that demonstrate that people generally begin reasoning by setting out to confirm their initial hypothesis while rarely seeking disconfirming evidence and being 'quite good at finding support for whatever they want to believe'. (Haidt, 2007, p. 998) Pinker indeed notes that 'the human moral sense can excuse any atrocity in the minds of those who commit it, and it furnishes them with motives for acts of violence that bring them *no* tangible benefit.' (Pinker, 2011, p. 597, p. 751)

The moral sense helps us understand why individuals (and indeed groups) suggest to themselves, that their actions are morally justified and alternatively why someone else's actions are not. The Social Intuitionist Model helps to make sense of the thought processes, which shape human moral reasoning and which consequently must find reflection in the understanding of human behaviour. We will see in Chapter 5, that this affective primacy does not mean that there is an *inevitable automatism* which translates affect into immediate behaviour and action, but rather, in true pursuit of a critical methodology we will point to the fact that an understanding of the interaction of the affective primacy with that of moral reasoning has the capability of unlocking truly counterintuitive, alternative behaviours and motivations.

However, building on the insight of the affective primacy helps to appreciate the tendency to universally moralise behaviours and actions and points to the need to recognises the implications of this existence of a distinct

mode of thinking about an action; this recognition of course has the consequence that moralised modes of thinking about actions become actionable, because they operate as intrinsically worthy, justifiable norms and taboos, and upholding them becomes paramount for social stability. (Pinker, 2011, p. 753-4) It is thus, that conscious and unconscious modes of thinking about an action translate into the motivation to act morally as well as the moralisation of action more generally.

As a consequence of this, it is necessary to move the analytical gaze away from the focus on the instrumentality violence per se, and recognise violence as ultimately always requiring justification. (Baumann, 2013, Haidt, 2007) In other words, because violence always requires justification, we cannot fail but recognise the utilitarian dimension in the moralisation that takes place. For it is only within the concrete circumstances of lived experiences that the subjective, yet universal moral sense in its manifestation as moral intuition, translates into the post-hoc requirement for an ethical justification. It is plainly human to remain caught up in one's own moral universe and think of one's actions as morally justified and further, to translate this conviction into utilitarian ethical justifications, while at the same time, not recognising them as such.

The interesting consequence of this is of course, that political intentionality, that is the instrumentality of violence even from a psychological perspective, becomes purely *self-referential* and violence becomes the only agglomerating feature of an individualised action; an action whose meaning, by its pure exercise initially rests with the individual only. This however only lasts for so long until the action connects the individual, through the contingency of effects, rather than to any core substance (for this core substance is inherently self-referential and illusive), to something (a meaning, a framing, an observation) she cannot control. It is then the effects, as observed and narrated *from the outside*, that bind individuals together rather than any psychological profile or ideological uniformity and arbitrarily determine which relationships, which fault-lines and which narratives become activated and implicated (Devji, 2005) and what aspects of an individual's biography are deemed irrelevant. It is also this outside (objective) social reality that represents the hegemonic universe of power relationships that make the meaning of the act experienceable beyond its (subjective) corporeality.

It is this insight then that allows to connect violence - as the most visible and analytically supposedly most interesting aspect of terrorism - to socially

projected, individualised beliefs and practices that thereby, rather than making these a means of instrumental politics, turn violence into something ethical because it precisely goes beyond any controllable relationship between means and end. Devji (2005) notes for the context of Al-Qaeda's jihad, that

> *'while indeed meant to accomplish certain ends, [Al-Qaeda's actions of jihad] have become more ethical than political in nature since they have resigned control of their own effects, thus becoming gestures of duty […] rather than acts of instrumentality.' (Devji, 2005, p. 3-4)*

At the same time however, it is moral psychology that encourages a shift in perspective, away from the instrumentality of violence to its social function in facilitating the 'living out' of the moral sense and gives explanatory recognition to the fact that people expect their relationships to be regulated violently. Rather than exceptionalising violence by normatively dissecting the circumstances, actors and victims, moral psychology provides for a route to understand that, while inherently moralising, no society *defines* every day, lived virtue and wrongdoings according to abstract normative principles. Indeed, among the six factors that Horgan (2008, p. 85) suggests as providing a powerful framework to explain the openness to socialisation into terrorism, is the belief in violence against the state or its symbols [as] 'not inherently immoral,' yet it is this aspect that, thus far has received little attention.

Social psychology then generally, and moral psychology particularly, can give important clues not only about this 'openness to socialisation' into terrorism because here descriptive morality - that is the subjective understanding of one's action as moral - functions to motivate *social action*. Violent action posited as *social action* is understood in reference to its social reflexivity and ultimately social function. It moves social relationships and the person's awareness of their social-relational embeddedness and the concomitant unboundedness of the social action to the forefront. Moreover, social psychology can also provide for a grounding for the demand for radical empathy. It is surprising that this empathetic understanding of terrorist violence as moral social action remains undervalued because it is precisely the fact that terrorism is understood as a threat to the fabric of social relations that forms the basis for so much of the widening of the 'soft' counterterrorism related, particularly preventative policy and radicalisation discourse - a discourse that forces a focus on the practises of social relations.

At the same time, analytically distinguishing between descriptive morality as per moral psychology, and normative morality helps to untangle the subjective motivation to engage in violence from seemingly unproblematic normative moral intuitions that follow from the instrumental use of violence. Positing violence as moral social action further recognises the reflexivity of the mental processes that guide the motivations of the individual to engage in violent action and allows the methodological move towards a closer look at the functional dimension of violence in the constitution of social relationships. This overall methodologically acknowledges the fact that there is a *necessary relationship of dependency between the analytical and the normative dimension of concrete instances of violence*.

4.2 Descriptive morality, social stability, and violence

Firstly, conceptualising terroristic violence as moral social action allows to envision that violence generally grows out of a relationship between perpetrator, victims and third parties. In doing so, it enables a closer look at the make-up and basis of conduct for these social relationships the individual aims to regulate (violently). Secondly, it enables an investigation into the cultural psychology and cultural meanings of violence rather than its instrumentality, and the manner in, which these functions to regulate relationships. Thirdly, it recognises that people are driven by an inherent moral sense and incorporates in the understanding a much-needed reflexivity, as well as emotions and intentions into the individual's decision-making process that give rise to violence. And lastly, it necessitates to explicitly relegate the question of normative morality to the question of the manner, in which social relationships are understood to be regulated more generally and thereby opens the route for an emancipatory approach to terrorism on the basis of an existential struggle for recognition at a later stage. It will be with reference to Virtuous Violence Theory that the first three aspects will be addressed for the remainder of this chapter, while indeed relegating the question of prescriptive morality to chapter six.

4.2.1 Virtuous Violence Theory and Relational Models Theory

Virtuous Violence Theory is based on the ethnographic observation that 'people often judge that to constitute or regulate relationships they are *morally*

required to hurt or kill another person, and that obligation makes local sociocultural sense'. The theory proposes that, in the purposeful pursuit of violence, 'people are morally motivated to do violence to create, conduct, protect, redress, terminate, or mourn social relationships with the victim or with others.' (Fiske and Rai, 2015, p. 2-3). The crucial core in attempts to understand violence becomes the social constitutive function that violence fulfils in social relationships, while at the same time making descriptively moral, that is right and therefore, stable social relationship the core point of reference. As Fiske and Rai (2015) suggest

> *'[T]he perpetrator is violent to make the relationship right - to make the relationship what it ought to be according to his or her cultural implementations of universal relational moral principles. That is, most violence is morally motivated. Morality is about regulating social relationships, and violence is one way to regulate relationships.' (Fiske and Rai, 2015, p. 34)*

In other words, reconceptualising violence as morally motivated enables a better description as well as explanation of violent acts, because in 'culturally informed relationships, by killing and by being killed, as well as by being liable to be killed or obligated to kill, participants constitute and vividly display their social relationships.' (Fiske and Rai, 2015, p. 34) They come to this conclusion based on their extensive and diverse field observations stretching from war to intimate partner violence, that particular practices provide contextual 'evidence that the primary motives for violence are at the same time subjectively moral (…) and also moral in the framework of relationship theory, where morality is the regulation or constitution of vital social relationships.' (Fiske and Rai, 2015, p. 34) Rather than proposing that perpetrators chose violence because of a failure to inhibit violent impulses or for strictly rational reasons in order to achieve instrumental goals the theory suggests, that violence is motivated by morality. (Rai, 2015)

4.2.1.1 Organising social relationships and the normalcy of violence

Foundational in understanding an individual's motivations to act in social relationships within Virtuous Violence Theory is the complementarity of actions. This means that fundamentally and from a social psychological perspective, an individual's action in a social relationship remains incomplete but for an *expected* congruent action by another participant of the social relationship. In other words, the individual anticipates the completion of their action by another actor and

motivationally evokes and morally invokes the ‘congruent action that will complete or dynamically sustain the joint constructed pattern’ (Fiske and Rai, 2015, p. 17) of the social relationship. Each participant implicitly or explicitly aims to induce the completion of their acts per expectations in relation to the manner, in which a particular social relationship ought to be constituted. The participants expect the other to *do their part*, in a *predictive* manner and *evaluate* the other’s actions according to how well they complete the intended coordination of activities of their social relationship. Central to any social relationship is a prescriptive model that regulates and motivates the expectation as well as evaluation of the complementarity of the participant’s action in any given social exchange.

Virtuous Violence Theory then proposes that a perpetrator utilises violence with the motivation and intention of constituting a social relationship in correspondence with a prescriptive model of what that relationship ought to be. (Fiske and Rai, 2015, p. 17) Rai (2015) for example points to a disperse array of instances of violence ranging from public executions, rape, domestic violence, honour killings to judicial corporeal punishment and emphasises that in all of these cases, perpetrators are using violence to create, conduct, sustain, enhance, transform, honour, protect, redress, repair, end and mourn valued relationships and think that violence is an acceptable means of making things right. This conclusion is based on the extrapolation from the interpolation and intuitive folk psychology where informants express not only their understanding about the prescriptive morality of ideal beings, but further about their social-relational motives; the reasoning goes: if the gods do it, everybody (ought to) regulate their relationships violently. The purpose of violence and the motivation to utilise it, is to ***sustain a moral order*** (Rai, 2015) and *people feel that it is deeply intrinsic to the nature of social beings that they regulate their relationships violently*. (Fiske and Rai, 2015, p. 53) The moralisation of the exchange in a social relationship is founded upon the expected predictability of the completion of the participants’ actions in a social relationship and becomes a function of the preservation of social stability.

While the psychologists Haidt and Graham (2007) suggest ‘moral foundations’ as the basis for an individual’s behaviour and actions and the anthropologist around Shweder (Shweder et al., 1997) has found that moral

norms across the world cluster around a small number of themes[39], Fisk and Rai (Fiske and Rai, 2015) follow relational models theory and organise moral concerns - the expectations of how an individual's action in a social relationship ought to be constituted in order for it to complete the action - in a fourfold manner. They propose that because an individual's action has a social meaning as well as specific moral function in constituting a social relationship, the way in which people conceive of their social relationships, that is the norms and manner in which they organise them, prescribes specific moral motives as well as a repertoire of available, complementary actions in order to coordinate their social activities. People coordinate their social activities by four fundamental relational modes: Communal Sharing, Authority Ranking, Equality Matching, and Market Pricing.

Each of these relational models suggests a core moral motive that motivates the generation, shape, and preservation or dissolution of the social relationships. It is this moral motive that lies at the basis of the expectation and evaluation of the appropriateness of the complementarity of the action of another participant in a social relationship. The core moral motive guiding Communal Sharing is *unity.* People perceive people of the same group as undifferentiated and equivalent in salient features while others are not and suggest a sense of in-group loyalty whereby resources are shared within the group.

The core moral motive that guides Authority Ranking is *hierarchy* and is directed towards the creation and maintenance of ranking in social groups which designates the relative position of individuals in a linear hierarch defined by dominance, status, age, gender, size, strength, wealth or precedence. While hierarchy comes with entitlements for the superior it also obliges a responsibility to protect those subordinates.

As the name suggests, the moral motive for Equality Matching is *equality* and is utilised by participants of a social relationship in order to keep track of

---

[39] Shweder et al. (1997) organise the world's moral concerns in a threefold way: Autonomy, the ethic we recognise in the modern West, assumes that the social world is composed of individuals and that the purpose of morality is to allow them to exercise their choice and to protect them from harm. The ethics of Community in contrast sees the social world as a collection of tribes, clans, families, institutions, guilds and other coalitions, and equates morality with duty respect, loyalty, and interdependence. The ethics of Divinity posits that the world is composed of a divine essence proportions of which are housed in bodies, and that the purpose of orality is to protect this spirit from degradation and contamination. […] The ethics of Divinity lies behind the moralisation of disgust and the moralisation of purity and asceticism; See also: (Pinker, 2011).

whether they are even. It is directed towards enforcing an even balance and in-kind reciprocity in social relations and reflects a basis for a sense of fairness.

Lastly, Market Pricing is morally motivated by *proportionality* and is directed towards calculating and acting in accord with ratios or rates among otherwise distinct goods to ensure that reward or punishment for each party are proportional to their costs, contributions, efforts, merit or guilt. (Fiske and Rai, 2015, p. 18-21)

Importantly however, we have to note the possibility that, while each participant in a social relationship invokes and evokes specific moral motives, each participant could be using a *different* relational model to generate their own action, as well as to evaluate the relationship coordination. They therefore could perceive their own action as conforming to the anticipated completion of their intended action, while perceiving the other participant's action as incongruent and transgressing the core moral motive. (Fiske and Rai, 2015, p. 40) This of course, brings with it the potential for conflict.

Moreover, people tend to have multiple - potentially conflicting - moral sentiments which are a result of distinct aspects of their *various* social relationships (Fiske and Rai, 2015, p. 4, Rai and Fiske, 2011) and each action could activate more than just one relational model, once again impacting on the implementation of the action and the expected complementarity which in turn entails the potential for conflict.[40]

While each relational model is driven by a specific moral motive, the realisation of the relational model in a given situation necessitates the coordination and/or evaluation of any activity *in context* and *with reference to other social relationships* and their moral motives. The individual requires guidelines, which specify which relational model applies, how, with whom, when and with respect to what that relational model operates. The actual implementation of the relational model must be 'guided by cultural precedents, praxis, prototypes, paradigms, precepts, propositions, prescriptions, pronouncements, proverbs and the like'; (Fiske and Rai, 2015, p. 22) A similar

[40] The manifestation of this dynamic has been elaborated upon extensively particularly in Social Movement Theory see for example: (McAdam et al. 2001, Munson, 2008 Pisoiu, 2012, Pisoiu, 2015).

observation leads Haidt (2007) to conclude that while *morality is universal on the one hand, it is also culturally variable on the other*.

4.2.1.2 Cultural variability, moral motives and social stability

At this point, two things need to be emphasised: Firstly, relational models, while expressing a universal moral core, do not prescribe and offer a resolution as to the individual's choice of relational model, or the structure of implementing it. Relational models are abstract. Relational Models Theory however would be of limited use in aiding an understanding of concrete actions and behaviours were it not for the explicit recognition that there have to be cultural guidelines that specify the modalities of the implementation for a particular context. It is the cultural context that provides both, the general expectations about the conduct in social relationships as well as the background against which the individual interprets which relational model applies, how, with whom, when and with respect to what that relational model operates. The moral core actualises through respecting or violating a relational model as well as its concomitant cultural guidelines rather than through abstract moral norms. This particular aspect will be elaborated on shortly to illustrate how individual's engage in moral reasoning, suffice it for now to point out, that generally, moral reasoning is not only a matter of getting our premises to be true (that is reasoning in the abstract) but also a matter of situating ourselves in our social community. (Edmonds and Warburton, 2017)

Secondly, Virtuous Violence Theory emphasises the purposeful pursuit of violence in order to make a particular relationship conform with its understood core moral motive. From anthropological observations, which substantially contributed to the formulation of the theory, we learn that violence (for the most part) does *not* disrupt the moral core of social relationships, because a perpetrators' moral sentiment by and large are consistent with the sentiments and judgements of their own cultural communities, however much they may differ from those of other cultures. (Rai and Fiske, 2011, p. 11) In the abstract, Magnani (2011) points out that morality is not only viscous, that is, infringements upon the moral core by individuals do not lead to the collapse of the communities entire moral horizon, but rather that individualised infringements can actually serve to reinforce the strength of a particular moral conviction of a society and further emphasises that our own 'moral embubblement' and points out that it is this

dynamic that 'renders invisible and condones both the disengaged morality and the related violence.'(Magnani, 2011, p. 178) Of course, importantly this aspect illustrates further our previous observations of chapter three in relation to the hegemonic universalism and the selective manner in which individual Muslim perpetrators of terroristic violence are seen as representatives of the faith and community and Muslim communities are seen as representatives and how this dynamic sustains liberal Islamophobia.

While it must be noted that Magnani's position is primality a moral philosophical and normative and prescriptive one and will be revisited as such in a later section, his analysis of moral disengagement is helpful in explaining the function of cultural contextuality of morality and preos.[41] Magnani points out that moral disengagement is facilitated through tools like

> *'ideology, religion, convictions, nationalistic commitments, ethnic stereotypes' and often occurs in a reciprocal interplay of personal, social, and institutional influences and pressures and concludes that moral disengagement ought to be understood as basically a reengagement with another morality; (Magnani, 2011, p. 172)*

This he considers to be

> *'favoured by peer modelling and exposure to bad examples. Moral mediators of various types, available "out there" in human and artificial environments, can serve moral disengagement providing new moral justifications and excuses.' (Magnani, 2011, p. 173)*

Importantly, he points out that people know how much they can allow themselves to 'lose control' as he puts it and points out that 'it is not that cultures place a positive value on violence but that culture dictates when and where (and how much) it is appropriate to lose control.' He concludes based on insights from moral psychology that it is not that a particular setting needs to place a 'positive value on violence' but can nonetheless encourage violence 'by making appropriate to let oneself go in response to a broad range of provocations.' (Magnani, 2011, p. 174) While I wish to advise caution regarding Magnani's use of the terminology 'lose control' and 'let go', due to its potential to invoke theories

---

[41] Fiske coins the term preos to describe 'shared indicators for how, when, and with whom to coordinate their social interaction. These interactions are universally structured but culturally organized; He uses the term 'preos' because it 'takes the form of precedents, prototypes, paragons, precepts, propositions, practices, and paradigms' and could be understood in short to be the culturally specific mode to translate a relational model into a concrete and complementary, that is culturally appropriate action. (Fiske, 2000, p. 83).

explaining violence with a breakdown in morality and the concomitant failure to suppress violent impulses,[42] the perspective is useful in pointing out the relativistic, and indeed utilitarian as well as arbitrary tendency in thinking about morality and violence, while at the same time pointing towards 'tools' like religion, custom and ideology or the individual's understanding of their position in wider social relationships in explaining violence.

It must be emphasised that these tools are directed at engineering social stability. The social relationships that people want to constitute (generally) are relationships that are culturally prescribed, ideally prototypical, or traditionally precedent, which means that ultimately, they conduct social relationships that conform to the local cultural preos. In short, they are relationships that sustain a familiar social order, bound and built on morality. Such a *community* constrains the individual and ties her to others, and in doing so creates an entity with shared norms about how members ought to behave combined with the means for imposing costs on violators and/or channelling benefits to co-operators.

From an evolutionary perspective, Haidt (2007, p 1000) reminds that humans attain extreme group solidarity by forming moral communities within which selfishness is punished and virtue is rewarded. Where Haidt emphasises with reference to Durkheim (1973), who observed gods to play an important role in the formation of such communities and understood religion to provide for a unified system of beliefs and practices, he points out that nearly all religions have culturally evolved complexes of practices, stories and norms that work together to suppress the self and connect people to something beyond the self. Haidt then concludes more abstractly, that through the evolution of these communities' reciprocal altruism is extended by indirect reciprocity. That means that virtue, or acting within the moral expectations of a particular community, pays by improving one's own reputations and elicits later cooperation from others from that community. (Haidt, 2007) From a social evolutionary perspective, we see that the communal maintenance of a moral core together with the complementarity of action provides the individual with a strong motivation for cooperation (Haidt,

[42] Note for example the propositions of disinhibition theory), which applied for the context of violence suggests that people have violent impulses that are usually held in check but (in response to particular stresses) when their moral sense breaks down, or is somehow blocked, they give in to violent impulses: (Muraven and Baumeister, 2000, Rai, 2015).

2007) with a bounded group demarcated by cultural guidelines which reinforce and maintain a stable social order.

4.2.1.3 Individual at crossroads: group guidelines and ambiguity

In order for the individual to actualise the abstract moral sense that is embodied in a particular relationship model, and to coordinate any aspect of any activity or to make any evaluations, the partners in an activity must know how precisely and contextually to participate in the interaction. She must know how to be part of a community. To successfully - that is morally - participate in the social relationship all participants must not only complement the chosen relational model of the other but further complement each aspect of the interaction in motive, intention, emotions and evaluations, but further do so in accordance with the appropriate cultural precedents, praxis, prototypes, paradigms, precepts, propositions, prescriptions, pronouncements, and the like. Expectedly this abundance of possibilities brings with it the potential for misunderstanding and conflict.

Anthropologists have long pointed out that individual experiences and the larger social matrix within which these are embedded can provide a picture of how larger-scale social forces come to be translated into personal behaviour and choices, because given processes and forces 'conspire - whether through routine, ritual […] to constrain agency.' (Farmer, 1996, p. 263) Such an understanding acknowledges the embeddedness of the individual in social relationships and institutions that, explicitly as well as implicitly, act upon the individual and therefore, limit their agency. Further support for this perspective can be found in Baumeister (1997) who points out that perpetrators of violence specifically, do not see things in simple, black-and-white absolutes but *perceive* events as complex and morally ambiguous. While they may well see something wrong with what they did, they also see how they were affected by external factors, including some that were beyond their control. This is confirmed by Fiske and Rai's ethnographic accounts and reflected in their conception of Virtuous Violence Theory. The point is, that morality according to Virtuous Violence Theory consists of intentions, motives, emotions, and judgements about realising relational models according to cultural preos *as the perceiver interprets and applies the preos to the situation* and violence is morally motivated when the perpetrator intends to regulate a relationship in a manner that is congruent with

the cultural preos as the perpetrator perceives them. (Fiske and Rai, 2015, p. 138-139) Crucially, there is *nothing about the features of the act* that makes them right or wrong, but actions acquire their moral qualities when evaluated post-act from the perspective of meaningful principles. (Baumeister, 1997, p. 269) In other words, while the meaning of the act initially rests with the individual only, by nature of the effects of the action, the individual loses control over the determination of the meaning of her action and 'invites' post-act moral scrutiny from others. However, by merely focusing on the act as *the* unit that determines our moral categorisation, we cannot generally detach ourselves from our moralising intuitions and engage in the attribution of moral meaning, which is prone to confirm pre-existing positions rather than a mere analytical reflection of the act.

While I will elaborate on particular psychological mechanisms in the next chapter, I consider it helpful to briefly preview the insight from cognitive psychology. This suggests that cultural narratives are more likely to achieve cultural stability if they are characterised by minimal counterintuitive cognitive structures, that is they incorporate clear intuitive concepts combined with a minority of counterintuitive ones. In other words, the persistence of stereotypical representations, myths, rituals, prototypes, paradigms, taboos which critically make up the cultural repertoire that provides the cultural preos is explained by the ease with which these can be recalled by the individual and the psychological relief this effortlessness affords (Norenzayn (2006) as quoted in Magnani, 2011, p. 255) and it is this psychological relief that makes religion for example cognitively speaking 'easy' and thereby crucial in maintaining social stability.

This insight crucially points towards a demarcation between the perceptions of the individual as the actor and those of the group. It moreover points to the analytical and communicative limitations of the scholarly observer. While the congruence of any act or practice with the preos of a given culture or subculture is always more or less ambitious, especially at the margins, *within* a community, religious or otherwise, there is often a *fair degree of consensus* about the morality of particular acts, but *not necessarily unanimity* - differences in perception and perspective are ubiquitous. (Fiske and Rai, 2015, p. 140) This of course is not surprising, for we have seen earlier that the purpose of this consensus is indeed community building and serves to feed predictability and social stability.

For Baumeister (1997) ‘evil’ begins when someone crosses a moral line, that line however may be fuzzy or unclear, ambiguous or blurred by incomplete information. As he points out ‘the luxury of reflection’ is what allows individuals to see choices framed in stark moral terms on a high level of abstraction and moral principles, however in reality people often find themselves thrust into situations that require them to make highly consequential decisions without being afforded that luxury. Structures, customs, rituals and the like, aim to minimise ambiguity. However, by nature of the sheer complexity of social life these tools merely suppress yet never managing to neutralise, ambiguity. It remains for the individual who needs to make contextual choices in situations that do not necessarily afford her with the luxury of reflection, albeit being firmly embedded in a social order with ‘clear’ cultural guidelines to make a decision and act accordingly. Seldom however is the analysing scholar equally firmly embedded in that social order and it is difficult to analytically do justice to the embeddedness and subjective choices that the individual perceives to be moral. Analytical categorisations that invoke moral intuitions, limit the methodological empathy available and thereby the understanding of the universal humanity and understanding of the motivations of the individual, who commits a violent act. It is for this reason that explicit normative theorising must be a crucial part of all scholarly endeavours to overcome these barriers.

As much as there is room for free will, as Magnani (2011) puts it, he must be acknowledged that morality, as embodied in moral knowledge passed down through cultural repertoires, merely permits free will because of the *order* it imposes on the randomness of human behaviour. As he emphasises, ‘moral practises protect the ownership of our destinies because ethics renders human behaviour more predictable and when we can count on shared values in dealing with other ‘moral’ human beings, we can better project our future.’ (Magnani, 2011, p. 253)

Of course, here we can observe the interesting parallel of a point that has been raised in the previous chapter in relation to the relative knowability in the context preventative counterterrorism measures, which was demonstrated to invoke values as but one way of coming to terms with uncertainty as the new security paradigm. Relative knowability for preventative counterterrorism seems reminiscent of both, shared values that make dealings with other human beings

more predictable and a recognition of free will. What looking at preventative counterterrorism measures has however also shown, was that the conception of shared values precisely called into question the compatibility of the different perspective on 'morality' of those who offer different values and providing the opening for hegemonic power struggles to play out in determining the value horizon available to constitute the social community. Indeed, here we can see affirmed the psychological logic behind shared values as that which makes behaviour predictable and enables preventative counterterrorism. This however is not to say that this dynamic is strictly speaking rational.

Albeit Magnani's being a primarily philosophically motivated perspective, it runs analogous and thereby lends credibility to Fiske and Rai's key motive of the complementarity of action, which underlies Virtuous Violence Theory. It must be noted, that culture has long been a topic in psychology and sociology, influences the manner, in which individual make decisions to act in general, and to act violently in particular, for it is the social environment that both limits but also liberates the individual in making her decision to act. Furthermore, it is abundantly clear that the aim of violence is often to regulate relationships not just with the victim but also with others. This leaves us to conclude that we cannot understand violence without recognising the meta-relational configuration that morally motivate it. Fiske and Rai (2015) speak of meta-relational motivations in an attempt to recognise the multitude of, potentially conflicting social relationships, that the individual is embedded in. Each of these relationships exercises an influence on the perceived expectations of moral conduct on the individual and is paramount in understanding mediating influences. At the same time, we must not forget that it is not necessary that a particular culture attaches a positive value to violence per se. We must recognise however, that culture dictates, when and where and how much violence is perceived as appropriate by the individual. It is therefore necessary, to make explicit the psychological mechanism, which underpin our hegemonic biases, in order to enable an empathetic understanding of the action of the individual who commits an act of violence from their frame of reference.

For the purpose of this thesis in particular, we must also note how these insights from social psychology provide a framework to make tangible the subjective investment of the individual for the context of equal citizenship and the

moral promise of a liberal democracy which I referred to in the previous chapter. The psychological investment in the moral promise of a liberal democracy and equal citizenship can be understood in the context of a distinct moral practises upon which the individual relies for the projection of her destinies while at the same time reconciling individual free will with the need and interest in social stability and predictability. In other words, the individual could be understood to defer her individualised desires (that is by making an effort to make her actions to be more congruent with that of the community) in return for actualising her participation in that community and the concomitant stability and predictability of the social order understood to rest on equal citizenship.

4.2.1.4 Religion as vehicle for individual moral action and social order

Religion is a complex object of investigation because it constitutes of both, ontological beliefs coupled with a set of social and moral implications. Religion is not only cognitively easy, because it provides stereotypical representations, myths, rituals, prototypes, paradigms, taboos which make up the cultural repertoire and are easily recallable. Religion is *secularly intertwined* with public axiological areas of human actions, which determines the actualisation of a specific understanding of what constitutes morality and thereby provides a basis for predictable and stable social relationships. (Magnani, 2011, p. 237) While those two aspects of religion of course can be analysed separately, failure to account for both aspects simultaneously clouds the fact that religion works beyond its ontological beliefs and indeed is embedded once again in hegemonic power-relationships.

Sociology of religion has, from its onset, emphasised the importance of religion as an expression of social cohesion; religion in the definition of Durkheim functions ‘to provide a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, i.e. things set apart and forbidden — beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community (…) all those who adhere to them.’ (Durkheim and Fields, 1995, p. 62) This leads Haidt (2007) to extrapolate that humans attain extreme group solidarity by forming moral communities more generally where selfishness is punished and virtue is rewarded. Haidt notes however, that nearly all religions have culturally evolved complexes of practices, stories and norms that work together *to suppress the self* and connect people to something beyond the self. In so far as religions carry prescriptive moral views they provide a code

how people within the group can expect to be treated;[43] however, this moral code is not extended, at least not in the same way to others outside the group and their actions potentially undermine social cohesion and threaten the group.

This follows from an understanding of humans as 'limited access strategic agents' which, in essence, reflects the fact that, because humans do not have the ability to discern other's intention with certainty and because information for a relevant social interaction is limited and/or faulty, access to perfect information is impossible. Conversely however, gods are 'full access strategic agents' and have access to all that is needed to make a sound judgement in any particular situation. Moral religions conceive of gods as interested parties in moral choices. In this way they become the vehicle for the moral code for that society to function as a coherent unit. Ultimately, religion not only provides for modes of suppression of the self in the form of moral codes, but also affords 'supernatural oversight' and thereby overall functions as a signal of the willingness to cooperate for and by those who share in it. (Magnani, 2011, p. 141, p. 251)

This understanding of the function of religion has found its way into thinking about religion, morality and violence. Religion becomes the vehicle for the moral code of a society as well as a signal of willingness to cooperate. Built explicitly on explaining the genesis of violence as well as a way of escaping it, religion is central in providing ethical knowledge and social learning; moral religions, through narratives, metaphors and stories provide scripts for secularise moral knowledge and teaching, shaping what is allowed and what is forbidden, and providing the individual with a place in the narrative, all with the purpose of imposing order on the randomness of human behaviour. (Magnani, 2011, p. 253)

Taking religion specifically as an example of preos is a fruitful avenue to have highlighted, not only because it provides a tangible example for the provision of concrete behavioural guidelines in the realisation of relational models through stories, rituals, myths, pronouncements, prescriptions and the like, but also because - be it in relation to questions surrounding the role of Islam in the West or the role of religion in relation to violence and terrorism - religion assumes a new centrality in popular, media and political consciousness in relation to core

[43] Religion in this sense therefore can be understood as a particular manifestation of the generally conceived moral grammar that regulates and orders social relationships of recognition as theorised by Honneth (1996). See Chapter 6 of this thesis..

values, sacredness and identity (Griffin, 2012) in contemporary politics. Furthermore, in emphasising not only the function of religion in facilitating cooperation through providing the individual with a place amongst others and encouraging the suppression of the self as virtuous, the fact that an individual perceives their deferral of their self as virtuous investment that ought to be respected and recognised as such can be made more tangible, because not only does it facilitate social stability but moreover conferred respect and/or recognition of said deferral enables minimal counterintuitive cognitive feedback affording psychological calm. A look at sacred values and taboos in the next section can illustrate this aspect further.

4.2.1.5 Sacred values, taboo, and identity

One of the most interesting aspects of religion is how it shapes very precious relationships with and around that which it designates as sacred.[44] Tetlock et al (1996) define as sacred, a value or resource that 'a moral community treats as possessing transcendental significance the precludes comparison, trade-offs, or indeed any mingling with secular values'. Following, what Tetlock et al describe as a long tradition of thought that suggests that 'citizens are more likely to do what they are supposed to do if they believe the moral codes that regulate their lives are *not arbitrary social constructions* but rather are anchored in bedrock values that transcend the whims or mere mortals', he summarises that in spite of a vast variation in the content of what groups hold sacred, sacredness qualifies as a functional universal across societies. Moreover, moral communities 'erect a variety of psychological and institutional barriers to insulate sacred values from secular contamination.' (Tetlock, 2003, p. 320)

Sacred Value Protection Model (SVPM) (Tetlock et al., 2000) suggests, that when sacred values come under secular assault, people struggle to protect their private selves and public identities from moral contaminations by the impure thoughts and deeds implied by the taboo proposal. The moral outrage that they experience reflects the individuals' commitment to others of the same moral community with whom they share the sacred value, by requiring us to even reject contemplating that certain values are comparable. Contemplating the trade-off of a sacred value is morally corrosive. Moral cleansing refers to the notion that, in

[44] Note how (Francis, 2016) makes a similar argument for the context of terrorism.

face of scared resources and competing values, people are in ‘disturbingly close psychological contact with temptations to compromise’ on sacred values which impacts on their subjective sense of having betrayed the sacred value and a concomitant need to reaffirm solidarity with the moral community. Suggesting that people are generally sincere in their commitment to sacred values and their protestation of their possible infringement, sacred value protection model however also recognises that reality constraints even the most sincere commitment to a sacred value and poses decision problems in which the cost of upholding a sacred value becomes prohibitive. (Tetlock, 2003, p. 321, Tetlock et al., 2000)

Tetlock et al. make very clear, that the SVPM hinges on cultural specific knowledge of what people hold sacred but maintains that functionally, sacredness is crucial in understanding individual decision making that does not reflect strictly rational-utilitarian, but rather an intuitive-theologian decision-making. Interestingly, Francis (2016) also suggests that the concept of non-negotiable or ‘sacred beliefs’, rather than ‘religion’ could provide for a more fruitful and alternative framework when looking at the justifications for terrorism and the role that beliefs play in motivations for sacred values can be invoked by both, secular as well as religious actors. McCauley (as quoted by Bower, 2016) rightly points to the need for clarification as to what counts as a sacred value and why some sacred values outweigh others.

A clue for (not) answering this question may be found in the tension between private selves and public identities that Tetlock et al. suggest, lie at the core of the sacred value protection model. Indeed, if as McGraw et al. (2003) observe that individuals infuse objects with meaning that reflect their relationship histories, what counts as a sacred value for the individual and why it outweighs one but not another one, would be found in the subjective narrative of the individual. Only she can give an indication as to the significance, meaning and content of the sacred value, because it is her that defines her own place relative to the object. In analogy to the endowment effect, which describes a twist in prospect theory, namely that the disutility of losing something is greater than the utility of gaining it, it can be argued that *sacre*d values represent an individualised emotional investment in a *something beyond the individual*, which *ties the individual to a moral community* which shares the emotional investment. The

individual's publicly lived commitment to both the sacred value and the moral community shape not only her membership in that community but also her personal history, experienced present and projected future.[45]

It is the difficulty to offset the endowment effect, exemplified by the interlacing of private emotional investments with publicly lived membership in diverse moral communities that helps to shed light on to the tendency to polarise discourse in relation to the public accommodation of hybrid identities. This polarity and insensitivity to the emotional investment of individuals in sacred values can be experienced in the context of debates around minority treatment and rights, be they religious, sexual, ethnic or otherwise. A tendency to focus on rational-utilitarian considerations miscalculates, if not dismisses, the intuitive-theological, emotional investment that individuals make in infusing their live histories with relationships made up of various sacred values in the form of public institutions, resources, ownership, visibility or participation. It is here where the 'private' yearns for public reconciliation or indeed recognition in order to be able to claim participation and ownership of ever expanding moral communities.

4.2.1.6 Philosophical interjection - constitutive pervertibility of religion

It is important to point out that religion as a vehicle for *descriptive* moral views also ultimately always substantiates *prescriptive* morality. Because religion offers positive ontological statements about reality, the concomitant instructions that regulate behaviour as well as inform moral judgement is derived from the commitment to these ontological beliefs. Philosophically it is important to emphasise that because religion originally and fundamentally addresses the problem of overcoming violence and evil, constitutively acts of faith contain in their empirical and historical actualisation their own pervertibility. This follows from the fact that, if religion proposes a positive, universal solution to the problem of violence, it is still religion that spills over in the reasoning that suggests a 'good way for emancipation' from violence and evil. (Magnani, 2011, p. 235-262, p. 239)

This of course has the important implication that it is neither possible to speak of religion as just peaceful - and of people who claim to act violently on

[45] This emotional investment will be revisited in chapter six in relation to the development of meaningful relations to the self as well as the existential struggle for recognition, whereby the individual defers part of their unique identity traits in anticipation of their sacrifice being understood as that and the individual therefore valued as a contributor to a shared communal goal.

behalf of a religion as misguided - nor is it possible to speak of religion as just violent. Both extremes would miss the philosophical point Magnani is making regarding the constitutive pervertibility of religion.

However, while Magnani points out that religion, by explaining the genesis of evil and violence and at the same time providing a way of escaping it, constitute the conditions which are inclined to shape the possibilities for conflict that can lead to violent outcomes, he also emphasises that *every vehicle* which substantiates morality always opens up by itself both a potential command to emancipate from violence and evil and an ineluctable commitment to violence and evil. (Magnani, 2011, p. 237) Religion however is unique in the sense that it is still fundamental in understanding political and institutional ways adopted by Western democracies to regulate seemingly secular interactions between their citizens and Others, particularly with respect to their cultural and personal identities. While it can be argued that religion generally no longer provides for an integral and compelling system of belief or narratively constructed way of life, it still provides critical terms, argumentative resources and a bold imaginary, taken-for-granted and crucially necessary for analysing contemporary culture successfully. (Magnani, 2011, p. 219, p. 240-1)

Even though we have looked at religion as exemplary for its pervertibility, the fact that religion is 'secularly intertwined with the public axiological area of human action' means that any decision that invokes a moral quality - religious or otherwise - by virtue of attempting to address any problem contains within itself the potential of its own pervertibility' (Magnani, 2011, p. 237) for this is its philosophical constitutive paradox. The specificity of religion then does not primarily come from the constitutive paradox of acts of faith containing within themselves the potential for their own pervertibility, but from the fact that religion is so central in providing cultural stability and predictability through ethical knowledge so as to create the illusion for the individual of control and ownership of her destiny in the face of always incomplete and/or imperfect information. This of course is augmented by the fact that our cognitive heuristics have evolved in such a way to systematically disguise our own moral embubblement. As matter of principle, we remain unaware of our own moral embubblement and therefore generally do not possess the critical awareness to scrutinise hegemonic power relationships and their manifold manifestations. Acknowledging the inherent

pervertibility of religion as a representation of any descriptive moral view and the relationship to normative judgements, makes explicit and can raise awareness for the subjectivity and ambiguity of descriptive moral positions. This bring with it not only the potential for conflict, but also the need to resolve it.

4.3 Getting violence 'right'

Against the narrowly conceived instrumental purpose of violence - that is an understanding that violence in the short run can establish power and material gain - it must be noted that it does not generally produce lasting positive outcomes for the perpetrator.[46] It is however such a bounded understanding of violence that is central to so much of the conceptual approach that drives the study of political violence in general and terrorism in particular, especially in attempts to understand motives and intentions of perpetrators.

Psychologically, culturally and philosophically however, it has been made clear that violence is a strategy intended to regulate social relationships in order to establish tranquillity and predictability that eases the navigation of social life. It is the desire to participate in reputation-based social relationships and the individual's understanding those social relationships are guided by universal moral principles that determine the culturally and socially appropriate motive, context, implementation and limitations for a violence act as but one relationship regulating strategy. As a regulating strategy, not all violence is appropriate and cultural psychology theorises that conformation systems are the primary way through which people regulate a specific relationship model. A confirmation system is a 'natural, intuitive, especially evocative and binding and is employed in interpersonal communication in intrapersonal cognition as a way to represent the relational model'. (Fiske and Rai, 2015, p. 252) Fiske and Rai utilise Conformation Systems Theory in order to map what purpose a specific act of violence serves as a relationship-regulating strategy to understand the specific social-relational *motive* that drives the particular instance of violence. It is through

[46] Due to the magnitude gap, it does however very much establish negative outcomes for the victim. (Baumeister, 1997) Here, the victim suffers losses that are larger compared to the benefits of the perpetrator which means that violence is mainly effective in causing the victim to suffer seriously and disproportionately. Violence thus is only effective instrumentally, if the goal is suffering.

conformation systems that they attempt explain what (amount and type of) violence is perceived as intuitively right in a particular context.

Based on the four relational models, which we have seen to embody four core moral motives, the manner through which individuals regulate a relationship based on Communal Sharing and unity is *consubstantial assimilation* which operates to 'by making bodies equivalent, people make themselves socially equivalent' and predict that violence to regulate Communal Sharing relationships will 'focus on the bodily essence of the victim in relation to the bodily essence of the person with whom the relationship is being constituted. (Fiske and Rai, 2015, p. 253) A relationship based on Authority Ranking and hierarchy is regulated through the *physics of magnitudes and dimensions*, in which relative magnitude or order along the dimension corresponds to social rank. Violence in this context functions to restore or create hierarchy and rank. (Fiske and Rai, 2015, p. 254) *Concrete ostensive operations* is the manner through which Equality Matching and equality is regulated and it is aimed at establishing one-to-one correspondence; an act to regulate such an relationship would be expected to be a practical demonstration that balance is restored. (Fiske and Rai, 2015, p. 255) Lastly, individuals regulate a relationship based on Market Pricing and proportionality through *arbitrary conventional symbolism* because the relationship surrounds ratios of distinct goods. Violence as a regulating mechanism in this context is particularly interesting because it is removed from the individual and becomes impersonal and bureaucratic based on abstraction, efficiency, and expected utility. (Fiske and Rai, 2015, p. 257)

However, this is not to deny the fact that these motives are ideal types and that, more often than not, human action is *open and multiply* motivated. It is difficult to discern specific confirmation systems and motives and/or intentions in their purity. Being able to point at conformation systems as cognitive mechanisms, which provide motives for the regulation of social relationships, merely enables a guide to the manner in which the individual's immediate, affect-laden emotional responses fit into socio-cultural contexts. (Fiske and Rai, 2015, p. 257) This points towards and clarifies that violence - as a strategy adopted to regulate a specific relationship - one the one hand is not inevitable, because we *can* become more sensitive to other people and their emotional responses and their intentions and motives in a particular context. On the other hand, it clearly

allows the conclusion of violence as a morally indifferent social action because independent of the perspective of culture or the actors' perceptions and intentions there is nothing about the features of the act as such that give it its moral quality. Ultimately, 'violence is morally motivated when the perpetrator intends the violence to regulate a relationship in a manner that is congruent with the cultural preos as the perpetrator perceives them.' (Fiske and Rai, 2015, p. 139)

Virtuous Violence Theory builds on the premise that the social relationships people want to constitute are generally those that are 'culturally prescribed, ideally prototypical or traditionally precedent' (Fiske and Rai, 2015, p. 141) and proposes violence, that is intended to regulate relationships in accordance with a culturally prescribed fashion, as descriptively moral. This presupposes a certain degree of consistency and predictability of the types of social relationships as well as the manner, in which social relationships are established, organised, navigated, and the like. This is the case because within Virtuous Violence Theory, the morality of violence stands and falls with the *individually perceived*, yet *culturally prescribed* and deemed appropriate, enactment of motives and intention. But as Fiske and Rai (2015, p. 4, 2011) point out, humans typically have 'multiple conflicting moral sentiments, derived from distinct aspects of their social relationships' and it is difficult for the individual, to get their relationship regulation exactly right. Humans, as 'limited strategic social agents' not only have multiple motives and conflicting sentiments but moreover lack full access to information.

Individuals, as we will shortly see, operate with 'unknown unknowns' in the form of a systematic disguise of their own cognitive biases and the additional fallibility and/or exploitability of their cognitive heuristics, and moreover are constantly confronted with incomplete information that make up environmental *unknowns.* After all, modernity forces the individual to experience reality as fragmented, ambiguous and 'liquid'. (Devji, 2005) Modernity robs the individual of a 'psychological terra firma' (Griffin, 2012, p. 29) and creates mobile citizens that inhabit a global society which is no longer defined by their particular tradition, culture, or place of origin. As much as Virtuous Violence Theory posits that individuals rely on a relatively static cultural preos in order to *appropriately* create, navigate and manage social relationships, modernity renders this relative clarity and predictability untenable. This however is not to negate the utility of Virtuous

Violence Theory for its intention is ironically primarily to do away with the automatism that violence is seen as morally objectionable, but merely to emphasise the crucial importance of the individual's perception of contextual circumstances and taken-for-granted mechanisms for relationship regulation. Where modernity breaks down cultural cohesion and moral absolutes become diluted, Devji (2008) makes the convincing point that the individual can no longer participate in instrumental politics of control as she can no longer successfully apply and navigate social relationships in accordance with relatively known and predictable preos.

Modernity entails a shift towards the individual, authenticity and 'the subject' while at the same time, globalisation mediates the local and indeed entails the latter with an existentialism that is yet another indication of the fragmentation of modern life. Devji (2008, p. 20) for example suggests an understanding of Islamic militancy as an instantiation of the manifestation of humanity because local histories in a global arena 'knock against one another to find accidental points of contact and construct new trajectories'. Militant acts, he explains 'serve to make humanity manifest' because they cannot serve a conventional political purpose. This follows from his thoughtful elaboration that Islamic militancy is too weak to participate in politics of control - and instrumental politics conventionally conceived - because there does not exist a proportionate relationship between cause and effect or means and end. He mentions for example that Al-Qaeda's jihad lacks intentionality and their violence lacks instrumentality, because Al-Qaeda can neither predict nor control the global repercussions of their militancy. He concludes, that 'the actions of this jihad, while they are indeed meant to accomplish certain ends, have become more ethical than political in nature, since they have resigned control of their own effects, becoming gestures of duty or risk rather than acts of instrumentality properly speaking'. (Devji, 2005, p. 3-4)

As the individual - and indeed movements and groups - cannot control the effects of their own actions, political action in modernity does no longer allow the individual to assume a position where she can anticipate with relative certainty the complementarity of her action. Politics become replaced with ethics, that is an individualised, subjectively perceived, globally mediated and locally expressed sense of virtue and duty, as a way of engaging with a complex, interrelated

‘accidental universe’ and to forge social relations through ethical action. This triggers a need for a more explicit normative theorising and moral learning that can provide the individual with the methodological tools for self-reflexivity and critical inquiry to navigate the ambiguities and inconsistencies of modernity. Indeed, Devji (2005, p. 19) makes a convincing point in so far as he suggest that ‘in a landscape of relations that are not determined by causes and intentions, the jihad must eschew a politics that would organise people around common beliefs or practices (…)’ but rather encourage that such ‘beliefs and practices are given over to individual rather than collective examination.’

It is the centrality of this fragmentation facilitated by the accidentality of effects of globalisation that not only depends on, but contributes to, the erosion of traditional religious and political allegiances and authorities that forces a penetration of the relative tranquillity and stability of social relationships that moral bubbles enable. When Baumeister notes that ‘evil begins when someone crosses a moral line and may be promoted by anything that tends to make the line fuzzy or unclear’ but emphasises, at the same time, that ‘when the line between right and wrong is clear, most people will consistently do what is right’ (Baumeister, 1997, p. 255), modernity provides for a context within which the individual is not securely socially, culturally, temporally or geographically embedded but picks and choses from a diverse pool of offerings. Robbed of a psychological terra firma, individuals, who are conceptualised as ‘prisoners of moral bubbles’, furthermore are permanently exposed to conflicting cognitions (Magnani, 2011, p. 178) and anxiety, which stems from the ontological fuzziness that modernity entails. (Griffin, 2012)

It follows, that when we attempt to understand violence, our approach must be cautious and empathetic. Cautious, because we can, and must understand violence as a descriptively moral social action even when instrumental intentionality is professed. Recognising Devji’s insight on the fortuitousness of effects and the limitations of political control moreover can lead us to a more empathetic approach. This is the case because the individual that performs the violent act, is not only a limited strategic access agent whose intentions and motives are multiple, complex and potentially conflicting, but also because she, like everyone else, is tragically embedded in a moral bubble that systematically disguises her violence to herself. This situation contributes to the

retreat to moral bubbles and polarities and it is this aspect that the following chapter will now turn to.

4.4 Conclusion

In this chapter, I offered an alternative for looking at violence primarily from the perspective of its immediate physicality: that is, its relation to the visible corporeal consequences. I did this because I suggest a line of argument that posits, that it is this perspective that leads Terrorism Studies to focus on questions of instrumental rationality and means/end relationships, particularly if Terrorism Studies attempts to operate within disciplinary frameworks in which the legitimacy of political violence rests with the nation state. We have seen that it is this perspective that, even though critiqued by particularly proponents of the Critical Terrorism Studies orientation, still dominates the conceptualisation of terrorism, within and beyond its academic study.

This thesis wishes to advance a position for the academic study of terrorism that focuses on social relationships, with the ultimate purpose of demonstrating that it is from such a starting point that emancipatory research becomes possible. I have argued that the preoccupation with the instrumentality of violence in the study of terrorism importantly misses its embeddedness in hegemonic power-relationships and the *socio-moral function* of violence and this in turn disconnects the individual from the central desire of participating in and shaping of social relationships as the motivation to use violence. With reference to Virtuous Violence Theory, I could suggest, not only that violence is central in regulating and manoeuvring social relationships, but furthermore that the individual is motivated to utilise violence because she subjectively perceives violence to be the appropriate, socially-sanctioned and therefore descriptively moral mechanism for the particular instance of relationship regulation. Therefore, it was possible to conclude that the violent act in itself does not possess an inherent moral quality, but rather leads us to conclude that ‘violence is morally motivated when the perpetrator intends the violence to regulate a relationship in a manner that is congruent with the cultural preos as the perpetrator perceives them’. (Fiske and Rai, 2015, p. 139)

5 On the tragic of moral bubbles and the persistence of exclusionary practises

It is the purpose of this chapter to highlight the tragic limitations in the form of fallacious cognitive heuristics and social practises, which inhibit precisely the fully actualised empathetic perspective-taking and the pursuit of emancipatory truth claims. This will be done by firstly showing that violence can become selectively disguised by cognitive heuristics that function to process information efficiently, but in doing so serve to sustain the stability of an individual's subjective reality to minimise cognitive effort and psychological discomfort. Secondly, the chapter will show how these heuristics manifest socially in the form of myths, narratives and ideology and can thereby fall prey to exploitation when combined with specific power interests that 'help' the individual to locate their subjective reality in a wider social reality. Thirdly, this chapter will illustrate how these mechanisms and dynamics manifest with reference to the Islamist radicalisation process. Lastly, this chapter will elaborate on the political manifestation of exclusionary practises and cognitive biases in preventative counterterrorism and revisit the political rhetoric of knowability and manageability to caution against bounded conceptions of values and identities as a contextual manifestation of the process of social stability and predictability.

This is done in order to demonstrate in the next chapter that Terrorism Studies, which takes a struggle for recognition as its framework for understanding social conflicts can establish a normative position from which Terrorism Studies can engage with the phenomenon of terrorism by contributing to the mediation of disparate perceptions of the phenomenon. Terrorism Studies can be in a position, to focus on emancipatory truth claims, which encourage perspective-taking, in order to enable radical methodological empathy with disparate perceptions of reality, truths and values. It challenges the stability of subjective realities and concomitant exclusionary practises that serve as the motivation for the struggle for recognition in order to counter-balance and navigate the tragic cognitive fallacies, their exploitability, and their polarising policy manifestation, and instead introduce a more responsible and indeed productive manner of relating to terrorism.

While the understanding of violence as serving a socio-moral function that we have seen in chapter four, has the distinct advantage of explicitly divorcing the violent act from the *analytical* necessity of a moral evaluation, it furthermore allows us to recognise the fact that ultimately, the violent act always carries a moral valence that reflects of a particular interpretation of right and wrong, not least because Virtuous Violence Theory also recognises the social and moral embeddedness of the violent act. The violently acting individual as a *limited* strategic access agent can get their violence, observationally speaking, wrong. This however does not do away with the fact that the underlying motivation to act violently, from the perspective of the acting individual, remains descriptively moral and oriented at demonstrating their commitment to and the power-relationships embedded therein and membership of relatively stable and predictable social relationships. It does, however, force a focus on the mechanisms that lie at the heart of the maintenance of disparate perceptions of the morality of the violent act in spite of its descriptive morality and it is the purpose of this chapter to sketch these cognitive and social mechanisms that inhibit reflexive perspective taking and indeed contribute to the maintenance of moral bubbles and polarisation.

Magnani stresses the need for 'philosophers of violence' to complement philosophers of science and philosophers of morality, not only because violence is no less important a topic than morality, but, he argues, because 'morality and violence are strictly intertwined'. (Magnani, 2011, p. 2) For Magnani (reminiscent of the earlier conclusions drawn on the basis of Virtuous Violence Theory) the violent act acquires its moral quality when evaluated from the perspective of meaningful principles focused on the act, but not in isolation from these principles. These meaningful principles, however, generally follow from moral principles that usually represent the *hegemonic consensus*. Violence cannot be understood on its own, but only as an 'aggressive activity to which judgements apply' (Magnani, 2011, p. 9) and this judgement, by and large, excludes the fact that perpetrators of violence generally act on the basis of moral deliberations. Indeed, he professes that

> *'violence is constitutive of politics, of thought, of knowledge, because all these practices are based on and justified by moral options and orientations that constitute more or less constrained or preferred options, conflicts and possible dominant relationships of power, and in turn favour (against others) certain behaviour followed by individuals and groups'. (emphasis added Magnani, 201, p. 66)*

The question then arises, as to how it can be, that only particular kinds of violence evoke negative moral judgements, while the violent potential of structures, artefacts, institutions, cultures, and ideologies is mostly disregarded and/or marginalised. Crucially, violence (for example, when exercised on the basis of legal and/or moral reasons) generally is seen as morally legitimate, even though this fact of course does not cancel out the instance of violence as such. This of course is not a new insight, but one that very much is picked up in the definitional debate of terrorism and the criticism (particularly from within Critical Terrorism Studies) relating to the exclusion of state-violence from the definition of terrorism, or of course in the more vernacular allegations of hypocrisy and double-standards. (Stanley and Jackson, 2016) What is new, however, is that Magnani relates the phenomenon of this *systematic disguised of violence* to a 'human imprisonment in moral bubbles'. (Magnani, 2011, p. 8) What Magnani does, is to work out the tragedy of the moral bubble, rather than its hypocrisy, in so far as he traces the origin of the systematic disguise of violence to cognitive fallacies; these cognitive fallacies, he emphasises, result in *unavoidable errors*. These errors or double-standards are unavoidable because our collective and individual cognitive heuristics are such that they not only disguise our own violence, but moreover conceal their fallacy from themselves. (Magnani, 2011) This means that 'any act of error-detection and error-correction is subject in its own right to the concealedness [sic.] of error'. (Magnani, 2011, p. 77) In other words, Magnani understands the '*tragic' [sic.] of the moral bubble* to lie in an inability to leave it behind because cognitively and socially, the existence of this bubble remains concealed by the very faculties that establish their existence in the first place and necessitates a critique of the underlying social relationships, the stability of which is the aim of the moral social action.

This unusually empathetic and indeed generous for inclusive perspective, explicitly problematises the observation that humans are always *constrained in their sensitivity to other people,* because even when we tell stories about our lives, these narratives are intended for our own private consumption, for us to comprehend events: to make sense of the world and our place in it. However, these private stories, through the act of narration become public and *part of the way we socially interact and construct the world*. Due to this interaction and construction, many narratives do not remain under our exclusive personal control,

but derive a publicly-moderated meaning not only because the social construction of the world does not directly represent our personal reality, (Berger and Luckmann, 1967) and because our tragically fallacious cognitive faculties lend themselves to social exploitation and manipulation, which for the context of our focus on the moral valence of violence manifests itself in the subtly constructed yet individually perceived *self-evidence of the immorality* of particular incidents of violence.

Two points follow from this: firstly, individuals, even in their capacity as conscious moral agents, can exercise (that is, actualise) only so much control over their own private destinies, as the collective sensitivities (in the form of perspective-taking by a limited strategic access agent) for another permit. Secondly, the actualisation of the full potential of individual (as well as our and their collective sensitivities) is inhibited, yet importantly not determined, by cognitive heuristics that facilitate cognitive fallacies and social practices that *privilege the maintenance of moral bubbles* and the concomitant social predictability and stability over fully-actualised empathetic perspective taking and emancipatory truths claims. It is the latter problem that a critical theory perspective is particularly appropriate to address.

5.1 Locating oneself in a *social* universe of meaning

For social psychologists, who profess the importance of people's subjective perceptions of the social environment in making sense of their social behaviour, cognitive heuristics enable the individual to solve complex problems by relegating these to simpler judgemental operations to make decision-making more efficient. While they can (and do) produce erroneous conclusions, they are generally used, relied upon and trusted by a 'social perceiver' because they *typically* produce correct inferences. (Fiske, 2016)

Cognitive heuristics merely offer explanations of how people construct preferences and judgements using selectively-remembered information. (Fiske, 2016) As inferential approximations (based on remembered information however), they are *not normative models* and carry with them the potential for error and bias, precisely because they are subjectively relied upon for efficiency and psychological ease rather than for their accuracy. While social psychologist posit automated types of judgement mechanisms such as cognitive heuristics, for

their sheer efficiency, they also emphasise their understanding of individuals as *motivated tacticians* that 'rely on relatively automatic processes or alternatively on more effortful ones, depending on the situational and motivational demands'. (Fiske, 2016, p. 25) If the social perceiver becomes more thoughtful, either by recalling a wider pool of information or by having more time to recall information, for example, individuals do not have to remain constrained by their cognitive heuristics and their ensuing potential for bias and/or error. Acknowledging the *typical* reliability as a rule of thumb, however, allows us to investigate the social contexts within which the social perceiver remains biased to see what she expects to see. (Fiske, 2016, p. 177-178)

5.1.1 Tragic moral bubbles and emancipation

Before I address, utilising social representation as well as communication, particularly the function of ideology, as examples of how social manipulation exploits our cognitive heuristics and their fallacious tendencies, I wish to emphasise that, from a moral-philosophical perspective, while the terminology might suggest otherwise, 'exploitation' or 'manipulation' of cognitive heuristics is not intended to suggest moral responsibility. This is precisely because I am sympathetic to Magnani's understanding of the *tragic* fallacy of cognitive heuristics that conceal their own errors from detection in order to achieve cognitive and as a consequence social stability and predictability.

Contrary to proponents of Critical Security Studies, or indeed Critical Terrorism Studies in particular, I wish to emphasise the tragic pervertibility rather than a position that locks in on pointing to, the most certainly available possibility of, hypocrisy, double-standards or strategic propaganda in representation, stereotypes or ideology. While I shall justify this position later on in relation to mediating influences and modernity, suffice it here to mention the tendency of calling out hypocrisy or state-complicity to fall into unhelpful polarities and partisanship - because not even well-meaning academics are immune to the fallibility of their cognitive faculties - that do neither contribute to methodological empathy nor the actual emancipation that Critical Terrorism Studies is aiming for.

The following sections sketch how representations and ideology, in aiming to create stability and predictability, play on cognitive fallacies to make life - evolutionarily and psychologically speaking - easy. I suggest the need for generous empathy as well as reflection in the face of acts of violence, by pointing

to universal cognitive processes and their tragic pervertibility exemplified in relation to representations and ideology. It will become clear however, that even though humans inhabit moral bubbles that are facilitated by cognitive fallacies and that these generally provide tranquillity and psychological ease, the maintenance of these bubbles is not an automatic necessity and that awareness of these cognitive fallacies, can (and must) be utilised for an empathetically and reasoned position taking to overcome the consequences of cognitive fallacies. This is an important step in critical theory method because it demonstrated the barriers to self-aware knowledge and emancipatory understanding. While social psychology does not problematise notions like a shared cultural pool of knowledge, social representations, ideology or culture in its attempt to uncover psychological mechanisms per se, we cannot fail but notice that the general pool of remembered and cultural knowledge of course must originate from somewhere and hegemonic power relations can find their way into the more 'neutral' mechanisms identified by social psychology.

5.1.2 Dialectic construction of social reality and reality maintenance

Cognitive heuristics offer psychological explanations of mechanisms that describe how individuals, who exist in complex and multifaceted social environments, process information under conditions of limited capability and capacity. In short, these mechanisms help the individual to make sense of their interactions with the social world by providing rules of thumb that individuals apply to process information. Central in understanding the functioning of these mechanisms is remembered information, its recallability and the concomitant judgement that is acquired and learned to be formed and generally applicable on its basis. McGarty et al. (2002, p. 5-6), for example, explain in relation to the formation of stereotypes, that there is a shared cultural pool of knowledge, social representations, ideology or culture from which different people sample and it is this that produces commonality of views as well as normative beliefs and judgements that are shared by members of groups because the members of groups act to coordinate their behaviour accordingly. Stereotypes are but one example of the biases that can develop when people are trying to make sense of the world and utilise readily accessible, that is, learned and remembered cultural *knowledge* and representations to enable and inform their understanding of the

social world. However, it is but one way of understanding and making accessible that social world.

Individuals, as social beings, however participate in the dialectic construction of their subjective reality. As we have seen their cognitive heuristics serve to provide generally reliable rules of thumb for processing information and therefore, for the individual to make sense of the social world. Furthermore, *knowing* social reality is the result of a process of socialisation whereby the individual *selectively* acquires the concepts to make sense of their being in the social world. Hereby, primary socialisation provides the basic structures that enables the individual to identify herself in an objective social reality into which the individual is born. This reality, while mediated through significant others and their subjective location therein, is acquired as a subjectively coherent and plausible identity, that also serves as a location in a specific social world that can be subjectively appropriated. (Berger and Luckmann, 1967, p. 150-152) It is the routine, everyday social interactions and experiences that provide for a general social stock of knowledge that builds on taken-for-granted cognitive and normative operating procedures and overall produce, a generally, *cohesive* social universes within which the individual *knows* to locate themselves.

While the individual comes to know her subjectivity as *distinct* from significant others during the process of primary socialisation, it is also this process that provides the individual with a symbolic universe that provides meaning for the individual, even in her most solitary experiences and provides order for the subjective apprehension of biographical experiences. Being able to call upon a social stock of knowledge and taken-for-granted cognitive and normative operating procedures also enables the individual to integrate and/or incorporate *new* experiences from different spheres of reality into the same overarching universe of meaning. (Berger and Luckmann, 1967, p. 114-115) This symbolic universe orders, and thereby legitimates, everyday roles, priorities, and operating procedures by integrating them into the most general frame of reference conceivable. Within the same context even the most trivial transactions of everyday life then of course may come to be imbued with profound significance. (Berger and Luckmann, 1967, p. 117)

As however subjective and objective reality can never be fully congruent because the individual consciousness is limited in her socialisation by the social

distribution of knowledge, a subjective biography cannot be fully social. In appropriation of Ugilt's terminology, subjective reality is meaningful in excess and there is always more subjective biography than is expressible in social reality. Throughout secondary socialisation and the experience of new social sub-realities, the individual must continuously engage in a balancing act, facilitated by conceptual procedures and taken-for granted cognitive mechanism, that serve to integrate new components of other realities into an already existing reality. Importantly, society must develop procedures of *reality-maintenance* to safeguard a measure of symmetry between objective and subjective reality, for otherwise taken-for-granted cognitive and normative operating procedures would lose their plausibility and threaten the tranquillity that a cohesive social universe provides.

Subjective reality is always dependent upon specific plausibility structures, that is, the specific social base and social processes required for its maintenance (Berger and Luckmann, 1967, p. 174) because the empirical existence of alternative symbolic universes poses a threat to the taken-for-granted inevitability of one's own social universe and thereby challenges the inevitability of one's own social reality and the concomitant psychological ease and tranquillity.

5.1.3 Accessible cultural knowledge and the inability of perspective-taking

Being aware that our cognitive heuristics facilitate misconceptions in our understanding of the world, by for example zeroing in on and overestimating the frequency of, for example, spectacular events of violence, overall, we utilise these heuristics in an attempt to make sense of our social environment. Representations, stories and myths then, serve as social procedures of reality-maintenance and play to our cognitive heuristics by anchoring and making readily accessible a cultural pool of knowledge that navigates the individual's position in the social world and thereby attempting to eliminate psychological strain and discomfort that could be caused by conflicting (or counterintuitive) information that necessities greater effort with regards to its psychological processing. The notion of the cultural pool of knowledge reminds of the notion of preos that we have previously seen utilised by Virtuous Violence Theory in providing concrete guidelines for the implementation of abstract conceptions of morality and justice. Unlike preos however, representations, stories and the like do not generally

provide concrete social and/or cultural guidelines for behaviour but merely enable a more or less *implicit* detection and processing of information in the form of latent, readily accessible background information upon which explanations and judgements are formed and that then find social and/or cultural expression.

Baumeister's (1997, p. 54-55) work on the myth of evil as a particular frame to think about violence, provides an illustrative example of how the tendency to see violence in morally clear terms with innocent, virtuous victims and evil, malicious perpetrators results from representations of evil in folk mythologies, religion, tales and more contemporarily in movies. The centrality of representations is merely one perspective from which Baumeister approaches the problem of evil. As a social psychologist he recognises that 'the reality of evil is sometimes shaped and altered by the image' - an image which he suggests is 'habitually shaped from the viewpoint of the victim.' (Baumeister, 1997, p. 33) He investigates how evil has usually been portrayed across a wide selection of resources, from religious theology to children's cartoons in order to understand the cultural pool of knowledge for the psychological forces, that is cognitive heuristics that sustain the myth of pure evil that eventually shape behaviour and the generally negative judgement of violence. This breadth of images leads Baumeister to conclude that the myth of evil is a composition of depictions that represent evil as the intentional infliction of harm, driven by the wish to inflict harm gratuitously without otherwise well-articulated motives whereby the victim is depicted as innocent and good while the perpetrator is 'the other, the enemy, the outsider' and has been such since time immemorial and does not respond to context or circumstances. Evil comes to represent the antithesis of order, peace and stability as well as self-control. (Baumeister, 1997, p. 60-75)

The central tenor of Baumeister's observation and a conclusion to draw for the purpose understanding how representations impact on behaviour is twofold: on the one hand it is that this representation produces *normative beliefs* by providing a clear and widely shared and therefore, readily accessible demarcation between victim and perpetrator. On the other hand, being able to refer to those widely shared representations as remembered information makes these normative beliefs and concomitant behaviours and judgements easy to recall and representations exploit cognitive heuristics that can lead to biased judgements and faulty conclusions. Both aspects however point to a dynamic that

privileges the maintenance of a particular social reality and the individual's investment therein. As Baumann points out, the representation of evil blinds people to the reciprocal, mutual causes of violence by inhibiting perspective-taking between victims and perpetrators, which ultimately leads to a kind of moral immunity on part of the victim. However, perpetrators on the other hand do not see things in simple absolutes but as complex and morally ambiguous. Baumeister points out that while perpetrators may well see something wrong in what they did, they also see how they were affected by external factors and/or as having acted in a way that was fully appropriate and justified, however the representation of evil puts responsibility on one side while it absolves the other. (Baumeister, 1997, p. 47, p. 91) The perpetrators' perspective, as a position to make sense of an act of violence however is widely missing and inaccessible because it cannot activate an equally readily available cognitive heuristic and/or social stock of knowledge, and one reason for this is to be found in the one-sided representation of evil.

Indeed, it is the perpetrator's perspective that confronts the victim with a discrepant symbolic universe which entails specific constellations of subjective reality and identity. While in principle this availability empirically demonstrates the existence of an alternative symbolic universe and thereby demonstrates the *relativity* of all social worlds including one's own, the representation of evil functions as a procedure of reality maintenance that safeguards the plausibility of a *particular* social reality and we can conclude that the confrontation of alternative symbolic universes implies a *problem of power*. (Berger and Luckmann, 1967, p. 126)

It is the role of ideology then, that is generally understood to serve as a means to interpret the same overall social universe in different ways and combining this with concrete power interest. By relying on plausibility structures generated through socialisation processes and thereby being able to locate concrete power interests within a specific social universe, ideologies are able to generate solidarity from within this specific social universe. (Berger and Luckmann, 1967, p. 141) The understanding that ideology works on the basis of socially acquired plausibility structures, which in turn serve the purpose to provide cognitive and normative ease and bring into alignment subjective and objective reality but also are ontologically threatened by the existence of divergent social

sub-universes sheds a different light on to a dynamic that serves to maintain a specific social reality propped by power interests. This shows that the question of power cannot successfully be divorced from analysis in social sciences.

5.1.4 On the function of ideology

While the role of ideology in terrorism in general and radicalisation in particular is central to the study of terrorism as well as preventative counterterrorism policy, not least because motivation becomes a key ingredient to definitionally distinguish terrorist violence from other kinds of violence, this role is not without controversy. Even though there is a clear political interest in the narrative content of ideology because counter-*extremism* strategies aim to counter and address ideology a key ingredient for terrorism. (National Security Council, 2015) Ideology after all, is regularly posited as enabling terrorism to grow. (Dawson, 2015) This section will not focus on the content of ideology per se, and will not try to deconstruct its proclaimed truths, but rather it looks at the cognitive purpose ideology serves. This is done to show its working and thereby enable an understanding of ideology that allows for methodological empathy and the caution with regards to normative judgement.

Ideology can activate cognitive heuristics as quick mechanisms the individual utilises to process information and efficiently make decisions in a complex social world and provides the individual with both, clarity and coherence - enabling quick availability and concomitant recallability, representativeness, anchoring and framing - which enables predictability in relation to the position for the individual in the social world. This latter aspect of connecting the individual to their social environment, equips the individual with an orientation that transcends her own existence, through membership in a community expressed in a shared world-view and beliefs. This world-view and beliefs are normative in so far as they shape the individual's behaviour to signify membership in that community and ultimately enable transcendental meaning beyond the individual. As Berger points out, 'human beings construct a social world not just for practical considerations of economic cooperation, but so as to impose order and self-transcending significance on the 'discrete experiences and meanings of individuals'. (Berger as quoted in Griffin, 2012, p. 64) Where Griffin (2012, p 48) imagines the 'militant fanatic as self-enclosed in a sacred cognitive and moral space' and Magnani (2011, p. 206-207) exemplifies his notion of moral bubbles

with reference to ideology, both authors in fact point to ideology as a tool that eliminates doubt and ambivalence through a targeted play with (fallible) cognitive heuristics. When Magnani concludes, that violence merely becomes a response, not to the content of the questioned beliefs but, of the *potential disruption of the tranquillity that those beliefs allow*, both authors converge and demonstrate the significance of understanding the role of ideology in the provision of norms that enable cognitive tranquillity and ease. (Festinger, 1957)

In an attempt to eliminate doubt then, and in order to establish psychological ease, ideology provides a reservoir of meaning and an anchor point for both collective and individual action and behaviour and functions utilising the same cognitive heuristics that enable the navigation of complexity and efficient decision making. Activating pervious knowledge acquired from others, anticipating long and abstract chains of causation and coordinating our behaviour with others enables ease and efficiency in everyday operations. (Pinker, 2011, p. 686-687) In order to achieve this tranquillity however, ideologies must rely on cognitive heuristics that can and do produce erroneous and/or tainted results because they also operate on the basis of particular power interests. In avoiding disruption of this tranquillity, both individually and collectively, Pinker (2011, p. 682-688) summarises five cognitive mechanisms that he identifies as crucial in explaining how ideology works to justify violence, particularly pointing at processes that edit beliefs in order to make actions seem justifiable, through reframing, moral disengagement, dispersion of responsibility, gradualism and derogation of the victim. It is with an eye to these objectives that ideologues can utilise ideology in order to eliminate doubt and/or ambivalence.

Magnani (2011) then concludes that ideologies thrive on the fact that they rest on the mutual reinforcement of moral beliefs, where each individual moral bubble acts together and combines their roughly similar moral beliefs into a collective moral bubble. This collective bubble then aims at systematically defusing all potential doubts, and cognitive heuristics aid in this diffusion. Consequently, each agent within the bubble ‘perceives his own moral principles as a given, just as much as a cognitive agent takes his beliefs as a positive, genuine truth.’ (Magnani, 2011, p. 206-207) Understanding that cognitive heuristics generally run in the background to enable a more or less effortless navigation of the social world, ideologies serve a soothing function.

Central then is the insight that violence ensues when the tranquillity that ideology enables is disrupted, through for example the confrontation with an alternative world view that makes one's own subjective world view appear less than inevitable thereby undermining the stability and predictability and ultimately the psychological comfort that the narrative, or ideology intended to facilitate. Deconstructing ideologies by pitting them against counter-narratives or pushing them to the fringes or underground may unsettle this tranquillity and indeed be rather counter-productive. Cognitive heuristics moreover, it must not be forgotten, merely serve as rules of thumb for effortless navigation of the social environment and as that do not dictate a particular course of action and/or behaviour. It is worth reiterating that, if the social perceiver becomes more thoughtful, either by recalling a wider pool of information and indeed by being confronted with multiple social realities and the relativity of one's own or by having more time to recall information for example, individuals do not have to remain constrained by their cognitive heuristics and their ensuing potential for bias and/or error. Appreciating the ease however with which these fallible heuristics and concomitant plausibility structures can be utilised and furthermore the psychological tranquillity thus afforded, however should at least provide for a degree of empathy for the tragic of moral bubbles. At the same time, it should however also demonstrate the need to intervene in expanding these ideologically and religiously motivated moral bubbles in order to mitigate the tendency to retreat in polarised positions via an approach that explicitly focuses on emancipatory truth claims rather than the maintenance of social stability and predictability.

5.1.5 Alternative discourse and the limitations of understanding others

At this point I consider it important to come back to the academic study of terrorism and consider that the very possibility of being able to invoke moral judgement by being able to rely on representations, the myth of evil or a particular representation of reality in the form of ideology and thereby persuading an audience of one's own moral stance, of course privileges status-quo narratives on morality and causation. This possibility relies on representations and can be augmented by the ability of being able to invoke academic objectivity. For the purpose of the study of terrorism this means that this dynamic contributes to a marginalisation, if not muting, of alternative narratives and by extension mutes

the standpoint of the terrorists' subjectivity. Because the question of morality is rarely made explicit, the mere act of paying attention to what the terrorist might have to say is already seen as a fateful step toward perhaps making an effort to understand their motives,[47] something that might lead to somehow 'justifying' what is unjustifiable. (Zuleika and Douglass, 2008, p. 32) For as long as Terrorism Studies privileges a focus on the reality as perceived by those that primarily identify with the victims of the act, does the act become terrorism, while an identification with the perpetrator turns the act into something more justifiable, even legitimate. (Greisman, 1977)

Resorting to terrorist means of course can also be understood as an attempt to make visible and construct an alternative discourse, an alternative social reality, backed by the willingness to utilise violence. (Devji, 2008) Terrorism has the potential to bring an alternative view to public reality, the perception of which makes all the difference. (Juergensmeyer, 2003, p. 141) Even though, it is a discourse that is made sense of from within an ideology that provides 'the framework for thinking (…) about the world – the 'ideas' that people use to figure out how the social world works, what their place is in it and what they ought to do.' Ideology contributes to the significance of meaning and representation, which are expressed through language, social action and practice (Hall as quoted in Taylor, 2011, p. 137) and has taken a very prominent position in attempts to explain terrorist violence. However, when Taylor and Horgan (2011, p. 138) posit that 'action and activity might be the route by which people initially engage with terrorism' and suggest that 'the recruit has to learn about the particular ideology and 'meaning' their behaviour has within the terrorist movement's context', and Crenshaw points to the 'theory of cognitive consistency', which suggests that individuals only absorb information that supports their beliefs and ignore discomforting evidence (Crenshaw, 2011, p. 254), a meaningful understanding of terrorism must include 'culturally derived measures of social status and needs to embed values in a particular social context' (Kuznar, 2007, p. 318) so as to provide situated and coherent meaning for the individual, who ultimately utilised what becomes described as terroristic violence. While ideology is surely important in framing narratives and perceptions, Toloyan (2001, p. 218) rightly observes that terrorism is a creature of its own time and place but 'what is more,

[47] See for example the discussion on research ethics in (Smyth, 2009).

it can be the time that is embedded in the historiography, traditional narratives, legend and myths which a society constitutes itself as a temporal entity'. Noting that the act of terrorism may well continue to have identical legal status in court, dismissing specific social descriptions of the way in which different societies maintain their vision of their collective selves with different *projective narratives* and so produce different terrorisms and different terrorists, with different cultural meanings and motives, and indeed morality inscribed that are relatively autonomous of legal codes or analytical conceptualisations. (Toloyan, 2001, p. 220)

Terrorism can neither be separated from its perception, nor its social context and the concomitant subjective moral universe. The scientific research on terrorism must, particularly in light of the perceptual importance of the divergence in morality of acts of terrorism, explicitly account for its moral commitment, because a closure of discursive space may very well lie in the implied amorality of the terrorist actor. After all, the concepts we use are acquired through *our* social context.

This implies that human beings and society construct and constitute each other simultaneously Terrorism is a phenomenon in itself and, at the same time only possible to understand as 'terrorism' through the concepts of meaning (Staun 2010, p. 9, Wittgenstein 1995) and moral valence. What is indeed required is an understanding of the motives and intention of others, (Booth, 2008, p. 75) or more empathetically, a restoration of the terrorist's identity into a meaningful whole. Such an understanding starts from the premise that the decision to 'eschew survival in order to realize a higher goal' differs for everyone because what constitutes this higher goal is culturally conditioned. (Zuleika and Douglass, 2008) This necessitates making contextual approaches central to the study of terrorism, and thereby placing acts that are labelled terrorist within the broader context of wider social practices and civil society relations, enabling researchers not only to see perpetrators of terrorism as part of a wider social environment, influenced by societal dynamics and broader intellectual debates, and actors that move in and out of terrorism. (Toros and Gunning, 2009, p. 95-107) In order to be able to do justice to this understanding however, it is necessary to explicitly problematise the moral valence of the act of violence and the role this plays in

communicating the stability of a *particular* social universe and the implied hegemonic power-relationships.

5.1.5.1 On radicalisation as occupational change

Indeed, the significance of extremist rhetoric and narrative frames has permeated attempts to explain social movement activism in general and terrorism in particular and receives special attention in the context of the notion of radicalisation particularly in relation to the role of ideology[48].

Haleem's (2012, p. 141) emphasis on the need to engage with reason in radical Islamist rhetoric because it 'can be seen as providing for its audiences a framework of interpretation, that is, a particular framework to understand experience' can be seen as complementing the social psychological insights on perceptions and aids in developing a bridge between experience, knowledge and motivations, while Pisoiu's (2012) understanding of Islamist radicalisation as an occupational change illustrates the contextual workings of plausibility structures and secondary socialisation.

Pisoiu is interested in understanding what the specific motivational mechanisms for Islamist radicalisation are and why and how they get activated. Her model suggests that there is no sui generis process of Islamist radicalisation but that this process represents a variation of a more general process of occupational change - a process which reminds of secondary socialisation more generally - which under certain conditions results in radical, activist, and for her case, Islamist occupation. Her model is interesting because, while mirroring Haleem's conceptualisation of Islamist extremism as universal, for existential and motivated by a struggle for recognition, Pisoiu's aim is to critique the understanding of the radicalisation as exceptional and argues strictly for a rational choice approach. Her grounded theory approach utilises an analysis of the transcripts of court proceedings and is aimed at establishing what 'participants themselves *perceived* as 'what is going on'. (Pisoiu, 2012, p. 47-8). She anchors her explanation of the *nature* of the motivation for choosing and staying within the Islamist radical occupation in 'following individuals developments along a process'. (Pisoiu, 2012, p. 50)

[48] See: (Holt et al., 2016, Silke and Brown, 2016, Sedgwick, 2012, Kruglanski, 2006).

As Pisoiu is particularly critical of the notion of grievances because it implicitly suggests that had there not been a grievance in the first place, the choice would not have been made, (Pisoiu, 2012, p. 55-59) she proposes that participation is explained rationally through selective (non-material) incentives. Individual goods can be used as selective incentives in the form of prestige, respect, leadership position, friendship, psychological gratification, group support, or more generally speaking 'social sanctions and rewards'. (Pisoiu, 2012, p. 48) It appears however, that while this insistence on rational choice is intended to de-exceptionalise the participation in terrorism, the caution and unease in relation to the conceptualisation of grievances is unfortunate, precisely because grievances can give an insight into the essence of the motivation, rather than its nature. Jasper (1997) for example, posits that a visible violation in someone's existing beliefs leads them to their activism while Munson (2008) observes that only after people engaged in activism do they transform a rather superficial, abstract and unconnected sense of a specific issue to a strong and crystallised position that the activist is able to understand and relate to a larger moral universe consistent with other beliefs and values. (Munson, 2008, p. 35)

5.1.5.2 Occupational change and perceived social approval

Pisoiu's approach identifies reward, standing and recognition as the main categories of selective incentives that impact on an individuals' occupational choice and points out that, on an abstract level, any occupational choice, 'the mujahid, the politician and the soldier all aim at reaching standing' but there is a difference in the way in which standing, and values are conceived. (Pisoiu, 2012, p 48, p. 85) Standing hereby not only denotes the relevant social surrounding but further reflections commonly shared values and invokes the idea of 'value commonality' which defines what is valued or recognised as valuable in a certain social environment. (Pisoiu, 2012, p. 91)

Recognition for Pisoiu refers to the *perceived* approval and support of action and activities by the social surrounding based on commonly shared apprehension of what is valuable or acceptable (Pisoiu, 2012, p. 94-5) and can plausibly tap into socialised structures the individual is familiar with. It is thus similar to Honneth's understanding of recognition, on which we will focus in the next chapter, in so far as the value and/or acceptance of the action is dependent on 'commonly shared' or accepted modes of recognition. It is distinguished however

by the lack of explicit reference to an existential and universal desire for recognition and cannot immediately trigger the moral consequentialism that the struggle for recognition necessitates. Recognition and perceived social approval in Pisoiu's model function as a mediator to the learning and adoption of norms, values and patterns of behaviour.

However, with reference to what Pisoiu terms 'reward' it is arguable that we can stretch her conceptualisation to fit Honneth's framework and more specifically the dimension of practical relations to the self; reward for Pisoiu refers to the idea of making a difference, which find expression in conviction of righteousness, morality and importance of what one did, the drive to affect the situation, and the conviction that one's actions would actually have an impact. The type of impact sought went along the lines of helping the poor, the oppressed, and reversing a situation of injustice. (Pisoiu, 2012, p. 101) Thus concretised, the desire to make a difference mirrors and resembles the precondition for social conflict that Honneth expresses regarding an existing intersubjective framework of interpretation that allows to show an individual's diagnosis of a situation to be typical for an entire group; Because Pisoiu focuses on explaining a process of radicalisation, she elaborates that there is a gradual and purposive adoption of an ever more exclusivsing radical interpretative frameworks, a process facilitated by three non-discrete stages of probing, centrifying and professionalising. (Pisoiu, 2012, p. 53) It is through this process that standing, recognition and reward are interpreted, and the salience of this interpretation is explained. Her elaborations, while remaining true to her commitment of explaining the radicalisation process in terms of an ordinary occupational change process rather than a sui generis process, can be supplemented with a normative framework that the struggle for recognition that we will focus on in the next chapter, enables and thereby it is possible expand her procedural insights to encompass a universal for existential dimension that can form the foundation for emancipatory truth claims.

5.1.5.3 Radical interpretative frames, resonance and reason

While Pisoiu seeks to provide an explanatory framework that accounts and elaborates on the Islamist radicalisation process, Haleem makes clear that distinguishing between the nature of the motivation to participate in Islamist extremism and its essence is paramount for successful policy approaches because only this enables a critical introspection as to the reciprocal causality of

violence. Understanding the existential and universal essence of terrorism and its moral consequentialist justification needs to take note of the fact, that hurt feelings become the motivational basis for collective resistance only, if the individuals/group are able to *articulate them within an intersubjective framework of interpretation*. (Honneth, 1996) It is only then, that they can show that their hurt feelings are in fact *typical for an entire group* and can demonstrate ownership and participation in the sustenance of a moral grammar and therefore show their struggle for recognition as one for greater justice overall.

Empirically, Pisoiu (2012) can show how radical interpretative frames impact on what counts as valuable to explain why some individual choses the radical Islamist occupation over another alternative. Shifting to the level of language and ideas she demonstrates the need to capture how individuals interpret experiences through radical interpretative frames. This move from actual lived experiences to frames is necessary because they account for 'the interests, perceptions, stereotypes and values we bring to the situation and that influence our goals and aspirations' as well as how we 'see the facts'. (Pisoiu, 2012, p. 106) Here Pisoiu, while not making this explicit, seems to follow a rationalist epistemological perspective. Haleem explains that from this follows that 'knowledge (…) does not *require* actual experience (sensory input) of the thing whose knowledge is in question.' (Haleem, 2012, p. 142) For Haleem (2012, p. 142), it is clear that 'reason in radical Islamist rhetoric can be seen as providing for its audiences a framework of interpretation, that is, a particular framework to understand experiences' that builds the foundation for knowledge of reality, which is the foundation for a particular *perception of reality*. In other words, while some experience is indeed necessary, reason as represented to rhetorical frames of interpretation play an equally important part in *shaping the knowledge* of the thing that we have experienced, because reason *shapes* knowledge by systematising and ordering our experiences.

In investigating radical interpretative frames, Pisoiu is primarily interested in an *analytical* understanding of how individuals acquire and cultivate ways of doing and thinking and thereby points to the significance of collective beliefs and their empirical credibility. However, particularly in relation to the latter, Pisoiu highlights the importance of accumulated learning, which depends on the confirmation or legitimation of newer ideas through cultural resonance with

existing ideas acquired at an earlier stage. (Pisoiu, 2012) One important implication this observation has, is that the social environment serves the 'role of learning stepping stones and 'normalisation' regarding frameworks of acting and thinking. This is fundamental for the change and activation of occupational categories as reward, standing, and recognition'. (Pisoiu, 2012, p. 126) But importantly, because these frames are schemata of interpretation that grow in existent belief systems that enable individuals to locate, perceive, identify, and label occurrences within their life space and the world at large, (Goffman, 1974, p. 21) there is no clear separation between general social beliefs and specific 'radical' frames. Furthermore, individuals evaluate beliefs, norms, and meanings as a whole. Pisoiu is not alone with her interest in frames, and Halverson et al (2011) engage with a selection of 12 'master narratives' of Islamic extremists, that they understand as deeply embedded in a culture and providing a pattern for cultural life and the social structure by creating a *communicative framework* that guides people in certain situations. While they note that their selection of master narratives are treasured by Muslims throughout the world, the meanings and political implications differ substantially from those extremists give. (Halverson et al., 2011, p. 6) Pisoiu cautions, that the concrete radical interpretative frames that she identifies, are only useful as an analytical, yet not an empirical, category (Pisoiu, 2012, p. 109), such a clear distinction is untenable precisely because of the interstitial position of terrorism expertise that was discussed in chapters one and two. Moreover, for the context of the pro-life debate in the US, Munson (2008) for example, cautions against the possibility that the instrumental and the expressive, as well as the political and the religious, can be separated analytically and empirically as clearly as Pisoiu is suggesting and notes that religious practice cannot be separated from the everyday and political happenings of the contemporary world. (Munson, 2008, p. 176-177)

From this follows then that the clean, analytic concepts we often use sometimes do a poor job of capturing the much messier reality of individual, everyday experience. Munson observes that the concept of religion as either churches or sets of belief is not fully adequate to understand the relationship between religion and activism and notes that rather than 'thinking of religion as a separate, distinct social phenomenon exerting an independent influence on the pro-life movement and the way in which people become activists, it is necessary

to see religion and activism as overlapping domains of action, each continually constituted and reconsidered by the practises of those who are involve in them.' This means that the boundaries between the two are blurry and 'events can speak in two voices'. (Munson, 2008) For Munson, this comes with two insights: Firstly, the importance of polysemy in everyday experiences whereby ideas, events, and behaviours do *not have a single meaning*, with the methodological implication that it is not possible to interpret a social phenomenon and tell us what it 'really' means. To those involved in events, the focus on single meanings manifests as a need to explain the reason they believe or act the way they do. However,

> *'experiences can take on multiple meanings, events can take on multiple voices, and behaviours can simultaneously express multiple intentions and beliefs. The issue is not to reduce these manifold meanings to one that is primary or more fundamental but instead to recognize [sic] that the polysemy of action can be a major source of social dynamism.' (Munson, 2008, p. 184)*

Secondly, Munson concludes that activism can be a source of religious negotiation, exploration, and change. In the relationship between religion and the pro-life movement, the movement is not simply an 'effect' caused by religion. He notes that a surprisingly large number of activists did not come to understand their activism through a religious lens but instead came to understand their faith through a pro-life lens.' (Munson, 2008, p. 184)

Methodologically however, the difficulty of generating data that differentiates between 'thin beliefs' and 'robust ideological commitment' lead to an almost catholic acceptance of the notion that grievances are a necessary prerequisite for mobilisation, yet Munson observe that beyond a very basic idea, 'there is no single movement worldview, master frame, or unified ideology that ties the movement together' and activists differ enormously in means and motivations. (Munson, 2008, p. 185-190)

But if we combine these insights with Haleem's, what follows is that, while there are concrete experiences, these experiences are subjectively interpreted, and moreover, represented in such a light that they create the knowledge for its audience that is both, empirical and rational, so much so that one's perception of how things are cannot be divorced from an understanding of actual experiences. This of course means that 'knowledge or 'reality' need not *necessarily* reflect concreteness or absoluteness (or *the thing in itself*, reality as it really is); knowledge of reality may reflect instead a particular understanding of reality

(through the systematisation and categorisation of experience)'. (Haleem, 2012, p.145) Haleem indeed makes clear that

> *'what is presented by the recruiters of Islamist extremist groups as the 'reality' of things is in fact a product of their particular reason (their systematisation and categorisation of experience that appears in their discourse) and which in turn shapes knowledge (through reason in rhetoric) of their audiences and shapes their perceptions. Perceptions of reality then ultimately determine the motivations of individuals to engage in violent and self-destructive missions.' (Haleem, 2012, p. 146)*

This of course demonstrates the importance of language as the basis for rhetoric in providing its audience with the framework of interpretation to make sense and bring into alignment their subjective social worlds, and it is important to emphasise the manipulative role that language plays in society. What becomes clear however is that it is possible, from an epistemological perspective, confirmed by empirical observation, to connect language and rhetoric via reason, knowledge and subjective yet shared perceptions of reality to individual motivations, whereby the *individual strives to generate and indeed force symmetry between disparate non-inevitable, competing social realities*. The detour focussing on the Islamist radicalisation process as occupational change process shows how cognitive heuristics operate in context.

5.2 Cognitive heuristics, conflict and reason

As much as cognitive heuristics enable a fall-back on automated decision-making processes and allow for the 'preservation of cognitive energy', the concomitant moral intuitions however usually refer to affect-laden processes in which an 'evaluative feeling of good-bad or like-dislike appears in consciousness without any awareness of having gone through steps of search, weighing evidence or inferring a conclusion.' (Haidt, 2007, p. 998) It must be emphasised that, neither of these two processes does rule out more controlled processes of conscious activity in order to reach a reasoned, rather than affect-laden moral judgment or decision.

In a series of experiments, Haidt (2007, p. 1001) clearly demonstrates that, in spite of moral motives being implemented by quick and automatic intuitions, individual moral reasoning can at times correct and even override moral intuition, especially in response to individuals navigating different and sometimes

conflicting social goals, which may however remain within the same social universe. He notes that there are at least three ways, all founded upon an understanding of moral reasoning as a result of social interaction, in which individuals can and do override immediate intuitive responses: through conscious reasoning, through reframing and through social interaction that brings to light new arguments. Haidt (2007, p. 1001) suggests that from an evolutionary perspective, moral reasoning utilises a relatively new 'cognitive machinery' that evolved 'by the adaptive pressure of life in a reputation-obsessed community' and concludes, that people reason morally, rather than relying exclusively on affective intuitions, because they care about how they (and others) treat people and how they (and others) participate in groups. He remains however generally sceptical about the persuasive power of moral reasoning *in conflict situations* because people do possess quick and automatic moral intuitions and when called on to justify, these intuitions generate *post-hoc* justifications out of a priori moral theories. He points out that this post-hoc reasoning relies on a priori moral theories that are made up of 'culturally supplied norms for evaluating and criticising the behaviour of others', but people do not necessarily realise this because of their reliance on automated cognitive processes. (Haidt, 2001, p. 823) Crucially, in conflict situations, people lack time to engage in conscious reasoning and/or social deliberation that could bring to the fore new arguments to re-evaluate the initial intuitive moral response. In the absence of urgency however, people can contemplate details and are able to see their choice framed in stark moral terms, on a high level of abstraction and moral principle, and consider multiple social relations with potentially conflicting prescriptive and proscriptive links - albeit in principle merely from within their own plausible social universe - and consider these in reaching a morally reasoned conclusion. In principle, both Baumeister and Haidt agree in their emphasis that 'in reality, however, people often find themselves unexpectedly thrust into situations that require them to make these highly consequential decisions or do not even recognise the issue as a great moral test of character at that crucial moment.' (Baumeister, 1997, p. 259) Baumeister (1997, p. 276), then in reference to research on self-control and violence, points out that 'people acquiesce in losing control', that is they learn 'when and where (and how much) it is appropriate to lose control' and to be violent, and in what context 'being violent' will not carry a reputational penalty.

5.2.1 Potential for conflict and violence

Whether an ensuing conflict is regulated with violent means does not (necessarily) depend on the instrumental value of violence as a means to achieve a specific strategic goal, even if it is this later understanding that takes precedent particularly for researchers on political violence as well as policy makers, probably precisely because individuals engage in post-hoc moralised justifications of their violence which *resembles* cost/benefit calculations. Indeed empirically, Ginges and Atran (2011) found that, in spite to the widespread understanding that people support violence in an instrumental rational manner - which they expected to find manifested in quantitative indicators of success and the perception of the efficacy of violence - support for violence more reliably followed deontological[49] reasoning. In other words, Ginges and Atran can show empirically that the decision to engage in violence resulted from morally motivated decision-making. Appreciating the moral valence of violence and the general intent to act morally as well as frame one's own action in moral terms, enables an understanding of the motivation for as well as violence as social action that communicates more than its instrumental and/or strategic goals. Indeed, focusing the understanding of violence on its instrumentality can backfire and have serious implications for the resolution of conflicts. Indeed, Ginges and Atran (2011, p. 1) have found that 'the judgement about the use of war are bounded by deontological reasoning and parochial commitment' rather than material incentives or the notions on the efficacy of political violence.

However, as human beings usually possess various moral frameworks that can be willingly and easily interchanged, Magnani (2011, p. 91) recognises the very high likelihood of (moral) conflict and violence. While cultural precedents, practices, prototypes paradigms, precepts, principles, proscriptions, and prescriptions and so forth provide aids and contextualised frames of reference that render individual action less random. This contributes to the stabilisation of human social relations in the form of a social order, but they can only provide for an approximation of abstract universal moral concerns. As much however as there may be broadly universal moral concerns, individuals in the pursuit of their

[49] While Ginges and Atran (2011) speak of deontological reasoning, this terminology appears inaccurate for the purpose of this thesis and would more appropriately reflect consequentialist reasoning within the framework of an existential struggle for recognition.

subjective understanding of moral action can and do get their social actions wrong. Humans after all are limited strategic access agents and this means that they are limited in their ability to predict with confidence and accuracy the intentions, motives, emotions, desires, needs and the like of others. Moreover, their cognitive heuristics are mere rules of thumb that have evolved to preserve cognitive energy rather than absolute accuracy and can lead individuals to false conclusions. What is more, individuals are also constrained in their individual action by the available cultural preos that makes actualisable *subjectively perceived moral concerns*. Inherently, social action carries with it the potential for conflict and violence as has been made very clear in the previous chapter is but one strategy to organise social relationships.

With the permanent potential for conflicting moral obligations emanating from diverse social relationships yet from within the same social universe, the immediate response of knowing what action is morally required (or even morally irrelevant for a specific situation) without the need to know why, balances, reconciles or combines fallible cognitive heuristics with potentially conflicting motives with the primary goal of managing social relationships. However, as we have seen in the previous chapter, we cannot understand these relationship-regulating strategies until we recognise the social-relational motives that drive them and the relationship-regulating aims they seek to fulfil. (Fiske and Rai, 2015, p. 161) The violent act then is morally indifferent in so far as it gains its (i)morality only in context and through the post-hoc evaluation of the act as an appropriate means to regulate a specific social relationship.

As we have noted before, anthropologists have long pointed out that individual experiences and the larger social matrix within which these are embedded can provide a picture of how larger-scale social forces come to be translated into personal behaviour and choices, because given processes and forces ‘conspire - whether through routine, ritual […] to constrain agency.’ (Farmer, 1996, p. 263) Such an understanding acknowledges the embeddedness of the individual in social relationships and institutions that, explicitly as well as implicitly, act upon the individual and limit their agency. This, as we have also seen is confirmed by Fiske and Rai’s ethnographic accounts and reflected in their conception of Virtuous Violence Theory.

In other words, the persistence of stereotypical representations, myths, rituals, prototypes, paradigms, taboos which critically make up the cultural repertoire that provides the cultural preos is explained by the ease with which these can be recalled by the individual and the psychological relief this effortlessness affords (Norenzayn (2006) as quoted in Magnani, 2011, p. 255) and it is this psychological relief that makes both, religion and ideology, cognitively speaking 'easy' and thereby crucial in maintaining the social stability within a particular social universe.

This insight crucially points towards a demarcation between the perceptions of the individual as the actor and those of the group. It moreover, points to the analytical and communicative limitations of the scholarly observer. While the congruence of any act or practice with the preos of a given culture or subculture is always more or less ambitious, especially at the margins, *within* a community, religious or otherwise, there is often a *fair degree of consensus* about the morality of particular acts, but *not necessarily unanimity* - differences in perception and perspective are ubiquitous. (Fiske and Rai, 2015, p. 140) This of course is not surprising, for we have seen earlier that the individual actualises their subjectivity within a specific social universe and the purpose of this consensus is indeed the maintenance of the plausibility of that social universe and an investment in community building that serves to feed predictability and social stability. In other words, fallible cognitive heuristics facilitate the maintenance of biases and bubbles, which in turn contribute to our inability to initially detect and subsequently leave our moral bubbles because the immediate psychological tranquillity translates into social and normative beliefs, which are propped by implicit or explicit power interests and plausible power relationships, that afford the same tranquillity and provide for plausibility of the inevitability of our social universe and subjective social reality.

5.3 Multiculturalism, human dignity and recognition

Thus far, we have seen how cognitive and social processes generally (can) function in concert in order to generate social stability and maintain a particular social universe, which in principle enables the individual to make sense of their location in a particular social universe, or for the example of the Islamist radicalisation process as occupational change to bring into alignment and stability

with previously acquired frames of reference, which in turn provides for psychological tranquillity and ease. As we have also come to recognise however, none of the available social universes are inevitable and indeed the existence of divergent social realities confront the individual with alternative social universes and thereby threaten the tranquillity afforded by any particular social universe within which the individual knows how to locate themselves, thereby empirically demonstrating the relativity of one's own social universe. In threatening the inevitability of a particular social reality and thereby implicitly calling into question roles, hierarchies and the distribution of power, the existence of alternative social universes not only disrupt the individual's psychological tranquillity but furthermore demonstrates that the social and political distribution of power is but *one* possibility.

Contextually chapter three has already drawn attention to the manner in which counterterrorism policy approaches and rhetoric, relies on the establishment of boundaries and the reification of a particular social universe. This necessarily fails to capture the multiplicity of identity processes and subjectivity in the lived every-day contexts of individuals and has been demonstrated to carry the potential for political polarisation and social conflict. This in turn has been shown to be taken up in counterterrorism discourse and policy making. This chapter however, thus far has demonstrated that fallible cognitive heuristics and the selective social interests in the maintenance of coherent social universes inhibit fully actualised perspective taking and emancipatory truth claims. Terrorism Studies has not managed to carve out a normative space from which it can participate in the mediation of subjectively moral claims to social truths.

Based upon an epistemic crisis of counterterrorism and a failure to politically adequately account for the implications and questions raised by the unboundedness of terrorism, policy making, and political rhetoric cannot but fail to confront the unboundedness at the heart of terrorism. In an attempt to exercise a perceived moral duty to prevent terrorist atrocities, governments in general, and as has been shown the UK government in particular, rely on constructed lines of orientation which incorporate existing exclusionary practises and cognitive biases that remain hidden but which take the form of 'British values', notions of extremism and radicalisation in order to be able to communicate relative

knowability of the origins of threats to national security in a climate where the dominant paradigm is one of uncertainty. Policy making and rhetoric, that is driven by an unrealistic desire to offer predictability, knowability and manageability, however does so by relying on a bounded conception of values and a sense of belonging. This do not do justice to the multiplicity of identity processes and subjectivity. Government therefore runs counter the promise of openness and equal participation of all citizens by failing to recognise that it makes it demands from within but one specific, pre-determined social universe, which moreover represents hegemonic power-relationships that minorities have few opportunities to shape. It must indeed be noted, that Stampnitzky (Forthcoming) is absolutely right in her observation, that the contestation on (the definition of) terrorism stands in lieu of more central questions that cultural and political life in a post-migration raises in relation to notions of the enemy, notions of the separation between public and private and what counts as political as well as on the legitimacy of violence. In other words, at the heart our relating to terrorism, lie exclusionary social, political and cultural practises, which privilege the status quo. This chapter thus far has illustrated cognitive and social mechanisms conspire to facilitate this privilege. But it has also made clear, that this privilege is no psychological or sociological necessity, precisely because it was shown that both, social reality and knowledge thereof, are dialectically constructed.

The following section builds on the processes that construct and enable knowledge of social reality and draw attention to the importance of identity processes and subjectivity in the context of a multicultural liberal democracy, in order to understand the subjectivity of the expectations that the promise of inclusivity and human dignity generate and concomitantly to see how preventative counterterrorism that focuses on a bounded conception of values serves to illustrate the exclusion of communities whose existence is not afforded a space of a-security. Overall, the purpose has however been to call upon Terrorism Studies to participate more responsibly in enabling policy making by making intelligible the fluidity and ambiguity at the heart of terrorism and promotes the ontological crisis at the heart of counterterrorism. It does so because it takes seriously the promise of a liberal democracy that expresses its commitment to human dignity and mutual respect for all its citizens and ultimately understands the academic study of terrorism to have a responsibility vis-a-vis humanity in the

form of emancipatory citizenship. It will serve the purpose to demonstrate that the task of Terrorism Studies ought to be to make intelligible and indeed navigate both the ontological and epistemological dimensions of terrorism, not only in order to enable better policy making but indeed to allow to navigate the fluidity, ambiguity and uncertainty that is not only the marker of counterterrorism but identity processes and subjectivity in modernity (Griffin, 2012) which attempt to deal with an ontological need for security and indeed the confrontation of the very questions that Stampnitzky argues to lie at the heart of the contestation of the notion of terrorism.

5.3.1 The pressure on multiculturalism

In Britain in particular, the notion of 'British values' (re-)captured political rhetoric and gained momentum since the election of the conservative government in May 2015, in its attempt to counter (non-)violent extremism. (National Security Council, 2015) Cameron's muscular promotion of British values and the institutions that uphold them juxtaposes this with a too tolerant multiculturalism. (Cameron, 2015) Multiculturalism has come under increasing political pressure throughout Western Europe (Malik, 2015), particularly for the supposed role it plays in enabling extremism, radicalisation and terrorism (BBC, 2011) for it is thought to be the root of the problem of domestic terrorism. (Cameron, 2011)

When Alexander (Alexander, 2007, p. 117) observes that community cohesion offers access to Britishness in 'circumscribed circumstances' the current political rhetoric in relation to the limits of tolerance in a liberal democracy like Britain is a case in point. As Theresa May, then Home Secretary makes clear:

> *'The starting point of the new [Counter-Extremism] strategy is the emphatic rejection of the misconception that in a liberal democracy like Britain, "anything goes", the belief that living in a society like ours means there aren't really any fundamental rules or norms. Instead, the foundation stone of our new strategy is the proud promotion of British values.' (May, 2015)*

This mirrors then Prime Minister Cameron's stance that

> *'[O]ur values have a vital role to play in uniting us. They should help to ensure Britain not only brings together people from different countries, cultures and ethnicities, but also ensures that, together, we build a common home. In recent years we have been in danger of sending out a worrying message: that if you don't want to believe in democracy, that's fine; that if equality isn't your bag, don't worry about it; that if*

you're completely intolerant of others, we will still tolerate you.' (Cameron, 2015)

Just as Alexander (2007, p. 118) notes for the context of community cohesion however, the rhetoric surrounding 'British values' in fact highlights the *unresolved tension* between 'the assertion of a common citizenship, the position of diverse ethnic, racial and faith communities and the ongoing issues of social, political and cultural marginalisation of minorities, both as collectives and as individuals.' This places into renewed focus Parakh's question of 'what values and loyalties must be shared by communities and individuals in One Nation (…) How is the balance struck between the need to treat people equally, the need to treat people differently, and the need to maintain shared values and social cohesion?' (CFMEB, 2000, p. xv)

In spite of the populist-charged criticism that the idea of a multicultural society receives then, multiculturalism remains the encapsulation of a moral promise for equal membership in society in spite of difference. (Taylor and Gutmann, 1992) It is the political and social attempt to come to terms with the existence of post-migration minority groups within a majority society. Indeed, Modood (2007, p. 39) observes, 'multiculturalism refers to the struggle, the political mobilisation but also the policy and institutional outcomes, to the forms of accommodation in which 'differences' are not eliminated, are not washed away but to some extend recognised.'

As institutions and conventions within a polity are shaped to first and foremost suit the needs and practises of the dominant cultural, linguistic or religious groups however, it must be acknowledged that the public space cannot be neutral, but 'unavoidably promotes certain cultural identities'. (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 108) In promoting certain cultural identities, even implicitly through their unquestioned, silent space in public institutions and conventions however and the only subsequent and explicit adjustment to the (negotiated) needs of a marginalised group, non-dominant cultural identities are disadvantaged. The presence of cultural, linguistic or religious minorities in a polity has a political character and gives rise to the processes and outcomes of political struggles and negotiations around the fact of difference, where struggles and outcomes in which certain kinds of difference are asserted, recognised and accommodated is not considered illegitimate. For multiculturalism recognises that cultural identities are constituted by differences that matter to people.

Multiculturalism then recognises that cultural identities are constituted by difference and recognises that group-differentiating dimensions exist in ways that are established *both* from inside the minority culture, but also from the outside. Difference is a product of exclusionary processes, of impositions both, from outside one's culture, as well as from the inside and is central to the social constitution of cultural identities. (Modood, 2007, p. 35-40)

The reason why cultural identities deserve public recognition is because their recognition acknowledge difference as not only a stigmatic differentiation from others but also as entailing a sense of belonging to others, that is a sense of identity that groups so perceived have of themselves. The differences perceived both, from the inside as well as from the outside, do not just constitute a form of distinctness but a form of alienness or inferiority, which contributes to a mode of being as well as a mode of oppression that fosters an unequal 'us-them' relationship. (Modood, 2007, p. 36-37) The moral promise of multiculturalism, captures an extended concept of equality, not just in the sense of equal dignity, but also in the sense of equal respect and necessitates an inclusion into and the making of a shared public space, rather than a (demanded) retreat to the private. (Modood, 2007, p. 61-62) Taylor and Gutman (1992, p. 24) note that mutual respect requires a widespread willingness and ability to articulate our disagreements and defend them in order to discern the difference between respectable and disrespectable disagreements, with the ability *to change our own minds* when faced with well-reasoned criticism. For this, the moral promised of multiculturalism depends on the exercise of open-ended deliberation and reason.

The political struggle for recognition, and multiculturalism according to Habermas (1994, p. 117), actually recognises the individual as a bearer of right to cultural membership and begins with the struggle about the articulation and interpretations of context-specify achievements and interests, whereby the scale of values of the society as a whole is up for discussion. A consequence of this of course is that, core private areas will become part of the public articulation of the expression of a collective identity and established boundaries between public and private spheres are up for discussion as well. Because it is recognised that it is through socialisation processes in inter-subjectively shared contexts of life that an individual conducts their ethical-political discourses and attempts to reach self-

understanding. With the individuals' identity interwoven with collective identities, and the moral promise of equal dignity and respect, the *individual's intersubjectively experienced identity* can only be stabilised in a network that is not merely private. Of course, what becomes clear then is that, via 'British values' the state appears to appeal to a seemingly cohesive reality and can lean on state power in order to invoke normative, affective and cognitive components geared to safeguard a measure of symmetry between objective and subjective reality. Identity, however is a key element of subjective reality stands in a dialectical relationship with society and is never static. (Berger and Luckmann, 1967, p. 194)

5.3.2 Identity and Recognition

Alexander (2007) reminds us that identity and difference take shape within institutional regimes of power and political practises but also notes that people locate themselves in relation to more immediate and more tangible sets of ties and obligations that stands between - and mediate - the state-citizen relationship. How we understand identity, becomes critical for our understanding of community, difference and how policy in relation to these is formulated.

Brah (2007, p. 140) furthermore points out that 'we become human through our sense of unique otherness'. Identity encapsulates 'a latent psychological investments in culturally specific, social ways of doing things in a particular way, an investment that reflects subjectivity and 'the self''. This in turn, is shaped by contradictory processes of identification, projection, disavowal, aspiration and ambivalence.' Social or political identities on the other hand, are a conscious action that seeks to make sense of 'the self' - the opaqueness of subjectivity - in relation to a lived social and political reality. The psychic investment in social or political identification, which consciously brings 'the self' into alignment with social reality is one that defers difference, (Hall in Du Gay, 1996) in the sense of forsaking a degree of our own sense of unique otherness. Because social and political identities come with this psychological investment and identities are shaped by social realities and collective dialogue, the public recognition of our identity requires a politics that leaves us to deliberate publicly about those aspects of our identities that we potentially share with others, (Gutman in Taylor, 1992, p. 7) for it acknowledges our humanity.

Social and political identities then are constituted by aligning 'the self' with social interactions and public discourse. By making the unconscious workings of

the self ‘the private’ conscious and public, conscious agency and unconscious subjectivity are enmeshed in everyday rituals which provide ‘the site on which a sense of belonging’ may be forced in articulating its difference from other people’s way of doing things. (Brah, 2007, p. 142) Brah (2007, p. 144) describes this as a ‘homing desire’ that gives individuals a sense of belonging and security and arises from the concrete circumstances that ‘give content to identification’.

Failing to recognise groups as individuals, however bears the danger of disregarding unconscious processes that are at work in deferring difference and forsaking a degree of our unique otherness and the psychological investment that comes with this. It may contribute to an undifferentiated obsession with a singular identity and indeed social stability, which appears to be the only one available for an individual and becomes the only source of meaning and pride, the only bond with others and the only way of forming part of a collective narrative. However, this erases both the recognition of individuals with minds, interests and talents of their own as well as the negotiated deferral of difference in which the individual has invested in bringing into alignment their subjective self with a conscious social or political identity. (Wolf, 1994)

The push for an identification with a political identity, such as ‘Britishness’ then must be *both,* part of a lived reality and a matter of daily experiences, nurtured through social relationships based on recognition and equality for it to provide for a sense of belonging *and* security. This is so because it recognises the psychological investment that comes with the deferral of our unique otherness that comes with this identification.

Morally then, national identity must be respectful of and build upon the negotiated identities that people value and does not trample upon them, precisely because it comes with the recognition of a negotiated individual subjectivity that may - or may not - identify with collectively expressed and/or performed signifiers. Such respect moreover, is a recognition of the moral promise of equal rights as well as equal dignity which flows from an understanding of a secure cultural context as a ‘basic primary good’ to provide meaning and guidance in peoples’ (individual) choice of a good life. (Taylor, 1992) A genuine recognition of equal dignity must go beyond solidarity with those who express the desire for respect of their (non-hegemonic) choice of the good life. It necessitates *transformation of our own* standards and values for the moral thrust of the

argument based on the recognition of equal dignity lies in a concern with the unjustified judgement of inferior status allegedly made of non-hegemonic cultures, that is the lack of understanding of what constitutes value from the perspective of 'the Other'.

Such a demand for respect and recognition necessitates a plural, changing, inclusive and lived British identity. Modood (2007, p. 150-151) points out that such a national identity, which is based on the 'fusion of horizons' can be as emotionally and politically meaningful to British Muslims as the appeal of jihadi sentiments, and would provide for a 'homing site' that provides both belonging and security. Sharing a common fate with fellow citizens then depends on the public recognition - both institutional and social - of the thrust of the moral promise of equality of rights *and* dignity so that, the subjectively experienced desire to flourish as an individual as well as the sacrifice in the form of the deferral of unique individual difference and the negotiated identification is intimately linked, for recognised as being linked, with the flourishing of public institutions and society.[50] This however, stands in stark contrast with observation that the notion of 'Britishness' today is 'non-relational and stresses passive attributes' that get most easily activated to 'disqualify any group that appears to show insufficient 'Britishness''. (Parekh, 2007, p. 134-135) It must be questioned, whether the move towards 'Britishness' or 'British values', can satisfy a 'homing desire' and provide a meaningful sense of belonging and concomitantly, increase national security.

In the absence of such a recognition and the undifferentiated bureaucratic application of the notion of 'British values' particularly in the context of preventative counterterrorism, it may indeed serve to remove 'Britishness' further from lived realities and daily experiences but become a function of institutional regimes of power and exclusionary political practices that jeopardises the ties that individuals have with the state and encourage a retreat to exclusive identity categories and a retreat into the private realm, where fallacious cognitive heuristics can go unchallenged. This attempt to offer bounded notions of threat and relative knowability in order to enable the management of uncertainty and

[50] This draws together Brah's homing desire as well as the CFMEB's report suggestion that national identity depends on the recognition of the interlink and investment in between the individual's and society's fate. (Brah, 2007, CRMEB, 200, Brah, 1996).

potentiality in preventative counterterrorism approaches does not only break the moral promise of equal citizenship but the overbearing focus on the potential threat to national security and the perceived moral obligation to 'do something' to counter that threat, makes it increasingly difficult to be self-reflective. In relating to the threat of terrorism, the government contributes to the establishment of a moral cocoon, which serves to reify and preserve as *the* objective social universe only one of many different readings of values and citizenship to the exclusion of all the others, which the moral promise of equal citizenship entails.

5.4 Terrorism Studies and the need for emancipatory truth claims

This chapter has demonstrated that individuals as well as societies function on the basis of operational procedures that enable the individual and the collective to make sense of their subjectivity in relation to their social universe. This process however is not only dynamic, socially mediated and selective but also works on the basis of fallible cognitive heuristics that, while enabling the individual to generally process information with ease, can lead to faulty conclusions. While it should generally hold true, that in a society where discrepant worlds are available on a market basis and an increasing consciousness of the relativity of all worlds, including one's own should develop, (Berger and Luckmann, 1967, p. 192) we have also observed that, social processes and cognitive heuristics work so as to privilege the maintenance of moral bubble and social predictability and stability to the detriment of emancipatory truth claims and the recognition of subjectivity. The tragedy hereby lies in the fact that both, social processes and cognitive heuristics function not only against the background of specific power interests and the threat inherent in the confrontation with an alternative that calls into question the inevitability of one's own subjective social (and moral) universe but also through the systematic disguise of their existence. Taken together, these processes inhibit empathetic perspective taking and the pursuit of emancipatory truth claims and contribute to the perpetual maintenance of moral bubbles and exclusionary practises.

It is against this background that this chapter wishes to reiterate its suspicion of positivist research and caution against the possibility of neutral and objective expertise on terrorism. What should be clear by now is that terrorism as

an unbounded object of knowledge and triggering, particularly for the context of preventative counterterrorism measures, uncertainty as the domineering security paradigm leads to relating to terrorism via questions central to civil society, national identity, and importantly via the invocation of morality.

Conceptually it is important that Terrorism Studies explicitly affirms the possibility, that terroristic violence is morally indifferent, and that morality follows from the selective, and as will become clearer in the following chapter, necessarily consequentialist application of moral theories. It is critical to note that morality as such does not fall apart because it is infringed upon by an individual, be it only once or on various occasions. Morality is viscous, that is morality recovers so that individual acts of violence will not make the system fall apart because ultimately morality serves to enable social stability. And because morality is viscous, it is arguable that the morality of violence is dominated by a consequentialist logic that relies on readily available moral theories to justify post-hoc instances of violence. Because morality bounces back, it is more than conceivable that morality requires forgiveness and empathy that facilitates the ongoing inclusion of the (violent) actor as well as the violent act in the social order.

It is in recognition of the fact, that the ‘evil’ of one’s own violence is disguised from the individual, that I wish to re-emphasise the very tragedy at the core of researching political violence in general and terrorism, in particular. On the one hand, violence is disguised ontologically through the individual’s moral embubblement propped by fallible cognitive heuristics and instances of our own violence may not be discernible as such. On the other hand, empirically we disguise our own violence through the post-hoc justification with a-priori existing moral theories, in an attempt to mitigate the potential for cognitive dissonance and psychologically experienced discomfort. We do in fact justify violence with reference to utilitarian considerations that find resonance with our own cultural repertoire, that is integrating our own subjective universe with the operating procedures of our social universe. It is for this twofold tragic augmented by that fact that, as we have seen in the previous chapter, humans can and do get social actions wrong, because they are limited strategic agents whose cognitive heuristics and operating procedures privilege stability over emancipatory truth claims.

An emancipatory approach to violence ought to start with an empathetic understanding of the social embeddedness of the individual social actor and the subjectively experienced and processed internal as well as external constraints upon an individual's social action that is guided by an explicit recognition of this very tragic. This understanding enables a radical methodological empathy rather than a clouding of analysis due to the moral valence that an act of violence (tragically) invokes. I emphasise the need for a radical methodological empathy because the processes and mechanisms described in this chapter apply universally, to policy-makers, to co-citizens, to interested observers as well as to perpetrators of terroristic violence, albeit of course as a mirror image of the other's perception. In recognising the humanity as well as tragic fallacies in ourselves as well as others, especially when we are shocked by their (non-) violent articulations and actions, we can respond in a more responsible manner that recognises and confronts the unbounded nature of terrorism for we recognise and mitigate for the fact, that our cognitive faculties are geared towards boundedness, embubblement and exclusion that are disguised from ourselves but importantly, visible and experienced from the perspective of the Other. It is for this reason that Terrorism Studies must provide expertise on the basis of an explicit normative position that enables emancipatory truth claims and instils moments of reflection that enable critical self-reflection and moral learning.

5.5 Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated how contextually differentiating between descriptive morality and normative valence of a violent act is made difficult, because in processing information and manoeuvring social relationships, humans rely on cognitive heuristics that privilege social stability and predictability and the concomitant psychological ease over (emancipatory) truth claims and non-consequentialist notions of morality. The (cognitive) aids, which help individuals to find their place in society and process information efficiently, have however been shown to be liable to be fallacious and thereby encourage a retreat to moral bubbles. This, due to the stability that cognitive heuristics and their structural manifestation enable, tragically prevent us from recognising our own biases and the power interests incorporated therein, by systematically fallible disguising our own violence from ourselves. We have however also noted, that

cognitive heuristics and the maintenance of the stability of our social universe are by no means inevitable but rather maintained in dynamic and open dialogue with social reality. Most importantly we have noted, that humans when called upon possess the ability to overcome affect-laden cognitive heuristics and incorporate new, reasoned information and thereby challenge conclusions reached by more automated processes which lends credibility to the claim, that moral learning is indeed possible. A tension, however, remains if confronted with alternative social universes that demonstrate the relativity of social universes to the individual and thereby disturbed the tranquillity afforded by cognitive and social processes of reality maintenance. This systematic albeit tragic fallibility of our cognitive heuristics as well as their exploitability for the purpose of maintaining social coherence and stability of course is inextricably linked with the construction of terrorism as inherently evil and the fact that in order to maintain credibility and authority, 'experts' on terrorism 'needed to maintain a certain distance from their very object of expertise.' (Stampnitzky, 2015b, p. 165-166) Stampnitzky notes that 'as terrorism solidified as an object of expert knowledge, it did not become 'purified' of its political or moral character; but rather, the expert discourse became more characterised by an intertwining of moral, political and scientific/analytical concerns, leading to persistent difficulties for those who would treat political violence as an object of rational knowledge accessible via positivist research methodologies.

6 Stretching Moral Bubbles - Existential struggles for recognition and emancipatory research

"*Since there is no typical psychological terrorist profile and since most terrorists are normal in a clinical sense (albeit not in a moral one), typologies of terrorism that take the terrorist actor as their main criterion for classification are bound to be of limited value." (Emphasis added Schmid, 2011, p. 191)*

Chapter two has established that terrorism as an object of knowledge occupies an intersitial position whose meaning Terrorism Studies continues to be unable to control because terrorism is an unbounded object of knowledge that is shaped through fluid and open discourse due to the lack of barriers that would qualify responsible participation and expertise on the topic. The academic and analytical study of terrorism, rather than being able to stabilise the discourse by appeal to universal, neutral, or apolitical principles cannot but fail to live up to this academic standard of objectivity, not least due to the permeability of its disciplinary boundary. Moreover, we have seen in chapter three that terrorism takes shape in the context of civil society and not only in the context of national security. This has tangible implications for the recognition of the existence and contestation over shared public space and exclusionary practises and discourses, which, for the context of the UK have been demonstrated to particularly shape the manner in which Muslims, can and do, express their subject and citizen position, most notably but not exclusively in the aftermath of terrorist atrocities. This has lead us to agree with Stampnitzky's observation, that contestation of terrorism can in fact be understood to reveal more profound questions central to contemporary political and cultural life, which has moreover been demonstrated to hold true particularly throughout chapter three for the context of preventative counterterrorism approaches under the UK government's PREVENT strategy and chapter five for the context of post-migration social realities and the contestation of multiculturalism, citizenship, and hegemonic values.

Through the lens of the politics of terrorism we saw that the move towards prevention relies not only on the notion of potentiality of the actualisation of a future threat or terrorist event, but moreover on the relative knowability as to the

origin and type of threat, which necessitates the delineation of boundaries as lines of orientation to enable policy making where the dominating policy paradigm rests on uncertainty. Against the uncertain threat of a potentially catastrophic act of terrorism, a vague and abstract notion of shared values has come to provide these lines of orientation aimed at making identifiable the uncertain threat, in an attempt to communicate relative knowability. Particularly the latter part of chapter three has also shown that the notion of shared values at the same time serves to reify taken-for-granted hegemonic power-relationships and to limit the unmitigated spaces for expression of notions of identity and equal citizenship that a dynamic liberal democracy promises.

The contextual manifestation of the politics of terrorism in the form of the PREVENT approach in the UK has shown, that the terrorism researcher is confronted with an inherent tension between the unboundedness of the object of knowledge and the concomitant permeability and consequences of its discourse and thus far, has remained unable to stabilise this tension through a responsible normative position from which to develop and exercise her expertise on the one hand, and on the other hand, an empathetic recognition of the universal human tendency to establish boundaries in an attempt to establish plausibility structures that aid the maintenance of a particular social universe and thereby provide a basis for relative knowability to enable not only preventative counterterrorism approaches but more universally, to generally enable the individual to successfully manoeuvre her social environment with psychological ease and tranquillity.

Chapter four on the other hand has emphasised the social psychological evolution of violence as an affect-laden strategy to regulate social relationships and stressed the fact that, even when humans regulate their social relationships violently, they generally aim to do so within *culturally shared and recognised moral motives.* The culturally shared and recognised moral motives however have been shown to be highly contextual and subject to the individual's perception but can indeed be understood as representative of the individual's attempt to navigate a particular social reality. The focus of the chapter was to demonstrate the fact, that even when individuals utilise violence, they do so with a subjectively moral motive in mind. This motivation has empirically been shown to hold true in spite of its counterintuitive appeal and has served to justify the shift

away from a focus on the corporeal manifestation and the instrumental utility of violence because of the latter's embeddedness in social and political power relation. Chapter four furthermore necessitated to distinguish normative moral valence of the violent act from the a contextual-descriptive morality of violence.

With this in mind, chapter five then demonstrated how contextually differentiating between descriptive morality and normative valence of a violent act is made difficult, because in processing information and manoeuvring social relationships, humans rely on cognitive heuristics that privilege social stability and predictability and the concomitant psychological ease over (emancipatory) truth claims and non-consequentialist notions of morality. It has therefore been difficult for experts to carve out a position from which to produce expertise that is rational/apolitical/value-neutral, and even experts who seem to get too close to terrorists may be tagged as 'sympathetic', and thus, lose their credibility.' (Stampnitzky, 2015b, p. 166) While these observations have important implications for the structural limitations of terrorism expertise, Jackson notes that Critical Terrorism Studies arose precisely as a counter-expertise movement aimed

> *'in part at exposing, resisting and deconstructing knowledge-power flows and relationships both in relation to the security and counterterrorism establishment as well as knowledge mediators between academia, the media, policy and the public, terror expertise nonetheless remains entangled in 'the politics of anti-knowledge' (Jackson, 2015b, p 186)*

At the same time and most importantly however, he notes that one weaknesses of Critical Terrorism Studies was the failure to 'fully articulate the theoretical basis for CTS in terms of its ontological, epistemological, methodological, and *normative* basis' (emphasis added, Jackson, 2015b, p. 197) which in other words confirms Stampnitzky's observation that experts failed to carve out a position *from which* to produce expertise. I argue that a normative position in fact would allow to recognise and responsibly account for the systematic disguise of different types of violence as strategies to regulate social relationships and anchored in fallible cognitive heuristics and thereby enabling empathy for the subject positions and motives of those whose violence we tend to cast as 'morally tainted' recognising moral taintedness as put a particular manifestation of taken-for-granted hegemonic power-relationships.

Indeed, it is the contention of this thesis, that the failure to provide a normative basis for the study of terrorism critically prevents Terrorism Studies from acting as responsible knowledge mediators of an unbounded, politicised, and as we will shortly see necessarily moralised object of knowledge. In recognition of the workings of the politics of terrorism and the boundedness and concomitant retreat to moral bubbles this encourages, Terrorism Studies can thus far, not provide the normative guidance that allows to responsibly navigate the tension between the tragic cognitive fallacies that lead to moral embubblement and its contextual implications for wider questions of political and social life, and terrorism as an unbounded object of knowledge. In other words, Terrorism Studies does not have a normative-theoretical position from which it could act as a responsible mediator of knowledge to encourage self-reforming moral learning and knowledge, that reminds of the need to take perspectives, allows for subjectivity and critical reflection and most importantly encourage caution because of the recognition of universal cognitive blind-sports and biases particularly in light of the observation that empirically, every act of terrorism brings to the fore terrorism experts as narrators or commentators that can and do exploit these necessarily fallacious cognitive heuristics. Without a normative position however it is the contention of this thesis, and as the quote from Schmid above makes clear, terrorism cannot be but morally condemned even in seemingly value neutral, positivist research approaches, even if this is rarely made explicit, because, as we have seen in the previous chapter, humans have cognitively evolved and adapted fallible heuristics to *selectively* 'see', and moralise violence. It is in recognition of the fact that individuals and societies privilege social stability and predictability, for Terrorism Studies to take on the role of generating responsible knowledge and precisely take on the task of making emancipatory truth claims.

However, the analytically thus far unchallenged position that terroristic violence has an often merely implicit pejorative moral valence - rather than seeing it as subjectively moral social action - has been shown in chapter five to build, in principle on the same evolved cognitive fallacies. Generously and empathetically understanding our own position of moral embubblement as a tragedy rather than hypocrisy, that lies at the very core of a disparate and precisely *never* neutral manner of relating to terroristic violence, would encourage reflexivity and an

explicit commitment to the production of emancipatory expertise. This must be done with the generous methodological recognition that neutrality and an amoral stance are tragically illusive. Recognising the universality of evaluative processes in relation to violence from a social psychology perspective as well as the exploitation of these processes has demonstrated to open an avenue for academic researchers to implore a more deeply reasoned and normative engagement with terroristic violence by making more explicit its essence and thereby facilitating a normatively-reasoned yet affect-empathetic engagement with terroristic violence. In other words, if terrorism research can develop a normative position that recognises universal, but fallacious individual cognitive heuristics to lie at the basis of the equally universal, moral motivation to utilise violence as a strategy to regulate social relationships, Terrorism Studies can contribute responsibly to the wider debates and the confrontation of exclusionary practises within societies that are shaped and framed through the lens of terrorism and counterterrorism.

While Stampnitzky (Forthcoming) insightfully points to the fact that the contestation over the definition of terrorism indicates that the more interesting question actually may be 'what does terrorism define?' and suggests that within the struggle to define terrorism are contained three fundamental of contemporary political life, namely 'who is the enemy? When is violence legitimate and when is it illegitimate? And which questions and concerns count as properly political?', this chapter will suggest that understanding terrorism from a context of social conflict in general and as a struggle for recognition in particular, can provide for the normative framework from which Terrorism Studies can exercise emancipatory expertise. This chapter wishes to follow Haleem (2012), who argues that paramount for understanding the essence of Islamist extremism is the ability to distinguish between the radical Islamist *explanations* of violence and the radical Islamist *justifications* of violence. Haleem shows that the former is conceptually reasoned in terms of existential Hegelian struggles for recognition, she demonstrates that the latter conceptually follow a moral consequentialist line of reasoning.

Placing terrorism within the context of social conflict and thereby taking the struggle for recognition as the normative framework for the study of terrorism will be demonstrated to not only provide for a position to produce responsible

expertise, but in its course also to humanise the terrorist actor and move beyond the event-driven accounts that contemporarily dominate the visibility of terrorism experts beyond the academic realm because it can serve to anchor terrorism as social conflict and fundamental questions that confront contemporary political life. This is possible because the struggle of recognition understands the essence of terrorism as both existential and universally anchored in the social reality of individuals. Within this framework it is possible to empathetically engage with the terrorist actor and take her and her social embeddedness as the main point of reference. This is with the reasoned recognition of the origins of the moral valence of the actor's violence and its observer's evaluation because the moral framing of the motivation. This is the case because the actor's expressed justification for activism is anchored in the self-understanding (beliefs) of the individual activist; these beliefs, the individual holds legitimately, because the very self-understanding of violence originates from an appeal to a universalised moral grammar to which the individual can lay claim. This normative framework follows the logic of the struggle for recognition and captures more than a reasoned appeal for the recognition of the ambiguity of moral judgement. This is the case because it can account at the same time for a moral self-understanding of the individual activist as well as the moral, political and social context (understanding by a third party) against which and within which the individual's activism takes place. It is this understanding that is the basis for making emancipatory truth claims. In other words, such a normative-theoretical framework allows to engage with the subjectively moral *meanings of the motives of terrorists* and at the same time, appreciates the need to responsibly manoeuvre the fact that 'research on terrorism is and has been deeply enmeshed with the politics of terrorism.' (Ugilt, 2012, p. 41)

6.1 Moral indistinguishability and the essence of terrorism

Trying to appeal to the need to understand the subjectively intended meaning of terrorism, Baumann (2013) approaches terrorism from a perspective that critically engages with the traditional difficulty in sociology to grapple with the normalcy and order of violence and broadly follows a phenomenology of violence that does not understand violence as a disturbance. By means of an

understanding sociology he follows Weber (1922), who sees violence as social action. Understanding violence as normalcy and social action that makes sense and has meaning in relation to another that conditions and shapes the action is an explicit attempt to move away from understanding violence as a social evil. This paths the way for Baumann to endeavour an investigation into the logic of violence rather than a demonstration of causal relationships. Indeed, Baumann stipulates that the traditional search for objective characteristics and causes of violence and therefore, by extension of violent behaviour of individuals is precisely unsuccessful because it builds on a double understanding of violence as both, a breakdown of 'normal' social relations as well as a social evil. (Baumann, 2013, p. 29) Baumann's approach is promising and familiar to Critical Terrorism Studies scholars, for it confronts the exceptionalism of terrorism from both a sociological as well as moral-philosophical perspective. In contrast to chapter four however, the approach taken here is less interested in understanding the individual's social-psychological motivations to utilise violence as a relationship regulating strategy, but rather focuses on the perspective of the observer and their perceptions and concomitant evaluation of the violence to demonstrate the need and opportunity in shifting this perspective. It moreover allows to embed the action within the workings of social relationships and can shed light on the manner in which violence serves to shape other questions central to social and cultural life within a society.

Baumann helpfully grounds his moral-philosophical considerations in a practical ethics and demonstrates amongst others by dissecting the application of Just War Theory that the supposedly absolute moral taboo of the killing of innocent civilians is regularly transgressed. He concludes, that the killing of innocents is not as much a moral taboo[51] - as it is widely taken for granted (Schmid, 2011b) when it comes to acts of terrorism - because the notion of (innocent) victimhood as the basis for its moral condemnation becomes irrelevant. Demonstrating the moral-philosophical obsolescence of the notion of the sanctity of innocent civilian life in conflict (Baumann, 2013, p. 192-200) as well as Just War Theory (Baumann, 2013, p. 202-214), he observes that both

[51] For challenging positions on the supposed moral taboo of killing civilians for the context of wars see for example (Glover, 2012, Downes, 2008, Walzer, 2006).

notions that limit violence as well as theories that justify violence[52] embody an inherent moral ambivalence or indeed, as a more cynical observer may note, a hypocritical double-standard.

Of course, this moral ambivalence remains hidden from within the social universe that maintains the individual's moral bubble, not least because it reflects the hegemonic consensus on the state's monopoly to violence. Baumann concludes, that in principle, violence *always lacks ethical foundation*, and consequently that violence is always morally illegitimate. However he also notes that precisely because the act of violence is always illegitimate, any act of violence requires justification. (Baumann, 2013, p. 243) Because Baumann can demonstrate that the moral evaluation of an act of violence is *not absolute* but arbitrary, and the a*pplication of a moral theory is consequentialist and not deontological*, he provides a moral-philosophical perspective that allows to empathetically understand the subjectively intended motives of terrorists by focusing on the justifications of their violence, that is a justification from within their social universe.

By demonstrating the moral indistinguishability of different acts of violence, Baumann captures the core of what is often described as hypocrisy when it is perceived as legitimate to justify one act of violence against civilians if it is committed by a nation state on the one hand and the blanket condemnation of acts of terrorism as immoral on the other. Baumann shifts attention to the level of justification and the availability to *communicatively establish legitimacy* of one act of violence over another. He further reiterates that communicating the legitimacy of the violent action is politically relatively easy for the state, because it can invoke a foundational legitimacy, but that any non-state actor that employs violence needs to ideologically, socially, or politically justify or seek legitimacy for their act of violence. (Baumann, 2013, p. 62) For the non-state actor, who does not automatically share in the state's monopoly to violence, this means that the space to communicate the moral ambivalence that is inherent in *any* act of violence, is considerably reduced, for the non-state actor cannot automatically rely either on the a priori, foundational legitimacy of their act of violence nor on the public space

[52] Here Baumann's (2013) engagement with Just War Theory and reference to the ethical contingency of moral questions in times where 'life is not calm' and 'ideas which seem noble and sensible (…) lose their moral glow and practical sense when times are hard' is insightful. See also: (Slim, 2008).

to communicate their justification. In fact, more often than not, the act of violence by the non-state actor is disqualified as nihilistic, senseless, evil and straightforwardly immoral which means that there is no political or moral need to engage any further with the motives of and the justification offered by the actor. Indeed, Baumann demonstrates that, by convoluting condemnation of terrorism with the definition thereof, any political, philosophical or other intellectual engagement regarding the legitimacy is, as a matter of principle, excluded (Baumann, 2013, p. 82) and terrorism becomes a non-explanation that perpetuates injustice and asymmetries of power. (English, 2009, p. 1) And because, as we have seen particularly in chapter three, terrorism and particularly preventative counterterrorism policies comes to shape core contestations within civil society, it cannot be emphasised enough that disregarding the perpetuation of injustices, asymmetries of power and exclusionary practises, fails to understand the essence of the contestations around terrorism particularly in a civil society context.

While Baumann concludes his moral-philosophical observations that violence is always illegitimate because it lacks moral foundation, he is also very clear that violence is a common social action. He must account for the fact that 'moral thought requires guidance for everyday decision making, particularly in exceptional circumstances to translate abstract moral thought into concrete ethical action.' (Baumann, 2013, p. 215) Because Baumann (2013) can demonstrate that morality is ambivalent, and any violent action can, in principle, be communicated as morally justified, it is necessary for the violent non-state actor to achieve a communal belief in the legitimacy of the violence utilised and this belief must be coherently communicated. In order to achieve this, an ideological motivation needs to be offered as a justification for violence. However, such a justification can only be successful if terrorists do not engage in simply nihilist violence and 'kill for killings' sake. They need to be able to morally distinguish and communicate the morally-founded motivation for their violence and be able to invoke, as we have seen in the previous chapter, principles that direct the use of violence that are accepted for the regulation of a particular social relationship. Baumann provides for a foundation that makes possible an engagement with terrorism that critically challenges most traditional positions that see terrorism as normatively wrong, by pointing to the *moral ambivalence* of any

act of violence and thereby confirms the moral subjectivity of the violent actor. Baumann empathetically concludes that, every one of us will at some point have to engage in an ethical balancing act, that is, in essence, *morally indistinguishable* from the terrorist's *logic* that justifies their violence. (Baumann, 2013, p. 243) And this, as we will shortly see, follows from an understanding of the motivation to use of terroristic violence within an emancipatory struggle which inevitably leads to a moral consequentialist reasoning.

By taking the normalcy of violence as a starting point and normatively demonstrating the moral ambiguity of all violence - even the one that can claim prima facie legitimacy because it is perpetrated on the basis of a foundation legitimacy that follows from the state - from a moral-philosophical perspective, Baumann can critically engage and challenge the observers', that is those that tend to condemn terroristic violence and thereby exclude attempts to understand *their* motives and *their* logic. He thereby moves closer to understand terrorist violence by highlighting the fact that even the terrorist's violence happens within ethical parameters, albeit ones that are not shared by its observers. It is these ethical parameters that are communicatively invoked in order justify the violence and generate legitimacy. Despite the clear transgression of the supposed moral taboo of the sacrifice of civilian life, which can in its application be demonstrated to be contingent, the question as to the essence of terroristic violence suggests that there is more than the insight of moral ambivalence and the selective moral condemnation of an act of violence against civilians. To understand the essence of terrorism then, we need to go further than pointing at the existence of double-standards and hypocrisy but need to uncover the very workings of the motivation to participate in acts of terrorism and the incoherence at its heart, precisely because we have seen in the previous chapter how we - tragically - have cognitively evolved to systematically disguise our own moral embubblement, our biases and cognitive fallacies from ourselves.

Where Baumann points to the need of *inner cohesion* - that is a reasoned and communicated logic that is not merely self-referential - in order to understand terroristic violence, he remains focused on the ambiguity in relation to the justification of violence. In other words, he demonstrates the lack of moral-philosophical, that is normative basis, for the *selective* application of moral-theories post-act and expressly points to contradictions as the starting-point to

encourage self-reflection and emancipatory truth claims if approached with methodological empathy, that is the recognition of moral embubblement and the concomitant emotional investment therein. Even though Baumann can demonstrate, that morality is ambivalent, and violence is morally always illegitimate, he is also clear that ethics is contextual and relational (Slim, 2008), and the normative evaluation of the violent act happens *in exchange* with the social environment of the non-state actor. Legitimacy of the terrorist's violent act is neither ultimately determined by the method utilised nor by a subjective perspective on morality, but by being able to communicatively utilise the inner cohesion and values of a constituent community.[53]

This ability ultimately raises questions of power. Indeed, the moral understanding of self-set ethical parameters that limit violence can be shown to be founded upon generally accepted and shared justifications, which the individual subjectively perceives as unfairly denied to themselves (or their constituency), for they are denied without adequate justification. (Forst, 2011) Haleem (2012) emphasises the need for a clear distinction between explanations of violence and justifications of violence, in order to understand the essence of terrorism. Cottee and Hayward (2011, p. 976) then suggest that we ought to understand terrorists as 'moral subjects who are compelled to give meaning to their lives'. Rather than focussing on normalising terrorism, they suggest that the central task of Terrorism Studies ought to be to humanise terrorists, for they are '*human* agents, with all-too-human dreams and passions and desires'. (Cottee and Hayward, 2011, p. 980), and conclude, very much in line with Baumann that the terrorists' self-perception is one of a moral agent. (Cottee and Hayward, 2011, p. 976)

While Cottee and Hayward (2011) observe the need to humanise the terrorist subject, they also note a striking focus on negative emotions such as anger, hurt, humiliation, and grief, while they suggest that positive emotions such as love, solidarity and compassion might offer a more promising approach in understanding terrorists' motivations. Indeed, through the lens of the existential struggle for recognition as an explanation for the motivation to participate in

[53] This conclusion broadly follows from Baumann (2013) who suggests that 'terrorists' rely on a society that regresses to a radical community because this closure allows for the terrorists to communicate their aspirations in resonance with the values of that community.

terrorist violence, it is not only possible to focus on these ‘positive emotions’ but furthermore it is possible to connect the terrorist actor and her environment not only to her immediate but also to a generally *shared* moral grammar that motivates the struggle for recognition. (Honneth, 1996)

Terrorism Studies scholars cannot stop at merely recognising that cognitive fallacies are such that they disguise actual incoherence and therefore prevent reasoned critique and self-awareness, but it must further connect the terrorist actor and observer to a shared humanity to enable critique and moral learning. Baumann alludes to the problematic incoherence by oscillating between the selective application of moral-philosophical theories to different instances of violence and emphasises the need to understand the other’s desire to establish legitimacy via communicative justification and the appeal of a different moral perspective and points to the need to empathise with the individual terrorist actor. While this is a step in the right direction, Terrorism Studies must go further than pointing at the inherent moral ambivalence and the need to empathise with the terrorist actor, not only because this moral ambivalence will necessarily remain disguised to either side because of the inner (illusive) coherence that the appeal to legitimacy attempts to establish, but also because merely pointing at ambivalent morality and the selective application of moral theories encourages a retreat to competing moral bubbles which disguise their own existence and do not encourage self-reflective emancipatory truth claims.

While the normative evaluation of the action ought not to be part of what interests in understanding terrorism, the essence of terrorism embodies the very workings of the incoherence in the normative evaluation of the action because the terrorist action is understood as social and its motivation is shaped by the meaning that the individual, who is cognisant of their social environment gives their action. In order to understand (the essence of) terrorism, that is an understanding of the very workings of incoherence in the motivation to participate in terroristic violence as well as the evaluation thereof, pointing to and acknowledging asymmetries in power and injustices as perceived by the perpetrator of violence is insufficient because it does not manage to connect *both* sides to anything beyond their subjective perceptions of justice, freedom and morality and is prone to contribute to relativism and polarities, but not emancipation. What becomes clear however, is that the ex-post communicated

justifications for violence give an insight into the moral universe not only of the individual but also their 'projected moral universe' of their social environment. This gives an indication, that a shared moral grammar connects the individual terrorist actor to a humanity beyond themselves. Haleem (2012) with her emphasises on the need for a clear distinction between explanations of violence and justifications of violence therefore, not only provides a basis for methodological empathy, but also makes explicit her understanding of the essence of terrorism in the form of a struggle for recognition. It is this struggle for recognition that connects the motivation of the individual terrorist actor to a shared moral grammar and humanity. Ultimately, if Terrorism Studies can provide for a normative framework that does justice to the humanity of the terrorist actor by capturing the existential essence of terrorism in the form of a desire to take up ownership and participation in a commonly shared humanity, Terrorism Studies can anchor its position of expertise in a normative framework and can thereby avoid being drawn into polarities and relativism, but indeed provide guidance for emancipatory truth claims and self-reforming dialogue.

6.2 From existential explanations to consequentialist morality

A significant part of this chapter will focus on the foundation of the moral self-understanding of the individual as best represented by a struggle for recognition, which is an integral part of human existence and existential in nature and suggest that violence plays a crucial part therein. Hegel argues that the development of human consciousness originates from a sense of identity, which leads to an inevitable desire of this very self-consciousness to be recognised as distinct and unique by others. (Haleem, 2012) The motivation to participate in violent action, can be explained by an existential desire to flourish as a human being whose identity is externally recognised and affirmed for the individual; This notion that struggles for recognition are existential in nature, leads Honneth (1996) to conclude, that these struggles are necessarily moral consequentialist in their justification. This follows from Honneth's central argument that 'notions of morality are *constructed* to give legitimacy (or a moral license if you may) to struggles for recognition.' (Haleem, 2012, p. 14) While Honneth is clear on this point, the implications thereof are often overlooked.

Honneth understands, that because the meaning-giving desire of humans, that is the desire of having ones distinct and unique traits of identity recognised by others, finds its foundation in well-established ethical relations into which the individual is conditioned and has learned to frame their moral expectations accordingly. When the individual's moral expectations are then being violated, the resulting outrage and struggle to rectify the violation is a *moral* struggle, because the struggle implies a normative evaluation of the legitimacy of existing social arrangements that reflect the socialisation of the individual into established ethical relations. (Honneth, 1996) Haleem, utilises this insight and links the struggles for recognition to the inevitability of moral consequentialist reasoning in the justification of Islamist extremist activism. She can thereby demonstrate that (violent) activism follows this line of argument and that moral consequentialism is indeed the very nature of notions of morality. In fact, what Haleem's dual-theoretical work shows for the context of Islamist extremism, confirms the conclusions we drew from Virtuous Violence Theory in the previous chapter, which stressed the *post-hoc moralised justification of violence.* It does so however, with an explicit appeal to normative theory.

Honneth's position in particular allows to derive a normative framework that allows to shift the focus from the violent act to the broadly moral expectations that she holds in light of well-established and practised ethical relations that binds the individual terrorist actor to *moral principles beyond herself* and beyond subjective moral relativism. Where Baumann establishes the subjective justifiability of illegitimate terroristic violence, Honneth's critical social theory does not deny the legitimacy of violence per se, because it can be anchored as a merely inevitably means of consequentialist morality in an existential struggle for recognition and thereby connects the individual terrorist actor not only to their immediate social environment but to the existential desires that motivate humanity.

6.2.1 Struggle for Recognition and the quest for full moral subjectivity

Building on Hegel's notion of self-consciousness, the struggle for recognition is understood to fundamentally challenge any master-slave relationship through a dialectic which describes the realisation by the salve of a *cyclical causality* between master and slave. The slave over time achieves an awakening of his distinct self-consciousness, that is her sense of autonomy. The struggle for

recognition of one's identity is of identity as at once distinct from the other and equally significant to the other. As a consequence, the slave comes to see the master's mastery as *rhetorical* and does no longer accept this mastery as the 'natural' order of things. The slave comes to a point where she comes to recognise her own worthiness despite the lack of recognition form the master. Once the slave reaches this self-recognition, she is empowered not only because she sees the tenuous nature of the master's mastery but also because she no longer depends on the master for the recognition of her distinct and autonomous sense of self. For Hegel, this struggle for recognition is based on the fears of negation and desires for recognition and in this way struggles for recognition have been argued to be existential, that is a common tendency of all human existence, and are in essence universal struggles against the negation of the self. (Haleem, 2012, p. 13-14)

Struggles for recognition in the Hegelian sense then, are struggles for the demarcation of one's autonomy and independence from the other, yet at the same time the recognition of equal significance to the other. It is important to keep in mind, that recognition in this context implies both, identification of one's distinct self-consciousness in the sense of acknowledgement, as well as the approval in the sense of respect for that distinct self-consciousness. (Inwood, 1992) From this of course follows that the other not only acknowledges but further respects differences and can only be experienced intersubjectively. Haleem (2012, p. 16) makes clear that

> *'if the other acknowledges one's distinctness but relegates it an inferior status, that is not the recognition that is sought in struggles for recognition for in such a case one is not considered equal to the other but only distinct from the other.' (Haleem, 2012, p. 16)*

And because recognition demarcates one's freedom and independence, and carries a sense of dignity, pride and autonomy, the struggle for recognition is critical in explaining the desire for recognition, and the motivation to struggle for recognition. What follows then for Hegel is that 'violent combat is not an accidental occurrence in human affairs but a necessary element in the process of proving oneself a person' because it serves to break the momentum that established existing and hegemonic relationships between the master and the slave. Violence then become not only demarcations of self-recognition but also

the very tools that challenge the master's mastery. (Devji, 2005, Haleem, 2012, p. 20-23)

It is against a background that endeavours human emancipation understood as 'liberation of human beings from the circumstances that enslave them' (Horkheimer, 1982, p. 244) that Honneth develops a Critical Social Theory that builds on Hegel's master-slave dialectic but further follows in a tradition of Marx, Kant, and Weber. Honneth understands the motivation for social conflict and the insight for emancipatory critique as resting within the domain of ordinary human experiences (Honneth, 1996, p. 163) rather than intellectual theorising. Although he initiates his approach with a discussion of Hegel and building on the existential struggle for recognition and in focusing on the dependence of the existence of well-established ethical relations for human flourishing, he argues that these relations can only be established through a social conflict. Honneth grounds his position within experience-based knowledge that persons have about their dependence on sound, autonomy enhancing forms of recognition, and further that because recognition is intersubjectively experienced, this means that a reconciliation of differences and the realisation of universality - that is true emancipation - can only be achieved through greater social inclusion, (Adorno and Jephcott, 2005, p. 103) because it is only through social interaction that the individual experiences herself as the full and trusted contributor to shared social projects. Honneth concludes, that the motivating origin of social conflict can be located in an individual's negative experience of having their broadly moral expectations violated.[54] (Honneth, 1996, p. xvii) This follows from Honneth epistemological stance where he identifies three socially sanctioned principles that are the result of *moral learning*, whereby over many generations members of society have gradually acquired knowledge of what it means to recognise each other with respect to various aspects of moral subjectivity and agency. (Brink and Owen, 2007, p. 9) If struggles for recognition are existential in their explanation, then they are necessarily moral consequentialist in their justification. This is because the individual's feeling of misrecognition and the concomitant outrage are driven by the intersubjectively experienced violation of the moral expectations

[54] While it is the violation of expectations and negative experiences of misrecognition that motivates social conflict, it is the desire for love and solidarity that lies at the core of this motivation. Positive emotions indeed provide for a more inclusive approach in understanding the motivation to participate in terroristic violence. See: (Cottee and Hayward, 2011).

of the distinct but equal significance of the individual's sense of identity. In other words, in struggling to rectify the experienced misrecognition, the individual appeals to an already shared moral grammar with the therefore (legitimate) expectation of being intersubjectively recognised.

6.2.2 Conditions for individual identity-formation and the good life

Honneth's formal conception of an ethical life is understood as the normative ideal of society that forms the basis for an individual's moral expectations and is premised on the intersubjective conditions that facilitate the individual's identity formation. This identity formation is premised on the development of three distinct versions of practical relations-to-self through which individuals come to experience themselves as having a certain status, be it as a focus of concern, a responsible agent, or a valued contributor to shared projects. This intersubjectively experienced process depends on modes or patterns of recognition that allow the individual to acquire the self-confidence, self-respect, and self-esteem necessary for the full development of their identity.

Honneth emphasises that '[O]ne's relationship to oneself, then, is not a matter of solidarity ego appraising itself, but *an intersubjective process*, in which one's attitude towards oneself emerges in one's encounter with an other's attitude towards oneself.' (Emphasis added Honneth, 1996, p. 168-170) Morality in this context then as the point of view of universal respect becomes one of several protective measures that serve the general purpose of enabling a good life that is the basis for an individual's identity formation. This particular understanding of the good life has to do with the intersubjective conditions that enable self-realisation and that can normatively be extracted from the plurality of all particular forms of life and it centres on a notion of *inclusivity,* because it is this that enables the individual to know herself as unique as well as equal. Honneth develops this from Plessner, whose social ontology distinguishes three degrees of intersubjective trust that enable the individual's identity formation in the form of the development of primary bonds, the trusted bearer of rights within society, and within as a contributor to a community of shared concern. Honneth goes on to justify this three-part distinction, because it can be empirically 'mapped onto different levels of practical relations-to-self' (Honneth, 1996, p. 93) by which he understands the individual's ability to experience herself as intra-subjectively

recognised and ‘worthy’ of concern. Honneth bases the distinction between three axes of practical relations to the self on social ontology confirmed by empirical observation, affirming his experience-based understanding of knowledge, that form the basis for an individual’s identity formation.

In his approach, Honneth is continuously and consciously committed to providing the framework, which identifies ‘accurately the social experiences that would generate the pressure under which struggles for recognition would emerge within the historical process’ (Honneth, 1996, p. 93) rather than seeking to find explanations in intellectual theorising only. It is this inter-subjective experience-based understanding that makes his framework helpful for Terrorism Studies because it makes it easy to map empirical findings and first-hand accounts onto said processes of identity formation while at the same time allowing to connect these to universal for existential struggles for recognition. Through the identification of socially experienced and sanctioned moral principles that lie at the basis of social conflict, we are provided with an approach that explicitly incorporates terrorism as social action within existing and socially lived moral experiences rather than merely abstract principles. Further, because Honneth’s framework sees a conception of the good for which the ideal of the autonomy of moral subjects and agents who are considered *equals* is central, he also includes an *emancipatory standard against which the normative evaluation of concrete claims for recognition can be undertaken*. (Brink and Owen, 2007)

Moreover, because the approach is born out of a critical theory tradition, and further committed to the intersubjective experience of the perceiving individual, it acknowledges the dialectical interdependence of the perceiving subject and the perceived object. (Wyn Jones, 1999, p. 21) Horkheimer (1982) argues, that the relationship between the subject and the object is far more complex and interdependent. He observes that

> *‘the object we perceive in our surroundings bear the mark of having been worked on by man. It is not only in the clothing and appearance, in outward from and emotional make-up that men are the product of history. Even the way they see and hear is inseparable from the social life-process, as it has evolved over the millennia. The facts, which our senses present to us are socially performed in two ways: through the historical character of the object perceived and through the historical character of the perceiving organ. Both are not simply natural, they are shaped by human activity’. (Emphasis added Horkheimer, 1982, p. 200)*

Taken together, this allows us to understand categories of thought as socially derived and created. It allows us to appreciate the process and the point of view of cognition as always individual, particular (Alway, 1995, p. 64) but importantly, intersubjective and neither neutral nor merely self-referential.

This twofold commitment to emancipation and perception of social facts as both contingent and intersubjective can provide for a normative orientation for the study of terrorism that restores a de-essentialised subjectivity of the terrorist actor because it makes the individual's identity formation on the one hand central to the conception of the good life and at the same time makes this process dependant on the recognition of others. In other words, the individual must be able to demonstrate that her unique identity traits are at once already represented and equal to those traits that find recognition within society and is able to connect her identity and her wellbeing to that of humanity.

In providing a framework that links the motivations for social conflict in general, and terrorism as manifestation of a social conflict in particular, to the existence of an inherent moral grammar of these conflicts, it is feasible to shift Terrorism Studies from a focus on the confrontation of a security problem to the provision of a normative framework that encourages methodological empathy. This framework allows to recognise the subjectively perceived but intersubjectively experienced and collectively *shared* moral grammar as the basis for anchoring an individual's claim for recognition in a common humanity. It is such a framework that provides for an understanding of the essence of terrorism as embodying the workings of intersubjectively experienced incoherences and subjectively perceived injustices of social arrangements because it can show that the individual's claim for recognition that is based on a shared moral grammar is unduly denied. Such a framework can serve as a normative position, to address the fact that terrorism highlights incoherences in contemporary politics, which manifest in the contestations of belonging and identity and the legitimacy of social arrangements, as described in chapter three and further expanded upon in chapter five.

6.2.2.1 Love and self-confidence - the individual as focus of concern

At a very basic level, Honneth builds on the idea that the first stage of the formation of an individual's identity develops from the love the individual receives which makes it possible for individuals to experience as well as 'mutually confirm

each other with regard to the concrete nature of their *needs*'. (Honneth, 1996, p. 95) This first stage of reciprocal recognition is experienced through that of loving care because both individuals know themselves to be united in their dependence on each other. From this Honneth also concludes that a recognition relationship is necessarily tied to the physical existence of concrete others who show each other feelings of particular esteem. It is the assured experience of care that gives the person who is loved the strength to develop a relaxed relation-to-self, which enables them to become independent and *experience themselves through the mutual dissolution of boundaries*. In speaking of recognition as a constitutive element of love, what is meant is an affirmation of independence that is guided – indeed, facilitated – by care (Brink and Owen, 2007, Honneth, 1996) so that the individual experiences and recognises herself as the worthy recipient of care.

Through an on-going exchange of ego-relatedness and boundary-dissolution, the individual continuously produces and establishes and maintains basic self-confidence in relation to the loving relationship to parents, friends, and lovers. (Brink and Owen, 2007, p. 11) Honneth affirms Hegel's assessment of love as the structural core of all ethical life, although there is always an element to moral particularism to this, because for Honneth, 'only this symbolically nourished bond which emerges through mutually desired demarcation, (…) produces the degree of basic individual self-confidence indispensable for autonomous participation in public life'. (Brink and Owen, 2007, Fraser and Honneth, 2003, Honneth, 1996, p. 107)

6.2.2.2 The individual as a morally responsible member of society

The second stage of an individual's identity formation lies in her recognition as the bearer of rights and privileges. This is traditionally conferred upon them through a legal system that can be understood as the expression of an universalisable interests of all members of society. By recognising the individual as a bearer of rights, the individual recognises herself as a free person (Honneth, 1996, p. 108-109) and a trusted and responsible participant in public life.

In order to participate in public life as a free and rational being, the individual needs to defer to the universalised will as expressed in a legal system and thereby signals their trustworthiness with the concomitant expectation for this trustworthiness of be recognised. This willingness to defer to a universal will, of course presupposes the expectation of reciprocity of the relationship of

recognition based on rights. The possession of rights means that the individual, in principle, is able to raise socially accepted claims which empowers the bearer of the right to engage in action that can be perceived as legitimate, that is right and trustworthy by their interaction partners. Importantly, by appealing to the idea of reciprocal recognition, the individual is able to relate socially accepted claims back to their own personhood. (Honneth, 1996) The notion of personhood captures the idea of the *moral responsibility* of the right-bearer in reciprocal social relations (Brink and Owen, 2007) and means that the fullest form of self-respecting autonomous agency can only be realised when one is recognised as possessing the capacities of 'legal persons' – that is, of a morally responsible agent.

Legal recognition confers upon the individual the understanding of herself as someone who possesses the competent subjectivity and agency that makes them a *full and responsible member of society*. This enables a relation to the self that is trusting one's own sense on one's needs and urges and gives rise to the form of consciousness in which one is able to respect oneself because one deserves the respect of everyone else. (Honneth, 1996, p. 114)

Honneth notes however, that actual self-respect can only be inferred indirectly, by making an *empirical comparison* involving groups of people, from whose general behaviour one can draw conclusions about the forms in which the experience of disrespect is symbolically represented. It is this *general behaviour* that is the basis for individual empirical comparison, which presupposes the existence of an *intersubjectively shared value-horizon*. This is the case because self and other can mutually esteem each other as *individualised* persons only on the condition that they share an orientation on those values and goal that indicate to each other the significance or contribution of their qualities for the life of the other. (Honneth, 1996, p. 121)

Due to its universal character, legal recognition however only allows for the individual to be recognised for her *universal features*, or rather, those features that make up the individually *shared value horizon*. Yet exactly not those components of an individual that allows for their individualised self-realisation. Legal recognition enables only the recognition of the particular qualities that expresses the universal features of human subjects. This means that this form of recognition demands a social medium that *mediates* the characteristic

differences among human subjects in a universal and more specifically, intersubjectively obligatory way.

This task of mediation is performed, at the societal level, by a symbolically articulated - yet in principle always *open* and porous - framework of orientation, in which those ethical values and goals are formulated that, taken together, comprise the *cultural self-understanding of a society*. The cultural self-understanding of a society provides the criteria that orient the person's social esteem, because their abilities and achievements are judged intersubjectively according to the degree to which they can help to realise these culturally defined values. (Honneth, 1996) As legal relations can only integrate those dimensions where prior agreement have been intersubjectively established, traits and abilities with regard to which members of society *differ* from one another, require recognition through alternative mechanisms or an explicitly articulated and reasoned justification for the denial of recognition. (Forst, 2011)

6.2.2.3 The individual as valued contributor to shared projects

The third stage of identity formation that Honneth specifies is self-esteem as a practical relation-to-self in which one's *distinct* traits and abilities are communally valued. An individual can only establish positive relations to themselves if they feel recognised for accomplishments that they precisely do not share in an undifferentiated manner with others. This practical relation-to-self is formed, Honneth argues, through relations of *solidarity* in which individuals or groups share in a common project or value horizon. The individual then no longer has to attribute the respect that they receive for their accomplishments back to an entire collective of social standards but can refer respect for the accomplishment positively back to themselves individually.

The individual learns to conduct themselves habitually in line with the collective expectations that are ethically linked to their social status or role, whereby 'status honour is normally expressed in the fact that above all else a specific style of life is expected from all those who *want to belong to the circle.*' (Honneth, 1996, p. 132)The identity traits towards which the social evaluation of a person is oriented under these presuppositions are not those of a biographically individuated subject, but are those of a *culturally typified status group*. It is according to the 'worth' of this group - which emerges, in turn, from the socially determined degree of their collective contribution to the realisation of societal

goals - which the social worth of each of its members is to be measures as well. *Within* the status group, subjects can esteem each other as persons who, because of their common social position, share traits and abilities that are accorded a certain level of social standing on the society's scale of values. *Between* status groups, one finds relations of hierarchically graded esteem, which allow members of society to esteem subjects outside their estate for traits and abilities that, to a culturally predetermined degree, contribute to the realisation of collectively shared values. (Honneth, 1996, p. 133)

Social-esteem signifies only the degree of social recognition the individual earns for their form of self-realisation by contributing to the practical realisation of the society's abstractly defined goals. (Honneth, 1996, p. xii) With regard to this new, individualised system of recognition relations, everything now depends, on the *definition of this general value-horizon*, which is supposed to be open to various forms of self-realisation and yet, at the same time, must also be able to serve as an overarching system of esteem. (Honneth, 1996, p. 126)

Under these altered conditions, the experience of being socially esteemed is accompanied by a felt confidence that one's achievements or abilities will be recognised as 'valuable' by other members of society. In modern societies, relations of social esteem are subject to permanent struggle, in which different groups attempt, by means of symbolic force and with reference to general goals, to raise the value of the abilities associated with *their* way of life. (Honneth, 1996, p. 126) The individual knows herself to be a member of the social group that can collectively accomplish things whose worth for society is recognised by all other members of society. (Honneth, 1996, p. 127) This form of mutual recognition is also tied to the presupposition of a context of social life, whose members, through their orientation towards shared conceptions of their goals, form a *community of value*. (Honneth, 1996, p. 122)

Among themselves, subjects mutually sympathise with their various different ways of life because they esteem each other symmetrically. The all-dominating agreement in practical goal instantly generates an intersubjective value-horizon, in which each participant learns to recognise the significance of the abilities and traits of the others to the same degree. (Honneth, 1996, p. 128) Symmetrical understood as free from being collectively denigrated one is given chance to experience oneself in light of one's own accomplishment and abilities as valuable

for society. (Honneth, 1996, p. 128) In modern societies then, social relations of symmetrical esteem between individualised (and autonomous) subjects represent a pre-requisite for solidarity. In this sense, to esteem one another symmetrically means to view one another in light of values that allow the abilities and traits of the other to appear significant for shared praxis. Relationships of this sort can be said to be cases of 'solidarity,' because they inspire *not just passive tolerance* but felt concern for what is individual and particular about the other person. (Brink and Owen, 2007, Honneth, 1996, p. 129)

Unlike rights, solidarity carries a communitarian moment of particularity. Particular traits and values are being endorsed, yet *these values are a contingent matter and are the result of social and cultural struggles that lack the universality of legal relations*. (Emphasis added Honneth, 1996, p. xvi) However, a truly inhibiting factor for solidarity is already included in the pattern of recognition that cannot extend beyond the collectively shared goals and value horizon. (Honneth, 1996, p. 172) By situating esteem in the horizon of values of a particular culture, Honneth opens up the possibility of conceiving of the conditions for self-esteem as a field of *contestation and cultural struggle* for the recognition of previously denigrated contributions to the common good. (Honneth, 1996, p. 125)

6.2.3 Misrecognition and the struggle for recognition - towards a normative position for Terrorism Studies

Honneth locates an individual's ability to develop positive relations to themselves within three distinct patterns of recognition, all of which carry in themselves the potential for the expectation of reciprocity of mutual recognition to be violated. Feelings that the institutionalised standards of recognition in society – standards that claim legal and moral legitimacy – are in fact unjust, for their violation of expectations of mutual recognition, frustrate the formation, sustenance, and further development of valuable aspects of the persons' identity, their subjectivity and their agency. Feelings of shame, hurt, or indignation 'are, in principle, capable of revealing to individuals the fact that certain forms of recognition are being withheld from them'. (Honneth, 1996, p. 136) It is the individuals' knowledge, which is founded on their intersubjective experience of social relations, and their awareness of their constitutive dependency on adequate social conditions that facilitate the symmetrical recognition for the formation of the individual's identity and the concomitant meaningful relations to

the self that make such feelings of injustice possible. (Brink and Owen, 2007, p. 15) Each of the negative emotional reactions that accompany the experience of having one's claims to recognition disregarded holds out the possibility that the injustice done to one will cognitively disclose itself and can become a motive for political resistance – the struggle for recognition. (Honneth, 1996, p. 138)

Hurt feelings of this sort then can become the motivational basis for (collective) resistance only if subjects are able to articulate them within an intersubjective framework of interpretation - a moral grammar - that they can show to be typical for an entire group; something that can potentially affect other individuals. This practical process in which individual experiences of disrespect are interpreted as typical for an entire group can motivate collective demands for expanded relations of recognition, a desire for greater justice and the inclusion of traits that have thus far not found collective recognition.

Individuals experience a situation as unjust only, if it violates claims, which they take to be legitimate; these expectations of legitimacy are represented by moral reasons, grounded in internalised but experienced for social practised patterns of recognition. Individuals have been socialised into accepting these patterns of recognition by observing their social surrounding. It is this social environment which already contains the corresponding principles of legitimacy. This means that individuals only form expectations of legitimacy in response to moral principles that possess factual validity in a social culture or social universe. (Honneth, 2007, p. 366) Expectations of legitimacy presuppose shared semantics, that is a shared moral grammar, which enable personal experiences of disappointment to be interpreted as something affecting not just the individual herself but also a circle of many other subjects. It is this semantic that allows for an anticipation of a future 'communication-community' that will recognise the currently misrecognised individual with and for their present abilities and traits, and further the anticipation that the individual will find themselves socially respected as the person that they cannot under present circumstances be recognised for being. (Honneth, 1996, p. 166) As the individual's expectations of justice and legitimacy result from her internalised experience of socially accepted patterns of recognition, or alternatively socially accepted patterns of justification for misrecognition (Forst, 2011), the injury of expectations is *legitimated by the surplus validity* of what is already contained in existing patterns of recognition,

that is the possibility of the expansion of existing patterns of recognition by an appeal to the actualisation thereof within a future community. It is this understanding that leads Haleem to conclude that morality is necessarily based on consequentialist reasoning. (Haleem, 2012)

The investigation of social struggles, in terms of a struggle for recognition, presupposes an analysis of the *moral consensus* that unofficially governs, within a context of social cooperation, the distribution of rights and responsibilities, (Honneth, 1996, p. 167) or the justifications for the limitations thereon (Forst, 2011) as well as the promises of inclusion that can be staked at future communication communities.

Honneth supports his theory with anthropological studies which show that cultural formulae define socially acceptable and unacceptable needs. Similarly this thesis has noted the perceived social appropriateness of violent strategies in the regulation and maintenance of social relationships in chapter four. Virtuous Violence Theory provides a social-psychological explanation for the centrality of subjective moral concerns that lie at the heart of not only the regulation of social relationships but, also violence as one strategy to organise social relations. Moore moreover suggests that 'one of the most powerful sources of moral outrage is to see someone else getting away with breaking a moral rule one has undergone great pains to make a part of one's own character' (Moore, 1978, p. 36) which of course confirms what Honneth sees as the individuals' dependency for their identity formation on the validity of their moral experiences which is grounded in their lived participation in an existing moral grammar. Honneth concludes, that if one interprets social struggle form the perspective of moral experiences in the manner mentioned, there is no theoretical pre-commitment in favour of either non-violent or violent resistance. Instead, *at the level of description*, it is left entirely open whether social groups employ material, symbolic, or passive force to publicly articulate and demand restitution for the disrespect and violation that they experience as being typical. (Honneth, 1996, p. 163)

The grammar of such struggles then is moral in the sense that the feelings of outrage and indignation driving them are generated by the rejection of legitimate claims to recognition and imply normative judgments about the legitimacy of social arrangements (Honneth, 1996, p. xi) but not in relation to the means utilised

to address the experienced misrecognition. Honneth's approach mirrors the insights of Virtuous Violence Theory in its focus on the descriptive and subjective moral concern of regulating social relationships rather than the more common focus on the instrumentality of violence but further serves as a basis to understand all appeals to morality in relation to their consequentialist reason.

On a descriptively explanatory level, the means employed in the struggle for recognition do not, in and by themselves, impact on the morality of the struggle. Honneth's framework complements the social psychological perspective that we have seen in the previous chapter, where we concluded that morality consists of intentions, motives, emotions and judgements about realising relationship models according to cultural preos as the perceiver interprets and applies the preos to the situation (Fiske and Rai, 2015, p. 138) which left us with a situation in which morality is ambiguous and contingents.

On a normative level however, Honneth's framework suggests that patterns of recognition, neither have an ontological status that is entirely independent from the culturally specific life worlds from which we judge and act, nor are they to be understood in a strong relativistic manner. He suggests in fact that a conception of the ethical good understood as an ethics of autonomy and equal respect builds the foundation that can help us to recognise valuable qualities in others. It is a normative *commitment to equality and respect for the self-realisation* of others that is founded in an understanding of the individual's dependence for their identity formation on intersubjectively experienced meaningful relations to the self that necessitates an expansion of the concrete spheres of recognition that serves as the normative benchmark for a formal conception of the good life. With this orientation to a formal conception of a good life, the feeling of being unjustly treated and the experience of being disrespected, both of which are relevant for the explanation of social struggles, no longer appear only as motives for action but also come to be examined with regard to the moral role that must be attributed to each of them in the development of relations of recognition. (Honneth, 1996, p. 168)

Morality understood as the point of view of universal respect, has then to do with individual self-realisation, which can be normatively extracted from the plurality of all particular forms of life. (Honneth, 1996, p. 168, p. 170) Claims for recognition that are concretely expressed in social conflict are made from a

particular perspective that has not yet found appropriate consideration by appeal to a general recognition principle, or alternatively, the claim for recognition of a particular form of self-realisation is denied without an adequate, socially developed and established justification. (Forst, 2011) Against the dominant interpretative praxis, it is shown that there are particular, hitherto neglected, facts whose moral consideration would require an expansion of the spheres of recognition (Fraser and Honneth, 2003, p. 186) that enables a moral learning process by outlining the factors that inhibit moral learning.

Taking particularly the latter two stages of identity formation that we have outlined above, as a morally responsible member of society as well as a valued contributor to the common good seriously, Honneth provides a theoretical framework that can answer why well-meaning policies that utilise values to provide orientation for preventative counterterrorism measures, such as PREVENT or the Counter-Extremism Strategy, are poorly received. It is because these policies represent the mediated cultural self-understanding of a society as a *fixed* value horizon, where the individual who has deferred their individualised needs to the universalised will of society. Their contribution to the common good however is *not recognised as equally valuable and trusted* and the individual must experience herself as, at the same time *not* being entrusted with the moral personhood, which equal citizenship would empirically entail, as well as excluded from being recognised for her contribution to the common value horizon of a society that she sees and has reasonable grounds to believe herself as part of.

But, as we have seen in chapter five our cognitive heuristics systematically disguise from ourselves to only our own moral embubblement but our biases which limits us in our cognitive capabilities to consider the perspective of others as the first step of moral learning. These cognitive limitations, as we have also seen however, merely serves the purpose of preserving cognitive energy but can be corrected by conscious reasoning and the availability of previously excluded perspectives and arguments. It is for this reason and as the second step of moral learning that Terrorism Studies must inject normative reason as the position from which it can exercise its expertise into the debate on terrorism. As an academic discipline it must be in a position, to not only understand terrorism as an unbounded object of knowledge whose meaning is malleable, manipulatable and socially contingent, but Terrorism Studies also can recognise that, beyond

strategic considerations surrounding the problem of counterterrorism, at the heart of terrorism in fact also lies a struggle for recognition. For this very reason, the manner in which societies relate to terrorism raises questions that touch the very core of the legitimacy of social arrangements and the individual's place and contribution therein.

6.2.3.1 Violence and the struggle for recognition

What becomes apparent is that for Honneth, the ensuing struggle for recognition represents not only a normative judgement about the legitimacy of existing social arrangements but it also follows that the struggle for recognition necessarily relies on a moral consequentialist reasoning for any and all means in its pursuit are utilised for the purpose of achieving recognition. Haleem observes, that when struggles of recognition 'are not disguised through reference to religious tenets, consequentialist notions of morality appear in terms of the imperative of 'justice', 'self-defence', 'national security' and even 'humanitarian action' (Haleem, 2012, p. 33) and concludes in fact that consequentialist morality is a universally relied upon narrative (Haleem, 2012, p. 96), a narrative that Habermas (1972) notes has a particularly persuasive appeal, and thereby confirms what we have already seen in Baumann (2013), who falls but short of making explicit this very observation.

For Honneth (1996, p. 190), what is central to the understanding of the motivation for social conflict and rebellion is his understanding of the foundations for the 'sense of what one deserves'. But because he also recognises that this motivation is born out of concrete experiences of misrecognition, what necessarily follows is the moral consequentialism of struggles for recognition because the dynamic reinterpretation of morality is the necessary corollary for the individual/group that perceives itself as disadvantaged, because within a struggle for recognition, it 'can define the rejection of their negation and oppression as 'just' and thus as 'morality'.' (Haleem, 2012, p. 34) The appeal to justice for example, even when provided with reference to religious, that appear to be deontological tenets, merely disguises the necessarily consequentialist essence of morality.

Haleem however goes even further than this and explicitly relates Honneth's theory to violence. By utilising this understanding of consequentialist morality to revisit Hegel's master-slave dialectic, she argues that violence, rather than

serving an instrumental purpose, is utilised to deconstruct 'the master's mastery'. She demonstrates that with reference to violence, radical Islamist discourse highlights 'the illegitimacy of the master's control, a control that it presents as dependent on physical force and not moral superiority.' (Haleem, 2012, p. 63) Indeed, Devji suggests similarly that it is a humanitarian logic at the heart of Islamist violence that demonstrates a unity which is made manifest by violence. It is this violence which

> *'builds a bridge between enemies by demonstrating that all men are equal if in death alone. It is as if this macabre equivalence has replaced the quality that is supposed to exist between men and unite them as part of a single humanity. The militant's violence, then, ironically, links the world's people together in the web of mutual obligation and responsibility.' (Devji, 2008, p. 43)*

In other words, violence is rhetorically presented as morality in its justification and this morality reflects the consequentialism of the struggle for recognition because such struggles are driven by the expected consequences of actions, namely the desire for recognition of the self as distinct and equally significant to the other (and as not inferior to the other). (Haleem, 2012, p. 135) What this confirms furthermore is that the essence of violence, even from a normative perspective, rather than being instrumental is indeed socio-moral, and confirms our observations in chapter four, as to its centrality of socio-moral relationship regulation.

6.3 A normative framework to relate to terrorism

When we looked at the moral psychological foundations of Virtuous Violence Theory and further looked at cognitive heuristics to understand the affect-laden processes that lead individuals to morally evaluate social actions and interaction, we did so with the intention of demonstrating that individuals do this to preserve cognitive energy and do not need to engage in conscious reasoning. And we have further seen that these dynamics privilege the maintenance of social reality and predictability over accuracy and emancipatory truth claims. We have also seen however, that social psychology suggests that conscious moral reasoning can at times correct and override moral intuitions. There we concluded that people reason morally because they care about how they and others treat people and how they and others (are seen to) participate in groups. While we remained

sceptical as to the power of moral reasoning in *conflict situations* because it is here where individuals tend to fall back to quick and automatic moral intuitions and heuristics, and a priori formulated moral theories as post-hoc justifications, individual moral reasoning can correct and even override moral intuition especially in response to individuals navigating different and/or conflicting social goals and they do so via conscious reasoning, through reframing and through social interactions that bring to light new perspectives and arguments.

While this chapter thus far has tracked a normative framework that emphasises the existential and necessarily moral consequentialism essence of terrorism for it ought to be understood as a struggle for recognition, and thereby wanted to demonstrate that consequentialist morality is the norm rather than a deviation and must be conceptualised and methodologically approached as such. Against the objection of a tyranny of the minority that wishes to expand hitherto accepted principles of recognition, it is prudent to point out that Honneth (Honneth, 1996) makes clear that he understands the underlying conception of the good life, that is emancipation, in liberal-egalitarian terms. While Honneth's framework initially opens the door for *any* unique trait to be potentially worthy of recognition, Honneth also provides a caveat in accepting morality only for those struggles that overall *expand the circle* of those whose unique traits that are socially valued for their contribution. Emancipation thus understood, is committed to expanding patterns of recognition so as to include the endeavours for individual self-realisation that continuously expand the circle of valuable and respected contributions to society and confronts exclusionary practise, which can be demonstrated to affect shared but unique traits necessary for the development of meaningful relations to the self as the basis for an individual's identify formation. Of course, we can anticipate the tension, that is the social conflict, that can arise between established patterns of recognition that represent the shared value horizon of a society and the desire for recognition of contribution that expand these shared values beyond existing patterns. But because we can demonstrate that this tension is both existential and universal and also that these tensions follow from an already shared moral grammar as lived in existing social relations, we can also demonstrate that the essence of this struggle is moral. And it is this conclusion that can provide for the framework that enables the normative position for Terrorism Studies.

Honneth provides a normative framework within which the individual's struggle to be recognised as an equally worthy carrier of rights is challenged by their wish to be socially valued for they unique traits and characteristics. What distinguishes the individual from others is at the same time to be seen as the source of self-esteem and solidarity so as enable the individual to develop a practical relation to the self and is further existential and universal. This carries the potential of unresolved tensions where the individual's unique traits are not (yet) socially valued or recognition is denied without adequate justification. What follows is firstly, that the motivation that is born out of the attempt to resolve this tension, is an affirmation of modes of recognition as legitimate, both socially and individually. The feeling of misrecognition then humanises the actor because she can relate her negative experience to a mode of recognition that is already being granted to everyone else as being withheld from her without adequate justification. The essence of the struggle for recognition necessitates that practically, that is experientially, modes of recognition need to be expanded or alternatively an adequate justification need to be provided for why unique traits are not socially recognised in spite of the moral grammar of modes of recognition. (Forst, 2011) Moreover, as the framework is founded upon accepted and practised modes of recognition, it is the struggle for recognition that is moralised for it demands only what is owed to the individual based upon accepted modes of recognition withheld without appropriate justification. What the individual is demanding is already owed to them in the first place and does not go beyond the moral foundations already accepted, albeit pushing the boundaries for modes and traits of recognition. The framework understands morality in strictly consequentialist terms and morality does precisely not hinge on the fact that violence is utilised in its pursuit.

Overall, this normative framework, by building on Hegel's existential and universal struggle for recognition, not only serves to illuminate the necessity of the moral consequentialist justification for terrorism, but via Honneth's understanding of the importance of intersubjective experiences for an individual's identity formation. This framework locates the motivation for the struggle for recognition with the individual and in actual experiences of misrecognition. This makes it useful for empirical and practical applicability rather than mere abstract philosophising and lays out a path for applied and empathetic reason as to the

manner in which policy makers, the media, academics and society at large can relate to terrorism, beyond a focus on the state. Haleem's observations on the dialectical reason in radical Islamist discourse give an important indication as to the importance of unpacking radical and/or extremist rhetoric where she shows that it is here where the slave demarcates her autonomy and independence through violence and thereby challenges the master's mastery. With this as the double-theoretical background, she can show that there is a critical difference in between the understanding the *nature of the motivations* and the *essence of* Islamist extremism. Hereby the important implication of course is that only the existential essence, that is the rejection of misrecognition, combined with the dynamic dialectical reason can explain the resonance of the radical's message, where violence is at its core *reciprocally causal.* (Haleem, 2012, Chapter 5)

Where Honneth's theory can demonstrate the necessary universality of moral consequentialist reasoning even in the justification of violence, it can help inject reason and thereby opportunities for empathy and moral learning into the contestation of terrorism. It is this that we have argued to be so crucial not only within the academic study of terrorism, but also when it comes to counterterrorism policies. Not only does this framework help to provide a position from which to present its expertise, but it also provides a vehicle that helps to recognise the moral consequentialism that is inherent in the contestation of terrorism, because it mirrors the contestation at the heart of the struggle for recognition and serves to normatively problematise the exclusionary practises that not only serve to sustain lines of orientation for preventative counterterrorism but also hide from examination the biases that are inherent to claims of analytical objectivity and neutrality in Terrorism Studies.

6.4 Recognising shared humanity and emancipatory research

> As long as terrorism is conducted by a well-defined enemy, we are comfortable condemning it, but when it is done by someone who looks a bit too much like ourselves, and who perceives himself to be a warrior in the fight against the terrorist enemies, we have been used to condemning, things get complicated. (Ugilt, 2012, p. 98)

The previous chapters have focused on establishing that terrorism as an object of knowledge occupies and intersitial position that Terrorism Studies, as an academic discipline has been unable to control. Terrorism as an empty signifier and unbounded object of knowledge is susceptible to being filled by desire and further shaped through a fluid and permeable discourse. The notion of the potentiality of terrorism concomitantly evoked not only a politics of terrorism that has been shown to rely on vague, ambiguous and abstract notions of values to provide orientation against the uncertainty inherent in the threat of a potentially catastrophic future act of terrorism but has further demonstrated that the contestation over the conceptualisation of terrorism finds actualisation in preventative counterterrorism policy and discourse.

Indeed, we have demonstrated that at the heart of the contestation of terrorism lie much broader questions of identity, belonging, and legitimacy. What we have also seen however, is that this essence is usually not made explicit and missed. By relying on the struggle for recognition as a framework to understand the essence of the nature of motivations in Islamist extremism as existential and having been able to demonstrate that the justification for this struggle are *necessarily* consequentialist, we managed to show that the motivating experience of a particular struggle for recognition lies in an actual or perceived experience of misrecognition, which if it can rely on a shared moral grammar not only affirms the legitimacy of that particular social order but also provides for the basis that individual experiences of disrespect can be read as typical for an entire group, and in such a way that they can motivate collective demands for expanded relations of recognition, based on the pre-existing moral grammar. (Honneth, 1996, p. 1) As Honneth (1996, p. 153) points out ‘empirically, whether the cognitive potential inherent in feeling hurt or ashamed become a moral-political conviction depends above all on how the affected subject’s cultural-political environment is constructed: only if the means of articulation of a social movement are available can the experience of disrespect become a source of acts of political resistance. The developmental logic of such collective movements, can however be discovered via an analysis that attempts to explain social struggles on the basis of the dynamics of moral experiences. (Sorel, 1976, p. 102). Morality though is based, not in the subjective self-understanding but rather in the recognition of meaningful relations to the self that are dependent on recognition. Then, the

action that is thus motivated, manifests socially and serves *multiple* social functions. Events, or actions for that matter, as Munson points out 'can speak in two voices' and 'experiences can take on multiple meanings, events can take on multiple voices, and behaviours can simultaneously express multiple intentions and beliefs.' (Munson, 2008, p. 184) Yet, at the same time there is a tension between the meaning that the action is meant to have and the meaning that it is given by the audience and further the manner, in which the act works independently as demonstrated by Ugilt's elaboration of terrorism as meaningfulness-as-excess. It is this nexus, that makes understanding the meaning of the motivation of the individual violent Islamist activist difficult to grasp. In other words, the individual actor does not establish an entirely 'new' ideology or worldview but rather attempts to communicate the unique traits they perceive for themselves as legitimate for already recognised as valuable. What the actor demands with their act and what is communicated as their motivation is already expected and accepted. In essence, actors use 'external' (socially agreed) values to understand their own action in moral terms to bridge the gap and incoherence between their subjective meaning of the act versus the social function that their action is being given.

It has been the purpose of this chapter then to articulate a normative-theoretical basis for Terrorism Studies from which to produce expertise. In noticing that the critical issue in understanding the essence of terrorism is the '*popular inability* to distinguish between the nature of reason in the radical Islamist explanations of violence and the radical Islamist justifications of violence' Haleem (emphasis added 2012, p. 144) inadvertently points towards the need to confront the very core issue of Terrorism Studies in lacking a basis from which to produce knowledge; knowledge which empathetically takes into consideration the fact that the motivation to participate in terroristic violence originates in an existential struggle for recognition that *necessarily* is moral consequentialist in its justification, and precisely located within the existing social order.

Utilising the insights from this chapter as its normative-theoretical position, allows to both navigate the tragic at the core of the struggle for recognition, and further to explicitly confront moralising approaches that, at the very least detract from our individual yet universal moral embubblement but are so very symptomatic of said popular inability to distinguish between the nature of reason

in explanations as opposed to justifications of terrorism. Recognising the consequentialist moral necessity of existential and universal struggles for recognition in relation to terroristic violence, augmented by the insights as to the social and psychological mechanisms that tragically facilitate our moral embubblement has demonstrated to equip academic researchers with a position from which to implore a more deeply reasoned, normative and most importantly introspective engagement with terroristic violence by making more explicit its moral essence and thereby facilitating a normatively-reasoned, yet affect-empathetic engagement with terroristic violence, which ultimately resides within an emancipatory struggle for recognition. If the 'function of academic enquiry is to say the unsayable' (Heath-Kelly, 2010, p. 252), then Honneth's framework offers a normative position to understand terrorism through eliminating an a priori condemnation and thereby marginalisation of the terrorist subject because it allows for the possibility that the terrorist's struggle can be understood as morally motivated and embedded in a *shared* moral grammar. It outlines the steps, necessary for moral learning and ultimately emancipatory truth claims. Moreover, if we take serious the fact that it is the potentiality of terror that makes terror 'meaningful in excess' and it is the excess of potentiality, which serves a political and moral purpose, it must be clear that the threat of terrorism does not necessitate a response. (Ugilt, 2012, p. 159) It is the responsibility of Terrorism Studies, to utilise its position to moderate the perceived sense of urgency triggered by the politics of terrorism and confront the popular inability to distinguish between the nature of terroristic violence and its moral consequentialist justification. Hereby it has been shown that Terrorism Studies can rely on a framework that takes seriously the existential nature of the motivations to participate in terroristic violence and the necessarily consequentialist justification. This is the case because it is this universalist essence, which not only humanises the terrorist actor and equips her with her own voice and desires, but further that can give Terrorism Studies the stability to act as a point of reference to confront the exclusionary practises that hide behind the contestation of terrorism. This allows Terrorism Studies a claim to emancipatory knowledge and expertise in spite of the unboundedness of its object of knowledge by understanding the terrorist act explicitly as moral social action. Taking such a position seriously can provide for the framework to

responsibly engage with terrorism and the wider questions central to social and cultural life that are being raised by terrorism, by providing an understanding of the barriers to moral learning and thereby providing an explicit impetus for moral learning and self-reflectivity from a normative, that is emancipatory, position.

Conclusion

This thesis has argued, that at the core of the academic study of terrorism, must lie a concern with the questions, which are raised by the contestations of (the concept of) terrorism. These questions reach to the core of social coexistence and societal boundaries and are intimately linked to questions of norms and values. The thesis has demonstrated, that a disregard for the social embeddedness of terrorism expertise and its participation in hegemonic power-relationships stemmed from, Terrorism Studies' reliance on positivist research approaches. This methodological position treats normative questions as tangential and oftentimes merely preparatory in its quest to answer the more compelling question as to why individuals turn to political violence. Against this background, the thesis has demonstrated, that Terrorism Studies however, always invokes and builds on questions of normative relevance, because terrorism is an unbounded object of knowledge. The thesis has argued further, that the emergence of Critical Terrorism Studies with its focus on critiquing the manifestation of state-power in the study of terrorism, has not managed to overcome the dominance of positivist research either. This is the case, because neither perspective has managed to methodologically relate terrorism to wider questions of social, political and cultural relevance and the normative questions this invokes.

Methodologically, both, Terrorism Studies and Critical Terrorism Studies chose to capture a reality where the nation state, rather than the subjective reality of the individual actor or their social relationships, becomes the central point of reference through a restrictively instrumental understanding of violence. Chapter four has demonstrated that this centrality of violence becomes problematic and a crucial point of origin for the failure of Terrorism Studies to leave behind its embeddedness with the hegemonic power-relationships circumscribed by the state. This has been shown to be the case because instrumental violence is always evaluated from the perspective of the only legitimate monopoly of violence resting with the state. This leads to a moralisation of violence because terrorist violence falls outside the readily available, taken-for-granted and accepted justification and can only be conceptualised as an instance of violence that has no (legitimate) place in politics.

Chapter four has shown, that Terrorism Studies' focus on the instrumentality of violence removes the individual's choice to use violence from a wider social and cultural explanatory framework, which does not focus on the state alone. It contrasted this observation with the suggestion, that violence can also be understood as a strategy intended to regulate social relationships. Pointing to Virtuous Violence Theory, the chapter has argued, that violence is a morally indifferent social action, because independent of the perspective of culture or the actor's perceptions and intentions, there is nothing about the features of the act as such, that give it its moral quality.

Chapter five then has emphasised, that the violent act acquires its moral quality when evaluated from the perspective of meaningful principles focused on the act, but not in isolation from these principles. The chapter has shown that these principles generally follow from moral principles, which represent the hegemonic consensus. This consensus arises, and persists, because the individual's cognitive heuristics and social practises function to enable predictability and stability. These moral bubbles are difficult to overcome because cognitive heuristics and social practises are such, that the tranquillity transferred by them, translates into social and normative beliefs, which provide for the plausibility of the inevitability of *our own* subjective social universe and subjective reality. The chapter however, has also shown, that the empirical existence of others and their subjective social realities, can confront the individual with alternative social realities and offer opportunities for (moral) learning. This is the case, because empathetic perspective-taking can challenge the taken-for-granted inevitability of one's own subjective social reality and inject different truth claims.

Chapter three therefore, can be read against this background to have illustrated how the failure to recognise, that terrorism serves to shape how wider questions of cultural and political life, are being experienced in the context of preventative counterterrorism in the United Kingdom. The chapter has shown the inherent tension between the necessarily bounded preventative logic of counterterrorism policies and the concretely experienced broken promise of openness and equal citizenship for *all* citizens in a post-migration society. It is these incoherences, which have demonstrated, that at the heart of preventative counterterrorism, lie contestations over values and normative questions. The

chapter thus has illustrated, that the disregard for normative theorising in the academic study of terrorism, has led to an inability to confront the fact that at the core of the invocation of values in preventative counterterrorism remains the maintenance of a hierarchical citizenship. It has further shown, that when the contestation of the concept of terrorism takes place in the context of national security rather than civil society, it does so *in lieu of* a wider social, cultural and political debate on (national) identity, the boundaries between political and private life, and ultimately, the legitimacy of violence. Terrorism Studies keeps struggling with the unboundedness of its object of knowledge, because it remains committed to a conceptualisation, which takes the political instrumentality of violence and the state as its central point of reference and thereby embeds a normative position, which it has not managed to overcome. It is for this reason, that the normative framework proposed by this thesis, in the form of the struggle for recognition, was aimed at an explanation of *social* conflict and the confrontation of exclusionary practises, which stand in the way of an individual's identity formation.

Terrorism, so the thesis has argued, occupies an interstitial position and always invokes an excess of meaning. Terrorism therefore, functions to mediate the scholarly production of knowledge by taking shape in conjunction, rather than independently from, a permanent dialogue with political, public and media discourses as well as counterterrorism policy making and its subjectively experienced application. Failing to methodologically capture, that subjective values and morality lie at the heart of much of the contestation over the conceptualisation of terrorism and in the way its excess manifests in the concrete contextual application, as has been shown for preventative counterterrorism in chapter three, therefore misses an important dimension of critique and responsible knowledge production.

The central question, this thesis has confronted therefore, was what methodological tools Terrorism Studies requires in order to firstly, identify and secondly, better navigate, terrorism as an unbounded object of knowledge that triggers a normative 'excess'. This thesis has suggested, that such a methodology must understand the production of knowledge and expertise that recognises terrorism as social action to which normative judgement applies. It has argued, that it is precisely this judgement that is intertwined with the

reproduction of hegemonic power-relationships and therefore wider questions of social, cultural and political significance. While the thesis recognised that the nation-state circumscribes hegemonic power-relationships, it was important to emphasise, that these relationships manifest in the concrete experiences of individuals. For this reason, the thesis saw it most fit to utilise a critical theory perspective, which understands the production of knowledge as inherently interested and furthermore with the goal to identify the potential for change through the empowerment of people, which challenge injustices in social relationships. (Howell, 2013) In its state goal, the thesis thus followed in the path of Critical Terrorism Studies and sought the potential for change through the empowerment of people. In the spirit of critical theory, the thesis sought to identify the potential for transformative practise and moral learning by identifying structural and cognitive barriers to emancipatory knowledge and suggested that explicit normative theorising is paramount in that endeavour, because it explicitly addresses the fact that the production of knowledge is inherently interested. To exemplify the importance of treating normative questions not as merely tangential, the thesis has demonstrated, that questions of values and morality are central to the study of terrorism from the beginning. The survey of the literature in Terrorism Studies of chapter two for example, has shown that the attempts to 'purify' the concept of terrorism to arrive at a more objective and/or neutral definition, necessarily fail, because 'the political is baked into the concept from the start' (Stampnitzky, Forthcoming) while chapter three has shown that preventative counterterrorism relies on values to provide lines of orientation where the dominant security paradigm is one of uncertainty.

The thesis expands on Critical Terrorism Studies by adding a normative framework in the form of the struggle for recognition. This framework locates barriers to knowledge, as well as opportunities for moral learning, within mundane social relationships and thereby moves beyond a critique of hegemonic power-relationships circumscribed by the nation state as its primary point of reference. The thesis has proposed, that the struggle for recognition provides a promising normative framework, because not only does it make the individual and their existential struggle for recognition its central point of reference, but it furthermore considers the existing social order as providing for the moral grammar, which enables the individual to articulate their subjective justification for their struggle.

It did so by demonstrating that different acts of violence are morally indistinguishable. Within this framework it is possible to reflexively engage with the terrorist actor in spite of, and yet with reasoned recognition of, the origins of the moral valence of the actor's violence and the observer's evaluation. This was demonstrated to be the case because the moral framing of the motivation that is the actor's justification for activism within the framework of a struggle for recognition, is anchored in the self-understanding of the individual activist. Their struggle is moral because the very self-understanding of violence originates from an appeal to a universalised and shared, that is taken-for granted, moral grammar to which the individual can lay claim. It is such a framework, which provides Terrorism Studies with a normative position that enables it to act as a point of reference to confront the exclusionary practises that hide behind the contestation of terrorism and allows Terrorism Studies a claim to emancipatory critique. This provides for the foundation for the field's participation in the confrontation of questions more central to contemporary political life, which positivist leaning methodologies problematically remain silent on. It is in the identification of the scarcity of explicit normative theorising and the consecutive suggestion of a normative framework in the form of a struggle for recognition where the thesis offered a contribution to Critical Terrorism Studies approaches and an original contribution to the knowledge of the field. The thesis then is an explicit recognition of the fact, that ethical questions (such as the ones raised by Stampnitzky (Forthcoming)) cannot be bracketed from terrorism scholarship or policy making. This thesis should however not be misunderstood as a dismissal of individual contributions to the academic study of terrorism, but rather wishes to suggest by means of an intervention, that a permeable field that engages with a topic as accessible to the public imagination and discourse as terrorism, ought to invest further resources in exercising its expertise on the basis of an explicitly formulated methodology, which enables addressing questions of normative concern, so as to provide concrete and measured ethical guidance for counterterrorism practitioners, policy makers and everyone who participates in the debates and practices triggered and implicated by terrorism. The strength of the struggle for recognition as a normative framework for the study of terrorism, lies in its potential to navigating the inconsistencies and absurdities of modern life, by recognising the barriers to moral learning as well as locating the impetus for moral learning

within the existing moral order. This position encourages self-reflection and empathy because it understands the identity formation of the individual to be dependent on the experience of being recognised as a valuable contributor to shared projects. This framework therefore, can provide ethical guidance to confront the questions central to contemporary political, social and cultural life that are being raised by terrorism, with the individual and not the state as its central concern. The thesis has argued, that it is this universalist essence, that humanises the terrorist actor and equips them with their own voice and desires, vis-à-vis a *shared* moral horizon.

By addressing the lack of a normative anchor point in Terrorism Studies, the thesis demonstrated a distinct contribution to the knowledge of the subject. The thesis has provided Terrorism Studies with the methodological tools to exercise its expertise from a methodological framework, which allow its experts to be explicit about the normative positions they invoked and from which they can confront exclusionary practices and hegemonic power-relationships, which hide behind the contestation of terrorism. This thesis has not tried to argue, that a more authentic understanding of terrorism can be achieved via normative theorising or indeed abstract philosophising alone. Rather, the thesis has suggested, that hidden behind the workings of terrorism expertise, that is in well-constructed, innovative and informative research on terrorism, but also counterterrorism policy making and vernacular discourses on terrorism, lie normative questions of hegemonic power relationships, which are much more central to the lived experiences of individuals and their navigation of the contradictions of modern social, political and cultural life.

Addressing these hidden workings is paramount to unlock the potential for moral learning and emancipatory truth claims. With its explicit normative framework, this thesis offered a methodological approach so that Terrorism Studies can provide concrete ethical guidance to navigate the incoherences of modern political, social and cultural life despite the unboundedness of its object of knowledge. In that, the thesis has provided an intervention against the potential for a negative binding to the usual targets of critique (Alvesson and Sköldberg, 2009, p. 167) and has also encouraged a look at social relationships as the site for critical self-reflection in answering the questions in relation to values, identity, boundaries, and exclusionary practises raised by terrorism. The thesis has

presented an approach that, while bringing us no closer to knowing what leads a person to turn to political violence, treats terrorism as a social phenomenon to which judgement applies. This has moved the key concern of the study of terrorism away from its relationship with the state to a focus on moral learning and emancipation of the state's citizenry and institutions. This concern allows to understand 'terrorism' as a crucial site of political struggle over boundaries and inclusion, at the heart of which lie normative questions and values, in which each individual has a stake. In a climate, where real security concerns are dominated by uncertainty and a sense of urgency, a failure to self-reflectively confront how taken-for-granted normative positions are projected, shape and give legitimacy to preventative action, the thesis has highlighted the difficulty to understand the subjectivity of others. It is the individual actor, whose perception of reality is complex, multi-faceted and shaped through her many mundane social and political interactions, which circumscribe her taken-for-granted understanding of her social world. Terrorism scholars, taking on the role of public intellectuals, must encourage a willingness for open-minded, self-reforming dialogue, which can yield the most promising opportunities, not only for understanding the incoherences of modern political, social and cultural life, but further for moral learning and emancipation.

Bibliography

ALGEMENE INLICHTINGEN EN VEILIGHEIDSDIENST. 2006. Violent Jihad in the Netherlands Current trends in the Islamist terrorist threat. *General Intelligence and Security Service Ministry of the interior and Kingdom Relations.* [Online]. Available: https://english.aivd.nl/publications/publications/2006/04/13/violent-jihad-in-the-netherlands. [Accessed 15 November 2012].

ABBAS, T. 2004. After 9/11: British South Asian Muslims, Islamophobia, Multiculturalism, and the State. *American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences,* 21**,** 26-38.

ABBAS, T. 2012. The symbiotic relationship between Islamophobia and radicalisation. *Critical Studies on Terrorism,* 5**,** 345-358.

ABRAHMS, M. 2008. What Terrorists Really Want: Terrorist Motives and Counterterrorism Strategy. *International Security,* 32**,** 78-105.

ACKERLY, B. A., STERN, M. & TRUE, J. 2006. *Feminist methodologies for international relations,* Cambridge, UK ; New York, Cambridge University Press.

ADORNO, T. W. & JEPHCOTT, E. F. N. 2005. *Minima moralia : reflections on a damaged life,* London ; New York, Verso.

AHALL, L. T. 2011. *Heroine, Monsters, Victims: Representations of Female Agency in Political Violence and the Myth of Motherhood.* Doctor of Philosophy PhD, University of Birmingham.

ALAM, Y. & HUSBAND, C. 2013. Islamophobia, community cohesion and counter-terrorism policies in Britain. *Patterns of Prejudice,* 47**,** 235-252.

ALEXANDER, C. 2007. Cohesive identities: the distance between meaning and understanding. *In:* WETHERELL, M., LAFLÈCHE, M. & BERKELEY, R. (eds.) *Identity, ethnic diversity and community cohesion.* London ; Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage.

ALVESSON, M. & SKÖLDBERG, K. 2010. (Post-)positivism, social constructionism, critical realism: three reference points in the philosophy of science. *In:* ALVESSON, M. & SKÖLDBERG, K. (eds.) *Reflexive Methodology New Vistas for Qualitative Research.* Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, Singapore, Washington DC: Sage Publications Ltd.

ALVESSON, M. & SKÖLDBERG, K. 2009. *Reflexive methodology : new vistas for qualitative research,* Los Angeles ; London, SAGE.

ALWAY, J. 1995. *Critical theory and political possibilities : conceptions of emancipatory politics in the works of Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse, and Habermas,* Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press.

ANWAR, M. 2008. Muslims in Western States: The British Experience and the Way Forward. *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs,* 28**,** 125-137.

APPIAH, K. A. 2009. *Ethische Experimente Übungen zum guten Leben,* München, Beck.

APPLEBY, N. 2010. Labelling the innocent: how government counter-terrorism advice creates labels that contribute to the problem. *Critical Studies on Terrorism,* 3**,** 421-436.

ARENDT, H. 1954. Ideology and Terror: A Novel Form of Government. *The Review of Politics,* 15**,** 303-327.

ARENDT, H. 1970. *On violence,* New York, Harcourt.

ATRAN, S. 2016. The Devoted Actor - Unconditional Commitment and Intractable Conflict across Cultures. *Current Anthropology,* 57**,** 192-203.

AUCHTER, J. 2012. Gendering Terror Discourses of Terrorism and Writing Women-as-Agent. *International Feminist Journal of Politics,* 14**,** 121-139.

AWAN, A. 2016a. The rise of religious identities and the Charlie Hebdo attack. *New Internationalist* [Online]. Available: https://newint.org/features/web-exclusive/2015/01/16/religion-identity-charlie-hebdo/ [Accessed 5 September 2017].

AWAN, A. 2016b. The Charlie Hebdo Attack: The Double Alienation Dilemma. *The National Interest* [Online] Available: http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-charlie-hebdo-attack-the-double-alienation-dilemma-12021[Accessed 05 September 2017].

AWAN, A., HOSKIN, A. & O'LOUGHLIN, B. (eds.) 2011. *Radicalisation and Media - Legitimising violence in the new media,* London: Routledge.

AWAN, I. 2012. "I Am a Muslim Not an Extremist": How the Prevent Strategy Has Constructed a "Suspect" Community. *Politics & Policy,* 40**,** 1158-1185.

BAKKER, E. & BOER, L. 2007. *The evolution of Al-Qaedaism,* The Hague, Clingendael.

BARTLETT, J. & MILLER, C. 2012. The Edge of Violence: Towards Telling the Difference Between Violent and Non- Violent Radicalization. *Terrorism and Political Violence,* 24**,** 1-21.

BAUMANN, M. M. 2013. *Schlechthin böse? : Tötungslogik und moralische Legitimität von Terrorismus,* Wiesbaden, Springer VS.

BAUMEISTER, R. F. 1997. *Evil : inside human cruelty and violence,* New York, W.H. Freeman.

BAUMEISTER, R. F., SMART, L. & BODEN, J. M. 1996. Relation of Threatened Egotism to Violence and Aggression: The Dark Side of High Self-Esteem. *Psychological Review,* 103**,** 5-33.

BAYLIS, J., SMITH, S. & OWENS, P. 2011. *The globalization of world politics : an introduction to international relations,* New York, Oxford University Press.

BBC. 2011. State multiculturalism has failed, says David Cameron. *BBC.* [Online]. Available: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-12371994. [Accessed 14 April 2015].

BBC. 2017. London attack: Who were the attackers? *BBC.* [Online] Available: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-40173157. [Accessed 01 July 2017].

BECKETT, L. & BURKE, J. 2017. Pathway to extremism: what neo-Nazis and jihadis have in common. *The Guardian.* [Online]. Available: https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/may/27/extremism-terrorism-far-right-neo-nazi-devon-arthurs. [Accessed 27 May 2017].

BERGER, P. L. & LUCKMANN, T. 1967. *The social construction of reality: a treatise in the sociology of knowledge,* London, Penguin P.

BERLING, T. V. 2015. *Security expertise : practice, power, responsibility,* London; New York, NY, Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group.

BERNSTEIN, J. M. 2010. Suffering Injustice: Misrecognition as Moral Injury in Critical Theory. *In:* RICHTER, G. (ed.) *Language without soil : Adorno and late philosophical modernity.* 1st ed. New York: Fordham University Press.

BITTNER, R. 2005. Morals in Terrorist Times. *In:* MEGGLE, G., BRANDL, J., KEMMERLING, A., KUENNE, W. & TEXTOR, M. (eds.) *Ethics of Terrorism & Counter-Terrorism.* Frankfurt, Lancaster: Ontos Verlag.

BJØRGO, T. 2005. *Root causes of terrorism : myths, reality, and ways forward,* London ; New York, Routledge.

BLEE, K. M. 2002. *Inside organized racism : women in the hate movement,* Berkeley, University of California Press.

BLOOM, M. 2005. *Dying to kill : the allure of suicide terror,* New York, Columbia University Press.

BLOOM, M. 2010. Death Becomes Her: Women, Occupation, and Terrorist Mobilization. *PS: Political Science & Politics,* 43**,** 445-450.

BLOOM, M. 2011. *Bombshell : the many faces of women terrorists,* Toronto ; New York, Viking Canada.

BONINO, S. 2012. Policing Strategies against Islamic Terrorism in the UK after 9/11: The Socio-Political Realities for British Muslims. *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs,* 32**,** 5-31.

BOOTH, K. 2008. The human faces of terror: reflections in a cracked looking-glass. *Critical Studies on Terrorism,* 1**,** 65-79.

BOUHANA, N. & WIKSTROEM, P.-O. H. 2008. Theorizing Terrorism: Terrorism As Moral Action A scoping Study. *UCL Jill Dando Institute of Security and Crime Science:* London, UK.

BOURDIEU, P. & THOMPSON, J. B. 1991. *Language and symbolic power,* Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press.

BOWER, B. 2016. Deadly devotion: New studies explore why ordinary people turn terrorists. *Science News* [Online]. Available: https://www.sciencenews.org/article/new-studies-explore-why-ordinary-people-turn-terrorist. [Accessed 15 August 2016].

BRAH, A. 1996. *Cartographies of diaspora : contesting identities,* London, Routledge.

BRAH, A. 2007. Non-binarized Identities of Similarity and Difference *In:* WETHERELL, M., LAFLÈCHE, M. & BERKELEY, R. (eds.) *Identity, Ethnic Diversity and Community Cohesion.* London: Sage Publications Ltd.

BREEN-SMYTH, M. 2014. Theorising the “suspect community”: counterterrorism, security practices and the public imagination. *Critical Studies on Terrorism,* 7**,** 223-240.

BRINK, B. V. D. & OWEN, D. 2007. *Recognition and power : Axel Honneth and the tradition of critical social theory,* Cambridge ; New York, Cambridge University Press.

BROWN, K. E. 2015. Marginality as a feminist research method in terrorism and counter-terrorism studies. *In:* DIXIT, P. & STUMP, J. L. (eds.) *Critical Methods in Terrorism Studies.* Kindle Edition ed. Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY: Routledge.

BRUBAKER, R. 2004. *Ethnicity without groups,* Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press.

BRUNNER, C. 2011. *Wissensobjekt Selbstmordattentat: Epistemische Gewalt und okzidentalistische Selbstvergewisserung in der Terrorismusforschung,* Wiesbaden, VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

BRYAN, D. 2012. Is terrorism a useful analytical term? *In:* JACKSON, R. & SINCLAIR, S. J. (eds.) *Contemporary debates on Terrorism.* Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY: Routledge.

BUTLER, J. 2005. *Giving an account of oneself,* New York, Fordham University Press.

BUTLER, J. 2006. *Precarious life : the powers of mourning and violence,* London ; New York, Verso.

CAMERON, D. 2011. PM's speech at Munich Security Conference. *Gov.uk.* [Online]. Available: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pms-speech-at-munich-security-conference. [Accessed 14 June 2015].

CAMERON, D. 2015. David Cameron : British values aren't optional, they're vital. *Mail Online.* [Online]. Available: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-2658171/DAVID-CAMERON-British-values-arent-optional-theyre-vital-Thats-I-promote-EVERY-school-As-row-rages-Trojan-Horse-takeover-classrooms-Prime-Minister-delivers-uncompromising-pledge.html. [Accessed 15 June 2015].

CAMERON, D. 2015. David Cameron: We must be intolerant of Isil intolerance. *The Telegraph* [Online]. Available: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/david-cameron/11704576/David-Cameron-We-must-be-intolerant-of-Isil-intolerance.html. [Accessed 13 June 2016].

CAMERON, D. 2015. Extremism : PM speech. *Gov.uk* [Online] Available: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/extremism-pm-speech. [Accessed 13 June 2016].

CAVANAUGH, W. T. 2009. *The myth of religious violence : secular ideology and the roots of modern conflict,* New York ; Oxford, Oxford University Press.

CFMEB 2000. *The future of multi-ethnic Britain : report of the Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain,* London, Profile.

CHENOWETH, E. & LOWHAM, E. 2007. On Classifying Terrorism: A Potential Contribution of Cluster Analysis for Academics and Policy-makers. *Defence & Security Analysis,* 23**,** 345-357.

CHERNEY, A. & MURPHY, K. 2016. What does it mean to be a moderate Muslim in the war on terror? Muslim interpretations and reactions. *Critical Studies on Terrorism,* 9**,** 159-181.

CHOUDHURY, T. 2016. The radicalisation of citizenship deprivation. *Critical Social Policy,* 37**,** 1-20.

CHOUDHURY, T. & FENWICK, H. 2011. Research report 72: The impact of counter-terrorism measures on Muslim communities. *Equality and Human Rights Commission*. [Online] Available: https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/en/publication-download/research-report-72-impact-counter-terrorism-measures-muslim-community. Manchester: Durham University. [Accessed 15 June 2014].

COADY, C. A. J. 2004. Terrorism, Morality, and Supreme Emergency. *Ethics,* 114**,** 772-789.

COADY, C. A. J. 2008. *Morality and political violence,* Cambridge ; New York, Cambridge University Press.

COKER, C. 2002. *Waging war without warriors? : the changing culture of military conflict,* Boulder, Colo., Lynne Rienner Publishers.

COPPOCK, V. & MCGOVERN, M. 2014. 'Dangerous Minds'? Deconstructing Counter-Terrorism Discourse, Radicalisation and the 'Psychological Vulnerability' of Muslim Children and Young People in Britain *Children & Society,* 28**,** 242-256.

COTTEE, S. 2016. "What ISIS Really Wants" Revisited: Religion Matters in Jihadist Violence, but How? *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 40, 439-454.

COTTEE, S. & HAYWARD, K. 2011. Terrorist (E)motives: The Existential Attractions of Terrorism. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism,* 34**,** 963-986.

COX, R. W. & SINCLAIR, T. J. 1996. *Approaches to world order,* Cambridge ; New York, Cambridge University Press.

CRENSHAW, M. 1981. The Causes of Terrorism. *Comparative Politics,* 13**,** 379-399.

CRENSHAW, M. 1990. The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Strategic Choices. *In:* REICH, W. (ed.) *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind.* Washington, D.C. : Woodrow Wilson Centre Press.

CRENSHAW, M. 1995. *Terrorism in context,* University Park, Pa., Pennsylvania State University Press.

CRENSHAW, M. 2000. The Psychology of Terrorism: An Agenda for the 21st Century. *Political Psychology,* 21**,** 405-420.

CRENSHAW, M. 2011. *Explaining terrorism : causes, processes, and consequences,* London ; New York, Routledge.

CROTTY, M. 1998. *The foundations of social research : meaning and perspective in the research process,* London ; Thousand Oaks, Calif., Sage Publications.

DABASHI, H. 2017. The liberal roots of Islamophobia. *Aljazeera*. [Online] Available: http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2017/03/liberal-roots-islamophobia-170302152226572.html. [Accessed 03 March 2017].

DALGAARD-NIELSEN, A. 2010. Violent Radicalization in Europe: What We Know and What We Do Not Know. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism,* 33**,** 797-814.

DAVIS, P. K. & CRAGIN, K. 2009. *Social science for counterterrorism : putting the pieces together,* Santa Monica, CA, RAND.

DAWSON, J. 2015. Counter-extremism policy: an overview. *In:* AFFAIRS, H. (ed.). London: House of Commons Library.

DE GOEDE, M. 2011. *European security culture: preemption and precaution in European security* Amsterdam, University of Amsterdam.

DELANTY, G. 2005. *Social Science: Philosophical and Methodological Foundations,* Buckingham, Open University Press.

DELLA PORTA, D. 2008. Research on Social Movements and Political Violence. *Qualitative Sociology,* 31**,** 221-230.

DELLA PORTA, D. 2009. Social Movement Studies and Political Violence. Aarhus: Aarhus University Denmark.

DENZIN, N. K. & LINCOLN, Y. S. 2008. *The landscape of qualitative research,* Los Angeles, Sage Publications.

DEVJI, F. 2005. *Landscapes of the Jihad : militancy, morality, modernity,* Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press.

DEVJI, F. 2008. *The terrorist in search of humanity : militant Islam and global politics,* New York, Columbia University Press.

INSITUTE FOR STRATEGIC DIALOGUE. 2012. Conference Report on Tackling Extremism: De-radicalisation and Disengagement, Copenhagen 8-9th May 2012.

DILANIAN, K. 2017. Controversial Trump Adviser Crows Over "Radical Islamic Terrorism" Line in Speech. *NBC News*, [Online] Available: https://www.nbcnews.com/card/controversial-trump-advisor-crows-over-radical-islamic-terrorism-line-n727601. [Accessed 1 March 2017].

DIXIT, P. & STUMP, J. L. 2011. A Response to Jones and Smith: It's Not as Bad as It Seems; Or, Five Ways to Move Critical Terrorism Studies Forward. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism,* 34**,** 501-511.

DIXIT, P. & STUMP, J. L. 2015. *Critical methods in terrorism studies*. Kindle Edition ed. Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY: Routledge.

DODD, J. 2011. Violence and nonviolence. *In:* ECKSTRAND, N. & YATES, C. S. (eds.) *Philosophy and the return of violence : studies from this widening gyre.* London: Continuum International Publishing Group.

DODD, V., TOPPING, A. & ELGOT, J. 2017. Rightwing extremists involved in nearly a third of terror referrals. *The Guardian* [Online]. Available: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/20/rightwing-extremists-make-up-nearly-third-of-prevent-referrals. [Accessed 15 July 2017].

DOWNES, A. B. 2008. *Targeting civilians in war,* Ithaca, Cornell University Press.

DOYLE, P. 2017. Fredi Kanouté: 'Muslims should not have to prove they are not terrorists before talking'. *The Guardian* [Online]. Available: https://amp.theguardian.com/football/2017/mar/28/fredi-kanoute-muslims-orphans-mali. [Accessed 28 March 2017].

DU GAY, P. & HALL, S. 1996. *Questions of cultural identity,* London, Sage.

DURKHEIM, E. 1973. *On morality and society; selected writings,* Chicago,, University of Chicago Press.

DURKHEIM, E. & FIELDS, K. E. 1995. *The elementary forms of religious life,* New York, Free Press.

EDMONDS, D. & WARBURTON, N. 2017. Eileen John on Art and Morality. *Philosophy Bites. [podcast]* Available: http://philosophybites.com/2017/03/eileen-john-on-art-and-morality.html [Accessed 08 September 2017]

EDWARDS, P. 2016. Closure through Resilience: The Case of Prevent *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism,* 39**,** 292-307.

EL DIFRAOUI, A. & UHLMANN, M. 2015. Prévention de la radicalisation et déradicalisation: les modèles allemand, britannique et danois. *Politique étrangère,* 80, 171-182.

ELLIS, B. H. & ABDI, S. 2017. Building Community Resilience to Violent Extremism Through Genuine Partnerships. *American Psychologist,* 72**,** 289-300.

ENGLISH, R. 2009. *Terrorism : how to respond,* Oxford ; New York, Oxford University Press.

ERLENBUSCH, V. 2010. Notes on violence: Walter Benjamin's relevance for the study of terrorism. *Journal of Global Ethics,* 6**,** 167-178.

ERLENBUSCH, V. 2011. *A history of terrorism in the age of freedom.* Doctor of Philosophy (DPhil), University of Sussex.

ERLENBUSCH, V. 2014. How (not) to study terrorism. *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy,* 17**,** 470-491.

ERLENBUSCH, V. 2015. Terrorism: Knowledge, power, subjectivity. *In:* DIXIT, P. & STUMP, J. L. (eds.) *Critical Methods in Terrorism Studies.* Kindle edition ed.: Routledge.

EROUKHMANOFF, C. 2015. The remote securitisation of Islam in the US post-9/1: euphemisation, metaphors and the "logic of expected consequences" in counter-radicalisation discourse. *Critical Studies on Terrorism,* 8**,** 246-265.

ESPOSITO, J. L. 1995. *The Islamic threat : myth or reality?,* New York, Oxford University Press.

EVANS, M., WARD, V. & MENDICK, R. 2017. Everything we know about Manchester suicide bomber Salman Abedi. *The Telegraph* [Online]. Available: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/05/26/everything-know-manchester-suicide-bomber-salman-abedi/. [Accessed 01 June 2017].

EXTREMISM TASKFORCE. 2013. Tackling extremism in the UK: Report from the Prime Minister's Task Force on Tackling Radicalisation and Extremism. *Gov.uk*. [Online]. Available:

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/tackling-extremism-in-the-uk-report-by-the-extremism-taskforce. [Accessed 10 Jan 2014].

FAIRCLOUGH, N., JESSOP, B. & SAYER, A. 2004. Critical realism and semiosis. *In:* JOSEPH, J. & ROBERTS, J. M. (eds.) *Realism Discourse and Deconstruction.* London ; New York: Routledge.

FARMER, P. 1996. On Suffering and Structural Violence: A View from Below. *Daedalus,* 125**,** 261-283.

FARMER, P. 2004. An Anthropology of Structural Violence. *Current Anthropology,* 45**,** 305-325.

FERGUSON, K. E. 1993. *The man question : visions of subjectivity in feminist theory,* Berkeley, University of California Press.

FESTINGER, L. 1957. *A theory of cognitive dissonance,* Evanston, Ill., Row.

FINDLEY, M. G. & EDWARDS, S. 2007. Accounting for the Unaccounted: Weak-Actor Social Structure in Asymmetric Wars. *International Studies Quarterly,* 51**,** 583-606.

FISKE, A. P. 2000. Complementarity Theory: Why Human Social Capacities Evolved to Require Cultural Complements. *Personality and Social Psychology Review,* 4**,** 76-94.

FISKE, A. P. & RAI, T. S. 2015. *Virtuous violence : hurting and killing to create, sustain, end, and honor social relationships,* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

FISKE, T. 2016. *Social cognition : from brains to culture,* Thousand Oaks, CA, SAGE Publications.

FITZGERALD, J., ALI, N. & ARMSTRONG, M. 2016. Editors' introduction: critical terrorism studies: reflections on policy-relevance and disciplinarity. *Critical Studies on Terrorism,* 9**,** 1-11.

FLETCHER, G. P. 2006. The Indefinable Concept of Terrorism. *Journal of International Criminal Justice,* 4**,** 894-911.

FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH OFFICE. 2014. Speech: Counter Violent Extremism – “Communities beat terrorism”. *Gov.uk.* [Online]. Available: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/counter-violent-extremism-communities-beat-terrorism. [Accessed 30 January 2014].

FOROST, R. M. 2005. Terrorist psychology, motivation and strategy. *The Adelphi Papers,* 45**,** 41-62.

FORST, B. 2009. *Terrorism, crime, and public policy,* Cambridge ; New York, Cambridge University Press.

FORST, R. 2011. *Kritik der Rechtfertigungsverhaeltnisse - Perspektiven einer kritischen Tehorie der Politik,* Berlin, Suhrkamp Verlag.

FOWLER, A. & SEN, K. 2010. Embedding the War on Terror: State and Civil Society Relations. *Development & Change,* 41**,** 1-27.

FRANCIS, M. D. M. 2016. Why the "Sacred" Is a Better Resource Than "Religion" for Understanding Terrorism *Terrorism and Political Violence,* 28**,** 912-927.

FRANK, M. C. 2015. Conjuring up the next attack: the future-orientedness of terror and the counterterrorist imagination. *Critical Studies on Terrorism*, 8, 90-109.

FRASER, N. & HONNETH, A. 2003. *Redistribution or recognition? : a political-philosophical exchange,* London ; New York, Verso.

FULLINWIDER, R. 2003. Terrorism, Innocence, and War. *In:* GEHRING, V. (ed.) *War After September 11.* Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

GAD, U. P. 2012. Preventing radicalisation through dialogue? Selfsecuritising narratives versus reflexive conflict dynamics. *Critical Studies on Terrorism,* 5**,** 391-407.

GAD, U. P. 2012. Concepts of dialogue as counterterrorism: narrating the self-reform of the Muslim Other. *Critical Studies on Terrorism,* 5**,** 159-178.

GALEOTTI, A. E. 2002. *Toleration as recognition,* Cambridge, UK ; New York, Cambridge University Press.

GANOR, B. 1998. *Defining terrorism : is one man's terrorist another man's freedom fighter?,* Herzliya, Israel, The International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism.

GENTRY, C. E. 2003. *Women in Revolutionary Organizations.* Ph.D, University of St. Andrews.

GENTRY, C. E. 2012. Thinking about Women, Violence, and Agency. *International Feminist Journal of Politics,* 14**,** 79-82.

GENTRY, C. E. 2015. Epistemological failures: everyday terrorism in the West. *Critical Studies on Terrorism,* 8**,** 362-382.

GENTRY, C. E. & SJOBERG, L. 2011. The Gendering of Women's Terrorism. *In:* SJOBERG, L. & GENTRY, C. E. (eds.) *Women, Gender and Terrorism* Athens & London: The University of Georgia Press.

GEWIRTZ, P. 1996. On "I Know It When I See It". *The Yale Law Journal,* 105**,** 1023-1047.

GIBBS, J. P. 1989. Conceptualization of Terrorism. *American Sociological Review,* 54**,** 329-340.

GIDDENS, A. 1991. *Modernity and self-identity : self and society in the late modern age,* Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press.

GILL, P. 2015. *Lone-actor terrorists : a behavioural analysis,* London ; New York,, Routledge.

GILL, P., HORGAN, J. & DECKERT, P. 2014. Bombing Alone: Tracing the Motivations and Antecedent Behaviors of Lone-Actor Terrorists. *Journal of Forensic Sciences,* 59**,** 425-435.

GILLESPIE, M. & O'LOUGHLIN, B. 2016. The Media-Security Nexus: Researching Ritualised Cycles of Insecurity *In:* ROBINSON, P., SEIB, P. & FRÖHLICH, R. (eds.) *Routledge Handbook of Media, Conflict and Security.* London: Routledge.

GINGES, J. 1997. Deterring the terrorist: A psychological evaluation of different strategies for deterring terrorism. *Terrorism and Political Violence,* 9**,** 170-185.

GINGES, J. & ATRAN, S. 2009. What Motivates Participation in Violent Political Action: Selective Incentives or Parochial Altruism? *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences,* 1167**,** 115-123.

GINGES, J. & ATRAN, S. 2011. War as a moral imperative: not practical politics by other means. *Proceedings of the Royal Society B,* 27**,** 2930-2938.

GITHENS-MAZER, J. 2008. Islamic Radicalisation among North Africans in Britain. *British Journal of Politics & International Relations,* 10**,** 550-570.

GITHENS-MAZER, J. 2009. Causal Processes, Radicalisation and Bad Policy: The Importance of Case Studies of Radical Violent Takfiri Jihadism for Establishing Logical Causality. *American Political Science Association Annual Meeting.* Toronto, Canada.

GITHENS-MAZER, J. 2012. The rhetoric and reality: Radicalisation and political discourse. *International Political Science Review,* 33**,** 556-567.

GITHENS-MAZER, J. & LAMBERT, R. 2010. Why conventional wisdom on radicalization fails: the persistence of a failed discourse. *International Affairs,* 86**,** 889-902.

GLOVER, J. 2012. *Humanity : a moral history of the twentieth century,* New Haven, Yale University Press.

GOERTZ, G. 2006. *Social science concepts : a user's guide,* Princeton, Princeton University Press.

GOFFMAN, E. 1974. *Frame analysis : an essay on the organization of experience,* Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press.

GOODWIN, J. 2009. The Relational Approach to Terrorism. *Swiss Political Science Review,* 15**,** 387-394.

GOTTSCHALK, P. 2013. Religion out of place: Islam and cults as perceived threats in the United States. *In:* SHAFIR, G., MEADE, E. & ACEVES, W. J. (eds.) *Lessons and Legacies of the War on Terror: From moral panic to permanent war.* New York and Oxon Routledge.

GREER, S. 2008. Human Rights and the Struggle against Terrorism in the United Kingdom. *European Human Rights Law Review,* 2**,** 163-172.

GREER, S. 2010. Anti-Terrorist Laws and the United Kingdom's "Suspect Community": A Reply to Pantazis and Pemberton. *British Journal of Criminology,* 50**,** 1171-1190.

GREER, S. 2014. Reply to Marie Breen-Smyth, “Theorising the ‘suspect community’: counterterrorism, security practices and the public imagination”. *Critical Studies on Terrorism,* 7**,**468-471.

GREER, S. 2015. The myth of the ‘securitised Muslim community’ - The social impact of post-9/11 counter-terrorist law and policy in the west. *In:* LENNON, G.; WALKER, C. (eds.) *Routledge Handbook of Law and Terrorism.* Abindgon: Routledge.

GREISMAN, H. C. 1977. Social Meanings of Terrorism: Reification, Violence, and Social Control. *Contemporary Crises,* 1**,** 303-318.

GRIFFIN, R. 2012. *Terrorist's creed : fanatical violence and the human need for meaning,* Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan.

GUNNING, J. 2007. Babies and bathwaters: reflecting on the pitfalls of critical terrorism studies. *European Political Science,* 6**,** 236-243.

GUNNING, J. & JACKSON, R. 2011. What's so 'religious' about 'religious terrorism'? *Critical Studies on Terrorism,* 4**,** 369-388.

HABERMAS, J. 1973. *Erkenntnis und Interesse*, Suhrkamp Verlag.

HABERMAS, J. 1994. Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State. *In:* TAYLOR, C. & GUTMANN, A. (eds.) *Multiculturalism Examining the Politics of Recognition.* Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

HABERMAS, J. R. 1971. *Toward a rational society: student protest, science and politics,* London, Heinemann Educational.

HABERMAS, J. 1972. *Knowledge and human interests,* London, Heinemann Educational.

HABERMAS, J. 1984. *Vorstudien und Ergänzungen zur Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns,* Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp.

HAIDT, J. 2001. The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgement. *Psychological Review,* 108**,** 814-834.

HAIDT, J. 2007. The New Synthesis in Moral Psychology. *Science,* 316**,** 998-1002.

HAIDT, J. & GRAHAM, J. 2007. When Morality Opposes Justice: Conservatives Have Moral Intuitions that Liberals may not Recognize. *Social Justice Research,* 20**,** 98-116.

HAJER, M. A. 2009. *Authoritative Governance: Policy Making in the Age of Mediatization,* Oxford, Oxford University Press.

HALEEM, I. 2012. *The essence of Islamist extremism : recognition through violence, freedom through death,* London ; New York, Routledge.

HALL, S. 2000. Who needs 'identity'? *In:* DU GAY, P., EVANS, J. & REDMAN, P. (eds.) *Identity: a reader.* Sage Publications Inc.

HALLIDAY, F. 2002. *Two hours that shook the world : September 11, 2001 : causes and consequences,* London, Saqi.

HALVERSON, J. R., GOODALL, H. L. & CORMAN, S. R. 2011. *Master narratives of Islamist extremism,* New York, Palgrave McMillan.

HAMID, S. 2015. France's False Choice *The Atlantic* [Online]. Available: http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/01/france-muslims-liberalism-crisis/384901/. [Accessed 15 April 2016].

HAMILTON, C. 2007. The Gender Politics of Political Violence: Women Armed Activists in ETA. *Feminist Review,* 86**,** 132-148.

HARDING, S. G. 2004. *The feminist standpoint theory reader : intellectual and political controversies,* New York, Routledge.

HEATH-KELLY, C. 2010. Critical Terrorism Studies, Critical Theory and the 'Naturalistic Fallacy'. *Security Dialogue,* 41**,** 235-255.

HEATH-KELLY, C. 2012. Reinventing prevention or exposing the gap? False positives in UK terrorism governance and the quest for pre-emption. *Critical Studies on Terrorism,* 5**,** 69-87.

HEATH-KELLY, C. 2013. Counter-Terrorism and the Counterfactual: Producing the 'Radicalisation' Discourse and the UK PREVENT Strategy. *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations,* 15**,** 394-415.

HEATH-KELLY, C. 2015. Talking about revolution: ex-militant testimony and conditions of 'tell-ability'. *In:* DIXIT, P. & STUMP, J. L. (eds.) *Critical Methods in Terrorism Studies.* Kindle edition ed.: Routledge.

HEATH-KELLY, C. 2017. The geography of pre-criminal space: epidemiological imaginations of radicalisation in the UK Prevent Strategy, 2007-1017. *Critical Studies on Terrorism*, 10, 297-319.

HEATH-KELLY, C., JARVIS, L. & BAKER-BEALL, C. 2014. Editors' introduction: critical terrorism studies: practice, limits and experience. *Critical Studies on Terrorism,* 7**,** 1-10.

HEINE, S. J., PROULX, T. & VOHS, K. D. 2006. The Meaning Maintenance Model: On the Coherence of Social Motivations. *Personality and Social Psychology Review,* 10**,** 88-110.

HELD, V. 2004. Terrorism and War. *The Journal of Ethics,* 8**,** 59-75.

HELD, V. 2008. *How terrorism is wrong : morality and political violence,* Oxford ; New York, Oxford University Press.

HELLER, R., KAHL, M. & PISOIU, D. 2013. Editors' introduction: the "dark" side of normative argumentation in counterterrorism - an emerging research field. *Critical Studies on Terrorism,* 6**,** 410-413.

HICKMAN, M. J., THOMAS, L., NICKELS, H. & SILVESTRI, S. 2012. Social cohesion and the notion of 'suspect communities': a study of the experiences and impacts of being 'suspect' for Irish communities and Muslim communities in Britain. *Critical Studies on Terrorism,* 5**,** 89-106.

HICKMAN, M. J., THOMAS, L., SILVESTRI, S. & NICKELS, H. 2011. 'Suspect Communities'? Counter-terrorism policy, the press, and the impact on Irish and Muslim communities in Britain. London Metropolitan University.

HM GOVERNMENT. 2010. The national security strategy - a strong Britain in an age of uncertainty. *Gov.uk.* [Online] Available: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-national-security-strategy-a-strong-britain-in-an-age-of-uncertainty. [Accessed 01 June 2014].

HOFFMAN, B. 2006. *Inside terrorism,* New York, Columbia University Press.

HOFFMAN, B. & MCCORMICK, G. 2004. Terrorism, Signaling, and Suicide Attack. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism,* 27**,** 243-281.

HOFFMAN, B., (RAND) 2007. *The radicalization of diasporas and terrorism : a joint conference by the RAND Corporation and the Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich,* Santa Monica, Calif; Zurich, RAND National Security Research Division ;

HOLLIS, M. 1994. *The philosophy of social science : an introduction,* Cambridge England ; New York, NY, USA, Cambridge University Press.

HOLLIS, M. 1996. *Reason in action : essays in the philosophy of social science,* Cambridge ; New York, Cambridge University Press.

HOLT, T. J., FREILICH, J. D. & CHERMAK, S. M. 2016. Internet-Based Radicalization as Enculturation to Violent Deviant Subcultures. *Deviant Behavior***,** 38, 1- 15.

HOME OFFICE. 2007. The definition of Terrorism : a report by Lord Carlile of Berriew. *Gov.uk*. [Online] Available: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-definition-of-terrorism-a-report-by-lord-carlile-of-berriew. [Accessed 20 November 2012].

HOME OFFICE. 2008. The Prevent Strategy: A Guide for Local Partners in England Stopping people from coming or supporting terrorists and violent extremists. *Nationalarchives.gov.uk.* [Online] Available: http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20121006113442/https://www.education.gov.uk/publications/standard/publicationDetail/Page1/288324.[Accessed 18 January 2013].

HOME OFFICE. 2011. Prevent Strategy 2011. *Gov.uk.* [Online] Available: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/prevent-strategy-2011. [Accessed 18 January 2013].

HOME OFFICE. 2014. CONTEST annual report 2013. *Gov.uk*. [Online] Available https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/contest-annual-report-2013. [Accessed 10 March 2016].

HOME OFFICE. 2015a. Channel guidance. *Gov.uk.* [Online]. Available: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/channel-guidance. [Accessed 30 April 2015].

HOME OFFICE. 2015b. CONTEST, UK strategy for countering terrorism; annual report for 2014. *Gov.uk.* [Online] Available: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/contest-uk-strategy-for-countering-terrorism-annual-report-for-2014. [Accessed 10 March 2016].

HOME OFFICE. 2016. CONTEST, UK strategy for countering terrorism; annual report for 2015. *Gov.uk*. [Online] Available: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/contest-uk-strategy-for-countering-terrorism-annual-report-for-2015. [Accessed 07 October 2016].

HONNETH, A. 1996. *The struggle for recognition : the moral grammar of social conflicts,* Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press.

HONNETH, A. 2007. Rejoinder. *In:* BRINK, B. V. D. & OWEN, D. (eds.) *Recognition and power : Axel Honneth and the tradition of critical social theory.* Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press.

HONNETH, A. 2012. *The I in We - Studies in the Theory of Recognition,* Cambridge, Polity Press.

HONNETH, A. & KOCH, F. 2014. The normativity of ethical life. *Philosophy and Social Criticism,* 40**,** 817-826.

HORGAN, J. 2005. *The psychology of terrorism,* London ; New York, Routledge.

HORGAN, J. 2012. Discussion Point: The End of Radicalization? *Discussion Point* [Online]. Available: http://www.start.umd.edu/news/discussion-point-end-radicalization [Accessed 28 September 2012].

HORGAN, J. 2015. Can Science Solve Terrorism? Q&A with Psychologist John Horgan. *Scientific American Blog Network.* [Online] Available: https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/cross-check/can-science-solve-terrorism-q-amp-a-with-psychologist-john-horgan/. [Accessed 17 November 2015].

HORGAN, J. & BOYLE, M. J. 2008. A case against 'Critical Terrorism Studies'. *Critical Studies on Terrorism,* 1**,** 51-64.

HORGAN, J. & BRADDOCK, K. 2011. *Terrorism studies : a reader,* Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, Routledge.

HORGAN, J. & STERN, J. 2013. Terrorism Research has not stagnated. *The Conversation Online opinion on ideas and higher education* [Online]. Available: http://chronicle.com/blogs/conversation/2013/05/08/terrorism-research-has-not-stagnated/. [Accessed 8 May 2013].

HORKHEIMER, M. 1972. *Critical theory; selected essays,* New York,, Herder and Herder.

HORKHEIMER, M. 1982. *Critical theory : selected essays,* New York, Continuum Pub. Corp.

HORKHEIMER, M. 1993. *Between philosophy and social science : selected early writings,* Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press.

HÖRNQVIST, M. & FLYGHED, J. 2012. Exclusion or culture? The rise and the ambiguity of the radicalisation debate. *Critical Studies on Terrorism,* 5**,** 319-334.

HOWELL, K. E. 2013. *An introduction to the philosophy of methodology,* Los Angeles, SAGE.

ILLING, S. 2015. We must call him a terrorist: Dylann Roof, Fox News and the truth about why language matters. *Salon*. [Online] Available: http://www.salon.com/2015/06/21/we_must_call_him_a_terrorist_dylann_roof_fox_news_and_the_truth_about_why_language_matters/. [Accessed 21 June 2015].

INWOOD, M. J. 1992. *A Hegel dictionary,* Oxford, OX, UK ;, Cambridge, Mass. Blackwell.

JACKSON, R. 2007a. Constructing Enemies: 'Islamic Terrorism' in Political and Academic Discourse. *Government and Opposition,* 42**,** 394-426.

JACKSON, R. 2007b. The Core Commitments of Critical Terrorism Studies. *European Political Science*, 6, 244-251.

JACKSON, R. 2009a. The Study of Terrorism after 11 September 2001: Problems, Challenges and Future Developments. *Political Studies Review,* 7**,** 171-184.

JACKSON, R. 2009b. Critical Terrorism Studies: An Explanation, a Defence and a Way Forward. *BISA Annual Conference.* University of Leicester.

JACKSON, R. 2011. In defence of 'terrorism': Finding a way through a forest of misconceptions. *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression, 3, 116-130.*

JACKSON, R. 2013. Don't shoot the mediator: reply to Stump. *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression,* 5**,** 225-228.

JACKSON, R. 2015a. The epistemological crisis of counterterrorism. *Critical Studies on Terrorism,* 8**,** 33-54.

JACKSON, R. 2015b. On how to be a collective intellectual - Critical terrorism studies and the countering of hegemonic discourse *In:* BERLING, T. V. & BUEGER, C. (eds.) *Security Expertise. Practice, Power, Responsibility* Oxon and New York: Routledge.

JACKSON, R. 2016. To be or not to be policy relevant? Power, emancipation and resistance in CTS research. *Critical Studies on Terrorism,* 9**,** 120-125.

JACKSON, R. & HALL, G. 2016. Talking about terrorism: A study of vernacular discourse. *Politics***,** 3, 1-16.

JACKSON, R. & SINCLAIR, S. J. 2012. *Contemporary debates on terrorism,* Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY, Routledge.

JACKSON, R., SMYTH, M. & GUNNING, J. 2009. *Critical terrorism studies : a new research agenda,* New York, Routledge.

JACKSON, R., TOROS, H., JARVIS, L. & HEATH-KELLY, C. 2017. Introduction: 10 years of Critical Studies on Terrorism *Critical Studies on Terrorism,* 10**,** 197-202.

JACOBELLIS V. OHIO, 373 U.S. 184, 1964, US Supreme Court

JARVIS, L. 2009a. The Spaces and Faces of Critical Terrorism Studies. *Security Dialogue,* 40**,** 5-27.

JARVIS, L. 2009b. *Times of terror : discourse, temporality and the War on Terror,* Basingstoke England ; New York, Palgrave Macmillan.

JARVIS, L. & LEGRAND, T. 2017. 'I am somewhat puzzled': Questions, audiences and securitization in the proscription of terrorist organizations. *Security Dialogue,* 48**,** 149-167.

JARVIS, L. & LISTER, M. 2016a. What would you do? Everyday conceptions and constructions of counter-terrorism. *Politics*, 36, 277-291.

JARVIS, L. & LISTER, M. 2016b. 'As a woman...': 'As a Muslim...': Subjects, positions and counter-terrorism powers in the United Kingdom. *Critical Social Policy,* 37, 1-23.

JASPER, J. M. 1997. *The art of moral protest : culture, biography, and creativity in social movements,* Chicago, University of Chicago Press.

JENKINS, B. M. 1980. The Study of Terrorism; Definitional Problems. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation.

JONES, P. 2006. Equality, Recognition and Difference. *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy,* 9, 23-46.

JOSEPH, J. 2009. Critical of What? Terrorism and its Study. *International Relations,* 23, 193-198.

JUERGENSMEYER, M. 2003. *Terror in the mind of God : the global rise of religious violence,* Berkeley, University of California Press.

KAHL, C. 2017. The Curious Case of Sebastian Groka, Trump's New Terrorism Guru, *Foreign Policy,*[Online]. Available: http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/03/the-curious-case-of-sebastian-gorka-trumps-new-terrorism-guru-security-clearance/. [Accessed; 20 March 2017].

KALDOR, M. 2006. *New & old wars,* Cambridge, Eng. ; Malden, MA, Polity Press.

KASSIMERIS, G. & JACKSON, L. 2012. British Muslims and the discourses of dysfunction: community cohesion and counterterrorism in the West Midlands. *Critical Studies on Terrorism,* 5, 179-196.

KHAN, K. 2009. Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) & PREVENT – a response from the Muslim community. *An-Nisa Society* [Online] Available: http://www.salaam.co.uk/muslimsinbritain/?p=2505. [Accessed: 4 September 2017].

KHAN, S. & MCMAHON, T. 2016. The Battle for British Islam: Reclaiming Muslim Identity from Extremism. Saqi Books.

KING, M. & TAYLOR, D. M. 2011. The Radicalization of Homegrown Jihadists: A Review of Theoretical Models and Social Psychological Evidence. *Terrorism and Political Violence,* 23, 602-622.

KLANDERMANS, B. 1984. Mobilization and Participation: Social-Psychological Expansions of Resource Mobilization Theory. *American Sociological Review,* 49**,** 583-600.

KLANDERMANS, B., VAN DER TOORN, J. & VAN STEKELENBURG, J. 2008. Embeddedness and Identity: How Immigrants Turn Grievances into Action. *American Sociological Review,* 73**,** 992-1012.

KNAPTON, H. M. 2014. The Recruitment and Radicalisation of Western Citizens: Does Ostracism Have a Role in Homegrown Terrorism? *Journal of European Psychology Students,* 5**,** 38-48.

KNEFEL, J. 2013. Everything You've Been Told About Radicalization Is Wrong. *Rolling Stone.* [Online]. Available : http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/everything-youve-been-told-about-radicalization-is-wrong-20130506. [Accessed 8 May 2013].

KRUGLANSKI, A. 2006. Inside the terrorist mind: The relevance of ideology. *Estudios de Psicologia: Studies in Psychology,* 27**,** 271-277.

KUNDNANI, A. 2009. Spooked! How not to prevent violent extremism. London: Institute of Race Relations.

KUNDNANI, A. 2012. Radicalisation: the journey of a concept. *Race & Class,* 54**,** 3-25.

KUNDNANI, A. 2015. A Decade Lost: Rethinking Radicalisation and Extremism. *Claystone.org.uk* [Online]. Available: http://www.claystone.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Claystone-rethinking-radicalisation.pdf. [Accessed 04 September 2017].

KUZNAR, L. A. 2007. Rationality Wars and the War on Terror: Explaining Terrorism and Social Unrest. *American Anthropologist,* 109**,** 318-329.

KYMLICKA, W. 1995. *Multicultural citizenship : a liberal theory of minority rights,* Oxford, Clarendon Press.

LAQUEUR, W. 1977. *Terrorism,* Boston, Little, Brown.

LEE, B. J. 2015. A Day in the "Swamp": Understanding Discourse in the Online Counter-Jihad Nebula. *Democracy and Security* 11**,** 248-274.

LEE, B. J. 2017. 'It's not paranoia when they are really out to get you': the role of conspiracy theories in the context of heightened security. *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression,* 9**,** 4-20.

LERNER, M. J. & CLAYTON, S. D. 2011. *Justice and self-interest : two fundamental motives,* Cambridge ; New York, Cambridge University Press.

LIHT, J. & SAVAGE, S. 2013. Preventing Violent Extremism through Value Complexity: Being Muslim Being British. *Journal of Strategic Security,* 6**,** 44-66.

LOCICERO, A. 2014. *Why "good kids" turn into deadly terrorists : deconstructing the accused Boston Marathon bombers and others like them,* Santa Barbara, California, Praeger.

LOVELL, T. 2007. *(Mis)recognition, social inequality and social justice : Nancy Fraser and Pierre Bourdieu,* London ; New York, Routledge.

LOWE, D. 2016. Prevent Strategies: The Problems Associated in Defining Extremism: The Case of the United Kingdom. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism***,** 1-17.

LYNCH, O. 2013. British Muslim youth: radicalisation, terrorism and the construction of the “other”. *Critical Studies on Terrorism,* 6**,** 241-261.

MACGINTY, R. 2013. Review Article Look who's talking: terrorism, dialogue and conflict transformation. *Critical Studies on Terrorism*, 6, 216-223.

MACKENZIE, C. & STOLJAR, N. 1999. *Relational autonomy : feminist perspectives on autonomy, agency, and the social self,* New York, Oxford University Press.

MAGNANI, L. 2011. *Understanding violence : the intertwining of morality, religion and violence : a philosophical stance,* Berlin, Springer-Verlag.

MAHMOOD, S. 2009. Religious Reason and Secular Affect: An Incommensurable Divide? *Critical Inquiry,* 35**,** 836-862.

MALIK, K. 2015. The Failure of Multiculturalism. *Foreign Affairs*. [Online] Available: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/western-europe/failure-multiculturalism. [Accessed: 04 September 2017].

MANTRI, G. 2011. Homegrown Terrorism. *Harvard International Review,* 33**,** 88-94.

MARCH, A. F. 2015. Islamism and the Left: An Exchange (Online Only). *Dissent* [Online].
Available: https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/islamism-and-left-exchange [Accessed 16 April 2016].

MARSDEN, S. V. 2015. Conceptualising 'success' with those convicted of terrorism offences: Aims, methods, and barriers to reintegration. *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression,* 7**,** 143-165.

MARTIN, T. 2014. Governing an unknowable future: the politics of Britain's Prevent policy. *Critical Studies on Terrorism,* 7**,** 62-78.

MARUSEK, S. 2017. Inventing terrorists: the nexus of intelligence and Islamophobia. *Critical Studies on Terrorism***,** 1-23.

MATTHEWS, J. 2015. Framing alleged Islamist plots: a case study of British press coverage since 9/11. *Critical Studies on Terrorism*, 8, 266-283.

MAY, T. 2015. Speech: A Stronger Britain, Built On Our Values. *Gov.uk* [Online] Available: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/a-stronger-britain-built-on-our-values. [Accessed 04 September 2017].

MCADAM, D., TARROW, S. G. & TILLY, C. 2001. *Dynamics of contention,* Cambridge ; New York, Cambridge University Press.

MCBRIDE, M. K. 2011. The Logic of Terrorism: Existential Anxiety, the Search for Meaning, and Terrorist Ideologies. *Terrorism and Political Violence,* 23**,** 560-581.

MCCAULEY, C. & MOSKALENKO, S. 2008. Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways Toward Terrorism. *Terrorism and Political Violence,* 20**,** 415-433.

MCCAULEY, C. & MOSKALENKO, S. 2014a. Some Things We Think We've Learned Since 9/11: A Commentary on Marc Sageman's "The Stagnation in Terrorism Research". *Terrorism and Political Violence,* 26**,** 601-606.

MCCAULEY, C. & MOSKALENKO, S. 2014b. Toward a Profile of Lone Wolf Terrorists: What Moves an Individual From Radical Opinion to Radical Action. *Terrorism and Political Violence,* 26**,** 69-85.

MCCAULEY, C. & MOSKALENKO, S. 2017. Understanding Political Radicalization: The Two-Pyramids Model. *American Psychologist,* 72**,** 205-216.

MCCAULEY, C. R. & MOSKALENKO, S. 2011. *Friction : how radicalization happens to them and us,* Oxford ; New York, Oxford University Press.

MCDONALD, L. Z. 2011. Securing Identities, Resisting Terror: Muslim Youth Work in the UK and its Implications for Security. *Religion, State and Society,* 39**,** 177-189.

MCDONALD, M. 2007. Emancipation and critical terrorism studies. *European Political Science,* 6**,** 252-259.

MCGARTY, C., YZERBYT, V. & SPEARS, R. 2002. *Stereotypes as explanations : the formation of meaningful beliefs about social groups,* London ; New York, Cambridge University Press.

MCGRAW, A. P., TETLOCK, P. E. & KRISTEL, O. V. 2003. The Limits of Fungibility: Relational Schemata and the Value of Things. *Journal of Consumer Research,* 30**,** 219-229.

MERRICK, R. 2017. Michael Gove has same 'crazy' anti-Muslim policies as Donald Trump, former Tory chairwoman says. *Independent* [Online] Available: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/michael-gove-donald-trump-baroness-warsi-anti-muslim-crazy-tory-chairwoman-a7649411.html. [Accessed 25 March 2017].

MI5. 2015. International Terrorism. *Mi5.gov.uk* [Online] Available: https://www.mi5.gov.uk/international-terrorism. [Accessed: 04 September 2017].

MI5 2017. Terrorism Threat Level *Mi5.gov.uk* [Online] Available: https://www.mi5.gov.uk/threat-levels. [Accessed 05 September 2017].

MODOOD, T. 2005. *Multicultural politics : racism, ethnicity, and Muslims in Britain,* Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press.

MODOOD, T. 2007. *Multiculturalism : a civic idea,* Cambridge, Polity.

MONDON, A. 2015. Charlie Hebdo attack: this is not a clash of civilisations. *The Conversation* [Online]. Available: https://theconversation.com/charlie-hebdo-attack-this-is-not-a-clash-of-civilisations-36030. [Accessed 10 March 2017].

MONDON, A. 2016. What Dutch Politician Geert Wilders's Trail says about the far-right in Europe. *Newsweek* [Online]. Available: http://europe.newsweek.com/geert-wilders-trial-netherlands-hate-speech-freedom-speech-far-right-europe-515841. [Accessed 10 March 2017].

MONDON, A. & WINTER, A. 2016. Islamophobia(s) In the Aftermath of the Nice Attack. *E-International Relations* [Online]. Available: http://www.e-ir.info/2016/07/28/islamophobias-in-the-aftermath-of-the-nice-attack/. [Accessed 09 March 2017 2017].

MONDON, A. & WINTER, A. 2016. Islamophobia(s) In the Aftermath of the Nice Attack*: E-International Relations* [Online]. Available: http://www.e-ir.info/2016/07/28/islamophobias-in-the-aftermath-of-the-nice-attack/ [Accessed 09 March 2017 2017].

MOORE, B. 1978. *Injustice : the social bases of obedience and revolt,* White Plains, N.Y. New York, M. E. Sharpe.

MORGAN, R. 2001. *The demon lover : the roots of terrorism,* New York, Washington Square Press.

MORRIS, T. & CRANK, J. P. 2011. Toward a phenomenology of terrorism: implications for research and policy. *Crime Law Soc Change,* 56**,** 219–242.

MORRISON, J. 2017. *Talking Terrorism*. [podcast]. Available at: https://www.uel.ac.uk/schools/royal-docks/terrorism-and-extremism-research-centre/research-projects/talking-terror [Accessed 01 May 2018].

MORRISON, J. 2017a. *Talking Terrorism*. [podcast]. Erica Chenoweth. Available at: https://www.uel.ac.uk/schools/royal-docks/terrorism-and-extremism-research-centre/research-projects/talking-terror [Accessed 10 January 2018].

MORROW, R. A. & BROWN, D. D. 1994. *Critical theory and methodology,* Thousand Oaks, Calif., Sage Publications.

MOSKALENKO, S. & MCCAULEY, C. 2009. Measuring Political Mobilization: The Distinction Between Activism and Radicalism. *Terrorism and Political Violence,* 21**,** 239-260.

MUNSON, Z. W. 2008. *The making of pro-life activists : how social movement mobilization works,* Chicago, University of Chicago Press.

MURAKAWA, N. 2014. *The first civil right : how liberals built prison America,* Oxford ; New York, Oxford University Press.

MURAVEN, M. & BAUMEISTER, R. F. 2000. Self-Regulation and Depletion of Limited Resources: Does Self-Control Resemble a Muscle? *Psychological Bulletin,* 126**,** 247-259.

MYTHEN, G., WALKLATE, S. & KHAN, F. 2009. 'I'm a Muslim, but I'm not a Terrorist': Victimization, Risky Identities and the Performance of Safety. *The British Journal of Criminology,* 49**,** 736-754.

MYTHEN, G., WALKLATE, S. & PEATFIELD, E.-J. 2016. Assembling and deconstructing radicalisation in PREVENT: A case of policy-based evidence making? *Critical Social Policy,*37**,** 1-22.

NACOS, B. 2005. The Portrayal of Female Terrorists in the Media: Similar Framing Patterns in the News Coverage of Women in Politics and in Terrorism. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism,* 28**,** 435-451.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL. 2015. Counter-Extremism Bill – National Security Council meeting. *Gov.uk.* [Online] Available: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/counter-extremism-bill-national-security-council-meeting. [Accessed 12 June 2016].

NEUMANN, P. A. R., BROOKE 2007. Recruitment and Mobilisation for the Islamist Militant Movement in Europe. London: ICSR King's College London.

NEUMANN, P. 2008, First International Conference on Radicalisation and Political Violence, 2008 London. The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence.

NEWMAN, E. 2006. Exploring the "Root Causes" of Terrorism. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism,* 29**,** 749-772.

NICHOLS, T. 2017. How America Lost Faith in Expertise. *Foreign Affairs,* 96**,** 60-73.

NUSSBAUM, D. & POWER, S. A. 2015. Can violence be moral. *The Guardian* [Online]. Available: https://www.theguardian.com/science/head-quarters/2015/feb/28/can-violence-be-moral. [Accessed 21 March 2016].

O'LOUGHLIN, B., VECCARI, C., ASLAN, B. & DENNIS, J. 2017. Twitter and Global Political Crises : Cycles of Insecurity in #PrayforParis and #PrayforSyria. *Middle East Journal of Culture and Communication,* 10**,** 175-203.

O'TOOLE, T., DEHANAS, D. N. & MODOOD, T. 2012. Balancing tolerance, security and Muslim engagement in the United Kingdom: the impact of the 'Prevent' agenda. *Critical Studies on Terrorism,* 5**,** 373-389.

OLIVERIO, A. 1997. The State of Injustice The Politics of Terrorism and the Production of Order. *International Journal of Comparative Sociology,* 38**,** 48-63.

PANTAZIS, C. & PEMBERTON, S. 2009. FROM THE ' OLD' TO THE 'NEW' SUSPECT COMMUNITY Examining the Impacts of Recent UK Counter-Terrorist Legislation *The British Journal of Criminology.* 49, 646-666.

PANTAZIS, C. & PEMBERTON, S. 2012. Reconfiguring Security and Liberty Political Discourse and Public Opinion in the New Century. *The British Journal of Criminology,* 52**,** 651-667.

PAREKH, B. C. 2007. Reasoned Identities: A committed Relationship *In:* WETHERELL, M., LAFLÈCHE, M. & BERKELEY, R. (eds.) *Identity, Ethnic Diversity and Community Cohesion.* London: Sage Publications Ltd.

PEARCE, W. B. & LITTLEJOHN, S. W. 1997. *Moral conflict : when social worlds collide,* Thousand Oaks, Calif., Sage Publications.

PEIRCE, G. 2008. Was it like this for the Irish? *London Review of Books,* 30**,** 3-8.

PHILLIPS, M. 2006. *Londonistan,* New York, Encounter Books.

PINKER, S. 2011. *The better angels of our nature : why violence has declined,* New York, Viking.

PISOIU, D. 2012. *Islamist radicalisation in Europe : an occupational change process,* Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, Routledge.

PISOIU, D. 2013. Coming to Believe "Truths" About Islamist Radicalization in Europe. *Terrorism and Political Violence,* 25**,** 246-263.

PISOIU, D. 2015. Subcultures, violent radicalization and terrorism *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression,* 7**,** 1-2.

POOLE, E. 2002. *Reporting Islam : media representation and British Muslims,* London, I. B. Tauris.

POOLE, E. 2011. Change and Continuity in the Representation of British Muslims Before and After 9/11: The UK Context. *Global Media Journal,* 4**,** 49-62.

POOLE, E. & RICHARDSON, J. E. 2006. *Muslims and the news media,* London, I. B. Tauris.

PRINS, G. & SALUSBURY, R. 2008. Risk, Threat, and Security: the Case of the United Kingdom. *RUSI Journal,* 153.

QURESHI, A. 2015. PREVENT: creating "radicals" to strengthen anti-Muslim narratives. *Critical Studies on Terrorism,* 8**,** 181-191.

QURESHI, A. 2017. An epistemic break from "expertise": Misunderstanding Terrorism by Marc Sageman. *Critical Studies on Terrorism***,** 1-8.

RABASA, A. & BENARD, C. 2015. *Eurojihad : patterns of Islamist radicalization and terrorism in Europe,* New York, Cambridge University Press.

RAGAZZI, F. 2016. Countering terrorism and radicalisation: Securitising social policy? *Critical Social Policy,* 37**,** 1-17.

RAGIN, C. C. & AMOROSO, L. M. 2011. *Constructing social research : the unity and diversity of method,* Los Angeles, SAGE Publications.

RAI, T. S. 2015. How could they? *Aeon - Ideas and culture* [Online]. Available: https://aeon.co/essays/people-resort-to-violence-because-their-moral-codes-demand-it. [Accessed 16 July 2016].

RAI, T. S. & FISKE, A. P. 2011. Moral psychology is relationship regulation: moral motives for unity, hierarchy, equality, and proportionality. *Psychological Review,* 118**,** 57-75.

RAMADAN, T. 2016. The politics of fear: how Britain's anti-extremism strategy has failed. *The Guardian* [Online]. Available: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/sep/05/politics-of-fear-britain-anti-extremism-prevent-government-radicalisation [Accessed 5 September 2016].

RAMSAY, G. 2015. Why terrorism can, but should not be defined. *Critical Studies on Terrorism*.

RANSTROP, M. 2009. Mapping terrorism studies after 9/11 An academic field of old problems and new prospects. *In:* JACKSON, R., SMYTH, M. & GUNNING, J. (eds.) *Critical terrorism studies : a new research agenda.* New York: Routledge critical terrorism studies.

RAPHAEL, S. 2009. In the service of power Terrorism studies and US intervention in the global South. *In:* JACKSON, R., SMYTH, M. & GUNNING, J. (eds.) *Critical terrorism studies : a new research agenda.* New York: Routledge critical terrorism studies.

RAPIN, A.-J. 2009. Does terrorism create terror? *Critical Studies on Terrorism,* 2**,** 165-179.

REID, E. F. & CHEN, H. 2007. Mapping the contemporary terrorism research domain. *Int. J. Human-Computer Studies,* 65**,** 42-56.

RICHARDSON, L. 2006. *What terrorists want : understanding the enemy, containing the threat,* New York, Random House.

RICHMOND, O. & FRANKS, J. 2009. The impact of orthodox terrorism discourse on the liberal peace: internalisation, resistance, or hybridisation? *Critical Studies on Terrorism,* 2**,** 201-218.

RUBY, C. L. 2002. Are Terrorists Mentally Deranged? *Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy***,** 2, 15-26.

SABIR, R. 2017. Blurred lines and false dichotomies: Integrating counterinsurgency into the UK's domestic 'war on terror'. *Critical Social Policy,* 37**,** 1-23.

SAGEMAN, M. 2004. *Understanding terror networks,* Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press.

SAGEMAN, M. 2008. *Leaderless jihad : terror networks in the twenty-first century,* Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press.

SAGEMAN, M. 2013. The Stagnation of Research on Terrorism. *The Conversation Online opinion on ideas and higher education* [Online]. Available from: http://chronicle.com/blogs/conversation/2013/04/30/the-stagnation-of-research-on-terrorism/ [Accessed April 30, 2013].

SAGEMAN, M. 2014a. The Stagnation in Terrorism Research. *Terrorism and Political Violence***,** 26, 565-580.

SAGEMAN, M. 2014b. Low Return on Investment. *Terrorism and Political Violence,* 26**,** 614-620.

SAGEMAN, M. 2017. *Misunderstanding terrorism,* Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, University of Pennsylvania Press.

SANDLER, T. 2013. The analytical study of terrorism: Taking stock. *Journal of Peace Research***,** 1-15.

SAUL, B. 2008. Attempts to Define 'Terrorism' in International. *Netherlands International Law Review*, 52, 57-83.

SAYER, A. 1997. Critical Realism and the Limits to Critical Social Science. *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour,* 27**,** 473-488.

SCHANZER, D. H. 2014. No Easy Day: Government Roadblocks and the Unsolvable Problem of Political Violence: A Response to Marc Sageman's "The Stagnation in Terrorism Research". *Terrorism and Political Violence,* 26**,** 596-600.

SCHMID, A. P. 2004. FRAMEWORKS FOR CONCEPTUALISING TERRORISM. *Terrorism and Political Violence,* 16**,** 197-221.

SCHMID, A. P. 2011. The responses problem as a definition problem. *In:* HORGAN, J. & BRADDOCK, K. (eds.) *Terrorism studies: a reader.* Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon ; New York: Routledge.

SCHMID, A. P. 2011. *The Routledge handbook of terrorism research,* New York, Routledge.

SCHMID, A. P. 2013. Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation: A Conceptual Discussion and Literature Review. *ICCT Research Paper.* [Online].

Available: https://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Schmid-Radicalisation-De-Radicalisation-Counter-Radicalisation-March-2013.pdf. The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism. [Accessed 05 September 2017].

SCHMID, A. P. 2014. Comments on Marc Sageman's Polemic “The Stagnation in Terrorism Research”. *Terrorism and Political Violence,* 26**,** 587-595.

SCHMID, A. P. & JONGMAN, A. J. 2005. *Political terrorism : a new guide to actors, authors, concepts, data bases, theories, & literature,* New Brunswick, N.J., Transaction Publishers.

SCHMID, A. P., JONGMAN, A. J.,1984. *Political terrorism : a research guide to concepts, theories, data bases, and literature,* Amsterdam, New Brunswick, U.S.A., North-Holland ; Distributors, Transaction Books.

SCHMID, A. P., JONGMAN, A. J., STOHL, M. 1988. *Political terrorism : a new guide to actors, authors, concepts, data bases, theories, and literature,* Amsterdam ; New York, New Brunswick (USA), North-Holland Pub. Co. ; Transaction Books, distributors for the Western Hemisphere.

SEDGWICK, M. 2010. The Concept of Radicalization as a Source of Confusion. *Terrorism and Political Violence,* 22**,** 479-494.

SEDGWICK, M. 2012. Jihadist ideology, Western counter-ideology, and the ABC model. *Critical Studies on Terrorism,* 5**,** 359-372.

SHANAHAN, T. 2010. Betraying a certain corruption of mind: how (and how not) to define 'terrorism'. *Critical Studies on Terrorism,* 3**,** 173-190.

SHWEDER, R. A., MUCH, N. C., MAHAPATRA, M. & PARK, L. 1997. The 'big three' of morality (autonomy, community, and divinity) and the 'big three' explanations of suffering. *In:* BRANDT, A. & ROZIN, P. (eds.) *Morality and health.* New York: Routledge.

SILKE, A. 2001. The Devil You Know: Continuing Problems with Research on Terrorism. *Terrorism and Political Violence,* 13**,** 1-14.

SILKE, A. 2004. The Road Less Traveled: Recent Trends in Terrorism Research. *In:* SILKE, A. (ed.) *Research into Terrorism: Trends, Achievements and Failures.* London: Routledge.

SILKE, A. 2005. Research on Terrorism A review of the Impact of 9/11 and the Global War on Terrorism. *In:* CHEN, H., REID, E., SINAI, J., SILKE, A. & GANOR, B. (eds.) *Terrorism Informatics Knowledge Management and Data Mining for Homeland Security.* New York, Springer.

SILKE, A. 2009. Contemporary terrorism studies Issues in research. *In:* JACKSON, R., SMYTH, M. & GUNNING, J. (eds.) *Critical terrorism studies : a new research agenda.* New York: Routledge critical terrorism studies.

SILKE, A. "The Golden Age? Assessing the State of Terrorism Studies.". Society for Terrorism Research 7th Annual Conference, 2013 University of East London. Society for Terrorism Research.

SILKE, A. 2014. *Prisons, terrorism and extremism : critical issues in management, radicalisation and reform,* London ; New York, Routledge.

SILKE, A. & BROWN, K. 2016. 'Radicalisation': The Transformation of Modern Understanding of Terrorist Origins, Psychology and Motivation.' In: JAYAKUMAR, S. (ed.) *State, Society, and National Security: Challenges and Opportunities in the 21st Century.* Singapore: Scientific Publishing.

SINAI, J. 2008. How to define terrorism. *Perspectives on Terrorism,* 2**,** 9-11.

SINCLAIR, K. 2008. Islam in Britain and Denmark: Deterritorialized Identity and Reterritorialized Agendas. *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs,* 28**,** 45-52.

SJOBERG, L. 2006. Gendered Realities of the Immunity Principle: Why Gender Analysis Needs Feminism. *International Studies Quarterly,* 50**,** 889-910.

SJOBERG, L. 2015. The terror of everyday counterterrorism. *Critical Studies on Terrorism,* 8**,** 383-400.

SJOBERG, L. & GENTRY, C. E. 2007. *Mothers, monsters, whores : women's violence in global politics,* New York, Zed Books.

SJOBERG, L. & GENTRY, C. E. (eds.) 2011. *Women, gender, and terrorism,* Athens: University of Georgia Press.

SJOBERG, L. & GENTRY, C. E. 2015. Introduction: gender and everyday/intimate terrorism. *Critical Studies on Terrorism,* 8**,** 358-361.

SKINNER, Q. 2002. Vision of Politics Volume 1: Regarding Method. Online Edition ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

SLIM, H. 2008. *Killing civilians : method, madness, and morality in war,* New York, Columbia University Press.

SMYTH, M. 2007. a critical research agenda for the study of political terror. *European Political Science,* 6**,** 260-267.

SMYTH, M. 2009. Subjectivities, ‘suspect communities’, governments, and the ethics of research on ‘terrorism’. *In:* JACKSON, R., SMYTH, M. & GUNNING, J. (eds.) *Critical Terrorism Studies : a new research agenda.* New York: Routledge critical terrorism studies.

SMYTH, M., GUNNING, J., JACKSON, R., KASSIMERIS, G. & ROBINSON, P. 2008. Critical Terrorism Studies - an introduction. *Critical Studies on Terrorism,* 1**,** 1-4.

SNOW, D. A., ZURCHER, L. A. & EKLAND-OLSON, S. 1980. Social networks and social movements: a microstructural approach to differential recruitment. *American Sociological Review,* 45**,** 787-801.

SOREL, J.-M. 2003. Some Questions About the Definition of Terrorism and the Fight Against Its Financing. *European Journal of International Law,* Vol. 14**,** 365-378.

SPALEK, B. & LAMBERT, R. 2008. Muslim communities, counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation: a critically reflective approach to engagement. *International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice,* 36**,** 257-270.

SPALEK, B., LIMBADA, Z., MCDONALD, L., SILK, D. & DASILVA, R. Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities: Methodology Report. Open Society Foundations, *Institute for Strategic Dialogue*.[Online] Available: https://www.counterextremism.org/resources/details/id/208/impact-of-counter-terrorism-on-communities-methodology-report. [Accessed 05 September 2017].

SPENCER, A. 2006. The Problems of Evaluating Counter-Terrorism. *UNISCI Discussions Paper,* No 12.

SPENCER, A. 2015. Metaphor analysis as a method in terrorism studies. *In:* DIXIT, P. & STUMP, J. L. (eds.) *Critical Methods in Terrorism Studies.* Kindle edition ed.: Routledge.

STAMPNITZKY, L. 2008. *Disciplining an Unruly Field: Terrorism Studies and the State, 1972-2001.* PhD Sociology, University of California, Berkeley.

STAMPNITZKY, L. 2010. Disciplining and Unruly Field: Terrorism Experts and Theories of Scientific/Intellectual Production. *Qualitative Sociology,* 34**,** 1-19.

STAMPNITZKY, L. 2013. *Disciplining terror : how experts invented 'terrorism',* New York, Cambridge University Press.

STAMPNITZKY, L. 2015a. Problematic knowledge: how 'terrorism' resists expertise *In:* BERLING, T. V. & BUEGER, C. (eds.) *Security Expertise. Practices, Power, Responsibility.* Oxon and New York: Routledge.

STAMPNITZKY, L. 2015b. Can Terrorism Be Defined? *Constructions of Terrorism* Orfelea Centre for Global & International Studies, UC Stanta Barbara.

STAMPNITZKY, L. 2016. Interview: If Orlando wasn't terrorism, why do gays feel terrorized? *greggormattson.com.* [Online] Available: https://greggormattson.com/2016/06/16/interview-if-orlando-wasnt-terorrism-why-do-gays-feel-terrorized. [Accessed 20 June 2016].

STAMPNITZKY, L. Forthcoming. Can Terrorism Be Defined. *In:* STOHL, M., ENGLUND, S. & BURCHILL, R. (eds.) *Constructions of Terrorism* Berkley: University of California Press.

STANLEY, L. & JACKSON, R. 2016. Introduction: Everyday narratives in world politics. *Politics***,** 3, 223-235.

STAUN, J. 2010. When, how and why elites frame terrorists: a Wittgensteinian analysis of terror and radicalisation. *Critical Studies on Terrorism,* 3**,** 403-420.

STEPHENS, A. C. & VAUGHAN-WILLIAMS, N. 2009. *Terrorism and the politics of response,* London ; New York, Routledge.

STERN, J. 1999. *The ultimate terrorists,* Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press.

STERN, J. 2014. Response to Marc Sageman's “The Stagnation in Terrorism Research”. *Terrorism and Political Violence,* 26**,** 607-613.

STRYDOM, P. 2011. *Contemporary critical theory and methodology,* London ; New York, Routledge.

STUMP, J. L. 2013. On the future of critical terrorism studies: A response to Richard Jackson's minimal foundationalist redefinition of terrorism. *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression,* 5**,** 217-224.

STUMP, J. L. & DIXIT, P. 2013. *Critical terrorism studies : an introduction to research methods,* London ; New York, NY, Routledge.

SWINFORD, S. 2015. David Cameron: Muslims must do more to tackle terrorism in wake of Paris shootings. *The Telegraph* [Online]. Available: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/religion/11340004/David-Cameron-Muslims-must-do-more-to-tackle-terrorism-in-wake-of-Paris-shootings.html. [Accessed 12 January 2015].

SWINFORD, S. 2015. It is lazy to say Paris terror attacks have nothing to do with Islam, Sajid Javid says. *The Telegraph* [Online]. Available: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/religion/11338258/It-is-lazy-to-say-

Paris-terror-attacks-have-nothing-to-do-with-Islam-Sajid-Javid-says.html. [Accessed 11 January 2015].

SYLVESTER, C. 2002. *Feminist international relations : an unfinished journey,* Cambridge, U.K. ; New York, Cambridge University Press.

SYLVESTER, C. & PARASHAR, S. 2009. The contemporary 'Mahabharata' and the many 'Draupadis' Bringing gender to critical terrorism studies. *In:* JACKSON, R., SMYTH, M. & GUNNING, J. (eds.) *Critical Terrorism Studies : a new research agenda.* New York: Routledge critical terrorism studies.

TAYLOR, C. & GUTMANN, A. 1992. *Multiculturalism and "The politics of recognition" : an essay,* Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press.

TAYLOR, M. 2014. If I Were You, I Wouldn't Start From Here: Response to Marc Sageman's "The Stagnation in Terrorism Research". *Terrorism and Political Violence,* 26**,** 581-586.

TAYLOR, M. & HORGAN, J. 2001. The Psychological and Behavioural Bases of Islamic Fundamentalism. *Terrorism and Political Violence,* 13**,** 37-71.

TAYLOR, M. & HORGAN, J. 2011. A conceptual framework for addressing psychological process in the development of the terrorist. *In:* HORGAN, J. & BRADDOCK, K. (eds.) *Terrorism Studies: A reader.* Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon ; New York: Routledge.

TETLOCK, P. E. 2003. Thinking the unthinkable: sacred valued and taboo cognitions. *TRENDS in Cognitive Sciences,* 7**,** 320-324.

TETLOCK, P. E. & AL, E. Revising the value pluralism model: incorporating social content and context postulates. *In:* SELIGMAN, C., ed. Ontario Symposium on Social and Personality Psychology, 1996 Ontario, Canada. Erlbaum, 27-58.

TETLOCK, P. E., KRISTEL, O. V., ELSON, S. B., GREEN, M. C. & LERNER, J. S. 2000. The psychology of the unthinkable: taboo trade-offs, forbidden base rates, and heretical counterfactuals. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,* 78**,** 853-870.

THOMAS, P. 2010. Failed and friendless: the UK's "Preventing Violent Extremism" programme. *British Journal of Politics and International Relations,* 12**,** 442-458.

THORNTON, A. & BOUHANA, N. 2017. Preventing Radicalization in the UK: Expanding the Knowledge-Base on the Channel Programme. *Policing***,** 1-14.

TILLY, C. 2003. *The politics of collective violence,* Cambridge ; New York, Cambridge University Press.

TILLY, C. 2005. *Identities, boundaries, and social ties,* Boulder, Colo., Paradigm Publishers.

TOLOYAN, K. 2001. Cultural Narratives and the Motivations of the Terrorist. *In:* RAPOPORT, D. C. (ed.) *Inside terrorist organizations.* 2nd edition ed. London: Frank Cass Publishers.

TOOSI, N. 2017. Breaking with Bush and Obama, Trump talks about 'radical Islamic terrorism'. *Politico* [Online]. Available: http://www.politico.com/story/2017/02/donald-trump-congress-speech-radical-islamic-terrorism-235531. [Accessed 13 March 2017].

TOROS, H. 2008. Terrorists, scholars and ordinary people: confronting terrorism studies with field experiences. *Critical Studies on Terrorism,* 1**,** 279-292.

TOROS, H. 2012. *Terrorism, talking and transformation : a critical approach,* Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, Routledge.

TOROS, H. 2015. Terrorists as co-participants? Outline of a research model. *In:* DIXIT, P. & STUMP, J. L. (eds.) *Critical Methods in Terrorism Studies.* Kindle edition ed. Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY: Routledge.

TOROS, H. & GUNNING, J. 2009. Exploring a critical theory approach to terrorism studies. *In:* JACKSON, R., SMYTH, M. & GUNNING, J. (eds.) *Critical terrorism studies : a new research agenda.* New York: Routledge critical terrorism studies.

TOROS, H. & TELLIDIS, I. 2013. Editor's introduction: Terrorism and peace and conflict studies: investigating the crossroad. *Critical Studies on Terrorism,* 6**,** 1-12.

TOWNSEND, M. 2017. Theresa May's counter-terrorism bill close to 'sinking without trace'. *The Guardian* [Online]. Available: https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/jan/29/theresa-may-counter-terrorism-bill-sinking-without-trace-extremism-british-values. [Accessed 29 January 2017].

TTSRL 2008. Defining Terrorism. *In:* Transnational Terrorism and the Rule of Law (ed.).The Hague.

TYRELL, H. 1999. Physische Gewalt, gewaltsamer Konflikt und "der Staat" - Überlegungen zu neuerer Literatur (Sammelbesprechung). *Berliner Journal für Soziologie,* 9**,** 269-288.

UGILT, R. 2012. The Metaphysics of Terror: The Incoherent System of Contemporary Politics. *Political Theory and Contemporary Philosophy.* London, New Delhi, New York, Sydney: Bloomsbury.

VAN EVERA, S. 1997. *Guide to methods for students of political science,* Ithaca, Cornell University Press.

VERMEULEN, F. 2014. Suspect Communities—Targeting Violent Extremism at the Local Level: Policies of Engagement in Amsterdam, Berlin, and London. *Terrorism and Political Violence,* 26**,** 286-306.

VICTOROFF, J. 2005. The Mind of the Terrorist: A Review and Critique of Psychological Approaches. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution,* 49**,** 3-42.

VICTOROFF, J. I. 2006. *Tangled roots : social and psychological factors in the genesis of terrorism,* Washington, DC, IOS Press.

VIDINO, L. & BRANDON, J. 2012. Countering Radicalization in Europe. London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR).

WÆVER, O. 1998. Insecurity, security and asecurity in the West European non-war community. *In:* ADLER, E. & BARNETT, M. (eds.) *Security communities* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

WALKER, P. 2016. Counter-extremism bill branded confusing by peers and MPs. *The Guardian* [Online]. Available: https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jul/22/counter-extremism-bill-branded-confusing-by-peers-and-mps. [Accessed 22 July 2016].

WALZER, M. 2006. *Just and unjust wars : a moral argument with historical illustrations,* New York, Basic Books.

WEBER, M. 1988 *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre*. J.C.B. Mohr: Paderborn.

WEBER, M. 1978. The Nature of Social Action. *In:* WEBER, M. & RUNCIMAN, W. G. (eds.) *Max Weber : selections in translation.* Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press.

WEINBERG, L., PEDAHZUR, A. & HIRSCH-HOEFLER, S. 2004. The Challenges of Conceptualizing Terrorism. *Terrorism and Political Violence,* 16**,** 777-794.

WHITTAKER, D. J. 2007. *The terrorism reader,* London ; New York, Routledge.

WILKINSON, P. 1974. *Political terrorism,* London, New York, Macmillan ; distributed by Halsted Press.

WILKINSON, P. 2006. *Terrorism versus democracy : the liberal state response,* London ; New York, Routledge.

WINTER, A. 2015. 'White Terror': racism and the racialization of violence. *Open Democracy* [Online]. Available: https://www.opendemocracy.net/aaron-winter/white-terror-racism-and-racialization-of-violence. [Accessed 9 March 2017].

WINTOUR, P. 2011. David Cameron tells Muslim Britian: stop tolerating extremists. *The Guardian* [Online] Available: https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2011/feb/05/david-cameron-muslim-extremism [Accessed: 06 September 2017].

WOLF, S. 1994. Comment. *In:* TAYLOR, C. & GUTMANN, A. (eds.) *Multiculturalism Examining the Politics of Recognition* Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

WOLFENDALE, J. 2006. Terrorism, Security, and the Threat of Counterterrorism. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism,* 29**,** 753-770.

WYN JONES, R. 1999. *Security, strategy, and critical theory,* Boulder, Colo., Lynne Rienner Publishers.

ZULEIKA, J. 2012. Drones, witches and other flying objects: the force of fantasy in US counterterrorism. *Critical Studies on Terrorism,* 5**,** 51-68.

ZULEIKA, J. & DOUGLASS, W. A. 2008. The terrorist subject: terrorism studies and the absent subjectivity. *Critical Studies on Terrorism,* 1**,** 27-36.