

Understanding the Discourse of British Muslim NGOs: Islamic Relief and MADE as Case Studies

Submitted by Davide Domenico Pettinato to the University of Exeter as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Arab and Islamic Studies, July 2017.

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DAVIDE DOMENICO PETTINATO

Acknowledgments

First and foremost, I thank and praise Allah for having allowed me to undertake and complete this work. Any good from this is from Allah, and any mistakes or omissions are from myself only.

I would also like to express my sincere gratitude to my wife and my son for their immense patience throughout these years: their presence and love have helped me to overcome the challenges of this demanding journey.

I also wish to heartfully thank my parents, for they have inspired me to pursue knowledge and supported me during these long years.

Of course, I also thank my supervisor, Dr Suha Taji-Farouki for her support and advice.

I would also like to thank the funding body that has provided me with a scholarship to undertake this study: this work was supported by the Economic and Social Research Council [grant number 1211543].

Finally, I wish to express my sincere gratitude to the people who have, in one way or the other, supported me throughout this journey: Adel, for the precious conversations we had together; Muhammad, for being so close to me despite the geographical distance; Mustafa, for being always ready to help out and offer sincere advice; Zohra, for having sacrificed much of her time in order to help me focusing on writing.

Abstract

Inspired by the increasingly high visibility of British Muslim NGOs (BMNGOs), by the lack of research on their discourses and by the growing salience of frames theory within the mainstream NGO sector, this thesis offers a significant and original contribution by exploring, describing, and analysing the discourse of two BMNGOs carefully selected as case studies: Islamic Relief (IR) and MADE (Muslim Action for Development and the Environment).

The primary aim of the thesis is empirical, driven by the research question: 'what frames seem to be at work in the discourse of BMNGOs?' Through an in-depth analysis of a range of public documents produced by the two case studies (e.g. annual reports and websites), the thesis identifies and analyses the main frames used by IR and MADE to articulate three key aspects of their discourses: i) organisational identity; ii) mobilisation efforts; and iii) conceptualisations of their supporter base. Guided by this overarching research question, the thesis offers an original and interdisciplinary insight into the nuances of the case studies' meaning systems, thereby showing their complexities and resonance with multiple narratives and ideational repertoires. The emerging 'thick descriptions' of IR and MADE represent, in and of themselves, the main results of the study, which is intended to enable readers from different disciplinary backgrounds to gain a nuanced insight into BMNGOs' discourses.

At a secondary level, the thesis also pursues the theoretical aim to start exploring how the frames identified in the study inform the two research sub-questions: 'how to think about BMNGOs?' and 'how to think about British Muslim civic engagement?' Several observations are put forward in this regard. Taken together, these suggest that IR can be understood as a faith-based organisation that simultaneously draws on a range of heritages and increasingly offers opportunities for active citizenship among British Muslims within the framework of what is broadly characterizable as a 'NGO-led order'. On the other hand, the thesis suggests that MADE can be understood as an exemplar of the current era of 'loose activist networks', more precisely as a 'Muslim lifestyle' social movement organisation that promotes among British Muslims a multifaceted form of civic engagement inspired by an Islamic ethical framework.

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List of abbreviations

- **Names of frames**

CYCW: CHANGE YOURSELF TO CHANGE THE WORLD

FM: 'Fight' Metaphor

HUCW: HELP US CHANGE THIS WORLD

IH: ISLAMIC HUMANITARIANISM

IHV: ISLAMIC HUMANITARIAN VALUES

IV: ISLAMIC VALUES

POP: POLITICS OVER PEOPLE

POPP: PROFIT OVER PEOPLE & PLANET

POPPP: PROFIT OVER PEOPLE, PLANET & PEACE

PPP: PROFIT & PEOPLE & PLANET

- **General**

BMNGO: British Muslim Nongovernmental Organisation

CAF: collective action frame

CSR: Corporate Social Responsibility

FBO: Faith-Based Organisation

GJM: Global Justice Movement

IF: Enough Food for Everyone IF campaign

MNGO: Muslim Nongovernmental Organisation

NGO: Nongovernmental Organisation

OWS: Occupy Wall Street movement

PBUH: abbreviated form of "peace be upon him," which is a customary utterance among Muslims after mentioning the Prophet's name. This expression appears few times in the original data. The Muslim reader is asked to assume its use elsewhere in the main text of this work as appropriate.

RR: Ramadan Revolution

SRM: Social Responsibility Movement

TBL: Triple Bottom Line

TMNGO: Transnational Muslim Nongovernmental Organisation

WOH: War on Hunger

WOW: War on Want

Chapter 1 . Introduction

“Muslims ‘are Britain’s top charity givers’.”¹ This was the headline in *The Times* that in July 2013—corresponding to that year’s Ramadan—brought to the British and international public’s attention that British Muslims are the most generous group in the UK, increasingly donating to both “Muslim and non-Muslim causes.”² The following year, during his message on the occasion of the start of Ramadan, the then UK Prime Minister David Cameron praised British Muslims as “our biggest donors.”³ More recently, during Ramadan 2016, a highly publicised blog by the Charity Commission⁴ praised not only the generosity of British Muslim donors, but also the “vast and varied work” of British Muslim nongovernmental organisations (henceforth, BMNGOs).⁵

Taken together, these “critical discourse moments”⁶ have contributed to give high (and somewhat positive) visibility to the fact that—despite their limited number⁷—BMNGOs represent one of the largest and most important players in the UK development sector:⁸ not only by virtue of their operations in over 70 countries, but also thanks to a collective annual income of around £150 million, much of which derives from the donations of an audience (the British Muslim publics) that

¹ Ruth Gledhill, ‘Muslims “are Britain’s Top Charity Givers”’, *The Times*, 20 July 2013, <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/muslims-are-britains-top-charity-givers-c7w0mrzzknf>.

² The research was made public through a press release from JustGiving, one of the world’s leading online giving platforms. The findings were based on two sources: internal data from JustGiving about online donations from Muslims; and an online survey of 4000 adults conducted by ICM Research on behalf of JustGiving. At the time of writing, the original press release is not anymore available on the JustGiving website. However, extracts from it are retrievable across the different outlets that have publicised the results, such as in: Sundas Ali, ‘British Muslims in Numbers. A Demographic, Socio-Economic and Health Profile of Muslims in Britain Drawing on the 2011 Census’ (The Muslim Council of Britain, 2015), 34.

³ David Cameron, ‘Ramadan 2014: David Cameron’s Message’, *GOV.UK*, 27 June 2014, <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/ramadan-2014-david-camerons-message>.

⁴ The governmental department that registers and regulates charities in England and Wales.

⁵ Nick Donaldson, ‘Ramadan – Making a Real Difference’, *Charity Commission*, 14 July 2016, <https://charitycommission.blog.gov.uk/2016/07/14/ramadan-making-a-real-difference/>.

⁶ Paul Chilton, ‘Metaphor, Euphemism and the Militarization of Language’, *Current Research on Peace and Violence* 10, no. 1 (1987): 7–19, quoted in William A. Gamson, *Talking Politics* (Cambridge University Press, 1992), 26.

⁷ Out of 164,069 charities registered with the Charity Commission in England and Wales, more than 11,600 report to be engaged in some form of ‘overseas aid or famine relief’. Further, over 450 NGOs are registered as members of BOND, the UK membership body for organisations working in international development or supporting those that do so. However, the number of BMNGOs is estimated to be only around 56. (Victoria Mecalfe-Hough, Tom Keating, and Sara Pantuliano, ‘UK Humanitarian Aid in the Age of Counterterrorism: Perceptions and Reality’ (Overseas Development Institute (ODI)), 3, accessed 31 May 2017, <https://www.odi.org/publications/9301-uk-humanitarian-aid-age-counterterrorism-perceptions-and-reality>.)

⁸ Bond, ‘Fast Forward: The Changing Role of UK-Based NGOs’, 2015, 10.

is estimated to give more than twice as much to charity as the average Briton.⁹ Indeed, in recent years, leading voices within the mainstream UK development sector (such as Bond) have increasingly highlighted the essential role that BMNGOs (through their dual nature of both diaspora and faith-based NGOs) can and should play in changing the discourse about development. Not only by developing tailored narratives that may specifically resonate with the British Muslims publics—and therefore tap into this potentially receptive audience¹⁰—but also by helping the sector as a whole to develop a more mature and diverse development narrative, which may be more reflective of the diversity found within UK society.¹¹

The salience of BMNGOs' role in shaping discourse around development derives from the fact that, like secular and other faith-based NGOs, these actors play two major roles. In the Global South, they provide services along the relief-humanitarian aid-development continuum.¹² In the UK, they engage their domestic audience in order to elicit support for their work: not only through fundraising activities (which remain essential for their survival), but also by influencing—whether by design or by accident—British Muslims' awareness,

⁹ The already mentioned research commissioned by JustGiving suggested that in 2012 Muslims gave more than twice as much per capita to charity as the average Briton (£371 versus £165). (JustGiving, 'Ramadan Donations Cause Spike in Digital Giving: British Muslims Take Zakat Donations Online', *JustGiving*, 20 July 2013, <http://www.justgiving.com/en/SharedMedia/press-releases/Ramadan%20donations%20cause%20spike%20in%20digital%20giving.pdf>. quoted in: Gabriela Flores and Alveena Malik, 'What Development Means to Diaspora Communities' (Bond, 2015), 8.

¹⁰ Flores and Malik, 'What Development Means to Diaspora Communities', 2.

¹¹ Bond, 'Change the Record. Exploring New Ways to Engage the UK Public in Tackling Global Poverty', 2014; Bond, 'Fast Forward: The Changing Role of UK-Based NGOs'; Flores and Malik, 'What Development Means to Diaspora Communities'.

¹² Relief, humanitarian aid and development could arguably be considered distinct approaches to alleviate suffering in the Global South. Whereas relief and humanitarian aid typically represent responses to war and disasters, and focus on the immediate alleviation of suffering, development takes a long-term perspective based on notions of socio-economic progress. Until the 1990s, these aspects were referred to as the 'continuum model', to indicate a sequential understanding of the transition from relief to development. Over the 1990s, this concept was slowly replaced by the 'contiguuum' model, which implies that different approaches (whether relief, rehabilitation or development) may be appropriate simultaneously. However, the 'continuum' model has continued to permeate most subsequent discourse and policy discussions. (Irina Mosel and Simon Levine, 'Remaking the Case for Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development. How LRRD Can Become a Practically Useful Concept for Assistance in Difficult Places', HPG Commissioned Report (Humanitarian Policy Group. Overseas Development Institute, March 2014), 3, [https://www.odi.org/publications/8319-relief-rehabilitation-development-resilience.](https://www.odi.org/publications/8319-relief-rehabilitation-development-resilience)) While I acknowledge the substantial differences between relief, humanitarian aid and development, for the purpose of the present analysis I will use these terms interchangeably since these concepts rest on the same core values, share the same discourses and practices, and are often simultaneously carried out by most NGOs. For a similar observation, see: Marie Juul Petersen, 'For Humanity or for the Umma? Ideologies of Aid in Four Transnational Muslim NGOs' (PhD Thesis, 2011), 65, <http://ccrs.ku.dk/phd/phdthesisdefences/mariejuulpetersen/>.

understandings, attitudes and beliefs about ‘bigger-than-self’ problems¹³ and their role in addressing them.¹⁴ Among the key functions that BMNGOs perform, therefore, their role as discourse makers and as platforms for fostering forms of positive civic engagement is of primary importance.

Despite the growing awareness of the positive role that BMNGOs can play (/are playing), much of the public, media and policy discourse around BMNGOs has been dominated by a negative narrative in recent years. Since 2011, in particular, BMNGOs humanitarian response to a series of crises that are “widely considered the ‘frontline’ of the fight against terrorism” have brought these actors under “an exceptional level of public scrutiny.”¹⁵ In parallel, though small in number, incidents and alleged incidents of abuse of BMNGOs “by individuals or organisations engaging in or supporting extremist or terrorist activities” have done “much reputational damage” to the sector.¹⁶ A manifestation and consequence of this context is that BMNGOs have increasingly found themselves in the midst of what has been called “a perfect storm of negative press and disproportionate regulation.”¹⁷ In fact, in recent years BMNGOs have often been facing “unfounded or sweeping allegations” by the media;¹⁸ they seem to have been “disproportionately affected by investigations”¹⁹ from the Charity Commission; and they have faced “increasing restrictions on their access to financial services,” as a number of banks have deemed them to fall outside their ‘risk appetite’, consequently freezing or closing their accounts, or declining their requests to

¹³ Such as poverty, hunger, and climate change. I borrow the expression ‘bigger-than-self’ problems from a key contribution to this debate: Tom Crompton, ‘Common Cause: The Case for Working with Our Cultural Values’, *Policy & Practice*, 10 September 2010, 8, <http://policy-practice.oxfam.org.uk/publications/common-cause-the-case-for-working-with-our-cultural-values-112367>.

¹⁴ Martin Kirk, ‘Beyond Charity: Helping NGOs Lead a Transformative New Public Discourse on Global Poverty and Social Justice’, *Ethics & International Affairs* 26, no. 2 (12 July 2012): 245–63.

¹⁵ Mecalfe-Hough, Keating, and Pantuliano, ‘UK Humanitarian Aid in the Age of Counterterrorism’, 1.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 7–8.

¹⁷ Augustus Della-Porta, ‘Muslim Charities Face a Perfect Storm’, in *Faith-Based Organisations Update* (Bates Wells & Braithwaite, 2015), 6, <http://www.bwbllp.com/file/muslim-charities-face-a-perfect-storm-pdf>.

¹⁸ Mecalfe-Hough, Keating, and Pantuliano, ‘UK Humanitarian Aid in the Age of Counterterrorism’, 9.

¹⁹ Adam Belaon, ‘Muslim Charities: A Suspect Sector’ (Claystone, 2014), 6.

open new ones.²⁰ In other words, BMNGOs “have had a hard time of it, of late”²¹ and the sector as a whole seems to be often portrayed and/or perceived as “a suspect sector.”²²

Notably, the two-pronged narrative about BMNGOs outlined above is somehow reflected in the still relatively limited literature on Muslim NGOs (more on this in the next chapter). On the one hand, works stemming from development studies and cultural anthropology tend to resonate within positive (or, at least, not necessarily negative) perceptions associated with Muslim NGOs (henceforth, MNGOs), seeing these actors as faith-based organisations (FBOs) that play a key role within the humanitarian/development sector thank to their instrumental advantage in efficiently and safely delivering services in the Muslim world. On the other hand, works informed by political sciences tend to resonate with negative (or, at least, not necessarily positive) perceptions associated with MNGOs, seeing these mainly as political actors engaged in ‘Muslim politics’ and/or the (re)Islamisation of Muslim societies—with some critical voices highlighting how MNGOs seem to have been the target of an “overreaction”²³ and “a witch hunt”²⁴ since the conflicts in Afghanistan and Bosnia in the 1980s and 1990s.

Whilst these strands of the literature are, each in their own way, useful to inform the study of MNGOs, they also point to a major gap insofar they tend to: i) adopt macro or meso levels of analysis; ii) focus on MNGOs based in the Muslim world, or on the operations of international MNGOs (such as BMNGOs) within it; iii) overlook the role of MNGOs as discourse makers. As a consequence, we lack detailed, microlevel analyses of the discourse of MNGOs based in the West, such as BMNGOs.

In fact, as I will outline in chapter 2, to date only one study (Petersen’s *For Humanity of for the Ummah?*²⁵) seems to have deeply engaged with the

²⁰ Mecalfe-Hough, Keating, and Pantuliano, ‘UK Humanitarian Aid in the Age of Counterterrorism’, 7–13.

²¹ David Ainsworth, ‘How Do You Handle a Question like Muslim Charities?’, *Civil Society Media*, 25 November 2014, <https://www.civilsociety.co.uk/voices/how-do-you-handle-a-question-like-muslim-charities-.html>.

²² Belaon, ‘Muslim Charities: A Suspect Sector’.

²³ Jonathan Benthall, ‘The Overreaction against Islamic Charities’, *ISIM Review*, no. 20 (Autumn 2007): 6–7.

²⁴ Jérôme Bellion-Jourdan, ‘Are Muslim Charities Purely Humanitarian?: A Real but Misleading Question’, in *Nongovernmental Politics*, ed. Michel Feher (New York: Cambridge, Mass: Zone Books; Distributed by MIT Press, 2007), 648.

²⁵ Petersen, ‘For Humanity or for the Umma?’

discourse of BMNGOs. Albeit valuable, that study presents some limitations, which this thesis aims to overcome. On the one hand, it focuses only on the two largest and better known BMNGOs (i.e. Islamic Relief and Muslim Aid), which show significant similarities with each other, hence precluding an appreciation of other 'voices' within the sector. On the other hand, with regards to the case study shared with this thesis (i.e. Islamic Relief) Petersen's analysis: i) considers only data until 2009, hence overlooking key developments occurred in the years 2010 to 2014, which are included in my analysis; ii) focuses on the organisation's 'ideology of aid' (through the range of meanings it specifically associates with 'aid' and 'Islam'), hence overlooking other key areas of its discourse, such as its mobilising efforts and the conceptualisation of its supporter base; iii) focuses on framing processes and metanarratives, rather than on micro-textual analysis, frames and their content, hence somehow failing to capture the detail of the organisation's discourse.

Further, given the timing of its original publication (in 2011), Petersen's work does not take into account more recent developments within the mainstream NGO sector, which increasingly highlight the significance of adopting a frame theory approach for the study of NGOs' discourse. One of the most ground-breaking and influential works in this sense²⁶ is the report "Finding Frames: New ways to engage the UK public in global poverty,"²⁷ which I will often refer to in the course of the thesis. Published in 2011 by Bond as the result of research supported by one of the world-leading NGOs (Oxfam) and the UK Department for International Development (DFID), the report offers two key contributions that inform this study. First, it presents a comprehensive overview of frame theory, focusing on the idea of cognitive frames²⁸ and establishing its relevance for the study (and making) of NGO discourse.²⁹ Secondly, it identifies a list of frames employed in the current discourses and practices of mainstream NGOs, discussing why they are problematic and suggesting some alternative 'positive' frames—with the proviso that this was intended as an exploratory exercise calling for more research to

²⁶ As acknowledged by scholars of NGOs, social movements and public engagement, such as in: Helen Yanacopulos, *International NGO Engagement, Advocacy, Activism: The Faces and Spaces of Change* (Springer, 2015), 54–58.

²⁷ Darnton, Andrew and Martin Kirk, 'Finding Frames: New Ways to Engage the UK Public in Global Poverty' (London: Bond, 2011).

²⁸ Specifically, as they appear in the work of the cognitive linguist George Lakoff.

²⁹ Darnton, Andrew and Kirk, 'Finding Frames: New Ways to Engage the UK Public in Global Poverty', 65–79.

validate and refine such frames, and also to identify different ones.³⁰ From this perspective, my study (in a sense) answers that call, engaging in a systemic frame analysis of the discourse of actors (BMNGOs) that were not specifically addressed by the “Finding Frames” report. Further, the report did not integrate the cognitive-linguistic perspective with the rich tradition of frame analysis deriving from social movement studies, which I incorporate in the thesis in two ways. Primarily, by adopting a methodology of frame analysis developed by a leading social movement scholar (Johnston) and by incorporating in my analysis the identification of organisation-specific frames linked to what another key figure in this discipline (Gamson) identified as two key components of ‘collective action frames’: injustice and agency. Secondly, by making interspersed references throughout the thesis to concepts borrowed from social movement studies.³¹

1.1. Objectives, research questions and original contribution

Informed by current debates around BMNGOs, by the lack of research on the meaning-making dimension of these actors, and by the growing salience of the frame theory approach to NGO communication, the thesis offers a significant and original contribution by exploring, describing, and analysing the discourse of two BMNGOs carefully selected as case studies: Islamic Relief and MADE.

The main, overarching objective of the thesis is to inform and enrich our understanding of BMNGOs’ discourse. The focus on the meaning systems of these actors is important not only because it says much about the organisations themselves, but also because it helps to better contextualise them within wider trends (discursive and societal), and because it highlights the type of ideas, values and perceptions these organisations promote (whether by design or by accident) among the British Muslim publics. Furthermore, improving our understanding of BMNGOs’ discourse is essential to contribute challenging incomplete essentialisations and/or negative stereotyping of BMNGOs, and rather prompt genuine interest in what they say and how they say it. Finally, from an impact-oriented perspective, both the empirical knowledge and the theoretical insights offered by the thesis could be used by the BMNGOs themselves in order

³⁰ Ibid., 81–102.

³¹ When I do so, I provide brief definitions of such concepts and try to clarify their particular significance in the specific context I use them.

to improve their discursive practices and communication strategies through critical self-reflection.

Within the scope of this overarching objective, the thesis has two interlinked, but discrete, aims.

The primary aim of the thesis is empirical, driven by the research question: ‘what frames seem to be at work in the discourse of BMNGOs?’. Through an in-depth analysis of a range of public documents produced by the two case studies (e.g. annual reports, websites, social media content), the thesis identifies the main frames they use to articulate three key aspects of their discourse:

- i) *organisational identity*—this aspect is explored in part one of the thesis’ core, which is guided by the question: ‘how do the case studies frame ‘the Self?’
- ii) *mobilisation efforts*—this aspect is the focus of part two, which is driven by the question: ‘what frames do the case studies utilise to mobilise support?’
- iii) *conceptualisations of the supporter base*—this aspect is discussed in part three, which explores the question: ‘what are the main frames utilised by the case studies to communicate what it means to support them?’

Guided by this overarching research aim, my analysis offers an original insight into the nuances of the case studies’ discourses, thereby showing their complexities and resonance with multiple narratives and ideational repertoires. By engaging in a systematic, in-depth analysis informed by Islamic studies, social movement studies, and NGO studies, the thesis offer a degree of detail that no previous study looking at BMNGOs has yet achieved. In doing this, the thesis advances our understanding of these actors and starts addressing the current knowledge gap, which I outlined earlier.

Additionally, the thesis presents also a secondary, theoretical aim. This stems from the fact that frames are both the conceptual structures through which we (mostly subconsciously) perceive discourse and which we (mostly subconsciously) use to structure our own processes of thinking and talking about issues—in other words, the “structuring structures” of our thought.³² From this perspective, identifying frames in BMNGOs’ discourse (i.e. the primary aim of the

³² Darnton, Andrew and Kirk, ‘Finding Frames: New Ways to Engage the UK Public in Global Poverty’, 70.

thesis) means not only to gain an insight into how these actors think (and talk), but also informs how we can think (and talk) about them. Through this lens, one secondary aim of the thesis is to build on the insights gained from the case studies' discourses in order to offer a useful contribution to current conceptualisations of BMNGOs and British Muslims' civic engagement—in other words, to start exploring how the frames identified in the study address the two research sub-questions: 'how to think about British Muslim NGOs?' and 'how to think about British Muslim civic engagement?'

Having outlined the significance of this study, its main objectives, and its original contribution, in the following I shall briefly introduce Islamic Relief and MADE, and present some important observations about the case study approach adopted by the thesis.

1.2. The case studies

To be clear, my aim is by no means to produce a conclusive analysis of the discourse of the BMNGO sector as a whole. Rather, the thesis is highly explorative and it is intended to provide a foundation of empirical research upon which further research can build.³³ From this perspective, the study primarily aims to provide new empirical knowledge about the two case studies, specifically. In approaching these, I self-consciously intended my understanding to be 'grounded' in the data from which it emerged (i.e. the case studies' discourses), rather than relying on pre-existing perceptions and characterisations of them. For this reason, I provide here only a short overview of the two organisations that is based as much as possible on 'hard facts and figures', in order to introduce the reader to the main 'structural' features of (and differences between) the two case studies, whilst leaving nuance and interpretation to emerge from the thick descriptions offered by the rest of the thesis.

Islamic Relief³⁴ (henceforth, IR) is the largest MNGO in the world.³⁵ In the period 2009-14, the organisation's budget raised from £58 to £182 million.³⁶ In the same

³³ I will outline some potential areas for future research in the concluding chapter of the thesis.

³⁴ As I will describe in chapter 4, Islamic Relief (UK) was established in 2006 as a subsidiary of Islamic Relief Worldwide. Within the thesis, I will focus on Islamic Relief (UK) and refer to it simply as Islamic Relief (IR).

³⁵ Petersen, 'For Humanity or for the Umma?', 47.

³⁶ Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2009' (Birmingham: Islamic Relief Worldwide, 2009), 43, http://www.islamic-relief.org.uk/content/uploads/2013/05/Annual_Report_2009.pdf; Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Islamic Relief Worldwide 2014 Annual Report & Financial Statements'

period, its average number of UK-based employees (based mainly in the headquarters of Islamic Relief Worldwide in Birmingham and of Islamic Relief UK in London) ranged between 200 to 300, approximately.³⁷ IR also employs thousands of people across fundraising offices in almost 15 countries (mainly in the Global North³⁸) and for delivering services and projects through implementing country offices, affiliated implementing partners and other partners organisations in almost 40 countries in the Global South.³⁹ IR provides primarily humanitarian aid and emergency relief⁴⁰ and, secondarily, development projects.⁴¹ Campaigning and advocacy activities do feature within IR's agenda, though they occupy only a very limited space.⁴² Finally, IR is also one of the oldest MNGO in the world⁴³ and the oldest BMNGO: it was established in response to the 1984 famine in Africa by a group of (mainly Egyptians) professionals led by Dr Hany El-Banna, who moved to the UK few years earlier to study medicine at the University of Birmingham.⁴⁴

MADE (an acronym that stands for: "Muslim Action for Development & Environment")⁴⁵ is a very small organisation. In the period 2009-14, its income

(Birmingham: Islamic Relief Worldwide, 2014), 5, <http://library.iracademy.org.uk/islamic-relief-worldwide-2014-annual-report-financial-statements/>.

³⁷ Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Islamic Relief Annual Report 2009', 65; Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Islamic Relief Annual Report 2014', 60.

³⁸ I use the expressions 'Global North' and 'Global South' in the thesis to delineate between the so-called 'developed'/rich and 'developing'/poor worlds. I prefer to adopt this terminology because of two main reasons. Firstly, it better reflects the complexity of today's multiple 'glocalities', by recognizing that the 'South' also exists in the 'North' and vice versa. Secondly, it allows stepping back from paradigms that assume socio-economic wealth as the main indicator of human development.

³⁹ Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Islamic Relief Annual Report 2014', 11.

⁴⁰ In 2014, 75% of IR's global programme expenditures was dedicated to this end. (Ibid., 7.)

⁴¹ In 2014, the following portions of IR's global programme expenditures were dedicated to each area: 9% Caring for orphans / children in need; 8% Providing access to healthcare and water; 6% Sustainable livelihoods; 1% Supporting education. (Ibid., 6–7.)

⁴² In 2014, only 1% of IR's global programme expenditures was dedicated to this area. (Ibid.)

⁴³ From Petersen's overview of the history of transnational Muslim NGOs, it is possible to infer that IR is the sixth oldest MNGO within the international landscape. (Petersen, 'For Humanity or for the Umma?', 89 Table 4.1.)

⁴⁴ 'History', *Islamic Relief Worldwide*, accessed 30 June 2017, <http://www.islamic-relief.org/about-us/history/>; Petersen, 'For Humanity or for the Umma?', 169.

⁴⁵ MADE has changed name over the course of my study. The organisation was known as MADE in Europe from 2009 to 2014. The acronym MADE stood for 'Muslim Agency for Development and Enterprise' between 2009 and 2011; and for 'Muslim Agency for Development Education' between 2011 and 2014. These changes in name indicate, in and of themselves, that MADE has been actively framing its organisational identity in these years. Since I aim to be as close as possible to the case studies' self-identification, I will refer to MADE using the last version of its name (i.e. simply MADE) throughout the thesis.

ranged from £108,718 to £173,992.⁴⁶ The organisation started with only two staff members, who were also its co-founders (Saif Ahmad as the CEO and Sarah Javaid as the Director of Operations) and maintained an average of 7-10 members of staff from 2011 to 2014. Originally hosted within the head office of the charity Faith Regen Foundation (a multi faith charity established in 2001 by Saif Ahmed himself, with the aim to build bridges between faith communities by promoting positive change for disadvantaged individuals),⁴⁷ in 2011 MADE moved to the popular London Muslim Centre, which is adjacent to the prominent East London Mosque at the heart of London's Tower Hamlets district.⁴⁸ MADE does not have other offices within the UK or abroad and its activities take place almost exclusively within the UK, primarily in London. Only in a couple of instances MADE's projects had a European scope,⁴⁹ whilst the sole example of MADE's direct engagement with the Global South was the Act Global project, an oversea volunteer scheme that the organisation run in 2010-11,⁵⁰ through which a limited number of MADE's volunteers were deployed to provide basic assistance in Haiti, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Kashmir.⁵¹ This lack of direct engagement with the Global South is reflective of the fact that MADE's main focus is on UK-based campaigning activities (~83% of programme expenditures in 2014 were directed to this area), accompanied by a secondary focus on educational activities⁵² and, to a small degree, volunteering.⁵³ Finally, MADE is also one of the youngest BMNGOs: it was established in 2009 and, notably, not in response to any specific humanitarian crisis.

⁴⁶ MADE in Europe, 'MADE in Europe. Annual Review 2009/2010' (London: MADE in Europe, 2010), para. Financial Info 2009/10; MADE in Europe, 'MADE in Europe. Annual Report 2013/2014' (London: MADE in Europe, 2014), 14.

⁴⁷ 'FRF History', *Faith Regen Foundation*, accessed 30 June 2017, <http://www.thefrf.org/about/history>.

⁴⁸ MADE in Europe, 'MADE in Europe. Annual Report 2011/2012' (London: MADE in Europe, 2012), 2.

⁴⁹ In 2011 and 2012 MADE run a volunteering scheme called Bosnia & Herzegovina: The Journey aimed at giving young people the opportunity to learn first-hand about post-conflict reconstruction and development within the Bosnian context. In 2013, MADE partnered up with FEMYSO (the Forum of European Muslim Youth and Student Organisations) to launch an awareness campaign focused on environmental issues called Green Up My Community!

⁵⁰ In partnership with GlobalMedic and the MNGOs READ Foundation and Islamic Help.

⁵¹ MADE in Europe, 'MADE Annual Report 2010', sec. Act Global; MADE in Europe, 'MADE in Europe. Annual Report 2010/2011' (London: MADE in Europe, 2011), sec. Act Global.

⁵² ~12% of MADE's programme expenditures in 2014 were directed to this area.

⁵³ ~5% of MADE's programme expenditures in 2014 were directed to this area. Percentages are derived from figures reported in: MADE in Europe, 'MADE Annual Report 2014', 14.

Having introduced the two case studies, it is appropriate here to outline the rationale for choosing a case study approach, its limitations and the reasons underlying my decision to use IR and MADE as case studies.

1.2.1. Rationale for the case study approach

My decision to study BMNGOs' discourse through a case study approach is based on a twofold rationale that intertwines epistemological and empirical considerations.

From an epistemological perspective, I choose this approach on the basis of my agreement with the proposition that "case knowledge is central to human learning."⁵⁴ This seems to be the case for two main reasons. Firstly, the phenomenology of human learning suggests that the accumulation of context-dependent knowledge through in-depth, concrete, well-chosen cases is essential to gain a nuanced view of reality through an understanding of and expertise on a certain topic.⁵⁵ From this perspective, choosing a case study approach to study the discourse of BMNGOs is not only appropriate, but also key to: i) fulfil the overarching aim of the thesis, i.e. to inform and enrich our understanding of these actors; ii) enable me to develop competence and expertise in this field.

Secondly, and as a consequence of such phenomenology of learning, this epistemological position sees social science as being inherently and inextricably linked to the type of context-dependent knowledge that case studies provide: since "in the study of human affairs, there appears to exist only context-dependent knowledge," it follows that social science "does not and probably cannot" provide context-independent theory, but only concrete, context-dependent knowledge.⁵⁶ In other words, the case study approach sees social science research as an endeavour that is undertaken (using Eysenck's words) "not in the hope of proving anything, but rather in the hope of learning something!"⁵⁷ From this perspective, the thesis adopts a case study approach not in the hope of (dis)proving anything about BMNGOs, but rather in the hope of advancing and nuancing our understanding of these actors.

⁵⁴ Bent Flyvbjerg, 'Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research', in *Qualitative Research Practice*, ed. Clive Seale et al. (London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2004), 222.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 221–23.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 221; 223.

⁵⁷ Hans Jürgen Eysenck, 'Introduction', in *Case Studies in Behaviour Therapy*, ed. Hans Jürgen Eysenck (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976), quoted in Bent Flyvbjerg, 'Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research', 224.

At the empirical level, I choose a case study approach because a detailed insight into BMNGOs' discourse through in depth-case studies and thick descriptions is precisely what is missing in the literature (as I will outline in chapter 2). From this perspective, and drawing from Thomas Kuhn's observations about the key role of case studies in any discipline, the study of MNGOs (in general) and of BMNGOs (more specifically) is inherently flawed by the absence of a large number of thoroughly executed case studies.⁵⁸ Consequently, by providing two exemplars of such in-depth case studies, the thesis intends to make a valuable contribution not only to the specific topic of 'Muslim NGOs' but also to the different disciplines engaged through the research process, such as: i) the sociology of Islam and Muslims (particularly, on themes such as: Muslim organisations in the West; forms of Muslim activism/civic engagement; Islam in the UK and British Muslims); ii) NGO studies (particularly, on themes such as: diaspora and faith-based organisations; NGO communications); and iii) social movement studies (particularly, on themes such as: framing; contemporary forms of activism).

1.2.2. Limitations of the case study approach

Like any other research strategy, the case study approach has some inherent limitations, too.

An oft-launched criticism towards this approach is that it represents "nothing more than a method of producing anecdotes."⁵⁹ Indeed, this represents one of the most common "misunderstandings about case-study research" (as Flyvbjerg puts it), according to which case studies cannot be of value in and of themselves.⁶⁰ This criticism is debunked by the foregoing considerations about the phenomenology of learning, which highlight how "the case study is a necessary and sufficient method for certain important research tasks in the social sciences."⁶¹ From this perspective, the thick descriptions I offer in the thesis are themselves the result,

⁵⁸ Thomas Kuhn, 'What Are Scientific Revolutions?', in *The Probabilistic Revolution: Ideas in History*, ed. Lorenz Krüger, Lorraine J. Daston, and Michael Heidelberger (Cambridge, Mass.: A Bradford Book, 1990), quoted in Bent Flyvbjerg, 'Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research', 242.

⁵⁹ Eysenck, 'Introduction', quoted in; Bent Flyvbjerg, 'Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research', 224.

⁶⁰ Bent Flyvbjerg, 'Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research'.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 241.

representing a section of reality that I make available to readers and scholars from different disciplines so that may gain a sensitivity to the issues at hand.⁶²

From this bases, the thesis produces a particularly ‘thick’ narrative of the two case studies, which is hard to summarize into neat, general propositions. Whilst critics of the case study approach see this as a drawback, advocates of this approach see this as a sign that the study has uncovered a particularly rich topic.⁶³ In fact, it has been argued that the very value of the case study lies precisely in prioritising detail over generalisations.⁶⁴ From this perspective, case study researchers are “explicitly warned against summarizing” because “something essential may be lost by this summarizing.”⁶⁵

In turn, however, this leads to the practical challenge (which I, too, have faced during the course of this study) of having to deal with the time-consuming process of working at the micro rather than at the macrolevel. Indeed, as I was writing the thesis, a question that seems to be commonly shared by researchers carrying out in-depth case studies has repeatedly surfaced in my mind: “Who will want to learn about a case like this, and in this kind of *detail*?”⁶⁶ The answer lies in the epistemological considerations outlined earlier about the validity and salience of in-depth case studies, and in the fact that we seem to know so little about the discourse of actors that are (nevertheless) so highly debated: from this perspective, it is hoped that the kind of detail achieved by this study will matter to scholars with a genuine interest in learning about BMNGOs.

Indeed, one of the aims of offering such a level of detail is to enable the reader to explore by him/herself the case studies, hence providing a type of knowledge that pre-emptively answers the ‘so what?’ question before this is even asked.⁶⁷ To attain this, I use three main strategies. Firstly, as suggested by Johnston specifically with regards to frame analysis (more on this in chapter 3), in the thesis I provide as much primary material from the case studies as possible. This includes both textual extracts (which, due to space limitations, I sometimes chose to reproduce in appendix, such as in chapters 7 and 8) and images. Secondly, I

⁶² Ibid., 238–39.

⁶³ Ibid., 237.

⁶⁴ Lisa Peattie, ‘Theorizing Planning: Some Comments on Flyvbjerg’s Rationality and Power’, *International Planning Studies* 6, no. 3 (1 August 2001): 257–62, doi:10.1080/713672898, quoted in Bent Flyvbjerg, ‘Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research’, 238.

⁶⁵ Bent Flyvbjerg, ‘Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research’, 238–39.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 237.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 240.

follow Flyvbjerg's suggestions to: i) self-consciously refrain (as much as possible) to summarise the case studies; and ii) avoid to link the cases with just one academic specialisation and rather relate them to bodies of knowledge and considerations from multiple disciplines⁶⁸ (something which is reflected in my interdisciplinary approach, which I present in chapter 3). In this way, I try to leave scope for readers from different backgrounds to be attracted by different things in the case studies, as "the goal is not to make the case study be all things to all people. The goal is to allow the study to be different things to different people."⁶⁹

Finally, a general limitation of the case study approach is that this is not suitable for formal generalisation. However, this is not a problem within the context of this study for three main reasons. First, as I stated earlier, the thesis does not aim to offer a comprehensive overview of the BMNGO sector as a whole. Rather, it aims to capitalise on "the force of example,"⁷⁰ contributing to advance our understanding of these actors by highlighting the peculiarities of the selected case studies. Second, whilst the case study approach does not enable hard-and-fast generalisations, it nevertheless has "general significance and stimulate[s] further investigations and theory-building"⁷¹ by offering the level of information and sophistication needed to challenge or nuance current constructions of a topic/phenomenon⁷²—particularly when a case study (or an aspect of it) does not fit well with pre-existing propositions. From this perspective, the general significance of the study partly derives from the fact that some of the findings of the thesis do challenge (or at least, nuance) current understandings of BMNGOs. Third, the general significance of the case study approach is increased by the strategic selection of cases,⁷³ which leads me to explain why I choose IR and MADE as case studies.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 238.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 228.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Lincoln Yvonna S. and Guba Egon C., 'Judging the Quality of Case Study Reports', in *The Qualitative Researcher's Companion*, ed. A. Michael Huberman and Matthew B. Miles (Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, Inc., 2002), 206.

⁷³ Bent Flyvbjerg, 'Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research', 229.

1.2.3. Why Islamic Relief and MADE?

As Flyvbjerg points out, when the objective of a study is to advance our understanding on a given topic or phenomenon by gaining the greatest possible amount of information about it (as in this thesis), it is essential to adopt an “information-oriented selection”⁸³ of the case studies under analysis—in other words, to engage in a “purposive sampling”⁸⁴ that is driven by the research questions. There are various strategies of purposive sampling that are not necessarily mutually exclusive and that can provide a unique wealth of information when they are combined,⁸⁵ as I do in this study.

The overall strategy adopted by the thesis is that of “maximum variation sampling,”⁸⁶ which consists in choosing case studies that are very different on one or more dimensions. This approach is particularly apt for exploratory studies (such as the present one), because it enables the investigation of “the spectrum of positions and perspectives” that characterise the topic under investigation.⁸⁷

From this perspective, I decided to choose IR and MADE because they display features that are readily identifiable as diametrically opposite with regards to their size, budget, staff-base, geographical outreach, operational focus, age, and history of formation—as I outlined through the brief descriptions I provided earlier, when I introduced the case studies.

The maximum variation strategy is also reflected by the fact that I combine “paradigmatic case sampling” with “extreme or deviant case sampling.”⁸⁸ On the one hand, paradigmatic cases are considered ‘exemplar’ for a certain category, and thus they are useful to highlight more general characteristics of the topic in question.⁸⁹ On the other hand, extreme or atypical cases are useful not only to highlight diversity, but also because they often offer the richest narratives by activating more/different (i.e. ‘atypical’) dimensions related to the topic under study.⁹⁰

⁸³ Bent Flyvbjerg, ‘Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research’, in *Qualitative Research Practice*, ed. Clive Seale et al. (London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2004), 230.

⁸⁴ Ted Palys, ‘Purposive Sampling’, ed. Lisa M. Given, *The SAGE Encyclopedia of Qualitative Research Methods* (SAGE Publications, 19 August 2008).

⁸⁵ Bent Flyvbjerg, ‘Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research’, 233.

⁸⁶ Palys, ‘Purposive Sampling’, 697.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Bent Flyvbjerg, ‘Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research’, 229.

It is important to note here that the selection of paradigmatic and atypical case studies among BMNGOs presents some challenges for the researcher that has little familiarity with it, given that it can be difficult for someone who approaches this field for the first time to determine beforehand which organisations can highlight general characteristics of the sector or provide particularly rich narratives. In my research, this challenge was overcome through two mechanisms that have enabled me to identify IR and MADE as a paradigmatic and an atypical case, respectively, based on a significant level of understanding of BMNGOs, generally, and of these two organisations, specifically.

The first mechanism consisted in the iterative nature of the research process itself. During the initial stages, I started out considering a large number of BMNGOs as potential cases and read extensively through their published materials. As my knowledge and understanding of the sector increased, I was able to identify general trends and common features among BMNGOs, which enabled me to gradually reduce the pool of potential case studies to fewer organisations. Two broad types of BMNGOs emerged. On the one hand, old, big, and well-established international NGOs; on the other hand, young, small, and more experimental organisations working mainly in the UK. Within the first type, I decided to choose IR as a case study because, as the oldest and biggest actor within the sector, it simultaneously reflects and shapes wider trends among other BMNGOs. Further, since this is the BMNGO that has received the bulk of attention of the limited literature on this topic (more on this in the next chapter), choosing IR enables the thesis to enter in dialogue with existing works (as I will outline in the course of the thesis whenever relevant). Within the second type, I chose MADE because I realised this organisation was presenting very unique features in the content and form of its discourse, despite sharing with more typical BMNGOs (such as IR) a focus on bigger-than-self issues broadly falling under the development agenda (such as poverty).⁹¹

⁹¹ The maximum variation strategy applied to BMNGOs that share a focus on what can be broadly understood as 'development issues' facilitates inevitable comparisons between the two organisations. However, it is important to highlight that the thesis does not aim to be (and should not be seen as) a comparative study, since a focus on comparison is at odds with the "thick description" approach adopted here, whereby the detailed descriptions of two different organisations (and not their comparison) are in and of themselves the focus of the study. Melinda C. Mills, 'Comparative Analysis', ed. Lisa Given, *The SAGE Encyclopedia of Qualitative Research Methods* (2455 Teller Road, Thousand Oaks, California 91320, United States: SAGE Publications, Inc., 2008), <http://methods.sagepub.com/reference/sage-encyc-qualitative-research-methods/n54.xml>.

In addition, my selection of IR and MADE as paradigmatic and atypical case studies was also informed by short work experiences I had with both of them, which I briefly outline in subsection 3.1.1, where I discuss my own positionality. These experiences enriched my understanding of their organisational cultures and of their positioning within the wider BMNGO sector, and confirmed my initial desk-based assessment and sampling.

1.3. Thesis Structure

Turning to structure of the thesis, Chapter 2 situates this study in relation to existing literature on MNGOs, outlining six main trends identifiable within it and highlighting two main limitations that the thesis seeks to overcome: i) the tendency of existing studies to neglect MNGOs' discursive dimension; and ii) the lack of in-depth case studies of BMNGOs.

Chapter 3 outlines the theoretical and methodological framework of the thesis. The first part of the chapter introduces the concept of 'frame', sketching the cognitive-structural and the collective-processual perspectives on this subject. Here, I also introduce Gamson's conceptualisation of the injustice and agency components of collective action frames, which I will often refer to in the course of the thesis—particularly in part two (see later), where I focus on the identification of the injustice- and agency-type frames adopted by the case studies in their mobilisation-oriented discourses. In the second part of the chapter I outline how Johnston brings together the cognitive-structural and the collective-processual perspectives and offers a valuable methodology for (micro) frame analysis, which I adopt for this study.

The next six chapters represent the "core" of the thesis,⁹² which offers an original contribution by exploring and analysing the frame systems emerging from the discourses of IR and MADE. I arranged this core material in three parts, each including a chapter on IR followed by a chapter on MADE. I decided to adopt this structure for two main reasons.

At the meso-level, I decided to present the two case studies side by side within each part of the thesis' core because I wanted to adopt a longitudinal approach

⁹² Dunleavy describes the core of a PhD thesis as "the most value-added bits, the sections where you make a distinctive contribution to scholarship or research." (Patrick Dunleavy, *Authoring a PhD: How to Plan, Draft, Write and Finish a Doctoral Thesis Or Dissertation* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 44.)

that explores the three key areas of discourse under study (i.e. framing of organisational identity, mobilisation efforts and supporter bases) across the two case studies. Whilst the reader may choose to go through all chapters dedicated to each organisation consecutively, the longitudinal structure of the thesis intends to facilitate sensitisation towards similarities and differences between the case studies, hence enabling a more nuanced view on the topic of BMNGOs to emerge.

At the macro-level, the tripartite structure of the thesis' core mirrors the three-stages model of analysis I propose to understand the discourse of the case studies, which I developed with the intent to mimic the defining moments of the hypothetical (and likely) 'engagement model' between NGOs and their audiences.⁹³ These 'critical discourse moments' serve as 'hotspots' where the organisations' meaning systems are most actively (re)shaped and presented to the publics, making them especially visible.⁹⁴

As a first step, NGOs often seek to grab the attention of the 'public cloud'⁹⁵ by presenting themselves in certain ways through their framing of 'the Self'. At this level, members of the public can be conceptualised mainly as 'onlookers'.⁹⁶ This moment of the case studies' discourse is reflected in part one, "Framing organisational identity."

Here, chapter 4 identifies the ISLAMIC HUMANITARIANISM frame as the dominant frame in IR's post-2010 discourse, and highlights how this projects IR as a faith-based organisation that is eager to proactively shape mainstream humanitarian/development discourse from a distinctive faith-based perspective. Chapter 5 reconstructs how MADE frames the Self through a MOVEMENT frame, and suggests that the self-conscious emphasis on grassroots membership and

⁹³ My conceptualisation of this model has been informed by the "Engagement Outcome Model" of the Enough Food For Everyone IF campaign, launched in 2013 by a coalition of 100 UK NGOs and faith groups to lobby the UK government to leverage action on ending global hunger. The engagement model outlined by the campaign is particularly valuable in light of the fact that the IF has been considered one of the "major campaigning 'moments'" of recent years (Yanacopulos, *International NGO Engagement, Advocacy, Activism*, 106.)

⁹⁴ Additionally, in the course of my PhD I have conducted extensive research (through the frame-based approach) on two other elements that may be considered as critical moments in the discourse of the case studies: their name and organisational logo. Despite space limitations preclude the inclusion of such research in the thesis, I intend to publish this as an independent piece of work in the format of academic journal article(s).

⁹⁵ Steve Tibbett and Chris Stalker, 'Enough Food for Everyone IF: Campaign Evaluation' (The Advocacy Hub, 2014), 29.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

activism implied by this frame points to a different way to think about BMNGOs and British Muslim civic engagement.

Part two (“Framing mobilisation efforts”) reflects the fact that, as a second step, NGOs often attempt to mobilise people who are already aware of them (i.e. individuals who are ‘keeping an eye on the organisations’) into taking some type of action within the framework of one (or some) of their activities/campaigns, as a form of *ad hoc* support. At this stage, members of the public can be conceptualised mainly as ‘endorsers’.⁹⁷ From this perspective, this part of the thesis offers a detailed analysis of one of the most critical moments of BMNGOs’ mobilisation-oriented discourse: Ramadan campaigns. Since the focus of this discursive moment is to mobilise the publics to some form of action, in this part of the thesis I adopt two of the most salient components of collective action frames—injustice and agency—to guide my analysis and structure the chapters.

Chapter 6 looks at IR’s War on Hunger campaign (2013) and identifies an injustice-type frame that I call the POLITICS OVER PEOPLE frame. This aims to mobilise bystanders through the moral condemnation of ‘politics as usual’ as an amorphous entity that overshadows the life and dignity of ordinary people, causing them harm through maliciousness and/or indifference. The frame is articulated through a ‘politics of war’, ‘politics of media’ and ‘politics of greed’ keyings. The analysis also identifies an agency-type frame that I call the HELP US CHANGE THIS WORLD frame. This conceptualises IR as the main (if not only) agentic actor and the publics as auxiliaries who are invited to delegate their agency to IR, rather than to take it on themselves to change the world.

Chapter 7 analyses MADE’s Ramadan Revolution campaign (2013; 2014). The chapter identifies an injustice-type frame that I call the PROFIT OVER PEOPLE & PLANET frame. This conveys indignation towards a socioeconomic, political and cultural (neoliberal) system that prioritises self-interest and material gain over the inherent value of people’s lives and the environment which, as a result, suffer harm and deterioration. The analysis highlights how this frame resonates with a range of contemporary movements and incorporates both a (secondary) ‘structural’ keying and (dominant) ‘lifestyle’ keying. The chapter then proceeds to reconstruct how MADE articulates an agency-type frame that I call the CHANGE

⁹⁷ Ibid.

YOURSELF TO CHANGE THE WORLD frame. This implies that individuals (rather than organisations) are simultaneously both agents and targets of change, prefiguring in their lives the change they wish to see in the world. The chapter suggests that this frame aligns MADE with a specific type of contemporary activism, loosely known as the Social Responsibility movement.

Part three (“Framing the supporter base”) mirrors the fact that, as a third step in their engagement model, NGOs often try to deepen and solidify their supporter base by focusing not just on occasional endorsers but on individuals that are emotionally invested and have a ‘sit forward’ engagement with them—those who are able to activate a range of ‘assets’ that include material resources, skills and personal networks. At this stage, members of the public can be conceptualised mainly as ‘supporters’.

Chapter 8 highlights how IR adopts a dominant GENEROUS DONOR frame (GD) that conceptualises its supporters mainly through a transactional mode of engagement, based on their willingness to support the organisation through monetary help. This frame is accompanied by a VOLUNTEER frame that is mainly articulated through a ‘fundraiser’ and a ‘non-financial helper’ keyings. The former resonates with the GD frame by conceptualising support mainly through a focus on the mobilisation of monetary resources. The latter conceptualises support as a means to donate to the organisation non-monetary resources (such as time, skills and free labour). The analysis also identifies a third keying recently emerging in IR’s discourse: the ‘active citizen’ keying, which conveys a more direct sense of agency, an increased focus on local and collective action, and a growing engagement with advocacy and campaigning activities.

Chapter 9 discusses how MADE frames its supporter base mainly through an ACTIVIST frame. The first part of the chapter focuses on the textual underpinnings of this frame within MADE’s discourse, highlighting how this conceptualises supporters as ‘change agents’ that consistently engage with bigger-than-self issues beyond MADE’s specific campaigns. The second part of the chapter builds on this, highlighting how the visual vocabulary developed by MADE contributes to nuance the ACTIVIST frame through two main keyings—the (secondary) ‘dissenting’ keying and the (dominant) ‘lifestyle’ keying—hence bringing together different traditions associated with this frame.

Finally, in the concluding chapter of the thesis I summarise some of the key findings and observations put forward by this study, highlighting how these are connected to both its primary aim (and research question) and to its secondary aim (and research sub-questions). Here, I suggest that IR and MADE can be understood as exemplars of what have been broadly characterised in the literature as the 'NGO-led order' and the current 'direct activism era', respectively. I conclude the thesis by outlining some of the limitations of this study and by suggesting areas for potential future research.

Chapter 2 . A review of the literature on Muslim NGOs

Introduction

In chapter 1 I pointed out that, despite BMNGOs have gained increasingly high visibility in recent years, little academic work has been dedicated so far to these actors. This chapter situates the study of BMNGOs in relation to existing literature on MNGOs, highlighting the relevance and significance of studying the former from a discourse-focused approach.

The chapter identifies six main trends in the available literature. The first three trends presented here (which focus on the ‘Muslim politics’ of MNGOs, their historical trajectories and their challenges in ‘troubled times’) tend to stem from social and political sciences and resonate, by and large, with debates around the negative perceptions often associated with MNGOs in recent times. The second three trends (which focus on the ‘cultural proximity’ thesis, the apparent ‘conjuncture of Islam with humanitarianism’ and on the ‘ideologies of aid’ elaborated by MNGOs) originate from a mix between cultural anthropological and development studies, reflecting, overall, more constructive conceptualisations of MNGOs.

Whenever relevant, the chapter discusses more at length those works that have looked at one of the two case studies of this thesis, IR. In particular, the last part of the chapter offers a constructive and quite detailed critique of what seems to be (to date) the only work that has deeply engaged with the discourse of IR (Petersen’s *For humanity or for the umma? Ideologies of aid in four transnational Muslim NGOs*), pointing out how this thesis differs from and complements it.

2.1. Muslim NGOs and ‘Muslim politics’

A significant portion of works on MNGOs derive from political sciences and focus on organisations based in the Muslim world, examining different aspects of their role and work within specific national contexts, often looking at the network structures they mobilise and on the socio-political and cultural implications of their activities. In other words, these works tend to emphasise how MNGOs in the Muslim world engage in what Eickelman and Piscatori defined as “Muslim politics,” insofar they “involve challenges to the limits of state authority” and engage in a “contest over people’s understandings of and wishes for social

order,” where claims and counterclaims are supported by ideas and symbols identified as “Islamic.”⁹⁸

Notably, the region that represents the main focus of literature on Muslim politics—the Middle East—is also at the centre of the literature on MNGOs in the Muslim world.⁹⁹

One of the earliest manifestations of this trend is represented by a special issue in 2000 of the *Middle East Report*—a publication that, notably, is specialised in Middle Eastern politics, culture and society rather than on NGOs and development. Entitled: “Critiquing NGOs: Assessing the Last Decade,” the issue introduced the topic of NGOs in the Arab world as being “both trendy and controversial,”¹⁰⁰ and looked at the “efflorescence” of NGOs in the Middle East over the 1990s from a critical perspective, exploring “the complex triangulated relationship” among NGOs, governments, international development agencies and donors, and the class bias implicit in the mission and work of many NGOs in the Muslim world.¹⁰¹

Around the same period (i.e. early 2000s) the work of political scientist Quintan Wiktorowicz also looked at MNGOs in the Muslim world specifically from the angle of ‘Muslim politics’. The author characterises “Islamic NGOs”¹⁰² as “widely used meso-level organisations”¹⁰³ that “Islamists utilise”¹⁰⁴ to mobilise support throughout the Muslim world to demonstrate “that “Islam is the solution” to everyday problems in Muslim societies.”¹⁰⁵ From this perspective, MNGOs are

⁹⁸ Dale F. Eickelman and James P. Piscatori, *Muslim Politics*, Second edition (Princeton University Press, 2004), 4.

⁹⁹ An example of this trend is Alterman and von Hippel’s (2007) anthology *Understanding Islamic Charities*. As noted by Petersen (2011), whilst the title of the book “leads one to expect a more broad-based investigation into this group of organisations (...) the majority of contributions to the book focus explicitly on the links between Muslim NGOs and national or transnational Islamic groups and movements.” (Marie Petersen, ‘For Humanity or for the Umma? Ideologies of Aid in Four Transnational Muslim NGOs’ (PhD Thesis, 2011), 22, <http://ccrs.ku.dk/phd/phdthesisdefences/mariejuulpetersen/>.)

¹⁰⁰ Sheila Carapico, ‘NGOs, INGOs, GO-NGOs and DO-NGOs: Making Sense of Non-Governmental Organizations’, *Middle East Report*, no. 214 (2000): 12, doi:10.2307/1520187.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 12.

¹⁰² Quintan Wiktorowicz and Suha Taji Farouki, ‘Islamic NGOs and Muslim Politics: A Case from Jordan’, *Third World Quarterly - Journal of Emerging Areas* 21, no. 4 (2000): 685–99; Quintan Wiktorowicz, *The Management of Islamic Activism: Salafis, the Muslim Brotherhood, and State Power in Jordan* (SUNY Press, 2001), 83–92; Quintan Wiktorowicz, ‘Introduction. Islamic Activism and Social Movement Theory’, in *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach*, ed. Quintan Wiktorowicz (Indiana University Press, 2004), 11.

¹⁰³ Wiktorowicz, ‘Introduction. Islamic Activism and Social Movement Theory’, 11.

¹⁰⁴ Wiktorowicz and Farouki, ‘Islamic NGOs and Muslim Politics’, 685.

¹⁰⁵ Wiktorowicz, ‘Introduction. Islamic Activism and Social Movement Theory’, 11.

“part of Muslim politics”¹⁰⁶ insofar they allegedly engage in the “cultural conflict” epitomised by Huntington’s controversial ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis.¹⁰⁷ To substantiate this argument, the author suggests that by providing goods and services, Islamists in the Muslim world hope to utilise MNGOs to “counter Western values and practices that are seen as inimical to Islam” and simultaneously foster a more religious society by “expand[ing] networks of shared meaning so that individuals will organise their lives in accordance with Islamic precepts.”¹⁰⁸

Returning to the ‘class bias’ identified by the special issue of the *Middle East Report*, this has been corroborated by field research carried out by two important scholars of civil society in the Muslim world.

In her pioneering work on social welfare providers in Egypt, Jordan and Yemen, political scientist Janine Clark highlights how the idea of faith-based MNGOs in the Muslim world often evokes and, as she argues, represents a reality “run by and for the middle class” through a process that “not only neglects the poor, it often comes at the expense of the poor.”¹⁰⁹ This peculiarity is well captured by Clark’s rationale for choosing the term “Islamic social institution” as opposed to MNGOs, on the basis of two main reasons. Firstly and most importantly, whilst the latter term explicitly evokes the idea of voluntary activity and/or charity for the poor, Clark’s own work shows that many MNGOs in the Muslim world have in fact established themselves as institutions that often are not for the poor, but rather for the paying middle class. Secondly, Clark sees the term “nongovernmental” as problematic within a geopolitical context where, as she puts it: “it is debatable whether or not (...) any nongovernmental associations, in the Middle East are in fact “nongovernmental”.”¹¹⁰

More recently, sociologist Asef Bayat¹¹¹ has reached similar conclusions with regards to both faith-based and secular NGOs in the Middle East. Notably, the author interprets the expansion in the region of what he calls “Islamic welfare associations” in the 1980s and 1990s as being simultaneously a reflection of both

¹⁰⁶ Wiktorowicz and Farouki, ‘Islamic NGOs and Muslim Politics’, 687.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 685–86.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., 685; 688. Also see: Wiktorowicz, *The Management of Islamic Activism*, 84.

¹⁰⁹ Janine A. Clark, *Islam, Charity, and Activism: Middle-Class Networks and Social Welfare in Egypt, Jordan, and Yemen* (Indiana University Press, 2004), 4.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., 163.

¹¹¹ Bayat was the former director of the International Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World, ISIM, at Leiden University, The Netherlands.

a “trend toward Islamization” and the growth of NGOs in the Middle East in general.¹¹² Bayat also acknowledges that both faith-based and secular NGOs have played a key role on partially filling the vacuum left by states in the region in offering social services to the needy.¹¹³ However, the author also stresses: i) that faith-based NGOs have not primarily been “of [and for] the disfranchised, but of [and for] the marginalized middle classes”;¹¹⁴ and ii) that secular NGOs have often been instrumental to “reinforce communal cleavages” and to establish a “new form of clientelism,”¹¹⁵ through a propensity to “paternalistic attitudes and structure” that serves “more their employees than the potential beneficiaries.”¹¹⁶

Whilst the aforementioned works highlight how the Middle East remains the primary focus of the literature on MNGOs in the Muslim world, two additional geographical areas have attracted considerable attention in recent years: the African continent and Bangladesh.

On the one hand, works on MNGOs in Africa tend to focus on the alleged role played by transnational Arab NGOs in the “Muslim politics of Africa,”¹¹⁷ through a mixture of material aid and ‘missionary’ activity that at once embodies and contributes to broader processes from time to time identified as: “the negotiation of Westernisation,” “the Islamisation of society” and the “revitalisation” of an ‘Islamic way of life’;¹¹⁸ “the need for replacing the failure of Western development model(s) with an Islamic civilising project”;¹¹⁹ and the “Islamization and Arabization” of African societies than have long been at the crossroads of Western/Christian and Arab/Muslim spheres of influence.¹²⁰

¹¹² Life as politics, 83 Asef Bayat, *Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East* (Stanford University Press, 2010), 83.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, 79-80; 85.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 83.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 37; 45.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 87, 88.

¹¹⁷ René Otayek and Benjamin F Soares, ‘Introduction: Islam and Muslim Politics in Africa’, in *Islam and Muslim Politics in Africa*, ed. René Otayek and Benjamin F Soares (Basingstoke, Hampshire [u.a.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).

¹¹⁸ Holger Weiss, ‘Reorganising Social Welfare among Muslims: Islamic Voluntarism and Other Forms of Communal Support in Northern Ghana’, *Journal of Religion in Africa* 32, no. 1 (2002): 86.

¹¹⁹ Mohamed Abdel Rahim M Salih, ed., ‘Islamic NGOs in Africa: The Promise and Peril of Islamic Voluntarism’ (Copenhagen: Centre of African Studies, Univ. of Copenhagen, 2002), 7.

¹²⁰ Mayke Kaag, ‘Aid, Umma, and Politics: Transnational Islamic NGOs in Chad’, in *Islam and Muslim Politics in Africa*, ed. B. Soares and R. Otayek (Springer, 2007), 86; 100; Mayke Kaag, ‘Transnational Islamic NGOs in Chad: Islamic Solidarity in the Age of Neoliberalism’, *Africa Today* 54, no. 3 (2008): 3–18; Mayke Kaag, ‘Connecting to the Umma through Islamic Relief: Transnational Islamic NGOs in Chad’, *International Development Planning Review* 33, no. 4 (1 January 2011): 463–74, doi:10.3828/idpr.2011.24.

On the other hand, works on Islam and NGOs in Bangladesh tend to focus on the tensions between religious and secular perspectives on development work, and on how these tensions shape social dynamics and hierarchical structures in the national context.¹²¹ One of the most recent and elaborate examples of this trend is Mohammad Salehin's work on "Islamic NGOs in Bangladesh," which investigates "the relationship between religion, the state, neoliberal development, Muslim women and secular and religious NGOs in Bangladesh" with a focus on the role of these actors in "changing governance and ideological structure in the rural villages."¹²²

To sum up this section, while the 'political science' approach to the study of Muslim NGOs world provides valuable and much needed analysis on the role played by these actors within Muslim majority countries, it also presents major limitations insofar it: i) adopts the 'Muslim politics' paradigm as its dominant (if not only) framework; ii) conceptualises Muslim NGOs mainly "as fronts for political organisations"¹²³ engaged in the political struggle for the (re-) Islamisation of Muslim societies, hence inherently problematising their existence and work; iii) focuses almost exclusively on Muslim NGOs in the Muslim world.

2.2. Muslim NGOs' historical trajectory

A number of studies approach the topic of MNGOs from a more socio-historical perspective. Taking in consideration the global social, political and economic landscapes whereby transnational MNGOs (TMNGOs) have originated and developed, this type of literature seeks to provide a dynamic perspective on "the trajectory of contemporary transnational Muslim NGOs"¹²⁴ as a 'phenomenon'

¹²¹ M. Rashiduzzaman, 'The Dichotomy of Islam and Development: NGOs, Women's Development and Fatawa in Bangladesh', *Contemporary South Asia* 6, no. 3 (1 November 1997): 239–46, doi:10.1080/09584939708719818; Mohammad Rafi and A. M. R. Chowdhury, 'Human Rights and Religious Backlash: The Experience of a Bangladeshi NGO (Droits de L'homme et Réactions Religieuses: L'expérience D'une ONG Bangladaise / Direitos Humanos E Reação Religiosa: A Experiência de Uma ONG Bengalesa / Los Derechos Humanos Y La Reacción Religiosa: La Experiencia de Una ONG de Bangladesh)', *Development in Practice* 10, no. 1 (2000): 19–30.

¹²² Mohammad Musfequs Salehin, *Islamic NGOs in Bangladesh: Development, Piety and Neoliberal Governmentality* (Routledge, 2016), 1; 4.

¹²³ Petersen, 'For Humanity or for the Umma?', 20.

¹²⁴ Marie Petersen, 'Trajectories of Transnational Muslim NGOs', *Development in Practice* 22, no. 5–6 (5 July 2012): 774, doi:10.1080/09614524.2012.685876.

characterised by a number of defining moments.¹²⁵ Taken together, these studies identify four main phases in the evolution of TMNGOs.

The first generation of TMNGOs emerged in the 1970s against the background of two main trends. On the one hand, the rise of transnational NGOs, in general, provided a favourable milieu for the establishment of this type of organisations around the globe. On the other hand, the so-called 'Islamic resurgence'—i.e. the global trend toward Islam's reassertion in both private and public life¹²⁶—provided the ideational underpinning for the increase in Islamically-oriented organisations and social welfare services, including MNGOs.¹²⁷

By the late 1970s/early 1980s three main events in the Muslim world prompted a surge of solidarity among Muslims around the globe, encouraging both: i) a shift towards the humanitarian field among Muslim organisations previously focused on *da'wa* (call to Islam); and ii) the establishment of new MNGOs.¹²⁸

Firstly, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 played an important role insofar many saw this "as an atheist attempt to intimidate a pious Muslim population."¹²⁹

This perception prompted expressions of "Islamic solidarity" among Muslims all over the world, based on the notion of the "struggle to defend the Muslim community, the *ummah*, in any lands where Muslims were being persecuted."¹³⁰

Secondly, the famines in the Horn of Africa of the early-1980s led to the emergence of a number of MNGOs, including Islamic Relief.¹³¹ Many of these

¹²⁵ Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan's seminal study, *The Charitable Crescent. Politics of Aid in the Muslim World* (2003) is a key example of this trend, despite also featuring a focus on the political dimension of MNGOs, as aptly epitomised by the second part of the book's title. (Jonathan Benthall and Jerome Bellion-Jourdan, *The Charitable Crescent: Politics of Aid in the Muslim World* (I. B. Tauris, 2003).)

¹²⁶ John L. Esposito, *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?* (Oxford University Press, 1999), 9–10.

¹²⁷ Jonathan Benthall, 'The Overreaction against Islamic Charities', *ISIM Review*, no. 20 (Autumn 2007): 6; Jonathan Benthall, 'Humanitarianism and Islam after 11 September', in *Humanitarian Action and The 'global War on Terror': A Review of Trends and Issues*, ed. Joanna Macrae and Adele Harmer (London: Humanitarian Policy Group, Overseas Development Institute, 2003), 37; Marie Petersen, 'Islamizing Aid: Transnational Muslim NGOs After 9.11', *Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations* 23, no. 1 (2012): 133; Petersen, 'Trajectories of Transnational Muslim NGOs', 766.

¹²⁸ J. Bellion-Jourdan, 'Islamic Relief Organizations: Between "Islamism" and "Humanitarianism"', *Article / Letter to editor*, 5, (2000), 15, <https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/handle/1887/17384>.

¹²⁹ Petersen, 'Trajectories of Transnational Muslim NGOs', 768.

¹³⁰ Jérôme Bellion-Jourdan, 'Are Muslim Charities Purely Humanitarian?: A Real but Misleading Question', in *Nongovernmental Politics*, ed. Michel Feher (New York: Cambridge, Mass: Zone Books; Distributed by MIT Press, 2007), 648–49.

¹³¹ As I mentioned in chapter 1, IR was founded in the UK in 1984 by Dr Hany El-Banna, when the then medical student was moved to action after witnessing in person the plight of famine refugees in Khartoum (Sudan), during a trip for a conference. ('Muslim Charities: A Question of Identity', *Third Sector*, 24 October 2014, sec. Interview: The father of Islamic Relief, <http://www.thirdsector.co.uk/article/1317839>.)

MNGOs were (at least partially) motivated by the fact that whilst most of the victims of the famine were Muslims, these were receiving aid almost exclusively from Christian and secular Western NGOs.¹³² Concerned that these actors might have been “combining relief with cultural indoctrination,”¹³³ and eager “to show the world that Muslim NGOs were capable of providing effective aid, and to challenge Western hegemony in the field,”¹³⁴ a number of MNGOs were established not only to provide aid but also “to protect the Muslim faith and identity” of their beneficiaries.¹³⁵

Thirdly, against the background of these crises and motivational drives, the surge of TMNGOs was also financially facilitated by the explosion of oil prices in 1979, which meant that Middle Eastern (particularly, Gulf-based) MNGOs could now count on an unprecedented flow of funds.¹³⁶

In the beginning of the 1990s, the 1992-95 Bosnian war catalysed another key moment in the trajectory of TMNGOs: many new MNGOs were founded in the West,¹³⁷ often adopting a strategy that emphasised neutrality and an increasing eagerness to work within the mainstream humanitarian norm, whilst still maintaining a particularist focus on fellow Muslim recipients affected by the war.¹³⁸ Notably, both Afghanistan and Bosnia saw a number of TMNGOs (especially those founded in the Gulf ‘petrodollar states’) mixing purely humanitarian aims with a more or less direct support for armed struggle, thus contributing to the emergence of a politicised and negative perception of MNGOs, overall.¹³⁹

In light of this context, and of the consequent environment of increasing regulation and control, certain MNGOs (particularly those based in the West) started to proactively distance themselves from any form of partisan or political support and put effort to consolidate their profile as purely humanitarian organisations through

¹³² Petersen, ‘Trajectories of Transnational Muslim NGOs’, 767.

¹³³ Bellion-Jourdan, ‘Are Muslim Charities Purely Humanitarian?: A Real but Misleading Question’, 648.

¹³⁴ Petersen, ‘Trajectories of Transnational Muslim NGOs’, 767.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ Abdel-Rahman Ghandour, ‘The Modern Missionaries of Islam.’, in *In the Shadow of ‘just Wars’*, ed. Fabrice Weissman (London: Hurst and Company, 2004), 239, quoted in Petersen, ‘Islamizing Aid’, 133.

¹³⁷ Including the BMNGO Muslim Hands, in 1993.

¹³⁸ Petersen, ‘Trajectories of Transnational Muslim NGOs’, 770–71.

¹³⁹ Benthall, ‘The Overreaction against Islamic Charities’, 6; Bellion-Jourdan, ‘Are Muslim Charities Purely Humanitarian?: A Real but Misleading Question’, 648–50; Petersen, ‘Trajectories of Transnational Muslim NGOs’, 770.

measures such as partnerships with leading non-Muslim NGOs and the formal adoption of international humanitarian codes.¹⁴⁰ Islamic Relief is a clear case in point to illustrate this trend. As it proudly displays in the list of its historical milestones, the organisation: i) joined leading British NGOs Oxfam and Save the Children in 1993 for the Bosnia fundraising appeal launched by the London daily *The Independent*; ii) it was the first Muslim NGO to receive UK government funding in 1994; and iii) signed the Red Cross Code of Conduct in 1999.¹⁴¹

Finally, the trajectory of TMNGOs was influenced by two main developments occurred in the 2000s.

On the one hand, the 2000s have seen a surge in the general interest in faith-based NGOs (commonly known as faith-based organisations, FBOs) among institutional donors, practitioners, and academics. Among the factors that contributed to this ‘religious turn’ in the development space were: i) a growing criticism of the role of NGOs within the landscape of the structural adjustment programmes of the 1980s and 1990s; ii) the post-secular challenge to narratives of modernisation and secularisation; iii) an increasing awareness of the importance of religion and FBOs in the lives of aid beneficiaries; and iv) a surge in the actual number and visibility of FBOs.¹⁴² This particular trajectory has been epitomised by key initiatives such the *World Faith Development Dialogue*, spearheaded in 1998 by then World Bank president James D. Wolfensohn and then Archbishop of Canterbury George Carey;¹⁴³ the policy paper “Faith in Development,” produced by the UK’s Department for International Development (DfID) in 2005;¹⁴⁴ the DfID-sponsored research programme *Religions and Development*, hosted by Birmingham University between 2005

¹⁴⁰ For example, the Code of Conduct for International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief, which was drawn up in 1992. (Bellion-Jourdan, ‘Are Muslim Charities Purely Humanitarian?: A Real but Misleading Question’, 650–53; Petersen, ‘Trajectories of Transnational Muslim NGOs’, 770.)

¹⁴¹ ‘Our History’, *Islamic Relief UK*, accessed 22 June 2017, <http://www.islamic-relief.org.uk/about-us/history/>.

¹⁴² Petersen, ‘For Humanity or for the Umma?’, 23–24.

¹⁴³ ‘World Faiths Development Dialogue’, accessed 22 June 2017, <https://berkeleycenter.georgetown.edu/wfdd/about>.

¹⁴⁴ ‘Faith in Development’, accessed 22 June 2017, <https://berkeleycenter.georgetown.edu/publications/faith-in-development>.

and 2010;¹⁴⁵ and the 2012 DfID “Faith Partnership Principles” policy paper.¹⁴⁶

Parallel to these practitioner and donor-oriented initiatives, a body of academic literature has emerged focusing not only on religion and development in general, but often also with a specific focus on FBOs.¹⁴⁷ Notably, most of these initiatives adopt an utilitarianist approach that focuses on the religious identity of FBOs as “an instrument and an added value in the effective implementation of development aid.”¹⁴⁸

On the other hand, the focus on FBOs in general has coincided with the post-9.11 era of the ‘war on terror’, which brought MNGOs under the spotlight from two main perspectives: on the one hand, ‘hard’ measures were taken to crack down on organisations allegedly involved in financing terrorist activities; on the other hand, these have been coupled with ‘soft’ measures seeking to strengthen relations with potential bridge-builders.¹⁴⁹

Combining an awareness of both the general increased interest in FBOs and of discourses and policies related to the ‘war on terror’, many MNGOs (particularly those based in the West, such as Islamic Relief) apparently came to perceive quasi-invisible religiosity as a sign of ‘moderation’ and as a means of achieving

¹⁴⁵ ‘About Us - University of Birmingham’, accessed 22 June 2017, <http://www.birmingham.ac.uk/schools/government-society/departments/international-development/rad/about/index.aspx>.

¹⁴⁶ ‘Faith Partnership Principles: Working Effectively with Faith Groups to Fight Global Poverty - GOV.UK’, accessed 22 June 2017, <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/faith-partnership-principles-working-effectively-with-faith-groups-to-fight-global-poverty>.

¹⁴⁷ For a review of the major strengths and weaknesses of this body of literature, see: Petersen, ‘For Humanity or for the Umma?’, 25–27.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 224.

¹⁴⁹ J. Howell and J. Lind, *Counter-Terrorism, Aid and Civil Society: Before and After the War on Terror* (Springer, 2009), 47, quoted in Petersen, ‘For Humanity or for the Umma?’, 224. As Petersen points out, one key example of this type of ‘soft’ measures was the Islamic Charities Project, formerly known (between 2005-09) as the Montreaux Initiative. Initiated by the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs in 2005 with the intent “to reflect how unjustified obstacles in the way of bona fide Islamic charitable institutions can be collectively removed,” the project has been hosted primarily by the Graduate Institute for International and Development Studies in Geneva, which has conducted research and organised high-stakeholder meetings aimed mainly at generating research-based policy recommendations on “how to make the work of Islamic charities more effective and more open to international scrutiny and accountability” and “facilitate dialogue among the various constituencies.” (‘Islamic Charities Project’, accessed 22 June 2017, http://graduateinstitute.ch/home/research/centresandprogrammes/ccdp/ccdp-research/clusters-and-projects-1/religion_politics/islamic-charities-project.html.) Benthall, one of the key academic figures behind the project, recounts that the project experienced highs and lows, it moved in 2012 to the Centre for Security Studies in Zurich, and was winding down by mid-2013. For a comprehensive overview on the project by Benthall himself, see: ‘The Islamic Charities Project (Formerly Montreaux Initiative)’, in *Gulf Charities and Islamic Philanthropy in the ‘Age of Terror’ and Beyond* (Gerlach Press, 2014), 285–306, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1df4hzq.15>.

'good aid', while visible religiosity as a sign of 'fundamentalism' and 'bad aid'.¹⁵⁰ Partly as a reflection and partly as a response to these trends, a number of MNGOs began to (more or less explicitly or deliberately) position themselves as 'moderate': whilst adopting a largely secularised discourse and practice that makes them in many ways almost indistinguishable from mainstream actors, this type of MNGOs approaches Islam primarily as a source of underlying values and motivations, or as a marker of 'cultural proximity' that can improve their service delivery in Muslim contexts. Consequently, by walking the tightrope between 'sameness' and 'distinctiveness', these actors simultaneously claim their full integration and legitimacy within the humanitarian/development norm, whilst also supposedly providing an 'added value' compared to their secular counterparts.¹⁵¹

To sum up this section, this strand of literature presents an informative and nuanced *longue durée* of MNGOs based on thorough sociological and historical analyses that contextualise these actors within their socio-historical contexts, offering an insightful bird's-eye view on their evolution. Nevertheless, it also presents limitations insofar it focuses primarily on: i) the international landscape, hence neglecting Western Muslim NGOs; ii) momentous events, rather than year-by-year incremental changes; iii) Muslim NGOs that have an evident weight on the international scene, hence neglecting the originality often brought within the sector by smaller actors, which reflect richer nuances and are frequently key to pioneer new dimensions that may be later become mainstream.

2.3. Muslim NGOs in "troubled times"¹⁵²

Informed by the role played by the 'war on terror' in influencing both the discourse and practices of MNGOs, on the one hand, and public perception (particularly in the West) about these actors, on the other, a strand of literature focuses on what can be identified as the theme of MNGOs in "troubled times."¹⁵³

Scholars of this strand are consciously aware that "inevitably the so-called "war on terror" hangs over our topic"¹⁵⁴ from two main perspectives: not only in terms

¹⁵⁰ Petersen, 'Trajectories of Transnational Muslim NGOs', 77.

¹⁵¹ Petersen, trajectories, 775-776. Ibid., 775-76.

¹⁵² I borrow the expression "trouble times" from Jonathan Benthall, *Islamic Charities and Islamic Humanism in Troubled Times* (Oxford University Press, 2016).

¹⁵³ Ibid.

¹⁵⁴ Robert Lacey and Jonathan Benthall, 'Introduction', in *Gulf Charities and Islamic Philanthropy in the 'Age of Terror' and Beyond*, ed. Robert Lacey and Jonathan Benthall (Gerlach Press, 2014), 6.

of the increased public scrutiny of an environment where “everybody is watching the Muslim NGOs”;¹⁵⁵ but also in terms of the emergence of a “dubious scholarship” that bypasses standard peer review and scholarly conventions under the guise of “so-called ‘counter-terrorist studies’.”¹⁵⁶

Concerning public perception about MNGOs, these scholars highlight that well before 9.11 and the ‘war on terror’ these actors “were already targets of a witch hunt” under the pretext that some of them were not ‘purely humanitarian’¹⁵⁷—such in the case of some of the TMNGOs involved in Afghanistan and Bosnia in the 1980s and 1990s. Crucially, this perspective sees the question of whether a MNGO “is truly a “humanitarian” organization or not” as a “real but misleading question”: it is real insofar it looks at the historical and political context of the emergence of TMNGOs; it is “misleading or partisan” when used to pre-emptively de-legitimise MNGOs on the basis of a “political bias aimed at stigmatizing specific organizations.”¹⁵⁸

Therefore, whilst acknowledging that certain TMNGOs (particularly, Gulf-based) were indeed “abused in the past for violent ends” (for example, in the context of the Afghan and Bosnian wars),¹⁵⁹ this perspective highlights how both the 1990s and the 2000s have represented “a period of increasing hostility for Muslim charities and NGOs,”¹⁶⁰ with the “overreaction”¹⁶¹ against them becoming more manifest in the last decade. Fuelled by allegations, lack of trust and “pre-existing misapprehension,”¹⁶² the “climate of suspicion”¹⁶³ against MNGOs has contributed to shape public perceptions in a way that the “the conjunction of the words “Islamic” and “charities” has acquired a negative connotation in much of

¹⁵⁵ Petersen, ‘Islamizing Aid’, 137.

¹⁵⁶ Benthall, ‘The Overreaction against Islamic Charities’, 6; Benthall, *Islamic Charities and Islamic Humanism in Troubled Times*, 9.

¹⁵⁷ Bellion-Jourdan, ‘Are Muslim Charities Purely Humanitarian?: A Real but Misleading Question’, 648.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 647-648.

¹⁵⁹ Lacey and Benthall, ‘Introduction’, 6.

¹⁶⁰ David Tittensor and Matthew Clarke, ‘Introduction. The Invisible Aid Sector.’, in *Islam and Development: Exploring the Invisible Aid Economy*, ed. David Tittensor and Matthew Clarke (Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2014), 4.

¹⁶¹ Benthall, ‘The Overreaction against Islamic Charities’.

¹⁶² Tittensor and Clarke, ‘Introduction. The Invisible Aid Sector.’, 3.

¹⁶³ Bruno De Cordier, ‘Faith-Based Aid, Globalisation and the Humanitarian Frontline: An Analysis of Western-Based Muslim Aid Organisations’, *Disasters* 33, no. 4 (1 October 2009): 608, doi:10.1111/j.1467-7717.2008.01090.x.

the non-Muslim world, even among the generally well informed.”¹⁶⁴ In other words, as Kroessin put it, in public discourse MNGOs are often considered “guilty by default.”¹⁶⁵

Perhaps one of the most vocal representative of this trend is Jonathan Benthall, a pioneer in the study of the nexus between Islam, humanitarianism, and MNGOs. A cultural anthropologist who has been researching the field since the late 1990s, Benthall emphasises that the “bad image”¹⁶⁶ of MNGOs in much of the non-Muslim world has been propelled by the emergence of a “dubious scholarship” that “disrespect[s]” the normal requirements of serious social research.¹⁶⁷ Cautioning to “be sceptical about the swirl of propaganda,”¹⁶⁸ Benthall consistently draws attention to the highly politicised nature of a body of “purported scholarship” that often seems to be “driven by political bias” in its approach to MNGOs.¹⁶⁹

Resonating with this critical perspective, within the UK a more collaborative and practitioner-oriented body of work has slowly started to emerge in order to bring attention to the “perfect storm of negative press and disproportionate regulation” faced by BMNGOs in the last couple of years.¹⁷⁰

One key example of this trend is the report “Muslim Charities: A Suspect Sector,” published in 2014 by Claystone, a think tank founded in 2013 precisely with the aim of addressing through research-based evidence some of the most pressing challenges faced by a British Muslim community that has increasingly “come under considerable scrutiny across the social and political spheres.”¹⁷¹ The report was prompted by concerns raised by Sir Stephen Bubb (then head of the charity chief executives body Acevo, Association of chief executives of voluntary organisations) about the perception that the Charity Commission (the UK Government regulatory body for charities in England and Wales) was

¹⁶⁴ Jonathan Benthall, ‘Islamic Charities, Faith-Based Organizations and the International Aid System’, in *Understanding Islamic Charities*, ed. Jon B. Alterman and Karin Von Hippel (CSIS, 2007), 1.

¹⁶⁵ Kroessin, Mohammed, ‘Islamic Charities and the “War on Terror”’: Dispelling the Myths’, *Humanitarian Exchange Magazine*, no. 28 (2007): 29.

¹⁶⁶ Benthall, ‘The Overreaction against Islamic Charities’, 6.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

¹⁶⁸ Benthall, *Islamic Charities and Islamic Humanism in Troubled Times*, 9.

¹⁶⁹ Lacey and Benthall, ‘Introduction’, 6.

¹⁷⁰ Augustus Della-Porta, ‘Muslim Charities Face a Perfect Storm’, in *Faith-Based Organisations Update* (Bates Wells & Braithwaite, 2015), 6, <http://www.bwbllp.com/file/muslim-charities-face-a-perfect-storm-pdf>.

¹⁷¹ ‘About Us’, *Claystone*, 18 June 2013, <http://www.claystone.org.uk/why-claystone/>.

disproportionately targeting Muslim charities.¹⁷² The report confirmed such concerns, concluding that Muslim charities in the UK “have been disproportionately affected by investigations” in a time where “the sector is coming under pressure amid unsubstantiated claims of the sector becoming a ‘hotbed’ of extremism and terrorist-funding activity.”¹⁷³

A less clear-cut conclusion was reached by a second important contribution in this strand of policy-oriented literature: the 2015 working paper “UK humanitarian aid in the age of counter-terrorism: perceptions and reality.” Commissioned by the Muslim Charities Forum (the umbrella organisation for TMNGOs based in the UK) and researched by the Humanitarian Policy Group at the Overseas Development Institute (the UK's leading independent think tank on international development and humanitarian issues), the paper looked at the impact of UK counter-terrorism measures on international NGOs (with a special emphasis on TMNGOs) from the perspective of international NGOs themselves, the banking sector, the government, and the Charity Commission. Whilst acknowledging the real challenges faced by the sector, the paper also brought to the forefront the theme of ‘perceptions’, concluding that “both the risk of abuse of INGOs [international NGOs] and the impact of counter-terrorism measures on INGOs are perceived by the stakeholders involved to be greater than the facts seem to suggest.”¹⁷⁴

Finally, it is worth noting an example of this strand of literature that looks at IR as a case study. Contextualised within an edited volume written mainly by political scientists to explore “when, why, how, and to whom NGOs make themselves credible when virtue alone is not enough,”¹⁷⁵ Thaut and colleagues’ “Defense of

¹⁷² Andy Ricketts, ‘Sir Stephen Bubb Says Perception of Bias by Regulator Damages Muslim Charities’, 3 July 2014, <http://www.thirdsector.co.uk/sir-stephen-bubb-says-perception-bias-regulator-damages-muslim-charities/governance/article/1301957>. Notably, in 2015 Bubb reiterated his concerns in a more substantive manner, saying that: “There are all sorts of abuses that might affect charities, and the number of statutory inquiries into Muslim charities has been disproportionate.” Quoted in Rebecca Cooney, ‘Sir Stephen Bubb Says Charity Commission Has “Disproportionate Focus” on Islamic Extremism’, 20 November 2015, <http://www.thirdsector.co.uk/article/1373704>.

¹⁷³ Adam Belaon, ‘Muslim Charities: A Suspect Sector’ (Claystone, 2014), 6; 23.

¹⁷⁴ Victoria Mecafe-Hough, Tom Keating, and Sara Pantuliano, ‘UK Humanitarian Aid in the Age of Counterterrorism: Perceptions and Reality’ (Overseas Development Institute (ODI)), 24, accessed 31 May 2017, <https://www.odi.org/publications/9301-uk-humanitarian-aid-age-counterterrorism-perceptions-and-reality>.

¹⁷⁵ Peter A. Gourevitch and David A. Lake, ‘Beyond Virtue: Evaluating and Enhancing the Credibility of Non-Governmental Organizations’, in *The Credibility of Transnational NGOs: When Virtue Is Not Enough*, ed. Peter A. Gourevitch, David A. Lake, and Janice Gross Stein (Cambridge University Press, 2012), 4.

Virtue: Credibility, Legitimacy Dilemmas, and the Case of Islamic Relief” chooses IR as a case study to explore an international NGOs’ “legitimacy dilemmas”—i.e. how a NGO attempts “to address a loss of legitimacy and recover its virtue with one audience that undermines its legitimacy and virtue with another.”¹⁷⁶ The chapter contextualises IR’s existence against the background of an increasingly securitised environment where almost anything ‘Islamic’ is more or less deliberately and/or consciously associated with the ‘war on terror.’ From this perspective, the authors offer an elaborate analysis of how IR has found itself in the midst of its own “legitimacy dilemma,”¹⁷⁷ whereby the need to address a loss of legitimacy with mainstream Western authorities and funding bodies (which have grown increasingly suspicious of MNGOs) may have unwillingly undermined its legitimacy and virtue with its Muslim audience of donors and beneficiaries.¹⁷⁸

The analysis highlights how, throughout the years, IR has had to work hard to develop an operational strategy aimed at pre-emptively producing “exonerating evidence” capable to work “in defense of [its] virtue” against potential allegations.¹⁷⁹ In doing this, IR’s efforts have mainly focused on increasing its “procedural legitimacy” in the eyes of its mainstream audience,¹⁸⁰ at the expenses of its “substantive legitimacy” in the eyes of some of its Muslim audiences, particularly that of its beneficiaries and donors in the Muslim world.¹⁸¹ In other words, according to the authors, IR has focused its efforts in demonstrating that it operates “in ways that are consistent with modern standards of practice”, rather than in highlighting how its work “is consistent with the values and aspirations of the [Muslim] community.”¹⁸²

By and large, the authors argue, the strategy worked: evidence of this lies in the fact that today IR enjoys credibility in the eyes of most Western governments, and it has also increased its ease of access to non-Muslim countries.¹⁸³ However, the “Western “seal of approval”” came with a price.¹⁸⁴

¹⁷⁶ Laura Thaut, Michael Barnett, and Janice Gross Stein, ‘In Defense of Virtue: Credibility, Legitimacy Dilemmas, and the Case of Islamic Relief’, in *The Credibility of Transnational NGOs: When Virtue Is Not Enough*, ed. Peter A. Gourevitch, David A. Lake, and Janice Gross Stein (Cambridge University Press, 2012), 140.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 163.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁸² *Ibid.*

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

In order to increase its legitimacy and credibility with its Western mainstream audience, and by virtue of strongly associating itself with mainstream norms, values, and professional bodies, IR “deemphasized its Islamic identity”: in other words, IR “reduced the “Islamic” and elevated the “aid” in “Islamic aid agency”.”¹⁸⁵ As a result of these tensions, the authors conclude IR has been facing an existential dilemma “that go[es] far beyond monitoring and speak[s] directly to who it is.”¹⁸⁶

Within this context, I would argue, IR framing of ‘the Self’ (which I discuss in chapter 4) acquires a pivotal importance both as a means to try navigating amidst multiple and often contrasting forces, and as a visible manifestation of such efforts. However, this area is overlooked by Thaut and colleagues. Despite acknowledging that, indeed, IR has put some effort on enhancing its substantive legitimacy with both its Western and Muslim audiences, through an attempt “to shore up its legitimacy by emphasizing how its values are universal and beyond reproach,”¹⁸⁷ the authors do not explore how IR has tried to find a narrative aimed at addressing the tensions deriving from speaking to multiple audiences. Writing from a political science angle, Thaut and colleagues seem to be more concerned with the operational strategy adopted by IR to navigate a challenging socio-political environment, rather than with the discursive strategy it adopted in order to maintain its legitimacy with its Muslim audience. While the authors argue that the main bulk of IR’s efforts were directed in the operational field (e.g. financial transparency), my discussion will highlight that IR also dedicated in parallel consistent efforts in its discursive work, particularly after 2010.

In conclusion, this strand of literature offers a valuable contribution to the study of MNGOs by: i) providing socio-political context; ii) highlighting practical challenges faced by MNGOs themselves; and iii) challenging the lack of academic rigour of biased and stereotyped narratives. However, this strand is also limited in scope by the very agenda it attempts to critically engage with, and it consequently runs the risk to indirectly (and perhaps unwittingly) perpetuate the framing of MNGOs mainly through a politicised and/or negative lens.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

2.4. Muslim NGOs and ‘cultural proximity’

As I mentioned in the previous section, the growing interest in FBOs observed in the 2000s partly springs from an increased awareness of the importance of religion and FBOs in the lives of aid beneficiaries. In turn, the question of whether “can faith-based organisations contribute to improving development?”¹⁸⁸ has been accompanied by a recent focus within development discourse and practice on the overlapping ideas of ‘cultural sensitivity’, ‘cultural rights’ and ‘cultural authenticity’—which, taken together, form the bases of what has come to be known as the “cultural proximity” debate.¹⁸⁹

The “cultural proximity” debate centres on the question of whether an assumed ‘cultural’ commonality between an NGO and its staff, on the one hand, and its beneficiaries, on the other, can be regarded as giving the NGO an operational advantage.¹⁹⁰ To advocates of the ‘cultural proximity’ argument, a shared culture (and, even more so, a shared religion) helps to create a sense of community and solidarity between the different actors involved in the aid chain, thereby bringing “added value” to the efforts of an NGO in virtue of its “ease of access and provision of more culturally appropriate services.”¹⁹¹ Significantly, the “cultural proximity” debate has emerged “almost exclusively in the context of work in the Muslim world” and with specific reference to MNGOs, around the “belief that Muslims are best at helping fellow Muslims.”¹⁹² From this perspective, the “cultural” in ‘cultural proximity’ essentially becomes “a euphemism for “religious”.”¹⁹³ The Muslim-centred dimension of the cultural proximity debate represents at once both the manifestation and the result of two main trends.

On the one hand, this focus partly derives from the challenges experienced by Western non-Muslim NGOs in working effectively and safely in complex emergencies in some Muslim majority countries, where security risks and logistical challenges often converge with a sense of hostility towards aid actors

¹⁸⁸ Petersen, ‘For Humanity or for the Umma?’, 26.

¹⁸⁹ Victoria Palmer, ‘Analysing Cultural Proximity: Islamic Relief Worldwide and Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh’, *Development in Practice* 21, no. 1 (1 February 2011): 97, doi:10.1080/09614524.2011.530226; Petersen, ‘For Humanity or for the Umma?’, 232.

¹⁹⁰ Jonathan Benthall, “‘Cultural Proximity’ and the Conjunction of Islam with Modern Humanitarianism”, in *Sacred Aid: Faith and Humanitarianism*, ed. Michael Barnett and Janice Gross Stein (Oxford University Press, 2012), 65.

¹⁹¹ Palmer, ‘Analysing Cultural Proximity’, 97.

¹⁹² Benthall, ‘Humanitarianism and Islam after 11 September’, 45.

¹⁹³ Benthall, “‘Cultural Proximity’ and the Conjunction of Islam with Modern Humanitarianism”, 66.

that are being perceived as instrumental to Western political agendas.¹⁹⁴ From this perspective, the debate around cultural proximity is articulated through questions such as: “is cultural proximity the answer to gaining access in Muslim contexts?”;¹⁹⁵ and “do Western-based Muslim aid organisations offer added value in predominantly Muslim areas and communities at times when aid structures from, or associated with, ‘the West’ are being perceived as instrumental to political agendas?”¹⁹⁶

On the other hand, MNGOs themselves (particularly, those based in the West) have increasingly claimed a “special aptitude to work with Muslim communities,”¹⁹⁷ in light of their being more acceptable than their Western counterparts.¹⁹⁸ From this perspective, cultural proximity is articulated through questions such as: “have Islamic aid agencies a privileged relationship in majority Muslim areas?”;¹⁹⁹ and “do the identity, background, Islamic references and real or perceived cultural proximity of Western-based Muslim aid organisations generate added value in Muslim-majority contexts?”²⁰⁰

Notably, the answer to these questions seems often to be affirmative, as pointed out both by: i) field-based research that has looked at factors that make access possible and smooth the way for good working relationships;²⁰¹ and ii) research that has explored the perspective of different analysts, Western and Muslim staff members of UN agencies and international and MNGOs.²⁰² Within this context, the “added value” expected by international donors and claimed (and often delivered) by MNGOs can be broken down in three main dimensions: i) easier and safer access to Muslim countries and areas, mainly deriving from a sense of shared identity/religious solidarity with national and local authorities and members of communities; ii) more effective delivery of aid, through services that

¹⁹⁴Ibid.; Palmer, ‘Analysing Cultural Proximity’, 97; De Cordier, ‘Faith-Based Aid, Globalisation and the Humanitarian Frontline’, 608.

¹⁹⁵ Nouria Brikci, ‘Is Cultural Proximity the Answer to Gaining Access in Muslim Contexts?’, *Humanitarian Exchange Magazine*, no. 29 (March 2005): 43–45.

¹⁹⁶ De Cordier, ‘Faith-Based Aid, Globalisation and the Humanitarian Frontline’, 622.

¹⁹⁷ Benthall, “‘Cultural Proximity’ and the Conjunction of Islam with Modern Humanitarianism”, 66.

¹⁹⁸ Brikci, ‘Is Cultural Proximity the Answer to Gaining Access in Muslim Contexts?’, 43.

¹⁹⁹ Jonathan Benthall, ‘Have Islamic Aid Agencies a Privileged Relationship in Majority Muslim Areas? The Case of Post-Tsunami Reconstruction in Aceh’, *The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance*, 26 June 2008, <https://sites.tufts.edu/jha/archives/153>.

²⁰⁰ De Cordier, ‘Faith-Based Aid, Globalisation and the Humanitarian Frontline’, 614.

²⁰¹ Benthall, “‘Cultural Proximity’ and the Conjunction of Islam with Modern Humanitarianism”, 74–81.

²⁰² De Cordier, ‘Faith-Based Aid, Globalisation and the Humanitarian Frontline’, 622.

are sensitive to the beneficiaries' religious needs; iii) more positive relations between Muslim NGOs' staff and beneficiaries through their sense of shared identity and awareness and respect for religious and cultural values and practices.²⁰³

Yet, a healthy degree of scepticism remains within the cultural proximity debate, with researchers highlighting that the added value of MNGOs' cultural proximity should not be taken for granted, and that the generalised assumptions underpinning it should often be qualified. For example, cultural proximity can be significantly influenced by factors such as different types of Islamic observance, different degrees and types of expectations from Muslim beneficiaries, and the role played by formal and informal Islamic institutions in any given society.²⁰⁴ Notably, both perspectives have been applied to IR as a case study.

From the perspective of cultural proximity advocates, Kirmani and Khan²⁰⁵ have looked at IR's 'added advantage' with Muslim refugees, stressing that "the status of Islamic Relief as a Muslim FBO is advantageous" on multiple levels, namely concerning access, trust-building and delivery.²⁰⁶ The authors argue that this comparative advantage derives from the fact that IR, as a MNGO, has a "greater sensitivity to the spiritual needs" of Muslim refugees.²⁰⁷ Consequently, IR translates its cultural sensitiveness in practical terms in order to contribute not only to the physical but also to "the spiritual well-being of beneficiaries"—for example, by "facilitating the community's performance" of "religious and cultural events" such as the delivery of food for evening breaking-fast meals during Ramadan, or the distribution of meat during the festival of Eid ul-Adha.²⁰⁸

However, in her study of IR's work with Muslim Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh, Palmer offered a more critical perspective on IR's comparative advantage. Firstly, she highlights that in Muslim-majority countries where tensions between 'Islamist' and 'secularist' trends are common in politics and everyday life (such as it is the case in Bangladesh), MNGOs may be actually seen with suspicion by both the

²⁰³ Palmer, 'Analysing Cultural Proximity', 98.

²⁰⁴ Benthall, 'Have Islamic Aid Agencies a Privileged Relationship in Majority Muslim Areas?'; De Cordier, 'Faith-Based Aid, Globalisation and the Humanitarian Frontline', 615.

²⁰⁵ Nida Kirmani and Ajaz Ahmed Khan, 'Does Faith Matter: An Examination of Islamic Relief's Work with Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons', *Refugee Survey Quarterly* 27, no. 2 (1 January 2008): 41–50, doi:10.1093/rsq/hdn032.

²⁰⁶ (IR "has in many cases an advantage in working with Muslim communities") 1 *Ibid.*, 1; 46-47.

²⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 41.

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 46.

government and the people, and therefore be disadvantaged in comparison to secular and non-Muslim faith-based NGOs.²⁰⁹ Secondly, Palmer notes that Muslim beneficiaries often expect more from Muslim NGOs, particularly in terms of the provision of certain religious services and facilities (such as the construction of mosques and religious schools): since MNGOs such as IR abstain from providing this kind of services in order to safeguard themselves from any accusation of proselytising, discrimination, or partiality, this can lead Muslim beneficiaries to feel a sense of disappointment with organisations that are perceived to be failing to live up to their religious identity.²¹⁰ Finally, Palmer highlights how the issue of national Muslim staff is also delicate and complex. In her study, some refugees claimed to feel no sense of trust towards IR's staff (despite these being Bangladeshi and Muslim), claiming that "it is difficult to speak to staff, because the latter have 'the job'," and leveraging accusations of arrogance, abuse of power, and corruption.²¹¹ Whether accurate or not, such accusations and perceptions are symptomatic of the 'class bias' that often characterises NGOs operating in the Muslim world (already mentioned in section 2.1). Also referred to as the phenomenon of "humanitarian aristocracies,"²¹² the distance (rather than the proximity) between national staff and beneficiaries partly derives from the fact that the type of professional skills required by NGOs are more available among the privileged layers of society, the "Westernised local elites and sometimes also regional, ethnic or confessional minorities"²¹³ who, in the word of one of De Cordier's interviewee, often "'act Western" and have this better-than-thou attitude".²¹⁴

The opposite findings of these studies are symptomatic of a wider tension in the field. On the one hand, the mainstream humanitarian sector increasingly considers MNGOs as a "much-needed phenomenon":²¹⁵ secular and non-Muslim NGOs increasingly partner with MNGOs such as IR, not only to deliver aid more efficiently to Muslim beneficiaries, but also to project a positive image of inter-faith/inter-cultural collaboration.²¹⁶ On the other hand, the extent to which

²⁰⁹ Palmer, 'Analysing Cultural Proximity', 101–102.

²¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 103-104.

²¹¹ *Ibid.*, 106.

²¹² De Cordier, 'Faith-Based Aid, Globalisation and the Humanitarian Frontline', 617.

²¹³ *Ibid.*, 616.

²¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 617.

²¹⁵ Palmer, 'Analysing Cultural Proximity', 107.

²¹⁶ Kirmani and Khan, 'Does Faith Matter', 47.

MNGOs can actually cater for the religious needs of Muslim beneficiaries rather than “merely pay lip service to ‘cultural authenticity’” is significantly limited by their integration into a mainstream NGO sector that (somehow paradoxically) simultaneously encourages their secularisation through “the continued dominance of a rigidly secular aid regime.”²¹⁷

In conclusion of this section, this strand of literature on MNGOs is useful to: i) bring to the fore these organisations as important actors within the development field; and ii) challenge the negative stereotypes often (deliberately or indirectly) associated with these actors by works that adopt a more political (/politicised) focus. Nevertheless, this approach is also limited insofar it focuses: i) on the ways in which Islam/Muslim identity can be instrumentalised by MNGOs in order to provide good development, rather than how these relate at a deeper level with the value-systems and cognitive universes of the Muslim publics; and ii) on the relation between MNGOs and their beneficiaries in the Global South, rather than with the Muslim publics in the Global North.

2.5. Muslim NGOs and the “conjuncture of Islam with modern humanitarianism”²¹⁸

By giving attention to the distinctively Muslim dimension of MNGOs’ identity and work, the issue of ‘cultural proximity’ can potentially call in question the standard humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality and universality.²¹⁹ Prompted by this potential challenge, a number of works have emerged exploring the common ground between Western humanitarian principles and Islam, and between the legal framework upon which Western humanitarianism is based (such as International Humanitarian Law and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights) and Muslim legal tradition.²²⁰ In other words, this strand of literature explores what a pioneer in the field, Johnathan Benthall, aptly calls the “conjuncture of Islam with Modern Humanitarianism.”²²¹ Two main sub-strands can be identified within this body of works.

²¹⁷ Palmer, ‘Analysing Cultural Proximity’, 107.

²¹⁸ I borrow this expression from: Benthall, “‘Cultural Proximity’ and the Conjuncture of Islam with Modern Humanitarianism’.

²¹⁹ Benthall, ‘Have Islamic Aid Agencies a Privileged Relationship in Majority Muslim Areas?’

²²⁰ Brikci, ‘Is Cultural Proximity the Answer to Gaining Access in Muslim Contexts?’, 44–45; Benthall, ‘Humanitarianism and Islam after 11 September’, 46.

²²¹ Benthall, “‘Cultural Proximity’ and the Conjuncture of Islam with Modern Humanitarianism’.

On the one hand, the 'practical' sub-strand takes a practitioners-oriented perspective and draws on case studies from the Muslim world to offer an insight on how MNGOs operate 'in the field'. The second part of the recent edited volume *Islam and Development: Exploring the Invisible Aid Economy* (2016) offers a clear example of this sub-strand, collecting contributions from Indonesia, Aceh and Bangladesh. Another very recent contribution in this sense is the edited volume *NGOs in the Muslim world: Faith and social services* (2016).²²²

On the other hand, the 'theoretical' sub-strand of this body of literature explores the relationship between Islam and development from a theological/textual perspective. Adopting mainly a cultural anthropology perspective, this sub-strand can be characterised using Benthall's words as one that "traces the roots of charitable action in the concepts and teachings of Islam, and explores the role of religion in the development of distinctively Islamic conceptions of humanitarian relief."²²³ In other words, as Benedetti more succinctly puts it, the aim of this sub-strand is to give to readers not acquainted with the Islamic frame of reference "a brief outline of the Islamic 'world vision' regarding charity."²²⁴

This sub-strand usually engages two main types of Muslim ideas and practices used by MNGOs. On the one hand, it offers a valuable introduction to concepts/practices such as *zakat*,²²⁵ *sadaqah*,²²⁶ *qurbani*,²²⁷ *waqf*²²⁸ and

²²² Susumu Nejima, ed., *NGOs in the Muslim World: Faith and Social Services*, New Horizons in Islamic Studies (Routledge, 2016).

²²³ Benthall, 'Humanitarianism and Islam after 11 September', 37.

²²⁴ Carlo Benedetti, 'Islamic and Christian Inspired Relief NGOs: Between Tactical Collaboration and Strategic Diffidence', *Journal of International Development*. 186 (2006): 854.

²²⁵ The third pillar of Islam, requiring Muslims who have possessed for one year a certain minimum amount of wealth to give a certain percentage (2.5 percent or one-fortieth of net worth) to one or more of eight categories: the destitute, the needy, the *zakat* administrators, those receptive to Islam, those who are in bondage, debtors, those engaged in anything that enhances the religion, and the wayfarer. (Abdallah al-Shiekh and Devin J. Stewart, 'Zakāt', *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World*. *Oxford Islamic Studies Online*, accessed 6 July 2017, http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t236/e0865?_hi=3&_pos=3.)

²²⁶ Charity, alms, freely made offering. (John L. Esposito, ed., 'Sadaqah', *The Oxford Dictionary of Islam*. *Oxford Islamic Studies Online*, accessed 6 July 2017, http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e2040?_hi=5&_pos=1.)

²²⁷ The sacrifice of a livestock animal performed by Muslims during the period of Eid ul Adha (Festival of the Sacrifice), from the morning of the 10th to sunset of the 12th Dhul-Hijjah, the 12th lunar month of the Islamic calendar. The sacrifice is performed by each of the pilgrims performing the Hajj (the pilgrimage to Mecca) and by Muslims throughout the world who participate vicariously in this ritual by performing their own sacrifices at home. ('Hajj', *Oxford Islamic Studies Online*, accessed 12 June 2017, <http://oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e771>.)

²²⁸ Waqf is "the endowment of a certain property for the sole benefit of a certain philanthropy with the intention of prohibiting any use or disposition of the property outside that specific purpose; applies to nonperishable property whose benefit can be extracted without consuming the property itself." (John L. Esposito, ed., 'Waqf', *The Oxford Dictionary of Islam*. *Oxford Islamic Studies*

ummah.²²⁹ On the other hand, these works highlight the existence of the banking and finance system often used by MNGOs, usually referred to as ‘Islamic finance’—the main peculiarity of which is the prohibition of interest (*riba*) and of investment in religiously illicit (*haram*) activities.²³⁰ The first two chapters of the pioneering *The Charitable Crescent. Politics of Aid in the Muslim World* represent classical examples of this sub-strand.²³¹ Another recent example of this sub-strand is represented by the first part of the already mentioned *Islam and Development*, which offers, for example, an overview of zakat,²³² and of the growth of the Islamic banking and finance sector.²³³

Notably, Benthall gives nuance to this sub-strand by identifying what he calls “a family resemblance” among MNGOs, centred around common features such as: i) references to religious tradition that “include not only allusions to *zakat*, *sadaqa* and *waqfs*, but also familiar Quranic verses and *hadiths*” and visual motifs such as the crescent and minarets; ii) salience of services for the orphans, in light of the Prophetic experience of this condition and emphasis on this type of support; iii) salience of services for the refugees, in light of the fact the first community of Muslim was displaced from their native city (Mecca) and that the majority of the world’s refugees are, indeed, Muslim; iv) a “religious calendar and lifecycle,” based on Islamic events such as Ramadan or Eid-ul-Adha, which represent major fundraising moments for Muslim NGOs.²³⁴

Finally, it is worth noting that an attention to the foundational principles of Islam related to charity is also central to the very limited literature dedicated to Western MNGOs. For example, De Cordier highlights that, whilst first generation Muslims

Online, accessed 6 July 2017, http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e2484?_hi=22&_pos=1.)

²²⁹ “Muslim community. A fundamental concept in Islam, expressing the essential unity and theoretical equality of Muslims from diverse cultural and geographical settings.” (John L. Esposito, ed., ‘Ummah’, *Oxford Islamic Studies Online. The Oxford Dictionary of Islam*, accessed 6 July 2017, http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e2427?_hi=24&_pos=1.)

²³⁰ Benedetti, ‘Islamic and Christian Inspired Relief NGOs’, 855.

²³¹ Jonathan Benthall, ‘Financial Worship’, in *Charitable Crescent: Politics of Aid in the Muslim World*, ed. Jonathan Benthall and Jerome Bellion-Jourdan (I.B.Tauris, 2003), 7–28; Jonathan Benthall and Jerome Bellion-Jourdan, ‘Waqf and Islamic Finance: Two Resources for Charity’, in *Charitable Crescent: Politics of Aid in the Muslim World*, ed. Jonathan Benthall and Jerome Bellion-Jourdan (I.B.Tauris, 2003), 29–44.

²³² Jan. A. Ali, ‘Zakat and Poverty in Islam’, in *Islam and Development: Exploring the Invisible Aid Economy*, ed. Matthew Clarke and David Tittensor (Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2014), 15–32.

²³³ A. Ali, ‘Riba-free Finance and Zakat-induced Economic Aid: The Political Economy of Two Developmental Initiatives in the Muslim World’, in *Islam and Development: Exploring the Invisible Aid Economy*, ed. Matthew Clarke and David Tittensor (Farnham, England: Ashgate, 2014), 87–108, <http://researchrepository.murdoch.edu.au/id/eprint/28127/>.

²³⁴ Benthall, ‘Humanitarianism and Islam after 11 September’, 42–43.

tended to practice zakat and qurbani through personal networks in the countries of origin, later generations have tended to do so through MNGOs based in their country of residence, which in turn not only offer opportunities for fulfilling religious duties but also capitalise on these as major fundraising moments.²³⁵

Notably, this perspective has also been adopted by the two contributions on Islamic Relief in the edited volume *Sacred Aid: Faith and Humanitarianism*. Whilst Khan offers an overview of zakat, sadaqah and waqf as principles and practices that motivate individual Muslims to engage in various forms of charitable giving through IR as a way to earn spiritual rewards,²³⁶ Barnett and Stein stress how these practices of charitable giving are “threaded through statements by the leaders of Islamic Relief.”²³⁷ Further, both contributions clarify the nexus between these principles/practices and the structure of IR’s development programs and fundraising strategies, reiterating De Cordier’s point about the fact that second and third generation Muslims tend not to have as strong links with the countries of origin as earlier generations, and therefore often donate their zakat, sadaqah and qurbani through MNGOs such as IR,²³⁸ which facilitates these practices through dedicated sections of its website.²³⁹ Finally, both contributions also highlight that, in addition to seasonal activities such as the distribution of qurbani meat, IR has incorporated Islamic teachings into other types of operational activities, such as shari‘a-compliant microfinance programs.²⁴⁰

To sum up this section, the ‘conjuncture of Islam with humanitarianism’ approach to the study of MNGOs has the threefold merit of: i) highlighting the rich and distinctively Muslim repertoire of ideas and practices related to development and humanitarianism and its potential to be a constructive addition in the development and humanitarian arena; ii) identifying common trends among the discourses and operational strategies of MNGOs; and iii) introducing Western MNGOs as key actors within the sector, by emphasising how they relate to their Muslim publics

²³⁵ De Cordier, ‘Faith-Based Aid, Globalisation and the Humanitarian Frontline’, 612.

²³⁶ Ajaz Ahmed Khan, ‘Religious Obligation or Altruistic Giving? Muslims and Charitable Donations’, in *Sacred Aid: Faith and Humanitarianism*, ed. Michael Barnett and Janice Gross Stein (Oxford University Press, 2012), 96.

²³⁷ Andrea Paras and Janice Gross Stein, ‘Bridging the Sacred and the Profane in Humanitarian Life’, in *Sacred Aid: Faith and Humanitarianism*, ed. Michael Barnett and Janice Gross Stein (Oxford University Press, 2012), 220.

²³⁸ Khan, ‘Religious Obligation or Altruistic Giving? Muslims and Charitable Donations’, 97.

²³⁹ Paras and Stein, ‘Bridging the Sacred and the Profane in Humanitarian Life’, 220.

²⁴⁰ Khan, ‘Religious Obligation or Altruistic Giving? Muslims and Charitable Donations’, 92; Paras and Stein, ‘Bridging the Sacred and the Profane in Humanitarian Life’, 220.

in the West precisely through a shared Muslim universe of meaning. However, this strand also presents limitations insofar it: i) pre-emptively conceptualises MNGOs only as FBOs that use their religion in an instrumental way to provide 'added value' to development work; ii) focuses only (and somehow redundantly) on a specific set of ideas and practices, which mainly gravitate around the umbrella-concept of charity; and iii) somehow essentialises MNGOs within this paradigm, hence precluding a more nuanced insight into their meaning-making systems, their discourses and the type of engagement they promote with Western Muslims.

2.6. Muslim NGOs' "ideologies of aid"²⁴¹

Very few studies have looked at MNGOs from the perspective of their ideational components and discourse, mainly through the lens of what Petersen calls "ideologies of aid"²⁴² (see later). Notably, IR as a case study seems to often feature among these studies.

In his analysis of the motivations, aspirations, and expectations of individual IR's British donors, Khan incidentally refers to the importance of IR's discourse in eliciting charitable donations. From an instrumentalist perspective, the author highlights how IR self-consciously "recognizes it is precisely religion that motivates many of its Muslim donors" and how, in turn, the organisation attempts to reinforce its "'Islamic' credentials" by "using religious language" and by concentrating its fundraising efforts at particular times of religious significance (such as the month of Ramadan and the festival of Eid-al-Adha), through specific 'religiously-oriented' media (such as Muslim newspapers and Muslim satellite television channels). Despite acknowledging the significance of IR's discourse in mobilising support, however, Khan offers only a very preliminary insight on it, by simply highlighting that:

Islamic Relief presents itself simultaneously as both Muslim and Western. It is "inspired by Islamic humanitarian values" and there are frequent references to the Qur'an and hadith in its promotional literature and websites. (...) It is probably also the case that Islamic Relief adapts itself and accentuates Muslim or Western characteristics according to the audience, stressing Islamic inspiration to Muslims and emphasizing

²⁴¹ I borrow the expression "ideologies of aid" from: Petersen, 'For Humanity or for the Umma?', 12.

²⁴² Petersen, 'For Humanity or for the Umma?'

conformity with common humanitarian standards and practices to secular and Western audiences.²⁴³

More significantly, Khan also points out that 2010 seems to have represented a watershed in the trajectory of IR's discourse: although the organisation had "come to resemble its secular counterparts" in years previous 2010, the growing concerns expressed by some staff and donors over a perceived "drift toward secularization" prompted IR to put a deliberate effort in addressing the question of organisational identity through the establishment of an "Islamic Values Committee" in June 2010, composed of senior staff and trustees "entrusted with safeguarding the Islamic nature of the organization."²⁴⁴ This observation informs and corroborate my analysis of the evolution of IR's discourse with regards to the framing of the Self, as it will become clear in chapter 5.

IR's discourse is also partly discussed by another contribution in the same volume, in Paras and Stein's comparative analysis of how four of the largest humanitarian NGOs in the world—two religious (the Christian Caritas Internationalis, and IR) and two secular (Médecins Sans Frontières, and Oxfam International)—"articulate and give meaning to the sacred."²⁴⁵ The authors highlight that "Islamic Relief anchors its mission in the Qur'an and the teachings of the Prophet," and that despite "the organization's mission is "inspired by Islamic values", IR "explicitly acknowledges drawing from both religious and secular sources to form, shape, and reshape its values."²⁴⁶ Indeed, the main contribution of Paras and Stain is not a sophisticated analysis of IR's discourse, but rather the suggestion that:

More so than any other large humanitarian organization, Islamic Relief lives in multiple worlds. Partly through circumstances and partly through design, it brings the sensibilities of both the sacred and the profane to the construction of humanitarian space. (...) Partly because of what it is and partly because of where it is, Islamic Relief bridges the religious and secular to give complex and textured meaning to the sacred. It sanctifies the secular and secularizes the religious to create a flexible concept of the sacred.²⁴⁷

²⁴³ Khan, 'Religious Obligation or Altruistic Giving? Muslims and Charitable Donations', 91; 108.

²⁴⁴ Ibid., 91; 103.

²⁴⁵ Paras and Stein, 'Bridging the Sacred and the Profane in Humanitarian Life', 212.

²⁴⁶ Ibid., 219; 222.

²⁴⁷ Ibid., 222-223.

Notably, the dynamics identified in the last line of the foregoing extract resonate with the arguments put forward by what it seems to be, so far, the most comprehensive study of MNGOs' discourse: Petersen's "groundbreaking doctoral thesis"²⁴⁸ *For humanity or for the umma? Ideologies of aid in four transnational Muslim NGOs* (henceforth referred to as FHFU²⁴⁹). In light of the originality and significance of this piece of work, I will discuss it here quite at length.

FHFU called for and started to adopt a different approach to the study of MNGOs: not only by adopting a balanced approach between the international and the Western dimension of this topic (by choosing as case studies two Gulf-based NGOs²⁵⁰ and two UK-based NGOs, IR and Muslim Aid); but also by prompting a methodological shift on three main levels. First, FHFU directs attention towards the processes and structures of meaning construction of these actors, adopting the framing approach to analyse what she calls "their ideologies of aid."²⁵¹ Second, FHFU engages in the qualitative analysis of in-depth, empirical case studies, in order to provide a more nuanced insight into MNGOs through thick descriptions of the discourses and practices of these organisations.²⁵² Third, it adopts a multidisciplinary approach in order to take into account the multiple landscapes through which MNGOs navigate, and to move away from the instrumentalist (and somehow simplified) understandings of MNGOs offered by the strands of literature discussed earlier.²⁵³

Petersen's analysis is based on the assumption that there are two main "cultures" (or "ideologies") from which Muslim NGOs draw and to which they relate dialectically.²⁵⁴ On the one hand, a largely Western "culture of development aid" that stems from the colonising experience, prioritises concepts such as universalism and neutrality, and assumes a strictly secularised character. On the other hand, a largely Middle Eastern "culture of Islamic aid" that is shaped by the experience of being colonised, emphasises notions of solidarity and justice, and

²⁴⁸ Lacey and Benthall, 'Introduction', 9.

²⁴⁹ Petersen's thesis was completed in 2011 and published as a book in 2015 with a slightly different title (Marie Juul Petersen, *For Humanity Or For The Umma?: Aid and Islam in Transnational Muslim NGOs* (Oxford University Press, 2015)). Throughout this thesis, I will use Petersen's thesis rather than her book as a reference because the latter became available only during the last phase of my research.

²⁵⁰ The International Islamic Charitable Organization (IICO) and the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIROSA).

²⁵¹ Petersen, 'For Humanity or for the Umma?', 12; 42-43.

²⁵² *Ibid.*, 12.

²⁵³ *Ibid.*, 32.

²⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 13.

it is “closely intertwined with a visible, pervasive religiosity.”²⁵⁵ Building on this assumption, the author advances two main arguments concerning Muslim NGOs’ ‘ideologies’.

The first argument advanced by FHFU is that Gulf-based and UK-based MNGOs (and, by proxy, their respective audiences) firmly position themselves at the two poles of a continuum. At one end, the Gulf-based NGOs “are firmly positioned in a Middle Eastern Islamic aid culture,” presenting what the author calls a “sacralised aid ideology” that is based on an “understanding of Islam and aid as closely intertwined and inseparable.”²⁵⁶ This manifests itself through a very visible religiosity that shapes all aspects of the organisations’ identity and services, echoing core elements of the Islamic aid culture such as “notions of Islamic solidarity in the umma.”²⁵⁷ At the other end of the spectrum, the UK-based Muslim NGOs present what the author defines as a “secularised aid ideology” that is based on an understanding of Islam and aid as two separate categories. This manifests itself through “an almost invisible, compartmentalised religiosity relegated to clearly defined spaces of seasonal activities and personal motivation,” echoing core elements of the culture of development aid, such as notions of a universalist humanity.²⁵⁸

Building on this, Petersen’s second main argument is that, whilst Gulf-based and Western MNGOs are firmly embedded within an ‘Islamic aid’ and a ‘development aid’ cultures, respectively, this does not represent a clear-cut dichotomy, because “things are in effect much more complicated.”²⁵⁹ In fact, trying to satisfy (sometime conflicting) expectations of different audiences (i.e. institutional donors, individual Muslim donors, trustees and staff members) all of her case studies “are—albeit to differing degrees—positioned in between two aid cultures.”²⁶⁰ Attempting to develop ‘ideologies’ that are simultaneously legitimate to their different audiences, these organisations engage in processes that the author call “developmentalising Islamic aid,” and “Islamising development aid.”²⁶¹

²⁵⁵ Ibid., 223.

²⁵⁶ Ibid., 15; 227.

²⁵⁷ Ibid., 15.

²⁵⁸ Ibid., 15.

²⁵⁹ Ibid., 228.

²⁶⁰ Ibid.

²⁶¹ Ibid., 229.

On the one hand, speaking from within the culture of 'Islamic aid', Gulf-based Muslim NGOs seek to "*developmentalise*" their Islamic aid 'ideology' through: i) the adoption of elements from the culture of development aid;²⁶² ii) the pragmatic alignment of elements from both aid cultures;²⁶³ iii) most importantly, the integration of elements from the development aid culture that are perceived to be "ideologically congruent" with the Islamic aid culture.²⁶⁴

On the other hand, speaking from within the 'development aid' culture, Western Muslim NGOs seek to "*Islamise*" their development aid ideology through: i) "subversive merging" that attempts to maintain one type of ideology unofficially while promoting another officially;²⁶⁵ ii) the maintaining of a "constructive ambiguity" that avoids definitive or categorical statements and opens up space for parallel interpretations²⁶⁶; iii) most importantly (and like the Gulf-based NGOs), the integration of elements from both the development aid and the Islamic aid cultures.²⁶⁷

In conclusion, Petersen's work highlights how MNGOs (both Gulf-based and Western) are engaged in a process of "break[ing] down the boundaries between the cultures of development and Islamic aid" on four main levels.²⁶⁸ Firstly, the organisations seem not to operate on a strict dichotomy between the 'development aid' and the 'Islamic aid' cultures: rather, they simultaneously and to different degrees emphasise and eclipse elements from both, thus contributing to shape new 'hybrid' cultures. Secondly, the cultures of 'development aid' and 'Islamic aid' are no longer predicated on a sharp geographical distinction between Western and Middle Eastern MNGOs, since actors based in both regions draw from both cultures. Thirdly, MNGOs seem not to operate on the basis of a strict dichotomy between the secular and the

²⁶² For example, ideas of accountability, transparency and neutrality. Ibid., 164.

²⁶³ For example, the support, in principle, of a universalist approach accompanied by a focus primarily on Muslims out of pragmatic reasons. Ibid., 165.

²⁶⁴ For example, the adoption of the developmental concept of 'empowerment' through a re-interpretation of the Islamic concept of *tawkeel*, originally understood in the sense of delegation of authority. Ibid., 229.

²⁶⁵ For example, while internal organisational dynamics may subtly pressure female staff to cover, gender equality is promoted externally. Ibid., 219.

²⁶⁶ For example, in relation to issues of zakat, where individual donors' expectation of it being distributed exclusively to Muslims clashes with development aid's demand for universalism. Ibid., 220.

²⁶⁷ For example, through microfinance projects that are based on Islamic economic principles. Ibid., 230.

²⁶⁸ Ibid.

religious, but rather on different kinds of religiosity that resonate with their main respective audiences. Fourthly, MNGOs seem not to operate on the basis of a strict dichotomy between solidarity with fellow Muslims (predicated by the ‘Islamic aid’ culture) and universalism (predicated by the ‘development aid’ culture): rather, echoing the recent development idea of ‘cultural proximity’, they maintain claims to religious solidarity with fellow Muslims without violating development principles of universalism.²⁶⁹

Beyond the specific arguments it advances, FHFU is original and significant—and, consequently informs this thesis—on four main levels. I summarise these below, and also point out how my thesis differs from and complement Petersen’s work.

- *Offering in-depth, empirical case studies*

FHFU offers a unique example of a qualitative study based on in-depth, empirical case studies of individual MNGOs, providing thick descriptions of their discourses and practices, thus contributing with new empirical knowledge to the study of (transnational) MNGOs. I, too, adopt the case study and thick description approach. However, I complement Petersen’s work on two key dimensions.

Firstly, by focusing only on two BMNGOs (rather than on two BMNGOs and two Gulf-based NGOs, as FHFU does) I argue that my thesis offers a richer and more nuanced (in a sense, a ‘thicker’) description of these organisations. Secondly, whilst FHFU and this thesis share a common case study (IR), Petersen’s analysis of the organisation is based on data derived from a limited timeframe, consisting in: i) interviews conducted with IR’s members of staff between 2008-09; ii) an older version of IR’s website; and iii) IR’s annual reports up to 2009. By contrast, this thesis includes data from the most recent version of IR’s website and from its annual reports (and other types of published material) up to 2014. As I will highlight in chapter 5, this represents a key difference, which qualifies the validity of Petersen’s analysis only within the timespan addressed by her research, and enables me to identify a new phase in IR’s discourse in the post-2010 era.

Secondly, whilst Petersen focuses on the two largest and internationally best known examples of BMNGOs (IR and Muslim Aid)—which are also the only two

²⁶⁹ Ibid., 230-232.

BMNGOs that have received any significant academic attention²⁷⁰—I complement the analysis of the well-known IR with the little-known MADE. In and of itself, this represent a key original contribution of the thesis, since MADE has never been the subject of any academic research. Furthermore, by including a somehow ‘atypical’ BMNGO like MADE (as I outlined in chapter 1), the thesis not only contributes with new empirical knowledge to the study of BMNGOs by adding a new case study, but (most importantly) highlights the diversity of discourses and actors within the sector.

- *Focusing on discourse and meaning systems*

One the most significant merits of FHFU is that it directs attention to the discursive and meaning-making dimension of MNGOs, attempting to offer a “comprehensive account of [their] meaning systems” through a focus on “processes and structures of meaning construction.”²⁷¹ From this perspective, FHFU approaches MNGOs neither as politicised actors nor as FBOs (something which is done by most of the rest of the literature, as outlined above) but “as signifying agents actively engaged in the production of meaning.”²⁷² In doing so, Petersen aims to distance herself from any presumptions about the organisations, in the attempt to “study the actually existing NGOs, not the NGOs that ought to or are presumed to exist.”²⁷³ This is, indeed, the same approach I adopt in my thesis.

However, as Petersen tells us, FUFH is “first and foremost an attempt to understand how meanings associated with ‘aid’ and ‘Islam’ are produced, expressed, contested and reworked *by actors in these organisations*.”²⁷⁴ This points to two key dimensions where this thesis differs from and complements FHFU.

²⁷⁰ For example, in addition to Petersen’s work, IR and Muslim Aid appear together in: Bellion-Jourdan, ‘Islamic Relief Organizations’; Benthall, ‘Humanitarianism and Islam after 11 September’; Benthall, ‘Have Islamic Aid Agencies a Privileged Relationship in Majority Muslim Areas?’; Benthall, “‘Cultural Proximity’ and the Conjunction of Islam with Modern Humanitarianism’; De Cordier, ‘Faith-Based Aid, Globalisation and the Humanitarian Frontline’. IR as a sole case study is the focus of the already quoted: Kirmani and Khan, ‘Does Faith Matter’; Palmer, ‘Analysing Cultural Proximity’; Khan, ‘Religious Obligation or Altruistic Giving? Muslims and Charitable Donations’; Paras and Stein, ‘Bridging the Sacred and the Profane in Humanitarian Life’; Thaut, Barnett, and Stein, ‘In Defense of Virtue: Credibility, Legitimacy Dilemmas, and the Case of Islamic Relief’.

²⁷¹ Petersen, ‘For Humanity or for the Umma?’, 12.

²⁷² Ibid., 30.

²⁷³ Ibid., 30.

²⁷⁴ Ibid., 12. Emphasis mine

Firstly, despite Petersen distancing herself from an instrumentalist understanding of MNGOs as FBOs that are expected to have a comparative advantage in delivering aid in the Muslim world, she nevertheless still implicitly approaches them mainly as FBOs insofar her attention to discourse and meaning-making is focused on “analysing their *ideologies of aid*,” through an analysis of how they “define and give meaning to concepts such as ‘Islam’, ‘development’” and “construct and conceptualise the nexus between Islam and aid.”²⁷⁵ From this perspective, this thesis differs from FHFU insofar my focus is not specifically on the case studies’ understanding of Islam, aid/development and their nexus, but rather on the system of frames they develop in order to articulate their organisational identity, mobilise British Muslims and conceptualise their UK supporter base. In doing so, the thesis approaches BMNGOs not merely (or primarily) as FBOs, but rather looks at them in a more open-ended manner, which enable us to better explore the research sub-question ‘how to think about BMNGOs?’ in light of the data and its emerging interpretation.

Secondly, FHFU emphasises the role that “actors in these organisations” have in producing and contesting their discourses.²⁷⁶ From this perspective, Petersen stresses that NGOs are “organisations made up of collectivities of interpreting and acting agents” and she suggests “a focus on the individual actors making up the organisations,” which “explores the biographies and networks of organisational staff” based on the assumption that these factors contribute to shaping the organisations’ ideologies.²⁷⁷ Consequently, the analysis in FHFU is based “on two different kinds of ideological representations”: on the one hand, “official representational discourses” expressed in public documents such as websites and annual reports; on the other hand, “more unofficial, individualised representations” expressed by staff members in interviews.²⁷⁸ Whilst this approach has the advantage of offering an insight into the complexity of the meaning-making dynamics internal to each organisation, it also presents three main issues: i) personal bias issue (i.e. some interviewees may emphasise or eclipse certain topics/dimensions due to personal reasons); ii) representation issue (i.e. the type of information shared by interviewees and their role in shaping

²⁷⁵ Ibid., 12; 28; 44.

²⁷⁶ Ibid., 12.

²⁷⁷ Ibid., 30; 40.

²⁷⁸ Ibid., 50.

the organisation's discourse can be affected by their status within it); iii) timeframe issue (interview data often capture perceptions held at a specific timepoint, which are not necessarily maintained at different points in time). In light of these drawbacks, and of space limitations, despite I acknowledge that different actors within each organisation and their audiences do play a key role, I choose to focus only on the case studies' official discourses as expressed in their public documents.

- *Adopting the 'framing approach'*

In her analysis of MNGOs' discourse, Petersen has "been inspired by the so-called framing approach."²⁷⁹ In particular, she focuses on the processual dimension of the framing approach, from two main perspectives. On the one hand, she applies Snow and Benford's idea of "core framing tasks" represented by diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational framing²⁸⁰ to explore, respectively: the organisations' visions of aid; the rationales they evoke to motivate donors to give aid in general, and to support them in particular (which she calls "authority frames"); the solutions and tactics they advocate.²⁸¹ On the other hand, Petersen also draws from Snow and Benford's idea of "frame alignment processes"²⁸² in her analysis of how Gulf-based Muslim NGOs seek to "*developmentalise*" their Islamic aid 'ideology' and Western Muslim NGOs seek to "*Islamise*" their development aid ideology.

Indeed, this approach is valuable because it highlights framing processes and dynamic. At times, this thesis, too, will do so. However, FHFU's focus neglects a parallel, vast body of literature in the social movement literature that explores the cognitive dimension of framing through the identification of organisation/campaign specific frames.²⁸³ Furthermore, this approach (i.e. the identification of specific frames, rather than of framing processes) has been championed by recent advancement in NGOs studies, particularly by the "Finding

²⁷⁹ Ibid., 43.

²⁸⁰ Robert D Benford and David A Snow, 'Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment', *Annual review of sociology* 26 (2000): 615–17.

²⁸¹ Petersen, 'For Humanity or for the Umma?', 44.

²⁸² Benford and Snow define "frame alignment processes" as the "deliberative, utilitarian, and goal directed" discursive "strategic efforts by social movement organizations to link their interests and interpretive frames with those of prospective constituents and actual or prospective resource providers." (Benford and Snow, 'Framing Processes and Social Movements', 624.)

²⁸³ For an overview of this literature, see: Robert D. Benford, 'An Insider's Critique of the Social Movement Framing Perspective', *Sociological Inquiry* 67, no. 4 (1 October 1997): 414–15, doi:10.1111/j.1475-682X.1997.tb00445.x.

Frames” report (which I introduce in chapter 1). From this perspective, this thesis differs from and complement Petersen’s work by directing attention to the cognitive dimension of frames as “structuring structures” of thought,²⁸⁴ rather than on framing as discursive processes.

In turn, this conceptual difference is also mirrored by a methodological difference in the analysis of data. In fact, in FHFU the analysis “takes the form not so much of a word for word analysis focusing on specific narrative structures, metaphors, and discursive devices, but instead presents a focus on substantive themes, patterns and metanarratives.”²⁸⁵ Whilst such approach may lead to a valid identification of framing processes, it also “misses important nuances in meaning and discursive style.”²⁸⁶ Indeed, the type of ‘micro-frame’ analysis overlooked by Petersen is exactly what frame analysis experts (such as Hank Johnston) have advanced as the most apt method for the identification of frames (as I will discuss in the next chapter). For these reasons, my thesis differs from and complements Petersen’s approach by self-consciously focusing precisely on what she calls “specific narrative structures, metaphors, and discursive devices,” in order to offer a deeper analysis of the ways in which meanings are constructed by the case studies.

- *Developing an interdisciplinary framework*

Finally, FHFU represents an original and valuable contribution to the study of MNGOs also because it adopts an alternative, interdisciplinary approach, inspired by anthropological and sociological NGO studies, sociology of religion and Islamic studies.²⁸⁷ Indeed, such interdisciplinarity is key to understand the complexity of MNGOs not as autonomous, isolated islands, but as meaning-making actors that are “at once carriers and consumers of existing cultural meanings and producers of new meanings,” “always shaped by and part of larger cultures and environments”—in other words, as actors that are “part of broader societal structures and sets of meanings, shaped in a constant,

²⁸⁴ Darnton, Andrew and Martin Kirk, ‘Finding Frames: New Ways to Engage the UK Public in Global Poverty’ (London: Bond, 2011), 70.

²⁸⁵ Petersen, ‘For Humanity or for the Umma?’, 43.

²⁸⁶ Robert J. Wuthnow, ‘Taking Talk Seriously: Religious Discourse as Social Practice’, *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 50, no. 1 (1 March 2011): 14, doi:10.1111/j.1468-5906.2010.01549.x.

²⁸⁷ Petersen, ‘For Humanity or for the Umma?’, 28.

dialectic relationship with these surroundings.”²⁸⁸ From this perspective, an interdisciplinary approach enables the analysis to take in consideration a diverse range of considerations regarding the social and discursive environments that shape MNGOs’ own meaning systems, thus providing a degree of context and nuance that is not attainable by monodisciplinary approaches. As I will outline in the next chapter, my thesis, too, adopts an interdisciplinary approach, on the basis of the same rationale.

However, my thesis also differs from and complements Petersen’s interdisciplinary approach on two key levels. Firstly, through the incorporation of a social movement studies dimension (which is only peripherally engaged by FHFU, through the adoption of the framing approach deriving from this discipline), I highlight dimensions of BMNGOs’ discourse that are completely overlooked by Petersen, such as their mobilising efforts through Ramadan campaigns (in part two). Secondly, in light of my background within the Islamic studies, I attempt to offer a more sophisticated analysis of the distinctively faith-based dimension of the case studies’ discourse, whenever relevant.

Conclusion

This chapter has contextualised the thesis against the wider literature on MNGOs. It has identified six different trends that, despite each in their way contributing valuably to bringing to the fore the ‘topic’ of MNGOs, point to a significant gap in the literature: the lack of in-depth analyses of the discursive work of BMNGOs. Partly, this gap could be explained by the inherent challenge of understanding the discourse of complex actors such as MNGOs in the West from the perspective of any one disciplinary field. Indeed, the only monograph-length study that includes a focus on the discourse of two BMNGOs (Petersen’s *For Humanity or the Umma?*), which I discussed at length in the last part of the chapter, highlights the salience and appropriateness of adopting an interdisciplinary framework. In the next chapter I address this dimension of the thesis, outlining the theoretical and methodological underpinnings of its interdisciplinary approach.

²⁸⁸ Ibid., 40; 31.

Chapter 3 . Understanding the discourse of British Muslim NGOs: an interdisciplinary approach

Introduction

As I highlighted in chapter 1, in very recent years the mainstream NGO sector has been increasingly realising the potential of new approaches to communication and a number of recent research efforts have been exploring how to change the development discourse in order to better engage the UK public in ‘bigger-than-self’ issues.²⁸⁹ The already mentioned, ground-breaking “Finding Frames” epitomises this trend, by specifically calling for the adoption of a ‘frame theory’ approach. Informed by these developments, the thesis adopts a theoretical and methodological framework that is partly taken from the frame analysis school, which I outline in section 3.2 of this chapter. In light of space limitations and of the fact that I approach frame theory mainly as a heuristic tool to better understand the discourse of the case studies (rather than as the complex, interdisciplinary epistemological landscape it also refers to), I do not attempt to provide here a comprehensive review of the literature on the theoretical debates about frames and framing.²⁹⁰ Instead, I focus on and take up relevant points from the work of Hank Johnston as the social movement scholar that has perhaps distinguished himself most in two areas that are pivotal to my use of frame theory: i) the simultaneous engagement of both the cognitive-structural and the collective-processual perspectives on frames;²⁹¹ ii) the development of an empirically grounded methodology of frame analysis.²⁹²

²⁸⁹ For example: Tom Crompton, ‘Common Cause: The Case for Working with Our Cultural Values’, *Policy & Practice*, 10 September 2010, <http://policy-practice.oxfam.org.uk/publications/common-cause-the-case-for-working-with-our-cultural-values-112367>; Darnton, Andrew and Martin Kirk, ‘Finding Frames: New Ways to Engage the UK Public in Global Poverty’ (London: Bond, 2011); Bond, ‘Change the Record. Exploring New Ways to Engage the UK Public in Tackling Global Poverty’, 2014; InterAction, ‘The Narrative Project UK User Guide. Building Support for Global Development’, 2014.

²⁹⁰ For a comprehensive overview, see: David A. Snow, ‘Framing Processes, Ideology, and Discursive Fields’, in *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, ed. David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi (Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2004), 380–412.

²⁹¹ Notably, commenting on the lively debate between these perspectives, Johnston states: “I do not see that these two perspectives are irreconcilable.” (Hank Johnston, ‘Comparative Frame Analysis’, in *Frames of Protest: Social Movements and the Framing Perspective*, ed. Hank Johnston and John A. Noakes (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005), 253.)

²⁹² These peculiar features of Johnston’s work have been acknowledged elsewhere within social movement literature (For example, in: Kimberley Fisher, ‘Locating Frames in the Discursive Universe’, *Sociological Research Online* 2, no. 3 (30 September 1997): pt. 3.20-3.26, <http://www.socresonline.org.uk/2/3/4.html>; Kevin Gillan, ‘Understanding Meaning in Movements: A Hermeneutic Approach to Frames and Ideologies’, *Social Movement Studies* 7, no. 3 (1

Additionally, as this study essentially falls within the contemporary sociology of Islam and Muslims, section 3.3 outlines the positionality of the thesis within the broad disciplinary field known as Islamic studies. Specifically, this section of the chapter outlines how the thesis adopts a post-Orientalist approach that contributes to inform the analysis from the perspective of the Muslim-specific repertoire of ideas displayed by the case studies, whilst avoiding (or at least, minimising) both essentialisation and pre-emptive normalisation.

Before I outline the frame theory and post-Orientalist approaches adopted by the thesis, I discuss in section 3.1 reflective questions about my positionality and clarify the rationale behind key choices I made during the research process.

3.1. Positioning this research

A researcher's positionality and her/his decisions in key choice points of the research process play an important role in informing and shaping the research itself. In this section, I reflect on questions that help situate myself and the thesis, therefore attempting to provide that sort of 'between the lines' knowledge that can strengthen the credibility of this study.

3.1.1. Situating myself

Whilst a wide range of dimensions of one's biography can influence the nature, purpose and direction of one's research,²⁹³ two particular aspects of my biography have played an important role in informing the thesis: my educational background and (part of) my work experience.

With regards to my education, the transition to Islamic studies and social sciences from a background in the natural sciences has likely played a role in my choice to adopt an approach to cultural studies (i.e. frame analysis) that, despite adopting an overarching interpretivist framework, also incorporates post-positivist

December 2008): 252, doi:10.1080/14742830802485643.) Further, other studies have already adopted Johnston's methodology for frame analysis (For example: Anna Triandafyllidou and Anastasios Fotiou, 'Sustainability and Modernity in the European Union: A Frame Theory Approach to Policy-Making', *Sociological Research Online* 3, no. 1 (30 March 1998), <http://www.socresonline.org.uk/3/1/2.html>; Jamie Hall, 'From the Text to the Frame: A Frame Analysis of the Collective Action Frames of the Zapatista Army of National Liberation, 1980 - 1998' (PhD Thesis, 2008), <https://ore.exeter.ac.uk/repository/handle/10036/48133>.) More specifically, the latter work also informs my methodological approach with regards to bringing together Johnston's methodology with Gamson's insight on the injustice and agency components of collective action frames.

²⁹³ E.g. one's gender, ethnic background, nationality, mother tongue, class, religious affiliation, moral commitments, etc.

features—such as the search for evidence that can be somehow considered ‘objective’²⁹⁴ and an attention to shared standard principles of analysis, such as those proposed in Johnston’s methodology for micro frame analysis (more on this in subsections 3.1.2 and 3.2.1).

Part of my work experience has also played an important role in the choices I made during the research process and in my analysis, given that I had the opportunity to increase my first-hand knowledge of the two case studies through short-term professional experiences with each of them.²⁹⁵ My twofold aim for conducting these work experiences was to strengthen the transferability of my research skills beyond the academia and to better understand the structures and workings of BMNGOs, in order to improve my ability to develop future research with an impact. To be clear, neither of these work experiences were designed nor led to collecting data for the thesis (which, instead, focuses only on publicly available material from both case studies; more on this in subsection 3.1.4). Despite the analytical distance between such work experiences and the thesis, however, these have unavoidably enriched my positionality with a sort of emic dimension/‘insider’s’ perspective, and provided the context for what could be seen as an indirect, loose form of ‘organisational ethnography’ insofar they enabled me to gain deeper and deeper knowledge and understanding of the dominant cultures of the two organisations and the wider BMNGO sector, through interaction and conversations with their staff. In turn, this enriched perspective also helped to substantiate my decision to select IR and MADE as case studies for the thesis, as I outlined in the concluding part of section 1.2.3.

3.1.2. Which research paradigm(s)?

Discussions around research approaches are frequently presented in terms of rival paradigms (e.g. positivistic versus humanistic, etc.). However, social science (in general) and multidisciplinary research such as this (in particular) are often complex enterprises where different paradigms and methodologies are mixed in

²⁹⁴ Though with the awareness that what is taken as ‘objective evidence’ for any particular claim is intrinsically linked to human subjectivity and open to debate.

²⁹⁵ AT IR, I have spent an internship through which I contributed developing: i) educational resources linking key Islamic concepts with Global Citizenship; and ii) a portfolio of case-study briefings showcasing IR’s commitment towards the Sustainable Development Goals. At MADE, I provided independent research consultancy on an ad hoc basis, through which I offered: i) a review of the organisation’s first 5 years of operations; ii) a research-based insight into project-planning and monitoring and evaluation. Both organisations were informed I was conducting a PhD on BMNGOs with themselves as case studies during such experiences.

various and eclectic ways to overcome the limits of each approach, to the advantage of empirical knowledge and theoretical insight.²⁹⁶ From this perspective, by adopting a frame theory approach to the analysis of organisational discourses, the thesis incorporates the eclecticism inherent to frame theory, which represents a bridge between the interpretivist and post-positivist traditions, as I briefly outline here.²⁹⁷

An interpretivist approach underpins the ontological, epistemological and methodological dimensions of the thesis. Ontologically, I see objective and subjective meanings as being deeply intertwined: whilst I see the social reality explored in this study (i.e. BMNGOs and their discourses) as somewhat objective and knowable, I also acknowledge that such reality is not separate from human subjectivity (mine, of the readers, of individuals working in the case studies, of external observers, etc.). Epistemologically, this implies that I see this thesis as a piece of contextual knowledge: whilst I argue that the interpretations I put forward are valid and reliable, I also recognise that these are affected by my own positionality and that they are somehow shaped by the wider intellectual and societal context in which the research took place. As such, they are subject to challenge and reinterpretation. Methodologically, the interpretative focus of the thesis is on a qualitative understanding of the web of meanings in the discourses of the two specific case studies, aimed at refining concepts for the analysis of future cases (rather than, for example, on a quantitative identification of cause-effect relationships aimed at generalisation, which is characteristic of more traditional positivistic approaches).

Despite such overarching interpretivist framework, however, the type of frame analysis adopted in this research also lends itself ‘naturally’ to post-positivistic features. Falling well within the linguistic and social-psychological approaches to frame analysis of key authors such as Johnston and Gamson (which, in fact, my research framework mainly draws from; see section 3.2), the micro frame analysis I adopt in the thesis has—according to its very own ‘founder’ Johnston—

²⁹⁶ As rightly highlighted by Della Porta and Keating, an eclectic approach must nevertheless ensure that different parts of the enterprise respect internal coherence, given that not all dimensions of different paradigms are mutually compatible. Donatella Della Porta and Michael Keating, ‘How Many Approaches in the Social Sciences? An Epistemological Introduction’, in *Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences: A Pluralist Perspective*, ed. Donatella Della Porta and Michael Keating (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 37–38.

²⁹⁷ Della Porta and Keating, 35.

“a strong empirical and positivistic social science focus” that “contrasts sharply with the hermeneutic tradition of textual analysis” exemplified by authors such as Ricoeur and Gadamer.²⁹⁸ Concerned with the issue of empirical credibility and with the oft-launched criticism that “there is too much loose interpretation taking place too far from the data,”²⁹⁹ this type of frame analysis adopts ‘harder’ qualitative methods³⁰⁰ in order to be able “to speak about frames with a great deal more empirical grounding.”³⁰¹ In turn, this represents both a reflection and a consequence of the fact that key authors in this intellectual tradition (and, by reflection, to a certain extent also myself) often have “their feet planted solidly in a conventional positivist epistemology while their heads are in the clouds of a post-positivist, constructionist world.”³⁰²

From this viewpoint, whilst I acknowledge that the analysis I present in the thesis: a) constitutes an act of subjective and fallible interpretation; b) represents only one of different possible interpretations; c) is deeply embedded and influenced by my positionality and context; and d) is open to challenge and reinterpretation, I also argue that (echoing Johnston’s words), it “does permit a systematic and fine-tuned discussion about frames and framing processes” in BMNGOs’s discourses and therefore represents a “rigorous exegesis of meaning [that] can advance the scientific enterprise”³⁰³ of improving our understanding of these actors.

In turn, the adoption of this overarching research approach has inherent implications with regards to the type of data the thesis focuses on and on the methods of its collection and selection. I briefly outline these next.

²⁹⁸ Hank Johnston, ‘Comparative Frame Analysis’, in *Frames of Protest: Social Movements and the Framing Perspective*, ed. Hank Johnston and John A. Noakes (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005), 283.

²⁹⁹ Hank Johnston, ‘A Methodology for Frame Analysis: From Discourse to Cognitive Schemata’, in *Social Movements and Culture*, ed. Hank Johnston and Bert Klandermans (U of Minnesota Press, 2003), 241.

³⁰⁰ Such as the search for empirical evidence, the consistent representation of significant text extracts, and the meticulous tracing of how one arrives at a frame through microanalysis of a text.

³⁰¹ Johnston, ‘Comparative Frame Analysis’, 241.

³⁰² William A. Gamson, ‘The Social Psychology of Collective Action’, in *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory*, ed. Aldon D. Morris and Carol McClurg Mueller (Yale University Press, 1992), 69.

³⁰³ Johnston, ‘A Methodology for Frame Analysis: From Discourse to Cognitive Schemata’, 241; 221.

3.1.3. Which discourse?

In light of the thesis' focus on exploring the meaning systems articulated by BMNGOs, I decided to title it: *Understanding the Discourse of British Muslim NGOs*. Yet, I am conscious that different research paradigms and types of research conceptualise and treat 'discourse' in different ways. These, in turn, have different implications with regards to methods of data collection and sampling. It is therefore important to briefly clarify here how the thesis approaches 'discourse' and its analysis, also in light of its overarching research approach, which I outlined earlier.³⁰⁴

As Johnston himself highlights (more on this in subsection 3.2.1), there are two key perspectives on discourse.³⁰⁵ In turn, these entail two alternative approaches to data collection and analysis in organisational discourse analysis.³⁰⁶

On the one hand, the Foucauldian approach adopts a *macroscopic* viewpoint. Discourse is not just a kind data but, rather, the site and manifestation of power struggles—it is about “relations of power, not relations of meaning”³⁰⁷ and about “what discourse *does* rather than what it *means*.”³⁰⁸ From this perspective, discourse analysis is not a method to interpret and understand meanings but, rather, the “exercise of a perspective” in “analysing sociopolitical relations” through a focus on power dynamics and broader discursive contexts, coupled with an intent to problematise and deconstruct the ‘truth regimes’ within which researchers themselves are implicated.³⁰⁹ In terms of organisational discourse analysis, a Foucauldian approach therefore implies a focus on exploring the internal dynamics and wider socio-political relations that shape the production and consumption of organisational narratives (in other words, the links between power and meaning), rather than on understanding the meaning systems conveyed by such discourses. With regards to data collection, this implies that—

³⁰⁴ Craig Prichard, Deborah Jones, and Ralph Stablein, ‘Doing Research in Organizational Discourse: The Importance of Researcher Context’, in *The SAGE Handbook of Organizational Discourse* (London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2004), 221.

³⁰⁵ Johnston, ‘A Methodology for Frame Analysis: From Discourse to Cognitive Schemata’, 219; 244.

³⁰⁶ Prichard, Jones, and Stablein, ‘Doing Research in Organizational Discourse’, 225.

³⁰⁷ Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977* (Pantheon Books, 1980), 114. Quoted in Prichard, Jones, and Stablein, ‘Doing Research in Organizational Discourse’, 222.

³⁰⁸ Prichard, Jones, and Stablein, ‘Doing Research in Organizational Discourse’, 222.

³⁰⁹ Foucault, quoted in: Michael J Shapiro, *Language and Political Understanding: The Politics of Discursive Practices* (New Haven, Conn., [etc.: Yale University Press, 1981), 127. Quoted in Prichard, Jones, and Stablein, ‘Doing Research in Organizational Discourse’, 222.

in order to explore questions of ‘who?’, ‘when?’, ‘how?’ and ‘why?’ that underpin the production and consumption of narratives—this approach often incorporates methods that are particularly suitable at revealing power relations (e.g. by highlighting the links between: individual and organisational narratives; subjective experience and social interaction; the explicit and the implicit), such as the analysis of internal documents, interviews, and participant observation.

By contrast, approaches to organisational discourse that adopt a post-positivist, interpretive, semiotic or broadly social constructionist approach (such as the brand of frame analysis chosen in this thesis) take a *microscopic* viewpoint. From this perspective, discourse constitutes data in itself and the purpose of discourse analysis is to contribute to a better understanding of the meanings it carries, not on the power dynamics underpinning its production or consumption. Consequently, concerning organisational discourse analysis, this approach typically sees data as a corpus of materials published by organisation(s) in the form of a wide range of publicly available documents (e.g. annual reports, leaflets, brochures, etc.), online content, and visual imagery.³¹⁰

In light of the main aim of this thesis (i.e. to improve our understanding of the meaning systems articulated by BMNGOs in their discourses) and of its overarching research approach (which is based, as I outlined earlier, on a brand of frame analysis that bridges interpretivist and post-positivist paradigms), I therefore choose to adopt the latter approach to organisational discourse and its analysis. In turn, this choice informed my selection of data, as I briefly outline next.

3.1.4. Which data?

- *Focusing on the case studies’ published materials*

In the thesis, I focus my analysis only on material that the case studies make available in the public sphere, which includes texts and visual imagery from: i) their annual reports and a range of other public documents (e.g. policies;

³¹⁰ Ibid., 218; 222; 226-227.

brochures; toolkits); ii) their websites;³¹¹ and iii) social media.³¹² There are three intertwined reasons underlying my decision to focus only on the case studies' published material.

Firstly, this type of data is the most apt to fulfil the main purpose of this thesis, i.e. to enrich our understanding of the meaning systems that BMNGOs publicly present and promote in the public sphere as their organisational voices. Expressing and illustrating official discourses as they are agreed-upon by the organisations—rather than by individuals in the organisations—these documents reflect the official voices of the case studies and convey the meaning systems they want their audiences to be exposed to. Conversely, I do not include here data from internal organisational documents (such as e-mails, memos, etc.) and do not adopt additional methods of data collection (such as interviews and participant observation). Whilst these kinds of data can be of value in answering research questions different from those asked by this thesis, they do not fit well with the fact that I am interested here in exploring meaning systems in BMNGOs' official discourses—not the dynamics or power relations that influence or shape such discourses or their consumption.

Secondly, my decision to treat official organisational discourses as data itself is coherent with the approach to discourse taken by the theoretical framework adopted by the thesis, which approaches discourse from a microscopic and sociolinguistic perspective focused on meaning systems (as outlined earlier).

Thirdly, conducting a type of micro-frame analysis that is highly labour intensive (more on this later) within the inherent time and space limitations of a PhD thesis inevitably necessitates a trade off in selecting one's methods of data collection.

³¹¹ Organisations' websites represent a very fluid form of 'text', which is often changed over time through the editing, adding and/or removal of textual components, images and links. Consequently, any analysis of website material necessarily represents a snapshot in time of the evolution of the website under study. This observation is particularly significant for this thesis, as both IR and MADE re-launched their websites sometime between late 2016 and 2017— i.e. towards the conclusion of my writing up, well after my data collection and analysis had already concluded. For this reason, some of the website-derived material (textual or visual) that I reproduce in the thesis may not be currently available online. Nevertheless, the analysis offered here represents a snapshot that is accurate at least up to July 2016, when most of the website content was last accessed online. In and of themselves, these changes are significant insofar they highlight the dynamic nature of the organisation's meaning-making work. For obvious practical reasons, however, it was not possible to carry out a comparison between material from the old and new versions of IR and MADE websites.

³¹² Whilst I include in my data videos uploaded on the official YouTube channels of both the case studies, I consider only MADE's Facebook page because its 'Ramadan Revolution' campaign (which is the case study for chapter 7) was rolled out mainly on this platform.

Therefore, whilst I acknowledge that other kinds of data and methods of collection (such as internal documents, interviews and participant observation) can provide valuable insight in the study of BMNGOs, I do not adopt them here in order to give enough space to a type of data (i.e. published material) that is more relevant to the thesis' overall aim.

- *Selecting parts of the data for in-depth analysis*

Published materials from the two case studies of the thesis include a wide range of discourse samples that, taken together, constitute an extensive corpus. Given that the type of micro frame analysis adopted by the thesis is very detailed and highly labour intensive (more on this in section 3.2.1), a careful selection of examples from the corpus was essential.³¹³

Before I outline how I undertook such process of selection, it is important to highlight that among key intellectuals within the strand of textually-oriented discourse analysis adopted in this thesis there is a widespread acknowledgment that the sort of detailed analysis implied by this approach is so labour-intensive that it can be productively applied only to small samples of data (i.e. just on specific texts, or on selected components of texts), rather than to large bodies of text.³¹⁴ Despite such broad consensus, however, there is no typical way of selecting data in this approach to discourse analysis: key authors within this tradition often offer little discussion about the rationale underpinning their choice of materials, leaving readers to assume these are selected because they are regarded as being particularly informative, representative, or relevant.³¹⁵ Gamson and Johnston (the two authors that most inform the methodological approach of this thesis) elucidate well this point.

In his seminal *Talking Politics*, which offers an in-depth analysis of how working-class people and the media in the US frame four major issues, Gamson mentions that his strategy for the selection of data “was to focus on what Chilton (1987)

³¹³ Further, it is widely acknowledged that an analysis of all types of samples is not required in any one research project—not only because different pieces of research have different purposes and focus, but also because inherent limitations of the publication format necessitates a trade off in the selection of methods of data collection.

³¹⁴ Norman Fairclough, *Analysing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research* (Psychology Press, 2003), 6; Johnston, ‘A Methodology for Frame Analysis: From Discourse to Cognitive Schemata’, 229.

³¹⁵ Michael Meyer, ‘Between Theory, Method, and Politics: Positioning of the Approaches to CDA’, in *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*, ed. Professor Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer (SAGE, 2001), 23–25.

calls “critical discourse moments” that make discourse on an issue especially visible.”³¹⁶ Notably, however, the way Gamson uses the notion of ‘critical discourse moments’ seems to be qualitatively different from Chilton’s original definition. On the one hand, Chilton—who aims to clarify certain theoretical questions around the construction of language—adopts a purely linguistic (and, in his own words, somehow “pernickety technical”) perspective, and defines ‘critical discourse moments’ as “acts in discourse that contradict the rights or beliefs or values of either the speaker or hearer or both,” through linguistic devices such as metaphors and euphemisms.³¹⁷ Conversely, Gamson—who explores the presence of collective action frames and their components in media discourse and popular conversations—conceptualises ‘critical discourse moments’ more loosely as critical junctures/milestones in the evolution of public discourse around specific issues.³¹⁸ Furthermore, despite Gamson mentions the use of “a set of rules for inclusion” and “criteria of relevance” for the identification and selection of relevant samples from such ‘critical discourse moments’, he does not elucidate what such rules and criteria are—something that highlights the significant degree of subjectiveness implied in this process of sampling.³¹⁹

Similarly, Johnston—whose main focus is precisely on providing a methodology for frame analysis—also does not provide specific rules or criteria for the identification and selection of data. Rather, he also implies a significant degree of subjectiveness in the process: on the one hand, he emphasises that the insights provided by close textual analysis can be particularly useful for small samples of data that researchers themselves deem to be “important”; on the other hand, he leaves it open to the researcher to “choose the more informative and representative narratives for verbatim transcription and close analysis,” and only suggests that these can be sampled “perhaps from critical junctures in the movement, or when the text is articulated particularly well, or when the text is highly representative.”³²⁰

³¹⁶ William A. Gamson, *Talking Politics* (Cambridge University Press, 1992), 26.

³¹⁷ Paul Chilton, ‘Metaphor, Euphemism and The Militarization Of Language’, *Current Research on Peace and Violence* 10, no. 1 (1987): 12; 17.

³¹⁸ Gamson, *Talking Politics*, 26. This understanding is substantiated by the fact that, when describing more in detail the selection of critical discourse moments in an appendix on “methodological issues,” Gamson essentially equates ‘critical discourse moments’ with historical milestones in the evolution of the different issues at the centre of his analysis. *Ibid.*, 199.

³¹⁹ As highlighted by the fact that “coders were instructed to include any elements that *seemed* relevant even if they were uncertain of which frame was implied (if any).” *Ibid.* 200. Italics mine.

³²⁰ Johnston, ‘A Methodology for Frame Analysis: From Discourse to Cognitive Schemata’, 229.

The aforementioned examples highlight that an interpretative, subjective dimension is inherently embedded in the sampling of data required by this strand of frame analysis.³²¹ However, the subjectively-driven selection of relevant texts for close analysis is not completely arbitrary. Rather, it is guided by the data itself through a process that—in a way similar to grounded theory—sees data collection, sampling and analysis as iterative and emergent.³²² From this perspective, the process of data selection is based on the following steps: i) an initial general review of the data; ii) a first round of broad analysis that leads to the identification of indicators for particular concepts / categories / themes, pointing towards specific frames; iii) a return to the original material; iv) the selection for close frame analysis only of those texts or portions of texts that (in light of the previous steps) appear to: a) represent critical junctures in the evolution of a narrative, an organisation, a movement, etc.; b) be highly representative; or c) articulate a frame particularly well.³²³

In light of the foregoing, my strategy for selecting parts of the data for in-depth analysis has involved a three-stages qualitative enquiry that incorporates a subjective assessment informed by the data itself and by the iterative nature of the research process. In the first stage, I have immersed myself in the data, reading as much published material from the two case studies as I could (including their websites), in order to gain a significant degree of familiarity with their discourses and hermeneutically uncover emerging themes, keywords, rhetorical cues and speech figures. This process of familiarisation and general review has also helped me to identify what can be loosely defined as ‘critical discourse moments’ for the two case studies: not in the purely linguistic sense advanced by Chilton, but more broadly—and following Gamson and Johnston’s approaches—as those discursive acts that either: i) correspond to critical milestones in the history of the organisations;³²⁴ ii) are highly representative of the organisations’ discourses;³²⁵ or iii) articulate particularly well (according to my

³²¹ As Johnsnton puts it, “there is clearly a qualitative element to the selection of text” Ibid., 222.

³²² In Johnston’s words, “there is no way of telling [in advance] which items will prove significant and which will not.” Ibid., 232.

³²³ Ibid., 222; Meyer, ‘Between Theory, Method, and Politics: Positioning of the Approaches to CDA’, 24.

³²⁴ E.g. the Ramadan campaigns selected as case studies in part two of the thesis, which both represent, in their own ways, critical milestones in the evolution of the two case studies, as I discuss more in detail in chapters 6 and 7.

³²⁵ E.g. textual extracts that are repeated across different types of materials (such as annual reports and websites).

own judgement/interpretation as a researcher) themes or frames identifiable in other parts of the data. These ‘critical discourse moments’ have eventually constituted a smaller set of data that I took forward for a second step of the analysis, where I returned to the text (and images) sampled in order to refine the identification of the emerging frames. Finally, I have enriched my analysis by taking in consideration a wide range of contextual knowledge that helped clarifying nuances and connections to wider discursive or societal trends. This has led me to draw, among other things, on: works on contemporary social movements and forms of activism; current trends in development discourse and practice; semiotics; the discourse of non-Muslim NGOs; journalistic accounts; and traditional interpretations of Islamic references.³²⁶

3.2. A frame theory approach

Within social movement studies, frame theory has been at the forefront of a renewed interest in the discursive dimension of movements and organisations, through a focus on their cultural and ideational processes. Since this approach has been “extraordinarily productive of new research and new understandings of social movements,”³²⁷ I adopt it in the hope that it may bear a similarly valuable output with regards to the subject matter of this study, BMNGOs.

Focusing on how people, movements and organisations develop and process discourse (particularly, but not exclusively, around public issues), frame theory has its roots in linguistics and cognitive psychology, particularly in the study of communicative interaction.³²⁸ Two main strands are discernible within this field of enquiry, broadly identifiable as the ‘cognitive-structural’ and the ‘collective-processual’ perspectives.

On the one hand, the cognitive-structural perspective draws from the seminal work of Erving Goffman³²⁹ and assumes that “we glance at nothing without applying primary frameworks (or basic everyday frames).”³³⁰ From this

³²⁶ Since my knowledge of Arabic is very limited, I only utilised material that is available in English, whether as the original language or in translation.

³²⁷ Pamela Oliver and Hank Johnston, ‘What a Good Idea! Ideologies and Frames in Social Movement Research’, *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 5, no. 1 (1 March 2000): 38, doi:10.17813/maiq.5.1.g54k222086346251.

³²⁸ *Ibid.*, 39-40.

³²⁹ Goffman introduced frame analysis to sociological research through works such as: Erving Goffman, *Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience* (Harvard University Press, 1974); Erving Goffman, *Forms of Talk* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1981).

³³⁰ Johnston, ‘Comparative Frame Analysis’, 239.

perspective, frames are mental structures/orientations that organize perception and interpretation—in other words, “problem-solving schemata, stored in memory, for the interpretative task of making sense of presenting situations.”³³¹

Notably, Goffman also introduced another “central concept in frame analysis” that I heuristically use in the thesis: that of “key” and “keying.” In Goffman’s perspective, frames are dynamic (rather than static) structures that can be nuanced and transformed through keys and the process of keying. As he explains:

[a key is] a set of conventions by which a given activity, one already meaningful in terms of some primary framework, is transformed into something patterned on this activity but seen by the participants to be something quite else. The process of transcription can be called keying.³³²

From this perspective, understanding “what is that’s going on here?”³³³—either in social life or discourse—means understanding several layers of frames, keys and keyings (and re-keyings) and their mutual interactions. Notably, since Goffman himself seems to use quite interchangeably the term ‘keying’ to refer both to: i) the process that alters a frame by creating new interpretational connections (i.e. keying as a verb); and ii) the product of that very process (i.e. keying as a noun), in the thesis I choose to use the term ‘keying’ (rather than ‘key’) to denote a specific layer or nuance of a frame in order to better acknowledge the dynamic nature of the layering/nuancing process.

On the other hand, as frame theory was increasingly adopted by social movement studies in the 1980s and 1990s,³³⁴ the focus tended to shift “away from cognition and toward collective and organizational processes appropriate to mobilization.”³³⁵ From the collective-processual perspective, frames are ‘*collective action frames*’ (henceforth, CAF). One of the pioneer of this current,

³³¹ Hank Johnston, ‘A Methodology for Frame Analysis: From Discourse to Cognitive Schemata’, in *Social Movements and Culture*, ed. Hank Johnston and Bert Klandermans (U of Minnesota Press, 2003), 217.

³³² Goffman, *Frame Analysis*, 43–44.

³³³ *Ibid.*, 8.

³³⁴ For example, through the seminal work of Snow and Benford. (David A. Snow et al., ‘Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation’, *American Sociological Review* 51, no. 4 (1986): 464–81, doi:10.2307/2095581; David A. Snow and Robert D. Benford, ‘Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization’, *International Social Movement Research*, 1988, 197–218; David Snow and Robert Benford, ‘Master Frames and Cycles of Protest’, in *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory*, ed. Aldon D. Morris and Carol McClurg Mueller (New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 1992), 133–223.)

³³⁵ Johnston, ‘A Methodology for Frame Analysis: From Discourse to Cognitive Schemata’, 217.

David Snow, clarifies how these differ from “everyday interpretive frames” by highlighting that:

collective action frames not only perform an interpretive function in the sense of providing answers to the question “What is going on here?”, but they also are decidedly more agentic and contentious in the sense of calling for action.³³⁶

More specifically, the ‘collective’ focus of CAFs “assumes the aggregation of numerous individual interpretative schemata around a norm and holds in abeyance idiosyncratic differences in order to approximate the essence of the phenomenon.”³³⁷ On the other hand, the CAF’s focus on ‘action’ “calls attention to the mobilising character of collective action frames—that is, their call that those who share the frame can and should do something about the situation.”³³⁸ Therefore, the collective, processual, strategic and action-oriented dimension of ‘framing’ (as a deliberate action by movements/organisations, rather than as a mental structure of individuals³³⁹) represents the main focus of this trend—as epitomised, for example, by the work of Snow and Benford. Acknowledging the importance of this dimension in the making of discourse, I do use in the thesis ideas deriving from this strand of literature (e.g. the ideas of ‘frame alignment’ and ‘narrative fidelity’), whenever relevant to highlight dynamics and processes over structure and content.

However, since the main focus of the thesis is, indeed, on the identification of the frames articulated by the case studies (rather than on the processes they strategically use to negotiate them within their socio-political landscape), another prominent scholar within the CAF paradigm plays a more salient role here: William Gamson. This is because Gamson is the author that “has perhaps done most to capture the ideational composition of collective action frames,” by offering

³³⁶ Snow, ‘Framing Processes, Ideology, and Discursive Fields’, 384-385.

³³⁷ Johnston, ‘A Methodology for Frame Analysis: From Discourse to Cognitive Schemata’, 218.

³³⁸ William Gamson, ‘Social Psychology of Collective Action’, in *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory*, ed. Aldon D. Morris and Carol M. Mueller (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 68.

³³⁹ Johnston and Oliver clarify the distinction and the mutual relationship between ‘frames’ and ‘framing’ when they say: “The concept of frame points to the cognitive process wherein people bring to bear background knowledge to interpret an event or circumstance and to locate it in a larger system of meaning. Framing processes are the ways actors invoke one frame or set of meanings rather than another when they communicate a message, thereby indicating how the message is to be understood. In everyday interaction, framing is often done tacitly by subtle linguistic and extralinguistic cues. Applied to social movement studies, framing processes mostly refer to the intentional activity of movement entrepreneurs at the organizational level.” (Oliver and Johnston, ‘What a Good Idea! Ideologies and Frames in Social Movement Research’, 45.)

“first and foremost, an unambiguous focus on the content rather than the process of collective action frames, thus rendering his collective action frame more suitable to Johnston’s micro-frame analysis in that both authors take discourse as the start-point for their approaches.”³⁴⁰ Indeed, Gamson suggested that there are three components of CAFs that “can be applied across different cultural and political contexts and to a variety of movements”:³⁴¹ *injustice*, *agency*, and *identity*.³⁴² Gamson defines these as follows:

The *injustice component* refers to the moral indignation expressed in this form of political consciousness. This is not merely a cognitive or intellectual judgment about what is equitable but also what cognitive psychologists call a *hot cognition*—one that is laden with emotion (see Zajonc, 1980). An injustice frame requires a consciousness of motivated human actors who carry some of the onus for bringing about harm and suffering. The *agency component* refers to the consciousness that it is possible to alter conditions or policies through collective action. Collective action frames imply some sense of collective efficacy and deny the immutability of some undesirable situation. They empower people by defining them as potential agents of their own history. They suggest not merely that something can be done but that “we” can do something. The *identity component* refers to the process of defining this “we,” typically in opposition to some “they” who have different interests or values.³⁴³

Through the identification of these CAF’s components, Gamson provides frame analysis with useful tools to avoid a purely inductive approach, particularly with regards to mobilisation-oriented discourse. This is because his insight highlights the salience of ‘standard frame-types’ (such as injustice- and agency-type frames), which can be used as a starting point to identify organisation-specific frames—as I do in part two of the thesis.³⁴⁴ Notably, I only use two (injustice and agency) of the three CAF’s components identified by Gamson for several reasons. Firstly, injustice and agency are the components that Gamson himself prioritises in his analysis, as the identification of a ‘we’ (through identity-type frames) is meaningful only if a sense of collective moral indignation (through

³⁴⁰ Hall, ‘From the Text to the Frame’, 34; 53.

³⁴¹ Oliver and Johnston, ‘What a Good Idea! Ideologies and Frames in Social Movement Research’, 49.

³⁴² William A. Gamson, *Talking Politics* (Cambridge University Press, 1992), 7; William A. Gamson, ‘Constructing Social Protest’, in *Social Movements and Culture*, ed. Hank Johnston and Bert Klandermans (Routledge, 2004), 90–104.

³⁴³ Gamson, *Talking Politics*, 7.

³⁴⁴ In doing this, my approach mirrors other works in social movement literature which have specifically looked at injustice-, agency-, or identity-type frames within the discourse of movements/social movement organisations. One example of this type is the already quoted work by Hall, ‘From the Text to the Frame’.

injustice-type frames) and a collective consciousness of agency (through agency-type frames) are already established. Secondly, following the primarily inductive and ‘textually grounded’ approach to frame analysis suggested by Johnston (see later), I wanted to prioritise the text over any pre-existing category: from this perspective, whilst I found enough evidence to suggest the emergence of injustice- and agency-type frames in the case studies’ discourses,³⁴⁵ I did not find the same with regards to the identity component, as neither organisations seem to develop a strong sense of ‘we’ in opposition to some adversarial ‘they’.

Notably, throughout the thesis I also adopt Gamson’s convention to indicate any organisation-specific frame using block capitals, in order to highlight their higher-ranking status within cognitive processes as ‘structuring structures’ of thought, rather than as mere words.³⁴⁶

Finally, it is important to note how Johnston (with Oliver) brings together the cognitive-structural and the collective-processual perspectives outlined so far by arguing two main points. Firstly, by arguing that, ultimately, all frames are “individual cognitive structures, located “within the black box of mental life” that orient and guide interpretation of individual experience (....) [through] complex interpretative schemata.”³⁴⁷ Secondly, that frames become important for collective action (i.e. as *collective action* frames) when “an ideal-typical formulation of a frame (...) rises above both idiosyncratic differences between participants and the contention, negotiation, and emergence that characterizes discursive behavior about the frames,” in a way that enables it to be shared by enough individuals and to channel their individual behaviours into collective

³⁴⁵ Notably, I adopt Gamson’s components heuristically, as tools to guide my analysis rather than as hard-and-fast frame-types. Thus, for example, whilst in Gamson’s definition agency-type frames necessarily “imply some sense of collective efficacy,” in my analysis I will identify an agency-type frame in IR’s discourse that conceptualises IR itself (rather than a more collective ‘we’) as the actor capable of effecting change. Nevertheless, I still consider this as broadly falling within the scope of an agency-type frame insofar it conveys the sense that change is desirable and achievable.

³⁴⁶ For examples of this presentation style in Gamson’s work, see Gamson, *Talking Politics*, chap. 8. Notably, this convention has also been adopted within cognitive linguistics, for example in Lakoff and Johnson’s ground-breaking work on a concept related to frames, metaphors (for example, in George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By* (University of Chicago Press, 1980). Another convention is to capitalise each word in a frame’s name and making its text bold (such as in Lakoff’s work on frame, for example in George Lakoff, *Don’t Think of an Elephant!: Know Your Values and Frame the Debate: The Essential Guide for Progressives* (Tandem Library, 2004), 35–38.) I prefer to use the blocks capital convention because, as I mentioned, this seems to better conveys the higher-ranking status of a frame compared to a word in cognitive processes.

³⁴⁷ Oliver and Johnston, ‘What a Good Idea! Ideologies and Frames in Social Movement Research’, 41.

action.³⁴⁸ From this holistic perspective, Johnston argues that ultimately, for both interpretative and collective action frames “the “true location” of a frame is in the mind.”³⁴⁹ Importantly, a corollary of this positions is that “ultimately frame analysis is about how cognitive processing of events, objects, and situations gets done in order to arrive at an interpretation.”³⁵⁰

On the basis of these theoretical considerations, Johnston himself provides a holistic and practical methodology for frame analysis, which I outline in the following.

3.2.1 The (micro-) frame analysis methodology

Johnston methodology for frame analysis includes both a theoretical and a practical dimension. Theoretically, the author argues that “there is an inextricable link between discourse and frames” and that only through what he calls “micro-discourse analysis”³⁵¹ (interchangeably referred to also as “micro-frame analysis” and “intensive textual analysis”³⁵²) it is possible to validly and consistently identify and reconstruct frames—through a process “from the bottom up, from the text to the frame.”³⁵³ Practically, Johnston identifies “certain procedures that allow the analyst to demonstrate the relations between concepts, knowledge, and experience” that constitute any given frame, in a way that can strengthen the reliability and validity of the analysis.³⁵⁴ I shall outline both the theoretical and the practical dimensions of micro-frame analysis in the following.

3.2.1.1 Theoretical underpinnings

Johnston’s methodology for frame analysis is based on two main theoretical underpinnings.

Firstly, as I introduced earlier, the author argues that, since the ultimate location of frame is in the mind, it follows that ultimately “frame analysis, implicitly or explicitly, is about cognitive processes.”³⁵⁵ From this premises, the author

³⁴⁸ Ibid.

³⁴⁹ Johnston, ‘A Methodology for Frame Analysis: From Discourse to Cognitive Schemata’, 218.

³⁵⁰ Ibid.

³⁵¹ Johnston, ‘A Methodology for Frame Analysis: From Discourse to Cognitive Schemata’, 241.

³⁵² Ibid., 237; Johnston, ‘Comparative Frame Analysis’, 246.

³⁵³ Johnston, ‘A Methodology for Frame Analysis: From Discourse to Cognitive Schemata’, 219.

³⁵⁴ Ibid., 217.

³⁵⁵ Johnston, ‘A Methodology for Frame Analysis: From Discourse to Cognitive Schemata’, 218; 234.

highlights two fundamental and overlapping aspects of cognitive processing underlying frame theory and analysis. Firstly, a central cognitive procedure that enables people to deal with a great deal of information in little time is to store details in the memory through the higher-ranking 'structuring structures' represented by frames. From this perspective, "most models of cognitive processing presume that experience is organized hierarchically," in a fashion that sees frames functioning as "higher-level categories" (or "nodes") that "subsume a multiplicity of detail and serve as points of access for retrieval from memory."³⁵⁶ Secondly, and directly linked to this, a key interpretative process consists in recognizing similarities with past experiences that are already structured within frames in the memory: when a specific frame is already present in the mind, this can be activated by present inputs (such as situations or textual clues) that offers a 'good fit' with the bundle of knowledge (i.e. the content) associated in the memory with such a frame.³⁵⁷ To illustrate these cognitive processes, Johnston offers the example of the 'protest' frame, which can be activated by and "provides access to events such as placard making, gathering, singing, chanting, marching, confrontation, solidarity, even after-protest socializing."³⁵⁸ From this perspective, the main task (and challenge) of frame analysis is therefore to get access to "the 'black box' of mental life" by developing an approximate reconstruction of the organisation of clues, ideas and experiences that make up the structure and content of frames.³⁵⁹ The way to pursue this is intrinsically related to the second theoretical premise of Johnston's methodology: the distinction between macro and microdiscourse.

Johnston highlights that there are two key perspectives on discourse: despite these sharing the same focus on the ideational components and symbols of meaning-making, they also present quintessential differences. On the one hand, the poststructuralist understanding of discourse focuses on its "macroscopic" dimension and attempts to 'deconstruct' texts in terms of broad patterns and the power dynamics (i.e. the relationship between the 'who', 'when' and 'why') behind them.³⁶⁰ Within social movement studies, the focus on this type of "macrodiscourse" helps to explain why certain movements are more successful

³⁵⁶ Johnston, 'Comparative Frame Analysis', 241–42.

³⁵⁷ Johnston, 'A Methodology for Frame Analysis: From Discourse to Cognitive Schemata', 236.

³⁵⁸ Johnston, 'Comparative Frame Analysis', 242.

³⁵⁹ Johnston, 'A Methodology for Frame Analysis: From Discourse to Cognitive Schemata', 234.

³⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 219.

than others in, for example, articulating grievances or drawing from pre-existing cultural patterns.³⁶¹ On the other hand, Johnston argues that the best way to “gaining access to frames” is through a “micro-discourse” approach rooted in linguistics, which seeks to explain the content of social movements and organisational discourses by exploring how and why certain combinations of textual and non-textual clues can evoke certain frames precisely by virtue of the way they “are put together the way they are.”³⁶²

Based on the awareness of the role of frames in basic cognitive processes and of the distinction between macro and microdiscourse, Johnston argues that only through an “intensive textual analysis”³⁶³ that pays “closer attention to the nuanced meaning in texts” it is possible to develop “a more empirically grounded approach to the “black box” of mental life”³⁶⁴—and, therefore, to frames. In his perspective, the content and “structure of mental frames can be reconstructed through close analysis”³⁶⁵ of texts that express the official discourse of an organization or a movement because only through “close attention to all sources of meaning, the analyst can more accurately reconstruct a frame schema that systematically shows the relationships between higher-level organizing concepts and details that fall under them.”³⁶⁶

In other words, the trifold role of the frame analyst consists of: i) clarifying “all sources of meaning—all that is left implicit in a text, and all that is taken for granted in its interpretation”; ii) identifying and reconstructing a frame by reproducing in detail the relationships among the different ideas that constitute and activate it; and iii) presenting empirical referents that allow close scrutiny of the analysis by the community of scholars.³⁶⁷ Whilst the author acknowledges that this approach to frame analysis (like any other approach) may not be perfect, he also plausibly argues that “it is a gain over more tacit approaches to the content and structure of frames because it systematizes presentation—facilitating

³⁶¹ Ibid., 244.

³⁶² Ibid., 219.

³⁶³ Johnston, ‘Comparative Frame Analysis’, 246.

³⁶⁴ Ibid., 247.

³⁶⁵ Ibid., 238.

³⁶⁶ Ibid., 249.

³⁶⁷ Johnston, ‘A Methodology for Frame Analysis: From Discourse to Cognitive Schemata’, 220; Johnston, ‘Comparative Frame Analysis’, 242.

comparison—and justifies their organization by close empirical reference” to the original text.³⁶⁸

Obviously, as Johnston himself recognizes, this type of microanalysis is time-consuming and “is so labor intensive that it is not practical to apply it to all documents or narratives.”³⁶⁹ Therefore, the author advises the frame analyst to focus only on highly significant documents (broadly identifiable as pertaining to what Chilton refers to as “critical discourse moments”³⁷⁰)—such as those produced at critical junctures in the movement/organisation, or those that present particularly well certain points, or those that are highly representative.³⁷¹ Mirroring the attention to detail characteristic of the in-depth case study approach, the frame analyst is therefore concerned with the “microscopic scrutiny” of such documents in the attempt “to capture data that would otherwise be lost, and [to] reveal connections in different parts of the text that give insight into the thought processes of the producer.”³⁷² As I will mention in section 3.3, this observation informs my own purposive selection of material from the two case studies.

But how to practically conduct such a “microanalysis of frames”?³⁷³ Johnston highlights two key challenges that need to be overcome. Firstly, frame analysis poses an inherent challenge insofar it is not easy to get access to the ‘black box’ of the mind, where frames are constructed and activated. Secondly, and as a consequence of this, frame analysis has displayed several persistent challenges related to reliability (i.e. “how to do it systematically”) and validity (i.e. “how to verify the content and relationships between the concepts within frames that have been identified”).³⁷⁴ Despite these challenges, Johnston argues that there are five key principles “by which the task can be undertaken, if only in a partial way.”³⁷⁵ In the thesis, I adopt these principles whenever relevant, as I briefly outline in the following.³⁷⁶

³⁶⁸ Johnston, ‘A Methodology for Frame Analysis: From Discourse to Cognitive Schemata’, 220.

³⁶⁹ Johnston, ‘Comparative Frame Analysis’, 249.

³⁷⁰ Paul Chilton, ‘Metaphor, Euphemism and The Militarization Of Language’, *Current Research on Peace and Violence* 10, no. 1 (1987): 7–19, quoted in William A. Gamson, *Talking Politics* (Cambridge University Press, 1992), 26.

³⁷¹ Johnston, ‘A Methodology for Frame Analysis: From Discourse to Cognitive Schemata’, 229.

³⁷² *Ibid.*

³⁷³ *Ibid.*, 219.

³⁷⁴ Johnston, ‘A Methodology for Frame Analysis: From Discourse to Cognitive Schemata’, 217.

³⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 220.

³⁷⁶ The only principle I do not adapt from Johnston’s methodology is that of “Role Analysis,” which he applies mainly to take into account “biographical data about the respondent.” This is because

3.2.1.2 Principles for the microanalysis of frames

- *Considering texts as ‘holistic constructs’*

Johnston’s advice to consider any text as a “holistic construct”³⁷⁷ can be broken down into three constitutive dimensions.

Firstly, since one of the main goals of frame analysis is to reconstruct and reproduce frames, and given that the text is the central empirical referent in micro-discourse analysis, Johnston advises to maintain textual integrity as much as possible.³⁷⁸ This has two main implications. On the one hand, this implies that doing “convincing research” means to stay “close to the original empirical texts.”³⁷⁹ In this study, I attempt to do this by, for example, naming the frames I identify using words or expressions that are as close as possible to those used by the organisations themselves.³⁸⁰ On the other hand, maintaining textual integrity means that “the process by which the analysis moves from raw data to specification of frames”³⁸¹ needs to be presented to the reader through the reproduction of representative text—in other words, “when frames are presented, representative texts on which they are based should be included in the presentation” because this “standardizes frame analysis and increases confidence in interpretations.”³⁸² From this perspective, in the thesis I systematically provide textual extracts or reproduce images from the case studies’ material, in order to clarify how I identify and reconstruct frames. Due to space limitations, in cases where the amount of primary text is particularly high,³⁸³ I move the extracts in appendix, and refer to them in the footnotes within the main body of the thesis. Furthermore, in order to clarify the presence of textual cues pointing to a specific frame or keying within extracts from primary data, I often highlight specific words or sections by adding italics, underline, or boldface. When

the material I analyse represents organisational discourse where— as Johnston himself acknowledges—“the identity of the writer is intentionally obscured because the text is intended as a collective statement rather than a personal one.”(Johnston, ‘A Methodology for Frame Analysis: From Discourse to Cognitive Schemata’, 224–27.)

³⁷⁷ Ibid., 221.

³⁷⁸ Ibid., 221-222.

³⁷⁹ Johnston, ‘Comparative Frame Analysis’, 245.

³⁸⁰ As noted by Gamson, since labelling issues or frames “is itself an act of framing,” it follows that “frame-neutral labels are best for analytical purposes—to the extent that they exist.” (Gamson, *Talking Politics*, 9.) From this perspective, I choose to label frames through words or expressions that are as close as possible to those used by the organisations themselves as an attempt to increase the ‘degree of neutrality’ of such labels (without claiming to achieve absolute neutrality).

³⁸¹ Ibid., 243.

³⁸² Ibid., 250; 272.

³⁸³ Such as in chapters 7 and 8.

I do this, I provide a brief clarification before the extract of how I use these tools for typographical emphasis at any time, and indicate in the footnotes whenever emphasis is mine.³⁸⁴

Secondly, considering texts as holistic constructs means to be aware that texts often include references that may be unclear or vague for readers that do not share the same cultural sensitivities of the organisation/movement under study, because they tap into body of knowledge that is tacitly understood between an organisation/movement and its audience.³⁸⁵ In the thesis, I adopt this awareness particularly with regards to the case studies' explicit or implicit allusions to the Muslim ideational repertoire, which I clarify for the reader whenever relevant and appropriate.

Thirdly, considering text as holistic constructs means to purposively focus on key portions for the purposes of verbatim quotation and close analysis, which are selected in light of their particular richness or representativeness—both of which can be assessed after a first step consisting of a general review of the entire text.³⁸⁶ In the thesis, I adopt this strategy when, for example, I focus on key discourse moments within each document, such as annual reports' opening messages from each organisation's CEO and/or Chair of Trustees.

- *Attentiveness to the text's 'speech situation' and 'pragmatic intent'*

Whilst distancing itself from the structural focus at the centre of macrodiscourse analysis, the microdiscourse analysis proposed by Johnston is not oblivious of the context wherein a text is produced and the influence the former can have on the latter. On the one hand, this is conveyed by an attention to the text's "speech situation," in other words the "bounded episode of interaction in which there are specific social rules for what should and should not be said."³⁸⁷ On the other hand, Johnston also highlights how "texts must be analyzed with an eye to what the speaker/writer is trying to accomplish, or the pragmatic intent behind the words."³⁸⁸ From this perspectives, the intended audience of a text, scope of

³⁸⁴ For an example of the use of this technique in published research, see: Lisa Lobry de Bruyn, 'Monitoring Online Communication: Can the Development of Convergence and Social Presence Indicate an Interactive Learning Environment?', *Distance Education* 25, no. 1 (2004): 73, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0158791042000212468>.

³⁸⁵ Johnston, 'A Methodology for Frame Analysis: From Discourse to Cognitive Schemata', 221.

³⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 222.

³⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 223.

³⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 227.

diffusion and purpose are important determinants of what gets said and how. In the thesis, my attentiveness to speech situation and pragmatic intent is reflected, for example, by the fact that I choose a Ramadan campaign for each case study as the paradigmatic example of their mobilisation efforts in light of the cultural opportunities this type of discourse moment offers within the BMNGO sector.

- *Attentiveness to 'discursive cues'*

Finally, Johnston advises the frame analyst to be aware of the fact that nonverbal channels of information also convey meaning, often indicating when different or shaded interpretations of texts are required.³⁸⁹ This is the case, for example, for “accompanying pictures in the case of documents,”³⁹⁰ which I do take in consideration in the thesis, through analyses that attempt to identify subtle cues and clarify their different layers of meaning (rather than taking them for granted).

3.2.1.3 *Theoretical payoffs*

In conclusion to this section of the chapter, it is important to highlight that (as Johnston himself notes) whilst sceptics may question what is gained by this time-consuming approach to frame analysis, this is in fact useful and important because it enhances: i) the reliability of the analysis, through a more systematic approach to the content of frames “through an intensive dialogue between the general concepts represented in frame structures and the textual materials on which they are based”; and ii) the validity of the analysis, by “avoiding factual errors” (thanks to approaching any text in its totality) and by strengthening interpretation through “a great deal more empirical grounding” that answers the oft-launched criticism “that there is too much loose interpretation taking place too far from the data.”³⁹¹

Having outlined how the theoretical and methodological underpinnings of the frame theory approach developed within social movement studies informs the thesis, the next section delineates how this study positions itself specifically as a research effort within the sociology of Islam and Muslims, falling under the broad disciplinary field of Islamic studies.

³⁸⁹ Ibid., 228.

³⁹⁰ Johnston, ‘Comparative Frame Analysis’, 246.

³⁹¹ Ibid., 249; Johnston, ‘A Methodology for Frame Analysis: From Discourse to Cognitive Schemata’, 241.

3.3 A 'post-Orientalist' approach

Recent years have seen the emergence of two major approaches to the study of Islam and Muslims, particularly (but not exclusively) with regards to expressions of Islam in the public sphere.

Since the 1990s, the post-Cold War disintegration of secular ideologies and the almost simultaneous emergence of a second wave of 'Islamic resurgence' have determined the flourishing of a vast body of literature (mainly originating from political science) which focuses on the 'Islamism'/'political Islam' paradigm.³⁹² At one end of the spectrum, the neoliberal reformulation of the 'West versus the rest' formula³⁹³ has been championed by a number of voices "conjuring with Islam,"³⁹⁴ which have enabled more or less Manichean and "frustrating"³⁹⁵ forms of 'neo-Orientalism'³⁹⁶ to often "infiltrate even the most avowedly objective of published studies."³⁹⁷ At the other end of the spectrum, however, the post-modern focus on the relationship between knowledge and power, its deconstructive thrust, and its emphasis on the subjectivity of any interpreter/interpretation has also led a number of scholars to attempt "stepping back from the world long enough to question the hegemonic discourses"³⁹⁸ in order to understand Muslim discourse "as close to its own terms and categories as humanly possible."³⁹⁹ Embarking on the 'post-Orientalist'⁴⁰⁰ trajectory set by Edward Said's seminal work, this strand

³⁹² Edward Said W., *Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World* (New York: Vintage Books, 1997), 149; Ahmed, Akbar S., 'Postmodernist Perceptions of Islam: Observing the Observer.', *Asian Survey* 31, no. 3 (1991): 217.

³⁹³ Said, Edward W., 'The Clash of Ignorance', in *The Geopolitics Reader*, ed. Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Simon Dalby, and Paul Routledge (London: Routledge, 2006), 147. The 'West versus the rest' paradigm has been articulated, for example, through works such as Lewis' "The Roots of Muslim Rage" and Huntington's "The Clash of Civilizations" (Bernard Lewis, 'The Roots of Muslim Rage: Why so Many Muslims Deeply Resent the West, and Why Their Bitterness Will Not Easily Be Mollified', *Atlantic Monthly*, 1990.; Samuel P Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).

³⁹⁴ Lawrence, Bruce B., 'Conjuring with Islam, II', *Journal of American History* 89, no. 2 (2002): 486; 488-490.

³⁹⁵ Sayed Khatab and Gary D. Bouma, *Democracy In Islam* (Psychology Press, 2007), 3.

³⁹⁶ Mohammad Samiei, 'Neo-Orientalism? A Critical Appraisal of Changing Western Perspectives: Bernard Lewis, John Esposito and Gilles Kepel' (Thesis, 2009), <http://westminsterresearch.wmin.ac.uk/8495/>.

³⁹⁷ Daniel Varisco, *Islam Obscured: The Rhetoric of Anthropological Representation* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 157.

³⁹⁸ Susan Buck-Morss, *Thinking Past Terror: Islamism and Critical Theory on the Left* (Verso, 2003), 42.

³⁹⁹ Roxanne L. Euben, *Enemy in the Mirror: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Limits of Modern Rationalism: A Work of Comparative Political Theory* (Princeton University Press, 1999), 90.

⁴⁰⁰ Carl W. Ernst and Richard C. Martin, 'Introduction: Toward a Post-Orientalist Approach to Islamic Religious Studies', in *Rethinking Islamic Studies: From Orientalism to Cosmopolitanism*, ed. Carl W. Ernst and Richard C. Martin, Studies in Comparative Religion [Columbia, S.C.]

of literature attempts to deconstruct monolithic, stereotyped and often pathologized images of Islam, whilst also advocating the right for Muslim actors (in the case of this thesis, BMNGOs) to speak for themselves.⁴⁰¹ .

Defining exactly what a 'post-Orientalist' approach represents, however, is not an easy task. This difficulty partly originates from the way 'Orientalism' and its contemporary cognate ('neo-Orientalism') are defined.

On the one hand, if Orientalism is considered as an almost value-free specific tradition of academic scholarship based on Western-centred "erudite study of texts and ideas"⁴⁰² related to Islam and Muslims, then 'neo Orientalism' becomes almost a synonymous of 'new cultural history'.⁴⁰³ At its best, this approach emphasises the specificities of the 'Islamic dimension' of discourse and practices, focusing on the relationship between religious/ideational elements with the Islamic textual and interpretative traditions. At its worst, this approach essentialises Islamic/Muslim exceptionality to the point of making it "unintelligible in comparative terms,"⁴⁰⁴ thus considering any manifestation of Muslim discourse (such as BMNGOs' discourse) as being "inherently or essentially rooted in the religion of Islam."⁴⁰⁵

From this perspective, the 'post' in 'post-Orientalism' refers mainly to a methodological evolution indicating two main shifts. On the one hand, the post-Orientalist approach is aware of the indispensability of "a degree of methodological self-consciousness,"⁴⁰⁶ which manifests itself through a degree of "reflexivity" and "anxieties" that are absent within neo-Orientalism.⁴⁰⁷ On the other hand, the post-Orientalist approach implies "the transformation of the subject matter of Orientalism with theories and methods more common in

(Columbia, S.C: University of South Carolina Press, 2010), 1–19; Hamid Dabashi, *Post-Orientalism: Knowledge and Power in Time of Terror* (Transaction Publishers, 2009).

⁴⁰¹ John L. Esposito, *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?*, 3rd ed. (Oxford University Press, USA, 1999), 2–3; Euben, *Enemy in the Mirror*, 6; 165.

⁴⁰² Carl W. Ernst and Richard C. Martin, 'Introduction: Toward a Post-Orientalist Approach to Islamic Religious Studies', 2.

⁴⁰³ Edmund III Burke, 'Islam and Social Movements: Methodological Reflections', in *Islam, Politics, and Social Movements*, ed. Edmund III Burke, Ervand Abrahamian, and Ira Ira Marvin Lapidus (University of California Press, 1988), 19–20.

⁴⁰⁴ Quintan Wiktorowicz, 'Islamic Activism and Social Movement Theory: A New Direction for Research', *Mediterranean Politics* 7, no. 3 (2002): 189.

⁴⁰⁵ Wolff, K. E, 'New New Orientalism: Political Islam and Social Movement Theory', in *Islamic Fundamentalism: Myths & Realities*, ed. Ahmad S. Moussalli (Ithaca Press, 1998), 44.

⁴⁰⁶ Burke, 'Islam and Social Movements: Methodological Reflections', 18.

⁴⁰⁷ Charles Kurzman, 'Social Movement Theory and Islamic Studies', in *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach*, ed. Quintan Wiktorowicz, Indiana Series in Middle East Studies (Bloomington, Ind: Indiana University Press, 2004), 296.

contemporary scholarship,”⁴⁰⁸ through the combination of “solid training in the languages, texts, and history of premodern Islam” (characteristic of traditional Orientalism) with theories, “questions and debates of contemporary scholarship across disciplines and regions.”⁴⁰⁹

Informed by this understanding, the thesis adopts a post-Orientalist approach insofar it is guided by the awareness of the challenge to acknowledge Islamic/Muslim specificities whilst abstaining from pre-emptive essentialisations based on ontological dualism. In order to do so, the thesis combines an attention to the distinctively Muslim tradition (of texts, interpretations and concepts) incorporated within BMNGOs’ discourse with a broader analysis of their meaning-making efforts through the frame theory approach.

On the other hand, Orientalism represents more than merely an academic tradition based on specific methodological approach. As Said reminds us, Orientalism also implies an ideological dimension, “a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction”⁴¹⁰ between the ‘Self’ (the Occident) and the ‘Other’ (the Orient)—“between Western superiority and Oriental inferiority.”⁴¹¹ Consequently, ‘neo-Orientalism’ represents a paradigm that inherits the colonial value-system of 19th century Orientalism and re-elaborates it against the background and under the influence of a globalised 21st century.⁴¹²

⁴⁰⁸ Carl W. Ernst and Richard C. Martin, ‘Introduction: Toward a Post-Orientalist Approach to Islamic Religious Studies’, 8.

⁴⁰⁹ Ibid., 13; 8.

⁴¹⁰ Edward W Said, *Orientalism* ([S.I.]: Penguin, 1995), 2.

⁴¹¹ Ibid., 42. To Said, Orientalism entails: “a *distribution* of geopolitical awareness into aesthetic, scholarly, economic, sociological, historical, and philological texts; it is an *elaboration* not only of a basic geographical distinction (...) but also of a whole series of “interests” which, by such means as scholarly discovery, philological reconstruction, psychological analysis, landscape and sociological description, it not only creates but also maintains; it *is*, rather than expresses, a certain *will* or *intention* to understand, in some cases to control, manipulate, even to incorporate, what is a manifestly different (or alternative and novel) world; it is, above all, a discourse that is (...) produced and exists in an uneven exchange with various kinds of power, shaped to a degree by the exchange with power political (as with a colonial or imperial establishment), power intellectual (as with reigning sciences like comparative linguistics or anatomy, or any of the modern policy sciences), power cultural (as with orthodoxies and canons of taste, texts, values), power moral (as with ideas about what “we” do and what “they” cannot do or understand as “we” do).” (Ibid., 12.)

⁴¹² Mohammad Samiei, ‘Neo-Orientalism? A Critical Appraisal of Changing Western Perspectives: Bernard Lewis, John Esposito and Gilles Kepel.’ (University of Westminster, 2009), 21–23. Authors such as Michael Cook, Patricia Crone, and Bernard Lewis are often considered as key exponents of this trend. (Lawrence Rosen, ‘Orientalism Revisited’, *Boston Review*, February 2007, sec. ‘Facts speak for themselves’; ‘Etymology is destiny’, <http://bostonreview.net/BR32.1/rosen.php>.)

From this perspective, the 'post' in 'post-Orientalism' refers not just to a theoretical-methodological evolution but, more importantly, to an epistemological and moral turn.

Informed by this understanding, the thesis adopts a post-Orientalist approach insofar it approaches BMNGOs as equal contributors to current NGO discourse, hence overcoming the Self/Other dichotomy and aiming to contribute challenging the stereotyping and pathologizing that often pre-emptively characterises debates around these actors.

Finally, a sub-field of the sociological study of Islam and Muslims that is particularly relevant for the thesis is that of the study of 'Muslim activism'. Within the context of the debates between neo- and post-Orientalism, a growing body of literature within this sub-field denounces the "significant intellectual gulf that divided between Middle East area studies, on the one hand, and broader international and comparative studies, on the other hand."⁴¹³ This gap partly derives from the (neo-)Orientalist tendency to consider forms of Muslim activism as 'exceptional' and inherently unsuitable for wider comparative approaches and/or theory-building.⁴¹⁴ Therefore, influenced by the post-Orientalist ethos, an emerging strand of literature is "eager to normalize and 'de-essentialize'" Muslim activism as comparable to other forms of activism,⁴¹⁵ contending that the former "resemble[s] other kinds of collective action, and should not therefore remain a separate category of analysis."⁴¹⁶ Consequently, this approach argues that the dynamics and organisation of Muslim activism transcend the phenomenon known as "Islamism" and rather show considerable parallels with various forms of contemporary non-Muslim activism.⁴¹⁷ From this perspective, Muslim activism "is manifested in heterogeneous and overlapping forms" that often are "neither purely political nor apolitical" but "existential":⁴¹⁸ as Bayat puts it, Muslim activism entails faith-inspired "*extra-ordinary*, extra-usual practices which aim, collectively or individually, institutionally or informally, to cause social change,"⁴¹⁹ through a

⁴¹³ Wiktorowicz, 'Islamic Activism and Social Movement Theory', 207.

⁴¹⁴ Oded Haklai, 'Authoritarianism and Islamic Movements in the Middle East: Research and Theory-Building in the Twenty-First Century', *International Studies Review* 11, no. 1 (2009): 29.

⁴¹⁵ Wiktorowicz, 'Islamic Activism and Social Movement Theory', 207.

⁴¹⁶ Wolff, K. E, 'New New Orientalism: Political Islam and Social Movement Theory', 53.

⁴¹⁷ Wiktorowicz, 'Islamic Activism and Social Movement Theory', 188–89.

⁴¹⁸ M Hashem, 'Contemporary Islamic Activism: The Shades of Praxis', *Sociology of Religion* 67, no. 1 (2006): 24-25.

⁴¹⁹ Asef Bayat, 'Islamism and Social Movement Theory', *Third World Quarterly* 26, no. 6 (2005): 893–94.

“variety of collective actors that operate in the name of ‘Islam’”—from Muslim study circles to Muslim NGOs.⁴²⁰ Notably, despite this school of thought implies a “punch line of universalism”⁴²¹ suggesting that Muslim activism “is not *sui generis*,”⁴²² it also acknowledges that “ideational components and the inspiration of Islam as an ideological world-view”⁴²³ often represent a locus of Muslim distinctiveness, and therefore cautions that the extent to which Muslim activism “conforms to the theoretical expectations of social movement studies is an empirical matter,”⁴²⁴ assessable only through “in-depth case studies and rich empirical detail.”⁴²⁵

Informed by this body of scholarship, the thesis provides in-depth, empirical case studies of BMNGOs as actors that mobilise different forms of ‘Muslim activism’ (broadly understood) through complex web of meanings derived from the interaction between a Muslim-specific universe of references with a broader (non Muslim-centric) system of frames.

In conclusion, before moving to the ‘core’ of the thesis in the next chapters, it is important to outline here how I practically collected and analysed the data from the two case studies under study.

Conclusion

In chapter 2 I highlighted that a significant gap exists in our understanding of the discourse of BMNGOs and that what is lacking is empirically grounded, detailed case studies. I also pointed to the fact that this gap may be partly explained by the inherent challenges of studying complex actors such as BMNGOs, which (often) fluidly navigate across different traditions (e.g. Islam, development, civil society, etc.) and therefore occupy, in and of themselves, a space between different disciplines. Conscious that a narrow disciplinary focus cannot help us understanding the complexity of these actors’ discourse, and given that, overall, I take an issue-driven research approach that prioritises the research

⁴²⁰ ‘Introduction: Islamic Activism and Social Movement Theory’, in *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach*, Indiana Series in Middle East Studies (Bloomington, Ind: Indiana University Press, 2004), 4–5.

⁴²¹ Kurzman, ‘Social Movement Theory and Islamic Studies’, 297.

⁴²² Wiktorowicz, ‘Islamic Activism and Social Movement Theory’, 189.

⁴²³ Ibid.

⁴²⁴ Kurzman, ‘Social Movement Theory and Islamic Studies’, 298.

⁴²⁵ Haklai, ‘Authoritarianism and Islamic Movements in the Middle East’, 36.

topic/questions (and flexibility) over concerns with disciplinary ‘purity’, in this study I adopt an original interdisciplinary methodological framework for the study of BMNGO’s discourse.⁴²⁸ In this chapter I have introduced this framework, highlighting how the combination between the frame theory approach (derived from social movement studies) and the post-Orientalist approach (derived from Islamic studies) represents a valuable (and possibly the best) methodological framework to achieve the aims of the thesis. The chapter has provided an outline of the main theoretical underpinnings of these approaches and highlighted some of their key methodological implications. Finally, the chapter concluded with an overview of the methods of data collection and analysis I practically adopted to conduct the research.

⁴²⁸ I use the term ‘interdisciplinary’ following the analysis of this term offered by Patricia Leavy in her comparison between this and the multi- and trans-disciplinary research approaches. Patricia Leavy, *Essentials of Transdisciplinary Research: Using Problem-Centered Methodologies* (Routledge, 2016), 20–23. Notably, my approach resonates with the recent call within the study of Muslim organisations in the West to introduce a more “multidisciplinary bottom-up research perspective” for to the study of these actors. Kerstin Rosenow-Williams and Matthias Kortmann, ‘Multidisciplinary Research on Islamic Organizations: Heterogeneous Organizational Forms, Strategies, and Practices’, in *Islamic Organizations in Europe and the USA. A Multidisciplinary Perspective*, ed. Matthias Kortmann and Kerstin Rosenow-Williams (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 8.

PART ONE:
FRAMING ORGANISATIONAL IDENTITY

Chapter 4 . Islamic Relief's ISLAMIC HUMANITARIANISM frame

Introduction

In recent years, IR has been increasingly identifying the Self as “a policy leader” and “an authority” on “*Islamic humanitarianism*.”⁴²⁹ Yet, this particular framing has not always been used to characterise the organisation's identity. Indeed, a close analysis of IR's discourse highlights that what can be called the ISLAMIC HUMANITARIANISM frame represents the fruit of an almost decennial work of development, alignment, and refinement of earlier frames—a work that aptly represents IR's efforts to navigate the porous borders between distinctiveness (i.e. IR as a Muslim faith-based organisation) and sameness (i.e. IR as a humanitarian/development NGO).

These processes (and the tensions underlying them) have not taken place in a vacuum. Rather, they reflect and manifest in discursive form debates that have emerged within the organisation throughout the last decade. At the centre of these dynamics lies a core question: how to frame IR's organisational identity vis-à-vis its relationship with faith, values, and humanitarian work?

Well aware of the significance of this question, IR has recently conducted an internal research exercise aimed at “investigating the role of values and their relationship with faith in a faith-based organisation.”⁴³⁰ In practice, this exercise represented a response to “a tipping point”⁴³¹ that led the charity's trustees to “question whether IR's faith values are being lost, with the organisation becoming comparable to secular organisations doing similar work.”⁴³²

As explicitly declared by IR, this tipping point is reflective of the organisation growth and maturation. During its formative period, IR was a relatively homogenous organisation whose leadership and workforce were constituted

⁴²⁹ Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Islamic Relief Worldwide 2013 Annual Report & Financial Statements’ (Birmingham: Islamic Relief Worldwide, 2013), 15; 39, http://www.islamic-relief.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/IRW_AR2013.pdf; Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Islamic Relief Worldwide 2014 Annual Report & Financial Statements’ (Birmingham: Islamic Relief Worldwide, 2014), 15, <http://library.iracademy.org.uk/islamic-relief-worldwide-2014-annual-report-financial-statements/>. Italics mine.

⁴³⁰ Shakil Butt, ‘The Role of Values and Their Relationship with Faith in a Faith-Based Organisation’ (Birmingham, UK: Islamic Relief Academy, 2015), 23, <http://library.iracademy.org.uk/the-role-of-values-and-their-relationship-with-faith-in-a-faith-based-organisation/>.

⁴³¹ Kasim Randeree, Head of Research & Development at Islamic Relief Academy. In: Ibid., sec. Foreword.

⁴³² Butt, ‘The Role of Values and Their Relationship with Faith in a Faith-Based Organisation’, 10.

mostly by first generation, practicing (male) Muslims of Middle Eastern or Asian origin, among which there was “an unspoken understanding of IR’s values.”⁴³³ As IR’s co-founder and former president Dr Hany El Banna, and previous CEO Haroun Atallah highlight, the faith-based, Muslim dimension of IR’s identity was especially prevalent during its foundational stages, and in that period the organisation “was 100 percent about faith.”⁴³⁴ With time, IR has become an increasingly heterogenous organisation. Internally, a more diverse personnel (which started to include second and third generation Muslims, women, and non-Muslim staff) led to the emergence of what IR tellingly describes as “subcultures.”⁴³⁵ Externally, IR has multiplied its collaborative efforts with partners that increasingly included both faith-based and secular organisations, working both in the Muslim and non-Muslim world.⁴³⁶ Altogether, these phenomena have led some of IR’s senior managers to have concerns about the possible dispersion of the organisation’s original identity as a distinctively “Islamic organisation” with values “formed strongly around faith” and about the risk that “dominant subcultures [would] thrive to fill neglected cultural voids.”⁴³⁷

In light of these developments, by the middle of the 2010s IR finds itself at a critical junction, aptly expressed by the key questions about distinctiveness that have arisen among its leadership and staff:

The questions that have arisen are: what is ‘Islamic’ about Islamic Relief? If the name and logo were removed would there be any difference between IR and other organisations? Is it important to have a difference?⁴³⁸

The aim of this chapter is to explore how these questions have found manifestation in IR’s public discourse through frames that have articulated different degrees of ‘distinctiveness’ (i.e. IR as a faith-based organisation) and ‘sameness’ (i.e. IR as a humanitarian/development NGO) throughout the years. Indeed, the exploration of this dimension of IR’s discourse is particularly significant at this moment in time, since the questions summarised in the foregoing extract mirror the organisation’s current deliberate efforts to find “a

⁴³³ Ibid.

⁴³⁴ Ibid., 25–26.

⁴³⁵ Kasim Randeree, Head of Research & Development at Islamic Relief Academy. In: Ibid., sec. Foreword.

⁴³⁶ Ibid., 10.

⁴³⁷ Kasim Randeree, Head of Research & Development at Islamic Relief Academy. In: Ibid., sec. Foreword.

⁴³⁸ Ibid., 10.

clearly defined articulation of where Islamic Relief is and where Islamic Relief aspired to be, in terms of its organisation values.”⁴³⁹

From this perspective, today’s IR’s framing of the Self as “a policy leader” or “an authority” in “Islamic humanitarianism” can be read as its most recent effort to capture the organisation’s identity through a frame (ISLAMIC HUMANITARIANISM) that self-confidently synthesises distinctiveness and sameness. In the following sections I will highlight how this framing strategy seems to represent the fruit of the evolution of two alternative frames that have enjoyed different prominence at different times in IR’s discourse: the ISLAMIC VALUES and the ISLAMIC HUMANITARIAN VALUES frames. I will also discuss how these frames developed alongside three main phases that can be identified in IR’s discursive trajectory, with two key shifts being prompted by IR’s adoption of its global strategies in 2007 (the 2007-09 strategy) and 2011 (the 2011-15 strategy).

4.1. Assuming distinctiveness: 2005-07

The 2005-07 biennium represents a period of discursive experimentation in between two ‘firsts’ for IR. In 2005, for the first time after twenty years from its foundation, IR begins to formalise its ethos by articulating an explicit vision and mission.⁴⁴⁰ In 2007, IR develops for the first time a ‘global strategy’,⁴⁴¹ which notably also stresses the importance for the organisation to develop a clear, coherent and value-centred organisational discourse.⁴⁴²

In this phase, IR adopts an ISLAMIC VALUES frame (henceforth, IV) that qualifies its organisational values simply as ‘Islamic’. This is prominently

⁴³⁹ Kasim Randeree, Head of Research & Development at Islamic Relief Academy. In: *Ibid.*, sec. Foreword.

⁴⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 21. Notably, the annual report marking IR’s twentieth anniversary (2004) is the first among those made available online in an electronic format by the organisation. This, however, does not mention any specific organisational vision or mission. Previous years’ reports are not available online, but only upon request (IR’s recently digitalised e-library provides only a scanned copy of the cover page for the annual reports 1997, 1998, 1999 and 2003, respectively accessible at: <http://library.iracademy.org.uk/islamic-relief-annual-report-1997/>; <http://library.iracademy.org.uk/islamic-relief-annual-report-1998/>; <http://library.iracademy.org.uk/islamic-relief-annual-report-1999/>; <http://library.iracademy.org.uk/islamic-relief-annual-review-2003/>).

⁴⁴¹ ‘Islamic Relief Strategy 2007-2009. Working for Change’ (Birmingham, UK: Islamic Relief Worldwide, 2007), 2, <http://library.iracademy.org.uk/islamic-relief-strategy-2007-2009/>.

⁴⁴² *Ibid.*, 20.

incorporated in the opening part of IR's mission statement in the years 2005-07, as I highlight in table 4.1.

Table 4.1 The ISLAMIC VALUES frame in IR's mission statement, 2005-07

Inspired by <i>Islamic values</i> , Islamic Relief Worldwide	2005 ⁴⁴³	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assisting individuals, groups and institutions to develop safe and caring communities. • Helping the poor and those who are suffering to enjoy self-reliance, with dignity. • Making it possible for those who wish to reach those in need of their help.
	will be a worldwide role model in	
	2006 ⁴⁴⁴	
	will be a global role model in	
	2007 ⁴⁴⁵	
	works to	

The adoption of a IV frame would suggest an emphasis on *distinctiveness* as the frame focuses on ‘values’ (in and of themselves the core of what can define an organisation’s distinctiveness) that are qualified uniquely as ‘Islamic’. In turn, this would plausibly make one assume to find within IR’s discourse at this stage a deliberate emphasis on its distinctive identity as a Muslim organisation—for example, by means of a consistent and relevant use of references drawn from the Muslim cultural repertoire.⁴⁴⁶ However, a closer analysis reveals an apparent paradox between IR’s incorporation of the IV frame and its overall narrative at this stage. In fact, references to Muslim tradition are virtually absent and IR’s discourse is almost undistinguishable from that of most international development NGOs—hence conveying a strong sense of sameness, rather than distinctiveness.

Two key examples are particularly significant to highlight this point. Firstly, the complete articulation of the mission statement (reproduced in the second and third columns in table 4.1) appeals to values that are neither explicitly expressed through a distinctively Islamic vocabulary,⁴⁴⁷ nor are identifiable as uniquely Islamic, such as: 1) leadership—both moral and professional;⁴⁴⁸ 2) benevolence

⁴⁴³ Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Islamic Relief Worldwide and Subsidiary Undertakings. Annual Report and Financial Statements 2005’ (Birmingham: Islamic Relief Worldwide, 2005), 7, http://www.islamic-relief.org.uk/content/uploads/2013/05/Annual_Report_2005.pdf.

⁴⁴⁴ Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Islamic Relief Worldwide and Subsidiary Undertakings. Annual Report and Financial Statements 2006’ (Birmingham: Islamic Relief Worldwide, 2006), 2, http://www.islamic-relief.org.uk/content/uploads/2013/05/Annual_Report_2006.pdf; ‘Islamic Relief Strategy 2007-2009. Working for Change’, 5.

⁴⁴⁵ Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Islamic Relief Worldwide and Subsidiary Undertakings. Annual Report and Financial Statements 2007’ (Birmingham: Islamic Relief Worldwide, 2007), 2, http://www.islamic-relief.org.uk/content/uploads/2013/05/Annual_Report_2007.pdf.

⁴⁴⁶ Such as well-known terms, concepts and historical precedents within Muslim civilisation.

⁴⁴⁷ This will be the case in the 2011-14 phase, as I discuss later in this chapter.

⁴⁴⁸ Conveyed by the expression: “will be a worldwide [/global] role model”

and generosity;⁴⁴⁹ and 3) empowerment.⁴⁵⁰ Secondly, the rather contradictory relationship between IR's adoption of a IV frame and the lack of references to a distinctive Muslim discourse is particularly clear in 2006, when IR dedicates for the first time an entire section in its annual reports to formalise its own values. The elaborated list of six items includes: 1) "accountability", 2) "humanitarianism", 3) "neutrality & impartiality", 4) "inclusiveness", 5) "integrity" and 6) "co-operation."⁴⁵¹ Notably, these values closely mirror the core principles underlying mainstream humanitarian/development discourse and practice. The latter has been articulated across the decades through a number of milestones, among which: the formalisation of the four overarching 'humanitarian principles' (humanity, neutrality, impartiality, independence);⁴⁵² the development of the ten core principles of the "Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief"—adherence to which has become an important way for NGOs to define themselves as humanitarian;⁴⁵³ and the principles for maximising the impact of aid and development work, outlined by the High Level Fora on Aid Effectiveness.⁴⁵⁴ Whilst it is beyond the scope of this analysis to provide a detailed comparative analysis, it is worth noting how IR's list of values at this stage can essentially be interpreted as a 'declaration of sameness' that stresses the organisation's alignment with mainstream humanitarian/development discourse. In figure 4.1 I highlight this by aligning IR's

⁴⁴⁹ Conveyed by the expressions: "Assisting"; "Helping"; "to reach those in need of their help".

⁴⁵⁰ Conveyed by the expression: "to develop safe and caring communities"; "to enjoy self-reliance, with dignity".

⁴⁵¹ Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2006', 2.

⁴⁵² The first three principles (humanity, neutrality and impartiality) were endorsed in 1991 by General Assembly resolution 46/182. The fourth principle (independence) was endorsed in 2004 by General Assembly resolution 58/114. The humanitarian principles are derived from the core principles of the International Committee of the Red Cross and the national Red Cross/Red Crescent Societies (which include also voluntary service, unity and universality). These were proclaimed in 1965 by the 20th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. 'OCHA on Message: Humanitarian Principles' (OCHA. UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2012), 1, <http://www.unocha.org/about-us/publications/humanitarian-principles>.

⁴⁵³ 'Code of Conduct', *International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies*, accessed 18 April 2017, <https://media.ifrc.org/ifrc/who-we-are/the-movement/code-of-conduct/>.

⁴⁵⁴ There have been four High Level Fora on Aid Effectiveness in Rome, Paris, Accra and Busan in 2003, 2005, 2008 and 2011 respectively. Significantly, the Forum that took place within the biennial under analysis in this section (i.e. Paris, 2005) marked the first time that donors and recipients both agreed to commitments and to hold each other accountable for achieving these. The commitments were laid out in the Paris Declaration, which also outlined five principles on effective aid. 'The High Level Fora on Aid Effectiveness: A History', *OECD - Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development*, accessed 18 April 2017, <http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/thehighlevelforaonaideffectivenessahistory.htm>.

values (in circles, at the centre) to the relevant principles set forth by the aforementioned key mainstream humanitarian references (top and bottom half).

The delicate tension between distinctiveness and sameness within IR's discourse at this stage is further highlighted by the fact that, despite its overall mainstream, secular tone, it nevertheless incorporates a 'higher', spiritual dimension ascribable to a distinct faith-based (Islamic) framework in the articulation of two of its six values: accountability and integrity. In fact, these are not framed merely through the lens of professionalism, but also incorporate a religious/moral dimension. This locates ultimate accountability not among humans but before the Divine and frames integrity not just as a commitment to work within the framework of international codes of conduct, but also on the basis of "the highest *moral* values":

1. ACCOUNTABILITY

We are accountable to:

- Our Creator in all that we do. (...)

5. INTEGRITY

We will: (...)

- Ensure the means we use will be based on the highest moral values.⁴⁵⁵

⁴⁵⁵ Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2006', 2.




Figure 4.1 Alignment of IR's values (central row) with mainstream humanitarian/development discourse

Against this background, the 2006 annual report introduces the ISLAMIC HUMANITARIAN VALUES frame (henceforth, IHV). Whilst the visibility of this frame is still very limited at this stage,⁴⁵⁶ its significance is notable because it appears right after the IV frame within one of IR's key objectives on "Campaigning and advocacy on humanitarian issues," as IR commits itself:

- To increase awareness of those *Islamic values* that encourage us to spend less on ourselves and more on the needy.
- To ensure that Islamic Relief Worldwide's *Islamic humanitarian values* are embedded in our work and are promoted to donors and the public.⁴⁵⁷

The simultaneous use of both the IV and IHV frames in the aforementioned passage highlights how these seem to be used by IR to evoke two different set of values. On the one hand, here the IV frame mainly conveys ideas of generosity traditionally associated with Islam's emphasis on charitable spending ("spend less on ourselves and more on the needy"). On the other hand, the IHV refers to a more holistic set of values (i.e. the list of six items mentioned earlier), which essentially mirrors key principles of mainstream humanitarianism.

Having qualified its apparently mainstream humanitarian values as 'Islamic' through the IHV frame, IR engages in at least three frame alignment processes⁴⁵⁸ that aim to rationalise their assumed 'Islamic-ness'.

Firstly, the 2006 report introduces IR's humanitarian values not just as being compatible with Islam, but as lying at its very core, as "integral" to it:

⁴⁵⁶ The expression 'Islamic humanitarian values' appears only once in the 2006 annual report, in the following extract.

⁴⁵⁷ Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2006', 13. Italics mine.

⁴⁵⁸ The idea of "frame alignment" was introduced by Snow, Benford and colleagues to refer "to the linkage of individual and SMO [Social Movement Organisations] interpretive orientations, such that some set of individual interests, values and beliefs and SMO activities, goals, and ideology are congruent and complementary." Frame alignment is "a necessary condition for movement participation" and consists in mainly four processes: (a) *frame bridging*: this refers to "the linkage of two or more ideologically congruent but structurally unconnected frames regarding a particular issue or problem"; (b) *frame amplification*: this refers to "the clarification and invigoration of an interpretive frame that bears on a particular issue" through, for example "value" and/or "beliefs amplification"; (c) *frame extension*: this refers to a process that "extend[s] the boundaries of its primary framework so as to encompass interests or points of view that are incidental to its primary objectives but of considerable salience to potential adherents"; (d) *frame transformation*: when "the programs, causes, and values that some SMOs promote" do "not resonate with, and on occasion may even appear antithetical to, conventional lifestyles or rituals and extant interpretive frames," then "new values may have to be planted and nurtured, old meanings or understandings jettisoned, and erroneous beliefs or "misframings" reframed" through frame transformation. (David A. Snow et al., 'Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation', *American Sociological Review* 51, no. 4 (1986): 464; 467-475, doi:10.2307/2095581.)

The following values guide and shape our policies and work, and are *integral to the Islamic faith*.⁴⁵⁹

In other words, conscious of the fact that the list of its six values closely mirrors the canon of mainstream humanitarian principles, IR seems to feel the need to argue that such a list is not borrowed from an ‘alien’ tradition (of secular, Western humanitarianism) but, rather, that it stems directly from the distinctive Islamic tradition which the organisation identifies itself with.

Secondly, the report aligns Islamic and humanitarian values by rooting IR’s six core aims (presented right after the section on values) into a holistic (and, to a certain degree, sloganeering) “Islamic spirit of humanitarianism” that situates humanitarianism at the centre of the Muslim worldview:

These aims are inspired by the *Islamic spirit of humanitarianism*.⁴⁶⁰

Thirdly, the report explicitly refers to the notion of ‘alignment’ in a section dedicated to IR’s “Ethos.” Here, IR’s humanitarian principles are “align[ed] with Islamic values” by apparently shifting the gravitational centre in IR’s value system: whilst the list of six organisational values revolves around humanitarianism as the central overarching idea, here the gravitational centre is represented by the value that IR articulates with the clearest reference to a distinctively Islamic dimension (i.e. accountability):

These values *align with Islamic values* which put a great emphasis on accountability before the Creator and Stakeholders and are *at the core* of IRW’s ethos.⁴⁶¹

In conclusion, at this stage IR attempts to navigate between distinctiveness and sameness through three main overlapping strategies: 1) the formalisation of a list of organisational values that *de facto* duplicate key principles of mainstream humanitarianism; 2) the incorporation of a visible but rather inconsistent IV frame; 3) the primordial development of a IHV frame that aims to bridge the gap between humanitarian and Islamic values by rationalising the alleged ‘Islamic-ness’ of the former. In light of these strategies and of the apparent discrepancy between the introduction of a IV frame, on the one hand, and the ‘mainstreamness’ of IR’s

⁴⁵⁹ Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2006’, 2. Italics mine.

⁴⁶⁰ Ibid., 3. Italics mine.

⁴⁶¹ Ibid., 20. Italics mine.

overall discourse, on the other, the 2005-07 phase can be thus characterised as one of ‘*assuming distinctiveness*’. This is because at this stage there seem to be two key unspoken assumptions. Firstly, the distinctiveness of IR as a Muslim organisation is taken for granted, in a way that does not imply the need to frame it by drawing from explicit references to the Muslim cultural repertoire. Secondly, Islamic values are assumed to be inherently (and almost self-evidently) compatible with humanitarian values, in a way that does not require an effort to elaborate on the synergies between the Muslim tradition and humanitarian norm.

4.2. Seeking balance: 2007-09

As mentioned in the previous section, 2007 is the year when IR formalises for the first time a global strategy. This milestone represents a key shift in IR’s commitment to try addressing the inconsistencies and possible tensions between alternative frames introduced in the earlier phase. Particularly, at this stage IR seems to become aware of the need to clearly and coherently communicate the distinctiveness that it had previously taken for granted, as highlighted by the following passage:

Raising awareness and interest in our work through *effective communication* is an important backdrop to successful fundraising, advocacy work and campaigning. *Strong, clear messages that reflect our Islamic values, and which are consistent* throughout our offices around the world, will help to promote our work and ensure that it is clearly understood by our increasingly diverse audiences.⁴⁶²

Indeed, there are at least four main signals indicating how this phase is characterised by a process of fine-tuning between distinctiveness and sameness through a more sophisticated use of the IV and IHV frames.

Firstly, in 2007 both the two critical discursive moments represented by the opening letters by IR’s Chair of Trustees (henceforth, ‘Chair’) and CEO⁴⁶³ suggest a quest for balance through an appeal to the ideas of “contributing” and “shaping,” which refer to a process of constructive interaction between distinctiveness and sameness. Looking outwards (i.e. on the global scene), IR’s Chair conveys a sense of constructive distinctiveness through an IV frame that emphasises the

⁴⁶² ‘Islamic Relief Strategy 2007-2009. Working for Change’, 20. Italics mine.

⁴⁶³ The 2007 annual report is the first to be opened with letters from the two top-ranking organisational spokespersons: IR’s Chair of Trustees and IR’s CEO. This will become a standard feature of following years’ reports until present day, though from 2011 onwards the two letters will merge into a unique message.

organisation's contribution to mainstream humanitarian discourse through its distinct "Islamic perspective":

recently we have also begun research into humanitarian issues, *contributing an Islamic perspective* to the international debates.⁴⁶⁴

Looking inwards (i.e. within IR), IR's CEO conveys a sense of flexible distinctiveness by emphasising the primary role of faith in providing a specific framework ("shaping") to its mainstream humanitarian values:

Our strategy and our work are shaped by our core values; accountability, humanitarianism, neutrality, inclusiveness, integrity and cooperation. *These values are shaped by our faith* which is the basis of everything that we do.⁴⁶⁵

Notably, the emphasis on IR's distinctive contribution to mainstream humanitarian discourse will become significantly stronger in the 2011-14 phase through the ISLAMIC HUMANITARIANISM frame, as I will explore in section 4.4.

Secondly, both the Chair and CEO adopt for the first time an explicit reference from the 'Islamic vocabulary' by opening their letters with the Muslim greeting formula: "*As salamu alaykum*"⁴⁶⁶ ('Peace be upon you'). Whilst the very decision to introduce this formula is already significant in providing a more distinctive outlook to this year annual report, the way the reference is presented is also notable to signal an undergoing quest for balance between distinctiveness and sameness. This is because on the one hand the formula is presented in its transliterated form in both letters, thus emphasising distinctiveness through its link to the original Arabic version. On the other hand, the CEO's contribution also concludes with an English translation of the formula ("Peace be with you"⁴⁶⁷), thus conveying a sense of sameness with mainstream discourse by virtue of making a uniquely Muslim reference easily accessible to a non-Muslim audience.⁴⁶⁸ Additionally, within the 2007-09 phase it is also worth noting that 2008 is the first time an IR's annual report opens with the English translation of the Islamic opening formula known as *basmalah* (*Bismillah Al-Rahman Al-Rahim*): "In the

⁴⁶⁴ Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2007', 4. Italics mine.

⁴⁶⁵ Ibid., 5. Italics mine.

⁴⁶⁶ Ibid., 4; 5.

⁴⁶⁷ Ibid., 5.

⁴⁶⁸ This specific way to express a quest for balance will be replicated and amplified in all of IR's subsequent annual reports, as the Islamic greeting formula will appear in both its transliterated and English translation forms in both the letters from IR's Chair and CEO.

name of Allah, most Merciful, most Kind.”⁴⁶⁹ Once again, the incorporation of the English translation of the basmalah is particularly significant because it can convey both distinctiveness and sameness by the very virtue of representing a well-known reference to Islamic discourse (i.e. highlighting IR’s identity as a Muslim NGO), which is nevertheless presented in a language accessible to a general audience (i.e. highlighting IR’s identity as a British NGO).

The third signpost highlighting IR’s quest for balance at this stage is represented by the fact that in 2008 the organisation explicitly expresses its desire to “better articulate” its ethos through a self-assessment exercise aimed at identifying and clarifying where its uniqueness lies. This is clearly exemplified by the following passages, which notably begin to give more prominence to the IHV frame (“our Islamic humanitarian values”; “inspired by Islamic humanitarian values”) over the IV frame (“Islamic charitable values”):

*we also need to better articulate – as an international NGO inspired by Islamic charitable values – what our role should be in developing sustainable models of material and civic progress.*⁴⁷⁰

*We will continue to increase awareness of our Islamic humanitarian values and our inclusive approach.*⁴⁷¹

*We will also be assessing what we have achieved over the past 25 years, where we can improve and what we can uniquely contribute as a British-based international aid agency inspired by Islamic humanitarian values.*⁴⁷²

Notably, IR’s quest for balance between distinctiveness and sameness is not limited to signposts disseminated throughout its annual reports. In fact, it is precisely during the period Jan 2008-Feb 2009 that IR dedicates significant efforts in discourse-making by publishing (for the first time in its history) a series of papers aimed at “Translating Faith into Development,” as the title of one of

⁴⁶⁹ Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Islamic Relief Worldwide and Subsidiary Undertakings. Annual Report and Financial Statements 2008’ (Birmingham: Islamic Relief Worldwide, 2008), 2, <http://library.iracademy.org.uk/islamic-relief-worldwide-2008-annual-report-and-financial-statements/>. As I will highlight in table 4.5, this formula will be adopted again only in the annual reports 2013-14. Indeed, the formula was used for the first time ever in IR’s discourse in its 2007-09 strategy document (‘Islamic Relief Strategy 2007-2009. Working for Change’, 1.) However, there it constituted part of the foreword by the Chair, rather than the opening of the document as a whole, thus representing more an expression of his voice as an individual rather than of the organisational discursive choice. To a certain degree, a similar observation could be applied to the use of the greeting “as salam alaiykum” in the opening letters from IR’s Chair and CEO. However, its consistency across different people and throughout the year can be plausibly interpreted as an indicator of organisational (rather than merely individual) discursive choice.

⁴⁷⁰ Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2008’, 5. Italics mine.

⁴⁷¹ Ibid., 6. Italics mine.

⁴⁷² Ibid., 72. Italics mine.

them aptly puts it.⁴⁷³ By offering 'Islamic perspectives' on different topics relevant to humanitarian/development work (such as: microfinance; support of refugees and internally displaced persons; fair trade; education; charitable giving; and sustainable development), this exercise represents a moment of strategic frame articulation. On the one hand, IR highlights its capability to meaningfully draw from a distinctly Muslim discourse, hence substantiating a IV frame that was used rather incoherently during the earlier phase. On the other hand, IR clarifies the connections between this and mainstream humanitarian discourse, hence strengthening the IHV frame that had previously tended to take such connections for granted.

Fourthly, IR's quest for balance in this period is pointed out by the way it locates 'Islamic humanitarian values' within the metaphorical spheres of both internal/organisational and external/general value-systems. For example, the extract from 2006 quoted in the previous section⁴⁷⁴ stresses how these values specifically belong to IR internal value-system (as signalled by the use of the possessive case, and by the need to 'embed' them internally and 'promote' them

⁴⁷³ Nida Kirmani, Ajaz Ahmed Khan, and Victoria Palmer, 'Islamic Microfinance – Theory, Policy and Practice' (Birmingham, UK: Islamic Relief Worldwide, 2008), <http://policy.islamic-relief.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Islamic-Microfinance.pdf>; Nida Kirmani, Ajaz Ahmed Khan, and Victoria Palmer, 'Does Faith Matter? An Examination of Islamic Relief's Work with Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons' (Birmingham, UK: Islamic Relief Worldwide, 2008), http://www.islamic-relief.org.uk/content/uploads/2013/09/Policy_Values_Islam_Refugees.pdf; Nida Kirmani, Ajaz Ahmed Khan, and Victoria Palmer, 'An Examination of Islamic Relief's Work with Refugees and IDPs' (Birmingham, UK: Islamic Relief Worldwide, 2008), <http://policy.islamic-relief.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Islamic-Relief-and-Refugees.pdf> Downloads; Ajaz Ahmed Khan and Laura Thaut, 'An Islamic Perspective on Fair Trade' (Birmingham, UK: Islamic Relief Worldwide, 2008), http://policy.islamic-relief.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Islam_and_Fairtrade.pdf; Mamoun Abuarqub, 'Islamic Perspectives on Education' (Birmingham, UK: Islamic Relief Worldwide, 2009), <http://policy.islamic-relief.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Islamic-perspectives-on-education-Feb09.pdf>; Ajaz Ahmed Khan, Ismail Tahmazov, and Mamoun Abu Arqub, 'Translating Faith into Development' (Birmingham, UK: Islamic Relief Worldwide, 2009), <http://policy.islamic-relief.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Translating-Faith-Into-Development.pdf>; Mamoun Abu Arqub and Isabel Philips, 'A Brief History of Humanitarianism in The Muslim World' (Birmingham, UK: Islamic Relief Worldwide, 2009), <http://policy.islamic-relief.com/storage/2014/05/A-Brief-History-of-Humanitarianism-in-the-Muslim-World-New-Format.pdf>; Rianne C. Ten Veen, 'Charitable Giving in Islam' (Birmingham, UK: Islamic Relief Worldwide, 2009), <http://policy.islamic-relief.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Charitable-Giving-in-Islam-Sep-09.pdf> Downloads; Mamoun Abu Arqub, 'Islamic Imperatives to Curb Corruption and Promote Sustainable Development' (Birmingham, UK: Islamic Relief Worldwide, 2009), <http://policy.islamic-relief.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Islamic-imperatives-to-curb-corruption-and-promote-sustainable-development.pdf>; Ajaz Ahmed Khan and Isabel Philips, 'The Influence of Faith on Islamic Microfinance Programmes' (Birmingham, UK: Islamic Relief Worldwide, 2010), <http://policy.islamic-relief.com/downloads/127-The%20influence%20of%20fai.pdf>.

⁴⁷⁴ "To ensure that Islamic Relief Worldwide's Islamic humanitarian values are embedded in our work and are promoted to donors and the public." (Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2006', 13.)

externally). In 2007, however, 'Islamic humanitarian values' seem to be somehow elevated to an 'objective' value-type that autonomously exists beyond IR, which the organisation simply aims to 'increase awareness' of through its own work. In other words, here IR is not only trying to communicate that 'Islamic humanitarian values' are distinctive of IR's identity (as in 2006), but primarily that the value-system referred by the IHV frame exists independently from IR and could potentially be used as a source of inspiration by mainstream discourse, too:

Over the years we have increased our work with other international NGOs, speaking out against poverty and raising awareness about the issues facing those we work with. We do this by: (...) Increasing awareness of *Islamic humanitarian values*.⁴⁷⁵

Manifesting the evolution of IR's discourse, in 2008-09 'Islamic humanitarian values' are articulated both as something internal to IR and as something independent from it. The former aspect is emphasised by the organisation's commitment to "continue to increase awareness of *our* Islamic humanitarian values"⁴⁷⁶ (where the 'our' clearly positions these values as internal); while independence is stressed by the mission statement, which is notably changed in 2008 with the abandonment of IV as the dominant frame, in favour of IHV. From this year until 2010, the opening line of IR's mission will read:

Inspired by *Islamic humanitarian values*, Islamic Relief Worldwide aims to: (...)⁴⁷⁷

In other words, whilst the IV frame featuring IR's mission statement in the 2005-07 phase assumed distinctiveness by identifying the generic idea of 'Islamic values' as the ultimate source of inspiration for IR, the adoption of a IHV frame qualifies IR's value-system both as distinctive and mainstream, being drawn from an eclectic mix of Islamic and humanitarian principles—a mix that supposedly exists independently from IR, and which the organisation will explicitly identify and refer to through the ISLAMIC HUMANITARIANISM frame from 2010 onwards.

⁴⁷⁵ Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2007', 6. Italics mine.

⁴⁷⁶ Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2008', 6; Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2009' (Birmingham: Islamic Relief Worldwide, 2009), 6, http://www.islamic-relief.org.uk/content/uploads/2013/05/Annual_Report_2009.pdf. Italics mine.

⁴⁷⁷ Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2008', 2; Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2009', 2; Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Islamic Relief Worldwide 2010 Annual Report & Financial Statements' (Birmingham: Islamic Relief Worldwide, 2010), 2, http://www.islamic-relief.org.uk/content/uploads/2013/05/Annual_Report_2010.pdf. Italics mine.

The period 2007-09 can be thus characterised as '*seeking balance*' insofar at this stage IR actively tries to bring together distinctiveness and sameness by clarifying and aligning the IV and IHV frames introduced in former years and by internalising them at a comparatively similar level. In the following sections I discuss how the quest for a 'hyphenated' balance articulated in the 2007-09 phase will mature through a turning point in 2010 into a more confident expression of the Self in the years 2011-14, through the adoption of the IH frame.

4.3. A turning point: 2010

Following the conclusion of the 2007-09 global strategy, 2010 represents a climax in the trajectory set by the 'seeking balance' phase and a turning point towards the refinement of a self-confident, distinctive synthesis through the introduction of the ISLAMIC HUMANITARIANISM frame (henceforth, IH).

The clearest indication of such a climax is represented by the fact that the 2010 annual report displays with the highest degree of visibility so far references derived from both the Muslim and humanitarian/development cultural repertoires. In what follows, I will briefly outline significant examples to illustrate how these parallel discursive dimensions are used by IR to convey both distinctiveness and sameness.

Distinctiveness is signalled by at least two important signposts that highlight IR's uniqueness as a Muslim organisation.

Firstly, in 2010 IR chooses to explicitly mention for the first time in its annual reports one of the most wide-ranging, emotionally laden, and popular terms associated with Islam: *shari'a* ('Islamic law'). The term will enjoy very little visibility in IR's discourse in the following years, with the only additional mention being in the 2011 annual report.⁴⁷⁸ Nevertheless, its introduction here is highly significant. On the one hand, IR's growing self-confidence about its distinctiveness as a Muslim organisation is conveyed by the very choice of using within the main text of the publication a term that represents one of the most quintessential references to the Islamic tradition but which has also become one of the most charged ideas

⁴⁷⁸ The relevant passage in the 2011 report reads as follows: "A range of micro-finance schemes operate across the world, but many drive poor people further into poverty with their interest charges. Our Islamic micro-finance provides *Shari'ah* compliant small loans, and, unlike conventional micro-finance, no interest is charged, so they offer a sustainable route out of poverty to some of the world's poorest people." (Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Islamic Relief Worldwide 2011 Annual Report & Financial Statements' (Birmingham: Islamic Relief Worldwide, 2011), 22, http://www.islamic-relief.org.uk/content/uploads/2013/05/Annual_Report_2011.pdf.)

associated with Islam in recent years. On the other hand, the use of this term also serves to frame IR's claims to authenticity by conveying a sense of intended conformity with the body of Islamic principles and injunctions which the shari'a is the highest representation of:⁴⁷⁹

Our Islamic micro-finance project provides *Shari'ah compliant* interest-free loans so that eligible entrepreneurs can earn a living"; "In 2010, Islamic Relief raised more than 170 new Waqf shares, bringing the total number to almost 3,470.

These were invested *according to the principles of Islamic Shari'ah*, and the return is then invested in projects to help the poor.⁴⁸⁰

Secondly, the 2010 annual report displays a clear effort to communicate IR's distinctiveness on three main dimensions of the Self, namely: i) IR's operative approach, which is conceptualised as an "Islamic way" to make a difference; ii) IR's main target audience, which is explicitly identified with Muslims upon which an "Islamic obligation" to help the needy is incumbent; and iii) IR's organisational identity, which is for the first time stressed through a faith-based lens, as that of a "Muslim charity":⁴⁸¹

Making a difference, **the Islamic way**. With more than 26 years of experience in serving humanity, Islamic Relief is the largest independent *Muslim charity* in the world. As such, we are able to provide special services to millions of donors who want to discharge *their Islamic obligation* to help those in need and make the maximum impact.⁴⁸²

Today, by the grace of God, it [IR] is the largest independent *Muslim charity* in the world.⁴⁸³

Notably, IR self-identification as a 'Muslim charity' is particularly important as annual reports so far had only characterised it in neutral, secular terms, as:

⁴⁷⁹ This dimension is highlighted particularly well by the fact that an explicit reference to compliance is incorporated in all the occasions when the term shari'a is used, both in 2010 and in 2011.

⁴⁸⁰ Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Islamic Relief Annual Report 2010', 29; 35. Italics mine.

⁴⁸¹ The only other time IR referred to itself as a 'Muslim charity' in its annual reports is in 2007, within the opening letter from the Chair: "Trustees of any organisation always focus on risk mitigation, but as a Muslim charity it is also important for us to focus on the potential risks posed to our reputation." However, in that case the adjective 'Muslim' seems not so much to be used to emphasise the faith-based ethos of the Self, but rather to pragmatically locate IR among those UK Muslim charities that were concerned about the introduction of the 2007 Charities Bill, as suggested by an earlier statement in the same paragraph: "Although we had little concern about the Charities Bill and the impact on our work, we were able to raise concerns about the potential defamation of Muslim charities." (Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2007', 4.)

⁴⁸² Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2010', 35. Bold in original. Italics mine.

⁴⁸³ Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2010'; *ibid.*, 4. Italics mine.

a non-governmental, non-political humanitarian aid organisation with operations in (...) countries.⁴⁸⁴

Whilst the aforementioned strategies highlight IR's distinctiveness, the evolution of a discursive synthesis between this dimension and sameness is represented by the fact that the 2010 annual report brings to the forefront archetypical references from *both* the Muslim and the development cultural repertoires. Concerning the Muslim dimension, the report features for the first time in IR's discursive trajectory direct quotes (in translation) from the Qur'an. With regards to development discourse, the report gives the highest visibility so far to "the world's central reference point for development cooperation"⁴⁸⁵ – i.e. the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

Accompanying four out of six of IR's work areas, Qur'anic references are used by IR in parallel to MDGs to firmly anchor the organisation's ethos simultaneously within both a distinctive Islamic worldview and a humanitarian agenda. On the one hand, this strategy frames IR's ethos as stemming directly from Qur'anic injunctions and principles, such as: taking care for and upholding justice on behalf of orphaned and oppressed children (Q 4:127); valuing education (Q 96:1); appreciating natural resources as a blessing (Q 50:9); preserving the value and dignity of human life (Q 5:32). On the other hand, IR also position its areas of work firmly within mainstream development framework, particularly with reference to MDGs one, two, four and seven (which focus on ending poverty and hunger, providing universal education, improving child health and promoting environmental sustainability, respectively). I highlight the alignment between IR's areas of work and both Muslim and mainstream development discourses in table 4.2.

⁴⁸⁴ Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2005', 7; Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2006', 20; Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2007', 56; Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2008', 83; Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2009', 43.

⁴⁸⁵ John W McArthur, 'The Origins of the Millennium Development Goals', *SAIS Review of International Affairs SAIS Review of International Affairs* 34, no. 2 (2014): 6.

Table 4.2 Alignment between IR’s areas of work, Qur’anic references, and MDGs in IR’s 2010 annual report

IR’s area of work	Muslim discourse: Qur’anic quote	Development discourse: MDGs
“Caring for orphans and children in need” ⁴⁸⁶	“... and concerning the children who are weak and oppressed: (Allah instructs) that you stand firm for justice to orphans.” [Qur’an, 4: 127] ⁴⁸⁷	One: End poverty and hunger Two: Universal education Four: Child health
“Supporting education” ⁴⁸⁸	“Read! In the Name of your Lord Who has created (all that exists).” [Qur’an, 96:1] ⁴⁸⁹	Two: Universal education
“Providing access to healthcare and water” ⁴⁹⁰	“And We send down from the sky rain chartered with blessing, and We produce therewith gardens and grain for harvests.” Holy Qur’an, [50:9] ⁴⁹¹	One: End poverty and hunger Seven: Environmental sustainability
“Campaigning and advocacy on humanitarian issues” ⁴⁹²	“...Whoever kills an innocent soul it is as if he killed the whole of Mankind. And whoever saves one, it is as if he saved the whole of Mankind.” [Qur’an, 5:32] ⁴⁹³	n.a.

Notably, the greater visibility given to MDGs in 2010 compared to previous annual report is not coincidental. Indeed, IR’s reference to the MDGs seems to have mirrored the latter’s level of popularity within mainstream development discourse across the years.

IR had already adopted sporadic references to the MDGs in 2005,⁴⁹⁴ and in 2006 the organisation formally committed to them within its mission statement⁴⁹⁵—a commitment manifested in the signing of a Programme Partnership Agreement with the UK Department for International Development, which formally linked IR’s efforts to the MDGs agenda.⁴⁹⁶ This paralleled the fact that, despite the MDGs

⁴⁸⁶ Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2010’, 12.

⁴⁸⁷ Ibid., 14.

⁴⁸⁸ Ibid., 16.

⁴⁸⁹ Ibid., 19.

⁴⁹⁰ Ibid., 20.

⁴⁹¹ Ibid., 23.

⁴⁹² Ibid., 30.

⁴⁹³ Ibid., 31.

⁴⁹⁴ Through the sentence: “As part of its commitment to the Millennium Development Goals, Islamic Relief Worldwide puts great emphasis on its health and water programmes.” Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2005’, 13.

⁴⁹⁵ Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2006’, 2.

⁴⁹⁶ Ibid., 3.

had been set in early 2000s,⁴⁹⁷ it is precisely in 2005-06 that they enjoyed a momentum in their popularity—both through global media attention, and through a series of major pledges by world’s governments that committed themselves to align the international development agenda with the MDGs.⁴⁹⁸ In light of these factors, between 2006 and 2009 IR consistently reiterates its commitment to MDGs in a prominent manner right after its mission statement.⁴⁹⁹

It is only in 2010, however, that IR chooses to structure the entire annual report using the MDGs as its main framework, by essentially aligning IR’s aims, areas of work, and achievements with it. The clearest indication of this climax consists in IR’s choice to open the document with a section on “Achieving our organisational aims” that not only highlights IR’s commitment to the MDGs within the text,⁵⁰⁰ but also displays a large infographic about these (reproduced in figure 4.2.a). In turn, MDGs icons are used throughout the report to indicate how IR’s “Achievements” (visibly highlighted through dedicated text-boxes) essentially correspond to advancements in accomplishing specific MDGs. Further, in order to emphasise an evolving alignment between distinctiveness and sameness, IR purposely juxtaposes such “Achievements” boxes to the Qur’anic quotes mentioned earlier in table 4.2, which are given visual prominence by using a typeface resembling that of the report subtitles (in terms of fonts, size, and boldness) (as illustrated in figure 4.2.b).

⁴⁹⁷ In 2000, the UN General Assembly adopted the “UN Millennium Declaration,” which contained the framework of values, principles and objectives for the international development agenda. Following the Millennium Declaration, the UN General Assembly mandated then-UN secretary-general Kofi Annan to prepare a long-term road map towards implementation. The end product was a September 2001 report entitled “Road map towards the implementation of the United Nations Millennium Declaration”, which was the first document to present the formal term “Millennium Development Goals” as a specific package of goals and targets. (McArthur, ‘The Origins of the Millennium Development Goals’, 6–7.)

⁴⁹⁸ Ibid., 21.

⁴⁹⁹ In the years 2006 and 2007, IR emphasises its commitment to the MDG framework, as expressed by the formula: “To achieve this we will raise funds, build partnerships and communicate key messages as we work to” [2006]; “We do this by” [2007] : (...) “Commit[ing] ourselves to harnessing our outputs and outcomes to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).” (Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2006’, 2; Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2007’, 2.) In the period 2008-10 IR’s focus shifted from commitment to actual contribution, through the formula: “Work (...) We hope to contribute to achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) through raising awareness of the issues that affect poor communities and through our work on the ground.” (Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2008’, 2; Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2009’, 2; Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2010’, 2.)

⁵⁰⁰ “Islamic Relief is committed to helping achieve the Millennium Development Goals, and ran more than 900 development projects in the last decade alone.” Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2010’, 7.

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a)

b)

Figure 4.2 Visual framing of the juxtaposition between development discourse (MDGs) and Muslim discourse (Qur'anic quotes) in IR's 2010 annual report.

a) The first page of the report, featuring an infographic on MDGs; b) an example of IR's juxtaposition between Qur'anic quotes and a MDG icon (goal two) linked to an "Achievements" text-box.

Source: adapted from Islamic Relief Worldwide 2010, 7; 19.

As much as IR's reference to the MDGs in the 2006-09 period paralleled the centrality of the latter within those years' development discourse, the fact that IR's allusion to the MDGs reaches a climax in its own discourse in 2010 and will decline thereafter is not coincidental, either.⁵⁰¹ In fact, it is precisely in 2010—a decade after the publication of the "UN Millennium Declaration," and with only five years left until the 2015 MDGs target date—that the international community formalised growing concerns about the uneven progress made towards the MDGs and called for a global renewed commitment to meet them. Warning that

⁵⁰¹ IR's 2012 and 2014 annual reports do not include any reference to MDGs. In 2011, there is only a brief mention of MDGs under the section "Funding from Institutional donors" ("We continued our commitment to the Millennium Development Goals through the Partnership Programme Agreement with the Department for International Development (DFID) in the UK, and the aims of our strategy reflect our contribution to achieving these essential global targets." (Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2011', 42.)) In 2013, MDGs are mentioned twice, in both cases to highlight IR's role in shaping the post-2015 agenda: once under the section "Campaigning for change" ("We also collaborated with civil society organisations to shape the development framework which will replace the Millennium Development Goals") and once under the section "Shaping the future of development" ("We worked with other leading civil society organisations to influence the post-2015 development agenda. Participating in a UN Special Event, we emphasised the need for sustainability and equality to be placed at the heart of the framework which replaces the Millennium Development Goals." (Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2013', 27; 31.)).

without additional efforts several of the MDGs were likely to be missed in many countries, the UN organised in September that year a “Summit on the Millennium Development Goals” to bring together world leaders, NGOs, foundations and business to “review progress, identify gaps, and commit to a concrete action agenda to achieve the MDGs.”⁵⁰² The summit was preceded by a series of key milestones distributed throughout the year,⁵⁰³ and it concluded with the adoption of the resolution “Keeping the Promise: United to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals,” which reaffirmed world leaders’ commitment to the MDGs and prompted the start of conversations about the post-2015 development agenda.⁵⁰⁴

With this context in mind, the fact that in 2010 IR dedicates its greatest emphasis in its discourse-making both to its distinctive Muslim references (through its first time use of quotes from the Qur’an) and to its mainstream frame of reference (the MDGs), highlights how this year represents, indeed, a climax of the ‘seeking balance’ phase.

Contextualised against this background, 2010 also represents a turning point in IR’s discursive trajectory through the introduction of the ISLAMIC HUMANITARIANISM frame (henceforth, IH). Despite this is evoked only once in the report, it notably appears in the key section on IR’s “Future plans-A new strategic direction 2011-2015,” within the subtitle “Leading the way in *Islamic humanitarianism*.”⁵⁰⁵

The introduction of the IH frame thus manifests IR’s willingness at this stage to embrace what it calls “a new strategic direction”⁵⁰⁶ for the 2011-14 phase, through the adoption of a new global strategy that the organisation purposely entitles:

⁵⁰² ‘UN Summit on the Millennium Development Goals. Fact Sheet’ (UN Department of Public Information), para. ‘What’, accessed 20 April 2017, http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/pdf/mdg_summit_factsheet.pdf.

⁵⁰³ Such as the release of 30 MDG-related country reports, informal hearings with NGOs held by the General Assembly and the publication of the “Millennium Development Goals Report 2010.” (Ibid., para. ‘Timeline’.)

⁵⁰⁴ In its concluding paragraph, the 2010 outcome document requested the Secretary-General “to make recommendations in his annual reports, as appropriate, for further steps to advance the United Nations development agenda beyond 2015.” Five years later (in in September 2015) world leaders adopted during the UN Sustainable Development Summit the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of the “2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development,” which built on and replaced the MDGs. (General Assembly resolution 65/1, ‘Keeping the Promise: United to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals. A/RES/67/97’. United Nations, 19 October 2010, para. 81, http://www.un.org/en/mdg/summit2010/pdf/outcome_documentN1051260.pdf.; ‘United Nations Sustainable Development Agenda’, *United Nations Sustainable Development*, accessed 20 April 2017, <http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/development-agenda/>.)

⁵⁰⁵ Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2010’, 38. Italics mine.

⁵⁰⁶ Ibid.

“Faith inspired action.”⁵⁰⁷ Developed in 2010 as the result of a major self-reflective exercise, the strategy manifests from its very title the critical questions arisen within IR at this critical point in its history (already outlined in the introduction of this chapter) about “what is ‘Islamic’ about Islamic Relief?”⁵⁰⁸. The self-reflective impulse behind this development is clear from the following passages, which highlight how the new strategy represented the result of “a comprehensive review” aimed at aligning the different dimensions of IR’s (self-) perception by “bring[ing] our vision, mission and values in line”:

In 2010 we undertook a *comprehensive review* of our organisational strategy, examining the values, motivation and approach we base our work on.⁵⁰⁹

This year [2011] saw Islamic Relief kick-start an innovative new strategic direction, which *brings our vision, mission and values in line* with the much-needed work we will be doing over the next five years.⁵¹⁰

Notably, IR emphasises that two organisational changes had been crucial for this milestone: a changed understanding of poverty, on the one hand, and a changing understanding of humanitarianism, on the other. In both cases, change is manifested within IR’s discourse through a more sophisticated and confident articulation of the synthesis between a distinctive, faith-based (Islamic) and a mainstream, secular (humanitarian) dimensions—a synthesis that is at the basis of the IH frame.

As far as IR’s understanding of poverty is concerned, the IH frame adopted in the post-2010 period stresses how the organisation’s newly adopted rights-based approach (according to which poverty is the result of a denial of people’s rights, rather than a simple failure to provide for their needs) does not merely reflect a similar shift occurred within mainstream development discourse since the early 2000s,⁵¹¹ but rather mainly reflects a deliberate effort to “resonate much more directly” with the primary sources of Islam:

⁵⁰⁷ Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Faith Inspired Action. Global Strategy 2011-2015’ (Birmingham, UK: Islamic Relief Worldwide, 2011), <http://library.iracademy.org.uk/islamic-relief-strategy-2007-2009/>.

⁵⁰⁸ Butt, ‘The Role of Values and Their Relationship with Faith in a Faith-Based Organisation’, 10.

⁵⁰⁹ Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2010’, 38. Italics mine.

⁵¹⁰ Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2011’, 8. Italics mine.

⁵¹¹ The mainstreaming of a human rights approach to development became a cornerstone of UN reform efforts initiated in 1997. Before then, most UN development agencies and international NGOs pursued a ‘basic needs’ approach whereby interventions were designed to meet basic requirements of the beneficiaries. The UN reform process led in 2003 to the UN “Statement of Common Understanding on Human Rights-Based Approaches to Development Cooperation and Programming” (the Common Understanding). Since then, the idea of a rights-based approach to

Changing our understanding of poverty. Our understanding of humanitarianism and development in the future will *resonate much more directly with the ‘principles’ behind faith teaching*. In 2011, we will be moving away from a ‘needs based’ approach to poverty and development, and towards a ‘rights based’ approach which recognises that poor and suffering people have rights over us, *as defined in the Qur’an and Sunnah*.⁵¹²

This, in turn, is mirrored by a ‘new’ understanding of humanitarianism, whereby IR is not anymore satisfied with balancing a distinctive faith-based dimension with a mainstream one, but rather aims to capitalise on the former in order to ‘lead the way’. The self-confident synthesis underlying the IH frame thus embeds a strong leadership dimension, which is aptly symbolised by the very choice of introducing the IH frame precisely in association with the expression “Leading the way”:

Leading the way in Islamic humanitarianism

Our new strategy for 2011-2015 provides the potential for *crucial leadership* in three vital areas:⁵¹³ (...)

- Developing a deeper faith-based framework for humanitarianism and development that offers *leadership and guidance* on issues affecting the developing world.⁵¹⁴

I will elaborate in the next section on how ‘leadership’ represents a central feature of IR’s adoption of a IH frame. What is important to note here is that the salience of this discursive shift cannot be underestimated: as the 2010 Chair (Dr Essam El Haddad) put it, the development of the 2011-15 strategy represented “one of the most significant milestones for Islamic Relief since it was established”⁵¹⁵—a salience that is reflected by the fact that the introduction of the IH frame in 2010-11 will shape IR’s discourse in the following years.

development has gradually become mainstream, and it has been adopted by most UN agencies and main international NGOs. (‘The Human Rights Based Approach to Development Cooperation: Towards a Common Understanding Among UN Agencies’, *UN HRBA Portal*, accessed 17 April 2017, <http://hrbaportal.org/the-human-rights-based-approach-to-development-cooperation-towards-a-common-understanding-among-un-agencies>; ‘The Human Rights-Based Approach’, *UNFPA - United Nations Population Fund*, accessed 17 April 2017, <http://www.unfpa.org/human-rights-based-approach>.)

⁵¹² Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2010’, 38. Bold in original. Italics mine.

⁵¹³ Ibid.; Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2011’, 8. Bold in original. Italics mine

⁵¹⁴ Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2010’, 39; Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2011’, 8; Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Islamic Relief Worldwide 2012 Annual Report & Financial Statements’ (Birmingham: Islamic Relief Worldwide, 2012), 7, http://www.islamic-relief.org.uk/content/uploads/2013/05/Annual_Report_2012.pdf; Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2013’, 10; Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2014’, 9. Italics mine.

⁵¹⁵ Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2011’, 6.

4.4. Finding a self-confident synthesis: 2011-14

I have discussed in section 4.1 how during the years 2005-07 (which I called the 'assuming distinctiveness' phase), the use of a ISLAMIC VALUES frame was accompanied by what can be essentially read as IR's declaration of sameness with the mainstream, through its complete alignment with a set of values and principles derived from humanitarian/development discourse. I have also highlighted in section 4.2 how the adoption of a ISLAMIC HUMANITARIAN VALUES frame in 2007-09 (which I called the 'seeking balance' phase) represented an effort to better articulate a balance between IR's distinctiveness as a Muslim organisation and its commitment to mainstreamness. With the introduction of the ISLAMIC HUMANITARIANISM frame in 2010, IR wishes to transcend a mere quest for balance and, rather, self-confidently articulate its Muslim distinctiveness as a leader in the global humanitarian scene. This self-confident distinctiveness is articulated on three main levels: i) the articulation of IR's values; ii) the explicit reference to the Prophetic example as a source of inspiration; and iii) an emphasis on global leadership specifically as a Muslim NGO.

4.4.1. Distinctiveness and values

As the very title of the 2011-15 strategy highlights ("Faith inspired action"), one of the main aims of the IH frame developed through this milestone is to emphasise the distinctiveness of IR's agency (symbolised by the word "action") in light of its 'Islamic-ness' (symbolised by the expression "Faith-inspired"). In fact, the word-choice for this title could have drawn from the vast vocabulary associated with humanitarian, development, or charitable work—such as it was the case with IR's first global strategy in 2007, which totally eclipsed distinctiveness under the generic title of: "Working for change."⁵¹⁶ Conversely, in 2011 IR chooses to explicitly situate the ultimate motive and source of inspiration for its work in the realm of faith. In turn, this renewed emphasis on the role of faith brings to the forefront the question of distinctiveness concerning organisational values. There are at least three key mechanisms through which IR articulates distinctiveness concerning its values in the 2011-14 phase.

⁵¹⁶ 'Islamic Relief Strategy 2007-2009. Working for Change'.

Firstly, from 2011 IR's values are portrayed as being distinctively and explicitly rooted in Islam. At a first glance, this strategy may appear to duplicate the IV frame adopted during the 'assuming distinctiveness' phase (2005-07). However, a closer analysis reveals a crucial difference. In fact, as I already highlighted, the IV essentially functioned as a tool to present humanitarian values as compatible and, indeed, superimposable with Islamic values. Conversely, the IH frame emphasises the uniqueness of Islamic values as "timeless" in light of their origins from the two primary sources of Islam—the Qur'an and *sunna* (the Prophetic example):

Exemplifying our *Islamic values*, we will mobilise resources, build partnerships, and develop local capacity, as we work to (...) ⁵¹⁷

We remain guided by the *timeless values* and teachings provided by the revelations *contained within the Qur'an and prophetic example* ⁵¹⁸

We remain mindful of our humble beginnings and *our values, rooted in the teachings of the Islamic faith* that calls us to restore a dignity that God gave to the children of Adam. ⁵¹⁹

We are guided by the *timeless values* and teachings of Islam. ⁵²⁰

Secondly, IR elaborates a new list of organisational values. Contrary to what happened in 2006, in 2011 IR stresses the "narrative fidelity"/"cultural resonance" ⁵²¹ of its values-system with the Islamic tradition by identifying them for the first time through the use of a vocabulary that is distinctively Islamic both in terms of: i) content—by referring to well-known concepts from the Islamic worldview; and ii) form—by using not only English translations, but also transliterations from Arabic:

Sincerity (Ikhlas): In responding to poverty and suffering our efforts are driven by sincerity to God and the need to fulfil our obligations to humanity.

Excellence (Ihsan): Our actions in tackling poverty are marked by excellence in our operations and conduct which are deserving of the people we serve.

⁵¹⁷ Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Faith Inspired Action. Global Strategy 2011-2015', 7; Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2011', 2. Italics mine.

⁵¹⁸ Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Faith Inspired Action. Global Strategy 2011-2015', 9; Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2011', 3. Italics mine.

⁵¹⁹ Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2013', 5. Italics mine.

⁵²⁰ Ibid., 15; Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2014', 15. Italics mine.

⁵²¹ Snow and Benford refers to these concepts to indicate the degree to which a frame (or part of discourse) "rings true" with existing cultural references (David A. Snow and Robert D. Benford, 'Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization', *International Social Movement Research*, 1988, 210; Robert D Benford and David A Snow, 'Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment', *Annual review of sociology* 26 (2000): 622.)

Compassion (Rahma): We believe the protection and well-being of every life is of paramount importance and we shall join with other humanitarian actors to act as one in responding to suffering brought on by disasters, poverty and injustice.

Social Justice (Adl): Our work is founded on enabling people and institutions to fulfil the rights of the poor and vulnerable. We work to empower the dispossessed towards realising their God-given human potential and developing their capabilities and resources.

Custodianship (Amana): We uphold our duty of custodianship over the earth, its resources and the trust people place in us as humanitarian and development practitioners to be transparent and accountable.⁵²²

Finally, a sense of self-confident distinctiveness is also conveyed by the visual framing of IR's new list of values. In 2012, this aspect is only indirectly appreciable through the choice of juxtaposing a prominent circular text-box which lists the values precisely next to the paragraph that starts with the line: "Leading the way in Islamic humanitarianism."⁵²³ In 2014, however, this emphasis becomes unequivocal through the choice of displaying as the sole element of the first page of the report an artistic rendering of IR's list of values, which emphasises distinctiveness by including for the first time the original Arabic versions (rather than their transliteration) and the reproduction of these in a circular composition based on 'Islamic calligraphy' (as illustrated in figure 4.3).

⁵²² Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2011', 3. Italics mine.

⁵²³ Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2012', 7.

This image has been removed by the author of this thesis for copyright reasons.

Figure 4.3 Visual framing of IR's values in its 2014 annual report
Source: adapted from Islamic Relief Worldwide 2014, 2.

4.4.2. Distinctiveness and the Prophetic example

In light of the new emphasis given to the religious source of its values, IR brings to the foreground the importance of following the Prophetic example as the archetype of 'faith inspired action' (to quote the very title of IR's 2011-15 global strategy). Notably, IR had never made explicit references to the sunna in previous years,⁵²⁴ whilst this strategy becomes a consistent feature of the 2011-14 phase. Indeed, one particular example of behaviour inspired by the Prophetic tradition is referred to across these years—that of "speaking out against injustice":

⁵²⁴ As I highlight later, in table 4.4. The only previous identifiable reference to the sunna is in the opening letter from IR's Chair in the 2008 annual report: "In the spirit of the prophetic teaching that 'charity does not decrease wealth'" Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2008', 4. Here, the Chair is quoting the first part of the hadith recorded in Muslim: "Charity does not in any way decrease the wealth and the servant who forgives Allah adds to his respect, and the one who shows humility Allah elevates him in the estimation (of the people)." Muslim ibn al-Ḥajjaj, *Al-Jāmi' al-Ṣaḥīḥ*, book 45, hadith number 2588, accessed 10 July 2017, <https://sunnah.com/muslim/45>

*In accordance with the Prophetic example of speaking out against injustice, we will focus our advocacy work on facilitating and campaigning for social change.*⁵²⁵

*Following the Prophetic example of speaking out against injustice, we concentrate on facilitating and campaigning for social change in our advocacy work.*⁵²⁶

We work to tackle the root causes of poverty and suffering worldwide, *in accordance with the prophetic example of speaking out against injustice.* This year, our challenging advocacy and campaigning efforts gave vulnerable and marginalised communities a voice, and were an active force for positive change.⁵²⁷

*In accordance with the prophetic example of speaking out against injustice, we continued to tackle the root causes of poverty and suffering in 2014. Our advocacy and campaigning, together with projects on the ground, focused on securing positive change and social justice for vulnerable people across the globe.*⁵²⁸

In these extracts, IR makes an indirect reference to a well-known *hadith* (Prophetic saying) which is collected in one of the most (if not the most) popular work of this genre: the *Forty hadiths of al-Nawawi*. The salience of this specific collection of hadiths within the Muslim cultural repertoire cannot be underestimated. Commenting on the significance of this book, contemporary Muslim scholar Jaafar Sheikh Idris states that this book has been:

for hundreds of years among the most popular of Islamic books in the Muslim world. It is to be found today in its original Arabic or in many other languages in the private libraries of almost all practicing Muslims. It is also studied as a textbook by almost all young students of Islam in the Muslim world.⁵²⁹

In addition to the significance related to the book's popularity (and, thus, the resonance with a wide Muslim audience), it must also be noted its significance in normative terms: as highlighted by Idris, the hadiths reported in this collection are considered "to be among the most important sayings of the Prophet (peace be upon him)," knowledge of which can offer "a comprehensive view of the most fundamental Islamic beliefs and principles."⁵³⁰

⁵²⁵ Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Faith Inspired Action. Global Strategy 2011-2015', 14; Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2011', 9. Italics mine.

⁵²⁶ Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2012', 12. Italics mine.

⁵²⁷ Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2013', 24. Italics mine.

⁵²⁸ Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2014', 25. Italics mine.

⁵²⁹ Jaafar Sheikh Idris, 'Introduction', in *Commentary on the Forty Hadith of Al-Nawawi*, by Jamaal al-Din M. Zarabozo (Al-Basheer Publication & Translation, 1999), 1.

⁵³⁰ Ibid.

Recorded by Nawawi in a narration from Muslim, the central part of the hadith indirectly referenced by IR is commonly translated as:

Whoever of you sees an evil must then change it with his hand. If he is not able to do so, *then [he must change it] with his tongue*. And if he is not able to do so, then [he must change it] with his heart. And that is the slightest [effect of] faith.⁵³¹

IR's reference to the "prophetic example of speaking out against injustice" is thus alluding to the Islamic religious duty to use one's speech to stop an evil (in this case: poverty) when one does not have the ability and/or the right to change by his/her hand.⁵³² Significantly, this very hadith plays a key role in IR's framing of its mobilising efforts in 2013-14, as I will highlight in chapter 6. What is important to note here is that an indirect reference to this well-known Prophetic saying is used by IR to frame from a distinctively Islamic perspective its alignment to dynamics which have characterised the mainstream development sector—represented in this case by an increasing focus of the sector and of IR itself on advocacy and campaigning work.⁵³³ Notably, a similar function seems to be carried out by the two other hadiths quoted by IR in these years, as they provide a distinctively Muslim narrative on themes that have become central (and often, buzzwords) within mainstream development discourse,⁵³⁴ such as 'justice' (referred to by the first hadith below) and 'empowerment' (alluded to by the hadith quoted in the second extract below):

There is a reward for one who establishes justice among people.⁵³⁵

Today our goal is clear—we must help people to lift themselves out of poverty forever so that they may become independent, in the same way that the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) encouraged. "I swear in the

⁵³¹ Jamaal al-Din M. Zarabozo, *Commentary on the Forty Hadith of Al-Nawawi*, vol. 2 (Al-Basheer Publication & Translation, 1999), 981. Italics mine.

⁵³² *Ibid.*, 2:1000.

⁵³³ Advocacy and campaigning have increasingly become a key feature of mainstream NGOs since the 1990s. (David Lewis and Nazneen Kanji, *Non-Governmental Organizations and Development* (Routledge, 2009), 98.)

⁵³⁴ By the late 1990s the rights-based approach and variants of ideas about empowerment as a means to claim social justice became mainstream within development discourse. (*Ibid.*, 58–59.)

⁵³⁵ Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Faith Inspired Action. Global Strategy 2011-2015', 14; Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2011', 9. IR is citing here the final part of a longer hadith: "There is a Sadaqa to be given for every joint of the human body; and for every day on which the sun rises there is a reward of a Sadaqa (i.e. charitable gift) for the one who establishes justice among people." Muhammad al-Bukhari, *Al-Jāmi' al-Ṣaḥīḥ*, book 53, hadith number 2707, accessed 10 July 2017, <https://sunnah.com/bukhari/53/17>

name of God that it is better for a person to take his rope on his back— instead of asking somebody else to do it for him...”⁵³⁶

4.4.3. Distinctiveness as a leading Muslim NGO

The third level on which IR emphasises distinctiveness in the 2011-14 phase is represented by the articulation of its organisational identity explicitly as a leading Muslim NGO. I have highlighted in section 4.3 how 2010 represents the first year in which IR consciously stresses a faith-based identity by self-identifying also as a “Muslim charity” (rather than solely projecting itself through the mainstream lens of “a non-governmental, non-political humanitarian aid organisation,” as it did in previous years). In the 2011-14 phase IR systematically frames its organisational identity through a faith-based lens in the key discursive moments represented by the annual messages from the IR’s Chair and CEO, where the organisation is referred to as: “the world’s largest not-for-profit organisation that is *inspired by Islamic principles*”;⁵³⁷ “one of the most impactful *faith-based not-for-profits* in the world”;⁵³⁸ “a global *Islamic (...) humanitarian organisation*.”⁵³⁹ Notably, as these quotes exemplify, at this stage IR’s identity is articulated not only through a distinctive faith-based lens, but also through a deliberate focus on the idea of ‘leadership’—the combination of which is at the basis of the sense of self-confident distinctiveness conveyed by the IH frame. In fact, as the IH solidifies within IR’s discourse year-on-year, the projected degree of IR’s leadership within the field of ‘Islamic humanitarianism’ evolves, too: this is mainly framed in terms of potentiality in 2011 and 2012 (as indicated by the use of the word ‘potential’ and the future tense); it evolves in the realm of factuality in 2013 and 2014 (as indicated by the prompts “As we lead”; “As a policy leader”; “We are a policy leader”); and reaches a climax in 2014 (indicated by the stronger expression: “As an authority”) (as I summarise in table 4.3).

⁵³⁶ Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2012’, 6. IR is quoting here an hadith that is recorded in different chains of narrations, with slightly different wordings in Muhammad al-Bukhari, *Al-Jāmi’ al-Ṣaḥīḥ*, book 24, hadiths number 1470, 1471, 1480, accessed 10 July 2017, <https://sunnah.com/bukhari/53/17>

⁵³⁷ Ibid.

⁵³⁸ Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2013’, 5. Italics mine.

⁵³⁹ Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2014’, 5. Italics mine.

Table 4.3 Evolution of the nature of leadership embedded within the IH frame, 2011-14

2011	Our new strategy for 2011-2015 provides <i>the potential for crucial leadership</i> in three vital areas: (...) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Developing a deeper <i>faith-based framework for humanitarianism</i> and development that offers leadership and guidance on issues affecting the developing world⁵⁴⁰.
2011; 2012	<i>We'll be a policy leader on Islamic humanitarian issues</i> ⁵⁴¹ .
2013	<i>As we lead the way in Islamic humanitarianism</i> , during 2011-2015 we will (...) ⁵⁴² <i>As a policy leader on Islamic humanitarianism</i> , we contribute to global discourse on development, help to shape the post-2015 development agenda, and enhance much-needed collaboration. ⁵⁴³
2013; 2014	<i>We are a policy leader on Islamic humanitarianism</i> , and we develop distinctive, practical approaches to the key issues that are affecting our world. ⁵⁴⁴
2014	<i>As an authority on Islamic humanitarianism</i> , we contribute to global discourse on development, help to shape the post-2015 development agenda, and enhance collaboration to benefit poor and vulnerable communities. ⁵⁴⁵

The extracts in table 4.3 also highlight how the IH frame qualitatively differs from the IHV frame: whilst the latter emphasised balance and compatibility between a distinctively Islamic and a mainstream humanitarian discourse, the IH frame communicates IR's willingness to play a leading role in shaping the latter from its distinctive faith-based perspective. This focus on leadership is stressed in 2013 in the very message from IR's Chair and CEO, which frames IR's capability to influence discourse as a *de facto* achievement:

*We shaped key discourses on faith and development around the world, and began advocating as part of the post-2015 agenda.*⁵⁴⁶

To emphasise this point, within the same year's report IR also dedicates two entire paragraphs to articulate the IH frame in a way that combines the organisation's quest for distinctiveness ("Understanding Islamic perspectives") on the one hand, with its self-confident commitment to contribute shaping

⁵⁴⁰ Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2011', 8. Italics mine.

⁵⁴¹ Ibid., 33; Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2012', 16.

⁵⁴² Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2013', 10.

⁵⁴³ Ibid., 39.

⁵⁴⁴ Ibid., 15; Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2014', 15.

⁵⁴⁵ Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2014', 39.

⁵⁴⁶ Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2013', 4. Italics mine.

mainstream discourse and practice (“Shaping the future of development”) on the other:

Understanding Islamic perspectives. In 2013, we continued with research to *deepen understandings of Islamic perspectives on development and humanitarianism*. Consultations engaged the expertise of scholars from around the world through a series of workshops held in Egypt, France and the UK. Our conceptual framework - published this year – underlined *the enormous potential of Islamic approaches in creating lasting positive change*. Other key publications *set out Islamic perspectives* on peacebuilding and gender and development. (...)

Shaping the future of development. In 2013, Islamic Relief achieved a *greater influence than ever before* in humanitarian and development policy. (...) Faith-community efforts to tackle global poverty were also given *renewed momentum* this year. At World Economic Forum events, *we highlighted the positive contribution that faith-based organisations can deliver*. We also engaged with key Muslim civil society organisations to progress constructive partnerships, including with the UK government, the UN and the UN Refugee Agency—as part of a *high level team building faith literacy and faith community partnership*.⁵⁴⁷

From the perspective of the IH frame, IR is therefore a leading Muslim NGO that explores humanitarian/development issues from a distinctive Muslim perspective, highlights its potential, and contributes to mainstream discourse by bringing its voice at key prestigious institutional platforms (such as the UN General Assembly, UNHCR meetings, the European Parliament, global conferences, world largest gatherings and university workshops). In the following extracts, I use ‘**bold**’ to highlight prompts to IR’s distinctiveness, and ‘underline’ to indicate references to key institutional platforms:

Complementing our projects that help vulnerable communities to adapt to a changing climate, hard-hitting campaigning and advocacy activities **underlined the potential of faith perspectives** to help secure social justice by safeguarding the planet. We presented our learning at the global ‘Religions for the Earth’ conference. (...) At the UN General Assembly, our side event on Eco Islam **explored the intersection of Islam and environmental issues** and launched online training that we helped develop for practitioners. Islamic Relief Worldwide also contributed to the creation of a coalition of Muslim civil society groups, which shares best practice and delivers joint advocacy on climate action.⁵⁴⁸

⁵⁴⁷ Ibid., 30. Bold in original. Italics mine.

⁵⁴⁸ Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2014’, 26. Bold and underline mine.

We launched a policy briefing, *The Rights of Forced Migrants in Islam*, at a UNHCR meeting this year, and explored the issue at university workshops in Brussels and the UK. We also contributed to a paper on **faith perspectives** regarding asylum, which was presented at the European Parliament.⁵⁴⁹

At the 58th session of the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW58), the world's largest gathering dedicated to empowering women and establishing gender equality, we took part in side events that **explored faith approaches** to gender-based violence and maternal health, as well as education for women and girls.⁵⁵⁰

The notion of the 'added value' brought by IR to the international humanitarian scene is thus central to the IH frame. As exemplified by the following extracts, this emphasis derives from a deliberate strategic choice made by IR in the 2011-14 phase:

We will be a policy leader on Islamic humanitarian issues. *We will also prioritise the strategic and programmatic opportunities provided by our faith* on development, humanitarianism, rights, sustainable livelihoods and micro-finance.⁵⁵¹

[Our new global strategy] *emphasises the value* that faith perspectives bring to the humanitarian agenda.⁵⁵²

With the adoption of the IH frame, IR is therefore keen not just to 'demonstrate' its compatibility with mainstream discourse (as it did through the IV and IHV frames). Rather, in IR's own words, by "providing Islamic perspectives" and "Islamic perspectives in policy and practice," its aim is to highlight that "the values and teachings of Islam" and the deriving "Islamic worldview on social issues" have a "huge potential": from the perspective of the IH frame, Islam can (and should) play a "critical," "crucial" role in "enrich[ing]" development discourses and practices through "distinctive approaches" to key issues:

3) Providing Islamic perspectives (...) *The Islamic worldview on social issues is a perspective that is increasingly critical* in our globalised world and particularly amongst Muslim communities that are affected by poverty and injustice.⁵⁵³

3) Providing Islamic perspectives

⁵⁴⁹ Ibid., 27. Bold and underline mine.

⁵⁵⁰ Ibid., 31. Bold and underline mine.

⁵⁵¹ Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2011', 33; Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2012', 16. (the latter has a slightly different wording and read as: "We'll be a policy leader on Islamic humanitarian issues. We will also prioritise the opportunities – both strategic and within our programmes – provided by our faith, particularly in development, humanitarianism, rights, sustainable livelihoods and micro-finance.") Italics mine.

⁵⁵² Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2011', 6. Italics mine.

⁵⁵³ Ibid., 33. Italics mine.

(...) We believe that *the values and teachings of Islam can enrich development discourses*, and strengthen service provision to beneficiaries from all backgrounds.⁵⁵⁴

5) Islamic perspectives in policy and practice

We are passionate about *the crucial role of faith-inspired humanitarianism* in improving the lives of the world's most vulnerable people (...) we develop *distinctive approaches* to key issues that are affecting our world today—including conflict resolution, child protection, inclusive finance and climate change – and put them into practice in our work.⁵⁵⁵

3) Islamic perspectives in policy and practice

We believe that *faith-inspired perspectives have huge potential* in tackling poverty and suffering worldwide. Islamic Relief actively develops *distinctive approaches* to key issues, most notably on gender, equality, child protection and climate change – and integrate these with grassroots learning throughout our work. We strengthen civil society and best practice and also plan to further enhance impact and embed lasting change *by increasing our focus on faith-literacy*.⁵⁵⁶

The period 2011-14 can be thus characterised as '*finding a self-confident synthesis*' because at this stage IR communicates through the IH frame a confident expression of the Self as a leading Muslim NGO capable of actively shaping mainstream humanitarian/development discourse from a distinctive Muslim perspective.

Conclusion

This chapter has provided a nuanced exploration of IR's framing of its own organisational identity over the period 2005-14. The analysis has identified three main frames that have been articulated by IR through a discursive trajectory conceptualizable in three main phases.

A first phase (2005-07) is characterised by the adoption of an ISLAMIC VALUES frame (IV), which is clearly conveyed, for example, by the opening part of IR's mission statement in these years. Despite its apparent emphasis on IR's distinctiveness (through a qualification of IR's values solely as 'Islamic'), the IV is not supported by the organisation's discourse as a whole at this stage, which lacks references to a distinctive Muslim narrative and essentially replicates that of secular development NGOs. I called this phase '*assuming distinctiveness*' because the distinctiveness of both: i) IR as a Muslim organisation; and ii) the

⁵⁵⁴ Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2012', 16. Italics mine.

⁵⁵⁵ Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2013', 39. Italics mine.

⁵⁵⁶ Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2014', 39. Italics mine.

Muslim tradition relevant to humanitarian/development discourse is not clearly articulated by IR at this stage but, rather, implicitly assumed.

This analysis corroborates (with regards to this phase) Petersen's argument that "the primary language of Islamic Relief is that of mainstream development and humanitarian aid"⁵⁵⁷ and that its legitimacy is framed more in terms of the services it provides than of the values it possesses.⁵⁵⁸ As she clearly puts it:

Islam is relegated to the intangible sphere of values. But not even there does Islam have priority over humanitarian and development values. Instead, the 'Islamic humanitarian values' that the organization builds its work upon are defined by and adjusted to the values of mainstream development and humanitarian aid.⁵⁵⁹

However, Petersen's analysis fails to capture that, whilst this interpretation may be plausible to understand IR's discourse in the 2005-07 phase, this does not seem to be the case in the following years.

In fact, my analysis highlights that starting from 2007-09 (i.e. the second phase analysed here, which overlaps with the implementation of IR's first global strategy) IR's discourse is increasingly characterised by a more self-conscious effort by the organisation to clearly and coherently communicate the distinctiveness that it had previously taken for granted. On the one hand, this is done through a fine-tuning of the IV frame, which is now substantiated by the explicit use of an 'Islamic vocabulary' (e.g. through the introduction of the expression "As salamu alaykum" and of the basmalah). On the other hand, this phase witnesses an increased salience of the ISLAMIC HUMANITARIAN VALUES frame (IHV), which had only been introduced in the previous phase. The IHV frame is based on a deliberate process of frame alignment that aims to rationalise the perceived 'Islamic-ness' of humanitarian values, the result of which is the identification/representation of a set of values that draws from an eclectic mix of Islamic and humanitarian principles. In light of this emphasis on alignment between different traditions (summed up by a IHV frame that hyphenates IR's

⁵⁵⁷ Marie Juul Petersen, 'Islamizing Aid: Transnational Muslim NGOs After 9.11', *Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations* 23, no. 1 (2012): 145.

⁵⁵⁸ Marie Juul Petersen, 'For Humanity or for the Umma? Ideologies of Aid in Four Transnational Muslim NGOs' (PhD Thesis, 2011), 184, <http://ccrs.ku.dk/phd/phdthesisdefences/mariejuulpetersen/>.

⁵⁵⁹ Petersen, 'Islamizing Aid', 146.

values as being *both* Islamic and humanitarian), I called the period 2007-09 as the ‘*seeking balance*’ phase.

Notably, my identification and interpretation of IR’s ‘seeking balance’ phase and of the IHV frame nuances another argument put forward by Petersen in her exploration of IR’s discourse: namely, that IR relies on “*integration* as an approach to merging different cultural frames” in the attempt “to Islamise development, presenting concepts of development, universalism and human rights as truly Islamic.”⁵⁶⁰ In particular, my analysis clarifies how such ‘integration’ has been (discursively) performed by IR, and qualifies Petersen argument as valid within a specific phase of the evolution of IR’s discourse. From this perspective, the process of fine-tuning identified in this chapter corroborates Petersen’s suggestion that IR has had to learn “to be bilingual, mastering the languages of both development and Islam” and that “this bilingual balance is not straight-forward or easy—sometimes the organization succeeds, and other times it does not.”⁵⁶¹ However, whilst Petersen’s suggestion that IR’s discourse “does not question the fundamentally secularist assumptions of development and humanitarian aid, but builds on the distinction between aid and religion”⁵⁶² may be applicable to this phase, this does not seem to be the case for the post-2010 period.

In fact, whilst Petersen considers IR’s discourse only up to 2009, my analysis identified precisely 2010 as a turning point in IR’s trajectory. This is clearly manifested by a climax in this year’s report of the visibility given to references derived from both the Muslim and the humanitarian/development ideational repertoires⁵⁶³ and by the introduction of the ISLAMIC HUMANITARIANISM frame (IH) as part of IR’s “new strategic direction”⁵⁶⁴ for the 2011-14 phase. Such development derives from and represents IR’s ‘new’ understanding of poverty, on the one hand, and of humanitarianism, on the other. As far as IR’s understanding of poverty is concerned, the IH frame stresses how the organisation’s newly adopted rights-based approach reflects a deliberate effort to

⁵⁶⁰ Petersen, ‘For Humanity or for the Umma?’, 220; 215.

⁵⁶¹ Petersen, ‘Islamizing Aid’, 150.

⁵⁶² Petersen, ‘For Humanity or for the Umma?’, 147.

⁵⁶³ As I have discussed in section 4.3, the 2010 report introduces for the first time direct quotes (in translation) from the Qur’an, which accompany sections explicitly structured around the Millennium Development Goals.

⁵⁶⁴ Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2010’, 38.

“resonate much more directly” (in IR’s own words) with Islamic teachings. With regards to IR’s ‘new’ understanding of humanitarianism, the organisation begins in 2010 to see its distinctiveness not merely as something to be aligned or made compatible with mainstream discourse, but rather as a ‘capital’ to be used in order to ‘lead the way’.

From these premises, the third phase (2011-14, which overlaps with the implementation of IR’s second global strategy) is thus characterised by a dominance of an ISLAMIC HUMANITARIANISM frame through which IR overcomes its earlier quest for balance between a Muslim and a mainstream identity, and rather self-confidently prioritises its Muslim distinctiveness as a source not only of internal inspiration and guidance, but also of leadership within the development sector as a whole. In light of this, I characterised the period 2011-14 as ‘*finding a self-confident synthesis*’. Among other things, this self-confident synthesis between distinctiveness and mainstreamness is articulated through: i) the articulation of IR’s values, which now are framed through an explicit Muslim lens both in terms of form and content; ii) the explicit reference to the Prophetic example as a source of inspiration; iii) an emphasis on IR’s willingness to play a leading role in shaping humanitarian/ development discourse from its distinctive faith-based perspective.

This analysis complements Petersen’s interpretation on two main levels. Firstly, my analysis shows that in the 2011-14 phase IR does indeed frame its legitimacy by means of its value-system, where Islam is given priority over the secular humanitarian/developmental norm—contrarily to Petersen’s interpretation, which can be therefore taken as valid only with regards to the pre-2010 period. Secondly, the fact that in 2011-14 IR is eager to play a leading role in shaping humanitarian/development discourse from its distinctive faith-based perspective can be interpreted as an eagerness to question the fundamentally secularist assumptions of the former—contrarily to Petersen’s interpretation, which (again) can be therefore taken as valid only with regards to the pre-2010 period. In order to highlight how the faith-based dimension of IR’s identity plays an increasingly important role in the organisation’s framing of the Self in the post-2010 period, I summarise in table 4.4 the occurrence of visible references to the Islamic ideational repertoire across annual reports.

Table 4.4 References to the Islamic ideational repertoire across IR's annual reports, 2005-14

	2005-06	-07	-08	-09	-10	-11	-12	-13	-14
	<i>Assuming distinctive -ness</i>	<i>Seeking balance</i>			<i>Turning point</i>	<i>Finding a self-confident synthesis</i>			
Greeting formula 'assalamu alaykum'		✓ ⁵⁶⁵	✓ ⁵⁶⁶	✓ ⁵⁶⁷	✓ ⁵⁶⁸	✓ ⁵⁶⁹	✓ ⁵⁷⁰	✓ ⁵⁷¹	✓ ⁵⁷²
Basmalah			✓ ⁵⁷³					✓ ⁵⁷⁴	✓ ⁵⁷⁵
Values in transliteration						✓ ⁵⁷⁶	✓ ⁵⁷⁷		
Values in Arabic									✓ ⁵⁷⁸
Quotes from Qur'an					✓ ⁵⁷⁹	✓ ⁵⁸⁰			✓ ⁵⁸¹
Quotes from sunnah			✓ ⁵⁸²			✓ ⁵⁸³	✓ ⁵⁸⁴	✓ ⁵⁸⁵	✓ ⁵⁸⁶

⁵⁶⁵ Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2007', 4,5.

⁵⁶⁶ Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2008', 4, 5.

⁵⁶⁷ Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2009', 4, 5.

⁵⁶⁸ Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2010', 4, 5.

⁵⁶⁹ Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Faith Inspired Action. Global Strategy 2011-2015', 6, 7.

⁵⁷⁰ Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2012', 6.

⁵⁷¹ Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2014', 4.

⁵⁷² Ibid.

⁵⁷³ Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2008', 2.

⁵⁷⁴ Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2013', 3.

⁵⁷⁵ Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2014', 2.

⁵⁷⁶ Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Faith Inspired Action. Global Strategy 2011-2015', 3.

⁵⁷⁷ Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2012', 6.

⁵⁷⁸ Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2014', 2. Notably, this year's report also feature an 'Islamic calligraphy' aesthetics, as reproduced earlier in figure 4.3.

⁵⁷⁹ Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2010', 4, 5.

⁵⁸⁰ Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Faith Inspired Action. Global Strategy 2011-2015', 9, 25.

⁵⁸¹ Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2014', pt. back cover.

⁵⁸² Indirect quote: "In the spirit of the prophetic teaching that 'charity does not decrease wealth'" Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2008', 4, 5.

⁵⁸³ Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Faith Inspired Action. Global Strategy 2011-2015', 9.

⁵⁸⁴ Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2012', 6. Indirect quote at page 12.

⁵⁸⁵ Indirect quote in: Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2013', 3.

⁵⁸⁶ Indirect quote in: Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2014', pt. back cover.

- *Implications for the research sub-questions*

Whilst it is beyond the scope of this study to explore the possible explanations for IR's evolution of the framing of the Self, the empirically-grounded analysis advanced in this chapter is pivotal to enrich our understanding of how to think about this organisation. In fact, the fine-tuning of IR's discourse over the years is a testimony that—partly because of what it is (i.e. a Muslim faith-based organisation) and partly because of where it is (i.e. a largely secular West)—IR exists “within multiple worlds,” bridges “multiple cultures and communities” and walks “a tightrope between being “different” and being “alike”.”⁵⁸⁷ Notably, whilst the range of developments identified in this chapter could not be captured by Petersen's ground-breaking work (which was concluded in 2011 and focused only on the 2003-09 period), sometime in 2010 the author envisaged the possibility of IR moving towards a new direction, when she wrote:

[Muslim NGOs] may in time find new ways of Islamizing aid, moving up or down the continuum [of different ways of Islamizing aid]. And they do: Islamic Relief, for instance, recently established an Islamic Values Committee, aimed at ensuring greater integration of ‘Islamic values’ into the organization's activities and *perhaps indicating a move towards a re-Islamization of aid.*⁵⁸⁸

Indeed, this chapter not only offers empirical evidence of how IR moved along a continuum of different framings of the Self, but also provides an in-depth exploration of the post-2010 change that was only conjectured as a possibility by Petersen.

Additionally, whilst Petersen's focus on Muslim NGO's conceptualisation of aid leads her to understand such continuum as one of “Islamization of aid,” my attention to IR's framing of the Self prompts me to interpret this evolution through slightly different lens. From a framing perspective, I understand the evolution of IR's discourse not only as the by-product of “internal debates and division about how to express the different layers of its identity”⁵⁸⁹ (as I outlined in the

⁵⁸⁷ Andrea Paras and Janice Gross Stein, ‘Bridging the Sacred and the Profane in Humanitarian Life’, in *Sacred Aid: Faith and Humanitarianism*, ed. Michael Barnett and Janice Gross Stein (Oxford University Press, 2012), 219; 221; 223.

⁵⁸⁸ Petersen, ‘Islamizing Aid’, 152–53. Italics mine.

⁵⁸⁹ Paras and Stein, ‘Bridging the Sacred and the Profane in Humanitarian Life’, 222.

introduction), but also as symptomatic of a broader “confusion as to the nature and make up of FBOs [faith-based organisations] when contrasted to NGOs.”⁵⁹⁰ Indeed, whilst the last 10 years or so (i.e. the period analysed in this chapter) have witnessed a significant increase in the number of studies exploring the role of faith and FBOs in international development, the literature remains divided as to how to understand (and frame) FBO themselves.⁵⁹¹ Notably, this divide is largely due to different conceptualisations of the origin and role of values inspiring and guiding a FBO’s work, which consequently situate FBOs in different positions vis-à-vis mainstream secular NGOs. Among the different perspectives emerging from this literature and identified by Clarke and Ware, three seem to epitomise particularly well the different stages of IR’s framing of the Self which I identified in this chapter.

The “same, same—but different” perspective focuses on the similarities between FBOs and NGOs, by emphasising their shared ethos to “respond to the humanitarian imperative” whilst effectively eclipsing any substantial distinctiveness.⁵⁹² From this perspective, while certain FBOs’ methods and activities may differ from their secular counterparts, these differences are considered simply as processual rather than substantive. The main weakness of this perspective is that it pre-emptively normalises FBOs against the benchmark of secular NGOs, thus neglecting the specificities of the former, particularly with regards to values and motivations.⁵⁹³

Within IR’s discourse, the ‘same, same-but different’ orientation seems to be reflected by what I called the ‘assuming distinctiveness’ phase (2005-07). In fact, in this period IR adopts an ISLAMIC VALUES frame that, despite qualifying its organisational values as ‘Islamic’, essentially perform a wholesome alignment with mainstream secular humanitarian/development discourse and neglects to refer to (let alone to capitalise on) a distinctively Muslim tradition. Whilst the incorporation of a ‘higher’, spiritual dimension with regards to values such as accountability and integrity contributes to convey a ‘same—but different’ nuance,

⁵⁹⁰ Matthew Clarke and Vicki-Anne Ware, ‘Understanding Faith-Based Organizations: How FBOs Are Contrasted with NGOs in International Development Literature’, *Progress in Development Studies* 15, no. 1 (1 January 2015): 46, doi:10.1177/1464993414546979.

⁵⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 38.

⁵⁹² *Ibid.*, 42.

⁵⁹³ *Ibid.*

emphasis at this stage is mainly on IR's compatibility and, indeed, sameness with the secular NGO sector.

The "coexisting" perspective⁵⁹⁴ understands FBOs as carrying an element of distinctiveness (deriving from their faith-inspired nature), a "cultural proximity" that enables them to have a comparative advantage (an "added value") in mobilising and/or serving members of their specific faith-communities.⁵⁹⁵ From this perspective, FBOs enjoy equal weightage as NGOs: they play distinct but equally important roles, and therefore "have a legitimate and equal right to exist and make claims on resources."⁵⁹⁶

Within IR's discourse, the 'coexisting' perspective is summed up by the ISLAMIC HUMANITARIAN VALUES frame prevailing in what I called the 'seeking balance' phase (2007-09). This is because in this phase IR begins to meaningfully draw from Muslim references in the attempt to place distinctiveness on a more equal footing with sameness, through an IHV frame that qualifies IR's value-system as being drawn from an eclectic mix of Islamic and humanitarian principles. Whilst this approach has the merit of not eclipsing the faith-based dimension of IR's, it appears to incorporate the utilitarian focus from which the 'coexisting' perspective emerges, in terms of its potential to improve the organisation's capability to either 'strike a chord' with individual Muslim donors, or to gain access to institutional donors that are increasingly interested in the comparative advantage of FBOs.

The 'intersectional' perspective understands FBOs as "organizations that sit within the intersection of NGOs and religious organizations," thus enjoying a "dual identity" whereby they can be classified as both NGOs (because of the work they conduct) and religious (because of their faith-based framework), on the one hand; and as being distinct from both solely secular NGOs and solely non-development religious organisations, on the other.⁵⁹⁷ From this perspective, FBOs have "feet in both camps" because they "are firmly rooted in their religious identity but committed to operating within the development sector" by developing an approach "infused or informed by the religious teachings."⁵⁹⁸

⁵⁹⁴ Ibid., 44.

⁵⁹⁵ Petersen, 'For Humanity or for the Umma?', 26.

⁵⁹⁶ Clarke and Ware, 'Understanding Faith-Based Organizations', 44.

⁵⁹⁷ Ibid., 41.

⁵⁹⁸ Ibid.

Within IR's discourse, the 'intersectional' orientation is evident during what I called the 'finding a self-confident synthesis' phase (2011-14). At this stage, IR develops an ISLAMIC HUMANITARIANISM frame that not only communicates a synthesis between distinctiveness (ISLAMIC) and sameness (HUMANITARIANISM), but also self-confidently projects IR as a FBO that is willing and capable of actively shaping mainstream humanitarian/development discourse from a distinctive Muslim perspective.

Finally, my analysis also highlights how the evolution of IR's framing of the Self has been accompanied by a parallel shift in the way the organisation has been increasingly drawing from and incorporating a distinctively Muslim discourse. Whilst Petersen only hinted to this possibility and characterised it as a potential "move towards a re-Islamization of aid,"⁵⁹⁹ my focus on Muslim NGOs as meaning-making actors and platforms for engagement (rather than as providers of aid) leads me to draw from Clarke's general classification of FBOs in order to suggest that IR's trajectory can be understood as an evolution from a "passive" orientation—where faith-based distinctiveness is subsidiary to a broader humanitarian narrative as a motivation for action and in mobilizing staff and supporters; to an "active" orientation—where faith-based distinctiveness "provides an important and explicit motivation for action and in mobilizing staff and supporters."⁶⁰⁰

Indeed, IR's 'active' orientation seems to be corroborated by the analysis I offer in chapter 6, where I illustrate the salience of a distinctive faith-based dimension within the organisation's mobilisation-oriented discourse.

⁵⁹⁹ Petersen, 'Islamizing Aid', 153.

⁶⁰⁰ Gerard Clarke, 'Faith-Based Organizations and International Development: An Overview', in *Development, Civil Society and Faith-Based Organizations*, ed. Gerard Clarke and Michael Jennings, International Political Economy Series (Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2008), 32, http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9780230371262_2.

Chapter 5 . MADE's MOVEMENT frame

Introduction

In their 2011 ground-breaking work towards the identification of “positive frames for development,”⁶⁰¹ Darnton and Kirk proposed that, in order to improve the quality of the UK public engagement in bigger-than-self issues such as global poverty, British NGOs should consider the MOVEMENT frame an alternative to the current (negative) CHARITY frame to articulate their identity (in discourse and practice).⁶⁰² Notably, stressing that “each alternative [frame] comes with its own frame system,” the authors also warned of the risk that frames can “become mere slogans” in the absence of a solid meaning system of which they are “the logical outcomes.”⁶⁰³

Indeed, this note of caution is particularly relevant with regards to the MOVEMENT frame, since there is no universally accepted definition of what a ‘movement’ is.⁶⁰⁴ In part, this stems from the fact that movements are shifting entities, which travel across a spectrum of possibilities. This ranges from collective actors and formally organised groups that challenge the status quo through mass mobilisations; to loose, informal networks of like-minded individuals who attempt to prefigure within their daily lives the change they envision in society.⁶⁰⁵

Despite the lack of a clear consensus on what a movement is, the MOVEMENT frame does come with a specific meaning-system that, in the case of MADE, includes a sense of injustice, a consciousness of agency, and the ‘fight’ metaphor—as I will discuss in sections 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4, respectively. Before attending to this, section 5.1 examines how MADE dedicates considerable discursive efforts to articulate a MOVEMENT frame through a consistent, explicit reference to the homonym term.

⁶⁰¹ Darnton, Andrew and Martin Kirk, ‘Finding Frames: New Ways to Engage the UK Public in Global Poverty’ (London: Bond, 2011), 88.

⁶⁰² *Ibid.*, 93-94-103.

⁶⁰³ *Ibid.*, 94; 102.

⁶⁰⁴ For a summary of some recent definitions of ‘movement’ from several noted social movement (each broken down into the three common components of actor(s), interest(s) and action(s)), see: Ellis Jones, ‘Social Responsibility Activism: Why Individuals Are Changing Their Lifestyles to Change the World’ (PhD Thesis, 2002), 153–54.

⁶⁰⁵ I will elaborate on this later in the thesis, when discussing the resonance of MADE’s discourse with that of contemporary movements (chapter 7) and forms of activism (chapter 9).

Additionally, the analysis points out that MADE articulates a sense of injustice and a consciousness of agency through what I call the PROFIT OVER PEOPLE & PLANET and the CHANGE YOURSELF TO CHANGE THE WORLD frames, respectively. Whilst I introduce these frames here, I will elaborate more on them in chapter 7, within my analysis of MADE's mobilising efforts as epitomised by its Ramadan Revolution campaign (2013-14).

5.1. A MOVEMENT

The most self-evident strategy through which MADE conveys a MOVEMENT frame is represented by the consistent use of explicit references to the term 'movement' at the macro-, meso- and a micro-level.

5.1.1. Macro-level

At the macro-level, MADE consistently answers the quintessential question: 'What is MADE?' by explicitly characterising itself as a 'movement'. A number of critical discursive moments exemplify this self-identification.

For example, the section of MADE's website that is precisely dedicated to articulate the identity of the organisation ("About_What we do") defines MADE as a "Muslim-led movement" and incorporates two of the most common cognitive structures associated with the MOVEMENT frame, the idea of 'injustice' and the 'fight' metaphor (more about these in sections 5.2 and 5.4, respectively):

MADE is a *Muslim-led movement* of young people who want to see our community leading the *fight* against global poverty and *injustice*.⁶⁰⁶

Secondly, the MOVEMENT frame is also conveyed through MADE's articulation of its invitation to support the organisation. MADE explicitly exhorts bystanders to "Join the movement" by filling a registration box on its website homepage, which enables visitors to say "I'm in!" the 'movement' by subscribing to MADE's e-mailing list (figure 5.1).⁶⁰⁷ In addition, in its effort to provide young British Muslims with an easily accessible platform for feeling part of a 'movement', MADE invites bystanders to become active supporters by offering them different "ways to join the movement," which can suit a range of tastes, skills, and levels of

⁶⁰⁶ 'What We Do', MADE, accessed 23 July 2016, <http://www.made.ngo/what-we-do>. Italics mine.

⁶⁰⁷ 'Home', MADE, accessed 23 July 2016, <https://www.made.ngo/>. Like other key sections of MADE's website, the e-mailing list registration box has been reformulated sometime after the summer of 2016. The new version's title is: "Join our mailing list," and the subtitle ("The fight against poverty and injustice starts here") has been removed.

commitment—such as volunteering, writing a blog for MADE’s website, following the organisation on social media, getting in touch and discussing ideas via email, or donating to support its work.⁶⁰⁸

This image has been removed by the author of this thesis for copyright reasons.

Figure 5.1 The MOVEMENT frame in MADE’s e-mailing registration box
Source: adapted from ‘Home’, *MADE*, accessed 23 July 2016, <https://www.made.ngo/>

In fact, even the invitation that is traditionally associated with the CHARITY frame⁶⁰⁹— i.e. the request to “Donate”⁶¹⁰—is articulated by MADE precisely through the MOVEMENT frame. Not only by explicitly equating monetary support with “be[ing] part of the movement,” but also by conceptualising this very type of support as a means to nurture among young Muslims a feature that is key to movements: agency (as conveyed by the line: “making sure young Muslims have the tools and the knowledge to make change happen”):

DONATE NOW—*BE PART OF THE MOVEMENT* (...)

Whether you make a standing order or one-off donation, your contributions will go towards *making sure young Muslims have the tools and the knowledge to make change happen*. We are creating a *life changing movement* both through education, which provides training and resources on the issues and skills needed to create future leaders and also campaigning, to create a platform on and offline to lobby decision makers. So donate now and *be part of the movement*.⁶¹¹

⁶⁰⁸ MADE in Europe, ‘MADE in Europe. Annual Review 2009/2010’ (London: MADE in Europe, 2010), pt. Back cover; MADE in Europe, ‘MADE in Europe. Annual Report 2010/2011’ (London: MADE in Europe, 2011), pt. Back cover; MADE in Europe, ‘MADE in Europe. Annual Report 2011/2012’ (London: MADE in Europe, 2012), pt. Back cover.

⁶⁰⁹ Darnton, Andrew and Kirk, ‘Finding Frames: New Ways to Engage the UK Public in Global Poverty’, 90.

⁶¹⁰ This is positioned right below the aforementioned box in MADE’s website homepage. (‘Home’, *MADE*, accessed 23 July 2016, <https://www.made.ngo/>)

⁶¹¹ ‘Donate’, *MADE*, accessed 26 April 2017, <https://www.made.ngo/donate>. Italics mine.

Notably, the incorporation of the MOVEMENT frame in MADE's invitation to support the organisation is also highly visible in a video it produced at the end of 2013 precisely to clarify the framing of the Self, entitled "Intro to MADE - Muslims campaigning against global poverty & injustice."⁶¹² The video explicitly characterises MADE as a 'movement' in the concluding rallying call and it reinforces the MOVEMENT frame by incorporating three deep cognitive structures associated to it: i) an injustice component (which I highlight using '**bold**' and discuss further in section 5.2); an agency component (which I highlight using 'underline' and discuss further in section 5.3); and the 'fight' metaphor (which I highlight using 'double underline' and discuss in section 5.4):

At MADE in Europe we have a vision of Muslims leading the fight against poverty, **injustice**, and environmental damage, by raising awareness and campaigning for change, inspired by the teachings of the greatest activist of all times ["Prophet Muhammad (PBUH)"] Join *the movement*: change yourself, to change the world for a better future.⁶¹³

Thirdly, MADE's macro-level articulation of the Self through the MOVEMENT frame is supported by two types of "frame articulators"⁶¹⁴ (internals and externals) that publicly endorse such a framing. On the one hand, young people who have supported MADE in different capacities (i.e. internals) reinforce the idea of MADE as a 'movement' by expressing the sentiment of 'feeling part of a growing movement':

I feel part of a solution and *part of a movement* to educate and address important issues that we have in this unequal world. (...) We can do so much. My first step towards a solution is through volunteering with MADE in Europe, so that *I feel part of the movement* and solution to this extreme poverty.⁶¹⁵

⁶¹² *Intro to MADE - Muslims campaigning against global poverty & injustice*, YouTube video, 1:50, posted by "Made In Europe," Dec 17, 2013, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=91FAQRGoMXc> Notably, MADE consciously highlights the strategic nature of the video not only through its very title, but also by: a) giving it prominent visibility within the aforementioned webpage; and b) incorporating the video in the website homepage under the title: "WHAT WE'RE ABOUT."('Home'.)

⁶¹³ MADE in Europe, *Intro to MADE in Europe - Muslims Campaigning against Global Poverty & Injustice*. All emphasis mine.

⁶¹⁴ For a discussion on the importance of the credibility of frame articulators, see: Robert D Benford and David A Snow, 'Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment', *Annual review of sociology* 26 (2000): 619–21.

⁶¹⁵ 'Part of a Solution', *MADE*, 25 October 2010, <http://www.made.ngo/updates/blogs/item/part-of-a-solution>. Italics mine.

The movement is growing and more and more people are coming on board. Don't let the train leave before jumping on – you won't regret it!⁶¹⁶

On the other hand, authoritative frame articulators from both Muslim and mainstream NGOs (i.e. externals) such as the co-founder and historic figurehead of Islamic Relief (Dr Hany El-Banna) and Oxfam's former Head of Public Engagement (Mrs Gillian Temple) consolidate the idea of MADE as a 'movement' through endorsements such as the following:

MADE in Europe is a very good initiative. It should be seen as more than just an organisation - *it is a movement*. I really believe in volunteerism and the power of the youth.⁶¹⁷

Muslim communities in the UK have a vital role to play in challenging the inequality and injustices around the world. (...) We are pleased that MADE in Europe is taking a leading role in mobilising grassroots action.⁶¹⁸

5.1.2. Meso-level

At the meso-level, MADE conveys the MOVEMENT frame by consistently highlighting throughout the years its movement-building efforts within different articulations of its vision and mission statements. Here, the MOVEMENT frame is evoked both explicitly (through reference to this term) and implicitly, through: i) the already mentioned injustice and agency components (which I highlight using '**bold**' and 'underline', respectively, in the following extracts); and ii) through a reference to the idea of mobilisation, in terms of both of its two key components of "consensus" and "action" mobilisation⁶¹⁹ (respectively evoked by the verbs "inspire" and "enable"):

⁶¹⁶ 'Shabaana Kidy, Ultimate Campaigner!', *MADE*, 22 May 2012, <http://www.made.ngo/updates/blogs/item/shabaana-kidy-ultimate-campaigner-2>. Italics mine.

⁶¹⁷ MADE in Europe, 'Annual Report 2010', sec. People's Page. Italics mine.

⁶¹⁸ Ibid. Italics mine.

⁶¹⁹ Consensus and action mobilisation refer to the processes through which a social movement "tries to obtain support for its viewpoint" and "calls up people to participate", respectively. (Bert Klandermans, 'Mobilization and Participation: Social-Psychological Expansions of Resource Mobilization Theory', *American Sociological Review* 49, no. 5 (1984): 586, doi:10.2307/2095417.) As Benford and Snow aptly summarise: "Simply put, the former [consensus mobilisation] fosters or facilitates agreement whereas the latter [action mobilisation] fosters action, moving people from the balcony to the barricades." (Benford and Snow, 'Framing Processes and Social Movements', 615.)

Our mission is to inspire and enable a grassroots European Muslim youth *movement* of faith in action for tackling global poverty, **injustice and inequality** (...)⁶²⁰

OUR VISION: *A movement* of conscious and active young Muslim leaders working to establish **justice** for all.⁶²¹

OUR VISION: *A movement* of conscious Muslim youth striving for a **just** and sustainable world.⁶²²

Additionally, the explicit reference to the term ‘movement’ is also conveyed in critical discursive moments such as the opening messages from MADE’s Chair and CEO in the organisation’s annual reports in two consecutive years (2010-11; 2011-12). Notably, here the MOVEMENT frame is mainly linked to the idea of ‘change’ (and, consequently, to the agency component), thus characterising MADE specifically as “a movement for change”:

This year MADE in Europe has spread its wings across the UK and even Europe, inviting young Muslims from across the continent to *join our movement for change*. (...) We hope you enjoy reflecting on our past year, and *join us in the movement for change* in the years to come.⁶²³

We would like to thank all of our supporters and volunteers who have contributed to all of our successes so far. We hope you enjoy reading about our experiences over the past year and continue to support *our movement for change*.⁶²⁴

Significantly, a MOVEMENT frame is also indirectly evoked by a similar focus on the idea of change in the message from MADE’s Chair and CEO that marks the organisation 5th anniversary in 2014, which self-confidently characterises the organisation as “steadily becoming a force for change”:

This year marks the 5th anniversary of MADE in Europe. From a small start-up testing the waters, all praise to God, we are steadily becoming *a force for change* in the heart of the community alongside the young people that we work with.⁶²⁵

⁶²⁰ MADE in Europe, ‘Annual Report 2010’, sec. Our Mission; MADE in Europe, ‘Annual Report 2011’, sec. Our Mission; MADE in Europe, ‘Annual Report 2012’, 2. (In 2011-12, the last sentence ends only with “poverty and injustice.”) All emphasis mine.

⁶²¹ MADE in Europe, ‘MADE in Europe. Annual Report 2012/2013’ (London: MADE in Europe, 2013), 2; MADE in Europe, ‘MADE in Europe. Annual Report 2013/2014’ (London: MADE in Europe, 2014), 2. All emphasis mine.

⁶²² MADE, ‘MADE. Annual Report 2015’ (MADE, 2015), 2. All emphasis mine.

⁶²³ MADE in Europe, ‘Annual Report 2011’, pt. opening letter from Chair and CEO. Italics mine.

⁶²⁴ MADE in Europe, ‘Annual Report 2012’, 2. Italics mine.

⁶²⁵ MADE in Europe, ‘Annual Report 2014’, 3. Italics mine.

Finally, the video launched by MADE to commemorate its 5th anniversary during a public event it organised in January 2015 at the Houses of Parliament⁶²⁶ concludes by conveying a MOVEMENT frame through an explicit reference to the term, and by accompanying it with a strong agency component (conveyed by the expressions: “principles of activism,” “activists,” “for change”):

Using the Islamic principles of activism and social justice, MADE is building a *movement* of activists who campaign for change.⁶²⁷

5.1.3. Micro-level

At the micro-level, MADE mirrors the high visibility given to the term ‘movement’ at the macro- and meso-levels by consistently using it to characterise virtually all of its projects, initiatives, and campaigns. A few significant examples can clarify this approach.

For example, MADE’s first “flagship campaign”⁶²⁸ (At Our Mothers’ Feet⁶²⁹) is described as one through which the organisation spearheaded the mobilisation of a “movement for maternal health in the UK Muslim community”:

BUILDING THE *MATERNAL HEALTH MOVEMENT*

At Our Mothers’ Feet was the first campaign of its kind in the UK Muslim community bringing an issue like maternal health to the fore. Through the hard work of the project team and countless volunteers, we have been able to reach thousands of people with our message that women do not need to die, and inspired hundreds of campaign actions. We have seen mosques, schools, madrasahs, Imams, charities, media personalities and women’s groups united under this one cause. *The movement for maternal health in the UK Muslim community has well and truly begun!*⁶³⁰

Similarly, MADE’s second flagship campaign (Green Up My Community!) was explicitly framed as a movement-building effort aimed to both “inspire a new pan-European Green Muslim Youth movement,” and to prompt Muslim institutions to be “at forefront of the [wider] environmental movement”:

FEMYSO, Europe’s largest Muslim youth network, in cooperation with UK campaigning NGO MADE in Europe, are launching “Green Up my Community!”, a campaign to inspire a new *pan-European Green Muslim Youth movement*. (...) The campaign will take place through 2013 and will

⁶²⁶ MADE’s 5 Year Journey #5YearsMADE, YouTube video, 1:31, posted by “Made In Europe,” Jan 11, 2015, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6K-QHUBFvFU>

⁶²⁷ Ibid. Italics mine.

⁶²⁸ MADE in Europe, ‘Annual Report 2013’, 6.

⁶²⁹ MADE’s longest campaign so far, lasting 3 years, from 2011 to 2013

⁶³⁰ ‘At Our Mothers’ Feet’, MADE, accessed 26 April 2017, <http://www.made.ngo/what-we-do/past-projects/item/at-our-mothers-feet-2>. Italics mine.

aim to inspire a new *Muslim youth-led pan-European environmental and trade justice movement*.⁶³¹

It's time to bring back the green in our deen! We want to see Muslim institutions – particularly our mosques – *at the forefront of the environmental movement*, preaching green from the pulpit and demonstrating eco-consciousness in everything they do.⁶³²

Notably, MADE adopts the MOVEMENT frame not just to articulate its own campaigns, but also those led by other groups/organisations. For example, MADE's adoption of the internationally-known charitable challenge Live Below the Line⁶³³ is described as a way to offer young British Muslims the possibility to "help build a *movement of passionate people* who want to change the way we think about extreme poverty."⁶³⁴ Again, the Enough Food for Everyone, IF campaign⁶³⁵ (which MADE participated in 2013) is referred to as "truly a *historic movement*" to end global hunger—a movement which "young Muslims can and must be at the forefront of."⁶³⁶

Taken together, the aforementioned evidence shows that MADE strategically commits significant efforts into explicitly articulating its organisational identity through the MOVEMENT frame by consistently using the homonym term at all levels of its discourse. Notably, the foregoing also highlights that, at times, MADE conveys the MOVEMENT frame in less explicit ways, through an allusion to some of the deeper cognitive elements traditionally associated with our understanding of what a 'movement' is, such as a sense of injustice, a consciousness of agency, and the 'fight' metaphor. I discuss each of these dimensions individually in the following three sections. Each section presents two main parts. The first (shorter) part highlights the conventional association between each of these deep ideational components and the MOVEMENT frame. The second (longer) part

⁶³¹ "'Green Up My Community' - MADE', accessed 26 April 2017, <https://www.made.ngo/updates/news/item/green-up-my-community>. Italics mine.

⁶³² 'Green Up My Community!', MADE, accessed 26 April 2017, <http://www.made.ngo/what-we-do/past-projects/item/green-up-my-community-2>. Italics mine.

⁶³³ Live Below the Line is an annual poverty awareness campaign organised since 2010 by the Organisations 'Global Poverty Project' and 'Oaktree Foundation': it challenges participants to feed themselves on the equivalent of the extreme poverty line for five days.

⁶³⁴ 'Live below the Line', MADE, 10 April 2012, <http://www.made.ngo/updates/blogs/item/live-below-the-line-2>. Italics mine.

⁶³⁵ The IF campaign was launched in 2013 by a coalition of 100 UK development charities and faith groups to lobby the UK government during its G8 presidency to take action on the root causes of hunger. The campaign represented a key campaigning moment for the British NGO sector as a whole, and throughout the thesis I will refer several times to it.

⁶³⁶ 'Allah Created Enough Food for Everyone', MADE, 23 January 2013, <http://www.made.ngo/updates/blogs/item/allah-created-enough-food-for-everyone>. Italics mine.

discusses in detail how MADE conveys a MOVEMENT frame by articulating the respective deep cognitive component at the macro-, meso- and micro-levels.

5.2. A MOVEMENT's spark: a sense of injustice

A second mechanism used by MADE to frame its organisational identity through a MOVEMENT frame springs from the incorporation within its discourse of a consistent reference to the idea of 'injustice'. In general terms, the connection between the MOVEMENT frame and a sense of injustice is highlighted by the fact that "injustice frames appear to be fairly ubiquitous across movements advocating some form of political and/or economic change."⁶³⁷ Indeed, a plethora of studies within social movement literature have highlighted how "social movements are both consumers and producers of injustice symbols,"⁶³⁸ leading to a fairly strong consensus about the fact that grievances articulated through injustice-type frames are crucial to the emergence of most movements.⁶³⁹ For one, Turner (a sociologist that played a key role in the contemporary study of collective behaviour and social movements) clarifies this conventional association in two key contributions. Firstly, in his (and Killian's) classic *Collective Behavior*, the author hints to the almost inextricable relation between a sense of injustice and the very existence of a movement by arguing that:

a movement is inconceivable apart from a vital sense that some established practice or mode of thought is wrong and ought to be replaced...The common element in the norms of most, and probably all, movements is the conviction that existing conditions are unjust.⁶⁴⁰

Such an intrinsic connection between the MOVEMENT frame and the idea of 'injustice' is also highlighted in Turner's analysis of "movements and injustice."⁶⁴¹ Here, the author stresses that "any major social movement depends upon and promotes some normative revision" that "takes the form of a new sense of what

⁶³⁷ Benford and Snow, 'Framing Processes and Social Movements', 615–16.

⁶³⁸ T. Olesen, *Global Injustice Symbols and Social Movements* (Springer, 2015), 1.

⁶³⁹ Robert D. Benford, 'An Insider's Critique of the Social Movement Framing Perspective*', *Sociological Inquiry* 67, no. 4 (1 October 1997): 415–16, doi:10.1111/j.1475-682X.1997.tb00445.x; David A. Snow et al., 'Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation', *American Sociological Review* 51, no. 4 (1986): 466, doi:10.2307/2095581; William A. Gamson, *Talking Politics* (Cambridge University Press, 1992), 31.

⁶⁴⁰ Ralph H. Turner and Lewis M. Killian, *Collective Behavior* (Pearson Education Canada, 1987), 242, quoted in Gamson, *Talking Politics*, 31.

⁶⁴¹ Ralph H. Turner, 'The Theme of Contemporary Social Movements', *The British Journal of Sociology* 20, no. 4 (1969): 390, doi:10.2307/588924.

is *just* and what is *unjust* in society.”⁶⁴² A sense of injustice is thus a prerequisite for the development of a movement insofar a substantial group of people needs to change the way they look at some problematic condition and at the way to address it: “no longer as a misfortune warranting charitable consideration but as an injustice which is intolerable in society.”⁶⁴³

In light of the conventional association between the MOVEMENT frame and the idea of ‘injustice’ outlined above, it is possible to appreciate how MADE’s discourse evokes the former by consistently articulating the latter through explicit references to both injustice and its opposite (justice) at the macro-, meso- and micro-levels.

5.2.1. Macro- and meso-levels

At the macro-level, the centrality of the idea of ‘injustice’ within MADE’s discourse is epitomised by its presence in the organisation’s standard rallying call for mobilisation:

AS MUSLIMS, THE FIGHT AGAINST POVERTY AND *INJUSTICE*
STARTS WITH YOU! ⁶⁴⁴

This appears in critical discursive moments such as the top banner of the website’s homepage (see later, figure 5.3), and in the introductory page of what it can be considered as MADE’s ‘manifesto’: the “Islam in action! The Ultimate Campaign Toolkit,”⁶⁴⁵ which also incorporate the ‘fight’ metaphor (discussed in section 5.4).

At the meso-level, the idea of ‘injustice’ has consistently populated MADE’s different articulations of its vision and mission over the years, with the statements adopted between 2012-14 offering the most explicit example of the dialectic between a negative moment of struggle against ‘the old’ (i.e. ‘fight against injustice’) and the positive moment of establishment of ‘the new’ (i.e. ‘to establish justice for all’):

⁶⁴² Ibid. Emphasis in original.

⁶⁴³ Ibid., 391.

⁶⁴⁴ ‘Home’. Last accessed 23 July 2016. Italics mine. (MADE’s traditional rallying call has been replaced in late 2016 with: “JOIN US AND INVEST IN POSITIVE FUTURES FOR OUR YOUTH!”. Ibid. Last accessed 29 April 2017.)

⁶⁴⁵ MADE in Europe and Oxfam GB, ‘Islam in Action! The Ultimate Campaign Toolkit’ (London: MADE in Europe, 2011), 3.

OUR MISSION: to mobilise European Muslim youth to lead *the fight against global poverty and injustice*.

OUR VISION: A movement of conscious and active young Muslim leaders working *to establish justice for all*.⁶⁴⁶

Further, the salience of the idea of 'injustice' in MADE's discourse is also mirrored by the organisation's self-perception as "a voice for justice," as illustrated by the message from MADE's Chair and Executive Director on the occasion of the organisation's 5th anniversary:

There is an enormous responsibility that comes with *being a voice for justice and peace* (...) We hope that you will respond to our call for unified action against poverty and *injustice* with resilience, leadership, and hope.⁶⁴⁷

5.2.2. Micro-level

At the micro-level, the pervasiveness of the idea of 'injustice' in MADE's discourse is well highlighted by its appearance across MADE's campaigns over the years, which consistently articulate a wide range of issues (as diverse as lack of maternal health, hunger, unfair trade regulations, the use of bottled water, and environmental damage/climate change) precisely as injustices. This is aptly illustrated by the following examples, respectively drawn from MADE's campaigns: At our Mothers Feet (2010-13); Eat of the Good Things (2011); Trade Justice in the Cotton Industry (2011); I Drink Tap! (2012); and Green Up my Community! (2012-15):

Islam commands us *to stand up against injustice*, whenever we come across it. The fact that thousands of women around the world continue to die in pregnancy and childbirth *is an injustice*, especially when we consider that most maternal deaths are preventable.⁶⁴⁸

The Eat of the Good Things campaign (...) aims to raise awareness about *global food injustice* by training and mobilising young Muslims to take leadership roles in their communities, build campaigning networks and inspire others to take action.⁶⁴⁹

This year we continued with our campaign on *trade justice* in the cotton industry, using the Christian Muslim Youth Forum in June 2011 as an opportunity to lobby the UK government to take a lead in ending the EU's

⁶⁴⁶ MADE in Europe, 'Annual Report 2013', 2; MADE in Europe, 'Annual Report 2014', 2. Italics mine.

⁶⁴⁷ MADE in Europe, 'Annual Report 2014', 3. Italics mine.

⁶⁴⁸ MADE in Europe, 'At Our Mothers' Feet Campaign Toolkit' (London: MADE in Europe, 2012), 9. Italics mine.

⁶⁴⁹ MADE in Europe, 'Annual Report 2012', 7. Italics mine.

distorting cotton subsidies which prevent over 10 million African farmers from trading fairly. Our campaigners formulated a statement expressing their concern over the *current injustices in the cotton trade*.⁶⁵⁰

Water is a gift from Allah. Bottled water is *an injustice to our planet and to fellow human beings*.⁶⁵¹

Islam, Injustice and the Environment. (...) Topic of the khutba is about a very specific type of injustice...*injustice to the world around us* (...) Islam is a religion of many things; love; mercy; worship; submission. Importantly, Islam is also *a religion of justice*. (...) *Adl (Justice)*: simply, *treating the world with justice*, first by recognizing that humans have a negative impact on Earth, and then by reducing that impact as much as possible.⁶⁵²

Further, a sense of injustice seems to be shared by individuals who have collaborated with MADE, in one capacity or another. This is aptly represented by the following testimonies from: i) a former MADE's intern; ii) a volunteer; and iii) a teacher involved in MADE's 'development education' programme. Significantly, all of these memoirs share not only a perception of the world as one that is laden with injustice at different levels (morality, the environment, economics, systems of production-consumption, and trade), but also highlight MADE's role as an "eye opener" to those very injustices that may otherwise sometimes be overlooked ("open your eyes to many things"; "helped open my eyes"; "an eye opener to the injustices that are prevalent today"), and as a platform to start tackling them ("to counteract the transgressions we commit"; "dealing with the injustices"; "to embark on the journey of change for equality and justice"):

Allah has created this universe, from the Earth to the furthest stars with balance and measure. We are not meant to *exceed the balance and spread injustice*. However as humans we have been transgressing the balance in many ways. We have exceeded the moral balance and the balance of this Earth. (...) We have *injustice* in our economies and we hurt our own fellow brethren. (...) That is why, as an ambitious and growing organisation, MADE In Europe aims to *counteract the transgressions we commit*. It intends to tackle *social injustices* and poverty around world. (...) [A]t MADE you will not only engage in activities but you will learn as a person and *open your eyes to many things*.⁶⁵³

⁶⁵⁰ Ibid., 11. Italics mine.

⁶⁵¹ 'Welcome to the I Drink Tap! Campaign', MADE, 23 March 2012, <http://www.made.ngo/updates/blogs/item/welcome-to-the-i-drink-tap-campaign>. Italics mine.

⁶⁵² 'Islam, Injustice and the Environment (Template Khutba)' (MADE in Europe), sec. 'Khutba Part 1: The Environmental Principles of our Deen', accessed 26 April 2017, <https://www.made.ngo/what-we-do/resources/item/green-khutba>. Italics mine.

⁶⁵³ 'MADE In Mizan - MADE', 1 April 2014, <http://www.made.ngo/updates/blogs/item/made-in-mizan>. Italics mine.

Islam teaches us *to stand up for justice*. MADE in Europe's Campaign Training programme *helped open my eyes* to the many ways of *dealing with the injustices* that take place in our global and local food systems.⁶⁵⁴

Working on the Fairtrade project with MADE in Europe has most definitely been *an eye opener to the injustices that are prevalent today*, and it has allowed our students *to embark on the journey of change for equality and justice* in trade.⁶⁵⁵

To sum up, the foregoing highlights how MADE's consistent incorporation of the idea of 'injustice' within its discourse is conducive to articulate its organisational identity through a MOVEMENT frame in light of the strong, conventional association between these two cognitive elements. I will explore more in detail in chapter 7 how MADE develops an injustice-type frame (which I call the PROFIT OVER PEOPLE & PLANET frame) that contributes to situate the organisation within a specific constellation of contemporary movements. In the following section I outline how the MOVEMENT frame is evoked by MADE also by a consistent reference to a second major ideational element associated with it: a consciousness of agency.

5.3. A MOVEMENT's nourishment: a consciousness of agency

Whilst the development of a sense of injustice represents from many aspects a necessary prerequisite for the emergence of a movement, it is also widely acknowledged that this is not sufficient in and of itself. For example, poverty may be framed as an injustice, but that does not necessarily entail action (in the form of a movement) to address it. Scholars focusing on framing processes (rather than on frames as interpretative schemata) argue that action (and the emergence of a movement) is contingent on the attributional component of "diagnostic framing" activities aimed at the "identification of the source(s) of causality, blame, and/or culpable agents"⁶⁵⁶—in other words, a movement can arise only when responsibility for injustice is attributed to clearly identifiable, concrete targets.⁶⁵⁷ At a more foundational level, a key necessary condition for a movement to arise is that injustice is not seen (or framed) as inevitable or unchallengeable. As Piven

⁶⁵⁴ 'Aiysha Amin: Eat Of The Good Things', accessed 26 April 2017, <http://www.made.ngo/team/volunteers/item/aiysha-amin-eat-of-the-good-things-2>. Italics mine.

⁶⁵⁵ '600 Muslim Schoolchildren Take Part in Fairtrade Fortnight - MADE', 19 March 2013, <http://www.made.ngo/updates/news/item/600-muslim-schoolchildren-take-part-in-fairtrade-fortnight-with-palestinian-farmers>. Italics mine.

⁶⁵⁶ Benford and Snow, 'Framing Processes and Social Movements', 616; Snow et al., 'Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation', 474.

⁶⁵⁷ Gamson, *Talking Politics*, 32.

and Cloward put it: “the social arrangements that are ordinarily perceived as just and immutable must come to seem *both* unjust and mutable.”⁶⁵⁸ Indeed, there is wide consensus that for a movement to emerge “at a minimum people need to feel both *aggrieved* about some aspect of their lives and *optimistic* that, acting collectively, they can redress the problem”—in other words, “anger at the perceived injustice” needs to be coupled with “hope that the injustice can be redressed through collective action.”⁶⁵⁹ This synergy highlights how (in terms of discourse) a MOVEMENT frame can be evoked through references not only to the idea of ‘injustice’, but also to a consciousness of agency that: i) postulates the viability of change by “deny[ing] the immutability of some undesirable situation”; ii) considers individuals and groups as agentic actors and implies “some sense of collective efficacy” on the basis of the “consciousness that it is possible to alter conditions or policies through collective action”; iii) conveys a sense of responsibility to take action by highlighting “not merely that something can be done but that “we” can [/should] do something.”⁶⁶⁰

As the following discussion will highlight, a consciousness of agency permeates MADE’s discourse at all levels, hence contributing to articulate its organisational identity through a MOVEMENT frame by virtue of the inherent association between these cognitive elements.

5.3.1. Macro- and meso-levels

At the macro-level, the idea of ‘agency’ is conveyed by MADE’s very name. This is done not only through an explicit reference to it through the terms “Agency”/“Action”⁶⁶¹ as the second individual acronymic component, but also by virtue of the choice of the very acronym MADE, as this is the past tense declension of one of the verbs more conventionally associated with the idea of ‘agency’: to make. In fact, this association is further strengthened by MADE’s tag-line. This incorporates the organisation’s name in a wordplay highlighting the consciousness that is possible to alter an undesirable situation through

⁶⁵⁸ Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, *Poor People’s Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail* (New York: Random House USA Inc, 1977), 12. Emphasis mine.

⁶⁵⁹ Doug McAdam, ‘Introduction to the Second Edition’, in *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970* (University of Chicago Press, 2010), x. Emphasis in original.

⁶⁶⁰ Gamson, *Talking Politics*, 7.

⁶⁶¹ In 2015 the term “Agency” in MADE’s name was replaced by the term “Action.”

appropriate action through the rhetorical question: “MADE a difference?”⁶⁶² (figure 5.2). Notably, this tag-line not only postulates the desirability and viability of change, but also serves as a rallying call through which MADE’s audience is invited to critical self-reflection (i.e. it prompts to ask oneself the question: ‘Have I made a difference?’) and to join/support MADE as a way to ‘make a difference’.

This image has been removed by the author of this thesis for copyright reasons.

Figure 5.2 MADE’s tag-line

Source: adapted from ‘Home’, *MADE*, accessed 23 July 2016, <https://www.made.ngo/>

At the meso-level, MADE’s different articulations of its vision and mission over the years (summarised in table 5.1) also contribute to convey a consistent reference to agency on two main dimensions. On the one hand, agency is conveyed by the articulation of the identity of MADE’s target audience as proactive subjects capable of leading change (“active citizens”; “active young Muslim leaders”; “playing an active leadership role”). On the other hand, agency is conveyed by the type of action ascribed to MADE’s audience, which emphasises its intended transformational nature through expressions such as “working to establish justice for all,” “striving for a just and sustainable world,” “lead the fight against global poverty and injustice,” and “take positive action.”

⁶⁶² MADE in Europe, ‘Annual Report 2010’, sec. cover; MADE in Europe, ‘Annual Report 2011’, sec. cover; MADE in Europe, ‘Annual Report 2012’, sec. cover. While this tag-line disappears in following years’ annual reports, it is still present (at the time of writing) in the banner at the bottom of MADE’s website, as illustrated in figure 5.2.

Table 5.1 MADE’s vision and mission statements 2009-15.
Prompts to the idea of ‘agency’ are highlighted in italics.

	2009-10	2010-11	2011-12	2012-13	2013-14	2014-15
VISION	Our vision is of prosperous and peaceful 21st century European societies which are multi-faith, multi-ethnic and inclusive where Muslim youth take up their roles as <i>active citizens</i> alongside their brothers and sisters of other faiths and none. ⁶⁶³	Our vision is of young Muslims in Europe playing an <i>active leadership role</i> alongside their brothers and sisters of other faiths and none to champion universal economic justice and social wellbeing. ⁶⁶⁴		A movement of conscious and <i>active young Muslim leaders</i> working to establish justice for all. ⁶⁶⁵		A movement of conscious Muslim youth <i>striving for a just and sustainable world.</i> ⁶⁶⁶
MISSION	Our mission is to inspire and enable a grassroots European Muslim youth movement of <i>faith in action (...)</i> ⁶⁶⁷			To mobilise European Muslim youth <i>to lead the fight</i> against global poverty and injustice. ⁶⁶⁸		To inspire and enable young British Muslims <i>to take positive action</i> for social and environmental justice. ⁶⁶⁹

5.3.2. Micro-level

At the micro-level, one of the most salient and comprehensive examples of MADE’s articulation of a consciousness of agency is represented by the already mentioned “Islam in action!” toolkit.⁶⁷⁰ In addition to epitomising through its very

⁶⁶³ MADE in Europe, ‘Annual Report 2010’, sec. ‘Our Vision’. Italics mine.

⁶⁶⁴ MADE in Europe, ‘Annual Report 2011’, sec. ‘Our Vision’; MADE in Europe, ‘Annual Report 2012’, 1. Italics mine.

⁶⁶⁵ MADE in Europe, ‘Annual Report 2013’, 2; MADE in Europe, ‘Annual Report 2014’, 2. Italics mine.

⁶⁶⁶ MADE, ‘Annual Report 2015’, 2. Italics mine.

⁶⁶⁷ MADE in Europe, ‘Annual Report 2010’, sec. ‘Our Mission’; MADE in Europe, ‘Annual Report 2011’, sec. ‘Our Mission’; MADE in Europe, ‘Annual Report 2012’, 1. Italics mine.

⁶⁶⁸ MADE in Europe, ‘Annual Report 2013’, 2; MADE in Europe, ‘Annual Report 2014’, 2. Italics mine.

⁶⁶⁹ MADE, ‘Annual Report 2015’, 2. Italics mine.

⁶⁷⁰ Because of its focus on agency and its wider importance as a key discursive moment in MADE’s discourse, the “Islam in action!” toolkit represents the main focus of the analysis presented in the following subsections.

title MADE's call for faith-inspired action, the booklet elaborates what Gamson identifies as the main characteristics of a consciousness of agency (which I have already outlined in the first part of this section and in chapter 3), namely: i) postulating the viability of change; ii) considering individuals and groups as agentic actors capable of effecting change; iii) conveying a sense of responsibility to take action.⁶⁷¹ I discuss each of these dimensions individually in the next three subsections.

5.3.2.1. *Postulating the viability of change*

As the following extracts highlight, MADE postulates the viability of change by touching upon what Gamson sees as the two major “forces that discourage a sense of agency among ordinary citizens”: “culture” and “social structure.”⁶⁷² On the one hand, MADE pre-emptively challenges what it seems to perceive as a counter-agentic ‘culture’ of scepticism and apathy (referred to by expressions such as: “the sceptics”; “Don’t believe it?”; “Don’t be sceptical”; “You probably think (...) Wrong!”) through exhortations such as “don’t be put off”; “go ahead”; “it’s important that you make your views heard!”. On the other hand, MADE also attempts to challenge the dominant image of a counter-agentic ‘social structure’ by purposely inviting its young Muslim audience to think of themselves as agentic actors that “can make a difference” by lobbying elected representatives who “do listen” to their constituencies, and by making their “views heard” by those decision-makers that have a key role their daily lives:

There are so many ways that *you can make a difference* in the fight against global poverty, (...) *don't be put off by the sceptics*—it is up to you to show them their potential!⁶⁷³

Lobbying (or ‘influencing’) your local or national MP can be *one of the most effective ways to bring about change*. The more people that speak out on a particular issue, the more *politicians are likely to change laws and policies* that could save lives. *Don't believe it?* MPs have said that as few as 20 individual letters from voters makes an issue a priority for them. Even if you are too young to vote, *your opinion does matter*, so go ahead and get in touch. *Don't be sceptical—they do listen!*⁶⁷⁴

⁶⁷¹ Gamson, *Talking Politics*, 7.

⁶⁷² William A. Gamson, ‘Constructing Social Protest’, in *Social Movements and Culture*, ed. Hank Johnston and Bert Klandermans (Routledge, 2004), 95.

⁶⁷³ MADE in Europe and Oxfam GB, ‘Islam in Action! The Ultimate Campaign Toolkit’, 38. Italics mine.

⁶⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 23. Italics mine.

*You probably think that ‘decision-makers’ are fuddy-duddy politicians, or corrupt businessmen, who are out of touch with the world, right? Wrong! Your local council representative, town planner, chief constable, supermarket manager or Imam are all decision-makers who can have an impact on the way you live. They rely on the support of the community, so if you are not happy about a particular issue, then it’s important that you make your views heard!*⁶⁷⁵

Indeed, MADE does not deny *tout court* that social structure may be counter-agentic: politicians *may be* fuddy-duddy, businessmen *may be* corrupt and elites (“governments, multinational corporations and powerful lobby groups”) are often responsible for political endeavours (“laws and policies”) that create and systematically sustain an unjust state of affairs in order to advance self-interest (“favour the rich and discriminate against the poor”):

This [social injustice] can be made worse by *decision-makers, such as governments, multinational corporations and powerful lobby groups*, who support *laws and policies* which favour the rich and discriminate against the poor.⁶⁷⁶

However, rather than focusing on this aspect of denunciation, MADE emphasises the viability of change by redefining the very perception of how and where change happens: it is not only about institutions and corporations’ corridors of power (i.e. ‘the big picture’), but also (and more importantly, according to MADE’s perspective) about everyday lives and local communities (i.e. ‘the small picture’) where individuals and groups can actually represent agentic actors. In fact, MADE’s emphasis on “starting small” is crucial to its framing of individuals and groups as agentic actors endowed with the potential to effect change (“you CAN make a difference”), as highlighted by the following extract:

It is easy to feel overwhelmed when faced with the huge challenges posed by global poverty but *you CAN make a difference*. Remember that campaigning is about *starting small*. Every time you persuade someone to sign a petition or encourage them to recycle their litter, *you are sparking off a chain of events* that could potentially change the lives of future generations in the developing world.⁶⁷⁷

⁶⁷⁵ Ibid., 22. Italics mine.

⁶⁷⁶ Ibid., 8. Italics mine.

⁶⁷⁷ Ibid., 12. Italics mine.

In MADE's perspective, therefore, lasting societal change is ultimately the fruit of a "chain of events" that starts within everyday life, "every time you persuade someone" to 'do something about something'—no matter how (a)political or small that act may appear. From this perspective, each individual can be an agentic actor, as I discuss in the next subsection.

5.3.2.2. *Considering individuals and groups as agentic actors*

Adopting the idea of "starting small" as a main conceptual peg, MADE consistently frames young Muslims as agentic actors by reiterating that their "small actions equal big changes," that they "are still making a difference" regardless of how small actions may seem to be, and that they can ultimately "change history":

If at some point you become a little campaign weary and feel that the fight is fruitless, remind yourself that *small actions equal big changes*.⁶⁷⁸

Whether you sign a petition or attend an event, *you are still making a difference*.⁶⁷⁹

[P]eople have been campaigning throughout the history of mankind (...) These campaigners could never have imagined that their actions would lead to decisions that would change the course of history forever. *Your actions can also change history*.⁶⁸⁰

In addition to explicit prompts (such as the adjectives 'your' and 'local'), MADE's focus on 'the small picture' is conveyed by articulating a geography of agency that locates targets of action (i.e. people and institutions) and platforms for performing and communicating action (i.e. places and the media) within overlapping spheres of everyday life.

Concerning people as targets of action, MADE identifies a series of concentric circles of influence ranging across the private(/apolitical)-public(/political) spectrum. From this perspective, agency begins with "inspiring your family and friends to take action";⁶⁸¹ it moves on to "[g]etting the community on board"⁶⁸² by mobilising networks such as "youth or mosque groups" and "student societies,"⁶⁸³

⁶⁷⁸ Ibid., 38. Italics mine.

⁶⁷⁹ Ibid., 16. Italics mine.

⁶⁸⁰ Ibid., 10. Italics mine.

⁶⁸¹ Ibid., 38.

⁶⁸² Ibid., 28.

⁶⁸³ Ibid., 19.

and by getting the support of “local religious and community leaders”;⁶⁸⁴ and finally reaches the traditional political sphere through actions such as lobbying “your local MP.”⁶⁸⁵

Types and platforms for action are also located by MADE on a similar spectrum, ranging from the promotion of ethical consumerism (“demonstrate outside your local supermarket to encourage shoppers to buy fairly traded products”⁶⁸⁶); to the mobilisation of different communities of interest (“put up posters and hand out flyers in your university canteen, library, local restaurant and mosque”⁶⁸⁷), and a specific mobilisation of local Muslim communities (“[have your] petition stuck on the notice-board of your mosque/local community centres”⁶⁸⁸); all the way to collective action targeting local political institutions (“organise a public meeting or demonstration outside your local town hall, council buildings or government offices”⁶⁸⁹).

Finally, communicating a consciousness of agency also travels on a similar continuum, where the individualised use of social media as tools “to become an online activist”⁶⁹⁰ is accompanied by a self-conscious and strategic use of more traditional public platforms that range from “your school or university newspaper,” to “local media outlets or community media”, up to “regional TV news stations” and “ethnic or Muslim television channels.”⁶⁹¹

In MADE’s perspective, then, each individual can be an agentic actor because agency is represented by a chain of events where positive change and action at the individual level are the prerequisite for positive change and action at the societal level:

*Changing attitudes and behaviour is ultimately what changes the world and this can be done at no cost.*⁶⁹²

Notably, the quote above is particularly clear in conveying a specific agency-type frame that characterises MADE’s discourse at large: the CHANGE YOURSELF

⁶⁸⁴ Ibid., 26.

⁶⁸⁵ Ibid., 23.

⁶⁸⁶ Ibid., 26.

⁶⁸⁷ Ibid., 36.

⁶⁸⁸ Ibid., 24.

⁶⁸⁹ Ibid., 26.

⁶⁹⁰ Ibid., 32.

⁶⁹¹ Ibid., 31.

⁶⁹² Ibid., 20. Italics mine.

TO CHANGE THE WORLD frame. In chapter 7 I will discuss more in detail this frame and how this situates MADE within a specific type of lifestyle movement loosely identifiable as the “social responsibility movement.”⁶⁹³ Here, it is worth highlighting that whilst MADE’s framing conceptualises agency at the small, individual, and local level as primary and necessary, it nevertheless incorporates a dimension of collective action more conventionally associated with the MOVEMENT frame for two main reasons.

Firstly, not only MADE suggests “organising a protest or demonstration” as one of the most efficient ways for “influencing decision makers,” but it also emphasises both its importance in terms of developing a sense of collective identity as members of a specific movement, and its legitimacy despite cultural and structural forces might suggest otherwise:

Large or small, a demonstration or protest *can create a real sense of unity* and can strengthen your campaign by attracting press coverage. (...) *Protests often get a bad reputation in the media but remember as long as they are safe and peaceful, they are perfectly legitimate.*⁶⁹⁴

Secondly, MADE’s emphasis on ideas such as “chain of events” (quoted earlier) and the “snow ball effect” (quoted below) essentially articulates a collective dimension of agency by mirroring the idea of “consensus and action mobilisation,”⁶⁹⁵ respectively pointed to by expressions such as “inspire”, “raising awareness”, and “give people the opportunity to reflect”, on the one hand; and “persuade”, or “encourage” to take action, on the other:

Think of *the snow ball effect*. By raising awareness of an issue and encouraging others in your community to make a positive change, you are making an impact. *As more and more people take action, the bigger your impact!* Remember that in the eyes of Allah, having an impact on just one person’s life has a greater significance than the action itself: “If any saves a life, it is as if he saves the lives of all mankind” (Qur’an 5:32).⁶⁹⁶

⁶⁹³ Jones, ‘Social Responsibility Activism’, 155. Jones’ research on “social responsibility activism” highlights that a high proportion of social responsibility activists seem to consider themselves part of a wider “social responsibility movement,” despite this specific term is rarely mentioned in social movement literature. (Haenfler, Johnson, and Jones, ‘Lifestyle Movements’, n. 2, p.16.)

⁶⁹⁴ MADE in Europe and Oxfam GB, ‘Islam in Action! The Ultimate Campaign Toolkit’, 26. Italics mine.

⁶⁹⁵ Klandermans, ‘Mobilization and Participation’, 586.

⁶⁹⁶ MADE in Europe and Oxfam GB, ‘Islam in Action! The Ultimate Campaign Toolkit’, 12. Italics mine.

From this perspective, the collective dimension of agency traditionally associated with the MOVEMENT frame is deconstructed into an aggregate of individual actions that are framed by MADE not as such, but rather as catalysers and indicators of wider, collective action through consensus and action mobilisation. On the one hand, change at the individual level is not for its own sake, but it rather represents the spark for consensus mobilisation. Whilst agentic young Muslims may be inspired by the “Islam in action!” toolkit to put ‘Islam in action’ in their own private lives (i.e. individual action), they are also explicitly and consistently exhorted to catalyse collective action as they “inspire others” to do the same:

This campaign toolkit is *a guide to help you change the world and inspire others to do the same.*⁶⁹⁷

Do you feel confident that *you could inspire others to make a change?* We hope so.⁶⁹⁸

(...) we would love to hear how you have used this campaign toolkit *to make a difference.* (...) P.S. Remember to *pass this toolkit on to inspire others* to start campaigning!⁶⁹⁹

On the other hand, individual change is also functional to action mobilisation because it implies greater willingness (in fact, desire) to participate at the collective level by “joining others” and “co-organis[ing]” efforts:

Expressing your views and speaking out on behalf of the poor are some of the most important ways that you can make a difference. Campaigning is about making your voice heard and *joining others who share your concerns.*⁷⁰⁰

Get in touch with your local community, youth or mosque groups to see if they would like *to co-organise* an event or share their resources (they could provide volunteers, provide event speakers or help with publicity). *Why not join* your Islamic Society or other student societies on campus (Women’s Society, UN Society, Debate Society, Fairtrade, Amnesty International, People & Planet) – they already *have a large network of supporters who are eager to make a change!*⁷⁰¹

Having postulated the viability of change and framed its audience as agentic actors, MADE also conveys a consciousness of agency by highlighting a sense

⁶⁹⁷ Ibid., 5. Italics mine.

⁶⁹⁸ Ibid., 38. Italics mine.

⁶⁹⁹ Ibid. Italics mine.

⁷⁰⁰ Ibid., 9. Italics mine.

⁷⁰¹ Ibid., 19. Italics mine.

of responsibility to take action. This is the focus of the next subsection.

5.3.2.3. *Conveying a sense of responsibility to take action*

MADE encourages its audience to fulfil their “collective responsibility” to take action on three concentric dimensions of life and identity: i) a civic responsibility “as global” and “proactive citizens”; ii) an ethical-moral responsibility “as witnesses to the suffering in the world” and “as human beings”; and iii) a religious responsibility “as Muslims”:

We believe Islam advocates for more than just giving to charity; we are called upon *as citizens, people of faith and as human beings*, to stand up and take action against the injustice and suffering experienced by over 3 billion people worldwide.⁷⁰²

As Muslims constitute over a fifth of the world’s population, *we have a huge responsibility* to tackle global poverty and to prevent millions more people from falling into the poverty trap. Whilst paying our Zakat, providing for the poor during Ramadan and performing Qurbani are all ways that we can alleviate poverty, Allah asks *us* to do more than that. He demands that *as witnesses to the suffering in the world*, we must speak out and raise awareness of injustice. The Prophet (PBUH) commanded *us to be proactive citizens* reminding us that change starts with *us*. *As Muslims*, we must set an example to others by acting in a fair, honest and ethical way.⁷⁰³

Events which draw people together and talk of a *collective responsibility or our duty as Muslims* are likely to have a bigger impact – religious leaders can help you with this. Alternatively think about an inter-faith event to highlight *our responsibility as global citizens*.⁷⁰⁴

The articulation of multiple, synergic dimensions of what constitute the agentic ‘we’ is not surprising, and it rather reflects MADE’s articulation of agency in different life areas, which implies calling individuals to act from time to time as family members, consumers, neighbours, students, political constituencies and members of a specific faith community. The aforementioned passages also highlight that—as a Muslim organisation speaking mainly to a Muslim audience—MADE strongly frames responsibility through the normative lens of faith, which is conveyed by expressions such as “Islam advocates,” “Allah asks us to do more than that. He demands”, and “The Prophet (PBUH) [peace be upon him] commanded us.” In fact, the centrality of faith in MADE’s articulation of the responsibility for taking action is epitomised by the rallying call that occupies the

⁷⁰² Ibid., 5. Italics mine.

⁷⁰³ Ibid., 11. Italics mine.

⁷⁰⁴ Ibid., 28. Italics mine.

entire first page of the “Islam in action!” toolkit, which frames the “fight against poverty and injustice” specifically as a religious duty:

AT MADE IN EUROPE, WE BELIEVE CAMPAIGNING IS *NOT THE RESPONSIBILITY OF OTHERS*. AS MUSLIMS, THE FIGHT AGAINST POVERTY AND INJUSTICE STARTS WITH YOU!⁷⁰⁵

In order to reinforce this sense of religious responsibility, MADE also articulates the “narrative fidelity”/“cultural resonance”⁷⁰⁶ of its conception of agency at the small level (i.e. small deeds in the realm of everyday life) precisely as the type of agency encouraged by Islam, through references to both the Qur’an and the sunna:

Allah does not change the condition of a people, unless they change what is in themselves. QUR’AN 13:11⁷⁰⁷

So don’t be discouraged. A successful campaign is not about changing the world overnight; it is about recognising the small part you can play in the fight against global poverty and then doing something about it – *no matter how small*. The Prophet (PBUH) said “*the good work most beloved to Allah is that which is done consistently, even if small*” (Muslim).⁷⁰⁸

Notably, the Qur’anic verse 13:11 enjoys a very prominent visibility in MADE’s discourse well beyond the “Islam in action!” toolkit, where the verse is quoted twice, as the first and last quote from Islamic sources.⁷⁰⁹ In fact, it is the most-often quoted Islamic reference overall, featuring (in slightly different translations) in virtually all of MADE’s most significant discursive moments. For example, the verse appears in big typeface at the top of MADE’s website homepage,⁷¹⁰ it is the only Qur’anic verse quoted in the “Intro to MADE” video,⁷¹¹ and it represents the most quoted Islamic reference across annual reports after 2011.⁷¹² The significance of this verse in MADE’s discourse is such that its relationship with

⁷⁰⁵ Ibid., 3. Italics mine.

⁷⁰⁶ David A. Snow and Robert D. Benford, ‘Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization’, *International Social Movement Research*, 1988, 210; Benford and Snow, ‘Framing Processes and Social Movements’, 622.

⁷⁰⁷ MADE in Europe and Oxfam GB, ‘Islam in Action! The Ultimate Campaign Toolkit’, 5.

⁷⁰⁸ Ibid., 12. Italics mine.

⁷⁰⁹ Ibid., 5; sect. back cover.

⁷¹⁰ ‘Home’.

⁷¹¹ MADE in Europe, *Intro to MADE in Europe - Muslims Campaigning against Global Poverty & Injustice*.”

⁷¹² In total, this verse is quoted six times across MADE annual reports: 2 times in 2011-12 (MADE in Europe, ‘Annual Report 2012’, 1; 2.); 2 times in 2012-13 (MADE in Europe, ‘Annual Report 2013’, 3; sect. back cover.); once in 2014-15 (MADE, ‘Annual Report 2015’, 5.) The verse was first quoted in MADE in annual report in 2010-11 (MADE in Europe, ‘Annual Report 2011’, sect. ‘What is MADE in Europe?’). 2013-14 is the only post-2011 report where the verse is not quoted.

the organisation's ethos is highlighted and explained for two consecutive years (2011-12 and 2012-13) in the annual reports' opening messages from MADE's Chair and CEO:

*Our inspiration at MADE in Europe is the Qur'anic verse that "Allah does not change the condition of a people unless they change what is in themselves" (13:11). We believe that if we wish to change the condition of humanity worldwide – and truly tackle the causes of poverty, climate change and conflict – then the change needs to start with ourselves and our communities here in the UK.*⁷¹³

Allah tells us in the Qur'an that He "does not change the condition of people until they change what is in themselves" (13:11). This verse *inspires us to begin by changing ourselves and our communities here in the UK, looking at how our own behaviour and choices impacts on other people and the environment.* Over the past year young people all around the UK have started making those changes – buying fairly traded products, giving up bottled water, volunteering in Bosnia, campaigning on mothers' health and supporting mosques to become more environmentally friendly.⁷¹⁴

The aforementioned extracts highlight how MADE explicitly identifies Qur'an 13:11 as its main source of 'inspiration' and utilises the verse to frame its audience's responsibility to take action by attaining to what Snow and Benford refer to as three "core framing tasks."⁷¹⁵ From a "diagnostic framing"⁷¹⁶ perspective, MADE identifies "the condition of humanity worldwide" as problematic (being characterised by "poverty, climate change and conflict") and thus in need of change. In light of the negative impact that "our own behaviour and choices" have "on other people and the environment," the attribution of blame or causality falls—at least partially—on "ourselves and our communities here in the UK." From this, it follows that MADE's "prognostic framing"⁷¹⁷ (i.e. its answer to the question: "what is to be done"?⁷¹⁸) consists in identifying "ourselves and our communities here in the UK" simultaneously both as agents and targets of change: since 'we' are partially culpable for problematic situations but also capable to change our harmful behaviours, it follows that 'we' have the responsibility for taking action. Tactics to start "making those [needed] changes"

⁷¹³ MADE in Europe, 'Annual Report 2012', 2. Italics mine.

⁷¹⁴ MADE in Europe, 'Annual Report 2013', 3. Italics mine.

⁷¹⁵ Snow and Benford, 'Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization', 199.

⁷¹⁶ Ibid., 200.

⁷¹⁷ Ibid., 201.

⁷¹⁸ Ibid.

include: i) adopting more responsible choices on a wide range of life areas—such as shopping (“buying fairly traded products”), eating and drinking (“giving up bottled water”), and community life (“supporting mosques to become more environmentally friendly”); and ii) espousing a more proactive involvement in society, through activities such as volunteering (“volunteering in Bosnia”), and campaigning (“campaigning on mothers’ health”).

This particular combination of diagnostic and prognostic framing contributes to articulate a specific agency-type frame that I call the CHANGE YOURSELF TO CHANGE THE WORLD frame. Whilst I will discuss this frame in chapter 7, it is worth noting here how, by articulating agency through the Qur’anic verse 13:11, MADE’s “motivational framing” locates the “rationale for action beyond the diagnosis and prognosis,”⁷¹⁹ in a spiritual dimension informed by the Qur’anic narrative on the link between individual and societal change.

To sum up this section, MADE implicitly evokes the MOVEMENT frame at the micro-level by consistently articulating a consciousness of agency through three main dimensions: i) denial of the immutability of a situation; ii) an awareness of the self as an agentic actor capable of effecting change; and iii) the identification of a ‘we’ responsible for doing something. Whilst it is beyond the aims of this research to evaluate the degree of resonance or success of this framing among MADE’s audience, it is worth noting how the following testimony by one of the participants to MADE’s “Be The Change” training programme⁷²⁰ unequivocally condense all of these dimensions by emphasising MADE’s “great job” in: i) challenging sceptical and apathetical mind-sets (which I highlight using *‘italics’*); ii) instilling a consciousness of the self as an agentic actor (which I highlight using **‘bold’**); iii) emphasising that the responsibility to take action as Muslims (which I highlight using ‘underline’):

The great thing was that the training session *didn’t just leave us hopeless about all injustices in the world.* (...) The MADE team did a great job at **inspiring us** throughout the weekend, and **making us feel really empowered.** *They taught me how ridiculous the popular notion of "There's no point in doing anything, I won't make a change anyway" really was.* What personally inspired me most was being enlightened about how it's my job

⁷¹⁹ Ibid., 201–2.

⁷²⁰ MADE in Europe, ‘Annual Report 2012’, 10.

as a muslim [sic] to do something about injustices in the world—not someone else’s problem.⁷²¹

In the next section (the last of this chapter), I turn to the fourth main mechanism used by MADE to activate a MOVEMENT frame: the consistent adoption of the ‘fight’ metaphor.

5.4. A MOVEMENT’s confrontational nature: the ‘fight’ metaphor

The fourth and final mechanism through which MADE evokes a MOVEMENT frame to characterise the Self is represented by the consistent incorporation of the ‘fight’ metaphor (henceforth, FM) in its discourse.

The conventional association between the FM and the MOVEMENT frame in popular discourse is well epitomised by their simultaneous incorporation of these components within the titles of books on a variety of types of activism, which range from the civil rights to the locavore and anti-corruption movements.⁷²² One of the bases for this association can be identified in the fact that, by postulating meaningful confrontational action against real or perceived injustice, the FM can bring together the sense of injustice and the consciousness of agency that are, in and of themselves, already inherently connected with the MOVEMENT frame (as I have outlined in sections 5.2 and 5.3). Indeed, this connection is highlighted by the fact that, despite there does not seem to be a universally accepted definition of what a movement is, the most common definitions incorporate an allusion to the FM across three main components of any movement, namely:

- i) *actors*: members of a movement are typically individuals who share agency and some form of collective identity based on common beliefs, which put them in opposition (i.e. a ‘fight’) against other sectors of society perceived as responsible for injustice;
- ii) *interests*: the objective of a movement is typically to challenge (i.e. to ‘fight’) and change (through agency) structural conditions or cultural assumptions that are deemed to be responsible for injustice;

⁷²¹ ‘Campaign Training in Cardiff’, *MADE*, 13 April 2012, <http://www.made.ngo/updates/blogs/item/campaign-training-in-cardiff>. All emphasis mine.

⁷²² For example: Harry G. Lefever, *Undaunted by the Fight: Spelman College and the Civil Rights Movement, 1957/1967* (Mercer University Press, 2005); Nick Saul and Andrea Curtis, *The Stop: How the Fight for Good Food Transformed a Community and Inspired a Movement* (Melville House, 2013); Frank Vogl, *Waging War on Corruption: Inside the Movement Fighting the Abuse of Power* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2016).

iii) *actions*: a movement typically advances its claims through some form of confrontation of injustice (i.e. a ‘fight’) that is articulated through a spectrum of options for agency, ranging from collective and contentious to highly individualised and noncontentious actions.⁷²³

In addition to the conventional association between the FM and the MOVEMENT frame, it is also important to highlight that the adoption of the FM to conceptualise poverty and other bigger-than-self issues “as an enemy to be defeated” has become a common approach within development discourse.⁷²⁴ This is well epitomised by two archetypical actors within the sector: the United Nations Development Programme, which has recently incorporated the FM in a news’ title that marked the agency’s fiftieth anniversary; and the World Food Programme, which incorporates the FM in its invitation to subscribe to its e-mailing list:

UNDP at 50 – Leading *the fight against* poverty and inequality⁷²⁵
Join *the fight against* hunger!⁷²⁶

This tendency follows the popular strategy of identifying abstract issues rather than real actors and policies as the culprit for a deplorable situation,⁷²⁷ and it has become so pervasive that even those actors that have been often identified as co-responsible for global inequality (such as the World Bank) have adopted it.⁷²⁸

Against this background, and more significantly for this analysis, the FM has also been increasingly incorporated within the discourse of mainstream campaigning NGOs. Leading international organisations such as CARE and Oxfam, for example, have important sections of their websites dedicated to explain “how we

⁷²³ This analysis builds on Jones’s summary of some recent definitions of MOVEMENT from several noted social movement theorists, which he breaks down into the three common components of actor(s), interest(s) and action(s). (Jones, ‘Social Responsibility Activism’, 20; 153-154.)

⁷²⁴ Joe Brewer, ‘The Many Faces of Poverty’, Weekly Research Report (The Rules, 18 June 2014), 4, <https://www.slideshare.net/joebrewer31/the-many-faces-of-poverty>.

⁷²⁵ United Nations News Service Section, ‘UN News - UNDP at 50 – Leading the Fight against Poverty and Inequality’, *UN News Service Section*, 24 February 2016, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=53312#.WQCM_ljyvIV. Italics mine.

⁷²⁶ ‘Join the Fight against Hunger! | WFP | United Nations World Food Programme - Fighting Hunger Worldwide’, accessed 1 May 2017, <https://www.wfp.org/subscription>. Italics mine.

⁷²⁷ This approach has been criticised due to its functioning as what Gamson calls an “*aggregate frame*” that fails to identify “an external target whose actions or policies must be changed,” thus conflating the adversarial distinction between ‘we’ and ‘they’ that is at the very root of what distinguishes a collective action frame from other types of frames. (Gamson, *Talking Politics*, 85. Emphasis in original.)

⁷²⁸ See for example: ‘World Bank Moves Forward in Fight against Poverty in West Africa’, *World Bank*, 6 April 2016, <http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2016/04/06/world-bank-moves-forward-in-fight-against-poverty-in-west-africa>.

fight poverty”;⁷²⁹ and campaigning/advocacy organisations such as ONE frame their call for support as an invitation to “join *the fight* against extreme poverty.”⁷³⁰ Perhaps the clearest case in point to highlight the mainstreaming of the association between the FM and the MOVEMENT frame within NGO discourse is offered by the British campaigning organisation War on Want (henceforth, WOW),⁷³¹ which I will briefly discuss here, before proceeding to present an analysis of MADE’s discourse.

Four examples from WOW’s discourse elucidate particularly well the its systematic incorporation of the FM.

The first critical discursive moment is represented by the organisation’s tag-line: “*Fighting* global poverty.”⁷³² Accompanying WOW’s logo in all of its public displays—from ‘traditional’ activist symbols such as placards and flags, to more personalised items such as t-shirts and canvas bags⁷³³—this tag-line reinforces the FM through repetition (at different events, and on different platforms) and through the particular emotional context of its occurrence, which can be linked either to the experience of participating to particular public events, or to the more personal choice of “wearing your politics on your sleeve.”⁷³⁴ Secondly, the FM is also explicit in WOW’s mission, which describes the organisation mainly in terms of the battle it conducts: “Our mission is *to fight against* the root causes of poverty and human rights violation, as part of the worldwide movement for global justice.”⁷³⁵ Thirdly, WOW’s call for support also evokes the FM by inviting the audience to join WOW’s metaphorical ‘army’ (“forces”): “*Join forces* with us

⁷²⁹ CARE International UK, ‘Fighting Poverty’, *CARE*, accessed 26 April 2017, <http://www.careinternational.org.uk/fighting-poverty>; Oxfam International, ‘How We Fight Poverty’, *Oxfam International*, accessed 26 April 2017, <https://www.oxfam.org/en/explore/how-oxfam-fights-poverty>. Italics mine.

⁷³⁰ ‘ONE’, *ONE*, accessed 26 April 2017, <https://www.one.org/international/>. Italics mine.

⁷³¹ In chapter 9 I will use again War on Want as a case in point to illustrate how the FM adopted by both this organisation and MADE is also conducive to evoke an ACTIVIST frame.

⁷³² ‘War On Want’, *War On Want*, accessed 26 April 2017, <http://www.waronwant.org/>. Italics mine.

⁷³³ ‘War on Want’, *The Ethical Shop*, (2017), <http://ethicalshop.org/our-partners/war-on-want.html>.

⁷³⁴ Marian Sawer, ‘Wearing Your Politics on Your Sleeve: The Role of Political Colours in Social Movements’, *Social Movement Studies* 6, no. 1 (1 May 2007): 39–56, doi:10.1080/14742830701251294. Significantly, these acts of “Politics of Everyday Life” are often considered “an important—perhaps the most important—place people find meaning, develop habits, and acquire a sense of themselves and their world.” (Frank Trentmann, ‘The Politics of Everyday Life’, in *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Consumption*, ed. Frank Trentmann (OUP Oxford, 2012), 522.)

⁷³⁵ ‘Fighting for Justice, Mobilising for Change. War on Want Strategic Framework 2015-2020’ (War on Want, May 2015), 2, <http://www.waronwant.org/resources/fighting-justice-mobilising-change>. Italics mine.

against the root causes of global poverty, inequality, and injustice.”⁷³⁶ Finally, the FM is also highly visible in WOW’s latest ‘manifesto’ (its Strategic Framework 2015-20) as it opens its very title: “*Fighting* for justice, mobilising for change.”⁷³⁷

Notably, alongside its consistent use of the FM, WOW also systematically evokes a MOVEMENT frame through explicit references to this term. Three examples are particularly explicative to highlight this.

The first example consists in WOW’s incorporation of both the FM and the MOVEMENT frame in its mission statement. In order to highlight how these are linked to each other (and to the idea of ‘injustice’), and to appreciate how MADE evokes the same web of meanings through its own vision and mission statements, it is useful to visualise in parallel in table 5.2 vision and mission statements for both organisations. To facilitate the comparison, in the table I highlight the FM using ‘*italics*’ and the MOVEMENT frame using ‘**bold**’, whilst I use ‘underline’ for the cues that allude to the idea of ‘injustice’.

Table 5.2 The MOVEMENT frame in WOW and MADE’s vision and mission statements

	WAR ON WANT	MADE (2012-2014)
VISION	Our vision is a world free from poverty and oppression, based on <u>social justice, equality and human rights for all</u> .	A movement of conscious and active young Muslim leaders working to establish <u>justice for all</u> .
MISSION	Our mission is <i>to fight against the root causes of poverty and human rights violation</i> , as part of the worldwide movement for <u>global justice</u> .	to mobilise European Muslim youth to lead <i>the fight against global poverty and injustice</i> .

A second significant example is represented by WOW’s very call for support, which (like in the in case of MADE, as discussed in section 5.1) exhorts bystanders to ‘join the movement’ by explicitly self-characterising the organisation as a “growing movement”:

⁷³⁶ ‘War On Want’, sec. top banner. Italics mine.

⁷³⁷ ‘Fighting for Justice, Mobilising for Change. War on Want Strategic Framework 2015-2020’. Italics mine.

JOIN A GROWING MOVEMENT. Your support today will help us challenge the root causes of global poverty and oppression. BECOME A MEMBER.⁷³⁸

The third and final example highlights how in WOW's discourse (as in MADE's) the FM (which I highlight below using '*italics*') and the MOVEMENT frame (which I highlight below using '**bold**') can be found together in order to stress the agency ("transformative change") of supporters/members of the movement:

We will continue to build our capacity as a democratic membership organisation within the **movement** for global justice, strengthening our voice and our impact in the *fight* for long-term, transformative change.⁷³⁹

As this brief digression on WOW has highlighted, the incorporation of the FM within an NGO's discourse can, indeed, be used to activate a MOVEMENT frame. Informed by these observations, the next two parts of this section expand on how MADE articulates its organisational identity through a MOVEMENT frame by consistently adopting the FM at macro-, meso- and micro-levels.

5.4.1. Macro- and meso-levels

At the macro-level, MADE adopts the FM in its mission statement in the period 2012-14, and implicitly alludes to it through its positive, specular articulation (i.e. 'striving for' rather than 'fighting against') in its post-2014 vision statement:

To mobilise European Muslim youth to lead *the fight against global poverty and injustice*.⁷⁴⁰

A movement of conscious Muslim youth *striving for* a just and sustainable world.⁷⁴¹

At the meso-level, a specific reference to the "fight against poverty and injustice" can be found in two of the most significant section of MADE's website. In its homepage, the metaphor is mentioned twice: i) in the main banner, under the Qur'anic verse adopted by MADE as its most-quoted verse (Q 13:11), within the slogan: "AS MUSLIMS THE FIGHT AGAINST POVERTY AND INJUSTICE STARTS WITH YOU!"; and ii) in the already mentioned fillable box at the centre-left of the page, which allows the audience to sign up to MADE's mailing list and

⁷³⁸ 'Join a Growing Movement', *War On Want*, accessed 26 April 2017, <http://www.waronwant.org/join-growing-movement>.

⁷³⁹ 'Fighting for Justice, Mobilising for Change. War on Want Strategic Framework 2015-2020', 7. All emphasis mine.

⁷⁴⁰ MADE in Europe, 'Annual Report 2013', 2; MADE in Europe, 'Annual Report 2014', 2. Italics mine.

⁷⁴¹ MADE, 'Annual Report 2015', 2. Italics mine.

metaphorically 'start the fight' by "Join[ing] the movement." (in figure 5.3, I use orange arrows to point out the occurrence of the FM in MADE's website homage). On the other hand, in the "About_What we do" section of its website (already quoted in section 5.1), MADE adopts the FM to clarify one of the aims of its work—i.e. to see Muslims at the forefront of the fight:

MADE is a Muslim-led movement of young people who want to see our community leading *the fight against global poverty and injustice*.⁷⁴²

This image has been removed by the author of this thesis for copyright reasons.

Figure 5.3 The 'fight' metaphor in MADE's website homepage
Source: adapted from 'Home', *MADE*, accessed 23 July 2016, <https://www.made.ngo/>

5.4.2. Micro-level

At the micro-level, the reference to the FM is also very visible and consistent among MADE's published material, which offer a more nuanced insight into its meaning and use. These references suggest that, at the broadest level, the entirety of MADE's work can be conceptualised through the FM as the sum of a multitude of "struggles" on different issues, all aimed to "create a fairer world," as aptly conveyed by the following extract from the 2011 annual report's "Thank you" message:

We pray that God rewards you immensely, and continues to guide us and help us *in our struggles to create a fairer world*, free from poverty and injustice.⁷⁴³

As this passage highlights, MADE's faith-based identity as a Muslim NGO influences its framing of the FM: in a complex world where the causes of poverty

⁷⁴² 'What We Do', *MADE in Europe*, accessed 15 July 2016, <https://www.madeineurope.org.uk/about>. Italics mine.

⁷⁴³ MADE in Europe, 'Annual Report 2011', sec. 'Thank You'. Italics mine.

and injustice are not always easily identifiable or addressable, any struggle can only be successful if Divine guidance and support are prayed for (“to guide us and help us”). In fact, the faith-based dimension constitutes a significant aspect of the motivational framing adopted by MADE to articulate the FM, in a way that fulfils three main function: i) it positions the fight against poverty as something “rooted in the traditions of Islam”; ii) it stresses the religious “responsibility” to contribute to it (mirroring the emphasis on the duty to take action, already discussed in section 5.3.2); and iii) it emphasises the distinctive contribution that Muslims can bring to it by playing their “unique part”:

*We believe that making a stand in the fight against poverty means more than just fundraising or paying our zakat (2.5% of annual wealth)—it is about promoting justice, equality, peace and human rights which are rooted in the traditions of Islam.*⁷⁴⁴

AT MADE IN EUROPE, WE BELIEVE CAMPAIGNING IS NOT THE RESPONSIBILITY OF OTHERS. AS MUSLIMS, *THE FIGHT AGAINST POVERTY AND INJUSTICE STARTS WITH YOU!*⁷⁴⁵

The global scale of poverty and injustice can sometimes leave us feeling hopeless and disempowered. But our faith *demand*s something else of us: The Prophet (pbuh) said: “If the Hour starts to happen and in the hand of one of you is a palm shoot or seedling; then if he’s able to plant it before the Hour happens, then let him plant it”. We try not to be deterred by the scale of the task, and instead we are inspired by the opportunity *to play our unique part in this struggle.*⁷⁴⁶

Significantly, MADE’s motivational framing of the FM is articulated not only from a distinctive Muslim angle, but also through a mainstream one. This is clear in how MADE incorporates what Benford identifies as two key motivational framings: a sense of urgency for and efficacy of taking action.⁷⁴⁷ The following passages, for example, respectively highlight: i) how the duty to join the fight is urgent because “we can never rest” in the face of the “disappointing outcome[s]” of institutional initiatives; and ii) that, despite potential feelings of ineffectiveness, the “fight” is successful in light of the “snow ball effect” already mentioned in section 5.3.2:

⁷⁴⁴ MADE in Europe, ‘Annual Report 2010’, sec. opening message from Chair and CEO. Italics mine.

⁷⁴⁵ MADE in Europe and Oxfam GB, ‘Islam in Action! The Ultimate Campaign Toolkit’, 3. Italics mine.

⁷⁴⁶ MADE in Europe, ‘Annual Report 2014’, 3. Italics mine.

⁷⁴⁷ Robert D. Benford, “‘You Could Be the Hundredth Monkey’: Collective Action Frames and Vocabularies of Motive within the Nuclear Disarmament Movement’, *The Sociological Quarterly* 34, no. 2 (1993): 203–6.

This year saw the disappointing outcome of the UN Climate Change Summit in Cancun, a big reminder that *we can never rest in the fight to tackle climate change.*⁷⁴⁸

If at some point you become a little campaign weary and *feel that the fight is fruitless*, remind yourself that small actions equal big changes.⁷⁴⁹

The foregoing illustrates how MADE's consistent use of the FM reinforces its self-characterisation through a MOVEMENT frame. Additionally, as I will explore in chapter 9, MADE systematic incorporation of the FM contributes to a particular articulation of what it means to be a supporter of the organisation and leads to the development of the ACTIVIST frame.

Conclusion

This chapter has highlighted that MADE consistently frames its organisational identity through a MOVEMENT frame by using four main mechanisms. Firstly, MADE explicitly uses the term 'movement' to define what it is (macro-level), what it envisions (meso-level), and what it does (micro-level) (5.1). Secondly, MADE imbues its discourse with a pervasive sense of injustice, which in and of itself is connected to the MOVEMENT frame. This characterises MADE's call for action (macro-level), its vision of resistance (meso-level), and the wide range of issues it has addressed through its campaigns over the years (micro-level) (5.2). Thirdly, MADE also attempts to communicate a strong consciousness of agency, which is, again, inherently connected to the MOVEMENT frame. This is conveyed through MADE's name and tag-line (macro-level), its vision and mission (meso-level), and through a discourse that (on the micro-level) articulates three main components of the consciousness of agency: i) the viability of change; ii) the capability of individuals and groups to effect change; iii) and a sense of responsibility to take action (5.3). Finally, MADE alludes to the confrontational dimension traditionally associated with the idea of a 'movement' by consistently incorporating the 'fight' metaphor within its discourse (5.4).

I have pointed out in section 5.4 that MADE's adoption of the 'fight' metaphor resonates with similar efforts in the mainstream NGO sector by organisations such as War on Want (WOW), which adopts a MOVEMENT frame that is

⁷⁴⁸ MADE in Europe, 'Annual Report 2011', sec. 'Other Campaigns...Climate Change'. Italics mine.

⁷⁴⁹ MADE in Europe and Oxfam GB, 'Islam in Action! The Ultimate Campaign Toolkit', 38. Italics mine.

reflective of its campaigning/advocacy approach. Notably, insofar both MADE and WOW focus on denouncing injustice(s) and imply a strong sense of agency for their supporters, they adopt a MOVEMENT frame that tells their story not in terms of service-provision,⁷⁵⁰ but through the lens of a collective eagerness “to remove a moral failing or achieve a freedom or right.”⁷⁵¹

In addition to this parallel between MADE and WOW, it is important to note here that the inherent fluidity of the idea of ‘movement’ has not only lead to use this term to describe a wide variety of forms of action/civic engagement, but has also stimulated a lively (often critical) debate among academics, practitioners, and activists around the relationship between movements and NGOs⁷⁵²—particularly around the question of whether movements “can absorb and reorient NGOs, or whether we will witness the NGO-ization of movements.”⁷⁵³ Indeed, whilst movements have traditionally emerged and have been sustained by ‘the people’ (i.e. by lay, often marginalised individuals at the grassroots level), NGOs have historically been managed and populated by middle-class professionals.⁷⁵⁴ This, in turn, determines significant differences in terms of membership and support. On the one hand, movements “are their members”⁷⁵⁵—members who often perceive themselves and can be understood as ‘activists’. On the other hand, NGOs are “overwhelmingly (...) driven by funders, boards and directors rather

⁷⁵⁰ Often, the provision of services is seen as one of the main characteristics that distinguishes an NGOs which generally focuses on providing services) from a movement (which generally does not provide services). (Lucy Earle, ‘Social Movements and NGOs: A Preliminary Investigation’ (INTRAC. International NGO Training and Research Centre, 2004), 1.)

⁷⁵¹ Darnton, Andrew and Kirk, ‘Finding Frames: New Ways to Engage the UK Public in Global Poverty’, 117.

⁷⁵² For example, see: Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (Cornell University Press, 1998); Lucy Earle, ‘Social Movements and NGOs: A Preliminary Investigation’; W. Lance Bennett, ‘Social Movements beyond Borders: Organization, Communication, and Political Capacity in Two Eras of Transnational Activism’, in *Transnational Protest and Global Activism*, ed. Donatella Della Porta and Sidney G. Tarrow (Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), 203–26; Islah Jad, ‘NGOs: Between Buzzwords and Social Movements’, *Development in Practice* 17, no. 4/5 (2007): 622–29; Marcelo Lopes de Souza, ‘NGOs and Social Movements’, *City* 17, no. 2 (1 April 2013): 258–61, doi:10.1080/13604813.2013.777551.

⁷⁵³ Alejandro Bendaña, ‘NGOs and Social Movements A North/South Divide?’ (United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 2006), 1.

⁷⁵⁴ Souza, ‘NGOs and Social Movements’, 259–60.

⁷⁵⁵ Lucy Earle, ‘Social Movements and NGOs: A Preliminary Investigation’, 3. Emphasis in original.

than members”⁷⁵⁶—and their supporters are mainly ‘generous donors’ offering monetary support and/or ‘volunteers’ offering unpaid labour.⁷⁵⁷

Against the background of these debates, the MOVEMENT frame has been recently incorporated by world-leading NGOs that bring together ‘traditional’ service delivery with a campaigning/advocacy dimension—such as Oxfam, which describes itself as a “global movement of people who share the belief that, in a world rich in resources, poverty isn’t inevitable.”⁷⁵⁸ From this perspective, part of Oxfam’s claim to the status of ‘movement’ derives from the great number of people it can mobilise thanks to its widespread reputation and broad geographical presence.⁷⁵⁹ On the other hand, however, evidence suggests that MADE cannot count on the same force of numbers.⁷⁶⁰ Further, in terms of its geographical/physical presence, MADE concentrates most (almost all) of its activities in London (often, in the East London area where the organisation is based). One way to interpret the apparent mismatch between the limited breadth of MADE’s outreach and the force of numbers generally associated with NGOs that claim a ‘movement’ status (such as Oxfam) is that MADE has (partly by design, partly by necessity) focused on quality, rather than quantity of engagement. This interpretation seems to be corroborated by MADE’s emphasis on “starting small” and on micro-mobilising positive change and action at the individual level as the prerequisite for positive change and action at the societal level (discussed in section 5.3). The findings of chapter 7, which identify a strong alignment between MADE and a lifestyle movement based on the micro-

⁷⁵⁶ Richard Pithouse, ‘NGOs and Urban Movements’, *City* 17, no. 2 (1 April 2013): 253, doi:10.1080/13604813.2012.754175.

⁷⁵⁷ The categories of ‘activist’, ‘generous donor’ and ‘volunteer’ can, in and of themselves, represent frames. I will elaborate more on these in part three of the thesis, where I focus on the organisations’ framing of their supporter base. Here is important to note that whilst the ACTIVIST frame (which is typically associated with the MOVEMENT frame) is, indeed, the dominant frame in MADE’s discourse (hence reinforcing the framing of the Self as a MOVEMENT), the GENEROUS DONOR and VOLUNTEER frames are those prevailing in Islamic Relief’s discourse.

⁷⁵⁸ “Oxfam is <http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what-we-do/about-us>

⁷⁵⁹ “There are some people who never know when to keep quiet. Fortunately, *quite a lot of them campaign with Oxfam!* Whenever an issue is blatantly unfair, or secretly shoved under the carpet, *we can rely on thousands of people* who come together to demand - and get - results.” “*Everyone knows Oxfam.* Let people know you support Oxfam too.” (<http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what-we-do/about-us/how-we-work>; <http://www.oxfam.org.uk/get-involved/how-your-company-can-partner-with-us/oxfam-business-network>)

⁷⁶⁰ Concerning public awareness and support of the organisation, MADE’s social media following can be used as a telling indicator. At the time of writing, MADE’s Facebook page has just over 9000 likes, and its Twitter account has almost 4000 followers. In comparison, the other case study of this thesis (Islamic Relief, which does not adopt a MOVEMENT frame) is liked by more than 265,000 people on Facebook and has more than 44,000 followers. (These figures refer to Islamic Relief UK.)

mobilisation of individuals through the agency-type CHANGE YOURSELF TO CHANGE THE WORLD frame further confirm this. From this perspective, the very fact that MADE identifies itself through the MOVEMENT frame challenges “Manicheism and one-sided narratives”⁷⁶¹ about the NGO-movement debate and suggests that this organisation can be understood not merely as an NGO, but as a Social Movement Organization (SMO)—i.e. a formal organisation “which identifies its goals with the preferences of a social movement (...) and attempts to implement those goals.”⁷⁶² Indeed, as chapter 7 will clarify, MADE can be plausibly interpreted as a SMO that identifies its goals and tactics with the “social responsibility movement.”⁷⁶³

Taken together, the ongoing debates about the relationship between NGOs and movements, and MADE’s relatively limited outreach can also inform the two research sub-questions of the thesis.

- *Implications for the research sub-questions*

With regards to the question: ‘how to think about BMNGOs?’, it is important to note that MADE framing of the Self through the MOVEMENT frame suggests a self-conscious emphasis on grassroots membership and activism, which in turn implies a deliberate distancing from ‘the establishment’. Notably, this resonates with the fact that, as recent research suggests, there seems to be “a considerable and healthy appetite for a spectrum of dissent and activism” among young British Muslims, who also simultaneously often experience a “noticeable disquiet concerning political parties and many Muslim institutions” in the British landscape”.⁷⁶⁴ Facing “diminishing prospects for effective participation in formal political processes, except through the domineering framework of counter-terrorism,”⁷⁶⁵ and experiencing lukewarm (if any) identification with both mainstream institutions and Muslim ‘representative’ organisations,⁷⁶⁶ young British Muslims are seeking alternative arenas and modes of engagement to

⁷⁶¹ Souza, ‘NGOs and Social Movements’, 261.

⁷⁶² John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, ‘Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory’, *American Journal of Sociology* 82, no. 6 (1977): 1218.

⁷⁶³ Jones, ‘Social Responsibility Activism’, 155.

⁷⁶⁴ Sughra Ahmed and Naved Siddiqi, ‘British by Dissent’ (Muslim Youth Helpline, 2014), 75-76.

⁷⁶⁵ Ben O’Loughlin and Marie Gillespie, ‘Dissenting Citizenship? Young People and Political Participation in the Media-Security Nexus’, *Parliamentary Affairs* 65, no. 1 (1 January 2012): 115, doi:10.1093/pa/gsr055.

⁷⁶⁶ Ahmed and Siddiqi, ‘British by Dissent’, 70.

channel their energies across a broad range of issues, in a way that can balance between their Muslim-centric and mainstream identities and concerns.⁷⁶⁷

Within this context, MADE's framing of the Self as a MOVEMENT can be understood as an attempt by a group of young British Muslims (i.e. those involved in setting up, managing, and supporting the organisation) to address the "mismatch between the aims and values of organisations, bodies and political parties"⁷⁶⁸ and the British Muslim youth. In fact, by stressing the grassroots and activist character (whether real, or self-perceived) of the organisation, the MOVEMENT frame contributes to project MADE as an organisational platform that genuinely work with and for young Muslims, simultaneously providing leadership, inspiration, and opportunities to channel concerns and activist appetites.

Additionally, concerning the second research sub-question of this study, MADE's adoption of the MOVEMENT frame points to a different way to think about British Muslim civic engagement. On the one hand, MADE moves beyond the transactional model that still prevails within the NGO sector,⁷⁶⁹ generally, and the BMNGO sector, specifically, whereby engagement with bigger-than-self issues is mainly conceived and actualized in terms of monetary support by 'generous donors' or free labour by altruistic 'volunteers' (which I discuss more in detail with regards to IR's discourse in chapter 8). On the other hand, MADE also moves beyond the reactive, claims-making mode that characterized (and, to a certain extent, still characterizes) British Muslim civic engagement in the last two decades of the 20th century.⁷⁷⁰ Indeed, by adopting a movement-like subculture, tactical repertoire and discourse, MADE seems to represent an expression of how a BMNGO can represent and inspire Muslims' civic engagement through a range of actions concerned not only with Muslim-centric issues, but rather based on a much broader understandings of (in)justice, agency and the common good.

I discuss more in detail the repertoire of actions encouraged by MADE in chapter 7, whilst I outline the implications of the MOVEMENT frame with regards to the

⁷⁶⁷ O'Loughlin and Gillespie, 'Dissenting Citizenship?', 115; Ahmed and Siddiqi, 'British by Dissent', 71.

⁷⁶⁸ Ahmed and Siddiqi, 'British by Dissent', 72.

⁷⁶⁹ Darnton, Andrew and Kirk, 'Finding Frames: New Ways to Engage the UK Public in Global Poverty', 33.

⁷⁷⁰ Zafar Khan, 'Muslim Presence in Europe: The British Dimension - Identity, Integration and Community Activism', *Current Sociology* 48, no. 4 (1 October 2000): 31, doi:10.1177/0011392100048004004.

conceptualisation of MADE's supporter base (through the ACTIVIST frame) in chapter 9.

PART TWO:
FRAMING MOBILISATION EFFORTS

Chapter 6 . Islamic Relief's POLITICS OVER PEOPLE and HELP US CHANGE THIS WORLD frames

Introduction: the War on Hunger Campaign (2013)

Around two weeks before the start of Ramadan 2013, in the conclusion of its one-minute long “How You Helped” YouTube video, IR solemnly declared: “The war on hunger has begun.”⁷⁷¹ Three days after, on June the 27th, IR officially launched its War on Hunger campaign (henceforth, WOH) through a press release on its website.⁷⁷² On the same day, IR published on its YouTube channel the first of a series of three mini-documentaries accompanying the campaign, featuring moving accounts of civilians caught up in war-torn scenarios in Syria, Afghanistan, and Pakistan,⁷⁷³ all of which concluded with a grave, momentous voiceover reading the line: “We have declared war—on hunger.”⁷⁷⁴

Purposely meant to be (in IR's own words) “hard-hitting,”⁷⁷⁵ the WOH kicked off the following day, with the campaign's videos being broadcasted on television, cinemas, and at fundraising events in major British cities. In parallel, WOH billboards were displayed around the UK. Deliberately designed to be “striking” and “eye-catching,”⁷⁷⁶ the posters displayed the metaphorical declaration “IT'S WAR” in large typeface as the central element of their visual composition, cutting across the image of a destitute young girl staring at the observer from the wretchedness of a war-like scenario. On the bottom left of the poster, bystanders were exhorted to: “JOIN THE WAR ON HUNGER” (figure 6.1).

⁷⁷¹ *How You Helped - Islamic Relief UK*, YouTube video, 1:00, posted by “IslamicReliefUK,” Jun 24, 2013, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AJE7OJieUZI>

⁷⁷² ‘Islamic Relief Looks beyond War on Terror and Declares “war on Hunger” in Hard-Hitting Ramadan Campaign’, *Islamic Relief UK*, 27 June 2013, <http://www.islamic-relief.org.uk/news/press-releases/islamic-relief-looks-beyond-war-on-terror-and-declares-war-on-hunger-in-hard-hitting-ramadan-campaign/>.

⁷⁷³ *Syria Appeal - Islamic Relief UK*, YouTube video, 4:22, posted by “IslamicReliefUK,” Jun 27, 2013, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nW4nYXqvD4k>; *Afghanistan - War on Hunger - Ramadan 2013 - Islamic Relief UK*, YouTube video, 4:03, posted by “IslamicReliefUK,” Jul 4, 2013, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yZ1JTlgC9Mc>; *Pakistan - War on Hunger - Ramadan 2013 - Islamic Relief UK*, YouTube video, 4:17, posted by “IslamicReliefUK,” Jul 4, 2013, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3p3nlJGROgY&t=2s>

⁷⁷⁴ The video on Afghanistan included a slight variation, reading: “We have declared war—not on man, but on hunger.” This line featured also in the main video accompanying the campaign, as I discuss in detail later.

⁷⁷⁵ ‘Islamic Relief Looks beyond War on Terror and Declares “war on Hunger” in Hard-Hitting Ramadan Campaign’, sec. Title.

⁷⁷⁶ ‘Islamic Relief Looks beyond War on Terror and Declares “war on Hunger” in Hard-Hitting Ramadan Campaign’.

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Figure 6.1 Billboard displaying IR's War on Hunger campaign ad
Source: Gemma Quainton, 'Islamic Relief', *Third Sector*, 5 July 2013, <http://www.thirdsector.co.uk/islamic-relief/communications/article/1189092>.

On July the 4th (four days before Ramadan) the WOH campaign was also launched at the traditional gala dinner that IR holds annually in Central London to welcome the holy month at the presence of Muslim and non-Muslim high-profile personalities.⁷⁷⁷ On the same day, IR published on its YouTube channel the rest of the mini-documentaries associated with the campaign,⁷⁷⁸ and the forty-seconds long main campaign's video,⁷⁷⁹ whose script read with grave and passionate tone:

InshaAllah [God willing], we will not give up on those in need. We will continue to deliver relief in the most dangerous countries in the world. And we will not cease, until hunger is eradicated. We have declared war—not on man, but on hunger. Join the war on hunger. Donate to Islamic Relief. Now.⁷⁸⁰

The intentionally “hard-hitting” and “eye-catching” nature of the WOH campaign did not go unnoticed. As the UK's leading publication for and about the voluntary

⁷⁷⁷ For example, the event saw the contribution of key Muslim political figures (from both the Labour and Conservative parties: Sadiq Khan MP, then Shadow Secretary of State for Justice and Shadow Lord Chancellor; and Baroness Sayeeda Warsi, then Senior Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and Minister for Faith and Communities); a popular British Muslim journalist and political commentator (Mehdi Hasan); and featured keynote speeches from Ed Miliband (then leader of the Labour Party), and Dr. Rowan Williams (former Archbishop of Canterbury and chair of trustees for the faith-based charity Christian Aid).

⁷⁷⁸ IslamicReliefUK, *Afghanistan - War on Hunger - Ramadan 2013*; IslamicReliefUK, *Pakistan - War on Hunger - Ramadan 2013*.

⁷⁷⁹ IslamicReliefUK, *Ramadan 2013 Appeal - War on Hunger*.

⁷⁸⁰ Ibid.

and not-for-profit sector put it in its verdict about the WOH campaign: it “packs a punch.”⁷⁸¹ Indeed, the highly visible incorporation of the ‘war against hunger’ metaphor in the very title of IR’s 2013 Ramadan campaign represented an original, unique, and relatively bold strategy within the organisation’s discursive approaches to mobilisation. Yet, the use of the idea of ‘war’ to conceptualise efforts aimed at tackling bigger-than-self issue does not represent an original or unique discursive strategy in and of itself.

In fact, as Lakoff and Johnson explore in depth in their classic *Metaphors We Live By*, the concept of ‘war’ as a tool for the metaphorical structuring of discourse seems to be deeply embedded within popular consciousness.⁷⁸² In light of this, metaphors based on the idea of ‘war’ have been increasingly become mainstream within discourse on bigger-than-self issues in the course of the last fifty years—in a way that closely mirrors the mainstreaming of the cognate ‘fight’ metaphor discussed in chapter 5. One of the earliest and most significant examples of this dates as far back as 1951, when future UK Prime Minister Harold Wilson published the seminal report “*War on Want. A Plan for World Development*”⁷⁸³ (which later led to the creation of a ‘War on Want’ committee, followed in 1959 by its formalisation into the organisation known until today with the same name⁷⁸⁴). A decade later, in the mid-1960s, then US president Lyndon B. Johnson reinforced the use of the ‘war’ metaphor to articulate a commitment to tackle public issues by declaring two symbolic ‘wars’⁷⁸⁵: domestically, in 1964 he announced “unconditional *war on poverty*”⁷⁸⁶ through the introduction of legislation aimed at tackling increasing national poverty; internationally, in 1966

⁷⁸¹ Gemma Quainton, ‘Islamic Relief’, *Third Sector*, 5 July 2013, <http://www.thirdsector.co.uk/islamic-relief/communications/article/1189092>.

⁷⁸² For example, the authors argue that the concept ‘war’ is key in the way we structure, understand, perform, and talk about an ‘argument’, hence leading to the ARGUMENT IS WAR metaphor. (George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By* (University of Chicago Press, 1980), 5; 77-86.)

⁷⁸³ Association for World Peace, *War on Want: A Plan for World Development* (London: The Association, 1952). Italics mine.

⁷⁸⁴ ‘NGO, Charity and Campaign Group Archives | SOAS University of London’, sec. War on Want, accessed 26 April 2017, <https://www.soas.ac.uk/library/archives/collections/ngo-and-charity-collections/#WarOnWant>.

⁷⁸⁵ Samuel Hale Butterfield, *U.S. Development Aid--an Historic First: Achievements and Failures in the Twentieth Century* (Greenwood Publishing Group, 2004), 83.

⁷⁸⁶ Lyndon B. Johnson, ‘Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union.’, 8 January 1964, para. III, The American Presidency Project, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=26787>. Italics mine.

he called upon the US to “lead the world in *a war against hunger*”⁷⁸⁷ through its food aid program. More recently, the 2000s have witnessed the popularisation of a different use of the concept of ‘war’ in public discourse through the introduction of the ‘war on terror’ frame. Notably, as Lakoff has argued in different occasions, the conditions of collective trauma wherein the ‘war on terror’ frame was introduced, together with its systematic use and repetition since the tragic events of 9/11 have caused this frame to become deeply entrenched not only in public discourse, but possibly in the very mind of millions of people.⁷⁸⁸

Against this discursive background, the WOH campaign articulated two specific injustice- and agency-type frames. These are explored in the next sections.

6.1. Framing injustice: the POLITICS OVER PEOPLE frame

An emotional outcry against a culpable situation permeates all the publicly available material related to the WOH campaign. This emotional component constitutes the basis for the articulation of an injustice-type frame that stems from the moral indignation about a wrongful state of affairs wherein innocent people are inflicted undeserved suffering, hardship or loss. The campaign’s focus on the injustice inflicted on “ordinary,” “innocent” people is clearly conveyed by this extract from the press release that launched the WOH campaign:

“We’re declaring war on hunger this Ramadan because when we look beyond the war on terror and the politics of the Syrian conflict we see *ordinary people who are suffering in the most extraordinary ways*,” says Jehangir Malik, Islamic Relief’s UK Director. (...) Each film [accompanying the campaign] includes harrowing accounts of *innocent people caught up in conflict or neglected because of it* (...)⁷⁸⁹

From this perspective, the WOH campaign aims to mobilise the audience by eliciting among them a visceral sympathy for the beneficiaries of IR’s projects not simply as ‘the hungry’ or ‘the poor’ (i.e. the ‘traditional’ conceptualisations of beneficiaries of development work), but rather as the victims of injustice. This framing is also explicitly conveyed by the way IR characterises the campaign as

⁷⁸⁷ Lyndon B. Johnson, ‘Special Message to the Congress: Food for Freedom’, 10 February 1966, sec. ‘A WAR ON HUNGER’, The American Presidency Project, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=28038>. Italics mine.

⁷⁸⁸ George Lakoff, *The Political Mind: A Cognitive Scientist’s Guide to Your Brain and Its Politics* (Penguin Publishing Group, 2008), 125–32; George Lakoff, *Thinking Points: Communicating Our American Values and Vision* (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2006), 28–31.

⁷⁸⁹ ‘Islamic Relief Looks beyond War on Terror and Declares “war on Hunger” in Hard-Hitting Ramadan Campaign’. Italics mine.

a way to implement the Muslim duty “to challenge injustice”, rather than to ‘give charity’:

The campaign draws inspiration from a hadith (saying of the Prophet) that urges Muslims to challenge *injustice* in a variety of ways.⁷⁹⁰

Across the WOH campaign videos, a sense of injustice is signalled by prompts that interchangeably convey: i) an outcry against the disregard for people’s dignity (“get their dignity back”, “restoring his dignity”); ii) an appeal to collective morality (“We can’t let this happen”); and iii) indignation about the current state of affairs (“We shouldn’t have to live in a world where politics overshadows poverty”):

We are trying to get people out of the camps, so they can get *their dignity back*.⁷⁹¹

We are providing livelihood projects like carpet weaving and six thousand two hundred families have received seeds, tools and training in farming. People like Abdulfattah, who can now provide for his family, *restoring his dignity* and making a safer world his children to grow up in.⁷⁹²

Sakina and Shukria live together in a cave. They are orphans. (...) They have no way of surviving, except begging for food. For them, the reality is they will soon be married off as child brides. And just to survive starvation. *We can’t let this happen*.⁷⁹³

One of the biggest challenges faced by any humanitarian aid worker in Pakistan is the danger of being caught up in the political killings and fights of others. All aid workers are at risk of attack, even the trusted ones like Islamic Relief. (...) *We shouldn’t have to live in a world where politics overshadows poverty*.⁷⁹⁴

IR’s denunciation of the wrongful denial of the dignity of innocent, ordinary people by a system “where politics overshadows poverty” articulate an injustice-type frame through what can be called (drawing precisely from the last expression) a POLITICS OVER PEOPLE frame (henceforth, POP). The POP frame aims to mobilise bystanders through the moral condemnation of ‘politics as usual’ as an amorphous entity that overshadows ordinary people and causes them harm through its maliciousness and/or indifference. In particular, a micro-analysis of the scripts of each of the campaign videos highlights that the POP frame is

⁷⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁷⁹¹ Islamic Relief UK, *Syria Appeal*. Italics mine.

⁷⁹² Islamic Relief UK, *Afghanistan - War on Hunger - Ramadan 2013*. Italics mine.

⁷⁹³ Ibid. Italics mine.

⁷⁹⁴ Islamic Relief UK, *Pakistan - War on Hunger - Ramadan 2013*. Italics mine.

articulated by IR through three main keyings: the 'politics of war', the 'politics of greed' and the 'politics of media' keyings.

6.1.1. The 'politics of war' keying

The 'politics of war' keying represents the main declension of the POP frame across the WOH videos.

In the main WOH video (quoted in its entirety earlier), the 'politics of war' keying is conveyed by the climax preceding IR's call to action, which implicitly stresses the diametrical opposition between the wrongfulness of the 'politics of war' culpable of launching 'war on man' on the one hand, and the rightfulness of humanitarian actors (such as IR itself) launching 'war on hunger' on the other:

We have declared war: not on man, but on hunger.⁷⁹⁵

Across the WOH mini-documentaries, this keying emphasises the culpability of politically-driven endeavours associated with war, such as foreign interventions ("When the troops pull out of Afghanistan"; "Outside powers seem only to contribute money, weapons, and troops") and internal politically-driven violence ("political killings, bombings"; "political killings and fights of others"). From this angle, the moral indignation underpinning the POP frame is evoked by highlighting the viciousness of the 'politics of war' and its indifference to the dignity of human life. This is because the 'politics of war' is responsible for exposing the life of innocent people and humanitarian workers to constant and undeserved threat by causing a "mess" and "murderer mayhem," by pushing innocent children to live in "terrifying conditions" as "a collateral damage of war," and by displacing innocent people and abandoning them to their struggle for survival in sub-human conditions (e.g. by having to live in "caves" or "leaking tents"). Regardless of the specific nature of harm, the 'politics of war' keying blames 'politics as usual' for disregarding the sanctity of life and for inflicting harm to innocent people, turning them into victims of undeserved suffering:

When the troops pull out of Afghanistan, who is going to clean up the mess? (...) War has people living wherever they can: some have taken refuge in caves, while others living in what should be temporary camps but they have been there for decades. A world of leaking tents: no sanitation, no water, no

⁷⁹⁵ IslamicReliefUK, *Ramadan 2013 Appeal - War on Hunger*. Italics mine.

food. (...) Children around the world are living in terrifying conditions and this is a collateral damage of war.⁷⁹⁶

The people of Pakistan are forced to deal with political killings, bombings, frequent natural disasters, and a rapidly shrinking economy.⁷⁹⁷

The Syrian conflict has escalated out of control. (...) Outside powers seem only to contribute money, weapons, and troops—but no one has been able to find a political solution to end the conflict. Amid the murderer mayhem, are millions of people who are suffering the prolonged effects of war.⁷⁹⁸

Notably, the ‘politics of war’ keying seems also to function as a way to challenge the ‘war on terror’ frame that (somehow paradoxically) the very title and rhetorical style of the WOH campaign material resonate with. Against the background of this resonance, IR’s explicit exhortation to “look beyond” the ‘war on terror’ essentially identifies the ‘politics of war’ underpinning it as a culpable entity that somehow directs attention away from the “very real and immediate” issue of hunger:

Islamic Relief looks *beyond war on terror* and declares ‘war on hunger’⁷⁹⁹

*Beyond the War on Terror There Is Hunger... And Hope*⁸⁰⁰

Discussions revolve around *the war on terror*, but sadly this media frenzy overshadows a very real and immediate situation that affects the country: hunger. (...) While the world’s attention is focused on *the war on terror*, they are not looking at the lives of millions of people who are suffering in silence.⁸⁰¹

Indeed, the moral critique of the ‘war on terror’ implied by the ‘politics of war’ keying of the POP frame takes place at a time when critical perspectives on the former have become increasingly mainstream. Whilst it is beyond the scope of this section to discuss such a discursive trend, it suffices here to highlight that it is commonly acknowledged that since 2009 the Obama administration has been actively trying to move away from the rhetoric of the ‘war on terror’.⁸⁰² This

⁷⁹⁶ IslamicReliefUK, *Afghanistan - War on Hunger - Ramadan 2013*.

⁷⁹⁷ IslamicReliefUK, *Pakistan - War on Hunger - Ramadan 2013*.

⁷⁹⁸ IslamicReliefUK, *Syria Appeal*.

⁷⁹⁹ ‘Islamic Relief Looks beyond War on Terror and Declares “war on Hunger” in Hard-Hitting Ramadan Campaign’. Italics mine.

⁸⁰⁰ ‘Beyond the War on Terror There Is Hunger... And Hope’, *Islamic Relief UK*, 8 July 2013, <http://www.islamic-relief.org.uk/blogs/beyond-the-war-on-terror-there-is-hunger-and-hope/>. Italics mine.

⁸⁰¹ IslamicReliefUK, *Pakistan - War on Hunger - Ramadan 2013*. Italics mine.

⁸⁰² Oliver Burkeman, ‘Obama Administration Says Goodbye to “War on Terror”’, *The Guardian*, 25 March 2009, sec. US news, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/mar/25/obama-war-terror-overseas-contingency-operations>.

tendency is aptly epitomised by the critical discourse moment of a speech delivered by then US president Barak Obama on May the 23rd 2013 (approximately just one month before the launch of the WOH campaign), which explicitly conveyed a critique of the ‘war on terror’ frame and called for a shift in rhetoric.⁸⁰³

Significantly, the last of the extracts quoted above from the WOH campaign highlights how this identified a second culpable entity closely connected to the ‘politics of war’: the ‘politics of media’. This represents the second main keying of the POP frame.

6.1.2. The ‘politics of media’ keying

There are two main mechanisms through which the WOH campaign conveys a ‘politics of media’ keying of the POP frame.

Firstly, the ‘politics of media’ keying is conveyed by IR’s consistent commitment and exhortation to “look beyond.”⁸⁰⁴ In fact, this particular conceptualisation implies that the public perception of ‘reality’ is hindered by a metaphorical wall (i.e. media representations) that impedes people to appreciate the whole picture lying ‘beyond’ such wall. This understanding builds on the widely shared consensus about the fact that media-generated images of the world play a key role in how we “construct meaning about political and social issues.”⁸⁰⁵ In particular, the ‘politics of media’ keying resonates with the widely held preposition that “the total media experience leads to a fragmentation of meaning,” which in turn leads “to substitute hyperreal representations (“simulacra”) for the “real” world.”⁸⁰⁶ From this perspective, the moral indignation underpinning IR’s call to “look beyond” media simulacra challenges the “pro-war frame” often adopted by the media to cover areas of the Muslim world (such as Afghanistan) in the post-

⁸⁰³ ‘Remarks by the President at the National Defense University’, *Whitehouse.gov*, accessed 19 September 2015, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-national-defense-university>.

⁸⁰⁴ ‘Islamic Relief Looks beyond War on Terror and Declares “war on Hunger” in Hard-Hitting Ramadan Campaign’.

⁸⁰⁵ William A. Gamson et al., ‘Media Images and the Social Construction of Reality’, *Annual Review of Sociology* 18 (1992): 374.

⁸⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 386–87.

9/11 era, which has “de-emphasized the civilian casualties and moral guilt of implementing military force.”⁸⁰⁷

Secondly, the ‘politics of media’ keying is conveyed by prompts such as those that I highlight using ‘*italics*’ in the following extract:

*The media attention that surrounds Pakistan is all too often negative. Discussions revolve around the war on terror, but sadly this media frenzy overshadows a very real and immediate situation that affects the country: hunger. (...) While the world’s attention is focused on the war on terror, they are not looking at the lives of millions of people who are suffering in silence. (...) These people’ struggles are going unheard amid the deafening noise of politics. Isn’t the plight of a blind lady, who has no bed and no food, as newsworthy as war?*⁸⁰⁸

The foregoing highlights how the ‘politics of media’ keying attributes blame to politically-driven media agendas for two main reasons. Firstly, this keying denounces what Gamson and colleagues have called the media “preoccupation with the immediacy of surface meaning and the absence of depth.”⁸⁰⁹ From this perspective, media attention is depicted as a morally condemnable hype that blamefully attaches an excessively negative image to certain Muslim countries (such as Pakistan), whilst also diverting public attention from “real” issues, such as hunger. Secondly, this keying denounces politically-driven media for wrongfully eclipsing the human stories behind the headlines through a discourse that amplifies “the deafening noise of politics” whilst forcing innocent, suffering people into silence and oblivion.

As the following extract exemplifies, through the ‘politics of media’ keying the WOH campaign aims to re-frame the story told to the (Muslim) Western audience on four key dimensions. Firstly, by identifying real issues beyond media headlines (“Beyond the war on terror there is hunger”). Secondly, by projecting a more optimistic overall picture (“...and hope”). Thirdly, by giving voice to the unheard (“aims to put faces and names to some of the innocent victims of war”). Fourthly, by re-focusing the misplaced attention of a distracted global audience (“compel us all to sit up and take notice”):

⁸⁰⁷ Shahira Fahmy, ‘Contrasting Visual Frames of Our Times: A Framing Analysis of English- and Arabic-Language Press Coverage of War and Terrorism’, *International Communication Gazette* 72, no. 8 (1 December 2010): 695, doi:10.1177/1748048510380801.

⁸⁰⁸ Islamic Relief UK, *Pakistan - War on Hunger - Ramadan 2013*. Italics mine.

⁸⁰⁹ Gamson et al., ‘Media Images and the Social Construction of Reality’, 386.

Beyond the war on terror there is hunger... and hope. (...) a new campaign launched on Friday aims to put faces and names to some of the innocent victims of war - and compel us all to sit up and take notice.⁸¹⁰

6.1.3. The 'politics of greed' keying

A third important nuance of the POP frame is represented by the 'politics of greed' keying. The following extract about three of the protagonists of the WOH mini-documentary on Afghanistan represents the most explicit example of this keying:

This is Nazia, and her twin sister. They are only eight. In the morning, they beg for food, and at night they huddle together to try to escape the freezing cold. They have no education, and find even basic communication difficult. *We asked them what they needed the most in the world. Nazia answered: Money. Then we asked what she hated the most in the world. And sadly she answered: money. This is the world we are creating, with all of our war and greed.* Each day their grandmother is faced with an *impossible choice*: if she does manage to get some money, she can only afford to buy either food or fuel. She has to choose whether these children die from starvation, or whether they freeze to death. Put simply: she has to choose how these children die. Unless we help her. Please, give generously now.⁸¹¹

Here, the "diagnostic framing"⁸¹² embedded in the 'politics of greed' keying is developed over two main dimensions. On the one hand, IR's denunciation focuses on the economic/material aspect of undeserved suffering.⁸¹³ 'Money' is projected as an ambiguous entity that can represent both the root cause of harm (money is the entity that Nazia, one of the protagonists of the video "hated the most in the world") and, paradoxically, also the 'solution' to the problem (money is the entity that Nazia also "needed the most in the world"). From this perspective, money not only represents the tool through which the 'politics of greed' wrongfully denies people their basic human rights (food, shelter, education) and force them to face "impossible choice[s]" that often leave them with little, if any, option to survive. It also represents the very type of resource that

⁸¹⁰ 'Beyond the War on Terror There Is Hunger... And Hope'.

⁸¹¹ IslamicReliefUK, *Afghanistan - War on Hunger - Ramadan 2013*. Italics mine.

⁸¹² Robert D Benford and David A Snow, 'Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment', *Annual review of sociology* 26 (2000): 616.

⁸¹³ This angle is also shared by other discursive moments, such as in the following extract from the mini-documentary on Pakistan: "The people of Pakistan are forced to deal with (...)a rapidly shrinking economy. (...) Over forty million People are living below the poverty line. (...) if they did earn some money, they still wouldn't be able to get medical support. Because they'd have to spend that money on food. (...) We're working to provide realistic ways out of poverty." (IslamicReliefUK, *Pakistan - War on Hunger - Ramadan 2013*)

IR attempts to mobilise in order to address this injustice, by calling upon its audience to donate: “Please, give generously now.”

On the other hand, IR’s diagnostic framing transcends the material dimension of poverty inflicted by the policies of institutional actors and denounces the selfishness of a global profit-driven culture perpetuated by an all-inclusive “we” (“This is the world *we* are creating, with all of *our* war and greed”). From this perspective, the ‘politics of greed’ keying turns the POP frame into what Gamson calls an “*aggregate* frame” that internalises blame and responsibility: since in this type of framing “we are the they,” it follows that ‘we’ (rather than policies or external actors) are in need of reform.⁸¹⁴ Consequently, the video concludes by projecting the act of donating as the platform for an individual reform that may lead to positive societal change: despite members of the audience may be (consciously or unconsciously) contributing to a deplorable ‘politics of greed’, they also have an opportunity to reform themselves and supposedly effect change by choosing to economically support IR (“Unless we help her”; “Please, give generously now”).

IR’s denunciation of greed is not surprising in light of its nature as a charitable, humanitarian organisation. Notably, however, IR’s nexus between hunger and the ‘politics of greed’ also resonates with the focus of a major mainstream campaigning moment occurred right before the WOH, to which IR itself took part: the Enough Food for Everyone IF campaign (henceforth, IF). Launched by a coalition of 100 UK development charities and faith groups on January the 23rd 2013 (i.e. around six months before the WOH campaign) the IF represented the most recent of a series of “major campaigning ‘moments’” in the UK, which built on the Jubilee 2000 (2000) and the Make Poverty History (2005) campaigns.⁸¹⁵ The IF campaign called on then Britain’s Prime Minister David Cameron to use the UK’s G8 presidency in 2013 to take action on “the root causes” of hunger, by addressing four key policy areas: land, aid, tax and transparency.⁸¹⁶

⁸¹⁴ William A. Gamson, *Talking Politics* (Cambridge University Press, 1992), 85. Emphasis in original.

⁸¹⁵ Helen Yanacopulos, *International NGO Engagement, Advocacy, Activism: The Faces and Spaces of Change* (Springer, 2015), 106.

⁸¹⁶ ‘PRESS RELEASE: Enough Food For Everyone IF’, *ActionAid International*, 23 January 2013, <http://www.actionaid.org/news/press-release-enough-food-everyone-if>.

As highlighted by Wild and Mulley, the IF campaign’s approach looked and felt different to more ‘traditional’ campaigns on development issues.⁸¹⁷ On the one hand, the IF’s incorporation of a deliberate “attempt to fundamentally ‘reframe’ the public discourse on and understanding of the ‘structural causes’ of poverty”⁸¹⁸ reflected key debates occurred in the early 2010s on how to have “a new public conversation, on what aid and development means in the twenty-first century.”⁸¹⁹ On the other hand, the IF’s focus on “policy and political”⁸²⁰ dimensions of hunger aimed to tap into the public’s eagerness “to hear more about the role of big business and international corporations.”⁸²¹ From this perspective, each of the four ‘IFs’ of the campaign conveyed what can be identified, indeed, as a ‘politics of greed’ keying of the POP frame. This denounces the injustice perpetuated by ‘political’ actors (“governments”; “big companies”; “investors”) that prioritise money and access to resources over people’s right to food and property (first ‘IF’), solidarity (second ‘IF’), and rule of law (third and fourth ‘IFs’):

[Enough Food for Everyone IF:]

- IF we stop poor farmers being forced off their land, and use the available agricultural land to grow food for people, not biofuels for cars.
- IF governments keep their promises on aid, invest to stop children dying from malnutrition and help the poorest people feed themselves through investment in small farmers.
- IF governments stop big companies dodging tax in poor countries, so that millions of people can free themselves from hunger.
- IF we force governments and investors to be honest and open about the deals they make in the poorest countries that stop people getting enough food.⁸²²

Notably, as I will highlight in section 6.2, the articulation of injustice through the ‘politics of greed’ keying of the POP frame is not the only resemblance between the WOH and the IF campaigns.

To summarise the foregoing analysis, the three main keyings articulating the POP frame evoke a sense of injustice by expressing IR’s indignation towards ‘politics as usual’ as a broad miscellany of actor-less entities (warmongering politics; media agendas; a greed-driven culture) that are either directly responsible for or

⁸¹⁷ Leni Wild and Sarah Mulley, ‘Is the New IF Campaign Trying to “Make Poverty History”, Again?’, *New Statesman*, 25 January 2013, sec. World, <http://www.newstatesman.com/global-issues/2013/01/new-if-campaign-trying-make-poverty-history%E2%80%99-again>.

⁸¹⁸ Steve Tibbett and Chris Stalker, ‘Enough Food for Everyone IF: Campaign Evaluation’ (The Advocacy Hub, 2014), 12.

⁸¹⁹ Wild and Mulley, ‘Is the New IF Campaign Trying to “Make Poverty History”, Again?’

⁸²⁰ Tibbett and Stalker, ‘Enough Food for Everyone IF: Campaign Evaluation’, 2.

⁸²¹ Wild and Mulley, ‘Is the New IF Campaign Trying to “Make Poverty History”, Again?’

⁸²² ‘PRESS RELEASE: Enough Food For Everyone IF’.

complicit with an unjust state of affairs. Notably, the POP frame abstains from identifying any concrete target of indignation, and rather points the finger towards 'politics as usual' as a vague, abstract source of injustice. This strategy seems to have two main implications.

On the one hand, the abstractness of the POP frame can be seen as a manifestation of the cultural dimension of a campaign deliberately aimed at (re)focusing public discourse on the centrality of the dignity of human life beyond "the deafening noise of politics" and "behind the headlines and stereotypes."⁸²³ Expressing frustration and indignation against 'politics as usual', the POP frame is not aimed at changing concrete targets (such as specific policies), but rather at bringing 'politics' under moral scrutiny.

On the other hand (and quite paradoxically), the specific way through which the POP frame is articulated seems to undermine the possibility of engagement with 'the political'. In fact, the distrust and cynicism for 'politics as usual' conveyed by the POP frame seem to encourage helplessness and resignation, rather than willingness to engage: since 'politics' itself is the abstract, elusive and malicious/indifferent actor responsible for the 'real' enemy of poverty/hunger, it follows that engaging 'politics' is pointless.⁸²⁴ From this perspective, the POP frame seems thus to function not as a means to nurture agency, but rather to highlight the moral distance between IR (and its supporter base) and what is perceived to be the 'dirty world of politics'.

In turn, these implications of the POP frame have significant repercussions for IR's articulation of agency. In fact, in a context where: i) politics is more part of the problem than of the solution; ii) targets of indignation are abstract and elusive ('politics'? 'the system'? 'we'?); iii) a clearly identifiable collective identity capable of sustaining collective action is missing; and iv) where IR is projected as a rightful (humanitarian) moral actor detached from the 'dirtiness' of politics, then the only viable option for the publics is to delegate their agency to a non-political, morally trustable humanitarian actor such as IR, and to privately support its work by

⁸²³ 'Beyond the War on Terror There Is Hunger... And Hope'.

⁸²⁴ This resonates with Gamson's critique of the abstractness of certain injustice-type frames that "render human agency as invisible as possible". As he puts it: "Vague, abstract sources of unfairness diffuse indignation and make it seem foolish. (...) When we see impersonal, abstract forces as responsible for our suffering, we are taught to accept what cannot be changed and make the best of it. Anger is dampened by the unanswerable rhetorical question: Who says life is fair?" (Gamson, *Talking Politics*, 32.)

contrasting ‘their greed’ with generous giving. Consequently, this leads to the emergence of a particular agency-type frame, which I call (drawing from the WOH’s very slogan, see later) the HELP US TO CHANGE THIS WORLD frame. A detailed analysis of this represent the focus of the next section.

6.2. Framing agency: the HELP US CHANGE THIS WORLD frame

Two key discursive moments of the WOH campaign contribute to highlight how IR articulates agency mainly through the HELP US CHANGE THIS WORLD frame (henceforth, HUCW).

On the one hand, the press release that launched the campaign⁸²⁵ and the WOH main video⁸²⁶ evoke the HUCW frame by identifying IR as the main actor capable of effecting change. This is conveyed by two main indicators. Firstly, the ‘we’ in these two discursive moments seems to refer only to the organisation (rather than to a collective ‘we’): IR is the actor that is launching the campaign (“We have declared war”) and that is already carrying out and intends to keep carrying out certain actions (“We’re working (...) and getting aid”; “we will not give up”; “we will continue to deliver relief”; “We will not cease”). Notably, the choice of projecting IR as the main (if not only) agentic ‘we’ is aptly symbolised by the very fact that the WOH press release stresses how each of the campaign videos ultimately highlights that IR itself (rather than its audience) “is making a world of difference”:

Each film includes harrowing accounts of innocent people caught up in conflict or neglected because of it, but also highlights how *Islamic Relief is making a world of difference*.⁸²⁷

Secondly, when IR’s audience is indeed mentioned, the type of action ascribed to them always imply a degree of delegation of agency to the organisation—either completely, by supporting IR’s work (“[the campaign is] urging the Muslim community and the wider public to (...) support its life-saving and life-changing work”); or partially, by prioritising the act of donating over other potential forms of agency (“We want to encourage our supporters to act (...) by donating,

⁸²⁵ ‘Islamic Relief Looks beyond War on Terror and Declares “war on Hunger” in Hard-Hitting Ramadan Campaign’.

⁸²⁶ IslamicReliefUK, *Ramadan 2013 Appeal - War on Hunger - Islamic Relief UK*, 2013, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K28wx2cGv5M&list=UUQQdt4yGL8UuKSo7CndiOFQ&index=70>.

⁸²⁷ ‘Islamic Relief Looks beyond War on Terror and Declares “war on Hunger” in Hard-Hitting Ramadan Campaign’. Italics mine.

campaigning and praying for change”).⁸²⁸ Taken together, the centrality of IR as the projected agentic ‘we’ and the implicit exhortation for its audience to mainly delegate the organisation to ‘do something’ about the issue (rather than primarily take direct action in their hands) articulate agency through the HUCW frame.

On the other hand, the HUCW frame is also (and perhaps even more explicitly) conveyed by the WOH campaign’s slogan, from which I derive the very frame’s name. This is displayed at the bottom of both the two main pages of the IR’s website dedicated to the campaign (“The War on Hunger”⁸²⁹ and the “Pray/The War on Hunger”⁸³⁰ webpages), together with the campaign’s logo⁸³¹ (which I reproduce in figure 6.2) and the widely-known hadith from which the campaign was inspired:

*Abu Sa’id al-Khudri said, “I heard the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, say, ‘Whoever of you sees something wrong should change it with his hand; if he cannot, then with his tongue; if he cannot, then with his heart, and that is the weakest form of belief.’” Donate, campaign, pray and help us change this world—for good.*⁸³²

This image has been removed by the author of this thesis for copyright reasons.

Figure 6.2 The tripartite logo/slogan of IR’s War on Hunger campaign
Source: adapted from ‘The War on Hunger’, *Islamic Relief UK*, 3 July 2013, <http://www.islamic-relief.org.uk/campaigns/war-on-hunger/>

By concluding with the sentence “help us change this world” (from which I derive the name of the HUCW frame), the WOH’s slogan essentially implies a qualitatively difference between the agency of IR and that of its audience. This is

⁸²⁸ Ibid.

⁸²⁹ ‘The War on Hunger’, *Islamic Relief UK*, 3 July 2013, <http://www.islamic-relief.org.uk/campaigns/war-on-hunger/>.

⁸³⁰ ‘Pray / The War on Hunger’, *Islamic Relief UK*, accessed 1 May 2017, <http://www.islamic-relief.org.uk/ramadan/pray-the-war-on-hunger/>.

⁸³¹ Additionally, the logo was also displayed in the campaign’s billboards, at the bottom centre-right, next to IR’s logo (as slightly visible in figure 6.1).

⁸³² ‘The War on Hunger’; ‘Pray / The War on Hunger’. Emphasis in original.

because the use of this sentence conveys: i) that the agentic ‘we’ (i.e. the “us” that can “change this world”) refers to IR; and ii) that IR’s audience are not internal members of that very ‘we’, but rather external actors who are invited to delegate their agency to IR (“help”), rather than to take it on themselves to change the world. From this perspective, despite the WOH’s slogan does imply some form of agency for the members of the public through the references to “Campaign” and “Pray” (more on this in sections 6.2.4 and 6.2.5), it also conveys the idea/feeling of a distinction between ‘you’ (i.e. members of the public) who are exhorted to “Donate, campaign, pray,” and “us” (i.e. IR) that can actually “change this world—for good.” Consequently, the HUCW frame articulates agency mainly as private and mediated through the organisation.

Notably, the discursive significance of the WOH’s slogan and logo cannot be underestimated in order to understand IR’s articulation of agency. I elaborate on key aspects of this significance in the following sections.

6.2.1. Introducing new dimensions of agency

IR’s adoption of the “Donate | Campaign | Pray” slogan/logo is particularly significant as it represents the first visible attempt by the organisation to expand its traditional framing of its mobilisation-oriented discourse: from a mere invitation to charitable giving (“Donate”) into a wider exhortation to act on two additional arenas—in the public realm of advocacy activities (“Campaign”), and in the private realm of spiritual life (“Pray”). The salience of the introduction of these additional dimensions of agency is highlighted by at least three contextual factors.

Firstly, the significance of the “Donate | Campaign | Pray” slogan/logo in IR’s discourse is represented by the very fact that this will be later adopted also in IR’s 2014 Stand Up For Syria! campaign. Like the WOH campaign, the Stand Up For Syria! campaign, too, featured two main webpages: one that introduced the campaign⁸³³ and another specifically dedicated to invite the public to pray for Syria (the “Pray for Syria” webpage⁸³⁴). Both pages displayed the “Donate | Campaign | Pray” slogan/logo at their bottom.⁸³⁵ In addition, within the context of

⁸³³ ‘Stand Up For Syria!’, *Islamic Relief UK*, 10 January 2014, <http://www.islamic-relief.org.uk/campaigns/stand-up-for-syria-campaign/>.

⁸³⁴ ‘Pray for Syria’, *Islamic Relief UK*, 13 January 2014, <http://www.islamic-relief.org.uk/uncategorized/pray-for-syria/>.

⁸³⁵ Though they did not display the hadith and the campaign slogan that accompanied the logo in the WOH campaign webpages. However, images related to the ‘Stand Up For Syria’ campaign

this campaign the logo was also popularised through its reproduction on a variety of highly visible, public platforms such as the placards used by IR's volunteers to call upon Muslim worshippers to sign the campaign's petition outside mosques across the UK⁸³⁶ and the t-shirts that IR's volunteers were wearing whilst handing over the petition's signatures at Number 10 Downing Street on the eve of the Geneva II peace talks.⁸³⁷

Secondly, the fact that with the WOH campaign IR published for the first time in its history two independent, purposely dedicated webpages inviting its audience to "Campaign" and "Pray" (i.e. the already mentioned "The War on Hunger" and "Pray/The War on Hunger" webpages) represents a milestone within IR's discourse-making efforts related to mobilisation. In fact, "The War on Hunger" webpage was among the first to ever appear in the "Campaign" section⁸³⁸ of IR's website (nested within the wider "Get involved" domain⁸³⁹), where it was preceded only by the publication of the page that announced IR's involvement in the IF campaign.⁸⁴⁰ Notably, the publication of both of these pages was preceded by a couple of weeks⁸⁴¹ by IR's very first attempt to exhort its audience to take a type of action other than charitable giving: lobbying the International Monetary Fund by signing the "Cancel Pakistan's Debt" online petition.⁸⁴² Although the

show that both these textual elements were actually incorporated in the physical material used during the campaign (e.g. placards, t-shirts. See next footnote).

⁸³⁶ IR was able to collect over 1600 signatures. 'British Mosques Stand Up For Syria with Islamic Relief', *Islamic Relief UK*, 10 January 2014, <http://www.islamic-relief.org.uk/news/british-mosques-stand-up-for-syria/>. As IR highlights: "Islamic Relief volunteers stood outside mosques with placards emblazoned with the 'Stand Up For Syria!' slogan, and a *hadith* (Prophetic saying) encouraging Muslims to act, speak and pray for positive change." The petition called then PM David Cameron to "Press for peace (...) Act for access (...) Raise resources (...) [and] Keep borders open." ('Stand Up For Syria!') A collection of pictures from the day is available on IR's Flickr account (Islamic Relief UK, #StandUp4Syria - Collecting Signatures at Friday Prayers, Flickr, accessed 3 May 2017, <https://www.flickr.com/photos/islamicreliefuk/sets/72157639803320453/>).

⁸³⁷ 'Amid Reports of 11,000 Syria Murders, Members of British Muslim Community Prompt New Approach to Strengthen Action', *Islamic Relief UK*, 21 January 2014, <http://www.islamic-relief.org.uk/news/british-muslim-community-prompt-new-syria-approach/>. A collection of pictures from the day is available on IR's Flickr account. (Islamic Relief UK, *Stand Up For Syria! 10 Downing Street Hand-In*, Flickr, accessed 3 May 2017, <https://www.flickr.com/photos/islamicreliefuk/albums/72157640111364733/>).

⁸³⁸ 'Campaign', *Islamic Relief UK*, accessed 8 May 2017, <http://www.islamic-relief.org.uk/category/campaigns/>.

⁸³⁹ 'Get Involved', *Islamic Relief UK*, accessed 23 July 2016, <http://www.islamic-relief.org.uk/get-involved/>.

⁸⁴⁰ The former appeared on the 3rd of July 2013; the latter on the 27th of May. 'Enough Food for Everyone IF', *Islamic Relief UK*, 27 May 2013, <http://www.islamic-relief.org.uk/campaigns/enough-food-for-everyone-if-3/>.

⁸⁴¹ May 16, 2013

⁸⁴² 'Cancel Pakistan's Debt', *Avaaz*, accessed 1 May 2017, https://secure.avaaz.org/en/petition/Cancel_Pakistans_Debt_2/?pv=9. The petition stemmed from the launch of the report "Unlocking

petition never featured prominently on IR's website,⁸⁴³ it represented a milestone as one of the first (if not the first) attempts by IR to engage its supporter base in campaigning activities. Against this background, the visibility given to the WOH campaign's webpages and their specific localisation within IR's website thus indicate the organisation's growing interest at this stage in incorporating 'campaigning' not just as an organisational tactic, but also as a key dimension through which framing its mobilisation efforts.

Finally, if the "The War on Hunger" webpage constituted the first example of IR visibly calling upon its audience to articulate their agency through campaigning activities (more about this in section 6.2.4), the "Pray/The War on Hunger" webpage represents the first moment through which IR attempted to mobilise its audience's agency in the realm of spiritual life. Notably, this strategy introduced an approach that IR will retain and build upon in the following years, as signalled by: i) the publication of three similarly structured webpages in 2014 ("Pray for Syria,"⁸⁴⁴ "Pray for Palestine"⁸⁴⁵ and "Pray for water"⁸⁴⁶); ii) the organisation's participation in "Interfaith prayers for Nepal"⁸⁴⁷ in occasion of the 2015 earthquake that hit this country; iii) IR's coordination of collective prayers across the UK in 2016 to mark the 5th anniversary of the start of the Syrian conflict.⁸⁴⁸ I will elaborate on IR's articulation of agency within the spiritual realm in section 6.2.5. Before attending to this, I consider in the next section the "narrative fidelity"/"cultural resonance"⁸⁴⁹ of the WOH campaign slogan/logo with the Islamic

the chains of debt. A call for debt relief for Pakistan," which IR published with the support of the Jubilee Debt Campaign.

⁸⁴³ The only kind of presence of this action on IR's website is represented by a link to the petition, which is hosted by the Avaaz.org platform (at: https://secure.avaaz.org/en/petition/Cancel_Pakistans_Debt_2/) being signposted by the sign 'DROP THE DEBT ON PAKISTAN' featuring in the WHO campaign page (at: <http://www.islamic-relief.org.uk/campaigns/war-on-hunger/>)

⁸⁴⁴ 'Pray for Syria'. This page also retains the "Donate | Campaign | Pray" logo.

⁸⁴⁵ 'Pray for Palestine', *Islamic Relief UK*, 21 July 2014, <http://www.islamic-relief.org.uk/uncategorized/pray-for-palestine/>.

⁸⁴⁶ 'Pray for Water', *Islamic Relief UK*, accessed 3 May 2017, <http://www.islamic-relief.org.uk/pray-for-water/>. (this webpage does not have a date, but it can be assumed it was published in the same year as it adopts the same textual structure as the 'Pray for Syria' and 'Pray for Palestine' webpages).

⁸⁴⁷ 'Interfaith Prayers for Nepal', *Islamic Relief UK*, 5 May 2015, <http://www.islamic-relief.org.uk/news/interfaith-prayers-for-nepal/>.

⁸⁴⁸ 'Islamic Relief Coordinates Prayers and Lobbies MPs', *Islamic Relief UK*, 15 March 2016, <http://www.islamic-relief.org.uk/news/islamic-relief-coordinates-prayers-and-lobbies-mps-as-syrian-conflict-enters-sixth-year/>.

⁸⁴⁹ David A. Snow and Robert D. Benford, 'Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization', *International Social Movement Research*, 1988, 210; Benford and Snow, 'Framing Processes and Social Movements', 622.

ideational repertoire. This excursion will provide a more solid background for my discussion on the tripartite call to action embedded in the WOH campaign (sections 6.2.3-5).

6.2.2. Resonance with Islamic references

Introduced by a widely-known hadith in both the main webpages of the WOH campaign, the “Donate | Campaign | Pray” slogan/logo represents one of IR’s mobilisation efforts most visibly framed through a faith-based lens.

The salience of this hadith within the Muslim ideational repertoire cannot be underestimated. On the one hand, as I have already highlighted in chapter 4, the hadith is widely known among Muslims, as it features within one of the most popular collections of Prophetic sayings, the *Forty hadiths of al-Nawawi*.⁸⁵⁰ On the other hand, the hadith exemplifies the key Islamic principle of ‘enjoining good and forbidding evil’ (*al-amr bi’l-ma’ruf wa’l-nahy ‘an al-munkar*).⁸⁵¹ Occurring multiple times in the Qur’an, the principle is used to describe the perfection of the Prophetic example (Q 7:157)⁸⁵² and it represents one of the key “qualities of faithful believers” (Q 9:71; Q 9:112).⁸⁵³ Enjoining good and forbidding evil thus represents not only the ideal behaviour that Muslims should seek to the best of their ability and strength (Q 31:17; Q 22:41)⁸⁵⁴ but also “an obligation on every member of this *Ummah* [Muslim community], each according to his ability” (Q 3:104),⁸⁵⁵ the performance of which enables them to be “the most righteous and

⁸⁵⁰ Presented in the collection as hadith number 34. The resonance of this hadith with a Muslim audience is well epitomised by the testimony of one of IR’s volunteers who took part to the other campaign featuring the same slogan (the “Stand up for Syria” campaign), as she recalls: “What that echoed throughout my head from the briefing was the meaning behind the slogan: “**Donate | Campaign | Pray**”. Shaheda, the External Affairs and Campaigns Manager, explained to us how it was based on the Prophetic saying: ‘*if one of you sees something wrong, let him change it with his hand; if he cannot, then with his tongue; if he cannot, then with his heart*’. **So beautiful.**” (‘My Journey to Number 10 - Stand Up For Syria!’, *Islamic Relief UK*, 29 January 2014, <http://www.islamic-relief.org.uk/news/my-journey-to-number-10/>. All emphasis in original.)

⁸⁵¹ Dr Jamal Ahmed Badi, *Commentary on the Forty Hadith of Imam Al-Nawawi - Timeless Prophetic Gems of Guidance and Wisdom* (Islamic Learning Foundation (ILF), 2016), 255–256; Jamaal al-Din M. Zarabozo, *Commentary on the Forty Hadith of Al-Nawawi*, vol. 2 (Al-Basheer Publication & Translation, 1999), 984.

⁸⁵² Ismail Ibn Kathir, *Tafsir Ibn Kathir (Abridged)*, trans. Sheikh Safiur-Rahman Al-Mubarakpuri, vol. 4 (Darussalam, 2003), 179.

⁸⁵³ *Ibid.*, 4:469–470; 522-523.

⁸⁵⁴ Ismail Ibn Kathir, *Tafsir Ibn Kathir (Abridged)*, trans. Sheikh Safiur-Rahman Al-Mubarakpuri, vol. 7 (Darussalam, 2003), 583; Ismail Ibn Kathir, *Tafsir Ibn Kathir (Abridged)*, trans. Sheikh Safiur-Rahman Al-Mubarakpuri, vol. 6 (Darussalam, 2003), 588.

⁸⁵⁵ Ismail Ibn Kathir, *Tafsir Ibn Kathir (Abridged)*, trans. Sheikh Safiur-Rahman Al-Mubarakpuri, vol. 2 (Darussalam, 2003), 233.

beneficial” for humankind and the rest of creation, both as individuals and as a community (Q 3:110).⁸⁵⁶

Stressing the inextricable relation between faith/belief (*iman*) and good actions/righteous deeds (*salihat; hasanat*), the hadith foregrounds agency by requiring every Muslim “to “change” the evil around him[/her].”⁸⁵⁷ Additionally, the hadith sets out three alternative ways to effect change, tailored around different circumstances, skills and likelihood of success: the ‘hand’, the ‘tongue’, and the ‘heart’ (conceptualizable as physical, verbal and spiritual agency, respectively). These three platforms for action are elaborated by IR into the WOH campaign’s logo through a set of what, drawing from Jasper and Poulsen, can be considered as “condensing symbols”:⁸⁵⁸ an open hand pointing downward, a megaphone and a heart.

Notably, whilst a superficial reading of the WOH campaign’s logo would identify the hand as the symbol that most closely mirrors the hadith, and the megaphone as that which most differs from it, a deeper level of analysis highlights that this may not be the case.

In fact, the megaphone seems to resonate quite closely with its corresponding reference in the hadith (the tongue): insofar the latter has traditionally been interpreted as a tool to effect change by using “one’s speech to influence the doers of evil to stop their evil,”⁸⁵⁹ the megaphone can be understood as a modern tool to amplify precisely that critical voice. This, in turn, provides the basis for IR’s alignment between the tongue (mentioned in the hadith), the megaphone (in the logo) and the call to campaign (in the slogan).

A slightly more significant re-interpretative distance seems to underpin IR’s conceptualisation of the ‘heart’ as the symbol adopted for its exhortation to pray. This is because the ‘heart’ mentioned in the hadith has been often understood as a means to effect change by virtue of changing a Muslim’s attitude and behaviour towards evil, rather than a specific reference to prayer. As “an obligation upon

⁸⁵⁶ Ibid., 2:238.

⁸⁵⁷ Zarabozo, *Commentary on the Forty Hadith of Al-Nawawi*, 2:981–1022.

⁸⁵⁸ Jasper and Poulsen define “condensing symbols” as the “multireferent, visual or verbal encapsulation of other cultural meanings” (James M. Jasper and Jane D. Poulsen, ‘Recruiting Strangers and Friends: Moral Shocks and Social Networks in Animal Rights and Anti-Nuclear Protests’, *Social Problems* 42, no. 4 (1995): 495. doi:10.2307/3097043.)

⁸⁵⁹ Zarabozo, *Commentary on the Forty Hadith of Al-Nawawi*, 2:1000.

every Muslim in every situation,”⁸⁶⁰ condemning and hating evil in one’s heart can effect change in two main ways. Firstly, hating evil in the heart leads to specific attitudes and actions that—despite not being the actual actions of changing the evil—may lead, through their consequences, to the evil being removed or lessened.⁸⁶¹ Secondly, hating evil in the heart somehow ‘prepares’ the Muslim to be “ever ready to remove the evil [by the hand] whenever he [/she] has the ability to do so.”⁸⁶² From this perspective, whilst IR’s exhortation to pray resonates with other Prophetic traditions concerning the importance and power of supplication,⁸⁶³ the alignment between the heart (mentioned in the hadith), its representation in the logo and the exhortation to pray (in the slogan) seems to be less straightforward than that concerning the tongue-megaphone-campaign alignment.

Finally, the most significant departure from traditional interpretations of the hadith seems to be conveyed precisely by the way IR reconceptualises the ‘hand’ in its slogan. In fact, the ‘hand’ in the hadith has been traditionally interpreted as the most efficient form of direct agency, consisting in the public and often contentious act of physically removing evil or nullifying oppression through one’s direct action.⁸⁶⁴ Paradoxically, whilst the hand seems to retain its status as the symbol of the most efficient form of agency in IR’s logo (by virtue of being represented as the first element of the composition), it does so by referring to a substantially different type of agency. In fact, by coupling the hand’s icon with the invitation to “Donate,” the WOH’s slogan essentially eclipses the public, contentious, and direct dimensions of action traditionally conveyed by the mention of the hand in the hadith, and it conceptualises agency from a rather opposite perspective—as private, noncontentious, and vicarious. In turn, this reinterpretation mirrors the second and concluding part of the campaign’s slogan (“(...) help us change this world”), thus reinforcing the main agency-type frame adopted by IR: the HUCW frame.

⁸⁶⁰ Ibn Rajab al Hanbali, *Jami’ Al-’Ulum Wa’l-Hikam (A Collectin of Knowledge & Wisdom)*, trans. Muhammad Fadel (Umm al-Qura, n.d.), 432.

⁸⁶¹ Zarabozo, *Commentary on the Forty Hadith of Al-Nawawi*, 2:1009.

⁸⁶² Ibid.

⁸⁶³ For example, a well-known hadith agreed upon by Bukhari and Muslim and collected also in Nawawi’s popular *Riyad as-Saliheen* (The Meadows of the Righteous) concludes with the line: “Beware of the supplications of the oppressed, for there is no barrier between it and Allah.” Abu Zakariyya Yahya Bin Sharaf An-Nawawi, ‘Hadith 1077’, *Riyad as-Salihin*, accessed 3 May 2017, <https://sunnah.com/riyadussaliheen/9/87>.

⁸⁶⁴ Hanbali, *Jami’ Al-’Ulum Wa’l-Hikam (A Collectin of Knowledge & Wisdom)*, 433.

A closer look at how IR articulates the HUCW frame through each of the dimensions of the WOH's slogan/logo across the campaign material can shed further light on the foregoing analysis. I discuss each of these dimensions individually in the next three sections.

6.2.3. The Hand: Donate

The call to 'donate' represents the central feature of the HUCW frame and dominates three key discursive moments of the WOH campaign.

Firstly, the video that introduced the campaign ("How you helped")⁸⁶⁵ conveys the HUCW frame through two main rhetorical mechanisms.

On the one hand, the very title of the video represents the archetype of fundraising-oriented motivational framings and it explicitly evokes a scenario where viewers are identified through a GENEROUS DONOR frame (I elaborate on this in chapter 8)—i.e. as benefactors who have helped IR to change the world through their generous donations.

On the other hand, the HUCW frame is also conveyed by the text of the video, which I quote below in its entirety. Here, the HUCW frame is evoked by consistently identifying IR as the main agentic 'we'. Unequivocally (and understandably) it is IR that supplies medical items, delivers food parcels and builds villages; and it is IR that takes pride in the fact that "this just a fraction of what we have done this year." From this perspective, IR represents the agentic actor (the 'we') that effects positive change in the Global South, whilst its audience are 'generous donors' who delegate the organisation to act on their behalf from the comfort of the Global North. The sense of delegation of agency embedded in the HUCW frame is further highlighted by two prompts that, paradoxically, may have been intended to convey a more direct dimension of agency, instead. First, despite IR uses the term "together" at the beginning of the video in a way that alludes to an inclusion of its supporters within the 'we', this does so in a subsidiary (rather than primary) way. This is because the term is mentioned only once, in relation to IR's supporters' role in an area of work that implies 'donating' as the sole form of agency (i.e. IR's orphan sponsorship scheme). Second, the sense of delegation of agency embedded in the HUCW

⁸⁶⁵ IslamicReliefUK, *How You Helped - Islamic Relief UK*.

frame is highlighted by the very fact that IR projects ‘donating’ as the only way ‘you’ (i.e. IR’s audience) “are making a real difference” and “have helped”:

Here comes the numbers: last year *we lifted* more than 3.5 million people out of hunger; together we are supporting 32,000 orphans; 146,000 children received an education; deep inside Syria, *our seventy field hospitals* supplied nearly two million items of medicine and equipment; one hundred thousand Ramadan food parcels *were delivered*; and three million people received Qurbani meat; in Pakistan *we build* 122 entire villages - that’s roads, buildings, sanitation systems, and schools; 600,000 people were helped through sustainable projects. And this is just a fraction of *what we have done* this year. But Nazia isn’t a number: she’s a child who has no home, no food - and without *our help*, she has no future. Your donations are making a real difference: and the 15.6 million people you have helped this year would agree. The war on hunger has begun. Visit Islamic Relief. Now.⁸⁶⁶

Secondly, the HUCW frame is also strongly conveyed by the main video ad of the WOH campaign,⁸⁶⁷ which I already quoted in the introduction of this chapter. Here, on the one hand the HUCW frame is conveyed by the specific articulation of ‘we’, which also mirrors that of the “How you helped” discussed earlier. On the other hand, the HUCW frame is also evoked by IR’s prognostic framing, which outlines how the main solution to hunger seems to be for IR to “continue to deliver relief,” supported by the donations of its ‘generous donors’.

Thirdly, the HUCW frame is conveyed by the fact that all the three mini-documentaries accompanying the WOH campaign conclude with the same call for monetary support for IR: “Please, give generously now” (see table 6.1). Specifically, IR’s approach consists in presenting a highly emotional and moving scenario (represented by what IR self-consciously describes as “harrowing accounts of innocent people”) from the perspective of archetypical innocent victims (a grandmother struggling to take care of her granddaughters; an hungry little girl; and an orphaned little boy), followed by a motivational framing that stresses the urgency of the need for help (“Unless we help her”; “she needs your help”; “he needs our help”), which leads to IR’s final call to donate.

⁸⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁶⁷ IslamicReliefUK, *Ramadan 2013 Appeal - War on Hunger - Islamic Relief UK*.

Table 6.1 IR’s call to donate at the end of each of the mini-documentaries of the WOH campaign

WOH VIDEO	CONCLUDING CALL TO DONATE (<i>italics mine</i>)
Afghanistan	Put simply: she has to choose how these children die. Unless we help her. Please, <i>give generously</i> now. We have declared war: not on man, but on hunger. ⁸⁶⁸
Pakistan	Because little Maryam is hungry and she needs your help. Please <i>give generously</i> now. We have declared war – on hunger. ⁸⁶⁹
Syria	Like millions of Syrians, he needs our help. Please, <i>give generously</i> now. We have declared war - on hunger. ⁸⁷⁰

In conclusions to this section, the foregoing analysis highlights how the WOH’s call to donate (represented by the icon of a hand in the campaign’s logo) played a central role in articulating agency through a HUCW frame. A close analysis of the two additional action items incorporated in the campaign’s slogan/logo (i.e. campaign and pray) illustrates that the WOH campaign has also been instrumental to introduce new dimensions (however secondary) to IR’s conceptualisation and representation of its audience’s agency.

6.2.4. The Megaphone: Campaign

Two key and related discursive moments related to the call to ‘campaign’ embedded in the WOH’s slogan/logo highlight how the incorporation of a more collective and direct dimension of agency within IR’s discourse seems to be still secondary at this stage, compared to the prominence of the HUCW frame.

On the one hand, the very webpage that launched the WOH campaign (“The War on Hunger”) includes both textual and visual prompts that somehow seem to challenge the HUCW frame.

From a textual standpoint, both the short post after the webpage’s title and the main text contain references to the public, collective, and contentious nature of campaigning that put this in contrast to the private, individual, noncontentious nature of charitable donating conveyed by the HUCW frame:

⁸⁶⁸ IslamicReliefUK, *Afghanistan - War on Hunger - Ramadan 2013*.

⁸⁶⁹ IslamicReliefUK, *Pakistan - War on Hunger - Ramadan 2013*.

⁸⁷⁰ IslamicReliefUK, *Syria Appeal*.

'The War on Hunger' is our intention to end world hunger. To make *long and lasting change*, as well as donating, we need to *challenge the governments and corporations* of the world to be more accountable.⁸⁷¹

This is only the beginning, as we plan to campaign on many more issues affecting our brothers and sisters around the world. You can get involved as little or as much as you like: it can be *as small as signing a petition, or as large as marching with us* to make a big noise people can't ignore...you choose!⁸⁷²

In the first extract, donating is explicitly characterised as a means that is in and of itself insufficient to bring about long and lasting change: whilst the use of the multi-word preposition "as well as" (meaning, 'in addition to') conveys the idea that donating still represents IR's primary call of action, the need for campaigning is emphasised as a necessary element to effect change. Despite the agentic 'we' mainly still alludes to IR as an organisation (by virtue of the use of the possessive pronoun "our" that qualifies the WOH campaign as IR's own "intention to end world hunger"), the HUCW frame is challenged here by the contentiousness of confronting well identifiable culpable actors and by the public nature of the demand for their accountability ("to challenge the governments and corporations of the world to be more accountable").

In the second extract, the HUCW frame is contrasted by projecting the agentic 'we' as a collective actor represented by IR *and* its supporters by virtue of their shared identity as Muslims (a perception conveyed through the allusion to the global Muslim community: "our brothers and sisters around the world"). Additionally, direct, collective, public action is explicitly referred to by exhorting the audience to take part to a spectrum of activities ranging from signing a petition to taking part in a march.

Notably, the "The War on Hunger" webpage also contributes to challenge the HUCW from a visual standpoint. This is because all the photos of the slideshow at the top right of the webpage (which I reproduce in figure 6.3) convey (in more or less prominent ways) ideas and feelings related to collective, direct, public, and 'political' action by depicting: i) a group of women in Pakistan marching in the streets behind a banner calling to "Drop Pakistan's Debt Now"; ii) a group of young people (including a majority of visibly Muslim women) holding signs from

⁸⁷¹ 'The War on Hunger'. Italics mine.

⁸⁷² Ibid. Italics mine.

the IF campaign in the company of a well-known British Muslim politician (Rushanara Ali MP); iii) a group of IF campaigners performing a “Spot The George” publicity stunt in the Thames, nearby Westminster Palace.⁸⁷³ To reinforce this perception, the banners preceding each of the aforementioned photos function as captions for the latter focusing on: i) policies-targeting action (“Unlocking the chains of debt in Pakistan”); ii) aid through the prism of policy/‘political’ action (“£8 billion secured for oversea aid”); and iii) collective action (“Working together: we joined with over 100 charities for the IF campaign”).

This image has been removed by the author of this thesis for copyright reasons.

Figure 6.3 Visual framing of IR’s “The War on Hunger” webpage
Source: adapted from ‘The War on Hunger’, *Islamic Relief UK*, 3 July 2013, <http://www.islamic-relief.org.uk/campaigns/war-on-hunger/>

Quite paradoxically however, this imagery also reinforces the perception that the framing of the agency component through more direct and public lens plays only a secondary role in IR’s discourse at this stage, as most of the aforementioned

⁸⁷³ On March 19th 2013, the IF campaign organised a “Spot The George” publicity stunt during which campaigners dressed as then Chancellor George Osborne and carrying replicas of the red ministerial Budget briefcase with the IF logo on it headed to Westminster a day before the Chancellor presented the Budget to Parliament, calling on the government to keep their promises to the world’s poorest people. (Pejman Faratin, ‘IF Campaign Budget Stunt’, *Metro*, 19 March 2013, http://metro.co.uk/2013/03/19/gallery-500-george-osbornes-flashmob-parliament-square-march-2013-3548988/ogb_78368_d3s_6772-lpr/.)

images (4/6) refer to IR's involvement in the IF campaign, rather than to the very WOH or to any other IR-led campaign. Indeed, IR is quite explicit about the connection between the WOH campaign and its participation to the IF campaign, as exemplified by this passage:

why hunger? (...) Hunger because we've been campaigning on this issue all year as a member of the Enough Food for Everyone IF Campaign, and it's a constant in the areas of conflict where we work.⁸⁷⁴

In light of the explicit and abundant references to the IF campaign within the WOH material, IR's framing of its own "Enough Food for Everyone IF"⁸⁷⁵ webpage is useful to enrich our understanding of the organisation's discursive efforts at this stage with regards to mobilisation. As I have highlighted earlier, this webpage was the first to ever appear in the "Campaign" domain of IR's website, on 27 May 2013. In and of itself, this signals how IR involvement within the IF campaign seems to have introduced new discursive (and operational) trends within the organisation. Consequently, it is not surprising that reverberations of some of the main discursive tools of the IF campaign can be identified in IR's own framing. For example, the overall framing of the IF campaign emphasised agency, as epitomised by very articulation around the 'if' conditional clause incorporated in the full slogan: "IF we come together, and IF we pressure our governments, change is possible."⁸⁷⁶ Indeed, the following extract from IR's webpage highlights how the organisation incorporated in its own framing the three main dimensions embedded in the IF slogan, namely: i) necessity of collective action ("IF we come together"); ii) necessity of 'political' action ("IF we pressure our governments"); and iii) viability of change ("change is possible"). I highlight prompts to each of these dimensions using '*italics*', '**bold**' and 'underline', respectively:

As Muslims we believe it is our duty to ensure that no one goes hungry and that we live in a world in which everyone gets enough food. We believe it's achievable – in our lifetime. But only **if we speak out and campaign for change.** We will only succeed in this campaign *IF we take action together*, and that's why we need YOU to join this campaign. *We want the campaign to make so much noise* **that our leaders are compelled to act.** Over the next few months we'll be engaging the Muslim community **to lobby their MPs** on hunger issues and take part in campaigning activities. You can be

⁸⁷⁴ 'Beyond the War on Terror There Is Hunger... And Hope'.

⁸⁷⁵ 'Enough Food for Everyone IF'.

⁸⁷⁶ Wild and Mulley, 'Is the New IF Campaign Trying to "Make Poverty History", Again?'

part of the change that saves millions of lives and helps give the poorest people the power to feed themselves for generations to come. The Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) said '**He who sleeps on a full stomach whilst his neighbour goes hungry is not one of us**' (Muslim)⁸⁷⁷

Additionally, insofar the IF campaign built upon the JUSTICE frame that was at the centre of the discursive efforts of its two historical precedents (the Jubilee 2000 and the Make Poverty History campaigns of 2000 and 2005, respectively),⁸⁷⁸ IR's webpage on IF, too, brings to the foreground a JUSTICE frame. On the one hand, this is done through a faith-based lens, by introducing the webpage through one of the Qur'anic references most popularly associated with the idea of justice:

O you who believe! *Stand out firmly for justice*, as witnesses to Allah, even though it be against yourselves, or your parents, or your kin, be he rich or poor, Allah is a Better Protector to both (than you). [Quran 4:135]⁸⁷⁹

On the other hand, a JUSTICE frame is also evoked from a mainstream perspective through the use of its specular dimension (injustice) in a passage that, despite neglecting to identify any culpable actor or entity, nevertheless represents an explicit expression of moral indignation by framing hunger as "unfair, unjust and entirely preventable":

While our planet provides enough food for everyone, not everyone has enough food. One in eight people are living with the pain and deprivation of hunger, and many die prematurely because of it. *It's unfair, unjust and entirely preventable.*⁸⁸⁰

Notably, the foregoing highlights that whilst IR understandably mirrors the IF's framing in its own mobilising efforts related to this campaign, it does so by incorporating references to the distinctive identity and ideational repertoire of its main audience as Muslims. Here, IR seems to engage in those kinds of "frame alignment processes" that Snow and colleagues call "frame amplification" and "frame extension":⁸⁸¹ through the use of purposely selected references from the

⁸⁷⁷ 'Enough Food for Everyone IF'. All emphasis mine, except in the last line.

⁸⁷⁸ Yanacopulos, *International NGO Engagement, Advocacy, Activism*, 118–20.

⁸⁷⁹ 'Enough Food for Everyone IF'. Italics mine.

⁸⁸⁰ Ibid. Italics mine.

⁸⁸¹ Frame amplification – particularly in its variety of "value amplification" exemplified here – refers to the "identification, idealization, and elevation of one or more values presumed basic to prospective constituents but which have not inspired collective action for any number of reasons." Frame extension refers to the effort of portraying an organisation's "objectives or activities as attending to or being congruent with the values or interests of potential adherents" despite the

two primary sources of Islam (Qur'an and sunna), IR attempts to mobilise its audience to take part to a mainstream-led campaign on the basis of values that are central to Islam (such as justice and solidarity, epitomised by Qur'an 4:135 and the aforementioned hadith), hence portraying the IF's objectives and tactics as being congruent with the Muslim identity of IR and of its main audience.

The discussion in this section thus highlights two main observations. Firstly, prompts that challenge the HUCW frame through an emphasis on more direct dimensions of agency are visible only in the "The War on Hunger" webpage rather than across the WOH material, where the HUCW frame dominates (as I discussed in the previous section). Secondly, such prompts can be more or less directly connected to IR's almost simultaneous involvement in the IF campaign (the WOH was introduced just one week after the climax of the IF⁸⁸²) and its consequent frame alignment efforts. Taken together, these observations highlight that the dominant frame in the WOH campaign was indeed the HUCW frame, with prompts hinting to more direct forms of agency essentially representing a reverberation of the discursive and strategic influence played by the IF campaign on IR itself.

In the next section I move on to discuss the second original dimension of agency introduced by the WOH campaign: prayer.

6.2.5. The Heart: Pray

Section 6.2.3 and 6.2.4 have highlighted how IR has committed significant efforts in articulating one of the key "factors affecting the mobilizing potency of preferred framings": narrative fidelity.⁸⁸³ This further is exemplified not only by the fact the WOH's slogan/logo is structured in its entirety around a widely-known hadith, but also by the incorporation of a dimension of agency that is particularly salient within Muslim life: to pray.

former may appear to have little if any resonance with the latter. (David A. Snow et al., 'Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation', *American Sociological Review* 51, no. 4 (1986): 469; 472, doi:10.2307/2095581.)

⁸⁸² The IF campaign reached a climax with the 'Big IF' rally in Hyde Park on June 8th, ahead of the UK-hosted G8 meeting on 17-18 June 2013; IR's WOH campaign was introduced with the 'How you helped' video on 24 June 2013.

⁸⁸³ Snow and Benford, 'Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization', 207–8.

Whilst the “Pray/The War on Hunger” webpage is limited in its textual content, it nevertheless features at least three elements which are important to characterise IR’s framing of agency in the spiritual realm.

The first element is represented by the rationale provided by IR to explain to its audience why engaging in prayer is pivotal to bring about change. The short text under the title (quoted here in its entirety) challenge the dominant HUCW frame by conceptualising agency as the sum of individuals’ direct engagement, and by stressing the importance of getting involved directly “rather than leaving good deeds to others”:

The Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) reminded us that we should all strive to help people every day, rather than leaving good deeds to others, but prayer is still essential.⁸⁸⁴

In addition, the beginning of the main text of the webpage clarifies IR’s articulation of the relationship between agency and spiritual life. Despite donating and campaigning may contribute to bring about change, “prayer is still essential” because the ultimate power to effect change lies with Allah:

Allah has the power to change any situation as ‘Allahu Akbar’—God is the Greatest.⁸⁸⁵

From these premises, the second significant element in IR’s framing of agency in the realm of spiritual life is that praying is framed not just an individual act intended to bring individual benefit, but also as a collective act intended to bring collective benefit. This is clearly conveyed by the following passage, which taps into key Islamic values such as mutual love, compassion, and solidarity between members of the community of believers (the *umma*) in order to emphasise the unique potential of prayer in making a difference in people’s lives through the help and by the permission of Allah:

Sincere prayers *for one’s brother or sister* are amongst the first to be accepted, so we encourage you to ask big! Here is a selection of prayers for you to recite, and other ideas on how to make the most of Ramadan – *for you, and for others.*⁸⁸⁶

⁸⁸⁴ ‘Pray / The War on Hunger’.

⁸⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁸⁶ Ibid. Italics added.

Notably, IR's invitation to "how to make the most of Ramadan—for you, and for others" highlights the third significant element of IR's articulation of agency in the realm of spiritual life. In fact, here IR emphasises the potential of the Muslim faith-based perspective to overcome the otherwise apparent conflict between self-serving (make the most for you) and altruistic (make the most for others) motivations—a potential that effectively overcomes one of the biggest challenges of the mainstream NGO sector, where "practitioners cannot have it both ways."⁸⁸⁷ By shifting 'self-interest' onto the spiritual realm (as opposed to the material self-interest that concerns mainstream practitioners⁸⁸⁸), IR challenges secular dualistic perceptions and identifies praying as a twofold type of action that may include *both* a self-serving and an altruistic dimensions. This is well conveyed by a document entitled "Selection of dua's [supplications]" that IR hyperlinked in the same webpage.⁸⁸⁹ This combines "Prayers for the poor" with self-oriented' "Ideas to maximise your Ramadan worship" in a way that can be organised as a matrix including: i) individual prayer aimed at individual spiritual benefit; ii) individual prayer aimed at collective benefit (i.e. the end of hunger); iii) collective prayer aimed at individual spiritual benefit; and iv) collective prayer aimed at collective benefit (i.e. the end of hunger). I summarise IR's specific suggestions in table 6.2, where I highlight their distribution across the aforementioned matrix.

⁸⁸⁷ Andrew Darnton, Martin Kirk, and England) Bond (London, *Finding Frames: New Ways to Engage the UK Public in Global Poverty*, 2011, 40, <http://www.findingframes.org/Finding%20Frames%20New%20ways%20to%20engage%20the%20UK%20public%20in%20global%20poverty%20Bond%202011.pdf>.

⁸⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁸⁹ Islamic Relief UK, 'Selection of Dua's', accessed 5 May 2017, http://www.islamic-relief.org.uk/content/uploads/2013/07/WOH_Pray_Duaa.pdf.

Table 6.2 IR’s suggestions to maximise Ramadan worship

		AGENCY IN THE SPIRITUAL REALM	
		<i>Individual Prayer</i>	<i>Collective Prayer</i>
INTENDED BENEFIT	<i>Individual Spiritual Benefit</i>	“Pray for the end of world hunger for your brothers and sisters in this blessed month of Ramadan, and know that you will reap the spiritual rewards as well”	“The Prophet told us that when people gather to remember Allah, the angels surround the gathering, so collective worship is a great way to gain blessings”
	<i>Collective Benefit (i.e. the end of hunger)</i>	“the Prophet said that there are three people whose prayers are not rejected – one being “the person who is fasting, until their fast is broken” – so set aside a few minutes before maghrib time to pray for the hungry.”	“If you’re attending a halaqah or an iftar – or even if you’re just spending time at home with your family! – get everyone to make du’a together for the end to world hunger.(...) collective worship is a great way to gain blessings and support those in need.”

Conclusion

The main aim of this chapter was to identify the specific web of meanings conveyed by IR during its 2013 War on Hunger Ramadan campaign (WOH) and its possible implications for addressing the two research sub-questions of the thesis. The WOH campaign was selected as a paradigmatic case study in light of representing simultaneously an atypical case offering the most information and a critical case pointing to more general trends within IR. By virtue of its uniqueness, the WOH has enabled the characterisation of a set of frames, keyings and resonances that are more ‘visible’ than in traditional IR’s Ramadan campaigns. In particular, the analysis has presented three main findings.

- *Campaign-specific frames*

The first finding is that the WOH campaign conveyed an injustice- and an agency-type frames that can be identified as the POLITICS OVER PEOPLE (POP) and the HELP US CHANGE THE WORLD (HUCW) frames, respectively.

The POP frame aims to mobilise the public by tapping on the widely shared frustration and discontent with ‘politics as usual’. This is denounced as an amorphous entity that overshadows the value of people’s life by directly causing harm and suffering, at worst, or by distracting from real issues and neglecting to offer solutions, at best. From this perspective, the POP frame does not attempt

to mobilise people only through an appeal to values and emotions traditionally associated with Ramadan campaigns (such as compassion for the ‘the poor’ and ‘the hungry’), but also by prompting a moral indignation towards a ‘politics as usual’ that turns innocent people into victims of injustice.

Paradoxically enough, whilst the POP frame brings ‘politics’ under moral scrutiny, it also seems to discourage agency in the policy/political realm. This is because the abstractness, elusiveness, and maliciousness/indifference of ‘politics’ conveyed by the POP frame imply its wholesome disqualification as a potential means to make a positive difference. In doing so, the POP frame seems to attain two core functions. On the one hand, it confirms (rather than challenge or qualify) the contemporary popular “erosion of citizens’ confidence in political leaders and institutions,”⁸⁹⁰ which is manifested in distrust and cynicism for ‘politics’ as an ‘impure’ space inherently lacking care for the public good.⁸⁹¹ On the other hand, this serves as a counterpoint to highlight the ‘purity’ of the (a-political) humanitarian space,⁸⁹² thus identifying the relief/development work carried out by IR as the best solution to address injustice.

The particular articulation of injustice conveyed by the POP frame has important implications for the WOH’s agency-type frame. In fact, since the delivery of relief/development work is projected as the best solution to address a deplorable state of affairs (in this case, hunger), it follows that agency lies with those actors (like IR) capable of implementing this type of work. Indeed, the analysis showed that the WOH campaign was dominated by a HUCW agency-type frame that postulates IR (rather than its audience) as the agentic actor, hence reducing the publics’ agency mainly into the realm of private, individual, noncontentious charitable donations as a means to ‘help’ the organisation to ‘change this world’. In doing this, the HUCW frame works in synergy with the POP frame: as much as the latter implies the moral indignation towards the ‘impurity’ of politics, the former exhorts the audience to effect change mainly through the projected ‘purity’

⁸⁹⁰ Pierre Rosanvallon, ‘Introduction’, in *Counter-Democracy: Politics in an Age of Distrust*, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge University Press, 2008), 1.

⁸⁹¹ Sonja Zmerli and Tom W. G. van der Meer, ‘The Deeply Rooted Concern with Political Trust’, in *Handbook on Political Trust*, ed. Sonja Zmerli and Tom W.G. van der Meer (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2017), 5.

⁸⁹² Andrea Paras and Janice Gross Stein, ‘Bridging the Sacred and the Profane in Humanitarian Life’, in *Sacred Aid: Faith and Humanitarianism*, ed. Michael Barnett and Janice Gross Stein (Oxford University Press, 2012), 213.

of the “humanitarian space” (to which IR belongs) as the main “meaningful and inviolable sphere of ethical action.”⁸⁹³

- *Nuances*

A second interesting finding of this chapter is that the WOH’s articulation of both the injustice- and agency-type frames incorporated a number of nuances.

With regards to the injustice-type frame, the analysis has highlighted how the POP frame was articulated by the WOH campaign through three main keyings. The ‘politics of war’ keying emphasises the culpability of political endeavours underpinning the brutality of war and contrast this with the ‘nobility’ of IR’s War on Hunger. The ‘politics of media’ keying highlights the role played by media’s agenda in propagating stereotypes and in overshadowing people and the ‘real’ issues affecting them, and contraposes this against IR’s intention to ‘look beyond’ clichés and to re-focus public attention on the centrality of human life’s dignity. The ‘politics of greed’ keying stresses the unethical nature of a global culture based on self-interest and sets it against a call for charitable giving as a platform for individual reform and societal change.

The analysis also highlighted how the WOH campaign played a key role in nuancing IR’s articulation of agency through the original introduction (however marginal) of a call to campaign and pray. Both of these dimensions point in different ways to the third main finding of this chapter: the WOH’s campaign resonance with wider narratives.

- *Resonance with wider narratives*

The third main finding of this chapter is that both the WOH’s main frames and their nuances resonate in one way or the other with three main types of wider narratives: i) public discourse; ii) mainstream development discourse; and iii) the Muslim repertoire of ideas and values.

Concerning resonance with public discourse, the analysis highlighted that: i) overall, the POP frame taps into the contemporary general discontent with ‘politics as usual’; and ii) that the ‘politics of war’ and ‘politics of media’ keyings seem to tap into the increasingly popular critique of the ‘war on terror’ and on the widely-held scepticism towards media representations of reality, respectively. On

⁸⁹³ Ibid.

the other hand, the analysis also highlighted how the ‘politics of greed’ keying of the POP frame resonates with a wider shift occurring within development discourse, epitomised by the 2013 IF campaign, which symbolised the mainstreaming of i) a focus on the policy/political dimension of hunger and ii) of campaigning as (one of) the ‘method(s) of choice’ for development NGOs to engage the public in bigger-than-self issues. In turn, this shift is also mirrored by the incorporation in the WOH’s slogan/logo of the call to campaign and by the presence of references (albeit marginal) to public and collective forms of agency in some of the WOH’s material.

Additionally, the analysis has highlighted that IR has also committed considerable effort in aligning the WOH campaign with a distinctively Muslim repertoire of ideas and values. Firstly, this is exemplified by the fact that IR identified one of the most well-known hadith dealing with injustice and agency as the source of inspiration for the WOH campaign, and consequently conceptualised the WOH’s slogan/logo around it. Secondly, the WOH exhorted its audience to action within the spiritual realm, by calling to pray as a means both to gain individual spiritual rewards and to effect positive social change. Thirdly, IR also attempted to make the IF campaign (from which the WOH itself drew inspiration) resonant with the Muslim narrative, by using key references from Qur’an and sunna to align its objectives and tactics with important Islamic values such as justice and solidarity.

Taken together, these findings point to a number of considerations that are important to address the research sub-questions of the thesis.

- *Implications for the research sub-questions*

The WOH campaign represents an “atypical case”⁸⁹⁴ within IR’s discourse for five main reasons. Firstly, it is the first and only IR’s Ramadan campaign that is referenced in the organisation’s website within the section specifically dedicated to its mobilisation efforts (i.e. the “Campaign” section).⁸⁹⁵ Secondly, it is the first

⁸⁹⁴ Bent Flyvbjerg, ‘Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research’, in *Qualitative Research Practice*, ed. Clive Seale et al. (London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2004), 229.

⁸⁹⁵ Traditionally, IR updates each year the “Ramadan” section of its website with its upcoming/current Ramadan campaign. However, the main webpages related to past Ramadan campaigns are removed from IR’s website sometime after their completion. At the time of writing, the main references to past Ramadan campaigns are located in the “News” (2014; 2015) or in the “Current appeals” sections (2016). (‘Alhamdulillah! Islamic Relief Welcomes Ramadan across the UK’, 1 July 2014, <http://www.islamic-relief.org.uk/news/alhamdulillah-islamic-relief-welcomes-ramadan-across-the-uk/>; ‘Islamic Relief Welcomes Ramadan - Share Your Relief’, 16 June 2015, <http://www.islamic-relief.org.uk/news/islamic-relief-welcomes-ramadan-share-your-relief/>;

IR-led initiative to have ever appeared in the same section of the website. Thirdly, it deliberately adopted a “hard-hitting” look and feel (rather than the soft and compassionate tone traditionally associated with Ramadan campaigns) capable of conveying a sense of indignation and righteous anger. Fourthly, it incorporated a tripartite slogan and logo (“Donate | Campaign | Pray”), rather than the traditional monodimensional invitation to donate. Fifthly, it was run right after IR’s involvement in a major, mainstream-led campaigning moment (i.e. the Enough Food for Everyone IF campaign).

The aforementioned therefore suggests that the WOH represented an atypical example of IR’s mobilising efforts, which is conceptualizable as a hybrid between a Ramadan and an awareness campaign. Given that: i) Ramadan campaigns represent the climax of IR’s discursive efforts dedicated to mobilise support; and that ii) awareness campaigns represent the archetype of mobilisation efforts, it follows that the WOH (as a hybrid Ramadan/awareness campaign) represents the best case to achieve the greatest possible amount of information about IR’s framing of mobilisation.

On the other hand, the WOH represents also a “critical case”⁸⁹⁶ insofar it is the most likely to: i) convey ‘strong’ injustice- and agency-type frames because of its nature as an awareness campaign and its unique hard-hitting look and feel; ii) emphasise a call to campaign by virtue of representing IR’s unique Ramadan campaign including this call in its slogan.

In light of the aforementioned, and on the basis of the falsification (or verification) of prepositions through the “most likely” (or “least likely”) logic,⁸⁹⁷ two deductions can be made.

First, given that the WOH conveys ‘weak’ injustice- and agency-type frames, then these are most likely to be weak elsewhere in IR’s discourse (because in the WOH campaign they have the potential to be stronger than anywhere else). Indeed, on the one hand, the POP frame is a ‘weak’ injustice-type frame because the hot cognition/righteous anger that underpins it is ‘weakened’ by the

Us Save Lives This Ramadan’, *Islamic Relief UK*, 6 June 2016, [http://www.islamic-relief.org.uk/current-appeals/ramadan-2016/.](http://www.islamic-relief.org.uk/current-appeals/ramadan-2016/))

⁸⁹⁶ Bent Flyvbjerg, ‘Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research’, 229.

⁸⁹⁷ i.e. if X is weak or does not occur at all in the critical case that is most likely to display it, then most likely X is weak or does not occur elsewhere. The specular form of this logical deduction is: if X occurs or is strong in the critical case that is least likely to display it, then most likely X occurs or is strong elsewhere. (Ibid., 231)

abstractness of the source of injustice it identifies. On the other hand, the HUCW is a 'weak' agency-type frame because the consciousness of the viability of change that underpins it is 'weakened' by the projection of IR (rather than its audience) as the main agentic actor. Notably, the 'weakness' of the POP and HUCW frames is not surprising, given that—despite its hybrid nature—the WOH was nevertheless a campaign run during Ramadan, with the primary aim to mobilise monetary support rather than action. This is quite explicitly and self-consciously conveyed by the following two extracts, which highlight how IR's Ramadan campaigns such as the WOH typically aim to capitalise on the increased levels of generosity of Muslims in this period of the year, in order to maximise IR's main source of income:⁸⁹⁸

why Ramadan, and why hunger? Ramadan because it's a time when Muslims fast from dawn to dusk for 30 days and give over £100million to charity as they think about those less fortunate than themselves – including the hungry⁸⁹⁹

The month of Ramadan is a time when Muslims fast from dawn to dusk and give over £100 million to charity as they think about those less fortunate than themselves – including the hungry. Islamic Relief receives around a third of its annual income during Ramadan⁹⁰⁰

Second, given that the WOH does not emphasise a call to campaign, then a call to campaign is most likely to represent only a marginal feature of IR's discourse, overall (because in the WOH campaign the call to campaign has the potential to be stronger than anywhere else).

Indeed, these inferences seem to be corroborated by both Ramadan and outside-of-Ramadan campaigns conducted by IR in following years. Whilst it is beyond the scope of this chapter (and of thesis) to provide an analysis of these campaigns, their very titles are sufficiently emblematic to offer an insight into this

⁸⁹⁸ Furthermore, the WOH's conceptualisation as mainly a fundraising effort is highlighted by the fact that the campaign is commemorated in IR's 2013 annual report under the section "Fundraising and volunteering in the UK" with a specific emphasis on funds raised ("During Ramadan, Islamic Relief declared 'War on Hunger'. (...) Our **Ramadan appeal raised over £7.4 million**, helping to lift thousands out of poverty and hunger worldwide" rather than under the "Campaigning for change" section (where, significantly, the IR participation to the IF campaign is mentioned, instead). Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Islamic Relief Worldwide 2013 Annual Report & Financial Statements' (Birmingham: Islamic Relief Worldwide, 2013), 33, http://www.islamic-relief.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/IRW_AR2013.pdf. Emphasis in original.

⁸⁹⁹ 'Beyond the War on Terror There Is Hunger... And Hope'.

⁹⁰⁰ 'Islamic Relief Looks beyond War on Terror and Declares "war on Hunger" in Hard-Hitting Ramadan Campaign'.

fact here. On the one hand, the Ramadan campaigns Alhamdulillah⁹⁰¹ (all thanks and praise is due to Allah) (2014); Share Your Relief (2015); and Gather the Rewards of Ramadan (2016) consistently adopted a more traditional, soft, compassionate look and feel, respectively emphasising values and feelings related to gratitude, generosity, and spiritual achievement. On the other hand, the titles of outside-of-Ramadan initiatives such as the Stand Up For Syria! and #WithSyria campaigns (2014) and the Don't Abandon Afghanistan campaign (2014) evoke feelings of solidarity and care, respectively (rather than of moral indignation, as the WOH did).

From this perspective, the relative absence of 'strong' injustice- and agency-type frames in IR's discourse on mobilisation resonates with traditional understandings of humanitarianism as a neutral, 'pure' space for ethical action. In turn, this resonance contributes to position IR firmly as a *humanitarian actor*. Simultaneously, the very incorporation of injustice- and agency-type frames (however 'weak') and of a campaigning dimension (however marginal) is symptomatic of IR's alignment with wider shifts occurring at the cutting-edge of the development community, which has been increasingly moving since the early 2010s towards a more 'policy/politics'-aware approach. This characterises IR as a *leading humanitarian actor* insofar it positions the organisation at the forefront of new trends within its community of reference. Additionally, the very introduction (from 2014) of campaigning initiatives within IR's basket of options to "get involved" is emblematic of the organisation *self-confidence* in testing new approaches to public engagement. Finally, the WOH's resonance with both mainstream discourses and the Muslim ideational repertoire highlights IR's willingness to *synthesise its mainstreamness and distinctiveness*.

Therefore, as far as the question 'how to think about IR?' is concerned, the foregoing highlights that IR's framing of its mobilisation-oriented discourse contributes to reinforce the range of meanings conveyed by the ISLAMIC HUMANITARIANISM frame identified in chapter 4, which characterises IR as a self-confident leader within the humanitarian sector, capable of constructively

⁹⁰¹ Traditional Muslim expression to convey feelings of gratitude towards and grateful praise of the Creator. Abdur Rashid Siddiqui, 'Ḥamd', *Qur'anic Keywords: A Reference Guide* (Kube Publishing Ltd, 10 December 2015).

synthetizing its mainstreamness as development NGO and its distinctiveness as a Muslim organisation.

On the other hand, with regards to the question of 'how to think about British Muslims' civic engagement?', IR's dominant framing by and large contributes to articulate the agency and identity of its supporters through frames traditionally associated with humanitarian/charitable work (such as the GENEROUS DONOR and VOLUNTEER frames, which I will discuss in chapter 8). However, the nuances highlighted here also suggest the presence of a discursive (and practical) space for the initial development of new, more agentic and collective dimensions, aptly epitomised by the 'active citizen' keying of the VOLUNTEER frame that I will also discuss in chapter 8.

In the next chapter, I will explore MADE's framing of its mobilisation-oriented discourse through its own (sole) Ramadan campaign: the 2013 (and 2014) Ramadan Revolution campaign.

Chapter 7 . MADE's PROFIT OVER PEOPLE & PLANET and CHANGE YOURSELF TO CHANGE THE WORLD frames

Introduction: the Ramadan Revolution campaign (2013-14)

On July the 5th 2013, four days before the start of that year's Ramadan, MADE boldly called for a 'revolution'—a "Ramadan Revolution."⁹⁰²

The Ramadan Revolution campaign (henceforth, RR) was a social media campaign rolled out on MADE's Facebook page,⁹⁰³ accompanied on Twitter by the hashtag: #RamadanRevolution.⁹⁰⁴ The RR consisted in a series of reminders and action requests embedded in poster-like images that MADE uploaded daily throughout Ramadan on its Facebook page, accompanied by brief commentaries in the 'status update' section of each post. The campaign was then repeated also in 2014,⁹⁰⁵ with a little variation: here, daily posts and action requests were directly and explicitly inspired by verses from the Qur'an extracted from the thirtieth part of it (*juz*) traditionally read during the corresponding nightly Ramadan prayer (*tarāwīh*).⁹⁰⁶ To better illustrate the format of the RR, I reproduce in figure 7.1 the image and post uploaded by MADE on the 15th day of each year's version, as an example. Notably, the very fact that MADE decided to repeat the RR in 2014 by introducing a more explicit focus on its narrative fidelity with Islam and on its proximity with the daily life of Muslims⁹⁰⁷ highlights how the organisation dedicated particularly significant meaning-making efforts into this campaign.

⁹⁰² 'Prophet Muhammad (Pbuh): The Revolutionary', *MADE*, 5 July 2013, <http://www.made.ngo/updates/blogs/item/prophet-muhammad-pbuh-the-revolutionary>. Following Johnston's methodological insight on frame analysis (discussed in chapter 3), I reproduce in appendix A, extract number 1 a significant portion of the blog, from which I will quote repeatedly in this chapter.

⁹⁰³ 'MADE NGO', *Facebook*, accessed 13 May 2017, <https://en-gb.facebook.com/MADEinEur/>.

⁹⁰⁴ '#RamadanRevolution', *MADE*, accessed 12 May 2017, <http://www.made.ngo/what-we-do/past-projects/item/ramadanrevolution>. The RR campaign had lower level of consistency on Twitter than on Facebook, which represented its main platform. For this reason, the following analysis focuses only on the latter.

⁹⁰⁵ Since the two editions essentially represented the same example of mobilising effort, I will aggregate data from both in my analysis and refer to either by using the abbreviation RR.

⁹⁰⁶ This was explained by the following announcement at the beginning of the campaign: "This verse you will have heard during taraweeh on the first night. Let us make a habit of deriving action points from the beautiful verses that are recited each night during taraweeh." MADE. Facebook post. 29 June 2014. <https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10152085970257127/?type=1&theater>

⁹⁰⁷ By virtue of connecting daily reminders and action requests to the portion of the Qur'an scheduled to be read during the same night.

This image has been removed by the author of this thesis for copyright reasons.

a)

b)

Figure 7.1 Posts and images uploaded by MADE on its Facebook page on the 15th day of the Ramadan Revolution campaign in 2013 (a) and 2014 (b)

Sources: adapted from: a) MADE. Facebook post. 24 July 2013;⁹⁰⁸ b) MADE. Facebook post. 13 July 2014.⁹⁰⁹

As MADE self-consciously emphasises when commemorating the RR as a milestone of the organisation's five years' journey, this was a "unique" campaign.⁹¹⁰ That was the case for three main reasons. Firstly, the RR represented the first and only example of MADE conducting a Ramadan campaign. In and of itself, this represented a unique phenomenon within a BMNGO sector that, instead, traditionally concentrates most of its mobilising efforts precisely during Ramadan.⁹¹¹ Secondly, the RR explicitly distinguished itself from the traditional understanding of Ramadan campaigns as fundraising efforts aimed at mobilising support in the form of donations. Rather, the RR incorporated only very marginally an invitation to donate,⁹¹² and instead

⁹⁰⁸<https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10151466291837127/>

⁹⁰⁹<https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10152114235677127/>

⁹¹⁰ "MADE's *unique* Ramadan campaign challenging supporters to change their daily lifestyle choices." MADE in Europe, 'MADE in Europe. Annual Report 2013/2014' (London: MADE in Europe, 2014), 5.

⁹¹¹ As exemplified by Islamic Relief's WOH campaign discussed in chapter 6.

⁹¹² An invitation to donate was present only in the 2014 edition, in two instances. The first was a request to specifically donate to MADE: "SET UP A REGULAR DONATION OF AT LEAST £3 PER MONTH IN SADAQAH TO REAP ONGOING REWARDS." The second was an invitation to generally donate to 'sustainable causes': "DONATE MONEY TO A SUSTAINABLE CAUSE - EDUCATION, HEALTHCARE, MOSQUES!" MADE. Facebook post. 2 July 2014. [https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10152093035497127/?type=3&theater](https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10152093035497127/?type=3&theater;); MADE. Facebook post. 26 July 2014. <https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10152133684972127/?type=3&theater>

represented mainly a platform for consciousness-raising and an invitation to lifestyle change (as I will explore in the course of this chapter). Thirdly, the RR adopted a campaigning medium (Facebook) that differs from that of traditional Ramadan campaigns (which are usually rolled out through video ads, billboard posters, and leaflets⁹¹³), contributing to align MADE with contemporary forms of activism that rely heavily on social media as a platform for mobilisation (such as the Occupy Wall Street movement⁹¹⁴).

In light of the foregoing, the uniqueness of the RR bears the question: why MADE chose to run a Ramadan campaign, and to frame it around the idea of 'revolution'?

On the one hand, since Ramadan is the month in which the Qur'an was historically first revealed, this is identified by MADE as the period of the year most apt to symbolise Islam as a "revolution" that started in Arabia in the seventh century and "change[d] the lives of billions of people for centuries to come."⁹¹⁵ More specifically, MADE's understanding of Islam as a 'revolution' derives from its conceptualisation of Islam as being "all about ethics and justice"⁹¹⁶ and "all about our balance between spiritual development and practical action."⁹¹⁷ From these premises, MADE sees Islam as a revolution that changed the world at two key levels. At the structural level, Islam changed "the political or economic scene" by "lifting up the voices of the most marginalised" and by "calling for rights and equality for all."⁹¹⁸ At the personal level, Islam "advocated a revolution in each and every individual so that every action, word and thought becomes governed by taqwa (God-consciousness)."⁹¹⁹

On the other hand, MADE chose to run a Ramadan campaign because Ramadan is generally considered the month that best helps Muslims to reform and refine their spirituality and behaviour. From this perspective, MADE describes Ramadan

⁹¹³ As exemplified by Islamic Relief's WOH campaign discussed in chapter 6.

⁹¹⁴ For an example of how Facebook was used as a mobilisation platform within the Occupy Wall Street movement, see: Sarah Gaby and Neal Caren, 'Occupy Online: How Cute Old Men and Malcolm X Recruited 400,000 US Users to OWS on Facebook', *Social Movement Studies* 11, no. 3–4 (1 August 2012): 367–74, doi:10.1080/14742837.2012.708858.

⁹¹⁵ 'Prophet Muhammad (Pbuh): The Revolutionary'.

⁹¹⁶ '#RamadanRevolution'.

⁹¹⁷ MADE. Facebook post. 17 June 2014. <https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10152061348857127/?type=3&theater>

⁹¹⁸ 'Prophet Muhammad (Pbuh): The Revolutionary'.

⁹¹⁹ Ibid.

as “a time to better ourselves as well as get rid of bad habits,”⁹²⁰ and it emphasises that “no time is better to make that change than the best of all months!”⁹²¹ Tapping into the potential for individual change embedded in this month, the RR thus aimed to enable its audience “to have a truly revolutionary Ramadan”⁹²² by reforming daily habits in order “to enjoy a greener, more ethical and more spiritual month.”⁹²³

Consequently, the RR had two main aims that distinguished it from traditional Ramadan campaigns. Firstly, the RR aimed to encourage Muslims to follow the “revolutionary” Prophetic example,⁹²⁴ articulated through teachings on a wide range of issues relevant to daily life—such as “workers’ rights & trade ethics,” “sustainable consumption,” “animal welfare and humane slaughter,” and “sustainable land use and conservation.”⁹²⁵ Emphasising that Prophetic teachings should “inspire us to reflect on the way we live,” the RR wanted to prompt its audience to critical self-reflection through the question: “ask yourself, is this how the Prophet (pbuh) would have lived?”⁹²⁶ From this perspective, and given that a fundamental tenet of Islam is that “there is no better example than the Prophet (pbuh) himself,”⁹²⁷ it follows that the RR aimed to get its audience to implement the Prophetic example as “the perfect balance of spiritual activity, with practical action.”⁹²⁸ Consequently, the second main aim of the RR was to promote a twofold process of consciousness-raising where a first step of realisation that “the seemingly small actions and choices we make on a daily basis such as what to eat or what to wear are actually an integral part of our deen [religion]” is followed by the commitment “to start a revolution in yourself and challenge the way that you eat, dress and live.”⁹²⁹

Contextualised against this background, the RR articulated an injustice- and an agency-type frames that resonate with other contemporary movements/activist

⁹²⁰ MADE. Facebook post. 25 June 2014. <https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10152076716197127/?type=3&theater>

⁹²¹ ‘#RamadanRevolution’.

⁹²² Ibid.

⁹²³ MADE. Facebook post. 28 June 2014. <https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10152084053592127/?type=3&theater>

⁹²⁴ ‘Prophet Muhammad (Pbuh): The Revolutionary’.

⁹²⁵ Ibid.

⁹²⁶ Ibid.

⁹²⁷ Ibid.

⁹²⁸ ‘#RamadanRevolution’.

⁹²⁹ ‘Prophet Muhammad (Pbuh): The Revolutionary’.

subcultures which share with MADE similar concerns and tactics. I will discuss these in detail in the following sections.

7.1. Framing injustice: the PROFIT OVER PEOPLE & PLANET frame

I already outlined in my analysis of MADE's articulation of the Self through the MOVEMENT frame (chapter 5) how the organisation systematically incorporates references to the idea of 'injustice' in its overall discourse. In this section I will illustrate how the RR evokes a specific injustice-type frame that I call the PROFIT OVER PEOPLE & PLANET frame (henceforth, POPP). This frame conveys moral indignation against a socioeconomic/political system and way of life that prioritise self-interest and material gain (in other words, "exchange value"⁹³⁰) over the inherent value of people's lives and the environment which, as a result, suffer harm and deterioration.

In particular, the following analysis will highlight that the RR developed two complementary nuances of the POPP frame, which I describe as the 'structural' and the 'lifestyle' keyings. On the one hand, the structural keying of the POPP frame projects injustice as being brought about by *institutional actors* operating through *unjust policies and practices* that enable them to gain material benefit at the expenses of individuals and the environment. On the other hand, the lifestyle keying articulates the POPP frame through a more 'private' lens that sees injustice as being brought about by *individual actors* living out *irresponsible and selfish lifestyles* whereby the pursuit of material benefit (e.g. spending less) or of self-interest (e.g. through extravagant tastes) is more or less consciously prioritised at the expenses of the well-being of other people and the planet.

Before presenting an in-depth analysis of how the POPP frame is conveyed by the RR, I present in the next section an original analysis of how the POPP and cognate frames seem to have been adopted by a range of contemporary movements and activist subcultures. Whilst it is beyond the scope of this study to provide an extensive examination of this phenomenon, this sketch will nevertheless provide a more solid background to better contextualise the web of meanings evoked by MADE's mobilisation-oriented discourse.⁹³¹

⁹³⁰ Stuart Hall, Doreen Massey, and Michael Rustin, 'Framing Statement. After Neoliberalism: Analysing the Present.', in *After Neoliberalism? The Kilburn Manifesto*, ed. Stuart Hall, Doreen Massey, and Doreen Massey (Lawrence & Wishart, 2015), 22; 5.

⁹³¹ In light of the scope of this research, the following analysis necessarily represents a preliminary simplification and thus does not claim to be definitive. Nevertheless, it is significant because these

7.1.1. The POPP frame among contemporary movements

At least four main variants of the POPP frame can be found among contemporary movements and activist subcultures that share some characteristics with MADE. The most basic variants are those that incorporate only one of the two types of ‘victim’ identified by the POPP frame—in other words, those frames that focus *either* on the social (PROFIT OVER PEOPLE) *or* the environmental (PROFIT OVER PLANET) dimensions of the injustice brought about by self-interested profiteering. A third frame is an extension of the POPP frame into what has recently emerged as the PROFIT OVER PEOPLE & PLANET & PEACE frame. Finally, a fourth cognate of the POPP frame is represented by a transformed version that erases its adversarial dimension by postulating the possibility of a ‘win-win’ scenario for profit, people and the environment: the PROFIT & PEOPLE & ENVIRONMENT frame.

7.1.1.1. *The PROFIT OVER PEOPLE frame*

Two of the most significant movements of the last two decades seem to have adopted the PROFIT OVER PEOPLE frame as their central injustice-type frame: the Global Justice movement⁹³² (also known as anti-globalisation or alter-

observations represent in and of themselves original contributions to social movement literature, and they will serve to strengthen my analysis of MADE.

⁹³² Rootes and Sotirakopoulos refer to the expression ‘Global Justice movement’ “as an umbrella term to denote a diverse constellation of organizations, groups, and networks, working with varying degrees of cooperation on a broad range of issues—from the indebtedness of the world’s poorest countries, the inequities of the global trade in goods and services, international peace and environmental degradation, to the human rights of workers and immigrants, especially in less economically developed countries. These issues are linked by an emerging consensus amongst activists that their root cause is the neoliberal agenda (...) that dominates global economic arrangements.” Christopher Rootes and Nikos Sotirakopoulos, ‘Global Justice Movement’, ed. David A. Snow et al., *The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements* (Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2013), <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9780470674871.wbespm297/abstract>.

globalisation⁹³³) and the Occupy Wall Street movement⁹³⁴ (henceforth: GJM and OWS, respectively).

Many observers have highlighted that “these movements shared many commonalities and were each influenced by one another.”⁹³⁵ As far as this discussion is concerned, the most interesting dimension is the overlap between the GJM and the OWS’s framing of grievances. As de Vries-Jordan highlights, both movements “used frames linked to global justice and addressed grievances concerning neoliberalism and capitalism.”⁹³⁶ More specifically, I suggest that both movements seem to have articulated a sense of injustice through a shared injustice-type frame aimed at “discrediting neoliberal ideology and promoting

⁹³³ In their analysis of the “political ideology” of the GJM, Steger and Wilson highlight that the expression “anti- globalization” has often been used by “many hard-core neoliberals and even some pro-market reformists” to dismiss the GJM as “little more than a superficial shopping list of complaints that lack a coherent theoretic structure and a unifying policy.” Employing discourse and content analysis to examine data from 45 organizations linked to the GJM, the article posits that the movement offers conceptual and policy alternatives to those championed by market globalists, suggesting that GJM “is not simply *anti*-globalization. Instead, it may be described more accurately as *alter*-globalization, offering a sophisticated alternative vision of global politics at the outset of the twenty-first century.” Manfred B. Steger and Erin K. Wilson, ‘Anti-Globalization or Alter-Globalization? Mapping the Political Ideology of the Global Justice Movement1’, *International Studies Quarterly* 56, no. 3 (1 September 2012): 440, doi:10.1111/j.1468-2478.2012.00740.x.

⁹³⁴ The Occupy Wall Street movement originated as a “series of protests, initiated on September 17, 2011 in lower Manhattan’s financial district, against alarming trends in social inequality, high rates of home foreclosure and unemployment, and the excessive influence of corporate and financial interests on government. The protests attracted large numbers of participants and gained widespread international attention due to the movement’s broad appeal, to “the 99 percent,” and tenacious use of nonviolent protest.” Whilst the status of OWS as a ‘movement’ has been at the centre of academic discussion (mainly in light of its non-hierarchical, fluid and evolving structure), its importance in shaping ‘movement culture’ has been identified as lying in the “readiness to look seriously and critically at inequality and at the question of whether actual democratic institutions are really working (...) in changing, at least a little, what people think is possible” and in having “seeped into the consciousness of many and assertively articulated that inequality is something we can all seek to remedy.” Heather Gautney, ‘Occupy Wall Street Movement’, in *The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements* (Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2013); Craig Calhoun, ‘Occupy Wall Street in Perspective’, *The British Journal of Sociology* 64, no. 1 (1 March 2013): 37–38, doi:10.1111/1468-4446.12002; Jenny Pickerill and John Krinsky, ‘Why Does Occupy Matter?’, *Social Movement Studies* 11, no. 3–4 (1 August 2012): 286, doi:10.1080/14742837.2012.708923.

⁹³⁵ Helma G. E. de Vries-Jordan, ‘The Global Justice Movement and Occupy Wall Street: Spillover, Spillover, or Coalescence?’, *Global Discourse* 4, no. 2–3 (3 July 2014): 182, doi:10.1080/23269995.2014.904547. In particular, parallels have been drawn between the movements regarding their origins, members, targets, tactical repertoires as well as the dynamics in mobilisation levels and the main challenges faced. Ron Hayduk, ‘Global Justice and OWS: Movement Connections’, *Socialism and Democracy* 26, no. 2 (1 July 2012): 43–50, doi:10.1080/08854300.2012.686276; Vries-Jordan, ‘The Global Justice Movement and Occupy Wall Street’.

⁹³⁶ Two of the most significant differences between the movements are: i) “Occupy movements tended to focus on austerity politics domestically as opposed to [GJM’s focus on] structural adjustment policies internationally”; ii) the GJM focused on diagnostic frames to highlight problems, whereas OWS not only focused on diagnosing problems, but more prognostic frames accompanied actions aimed to embody the world that participants wanted to create. Vries-Jordan, ‘The Global Justice Movement and Occupy Wall Street’, 191.

notions of global justice”:⁹³⁷ the PROFIT OVER PEOPLE frame (henceforth, PEOPLE).

In fact, both GJM and OWS seem to have adopted the PEOPLE frame to emphasise the social dimension of injustice brought about by neoliberalism as “a global system that benefits the rich and keeps the majority of the world’s population mired in poverty and pain”⁹³⁸—in other words, to primarily denounce the self-interested profiteering economics that benefits the 1% at the expenses of the 99%. The prominence of the PEOPLE frame in both movements is indicated by the fact that this can be found in a wide range of material related to them. For example, the specular, prognostic slogan of ‘people over profit’ was central within manifestations of collective action within both GJM⁹³⁹ and the OWS,⁹⁴⁰ and it is quite explicitly conveyed by key discursive moments from organisations and documents related to both GJM⁹⁴¹ and OWS.⁹⁴² Additionally, the PEOPLE frame was widely popularised by the very title of a book published in parallel to the ‘coming of age’ of the GJM (i.e. the 1999 Seattle protests against the World Trade Organisation) by one of the public intellectuals that has provided the most visible support for this movement: Noam Chomsky.⁹⁴³ Notably, if Chomsky’s classic *Profit Over People: Neoliberalism and Global Order*⁹⁴⁴

⁹³⁷ Hayduk, ‘Global Justice and OWS’, 49.

⁹³⁸ *Ibid.*, 44–45.

⁹³⁹ Geoffrey Pleyers, ‘The Global Justice Movement’, *Globality Studies Journal*, no. 19 (1 July 2010): para. 14, <https://gsj.stonybrook.edu/article/the-global-justice-movement/>.

⁹⁴⁰ Paolo Cossarini, ‘Protests, Emotions and Democracy: Theoretical Insights from the Indignados Movement’, *Global Discourse* 4, no. 2–3 (3 July 2014): 291, doi:10.1080/23269995.2014.895930; Tan Yangfang, ‘A Review of the “Occupy Wall Street” Movement and Its Global Influence’, *International Critical Thought* 2, no. 2 (1 June 2012): 249, doi:10.1080/21598282.2012.684287.

⁹⁴¹ In the “Who we are” section of its website, the British organisation Global Justice Now (which was part of the GJM) states: “Financial markets, one-sided trade agreements, and privatisation all take control out of the hands of the ordinary people, especially the poorest. (...) We work with others in a global movement to build alternatives which put *people before profit*.” ‘Who We Are’, *Global Justice Now*, 27 June 2014, <http://www.globaljustice.org.uk/who-we-are>. Italics mine.

⁹⁴² OWS’s “Declaration of the Occupation of New York City” accepted on September 29, 2011 states: “As we gather together in solidarity to express a feeling of mass injustice, we must not lose sight of what brought us together. We write so that all people who feel wronged by the corporate forces of the world can know that we are your allies. (...) We come to you at a time when corporations, which place *profit over people*, self-interest over justice, and oppression over equality, run our governments.” ‘Declaration of the Occupation of New York City’, *Occupy Wall Street*, accessed 10 July 2017, <http://occupywallstreet.net/policy/declaration-occupation-new-york-city>. Italics mine.

⁹⁴³ Liam Leonard and Sya B. Kedzior, ‘Introduction’, in *Occupy the Earth: Global Environmental Movements*, ed. Liam Leonard and Sya B. Kedzior (Bingley, UK: Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 2014), xi.

⁹⁴⁴ Noam Chomsky, *Profit Over People: Neoliberalism and Global Order* (Seven Stories Press, 1999).

explicitly epitomises the PEOPLE frame’s critique of neoliberalism,⁹⁴⁵ his more recent *Occupy*⁹⁴⁶ links the OWS to the same frame by virtue of representing an analysis of how neoliberalism in the US specifically led to the development of this movement. Taken together, these evidences suggest that the PROFIT OVER PEOPLE frame represents (one of) the main site(s) of discursive overlap between the GJM and the OWS.

7.1.1.2. *The PROFIT OVER PLANET frame*

The PROFIT OVER PLANET (henceforth, PLANET) frame represents (one of) the main injustice-type frame of the dominant environmentalist discourse emerged since the early 1970s.⁹⁴⁷ By pinpointing the irreconcilable “dispute between profit and the environment,”⁹⁴⁸ this frame sees environmental degradation as the result of corporate greed, the by-product of a system whereby “elites in government and industry” pursue their self-interest at the expenses of the planet.⁹⁴⁹ Today, the PLANET frame is still widely popular throughout the world, as “new [global environmental] movements are emerging in an attempt to challenge those who would *put profits before the planet*.”⁹⁵⁰ Often articulated in the public space through the specular, prognostic slogan of ‘planet over profit’,⁹⁵¹ the frame is still prevalent within organisations/groups that—despite being on a transformational path—by and large represent the strand of environmentalism

⁹⁴⁵ From this perspective, neoliberalism is seen as being responsible for “a massive increase in social and economic inequality, a marked increase in severe deprivation for the poorest nations and peoples of the world, a disastrous global environment, an unstable global economy and an unprecedented bonanza for the wealthy.” Robert McChesney, ‘Introduction’, in *Profit Over People: Neoliberalism and Global Order*, by Noam Chomsky (Seven Stories Press, 1999), 8.

⁹⁴⁶ Noam Chomsky, *Occupy* (Penguin UK, 2012).

⁹⁴⁷ Whilst he does identify a POP frame, Pellow essentially points to a similar observation in his analysis of the “Political Economic Frame in Environmentalist Discourse” David N. Pellow, ‘Framing Emerging Environmental Movement Tactics: Mobilizing Consensus, Demobilizing Conflict’, *Sociological Forum* 14, no. 4 (1 December 1999): 660; 666, doi:10.1023/A:1021604104463.

⁹⁴⁸ Christopher Wright and Daniel Nyberg, *Climate Change, Capitalism, and Corporations* (Cambridge University Press, 2015), 26.

⁹⁴⁹ Pellow, ‘Framing Emerging Environmental Movement Tactics’, 660; 667.

⁹⁵⁰ Leonard and Kedzior, ‘Introduction’, xii. Italics mine.

⁹⁵¹ For examples of images of protesters displaying the slogan (and cognates) see: ‘European Parliament Continues Dangerous Push to Fast-Track CETA’, *Friends of the Earth Europe*, accessed 10 July 2017, <http://www.foeeurope.org/European-Parliament-continues-dangerous-push-to-fast-track-CETA/>; ‘Green Climate Fund: Where Big Banks Profit Again from Crisis They Helped Create’, *Common Dreams*, accessed 10 July 2017, <https://www.commondreams.org/news/2016/03/07/green-climate-fund-where-big-banks-profit-again-crisis-they-helped-create/>; ‘Earth Day to May Day’, *Global Climate Convergence*, accessed 10 July 2017, <http://globalclimateconvergence.org/>.

that has become dominant since the 1970s.⁹⁵² A case in point is represented by Greenpeace: whilst stressing that “well in its fifth decade of existence, Greenpeace continues to reinvent itself,” the organisation remains mainly monothematic in its focus on ‘the planet’, and it articulates the PLANET frame in key discursive moments related to its identity.⁹⁵³

Notably, the transformational path alluded to by Greenpeace refers to the evolution of the environmental movement in parallel to other key movements of the 2000s (such as the GJ and OWS), which has progressively led to the development of the PROFIT OVER PEOPLE & PLANET and the PROFIT OVER PEOPLE, PLANET & PEACE frames.

7.1.1.3. *The PROFIT OVER PEOPLE & PLANET and the PROFIT OVER PEOPLE, PLANET & PEACE frames*

Particularly in the 2010s, “the environmental movement has changed” by increasingly moving away from the narrow focus on ‘the planet’ conveyed by the PLANET frame, and by progressively incorporating more attention to the social dimension of injustice suffered by “frontline and indigenous groups quietly fighting power plants, polluters, or land appropriators in their own communities.”⁹⁵⁴ Partly influenced by the PEOPLE frame of contemporary influential movements such as GJM and OWS, the environmental movement has therefore conducted a process of “frame extension”:⁹⁵⁵ the traditionally monodimensional focus of the PLANET frame has often been extended to incorporate an additional social dimension through the PROFIT OVER PEOPLE & PLANET (POPP) frame. Often articulated through the specular prognostic slogan ‘people and planet over profit’, the POPP frame appears in popular discourse on a range of platforms—from the title of rallies/marches that bring together consumer and environmental organisations

⁹⁵² Christopher Rootes, ‘Environmental Movements’, in *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, ed. David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi (John Wiley & Sons, 2008), 613; 615.

⁹⁵³ Like in the ‘About’ section of its website, where it states: “We exist to expose environmental criminals, and to challenge government and corporations when they fail to live up to their mandate to safeguard our environment and our future.” ‘About Greenpeace’, *Greenpeace International*, accessed 10 July 2017, <http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/about/>.

⁹⁵⁴ Emma Foehringer Merchant, ‘How the Environmental Movement Has Changed’, *New Republic*, 30 November 2015, <https://newrepublic.com/article/124647/environmental-movement-changed>.

⁹⁵⁵ In the words of Snow and Benfor, “frame extension entails depicting an SMO’s [social movement organisation] interests and frame(s) as extending beyond its primary interests to include issues and concerns that are presumed to be of importance to potential adherents.” Robert D Benford and David A Snow, ‘Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment’, *Annual review of sociology* 26 (2000): 625.

with rights and democracy groups,⁹⁵⁶ to news headlines that highlight the potential of “what may seem like an unlikely alliance” between environmentalist and labour groups.⁹⁵⁷ A case in point of the adoption of the POPP frame by environmentalist groups is represented by the Rainforest Action Network, which explicitly conveys it in the articulation of its vision.⁹⁵⁸

On the other hand, contemporary movements that have originally mainly incorporated a PEOPLE frame have also increasingly moved towards its extension into the POPP frame. For example, whilst OWS’s original Declaration adopted a dominant PEOPLE frame and largely overlooked the planet, a resolution passed in January 2012 signalled the first steps of the evolution of the movement towards a convergence between the original focus on the socio-economic impact of neoliberalism with a growing concern about climate change and environmental devastation. Calling for “connecting the dots between the 1% and the destruction of the planet,” the resolution incorporated the POPP frame within the OWS by highlighting that “the destruction of the climate and environment is an integral part of the neoliberal world order. The same corporations, banks and financial institutions that destroyed the economy are destroying the global environment.”⁹⁵⁹ From this perspective, environmentalist-oriented groups within the OWS (such as 99forEarth) have incorporated the POPP frame in an attempt to initiate “a new stage in the Occupy movement—joining forces with the grassroots environmental movement and placing the

⁹⁵⁶ For example, the 2016 ‘People and the Planet over Profit’ march and rally was organised on what is now commonly known as Indigenous People’s Day (formerly Columbus Day) (October 10th) to rally in solidarity with the Standing Rock Sioux tribe in their struggle against the development of new fossil fuel infrastructure (the Dakota Access Pipeline) Elise Greaves, ‘People and the Planet Over Profit Rally’, *Rights and Democracy VT*, accessed 10 July 2017, <http://www.radvt.org/oct10>; Emma Schoenberg, ‘Standing in Solidarity’, *Vermont Public Interest Research Group*, 7 October 2016, http://www.vpirg.org/news/solidarity_standing_rock/.

⁹⁵⁷ ‘In Stand for People and Planet Over Profit, Green Groups Back Oil Worker Strike’, *Common Dreams*, 3 February 2015, <https://www.commondreams.org/news/2015/02/03/stand-people-and-planet-over-profit-green-groups-back-oil-worker-strike>.

⁹⁵⁸ “FIGHTING FOR PEOPLE AND PLANET. RAN envisions a world where each generation sustains increasingly healthy forests, where the rights of all communities are respected, and where corporate profits never come at the expense of people or the planet.” ‘RAN’s Mission and Values’, Rainforest Action Network, accessed 10 July 2017, https://www.ran.org/mission_and_values_old. Notably, the POPP frame is also prominent in RAN’s latest publication: ‘Profits Over People and Planet Not “Performance with Purpose”. Exposing Pepsico’s Real Agenda’ (Rainforest Action Network, April 2017), https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/rainforestactionnetwork/pages/17708/attachments/original/1493246815/RAN_PepsiCo_Profits_Over_People_Planet.pdf?1493246815.

⁹⁵⁹ Jeremy Brecher, ‘Occupy Climate Change’, *The Nation*, 14 March 2012, <https://www.thenation.com/article/occupy-climate-change/>.

climate crisis at the forefront of the global social movement,”⁹⁶⁰ these groups have attempted to re-brand OWS around ideas such as Occupy Earth⁹⁶¹ and Occupy Climate Change.⁹⁶²

Additionally, the POPP frame has also been incorporated by multidimensional organisations that do not position themselves mainly as ‘environmentalist’. An apt example of this type is represented by the “largest student network in Britain campaigning to end world poverty, defend human rights and protect the environment,” which incorporates the POPP frame in its very name: “people & planet.”⁹⁶³ Notably, this organisation shares a number of fundamental characteristics with MADE, such as its framing of the Self through a MOVEMENT frame and its focus on training young people to become agents of change⁹⁶⁴—an overlap that highlights how the POPP frame seems to have gained particular resonance within the student activist scene in the UK in recent years.

Finally, a very recent and more far-fetched extension of the POPP frame is represented by the PROFIT OVER PEOPLE, PLANET & PEACE frame (henceforth, POPPP). Articulated through the specular, prognostic slogan: ‘people, planet, and peace over profit’, the POPPP frame has been adopted by groups that emphasise their intention to bring together the social and environmental dimensions of movements that traditionally have operated in relatively separated spheres. This is well epitomised by the very name of one of these groups, the Global Climate Convergence, which aims “to harness the transformative power we already possess as a thousand separate movements springing up across the planet”⁹⁶⁵ with the intent to form an “international

⁹⁶⁰ Shepherd Bliss, ‘Occupy Earth: State Of The Environment Fundamentally Linked to Economic Injustice’, *Huffington Post*, 21 March 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/shepherd-bliss/occupy-earth_1_b_1371231.html.

⁹⁶¹ Chip Ward, ‘From Occupy Wall Street to Occupy Earth’, *Grist*, 28 October 2011, <http://grist.org/pollution/2011-10-27-from-occupy-wall-street-to-occupy-earth/>; Bliss, ‘Occupy Earth’.

⁹⁶² Brecher, ‘Occupy Climate Change’; Vries-Jordan, ‘The Global Justice Movement and Occupy Wall Street’, 192.

⁹⁶³ ‘History’, *People & Planet*, 31 May 2016, <https://peopleandplanet.org/about/history>.

⁹⁶⁴ “We’re a student-led movement that empowers young people with the skills, confidence and knowledge they need to make change happen, at home and globally.” Ibid.

⁹⁶⁵ ‘Our Story’, *Global Climate Convergence*, accessed 10 July 2017, <http://globalclimateconvergence.org/our-story/>. Significantly, the group was started in 2014 as a mobilising effort symbolically running from the day that marks the anniversary of the birth of the modern environmental movement in 1970 (i.e. Earth Day) to day that best symbolises historical struggles of the labour movement (i.e. the International Workers’ Day of May Day).

movement for *People, Planet, and Peace Over Profit*.⁹⁶⁶ Additionally, the POPPP frame has been recently amplified by one of the most distinct forms of institutionalised environmentalism⁹⁶⁷—the Green Party—as the central frame of the manifesto of the Green candidate for the US 2016 presidential elections, Jill Stein.⁹⁶⁸

7.1.1.4. The PROFIT & PEOPLE & PLANET frame

Finally, it is important to note that a strand of the environmentalist movement has evolved since the 1990s into a rather opposite direction from that described earlier, towards a “sophisticated balance between conflict and collaboration”⁹⁶⁹ with the very corporate world that is identified as the enemy by the POPP and POPPP frames. The more dramatic example of this phenomenon is represented by the “corporate environmentalism”⁹⁷⁰ embedded in much of the Corporate Social Responsibility movement (CSR)—i.e. the increasingly popular trend among business organisations to adopt a “verifiable commitment to operating in an economically, socially and environmentally sustainable manner that is transparent and increasingly satisfying to its stakeholders.”⁹⁷¹

Emerged in the 1990s as corporations and investors attempted to meet a growing demand for socially and environmentally sustainable products by “socially conscious consumers,”⁹⁷² by the late 1990s the CSR gained momentum alongside the “Triple Bottom Line” theory (TBL), with the two terms almost becoming synonymous.⁹⁷³ By focusing on “corporations not just on the economic

⁹⁶⁶ ‘LIBERTY TREE: Act in Solidarity for People and Planet - Earth Day to May Day’, *Global Climate Convergence*, accessed 10 July 2017, <http://globalclimateconvergence.org/2017/03/liberty-tree-act-in-solidarity-for-people-and-planet-earth-day-to-may-day/>. Italics mine.

⁹⁶⁷ Rootes, ‘Environmental Movements’, 623.

⁹⁶⁸ “My Power to the People Plan creates deep system change, moving from the greed and exploitation of corporate capitalism to a human-centered economy that puts people, planet and peace over profit.” Jill Stein, ‘Power to the People Plan’, *Jill Stein 2016*, accessed 10 July 2017, <http://www.jill2016.com/plan>.

⁹⁶⁹ Pellow, ‘Framing Emerging Environmental Movement Tactics’, 660. This strand positions environmentalists in a way that challenges their traditionally direct and adversarial role, and rather it engages “in collaborative framing with their adversaries” in order to locate activists “at the decision-making table with elites.” (Ibid., 673; 659.)

⁹⁷⁰ Wright and Nyberg, *Climate Change, Capitalism, and Corporations*, 43.

⁹⁷¹ Where “stakeholders include investors, customers, employees, business partners, local communities, the environment and society. Katsoulakos, P et al., ‘An Historic Perspective of the CSR Movement’ (CSRQuest, 26 October 2004), 1, <http://www.csrquest.net/uploadfiles/1D.pdf>.

⁹⁷² Ellis Jones, ‘Social Responsibility Activism: Why Individuals Are Changing Their Lifestyles to Change the World’ (PhD Thesis, 2002), 51.

⁹⁷³ Wayne Norman and Chris MacDonald, ‘Getting to the Bottom of “Triple Bottom Line”’, *Business Ethics Quarterly* 14, no. 2 (April 2004): 247, doi:10.5840/beq200414211.

value that they add, but also on the environmental and social value that they add—or destroy,”⁹⁷⁴ the TBL promoted the idea that business activity can simultaneously deliver economic, social and environmental benefits. Through the TBL, the CSR thus aimed to “legitimise profit-seeking corporate behaviour in response to environmental [and social] criticism,” by erasing the conflictual dimension between neoliberal economy on the one hand, and social justice and the protection of the environment, on the other.⁹⁷⁵ Projecting a possible win-win relationship between corporate interest, people, and the planet,⁹⁷⁶ the CSR engaged in a process of “frame transformation”⁹⁷⁷ (or, as Wright and Nyberg put it: “compromise”⁹⁷⁸): by attempting to harmonise the three Ps of the POPP frame (profit, people and planet), the CSR removed the adversarial dimension embedded in the POPP frame’s dichotomy between PROFIT (on the one hand) and PEOPLE & PLANET (on the other), thus transforming it in a new, non-contentious frame: the PROFIT & PEOPLE & PLANET frame (henceforth, PPP).⁹⁷⁹

To conclude, the foregoing original analysis of the POPP frame and its cognates highlights two important observations to bear in mind to better contextualise MADE’s discourse. Firstly, all the movements and organisations that incorporate the PEOPLE, the PLANET, the POPP or the POPPP frames not only share a set of core ‘progressive values’, but also: i) incorporate features of traditional social movements, such as a focus on collective, often contentious action; and ii) adopt mainly a structural keying of the respective frames, which seeks systemic change by directly challenging corporate power and institutions. Secondly, the movements and organisations that incorporate the noncontentious PPP frame (i.e. corporate environmentalism and CSR) distinguish themselves by adopting a “no enemy” approach that pursue change within (rather than against) ‘the

⁹⁷⁴ John Elkington, ‘Enter the Triple Bottom Line’, in *The Triple Bottom Line: Does It All Add Up? Does It All Add Up? - Assessing the Sustainability of Business and CSR*, ed. Adrian Henriques and Julie Richardson (London ; Sterling, VA: Routledge, 2004), 3.

⁹⁷⁵ Wright and Nyberg, *Climate Change, Capitalism, and Corporations*, 43.

⁹⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷⁷ Snow and Benford use the expression “frame transformation” to refer to the fame alignment process of “changing old understandings and meanings and/or generating new ones.” Benford and Snow, ‘Framing Processes and Social Movements’, 625.

⁹⁷⁸ Wright and Nyberg, *Climate Change, Capitalism, and Corporations*, 99.

⁹⁷⁹ The mainstreaming of the noncontentious PPP frame within CSR discourse is clearly epitomised by the very title of a recent book on this subject: *People, Planet and Profit: Socio-Economic Perspectives of CSR*. Samuel O. Idowu, Abubakar S. Kasum, and Asli Yüksel Mermod, eds., *People, Planet and Profit: Socio-Economic Perspectives of CSR* (Routledge, 2016).

system', through a process of gradual reform and compromise with corporations and institutions that are usually seen as adversaries by the rest of movements discussed here.⁹⁸⁰

I will elaborate in the conclusions of this chapter how these observations inform my interpretation of MADE. In the next two sections I explore how MADE's RR campaign conveyed a POPP frame through both a (secondary) structural keying and a (dominant) lifestyle keying.

7.1.2. The 'structural' keying of the POPP frame

Within the RR campaign, the POPP frame is evoked only in few instances through what I call a 'structural' keying. One of the clearest examples of this type of keying is offered by the blog that launched the RR in 2013.⁹⁸¹ Despite the concluding lines of this passage explicitly situate the onus of change on individuals ("we're asking *you* to start a revolution *in yourself* and challenge the way that *you* eat, dress and live"), the text preceding the very call for a 'revolution' ("We think it's time for another revolution") does, indeed, convey a structural dimension of the POPP frame. This is because the injustice characterising today's society (which is deemed to be "not far away" from a 7th century Arabian "society where slavery, sexism, corruption and exploitation were the daily norm!") is seen as the fruit of a 'system' where the status quo profits from unjust policies and practices ("the wealthy getting richer with big bonuses and under-the-table deals") at the expenses of people and the planet ("while the poor struggle for survival and the planet bears the cost.")

Among the posts uploaded on Facebook during the campaign, this keying of the POPP frame is sometimes accompanied by a specific attribution of responsibilities, whether explicitly or implicitly. For example, the RR explicitly identifies three 'institutional' actors (the multinational corporations Gap, Asda and Topshop) as culpable of putting PROFIT OVER PEOPLE (rather than, as MADE puts it, putting "people before profit") by virtue of their refusal to sign up to a

⁹⁸⁰ Jones, 'Social Responsibility Activism', 51–52.

⁹⁸¹ Which I quote extensively in appendix A, extract 1.

specific policy framework⁹⁸² designed to protect workers' rights.⁹⁸³ Additionally, the RR also implicitly denounces the same actors by bringing to the forefront the injustice suffered by "the exploited workers in Bangladesh."⁹⁸⁴

In other occasions, the structural keying of the POPP frame is conveyed by a more general moral condemnation ("What an injustice!") of 'the system', rather than of specific actors. This is the case, for example, for the injustice suffered by "the world's poorest countries" as the 'victims' of a system where the richest countries produce 99% of the carbon emissions causing the climate-related disasters that affect countries in the Global South.⁹⁸⁵

Additional prompts to a structural keying can, indeed, be found in other moments of the RR—hence highlighting its resonance with contemporary movements that adopt the POPP frame. However, these are often quite subtle, and dispersed within a context that prioritises the lifestyle keying. Wherever relevant, I will highlight these occurrences in the following section.

7.1.3. The 'lifestyle' keying of the POPP frame

Within the RR, the dominant 'lifestyle' keying of the POPP frame is articulated by conceptualising injustice as the fruit of selfish individual choices in different aspects of everyday life.

Injustice is represented by MADE as the individual act of "supporting oppression" through consumer choices ("our purchased items") that are judged to be "wrong" when they do not comply with what is projected as a "more islamically ethical" approach to consumerism—that is, one that sees individual Muslims as critical consumers ("through your consumer choices") who are demanded by their very faith to promote fair-trade, reduce consumption and waste, and support the economy of oppressed people.⁹⁸⁶ From this perspective, adopting consumer

⁹⁸² The "Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh." This is a five year independent, legally binding agreement between global brands and retailers and trade unions designed to build a safe and healthy garment industry in Bangladesh. This was developed in 2013 in the immediate aftermath of the Rana Plaza building collapse that led to the death of more than 1100 people and injured more than 2000. Notably, in 2013 MADE launched a campaign (entitled Every Garment has a Name) that exhorted British Muslims to sign a petition calling retailers Gap, Asda and Topshop to sign up to the agreement. 'About the Accord', *The Bangladesh Accord*, accessed 10 July 2017, <http://bangladeshaccord.org/about/>; 'Every Garment Has a Name', *MADE*, accessed 23 July 2016, <http://www.made.ngo/what-we-do/past-projects/item/every-garment-has-a-name>.

⁹⁸³ Appendix A, extracts 2 and 3.

⁹⁸⁴ Appendix A, extract 4.

⁹⁸⁵ Appendix A, extract 5.

⁹⁸⁶ Appendix A, extract 6.

choices that are deemed to be more aligned to Islamic ethics represents a way of confronting injustice by “outweigh[ing] the good” against what is perceived to be the current prevailing evil of a profit-driven economy sustained by hyper-consumeristic lifestyles (alluded to by using the Qur’anic reference: “the abundance of evil might impress you”⁹⁸⁷). Further, the good/evil (justice/injustice) dialectic is also used to promote the lifestyle choices at the very centre of the RR as a way of “striving to achieve justice,” and as a step towards the good (“much good has been achieved”) in the ‘fight’ against the injustices (“these wrongs”) identified by the campaign.⁹⁸⁸

Notably, the very subtitle of the 2013 edition of the RR (“Eat. Wear. Be. Change”) highlights how MADE identifies two main areas of everyday life where individual choices may (in more or less conscious ways) support injustice: eating (/drinking) (“Eat”), and clothing (“Wear”).⁹⁸⁹ In light of their significance, I will discuss each of these two areas individually in the following two subsections.

7.1.3.1. “Eat” (/drink)

With regards to food, the RR articulates a lifestyle keying of the POPP frame by conceptualising injustice as the result of individual daily choices about *what* and *how* to eat.

As far as the ‘what to eat’ choice is concerned, injustice consists in bringing harm to: i) people, through the consumption of un-fairly traded products; and ii) animals, through the consumption of cruelty-laden, mass-produced goods.

The focus on PEOPLE is particularly clear when the RR touches upon the ‘Palestinian issue’. Notably, here injustice is not framed mainly through a structural keying that focuses on the political-legal dimension of the issue (only alluded to by the reference to “illegal Israeli settlements”).⁹⁹⁰ Rather, injustice is projected mainly through the prisms of trade by emphasising Islam’s focus on trade justice. As both a consequence and a manifestation of the identification of

⁹⁸⁷ Appendix A, extract 6.

⁹⁸⁸ Appendix A, extract 7.

⁹⁸⁹ Later in this chapter (in my discussion of the RR campaign’s use of a CHANGE YOURSELF TO CHANGE THE WORLD frame) I will highlight how, in reality, MADE exhorts its audience to take action on an even wider range of life areas.

⁹⁹⁰ Notably, the eclipsing of the political-legal dimension of the Palestinian issue mirrors the secondary role played by the structural keying of the POPP frame, overall. However, the reference to the illegality of Israeli settlements in Palestinian territories is significant in indicating the presence (however secondary) of this very keying.

injustice within the realm of trade (rather than politics), the lifestyle keying of the POPP frame emphasises the culpability of a “shocking number of Muslims” who—whether because of ignorance or laziness—neglect to boycott dates produced in illegal settlements, consequently contributing to perpetuate injustice through their very consumption choices. Significantly, the gravity of injustice is stressed by the very fact that ‘eating’ here refers not just to a general, mundane act, but rather to the specific and religiously laden moment of the daily breaking of the fast (*iftar*) during the holiest month of the Islamic calendar. This aspect is particularly stressed in the very call for action: through the exhortation to “break your fasts ethically,” MADE evokes a sense of injustice by implying that breaking the fast with dates from Israeli settlements is un-ethical (/unjust).⁹⁹¹

On the other hand, the focus on PLANET of the lifestyle keying of the POPP frame is conveyed, for example, by posts where the idea of ‘injustice’ is evoked by alluding to a link between excessive meat consumption (which benefits individual Muslims mainly in term of ‘selfish’ taste) and the “mistreat[ment] and oppress[ion]” of animals, whose “precious” lives are taken without showing the gratitude, appreciation, and respect their sacrifice deserves.⁹⁹²

Interestingly, a sense of injustice is also evoked here by the simultaneous incorporation of a structural keying that puts (some of) the blame on the current system of meat production (“the excessive nature of the intensive farming industry”⁹⁹³). However, like elsewhere, the structural keying is here only secondary, as the main culpable actor identifiable in the call for action is not the farming industry itself, but rather individual Muslims who are considered as taking part to injustice by virtue of their meat over-consumption. Here, too, the gravity of injustice is stressed through a religious lens, through three main arguments. First, MADE draws inspiration from the Qur’anic reference it quotes (6:38) in order to stress the embedded value of both human and animal lives, which are represented through an all-inclusive “we” (“We are all the precious creation of Allah”⁹⁹⁴). From this perspective, injustice is perpetuated by choosing to consume meat through a system of production that does not respect animal lives’ value. Second, MADE highlights not only Muslims’ “responsibility” to be grateful for the

⁹⁹¹ Appendix A, extract 8.

⁹⁹² Appendix A, extract 9.

⁹⁹³ Appendix A, extract 9.

⁹⁹⁴ Appendix A, extract 9.

fact that “certain animals have been made lawful” to eat, but also their duty to fulfil their role as “stewards on the Earth.”⁹⁹⁵ From this angle, injustice is the result of Muslims’ failure to live up to such responsibilities through consumer choices that imply “mistreat[ment] and oppress[ion]”⁹⁹⁶ of animals. Third, injustice stems from a failure to follow the Prophetic example, which is in itself antithetical to meat over-consumption.⁹⁹⁷

Additionally, the RR evokes a sense of injustice not only through an emphasis on consumers’ choices concerning what to eat, but also with regards to *how* to eat. In particular, the themes of extravagance and waste represent the fulcrum of the lifestyle keying of the POPP frame in this regards.

For example, the lifestyle keying of the POPP frame situates culpability for hunger at an individual level (“We have surely brought injustice upon ourselves!”) by alluding to the eating habits in the Global North, which are characterised by massive food waste (“Yet, 1/3 of all food produced is wasted, and most of the food is consumed in the most developed countries”).⁹⁹⁸ Additionally (and similarly to its articulation of the injustice component with regards to what to eat), MADE adopts a religious lens also to stress the severity of eating habits that promote over-consumption and waste. This is done by highlighting how for many Muslims in the Global North⁹⁹⁹ the experience of Ramadan has wrongfully incorporated harmful habits, thus becoming also “a month of gluttony and over-consumption”¹⁰⁰⁰ and “of feasting and over-indulgence.”¹⁰⁰¹ Not only these tendencies go against the Prophetic example of simplicity (“the sunnah of only filling a third of your stomach with food”¹⁰⁰²), but they also represent a form of religiously despicable extravagance (“we mustn’t go overboard even in something that is halal [permissible] for us”¹⁰⁰³) that eventually leads to wastefulness (“we prepare more food than we’ll eat, and the rest is sometimes just thrown away”¹⁰⁰⁴).

⁹⁹⁵ Appendix A, extract 9.

⁹⁹⁶ Appendix A, extract 9.

⁹⁹⁷ Appendix A, extract 9.

⁹⁹⁸ Appendix A, extract 10.

⁹⁹⁹ Which includes rich Muslim countries, such as Qatar, quoted in the second extract.

¹⁰⁰⁰ Appendix A, extract 11.

¹⁰⁰¹ Appendix A, extract 12.

¹⁰⁰² Appendix A, extract 11.

¹⁰⁰³ Appendix A, extract 13.

¹⁰⁰⁴ Appendix A, extract 14.

In addition to its denunciation of the extravagance and wastefulness characterising certain Muslims' eating habits, the RR also incorporates a significant critique of their use of water. For example, the use of bottled water is framed as an 'injustice' not just through the structural keying of the POPP frame ("it takes 3 bottles of water to produce 1 bottle of water (...) This is an unsustainable and harmful way to produce water"¹⁰⁰⁵); but also—and more emphatically—through its lifestyle keying. From this perspective, harm to the planet is brought about not merely by the system of bottled water production, but also by individuals' everyday life choices such as laziness in recycling ("only 25% of plastic bottles being recycled"¹⁰⁰⁶), and over-consumption of plastic bottles even during special religious occasions such as collective iftars and Ramadan nightly prayers ("Most Mosques give plastic water bottles especially during iftar and taraweeh. Why not describe *the harms and how unnecessary they are* and try to set up alternative water options"¹⁰⁰⁷).

Notably, the severity of wasting water is stressed in the RR also from the religiously-oriented question of 'how to use water to perform ritual ablutions?' From this angle, the lifestyle keying of the POPP frame stresses how wasting water during ablutions represents a misuse of "an essential resource for sustaining life,"¹⁰⁰⁸ which Muslims have been specifically instructed not to waste, regardless of how abundant this resource may appear to be ("Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) told us not to use excessive water during wudu even if one was making wudu at the banks of a free flowing stream or river"¹⁰⁰⁹). Consequently, injustice is brought about by individual acts of laziness or carelessness—such as leaving taps running ("make sure taps aren't running"¹⁰¹⁰)—that are not in line with the Prophetic example ("Today we challenge you to make wudu like the Prophet using just a cupful of water!"¹⁰¹¹).

7.1.3.2. "Wear"

The second main area of everyday life identified by the lifestyle keying of the POPP frame as a potential locus for perpetuating injustice is that of clothing.

¹⁰⁰⁵ Appendix A, extract 15.

¹⁰⁰⁶ Appendix A, extract 16.

¹⁰⁰⁷ Appendix A, extract 15.

¹⁰⁰⁸ Appendix A, extract 17.

¹⁰⁰⁹ Appendix A, extract 17.

¹⁰¹⁰ Appendix A, extract 18.

¹⁰¹¹ Appendix A, extract 17.

Within this life-area, choices about what to wear can reflect injustice through four intertwined characteristics of materialistic lifestyles: i) ungratefulness (“Of the biggest *blessings we take for granted*, is the clothing that Allah blesses us with”); ii) over-consumption and wastefulness (“we are so used to buying new clothes for every occasion, and just throwing away what goes ‘out of fashion’”); iii) selfish heedlessness (“not considering the labour behind the label”); and iv) ‘throwaway culture’ (“we can fall into the culture of buying clothes that we wear once, and then never again”).¹⁰¹²

Further (and similarly to what observed about food and water consumption), here, too, the RR stresses the severity of unconsciously supporting injustice specifically on religiously significant moments of life, such as the feast marking the end of Ramadan (*Eid*). In fact, building on the significance of Eid as the end of Ramadan and, consequently, as the end of the RR, MADE quotes a statement about Eid from the prominent 14th century scholar Ibn Rajab to emphasise the ‘religious’ importance of simple and wholesome living (what MADE refers to through the concept of “*tayyib*”¹⁰¹³) not only during the month that epitomises this specific lifestyle, but also beyond it (“Make a commitment to Allah to change one thing in order to live more *tayyib* after Ramadan”).¹⁰¹⁴

Finally, MADE emphasises the religious significance underlying the choice of what to wear also by contraposing the Prophetic injunction to treat workers justly and compensate them fairly against the reality of today’s exploitative system of production-consumption (“Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) said: When you hire, compensate the workers and treat them fairly. Unfortunately we see that this is not the case today”).¹⁰¹⁵ Whilst this implies a degree of structural keying of the POPP frame, the lifestyle keying dominates by emphasising the selfish interest of (Muslim) consumers in the Global North who are (consciously or

¹⁰¹² Appendix A, extract 19.

¹⁰¹³ The concept of *tayyib* is broadly translated in English as ‘good and wholesome’. This derives from the Qur’anic verse 7:160, which is often translated in English as: “Eat from the good things [*tayyibat*] with which We have provided you.” Notably, this is the precisely the verse from which MADE derived one of its campaigns’ title, Eat of the Good Things, as mentioned in chapter 5. I will come back to MADE’s campaign in chapter 9. More generally, the idea of *tayyib* refers to a range of meanings related to “good, agreeable, palatable, pleasant, pleasing, delightful, delicious, sweet, embalmed, perfumed and soothing to one’s mind” Sazelin Arif and Ridzwan Ahmad, ‘Food Quality Standards in Developing Quality Human Capital: An Islamic Perspective’, *African Journal of Business Management* 5, no. 31 (7 December 2011): 12244, doi:10.5897/AJBM10.1692.

¹⁰¹⁴ Appendix A, extract 20.

¹⁰¹⁵ Appendix A, extract 21.

unconsciously) complicit in bringing harm to people by virtue of their consumer choices (“the risks that workers in many developing countries face while manufacturing items that will be used by customers in the West”;¹⁰¹⁶ “Those who died were making clothes for retailers on our high street”¹⁰¹⁷).

In conclusion, this section highlighted how the RR conveyed the POPP injustice-type frame mainly through a lifestyle keying, and only secondarily through a structural keying. Notably, these keyings resonate in their own ways with those contemporary movements/subcultures that have adopted the POPP frame or one of its cognates (outlined in section 7.1.1), and are responsible for activating specific agency-type frames.

On the one hand, the structural keying is predominant among those movements that have adopted either: i) the monodimensional versions of the POPP frame—i.e. the PEOPLE (e.g. GJM; OWS) or the PLANET (e.g. traditional environmentalism) frames; ii) the POPP frame itself (e.g. the Rainforest Action Network; people & planet; Occupy Earth); iii) extensions of the POPP frame—i.e. the POPPP frame (e.g. Global Climate Convergence; the Green party). The dominance of the structural keying is conducive to activate an agency-type frame that has been called the “CHANGE THE SYSTEM” frame, where “effort is directed toward shifting power structures and reforming institutions.”¹⁰¹⁸

On the other hand, the lifestyle keying is predominant among those movements/subcultures that have adopted a transformed, non-adversarial version of the POPP frame: the PPP frame (e.g. corporate environmentalism, CSR). The dominance of the lifestyle keying is conducive to convey a sense of agency through what have been called the “INDIVIDUAL CONCERN” and the “SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY” frames,¹⁰¹⁹ which respectively focus “on altering individual decisions through appeals to core concerns of individuals,” and on calling “upon people to recognise their role in making society better.”¹⁰²⁰

In the following section I will highlight how the foregoing has two main implications for the RR’s articulation of its agency-type frame. First, given the secondary role

¹⁰¹⁶ Appendix A, extract 21.

¹⁰¹⁷ Appendix A, extract 22.

¹⁰¹⁸ Darnton, Andrew and Martin Kirk, ‘Finding Frames: New Ways to Engage the UK Public in Global Poverty’ (London: Bond, 2011), 116.

¹⁰¹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰²⁰ Ibid., 117.

played by the structural keying in the articulation of the injustice-type frame, the related CHANGE THE SYSTEM agency-type frame occupies only a very marginal position within the RR's articulation of agency. Second, the dominance of the lifestyle keying leads the RR to bring together the INDIVIDUAL CONCERN and the SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY frames in what I call the CHANGE YOURSELF TO CHANGE THE WORLD agency-type frame. Additionally, I will outline how, in turn, this frame closely aligns MADE's mobilising efforts with the lifestyle movement loosely known as Social Responsibility movement.

7.2. Framing agency: the CHANGE YOURSELF TO CHANGE THE WORLD frame

I have mentioned in my analysis of MADE's framing of the Self through the MOVEMENT frame (in chapter 5) that the organisation generally articulates a consciousness of agency through what I have called the CHANGE YOURSELF TO CHANGE THE WORLD frame (henceforth, CYCW). This assumes individuals (rather than groups or organised systems) as being simultaneously both direct agents and loci of change. In this section I discuss more in detail this agency-type frame and introduce how it is peculiar to a specific type of lifestyle movement: the Social Responsibility movement.

I derive the name of the CYCW frame directly from MADE's own discourse: not only from the RR itself (whose slogan in 2014 was "Take action. *Change yourself*,"¹⁰²¹ as I will discuss in section 7.2.3); but also, and perhaps most significantly, from the last line of the key discursive moment represented by the "Intro to MADE" video (which I already introduced in chapter 5 and will discuss again the conclusions), which reads:

Join the movement: *change yourself, to change the world* for a better future.¹⁰²²

Additionally, despite the foregoing highlights how the CYCW frame is rooted within MADE's own discourse, it is also important to note that this frame is neither original nor unique to MADE. Popularised by the widely known motto "be the

¹⁰²¹ MADE. Facebook post. 10 July 2014. [¹⁰²² Made In Europe, *Intro to MADE*.](https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10152108831877127/?type=3&theater. <u>mine.</u> <i>Italics</i></p></div><div data-bbox=)

change you want to see in the world,”¹⁰²³ the CYCW frame has been adopted and propagated by a number of contemporary social change-oriented “lifestyle movements” that are fluidly located at the intersections between “private action and movement participation, personal change and social change, and personal identity and collective identity.”¹⁰²⁴ Based on the assumption that “everyday acts by citizens have the power to potentially restructure society,”¹⁰²⁵ organisations and groups adopting the CYCW frame “*consciously and actively promote a lifestyle, or way of life, as their primary means to foster social change.*”¹⁰²⁶ These lifestyle movements have therefore incorporated the CYCW frame to articulate agency as “a politics of prefiguration (...) which aims to build achievable future aspirations in the present through an accumulation of small changes.”¹⁰²⁷ Consequently, the CYCW frame differentiates lifestyle movements from traditional social movements by conceptualising agency not as collective action in the realm of politics, but rather as “individualized collective action” in the realm of “subpolitics”—i.e. “politics emerging in places other than formal politics.”¹⁰²⁸ From this perspective, the CYCW frames brings together the INDIVIDUAL CONCERN and SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY frames (which I mentioned in the conclusion of the former section) by simultaneously postulating that: i) individuals should “consider the impacts that their daily choices have on their social world” (i.e. INDIVIDUAL CONCERN); and ii) that they should “subjectively understand their choices as part of larger efforts toward social change” (i.e. SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY).¹⁰²⁹

¹⁰²³ Whilst this quotation has been popularly attributed to Ghandi, the correctness of such an attribution has been contested, as there does not seem to be reliable documentary evidence for the quotation but only for the similar remark: “If we could change ourselves, the tendencies in the world would also change. As a man changes his own nature, so does the attitude of the world change towards him. ... We need not wait to see what others do.” Brian Morton, ‘Falsar Words Were Never Spoken’, *The New York Times*, 29 August 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/30/opinion/falsar-words-were-never-spoken.html>.

¹⁰²⁴ Ross Haenfler, Brett Johnson, and Ellis Jones, ‘Lifestyle Movements: Exploring the Intersection of Lifestyle and Social Movements’, *Social Movement Studies* 11, no. 1 (1 January 2012): 2, doi:10.1080/14742837.2012.640535.

¹⁰²⁵ Michele Micheletti, *Political Virtue and Shopping: Individuals, Consumerism, and Collective Action* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 29–30.

¹⁰²⁶ Haenfler, Johnson, and Jones, ‘Lifestyle Movements’, 2.

¹⁰²⁷ Paul Chatterton, ‘Do It Yourself: A Politics for Changing Our World’, in *The Rise and Fall of Neoliberalism: The Collapse of an Economic Order?*, ed. Kean Birch and Vlad Mykhnenko, 1 edition (London ; New York : New York: Zed Books Ltd., 2010), 198.

¹⁰²⁸ Micheletti, *Political Virtue and Shopping*, 24; 29.

¹⁰²⁹ Haenfler, Johnson, and Jones, ‘Lifestyle Movements’, 14–15.

Notably, the act of “self-assertive responsibility-taking”¹⁰³⁰ at the centre of the CYCW frame can be understood as a prognostic counterpart of the PROFIT OVER PEOPLE & PLANET frame insofar the process of individual change (CHANGE YOURSELF) is meant to lead individuals, first, and societies, later, to prioritise people and the planet over profit or self-interest (CHANGE THE WORLD). Importantly, the individual dimension of the CYCW frame (CHANGE YOURSELF) also implies that the responsibility for problem-solving (CHANGE THE WORLD) is neither delegated to institutional actors (e.g. political parties, unions, or NGOs), nor located within institutional spheres of action (e.g. the ballot box, the negotiation table, or field projects). Rather, responsibility and action are taken on by individuals who conceptualise themselves as “everyday-makers” – i.e. people who aim to ‘make the world a better place’ through small actions in “their everyday, individual-oriented life arena that cuts across the public and the private spheres.”¹⁰³¹

In summary, then, the CYCW frame evokes a sense of agency through a focus on ‘individualised collective action’ that implies: i) focusing on individuals in relative isolation from one another, rather than on groups, as the fundamental agents of change (‘individualised’); ii) taking actions in one’s everyday life to help bringing about the change envisioned for society at large (‘action’); iii) exercising a conscious effort to promote such actions within society, in the hope that these will be adopted by large group of individuals (‘collective’).¹⁰³²

Whilst the CYCW frame has been adopted to some degree by a wide range of contemporary lifestyle movements, the most comprehensive articulation of this frame seems to be represented by what has been loosely defined as the Social Responsibility movement¹⁰³³ (henceforth, SRM¹⁰³⁴). Given that the SRM can be plausibly understood as the archetype of the lifestyle movements adopting the CYCW, I will use some of its main characteristics as a means to structure my

¹⁰³⁰ Micheletti, *Political Virtue and Shopping*, 25.

¹⁰³¹ *Ibid.*, 34; 29.

¹⁰³² Jones, ‘Social Responsibility Activism’, 2; 92.

¹⁰³³ From this perspective, it is not surprising that the first detailed study on this phenomenon (from which this section mainly draws from) incorporates the CYCW frame in its very title: “Social Responsibility Activism: Why Individuals Are Changing Their Lifestyles To Change The World.” *Ibid.*, title. Notably, whilst Jones’ study revealed that the majority of SR activists surveyed (77% of respondents) considered themselves part of a ‘social responsibility movement,’ this specific expression is still quite rarely mentioned in social movement literature. Haenfler, Johnson, and Jones, ‘Lifestyle Movements’, 16 (note 2).

¹⁰³⁴ Whenever I will refer to activism stemming from the SRM, I will use the expression ‘SR activism’.

analysis of this frame within MADE's RR campaign. Despite a comprehensive discussion of the SRM is beyond the scope of this research, the next section outlines its main characteristics in order to clarify its connection with the CYCW frame and better contextualise my analysis of the RR.

7.2.1. The CYCW frame and the Social Responsibility movement

The SRM represents a contemporary “phenomenon that involves millions of individuals, in relative isolation from one another, taking actions in their everyday lives to help bring about what they see as a more socially (and environmentally) responsible world.”¹⁰³⁵ The roots of the SRM can be located with the rise of movements and activist subcultures in the late 1960s, which the SRM shares a number of characteristics with (such as a desire for positive social change, values and core issues).¹⁰³⁶ Notably, however, the SRM differs from these movements/activist subcultures in at least two major ways.

On the one hand, a key difference between the SRM and more conventional social movements is represented by the fact that “instead of pursuing social change at a political level (...) [the SRM] encourages its participants to take actions in various areas of their everyday lives (life-areas).”¹⁰³⁷ Promoting “environmental and social sustainability through ethical consumption (e.g., fair trade) and daily habits,”¹⁰³⁸ the SRM consists of “people acting individually in an effort to bring about social change around a set of issues (...) by taking a range non-confrontational, lifestyle actions.”¹⁰³⁹ In other words, what mainly distinguishes the SRM from conventional social movements is its very understanding of agency through the CYCW frame: since “individuals, rather than groups are seen as the fundamental agents of change,” it follows that “everyday life becomes the domain where social change is brought about rather than the political arena.”¹⁰⁴⁰ Consequently, a lifestyle movement like the SRM can be conceptualised as promoting a sort of “micro-activism” where “micro-actions can produce significant impacts at the macro-level” in light of the assumption that “it

¹⁰³⁵ Jones, ‘Social Responsibility Activism’, 3.

¹⁰³⁶ Ibid., 48–59.

¹⁰³⁷ Ibid., 116.

¹⁰³⁸ Haenfler, Johnson, and Jones, ‘Lifestyle Movements’, 5.

¹⁰³⁹ Jones, ‘Social Responsibility Activism’, 156.

¹⁰⁴⁰ Ibid., 92.

is the cumulative and collective impact of individual actions that creates social change.”¹⁰⁴¹

On the other hand, a second key difference between the SRM and other lifestyle movements lies in its comprehensiveness: whilst the latter typically focus on promoting change within just one or few domains of everyday life,¹⁰⁴² the SRM can be conceptualised as representing “the most comprehensive of any lifestyle activism” as it “opens every “life-area” for conscious action by the activist.”¹⁰⁴³

Notably, the foregoing sketch of the SRM also highlights how this lifestyle movement positions itself vis-à-vis those contemporary movements that adopt a POPP frame or its cognates (outlined in section 7.1.1). In fact, these movements can be conceptualised as SRM-related movements insofar they share some characteristics with the SRM but also differ from it in some way.¹⁰⁴⁴

On the one hand, whilst the movements and organisations that incorporate the POPP (and the POPPP) frame share with the SRM a set of core progressive values and the holistic concern for both the social and environmental dimensions of injustice, they also differ insofar they tend to prioritise a ‘structural’ rather than a ‘lifestyle’ keying of the frame. This is because movements that adopt the POPP (or POPPP) frame pursue systemic change by directly challenging corporate power/institutions and adopt a “traditional activism” approach based on “large, well-organized, contentious” public action, whilst the SRM seeks mainly individual change aimed to “slowly reform existing economic and cultural institutions” by mainly adopting an “individual, uncoordinated, non-confrontational, and inclusive” approach.¹⁰⁴⁵

On the other hand, the SRM overlaps with movements that adopt the noncontentious PPP frame (such as the CSR) insofar these adopt a “no enemy” approach for pursuing change and a “willingness to work within the mainstream economic system, directly with businesses and corporations—which are usually

¹⁰⁴¹ Ibid., 171–72.

¹⁰⁴² For example, “the actions of vegetarianism are centered primarily around diet, voluntary simplicity around consumption” Ibid., 97.

¹⁰⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴⁴ Ibid., 49–59.

¹⁰⁴⁵ Ibid., 57–59.

seen [by conventional movements] as enemies rather than potential agents of purposive social change.”¹⁰⁴⁶

I will elaborate in the conclusions of this chapter on how these considerations inform my analysis of MADE. Now, having outlined the main features of the CYCW frame and of the SRM as the lifestyle movement that best epitomises it, I can proceed to discuss how MADE’s RR campaign evoked a CYCW frame by closely mirroring the SRM in terms of: i) the sense of ‘individualised collective action’ it conveyed (7.2.2); ii) the strategies it adopted (7.2.3); and iii) the domains for action/change it identified (7.2.4). In each of the following subsections, I will first briefly outline how the specific dimension under consideration characterises the SRM, and then move on to illustrate how the same dimension was articulated within the RR.

7.2.2. Individualised collective action in the RR campaign

I outlined in the previous section that whilst the CYCW frame adopted by the SRM implies an individualisation of agency, this does not totally jettison the collective dimension of action that characterises more traditional movements. Rather, ‘collectiveness’ is re-conceptualised by the SRM through the concept of ‘individualised collective action’. From this perspective, one of the major goals of lifestyle movements such as the SRM is to prompt a process of ‘micromobilisation’¹⁰⁴⁷ whereby individual change in consciousness leading to personal behavioural change accumulates amongst a large enough number of

¹⁰⁴⁶ Ibid., 51–52. In fact, Jones identifies the CSR as one of the “parent movements” that “arguably had the greatest influence” on the development of the SRM, together with environmentalism. Ibid., 49.

¹⁰⁴⁷ Micromobilisation represents the focus of much social movement literature. The term generally refer to a set of interactive processes distinguishable from macromobilisation processes such as changes in power relationships and opportunity structures. (David A. Snow et al., ‘Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation’, *American Sociological Review* 51, no. 4 (1986): 464, doi:10.2307/2095581.) A recent contribution by Ward (2016), highlights that historically the concept of micromobilisation has been approached in two main ways. One approach focuses on the role that values and beliefs can play in getting people ‘to participate’. This often looks at micromobilisation attempts carried out by organisations or individual through frame alignment processes. A second approach stresses the multi-dimensionality of micromobilisation, emphasising that distinct mechanisms differentiate each stage of the process (e.g. cognitive, affective, and/or structural processes). Ward synthesises these two distinct, yet interrelated approaches and the idea of micromobilisation is used here to refer to such a synthesized conceptualization. Matthew Ward, ‘Rethinking Social Movement Micromobilization: Multi-Stage Theory and the Role of Social Ties’, *Current Sociology* 64, no. 6 (1 October 2016): 853–74, doi:10.1177/0011392116634818.

people to eventually constitute a collective change in consciousness leading to broader cultural and/or structural change.

Indeed, the RR articulates this very understanding of individualised collective action in several occasions.

Drawing from one of the key Qur'anic references (3:104) about the Islamic principle of 'enjoying good and forbidding evil' (*al-amr bi'l-ma'ruf wa'l-nahy 'an al-munkar*), the RR aligns the idea of individualised collective action with the Muslim repertoire of ideas and values.¹⁰⁴⁸ From this perspective, individual action should lead to collective action by virtue of the religious duty to "encourage action by other people."¹⁰⁴⁹ This process of micromobilisation is encouraged by the RR on concentric spheres of influence that radiate from the realm of intimate relationships, passing through professional networks, all the way to the community level ("our family, friends, work colleagues, local leaders"¹⁰⁵⁰). Indeed, the call to become active agents of this process of micromobilisation is embedded in a number of action requests put forward by the RR. In these cases, collectiveness is conveyed by an invitation to prompt a critical consciousness not only at the level of close relationships (by encouraging family members and friends to "pledge" commitment to socio/environmental responsible actions such as "recycling, saving energy" and buying "ethical gifts"¹⁰⁵¹), but also beyond the circle of one's pre-existing social ties (e.g. by "tell[ing] 5 people about the #ramadanrevolution"¹⁰⁵² and by "collect[ing] 50 signatures"¹⁰⁵³ in support of a petition).

From this angle, the necessity to translate personal efforts into collective action is well conveyed by MADE's consciousness that individual action is necessary but not sufficient to effect positive change at the societal level (as conveyed by the expression: "as well as making the change ourselves"¹⁰⁵⁴). Therefore, given that "a more sustainable and just future" can only be built through a collective effort ("Let's together"),¹⁰⁵⁵ MADE stresses that the RR can have a significant

¹⁰⁴⁸ Appendix A, extract 23.

¹⁰⁴⁹ Appendix A, extract 23.

¹⁰⁵⁰ Appendix A, extract 23.

¹⁰⁵¹ Appendix A, extracts 25-27.

¹⁰⁵² Appendix A, extracts 28.

¹⁰⁵³ Appendix A, extracts 29.

¹⁰⁵⁴ Appendix A, extract 23.

¹⁰⁵⁵ Appendix A, extract 24.

impact only if individuals mobilise other people to support its call (“Get 5 friends to be part of the # RAMADANREVOLUTION”¹⁰⁵⁶).

Having highlighted the salience of the idea of individualised collective action within the RR, I proceed in the next two sections to explore quite in detail how the RR mirrored the SRM’s strategies and domains for action.

7.2.3. Strategies of the RR campaign

The CYCW frame characteristic of the SRM implies that three main strategies are adopted to mobilise support: focus on individual action; customised commitment; and a lifestyle-light approach.¹⁰⁵⁷

7.2.3.1. “Focus on individual action”¹⁰⁵⁸

Rather than dedicating efforts in developing and promoting a well-defined ideological system, the SRM offers practical advice on a “variety of practical actions for individuals to take” in their own lives “on a consistent, often daily basis.”¹⁰⁵⁹

Within the RR, this focus on individual action is first and foremost conveyed by the very slogans attached to the campaign in both 2013 and 2014:

Eat. Wear. Be. Change¹⁰⁶⁰

Take action. Change yourself¹⁰⁶¹

In both cases, the slogans represent an explicit invitation to take action at the individual level. In 2013, the individualisation of action is conveyed by its domains: food (“Eat”) and clothing (“Wear”). In both 2013 and 2014, the individual as the main locus of change is clearly emphasised by the second part of each slogan, which explicitly exhorts change at the personal level (“Be. Change”; “Change yourself”). Focus on individual action is also conveyed by the very conceptualisation of the RR as a whole, which was specifically conceived as a

¹⁰⁵⁶ Appendix A, extract 23.

¹⁰⁵⁷ In order to better highlight the overlap between the RR and the SRM, the title and focus of the next three subsections mirror those found under the section “Strategies” in Jones, ‘Social Responsibility Activism’, 92-95.

¹⁰⁵⁸ Ibid., 92.

¹⁰⁵⁹ Ibid., 92-93.

¹⁰⁶⁰ MADE. Facebook post. 10 July 2013. <https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10151442682937127/?type=3&theater>

¹⁰⁶¹ MADE. Facebook post. 10 July 2014. <https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10152108831877127/?type=3&theater>

“daily dose of spiritual reminders” for individuals to reflect upon, and of invitations to practical actions for individuals to take (“30 days of action”)¹⁰⁶² in order to challenge their individual lifestyle (“challenge you the way you eat, dress and live”¹⁰⁶³).

Additionally, given that the SRM aims to prompt the largest number of people to take individual action in the broadest number of life-areas on the most regular basis, two other key strategies of mobilisation are “customised commitment” and a “lifestyle-light approach.”¹⁰⁶⁴

7.2.3.2. “Customised commitment”¹⁰⁶⁵

“Customised commitment” refers to the fact that, in order to get a significant number of people to change everyday actions in a sustainable and durable way, the SRM conveys a sense of agency through the encouragement to take a wide spectrum of actions that are “accessible to people beyond conventional social activism.”¹⁰⁶⁶ In other words, SR activism aims to be accessible to as many people as possible by offering a wide “range of socially responsible options” from which bystanders and adherents can choose from “depending on their personal level of commitment.”¹⁰⁶⁷

Indeed, the RR not only adopts a customised commitment approach by proposing a wide spectrum of actions ranging from ‘clicktivism’¹⁰⁶⁸ (“changing your Facebook cover image”¹⁰⁶⁹) to political lobbying (“write to your local MP to ask them to sign the support ethical fashion petition”¹⁰⁷⁰); it also consciously

¹⁰⁶² Appendix A, extract 30.

¹⁰⁶³ Appendix A, extract 31.

¹⁰⁶⁴ Jones, ‘Social Responsibility Activism’, 93–94.

¹⁰⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 93.

¹⁰⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 94.

¹⁰⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 94–95.

¹⁰⁶⁸ Clicktivism is a combination of terms describing ‘online activism’—i.e. activism that is conducted via the Internet, particularly through social media networks like Twitter and Facebook. Clicktivism involves acts such as: changing a profile picture; clicking the “like” button on Facebook to show support for an organisation or a post; sharing content; signing online petitions. Clicktivism is also known as ‘slacktivism’. This definition takes a critical perspective on clicktivism, framing it as “a lazy or overly convenient alternative to the effort and legitimacy of traditional engagement.” (Max Halupka, ‘Clicktivism: A Systematic Heuristic’, *Policy & Internet* 6, no. 2 (1 June 2014): 119; 116, doi:10.1002/1944-2866.POI355.) A more sympathetic view sees these forms of Internet-mediated activism as “a way of bearing witness to injustice that contributes to collective identity and global awareness.” Bart Cammaerts, ‘Social Media and Activism’, in *The International Encyclopedia of Digital Communication and Society* (John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2015), 1031.

¹⁰⁶⁹ MADE. Facebook post. 10 July 2013. <https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10151442500282127/?type=3&theater>

¹⁰⁷⁰ MADE. Facebook post. 25 July 2013. <https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10151467989352127/?type=3&theater>

communicates this approach by highlighting it in the very first and last posts of the campaign. Here, the exhortation to daily actions and changes is described as an “opportunity to try out new things” that incorporates customisability of individual commitment (“We don’t expect you to do every single one them”) because even “to change one thing” is deemed to be sufficient in order to start living a more wholesome and responsible (“tayyib”) lifestyle.¹⁰⁷¹ From this perspective, the RR represents an invitation that meets individuals where they are at (“to take a small action, make a small change”; “we should all be able to take some of these actions”¹⁰⁷²) in order to attain sustainability beyond the RR (“which of these new ideas we’ll be continuing with post-Ramadan”;¹⁰⁷³ “make a commitment to Allah to change one thing in order to live more tayyib after Ramadan”¹⁰⁷⁴).

Indeed, as I already outlined in chapter 5, the idea of ‘starting small’ plays a key role in MADE’s articulation of agency, particularly in conveying the consciousness of the capacity to effect change (see 5.3.2). Within the RR, this idea is coupled with another key feature associated with SR activism and the CYCW frame: a lifestyle-light approach.

7.2.3.3. *“Lifestyle-light approach”*¹⁰⁷⁵

Stemming from its customisability of commitment, the SRM adopts a “lifestyle-light approach” that does not ask bystanders and adherents to adopt a “*radical* lifestyle change” that may be incompatible with mainstream lifestyle choices.¹⁰⁷⁶ This is because in order to make SR activism “accessible to larger numbers of people and more easily sustained than traditional activism,” the lifestyle change envisioned by the CYCW frame does not invite bystanders and adherents to revolutionise but rather to “alter, [only] in minor ways, daily decisions within the context of their existing lifestyle.”¹⁰⁷⁷ In doing so, the SRM essentially adopts a “reformist approach” to change, whereby adherents “work within existing social

¹⁰⁷¹ Appendix A, extract 33.

¹⁰⁷² Appendix A, extract 32.

¹⁰⁷³ Appendix A, extract 32.

¹⁰⁷⁴ Appendix A, extract 33.

¹⁰⁷⁵ Jones, ‘Social Responsibility Activism’, 94.

¹⁰⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 95. Italics mine.

¹⁰⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 94–96.

structures to reform and reshape, rather than confront and replace, institutions that stand in conflict to the social change sought.”¹⁰⁷⁸

Indeed, despite the idea of ‘revolution’ is central to the RR, the type of actions and changes proposed by it are far from being ‘revolutionary’ in the traditional sense of the word. Additionally, this “lifestyle-light approach” is also explicitly stressed by MADE through an emphasis on the ease of the actions/changes proposed by the RR (“Our aim is to give people simple, practical actions that they can take every single day to have a truly revolutionary Ramadan”;¹⁰⁷⁹ “We have prepared 30 practical actions that every Muslim can do during Ramadan”¹⁰⁸⁰). Finally, the RR also challenges potential feelings of powerlessness precisely by emphasising the value of small actions/changes in the everyday life (“it can overwhelm us that we can’t do the same” “as the big extraordinary things the sahaba [Prophet’s companions] used to do. But it’s also the little things (...) Make those little everyday struggles a little more extraordinary.”¹⁰⁸¹) In turn, this plays an important role in re-conceptualising the idea of ‘revolution’ through the lens of “the revolution of the everyday.”¹⁰⁸² I will elaborate in the conclusions how this reconceptualization contributes to align MADE with wider contemporary activist subcultures.

In summary, this subsection has highlighted how the RR articulated a CYCW agency-type frame by closely mirroring the strategies of action envisioned by the SRM. In the next section I provide an overview of how this overlap is corroborated by the main life-areas identified by the RR as the domains wherein action and change are sought.

7.2.4. Domains of the RR campaign

Research on the SRM has identified a number of domains that seem to represent “focal points for individual change”: food, shopping, home, work, personal

¹⁰⁷⁸ Ibid., 92.

¹⁰⁷⁹ ‘#RamadanRevolution’.

¹⁰⁸⁰ Appendix A, extract 34.

¹⁰⁸¹ Appendix A, extract 35.

¹⁰⁸² Jenny Pickerill and Paul Chatterton, ‘Notes towards Autonomous Geographies: Creation, Resistance and Self-Management as Survival Tactics’, *Progress in Human Geography* 30, no. 6 (1 December 2006): 732; 738, doi:10.1177/0309132506071516.

relationships, community, transportation, travel, media, money and—although to a lesser degree—politics.¹⁰⁸³

Notably, the RR overlaps with the SRM in at least the first seven of these domains. I discuss each of these in the following subsections, moving from the most to the least prominent life-area within the campaign itself. Notably (and somehow unsurprisingly, given MADE’s faith-inspired ethos), what seems to particularly distinguish the RR’s articulation of the CYCW frame in comparison to the SRM is the emergence of a life-area that sets it apart from the “strictly secular”¹⁰⁸⁴ character of the latter—i.e. the area of spiritual life. In fact, this domain is particularly significant not only because it represents something that distinguishes the RR from mainstream SRM, but also because it constitutes the life-area most frequently mentioned, overall. For these reasons, I discuss this specific dimension first and in more detail.

7.2.4.1. *Spiritual life*

The RR encourages at least five types of actions/changes in the realm of spiritual life.

The most abundant type of invitation is represented by an exhortation to counter the materialism and shallowness prevalent in our times by (re)connecting with the spiritual dimension of everyday life.¹⁰⁸⁵ This is done by the RR through an allusion to the Islamic concept of *tafakkur* (from the verb *fakara*, ‘to think’), which refers to the action of reflecting over the creation of Allah and implies a range of meanings such as “to think deeply,” “to contemplate,” “to meditate,” “to immensely think,” and “to deeply reflect.”¹⁰⁸⁶ In all of these posts, a *physical action* aimed at (re)connecting individuals to nature (“plant a seed”; “sit outside”; “go pray outdoors”) is accompanied by the *spiritual action* of *tafakkur* (“marvel at Allah’s creation”; “reflect on Allah’s wondrous creation”; “reflect over Allah’s magnificent creations”).¹⁰⁸⁷ From this perspective, contemplating on the beauty and balance

¹⁰⁸³ Jones, ‘Social Responsibility Activism’, 97. In order to better highlight the overlap between the RR and the SRM, the title and focus of the next subsections mirror those found in Jones, ‘Social Responsibility Activism’, except for section 7.2.4.1.

¹⁰⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 59.

¹⁰⁸⁵ Appendix A, extracts 36-38.

¹⁰⁸⁶ Ibn Manzur quoted in: Noor Shakirah Mat Akhir and Muhammad Azizan Sabjan, ‘Tafakkur as the Spiritual Mechanism for Environment Conservation’, *Journal of Religious & Theological Information* 14, no. 1–2 (3 April 2015): 2, doi:10.1080/10477845.2015.1035195.

¹⁰⁸⁷ Appendix A, extracts 36-38.

of Allah's creation does not represent a mere 'spiritual exercise'. Rather, it involves an active process of moulding the "thinking, emotions, perception, imaginations, and ideas of an individual [in way] that will then influence his behavioral development."¹⁰⁸⁸ In other words, within the domain of spiritual life, the CHANGE YOURSELF part of the CYCW frame means to change oneself from a state of distraction and ingratitude associated with immersion in a materialistic lifestyle, to a state of mindfulness and gratitude stemming from the practice of tafakkur in everyday life. On the other hand, the CHANGE THE WORLD part of the CYCW frame is implied here by the fact that tafakkur represents a way to change one's behaviour toward righteousness—represented, for example, by the adoption of actions aimed at protecting the environment in light of its appreciation as a blessing from the Creator.¹⁰⁸⁹

The second most frequent type of exhortation from the RR within the spiritual life-arena consists in an invitation to read the Qur'an with the intention of deriving lessons implementable in everyday life.¹⁰⁹⁰ Here, MADE alludes to the Islamic concept of *tadabbur*, (derived from the verb *dabbara*: to procure, obtain, get, and secure), which refers to the action of pondering on the contents of the Qur'an and the knowledge derived from its stories.¹⁰⁹¹ In particular, given that *tadabbur* implies a "concentrated and goal-oriented thinking provoked by the challenge to find something new or to solve a difficult problem,"¹⁰⁹² one of the main objectives of this type of activity is to practically implement lessons, rather than just abstractly speculate about them.¹⁰⁹³ From this perspective, the RR invites Muslims to engage with the Qur'an with the twofold goal-oriented purpose of: i) extracting lessons related to today's issues ("read surah al-ma'un which encourages us to advocate on behalf of the poor"; "discuss the many lessons of

¹⁰⁸⁸ Akhir and Sabjan, 'Tafakkur as the Spiritual Mechanism for Environment Conservation', 6.

¹⁰⁸⁹ Ibid., 11.

¹⁰⁹⁰ This aspect was particularly evident in the 2014 edition of the RR by virtue of this edition of the campaign being structured around Qur'anic sections: "Each action is inspired by a juz of the Qur'an, with the intention of getting closer to Allah's book, while applying at least one thing we learn every single day!" '#RamadanRevolution'.

¹⁰⁹¹ Jamal Badi, "Thinking" Terminologies from Qur'anic Perspective and Their Impact on Human Intellectual Development', *International Journal of Arab Culture, Management and Sustainable Development* 2, no. 1 (1 January 2011): 48.

¹⁰⁹² Mohammad Hashim Kamali, 'Reading the Signs: A Qur'anic Perspective on Thinking', *Islam and Science* 4 (Winter 2006): 143.

¹⁰⁹³ Syed Zainal Abidin, Syed Kamarul Bahrin, and Nur Firdaus Abdul Razak, 'Defining the Cognitive Levels in Bloom's Taxonomy through the Quranic Levels of Understanding - Initial Progress of Developing an Islamic Concept Education', *International Journal of Asian Social Science* 3, no. 9 (2013): 2063.

justice in surat Yusuf”; “read surat an nahl today and share what lessons you can take”¹⁰⁹⁴); and ii) sharing such lessons with other people (“organise a halaqah [religious study circle] and discuss”; “share what lessons”¹⁰⁹⁵). In these instances, the CHANGE YOURSELF part of the CYCW frame is represented by (re)connecting oneself with the Qur’an in a meaningful way, whilst the CHANGE THE WORLD part is represented by the physical act of implementing at the individual and collective levels the lessons derivable from it.

The third type of action suggested by the RR in the domain of spiritual life represents an exhortation to embody the key Islamic concepts of *hamd* (grateful praise) and *shukr* (thankfulness), on the one hand, and of *ikhlas* (sincerity) and God-consciousness (*taqwa*) on the other.

Hamd and shukr reflect slightly different connotations of gratitude. Hamd incorporates an element of praise (and can therefore be understood as “grateful praise”), and implies an acknowledgement of the excellent qualities of the benefactor independently from the object of gratitude. In this sense, it can be used exclusively to express gratitude to Allah. Shukr refers to the thankfulness, gratefulness or gratitude expressed by a recipient towards his/her benefactor where thanks are given for what was done (and not merely because of the benefactor’s characteristics).¹⁰⁹⁶ Concerning hamd and shukr, the RR’s invitation to adopt a grateful mindset (“write down everything you eat for iftar, and thank Allah for each and every item”) represents a change of consciousness (i.e. the CHANGE YOURSELF part of the CYCW frame) that leads to action capable to CHANGE THE WORLD (i.e. the second part of the CYCW frame) by virtue of valuing and not misusing the favours received (e.g. by eating moderately without wasting food) and by developing a sense of responsibility towards the have-nots (“Remember there are those who fast all day long without anything to break their fast with. Keep them in your duas [supplications]”).¹⁰⁹⁷

On the other hand, *ikhlas* is a comprehensive concept that refers to “having sincere faith and doing all acts exclusively for Allah’s pleasure.”¹⁰⁹⁸ This concept

¹⁰⁹⁴ Appendix A, extracts 39-41

¹⁰⁹⁵ Appendix A, extracts 40-41.

¹⁰⁹⁶ Ismail Ibn Kathir, *Tafsir Ibn Kathir (Abridged)*, trans. Sheikh Safiur-Rahman Al-Mubarakpuri, vol. 1 (Darussalam, 2003), 70; Abdur Rashid Siddiqui, *Qur’anic Keywords: A Reference Guide* (Kube Publishing Ltd, 2015), 73; 222.

¹⁰⁹⁷ Appendix A, extract 42.

¹⁰⁹⁸ Siddiqui, *Qur’anic Keywords*, 98.

is closely intertwined with that of intention (*niyyah*) and action (*‘amal*) by the widely-known hadith that states that “all actions are but by intention and one will get the reward for what one has intended.”¹⁰⁹⁹ Taqwa can be defined as “that state of the heart that gives certainty of the presence of Allah at all times, thus differentiating between good and evil and disposing one towards good and creating hatred of evil”¹¹⁰⁰—a state of God-consciousness that is required in all actions of a believer’s life.

Concerning these key Islamic principles, the RR reminds its audience that every action (*‘amal*) needs to be: i) accompanied by proper intention (*niyyah*) (“Today we are reminding ourselves to reflect on our intentions”); ii) guided by God-consciousness (*taqwa*) (“[we] pray that we become people of sincerity and God consciousness”); and iii) performed for the sake and with the assistance of Allah (“make everything you do for the sake of Allah by starting each action with *bismillah*¹¹⁰¹”).¹¹⁰² From this angle, the RR calls for a spiritual awakening (i.e. the CHANGE YOURSELF part of the CYCW frame) that can lead to positive societal change (i.e. the CHANGE THE WORLD part of the CYCW frame) by virtue of the collective accumulation of the ‘good deeds’ of grateful, sincere, and God-conscious individuals.

The fourth type of action suggested by the RR within the realm of spiritual life links ritual worship with acts of environmental responsibility. For instance, using only a limited amount of water to perform ritual ablutions (*wuḍū‘*) represents a way to both follow the Prophetic example and to reduce water waste,¹¹⁰³ and the use of a (MADE-branded) reusable bottle to drink from during Ramadan nightly

¹⁰⁹⁹ Ibid., 99.

¹¹⁰⁰ Ibid., 241.

¹¹⁰¹ The basmalah (i.e. saying ‘*bismillah*’, “In the name of Allah”) represents the Muslim faith-based opening formula that has three main simultaneous significations: “(a) With the name of Allah (b) With the help of the name of Allah (c) With the barakah or benediction of the name of Allah.” Muḥammad Shafī’ and Muḥammad Taqī ‘Uṣmānī, *Ma‘ariful-Quran*, vol. 1 (Surah Al-Fatihah, Al-Baqarah) (Karachi: Maktaba-e-Darul-Uloom: Distributor, Idaratul-Ma‘arif, 1996), 58. Notably, the basmalah is mentioned in this post in a way that links the concepts of *ikhlas*, *niyyah*, and *taqwa* by representing a means to purify one’s intention before conducting any permissible action and to self-consciously link it to the remembrance of Allah. Further, given that pronouncing the basmalah “is recommended before starting any permissible action or deed,” this formula occupies a central position in every sphere of life of the believer (be it religious or mundane, private or public). Ismā‘īl ibn ‘Umar Ibn Kathīr and Shaykh Safiur-Rahman Al-Mubarakpuri, *Tafsīr Ibn Kathīr*, vol. Volume 1: Parts 1 and 2 (Surat Al-Fatihah to Verse 252 of Surat Al-Baqarah) (Darussalam, 2003), 64. From this perspective, its mention within the RR emphasises the ‘everyday’ dimension of action and change sought for.

¹¹⁰² Appendix A, extract 43.

¹¹⁰³ Appendix A, extract 44.

prayers represents an opportunity to help preserving the planet by limiting the use of plastic.¹¹⁰⁴ In both instances, a change in the environment-*unfriendly* habits that some Muslims associate with their ritual acts of worship (i.e. the CHANGE YOURSELF part of the CYCW frame) is assumed to be conducive to societal change (in the form of environmental protection) if a large enough number of Muslims are mobilised (i.e. the CHANGE THE WORLD part of the CYCW frame).

Finally, MADE's invitation to agency in the spiritual realm also includes more 'traditional' invitations, such as an exhortation to perform collective supplications for the oppressed ("make joint du'a")¹¹⁰⁵ and regular charitable donations (*sadaqah*).¹¹⁰⁶

Having discussed how the RR articulated the CYCW frame within the spiritual life-area, the following seven subsections outline how this frame is conveyed within the 'secular' life-areas that the RR shares with the SRM.

7.2.4.2. "Food"¹¹⁰⁷

The first life-area that the RR campaign shares with the SRM is that of food. Within the SRM, the CYCW frame is articulated through "a melding of the philosophies and policies of vegetarians, environmentalists, local and independent business advocates, and the slow food movement."¹¹⁰⁸

Similarly, the RR calls for a range of actions that can be linked to five main food-oriented subcultures/lifestyle movements.

One action-type draws from a mixture of 'green living'¹¹⁰⁹ and 'locavore'¹¹¹⁰ cultures and invites individuals to (re)connect with nature, the system of food

¹¹⁰⁴ Appendix A, extract 45.

¹¹⁰⁵ Appendix A, extract 46.

¹¹⁰⁶ Appendix A, extract 47.

¹¹⁰⁷ Jones, 'Social Responsibility Activism', 102.

¹¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁰⁹ 'Green living' can be broadly understood as "living 'lightly on the planet' by recycling and conserving energy and water." Haenfler, Johnson, and Jones, 'Lifestyle Movements', 5.

¹¹¹⁰ 'Locavore' is a neologism (coined in 2005, it became 'Oxford Word of the Year' in 2007) that blends the word 'local' with the suffix '-vore' (from Latin *vorare* "to devour"), which describes organisms based upon the type(s) of food they eat (as, for example, in herbivore). The term refers to both individuals and the broader consumer movement that promote consumption of locally grown food whenever possible (e.g. buying from local farmers' markets or growing one's own food). Locavore is often seen as a way "to support local economies and environmental sustainability." 'Oxford Word Of The Year 2007: Locavore', *OUPblog*, 12 November 2007, <https://blog.oup.com/2007/11/locavore/>; Suzanne Kemmer, 'Locavore', *The Rice University Neologisms Database*, 25 November 2013, <http://neologisms.rice.edu/index.php?a=term&d=1&t=18460>; Haenfler, Johnson, and Jones, 'Lifestyle Movements', 5.

production, and local economies by “start[ing] planting your own herbs,”¹¹¹¹ supporting “your nearest market” and “buy[ing] some local in-season ingredients.”¹¹¹² A second type of action draws from vegetarianism and invites Muslims to limit their meat consumption and try to “go veggie”¹¹¹³ at times, by “plan[nig] at least 1 vegetarian iftar a week.”¹¹¹⁴ The RR also partially draws from the lifestyle movement known as “voluntary simplicity,”¹¹¹⁵ and invites Muslims to reduce food consumption as a way to both follow the Prophetic example (“follow the sunnah of only filling a third of your stomach”¹¹¹⁶) and minimise waste (“eat on a smaller plate”¹¹¹⁷). Fourthly, the RR incorporates dimensions of animal rights activism, local/independent business advocacy, and ‘slow food’ culture¹¹¹⁸ as it calls upon Muslims to buy free-range produce, support local and organic food producers (“order your meat for Eid from Willowbrook organic farm”¹¹¹⁹) and join community events that promote the aforementioned activities (“put 18 august in your diary for our ethical Eid BBQ”¹¹²⁰). Fifthly, the RR taps into ‘Fairtrade activism’ by encouraging Muslims to buy this type of products, particularly to support the Palestinian economy.¹¹²¹ Finally, the RR also projects food as a means to foster personal relationships and community-building (which represent

¹¹¹¹ Appendix A, extract 48.

¹¹¹² Appendix A, extract 49.

¹¹¹³ Appendix A, extract 50.

¹¹¹⁴ Appendix A, extract 51.

¹¹¹⁵ Voluntary simplicity is defined as the voluntary act of “reducing material possessions for psychological, social, and environmental reasons.” Haenfler, Johnson, and Jones, ‘Lifestyle Movements’, 5.

¹¹¹⁶ Appendix A, extract 52.

¹¹¹⁷ Appendix A, extract 53.

¹¹¹⁸ Slow food culture “links pleasurable eating and good food to building community and environmental sustainability.” Haenfler, Johnson, and Jones, ‘Lifestyle Movements’, 5.

¹¹¹⁹ Appendix A, extract 54. The Willowbrook Organic Farm is one of the UK’s first halal organic farms, a family run business set up in 2002 in the Oxfordshire countryside. MADE has been working alongside the farm in a number of projects, to promote different aspects of its ‘lifestyle culture’, such as the already mentioned concepts of tayyib, green living, locavore, voluntary simplicity and slow food. Some examples of MADE activities/projects that witnessed the participation of Willowbrook farm include: the already mentioned Eat of the Good Things campaign; a cycling challenge entitled Tour de Farm, consisting in cycling from London to the farm; a public talk titled “Let’s Meat: the Ethics of Halal,” where Willowbrook founder (Dr. Lutfi Radwan) spoke alongside representatives of the two major halal certifying organisations in the UK (Halal Monitoring Committee, HMC; and Halal Food Authority, HFA). “Walden and Willowbrook’, *MADE*, 14 October 2011, <http://www.made.ngo/updates/blogs/item/walden-and-willowbrook>; ‘Cycling 100k Towards an Organic BBQ - MADE’, *MADE*, 13 June 2014, <http://www.made.ngo/updates/blogs/item/cycling-100k-towards-an-organic-bbq>; ‘Let’s Meat: HMC, HFA, Willowbrook Organic, iEAT - MADE’, *MADE*, 10 December 2014, <http://www.made.ngo/updates/news/item/let-s-meat-hmc-hfa-willowbrook-organic-ieat>.

¹¹²⁰ Appendix A, extract 54.

¹¹²¹ Appendix A, extracts 56-57.

in and themselves life-areas touched upon by the SRM, discussed separately later) by encouraging Muslims to share their meals.¹¹²²

7.2.4.3. “Shopping”¹¹²³

Agency in the economic realm (i.e. in the life-area broadly categorical as ‘shopping’) represents “the predominant and arguably the most developed type” within the SRM.¹¹²⁴ From this perspective, individuals are asked to “buy a better world” through the specular actions of *buycotting* (i.e. “supporting those producers whose priorities are in line with SR values”) and *boycotting* (i.e. “avoiding those companies whose practices and commitments were less responsible”).¹¹²⁵

Within the RR, both the positive (buycotting) and negative (boycotting) dimensions of “consumer activism”¹¹²⁶ are elaborated through a number of posts. These exhort Muslims to commit in a durable manner (“make a pledge”) to use shopping as a means to implement a more upright lifestyle (“become more ethical right now through your consumer choices”) by supporting companies that align with MADE’s values (“buy more ethical clothing”) whilst lobbying those that depart from them (“sign the support ethical fashion petition”).¹¹²⁷

On the one hand, exhorting its audience to “make a difference (...) by using your money to stand up for justice,” MADE articulates the idea of buycotting not only by generally exhorting to support producers that are aligned to its values, but also by specifically inviting to buy products from its own ethical e-commerce initiative, the “MADE Shop.”¹¹²⁸

¹¹²² Appendix A, extracts 58-59.

¹¹²³ Jones, ‘Social Responsibility Activism’, 103.

¹¹²⁴ Ibid., 163.

¹¹²⁵ Ibid., 164; 64.

¹¹²⁶ ‘Consumer activism’ broadly refers to the attempt of “doing good via enlightened consumption choices.” Matthew Adams and Jayne Raisborough, ‘Making a Difference: Ethical Consumption and the Everyday’, *The British Journal of Sociology* 61, no. 2 (1 June 2010): 262. This is based on individuals approaching consumption (and in particular the act of shopping) as a ‘political’ act and the subject of moral judgment through which one can contribute to ‘change the world’. Many different terms have been applied to this phenomenon, such as: “ethical shopping, ethical purchase behavior, ethical consumption, political consumption, political consumerism, and critical consumerism.” Eivind Jacobsen and Arne Dulsrud, ‘Will Consumers Save The World? The Framing of Political Consumerism’, *Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics* 20, no. 5 (1 October 2007): 469–70, doi:10.1007/s10806-007-9043-z. For a comprehensive overview (including the historical development) of consumer activism, see: Matthew Hilton, *Prosperity for All: Consumer Activism in an Era of Globalization* (Cornell University Press, 2009).

¹¹²⁷ Appendix A, extracts 60-61.

¹¹²⁸ Appendix A, extract 62. Until 2016, MADE was running its ethical online shop at: MADE, *MADE Shop*, accessed 23 July 2016, <http://www.made.ngo/shop/>

On the other hand, the RR articulates the resistance-oriented dimension of consumer activism (i.e. boycotting) through a rather 'light' approach. In fact, rather than calling for an outright boycott (i.e. total avoidance) of specific products/companies, MADE attempts to meet its audience where they are at. Following the reformist, 'light lifestyle approach' of the SRM outlined earlier, the RR asks Muslims to use the power deriving from their position as customers to put pressure (through a petition) on those companies that they may wish to nevertheless keep buying from ("As consumers we can make a difference! We can put pressure on the companies that we buy our clothes from"¹¹²⁹). Whilst this represents a less 'revolutionary' action than a complete boycott of such companies, it still implies a sense of agency (through the CYCW frame) by assuming that individualised collective action (in the form of a petition) can hold big companies to higher moral standards and eventually lead to change in their policies.

Finally, MADE's articulation of the CYCW frame within the life-area of shopping also includes a dimension of 'flea market culture'. This promotes a "second-hand economy" that seeks to counter the harm brought about by mass-production/consumption by "extending the lifespan of products by providing for their reuse by other individuals."¹¹³⁰ This subculture is exemplified in the RR by invitations to "buy something from a second-hand clothes,"¹¹³¹ "donate/upcycle [i.e creatively reuse] anything that you no longer use,"¹¹³² and "swap" clothes.¹¹³³

7.2.4.4. "Home"¹¹³⁴

Much of the everyday activism envisioned by the SRM and the CYCW frame takes place within the archetype of everyday life: home. Essentially, agency in this area consists of "creating a home environment that supports SR values" by engaging in a number of daily actions such as reducing waste, recycling, and saving energy and water.¹¹³⁵

¹¹²⁹ Appendix A, extract 63. See also extracts 23 and 29.

¹¹³⁰ Fabien Durif et al., 'The Kijiji Second-Hand Economy Index. 2016 Report' (Kijiji, 2016), 2.

¹¹³¹ Appendix A, extract 64.

¹¹³² Appendix A, extract 65.

¹¹³³ Appendix A, extract 66.

¹¹³⁴ Jones, 'Social Responsibility Activism', 112.

¹¹³⁵ Ibid.

Indeed, the RR exhorts its audience to take precisely the same kind of actions the SRM envisions at home—i.e. “cut down”/“reduce” waste¹¹³⁶; “recycling”¹¹³⁷; “saving energy”;¹¹³⁸ and “save water.”¹¹³⁹ Importantly, being conscious that a positive societal difference can be achieved only if a large enough number of people commit themselves to carry out small actions/changes in a consistent way, MADE repeatedly stresses in this life-area the importance for the audience to a take serious (almost formal) commitment in the form of a “pledge.”¹¹⁴⁰

7.2.4.5. “Relationships”¹¹⁴¹

The CYCW frame and its ‘individualised collective action’ model of agency assume that conscientised individuals need to make a proactive effort to prompt individual change among other people. From this perspective, personal relationships are seen “as avenues for social transformation” through “modeling, discussing and changing values and actions” of the people engaged through those very relationships.¹¹⁴² Consequently, the SRM encourages people to “putting more time and energy into one’s personal relationships (children, family, friends, neighbors, co-workers, strangers)” not only as an end in itself, but also as “a socially transforming act.”¹¹⁴³

Indeed, the RR invites its audience to strengthen their relationship within overlapping circles of influence within society: the family nucleus, with a focus on mothers;¹¹⁴⁴ extended family and friends;¹¹⁴⁵ and distant or even hostile acquaintances.¹¹⁴⁶ Notably, these invitations convey and emphasise values such as love, gratefulness, solidarity, care and forgiveness that are key to effect change also in the next life-area: community.

¹¹³⁶ Appendix A, extracts 67, 68.

¹¹³⁷ Appendix A, extracts 68, 69.

¹¹³⁸ Appendix A, extract 69.

¹¹³⁹ Appendix A, extract 70.

¹¹⁴⁰ Appendix A, extracts 68-70.

¹¹⁴¹ Jones, ‘Social Responsibility Activism’, 100.

¹¹⁴² Ibid., 164; 100.

¹¹⁴³ Ibid., 164.

¹¹⁴⁴ Appendix A, extracts 71, 72.

¹¹⁴⁵ Appendix A, extract 73.

¹¹⁴⁶ Appendix A, extracts 74, 75.

7.2.4.6. “Community”¹¹⁴⁷

The SRM’s “emphasis on the value of human connections” and on relationship-building as an avenue for social transformation implies an invitation to deepen community engagement through actions that promote involvement with local people and organisations, such as regular volunteering and supporting (/organising) local projects that aligns with the SRM’s values and aims.¹¹⁴⁸

This dimension of the SRM is well illustrated in the RR campaign, which focuses on promoting young Muslims’ action with and subsequent change within the archetype platform of Muslim community-life: the mosque. In fact, young Muslims are not only encouraged to donate more of their time to ‘traditional’ mosque activities (e.g. volunteering to help with community iftars);¹¹⁴⁹ they are also invited to promote the incorporation of new dimensions within such activities, in a way that support values and aims aligned with those of MADE—e.g. through “green iftar[s],”¹¹⁵⁰ and by helping mosques to become “more eco-friendly.”¹¹⁵¹

7.2.4.7. “Transportation”¹¹⁵²

Transportation is a domain of everyday life used by the SRM not only to support environmental protection, but also to promote individual benefits. This is because eco-friendly modes of transportation (such as walking, biking, and using public transport) are considered key not only in light of their nil/lower impact on the environment, but also because they benefit other aspects of one’s life, such as the individual’s sense of belonging.¹¹⁵³

This multidimensional approach to the significance of ‘green’ modes of transport is mirrored by the RR through its invitation to walk, cycle, and use public transport as means to benefit not only the environment, but also the individuals engaging in such actions—both from a physical (“help you burn off the iftar meal”¹¹⁵⁴) and a spiritual perspective (“help you refresh for salah [prayer]”; “you gain more barakah [blessings] and reward”¹¹⁵⁵).

¹¹⁴⁷ Jones, ‘Social Responsibility Activism’, 109.

¹¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁴⁹ Appendix A, extract 76.

¹¹⁵⁰ Appendix A, extract 77.

¹¹⁵¹ Appendix A, extract 78.

¹¹⁵² Jones, ‘Social Responsibility Activism’, 107.

¹¹⁵³ Ibid., 107–8.

¹¹⁵⁴ Appendix A, extract 79.

¹¹⁵⁵ Appendix A, extracts 79, 80.

7.2.4.8. Politics

As I highlighted in the introduction of this section, one of the main differences between the SRM and more traditional social movements is represented by the fact that the former privileges engaging ‘subpolitics’, rather than politics. However, this does not mean that the SRM jettison altogether conventional politics as viable avenues for social change.¹¹⁵⁶ In turn, this implies that “while, as a general rule, SR activism remains politically neutral insofar as it does not support political parties or candidates, some traditional political actions are taken”—e.g. by lobbying elected representatives.¹¹⁵⁷

Mirroring the SRM, the RR brings to the foreground the realm of subpolitics whilst also not completely overlooking politics. Representing an exception, the only invitation within the RR to engage the life-area of politics encourages young Muslims to “do a bit” of something which they themselves may see as marginal in their lives—i.e. “political lobbying”—and encourages them to “write to your MP asking them to sign the [ethical fashion] petition.”¹¹⁵⁸

In conclusion, this section highlighted how the RR conveyed a sense of agency through the CYCW frame, closely mirroring the lifestyle movement that best epitomises this frame: the SRM. Notably, the section also highlighted one major difference between the RR and the SRM articulations of the CYCW frame: the fact that the RR expands agency in the spiritual life-area.

Conclusion

Providing an original microanalysis of MADE’s Ramadan Revolution campaign (2013; 2014), this chapter has led to three main findings.

- *Campaign-specific frames*

The first finding is that the RR conveyed an injustice- and an agency-type frames that I have called the PROFIT OVER PEOPLE & PLANET (POPP) and the CHANGE YOURSELF TO CHANGE THE WORLD (CYCW) frames, respectively.

Through the POPP frame, the RR aimed to mobilise young Muslims by tapping on the moral indignation against a neoliberal order that inflicts harm to people

¹¹⁵⁶ Jones, ‘Social Responsibility Activism’, 153.

¹¹⁵⁷ Ibid., 162.

¹¹⁵⁸ Appendix A, extract 81.

and the planet by promoting a socioeconomic/political system and way of life that prioritise “exchange value”¹¹⁵⁹ (i.e. self-interested, materialistic profiteering) over the inherent value of humanity and the environment. Through the CYCW frame, the RR attempted to mobilise young Muslims by drawing from the popular motto: ‘be the change you want to see in the world’. By bringing together the “INDIVIDUAL CONCERN” and the “SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY” frames,¹¹⁶⁰ the RR conveyed a CYCW frame that exhorts individuals to be mindful of the impacts that their daily choices have on other people and the planet, and prompt them to consider lifestyle choices on a wide range of life-areas as platforms where it is possible to prefigure on a small, manageable scale the change they want to see within wider society.

The RR represents an atypical case of MADE’s mobilising efforts (as the first and only Ramadan campaign the organisation has run until the time of writing, and as purely a social media campaign), which is particularly rich and helps to identify frames/web of meanings that are not only campaign-specific, but that also characterise MADE’s discourse, more generally. Whilst space limitations preclude here a comprehensive analysis of the POPP and CYCW frames within MADE’s general discourse, an additional critical discursive movement exemplifies particularly well the centrality of the lifestyle keying of the POPP frame and of the CYCW frame beyond the RR.

This is represented by the already mentioned video “Intro to MADE in Europe,”¹¹⁶¹ which MADE purposely developed in between the two editions of the RR¹¹⁶² to clearly and succinctly express the main characteristics of its subculture—or, as MADE itself puts it, to clarify “WHAT WE’RE ABOUT.”¹¹⁶³

Throughout the first half of the video, the ‘lifestyle keying’ of the POPP frame is articulated through a focus on the everyday life of what the voiceover describes as the “average Muslim”¹¹⁶⁴ who—more or less deliberately—lives a lifestyle that prioritises self-interest and convenience (PROFIT) over the well-being of people and the planet. Mirroring the RR, here, too, injustice is perpetuated through

¹¹⁵⁹ Hall, Massey, and Rustin, ‘After Neoliberalism?’, 22; 5.

¹¹⁶⁰ Darnton, Andrew and Kirk, ‘Finding Frames: New Ways to Engage the UK Public in Global Poverty’, 116.

¹¹⁶¹ Made In Europe, *Intro to MADE*.

¹¹⁶² In December 2013.

¹¹⁶³ ‘Home’, *MADE*, accessed 23 July 2016, <https://www.made.ngo/>.

¹¹⁶⁴ Named ‘Stick’, the fictional protagonist of the video.

individual choices in different life-areas, such as: clothing;¹¹⁶⁵ transportation;¹¹⁶⁶ food;¹¹⁶⁷ and environmentally un-friendly habits culpably associated with the performance of religious rituals.¹¹⁶⁸ Notably, however, is precisely within the spiritual life-area that is also at the centre of the RR¹¹⁶⁹ that the “average” Muslim develops a critical consciousness and “realises the changes he needs to make.”¹¹⁷⁰ From this perspective, the ‘new’ average Muslim can finally appreciate the interconnectedness between daily choices and their effects, thus appreciating the lifestyle changes he needs to adopt (CHANGE YOURSELF) in order to change the world around him for the better (TO CHANGE THE WORLD). Indeed, the CYCW frame is so central to the video, that this concludes with a call to action explicitly and uniquely articulated through it:¹¹⁷¹

Join the movement: *change yourself, to change the world* for a better future.

- *Nuances*

The second major finding of this chapter is represented by the identification of a number of nuances in the RR’s articulation of both the injustice- and the agency-type frames.

Concerning injustice, the analysis has highlighted how the POPP frame was declined by the RR through two main keyings. On the one hand, the structural keying focuses on the harm brought to people and the planet by corporate/institutional actors that prioritise self-interested profiteering over social

¹¹⁶⁵ Which bring harm to people through complicity with an exploitative garment industry, and to the planet through irresponsible over-consumption and waste. This is conveyed by the line: “[Stick] gets its clothes from the typical High street store” and the textual prompt: “The average UK household owns around £4000 worth of clothes. 1/3 of all clothes we buy go into landfills. In countless clothing factories across Asia workers are living in poverty. Since 2005, over 1800 workers have died in Bangladesh alone due to the fatal factory conditions.” *Made In Europe, Intro to MADE.*

¹¹⁶⁶ Extravagant use of which brings harm to people by affecting their health and to the planet by polluting it, as conveyed by the line: “Stick likes to drive his car everywhere” and the textual prompt “Motor vehicles produce more air pollution than any other single human activity. 12000-24000 people die every year due to air pollution in the UK.” *Ibid.*

¹¹⁶⁷ Which bring harm to animals just to appease one’s material convenience and tastes, as conveyed by the line: “Stick’s favourite food is the ‘number 3 special’ from the fried chicken shop” and the textual prompt “2/3 farm animals in the world are now cruelly factory farmed.” *Ibid.*

¹¹⁶⁸ Such as wasting water to perform ritual ablutions, as conveyed by the line: “[Stick] tries hard to be on time for prayer” and the textual prompt: “3 billion litres of water is wasted every day. That’s 50 litres per person.” *Ibid.*

¹¹⁶⁹ Represented in the video by the consciousness-raising function of the sermon during the Friday congregational prayer.

¹¹⁷⁰ *Made In Europe, Intro to MADE.*

¹¹⁷¹ From which, as I highlighted in section 7.2.1, I originally drew the specific name for this frame within MADE’s discourse.

and environmental wellbeing. On the other hand, the lifestyle keying concentrates on the negative consequences of selfish and materialistic lifestyles that prioritise personal convenience and/or extravagance over social and environmental responsibility.

The analysis also pointed out two main observations that highlight how the lifestyle keying is significantly dominant within the RR. Firstly, this represents the main (and often, the only) keying of the vast majority of the RR's posts. Secondly, whenever this keying occurs in combination with the structural keying, the former is predominant.¹¹⁷² Consequently, despite the structural keying has the potential to activate an agency-type frame that has been referred to as the CHANGE THE SYSTEM frame,¹¹⁷³ the dominance of the lifestyle keying leads to convey a sense of agency mainly through the CYCW frame, instead.

Indeed, the analysis highlighted that through the CYCW agency-type MADE strongly aligns its discourse (and practice) with that of the archetypical manifestation of the CYCW frame: the Social Responsibility movement (SRM). However, the analysis also pointed out that MADE distinguishes itself from the SRM in at least one major way: its extension of agency in the spiritual life-area. In fact, the RR differentiates itself from the SRM not only because it overcomes the "strictly secular"¹¹⁷⁴ nature of the latter, but also because it is precisely the spiritual life-area that constitutes the most frequently mentioned domain of action, overall.

- *Resonance with wider narratives*

The third main finding of this chapter is that through its frames and nuances, the RR resonates with two main types of wider discourses: social movement discourse, on the one hand; and a distinctively Muslim discourse, on the other.

¹¹⁷² For example, section 7.1.3 highlighted that: i) despite the RR denounces the injustice of "illegal Israeli settlements," (i.e. 'structural keying'), it nevertheless focuses on attributing blame on individual Muslims who neglect to boycott products from these areas and calls upon them to change their consumption choices (i.e. 'lifestyle keying'); ii) despite the RR denounces the injustice of the current system of meat production (i.e. 'structural keying'), it nevertheless focuses on attributing blame on individual Muslims in light of their dietary preferences and calls upon them to change these (i.e. 'lifestyle keying'); iii) despite the RR denounces the injustice of the system of production of bottled water (i.e. 'structural keying'), it nevertheless focuses on attributing blame on individual Muslims in light of their laziness in recycling and over-consumption of plastic bottles, and calls upon them to change these behaviours (i.e. 'lifestyle keying').

¹¹⁷³ Darnton, Andrew and Kirk, 'Finding Frames: New Ways to Engage the UK Public in Global Poverty', 116.

¹¹⁷⁴ Jones, 'Social Responsibility Activism', 59.

With regards to the RR's resonance with social movement discourses, in subsection 7.1.1 I outlined how the POPP frame adopted by the RR draws from and tap into a set of cognate frames that have characterised a range of contemporary movements and activist subcultures. Further, section 7.2 highlighted how the RR epitomises a close overlap between MADE and the SRM, specifically.

Notably, the RR's resonance with social movement discourse is further reinforced by its adoption of the "rhetoric of the closed fist"¹¹⁷⁵ (embedded in the RR's logo) and the "the rhetoric of revolution"¹¹⁷⁶ (embedded in the RR's name). On the one hand, the RR's logo taps into the "semiotic force"¹¹⁷⁷ of a symbol (the clenched fist) that is widely associated with social movement discourse in light of two main historical traditions.¹¹⁷⁸ First, this symbol alludes to progressive values and left-leaning political sensitivities: popularised by traditional workers' and socialist iconography,¹¹⁷⁹ the clenched fist "became an international left-wing symbol" during the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939), and was widely popularised through the political and social struggles of the 1960s and early 1970s.¹¹⁸⁰ Second, the clenched fist also alludes to the struggles against oppression carried out by

¹¹⁷⁵ Edward P. J. Corbett, 'The Rhetoric of the Open Hand and the Rhetoric of the Closed Fist', *College Composition and Communication* 20, no. 5 (1969): 288–96, doi:10.2307/355032.

¹¹⁷⁶ James Wilkinson, 'After the Revolution in France: The Rhetoric of Revolution', *Salmagundi*, no. 84 (1989): 154–76.

¹¹⁷⁷ Richard Marback, 'Detroit and the Closed Fist: Toward a Theory of Material Rhetoric', *Rhetoric Review* 17, no. 1 (1998): 78.

¹¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 75. The association between the clenched fist and social movement discourse is epitomised by the almost ubiquitous representation of this symbol across a wide range of platforms related to activism and social movements—stretching from 'activist' merchandise (e.g. t-shirts, badges, and posters) to the covers of academic books on these topics. For example, see the cover of: Kathrin Fahlenbrach, Martin Klimke, and Joachim Scharloth, eds., *Protest Cultures: A Companion* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2016); Laura Pulido, *Black, Brown, Yellow, and Left: Radical Activism in Los Angeles* (University of California Press, 2006).

¹¹⁷⁹ A comprehensive overview of the history of the clenched fist symbol can be found in: Gottfried Korff, 'From Brotherly Handshake to Militant Clenched Fist: On Political Metaphors for the Worker's Hand', trans. Larry Peterson, *International Labor and Working-Class History*, no. 42 (1992): 70–81. Here, the author traces the roots of the traditional workers' and socialist iconography back to the strike wave of the 1880s, when the symbol of the clenched fist "was quickly incorporated into the rhetoric of strikes and protest." (77) The clenched fist was later adopted by workers' organizations around 1900, and in 1917 (the year of the Russian Revolution), it was widely popularised by the Industrial Workers of the World through a propaganda cartoon (reproduced in figure 13 in Korff's paper) that "transformed it into a symbol of the solidarity of workers from all backgrounds." (*ibid.*). Two decades later the symbol was adopted as the self-identifying gesture of the left-leaning factions fighting against the fascist military dictator Franco during the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939). Left-wingers and opponents of fascism in the rest of Europe and around the world later adopted the clenched fist, which became one of the most iconic symbols of the political and social struggles of the 1960s and early 1970s. It is in this period (1969) that the symbol was also incorporated in the official logo of the Socialist International (as a clenched fist holding a red rose), where it appears to this day (reproduced in figure 16 in Korff's paper). *Ibid.*

¹¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 81

different types of marginalised groups across the world,¹¹⁸¹ as epitomised by the adoption of the clenched fist by the civil rights movement¹¹⁸² and by post-colonial liberationist struggles.¹¹⁸³

On the other hand, the very name of the RR aligns this campaign to social movement discourse through the idea of ‘revolution’. This is because traditional understandings of this idea incorporate “a predominant and specialized political meaning” that associates it with social movements insofar the latter have traditionally aimed to overthrow an old order and make a new one,¹¹⁸⁴ symbolising a “struggle against an *ancien regime*”¹¹⁸⁵ in “the service of a moral ideal.”¹¹⁸⁶

Additionally, the RR also closely resonates with a distinctive Muslim discourse through three main mechanisms.

First, the RR consistently evoked a specific Muslim repertoire of ideas and values by systematically incorporating references to both Qur’an and sunna— a connection that was made particularly explicit in the 2014 edition, since this was deliberately structured around the thirtieth portion of the Qur’an (juz) scheduled to be read during the corresponding nightly Ramadan prayer.

Secondly, the RR emphasised the importance of agency in the spiritual life-area, thus highlighting how Muslims can make a positive difference in society precisely by virtue of their own spiritual and ethical framework, through the practical

¹¹⁸¹Hilda E Kurtz, ‘Reflections on the Iconography of Environmental Justice Activism’, *Area* 37, no. 1 (1 March 2005): 84.

¹¹⁸² Epitomised by the adoption of the clenched fist as the symbol/gesture of the Black Panther Party (Marback, ‘Detroit and the Closed Fist’) and of the ‘Black Power’ subculture. The association between the clenched fist symbol/gesture and the ‘Black Power’ culture was widely popularised through the iconic raised-fist protest of Afro-American sprinters Tommie Smith and John Carlos on the victory podium at the Olympic Games in Mexico City in 1968. Richard Marback, ‘Corbett’s Hand: A Rhetorical Figure for Composition Studies’, *College Composition and Communication* 47, no. 2 (1996): 182–83.

¹¹⁸³ Epitomised by the adoption of the clenched fist by the African National Congress party, popularised by Nelson Mandela raising his clenched fist whilst being released in 1990 from 27-and-a-half years in prison. In the context of Apartheid South Africa, the African National Congress party (to which Mandela belonged) and the ‘Black Consciousness’ movement “directly borrowed the clenched fist Black Power salute, [in the 1960s and made it] one of the lingering symbols of resistance since [the mid-1970s protests in] Soweto.” Thomas William Penfold, ‘Black Consciousness and the Politics of Writing the Nation in South Africa’ (PhD Thesis, University of Birmingham, 2013), 69, <http://etheses.bham.ac.uk/4643/>.

¹¹⁸⁴ Raymond Williams, *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society* (Oxford University Press, USA, 1985), 270; 273. 270; 273

¹¹⁸⁵ Alain Touraine, ‘The Idea of Revolution’, *Theory, Culture & Society* 7, no. 2 (1 June 1990): 122.

¹¹⁸⁶ Wilkinson, ‘After the Revolution in France’, 155.

implementation of key Islamic concepts such as al-amr bi'l-ma'ruf wa'l-nahy 'an al-munkar, tafakkur, tadabbur, hamd, shukr and ikhlas.

Thirdly, it is also worth highlighting here that the RR's framing of Islam as a 'revolution' and of the Prophetic example as 'revolutionary' resonate with contemporary strands of both Muslim and Christian discourses about Islam. Within Muslim discourse, the roots of this trend can be traced back to various currents of the 'revivalist' movement of the post-World War II era (1950-70s), with contemporary Muslim thinkers often characterising the Prophet as a "liberator of the oppressed of Mecca," "a man of God leading a social as well as a religious revolution," "a righteous revolutionary struggling on behalf of "the oppressed".¹¹⁸⁷ Beyond Muslim discourse, this framing has represented a key element of that strand of Christian thinking about Islam that—in the words of one of its leading figures, the late David Kerr—"attempt[s] to deal theologically, from a Christian perspective, with the historical fact of Muhammad's greatness."¹¹⁸⁸ Informed by the will to "provide a more progressive theological basis than currently exists for Christians to engage with Muslims in a mutual struggle for justice and peace,"¹¹⁸⁹ this current adopted a liberationist angle to appreciate the 'revolutionary' Prophetic role. From this perspective, this discourse acknowledges "that Muhammad was a prophet in the liberative sense,"¹¹⁹⁰ and thus characterises him as a "Prophet of Liberation,"¹¹⁹¹ "an activist in that he sought to liberate the people from the oppression caused by division."¹¹⁹²

¹¹⁸⁷ Henry Munson, *Islam and Revolution in the Middle East* (Yale University Press, 1989), 10; 23. This framing resonates with interpretations of Jesus 'as a revolutionary' from liberation theologians. *Ibid.* 10. Providing a complete overview of these trends is beyond the scope of this analysis. In order to highlight its significance, however, it suffices here to mention how one of the archetypal Muslim ideologists - Abul A'la Mawdudi - articulated these ideas in one of its seminal works ('Towards understanding Islam') by characterising the Prophetic example as that of "The greatest revolutionary," a "unique example of a 'maker of history' (...) amidst all 'makers of history' and revolutionary figures of all times" who, alone, "harmonised Faith with Knowledge and Action." Sayyid Abul A'la Mawdudi, *Towards Understanding Islam* (Kube Publishing Ltd, 2013), 49–50; 47.

¹¹⁸⁸ David A. Kerr, 'Muhammad: Prophet of Liberation - a Christian Perspective from Political Theology', *Studies in World Christianity* 6, no. 2 (1 October 2000): 141; 145.

¹¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 141.

¹¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 168.

¹¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*, Title.

¹¹⁹² Guillermo Márquez-Sterling, *Rise of the Spiritual Activist: A Beginner's Guide for Integrating Faith and Justice* (Author Solutions, Incorporated, 2012).

- *Implications for the research sub-questions*

Taken together, the findings outlined so far have significant implications concerning the research sub-questions.

Concerning the question: 'how to think about British Muslim NGOs?', the analysis highlights three main implications.

Firstly, MADE's adoption of the POPP and CYCW frame positions the organisation within a constellation of prominent movements that have adopted these frames in recent times. On the one hand, MADE's incorporation of the POPP frame aligns the organisation with the wider convergence occurred since the early 2010s between movements that have traditionally been either PEOPLE- or PLANET-focused, such as the Global Justice Movement and the environmentalist movement, respectively. On the other hand, MADE's adoption of the CYCW frame clearly aligns the organisation with the movement that best epitomises this frame, the Social Responsibility movement. This twofold convergence, which derives from MADE's articulation of both its main injustice- and agency-type frames, reinforces MADE's adoption of the MOVEMENT frame to articulate its organisational identity (discussed in chapter 5), therefore implying that a plausible way to think about this organisation is not merely as an NGO but as a Social Movement Organisation (SMO).

Secondly, MADE can be understood not just as a SMO, but as a *lifestyle* SMO. This is because whilst MADE taps into the ideational repertoire associated with traditional understandings of social movements (such as the structural, collective and confrontational dimensions conveyed by the POPP frame and by the rhetoric of the clenched fist and of revolution), its lifestyle dimension prevails through: i) the dominance of a lifestyle keying in the articulation of the injustice-type frame; ii) the overlap between its articulation of the agency-type frame and that of one of the most comprehensive lifestyle movements, the SRM.

Thirdly, the fact that the RR campaign expands the traditionally secular nature of the SRM through its resonance with Muslim faith-based discourse (articulated through a consistent narrative fidelity to the Muslim repertoire of ideas and values, and through the expansion of the CYCW frame into the spiritual life-area) implies that MADE can be thought about not merely as a lifestyle SMO, but as a '*Muslim lifestyle*' SMO.

In turn the foregoing has a number of implications for how MADE's discourse informs our understanding of British Muslim civic engagement.

As a 'Muslim lifestyle' SMO that resonates with traditional understandings of collective action, MADE taps into young British Muslims' "considerable and healthy appetite for a spectrum of dissent and activism"¹¹⁹³ and channels it into creative, noncontentious forms of everyday engagement with bigger-than-self issues. The rhetoric of the clenched fist and of revolution adopted by the RR's logo and title represent a clear case in point to illustrate this. As far as the use of the clenched fist is concerned, the RR draws from its recent re-popularisation among contemporary (youth) movements in order to capitalise on its historical heritage and persuade young British Muslims that taking individual action through choices in everyday life can represent in and of itself an avenue for dissent, activism and societal transformation. On the other hand, MADE's adoption of the idea of revolution—one that is diametrically opposed to the noncontentious, reformist approach adopted by the campaign (and MADE in general)—can be read as an attempt to popularise among young British Muslims the idea of "the revolution of the everyday."¹¹⁹⁴ As far as a sense of injustice is concerned, this idea taps into young British Muslims' awareness of a general crisis of society—not only in terms of its institutions and its actors,¹¹⁹⁵ but also in terms of lifestyle choices. As far as a consciousness of agency is concerned, the idea of the revolution of the everyday attempts to persuade young British Muslims that lifestyle choices represent 'little revolutions' where negative models can be resisted and where the 'ideal society' can be prefigured on a small, manageable scale. From this perspective, whilst prompting positive societal change is the end-goal of a campaign such as the RR, the focus of MADE's mobilisation-oriented discourse seems to be getting young British Muslims to question what is right and wrong (and why), in a way that enables them to engage in the "politics of self-actualization"¹¹⁹⁶ by asking 'how should we live' an ethical Muslim lifestyle.

In turn, this implies that support for an organisation like MADE cannot be understood through frames traditionally associated with the charitable/NGO sector (such as the GENEROUS DONOR and the VOLUNTEER frames that

¹¹⁹³ Sughra Ahmed and Naved Siddiqi, 'British by Dissent' (Muslim Youth Helpline, 2014), 75-76.

¹¹⁹⁴ Pickerill and Chatterton, 'Notes towards Autonomous Geographies', 732; 738.

¹¹⁹⁵ Touraine, 'The Idea of Revolution', 128.

¹¹⁹⁶ Haenfler, Johnson, and Jones, 'Lifestyle Movements', 14–15.

characterise Islamic Relief's discourse, as I will discuss in the next chapter). Rather, MADE resonance with both: i) movements that are traditionally perceived as contentious (through the POPP frame and the rhetoric of the clenched fist and of 'revolution'); and ii) the no-enemy, reformist strategy of the SRM (through the prevalence of the lifestyle keying of the POPP frame and the adoption of the CYCW frame) enables MADE to frame the civic engagement of its supporters through an ACTIVIST frame, which it articulates both through a (secondary) 'dissenting' keying and a (dominant) 'lifestyle' keying. I will explore these in detail in chapter 9.

PART THREE:
FRAMING THE SUPPORTER BASE

Chapter 8 . Islamic Relief's GENEROUS DONOR and VOLUNTEER frames

Introduction

I have pointed out in chapter 6 how 2013 marks a milestone in IR's discursive and operational trajectories: through highlights such as the WOH campaign and its participation to the IF campaign, IR at this stage is adopting a language and offering practical opportunities for engagement that manifest a deliberate willingness to broaden the organisation's supporter base. Perhaps the most vivid expression of the evolution of IR's understanding (and, consequently, framing) of support is represented by the following words by Mr. Jehangir Malik who, having been the Director of Islamic Relief UK from its very foundation until 2015,¹¹⁹⁷ represents one of the most informed insights into IR's trajectory:

I think we could be seeing the start of a significant change in the way ordinary Muslims are engaging and campaigning with the government. (...) Mosques, students and community members *increasingly want to do more than just give money when they see suffering or injustice*. They are now demanding political solutions and taking peaceful direct action.¹¹⁹⁸

Indeed, these words strongly resonate with what has been called a “key moment amongst INGO [international NGO] practitioners to carry out some self-reflection and some criticism as well as some business as usual.”¹¹⁹⁹ Increasingly aware of the shortcomings of the ‘aid debate’, of the issue of ‘compassion fatigue’ and of the importance of connecting and engaging with the public in a more meaningful way, the sector has been recently characterised by tensions between ‘traditional’ understandings of engagement and increasingly common calls for “the re-politicisation” of NGOs.¹²⁰⁰ Contextualised against this background, it is not surprising that the aforementioned comment by Mr. Malik was related to one the first and most comprehensive mobilising efforts by IR beyond its traditional Ramadan campaigns: the Stand Up For Syria! campaign (which I already

¹¹⁹⁷ Alice Sharman, ‘Islamic Relief UK Director Stepping down after 23 Years’, *Civil Society*, 24 September 2015, <https://www.civilsociety.co.uk/news/islamic-relief-uk-director-stepping-down-after-23-years.html>.

¹¹⁹⁸ ‘Amid Reports of 11,000 Syria Murders, Members of British Muslim Community Prompt New Approach to Strengthen Action’, *Islamic Relief UK*, 21 January 2014, <http://www.islamic-relief.org.uk/news/british-muslim-community-prompt-new-syria-approach/>. Italics mine.

¹¹⁹⁹ Helen Yanacopulos, *International NGO Engagement, Advocacy, Activism: The Faces and Spaces of Change* (Springer, 2015), 60.

¹²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 59–60.

mentioned in chapter 6). Reaching a climax with the handing of a petition at Number 10 Downing Street a day ahead of the Geneva II peace talks, the campaign represented an original type of engagement with ‘the political’ not only for IR, but also for the BMNGO sector as whole.¹²⁰¹ As this chapter will highlight, this development symbolised the most recent evolution of IR’s framing of engagement with and support by British Muslims. Notably, Mr. Malik’s own words aptly highlight how in the mid-2010s IR’s discourse is developing in light of the organisation’s growing consciousness of three main interrelated phenomena. First, a growing consciousness about societal changes occurring within its main target audience, the UK Muslim community (“the start of a significant change”). Second, a growing consciousness of the importance for IR to mobilise different sectors within that very same Muslim community (“ordinary Muslims (...) Mosques, students and community members”). Third, a growing consciousness of the incapability of the type of agency implied by the HELP US TO CHANGE THE WORLD frame (discussed in chapter 6) to cater for what it appears to be an increasing appetite for more nuanced forms of engagement and support (“want to do more than just give money (...) They are now demanding political solutions and taking peaceful direct action”).

In what follows I will outline how the aforementioned represents what is, indeed, a very recent and relatively primordial (at the time of writing) evolution of IR’s framing of support through what I call the ‘active citizen’ keying of the VOLUNTEER frame (8.2.3). Before attending to this, I will provide an overview of how IR’s discourse has been historically dominated by a GENEROUS DONOR frame (8.1), which has been traditionally accompanied by a VOLUNTEER frame mainly articulated through a ‘fundraiser’ and a ‘non-financial helper’ keyings (discussed in 8.2.1 and 8.2.2, respectively). In order to better appreciate the evolution of IR’s framing of its supporter base through the years, here (like in chapter 4), my main data is represented by IR’s annual reports, as

¹²⁰¹ Significantly, a similar approach was taken in 2013 by the other case study of this thesis, MADE, when the organisation took “for the first time in the history of Muslim schools” pupils from two Muslim schools to meet the UK Prime Minister at No.10 Downing Street. Contextualised against MADE’s efforts within the IF campaign, the initiative consisted in enabling the pupils to ask the Prime Minister “to take the message of ending global hunger to the G8 summit which he was hosting a few weeks later.” MADE in Europe, ‘MADE in Europe. Annual Report 2013/2014’ (London: MADE in Europe, 2014), 12.

these provide paradigmatic year by year snapshots of the organisation's discourse.

8.1. The GENEROUS DONOR frame

The starting point of my exploration of IR's framing of support is 2005, the year that marks a landmark in the history of the organisation's relationship with the British Muslim public through the formation of Islamic Relief UK (IRUK).¹²⁰²

IRUK was formed as a "subsidiary" entity of IR¹²⁰³ for two main reasons: i) "to facilitate a streamlined operation"; and ii) to "fund-raising in the United Kingdom for humanitarian (emergency and development) projects and raising awareness of Islamic Relief Worldwide activities."¹²⁰⁴ In parallel, as I have highlighted in chapter 4, IR's framing of the Self at this stage is underpinned by an organisational culture that actively seeks to distance the organisation from any association with 'the political': claims to professional and moral authority are consistently articulated by means of the humanitarian principle of 'political neutrality', and IR's identity is deliberately stressed as that of a "*non-political* humanitarian aid organisation."¹²⁰⁵ Consequently, by deploying a language that emphasises business-like features whilst stressing the organisation's non-political nature, the narrative about the foundation of IRUK highlights how this was originally conceived mainly as the local fundraising branch of a global NGO (IR Worldwide), rather than as a platform for understanding and channelling British Muslims' appetite for engagement with bigger-than-self issues.

Indeed, this understanding is corroborated by the way IR characterises British Muslims in these years' reports: that is, almost exclusively as an indicator to measure its own organisational efficiency in raising funds. This is epitomised by

¹²⁰² Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Islamic Relief Worldwide and Subsidiary Undertakings. Annual Report and Financial Statements 2005' (Birmingham: Islamic Relief Worldwide, 2005), 4, http://www.islamic-relief.org.uk/content/uploads/2013/05/Annual_Report_2005.pdf.

¹²⁰³ Which, in turn, will be known as Islamic Relief Worldwide from now on. Ibid., 4–5.

¹²⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁰⁵ Ibid., 7; Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Islamic Relief Worldwide and Subsidiary Undertakings. Annual Report and Financial Statements 2006' (Birmingham: Islamic Relief Worldwide, 2006), 20, http://www.islamic-relief.org.uk/content/uploads/2013/05/Annual_Report_2006.pdf; Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Islamic Relief Worldwide and Subsidiary Undertakings. Annual Report and Financial Statements 2007' (Birmingham: Islamic Relief Worldwide, 2007), 56, http://www.islamic-relief.org.uk/content/uploads/2013/05/Annual_Report_2007.pdf; Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Islamic Relief Worldwide and Subsidiary Undertakings. Annual Report and Financial Statements 2008' (Birmingham: Islamic Relief Worldwide, 2008), 83, <http://library.iracademy.org.uk/islamic-relief-worldwide-2008-annual-report-and-financial-statements/>; Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2009' (Birmingham: Islamic Relief Worldwide, 2009), 43, http://www.islamic-relief.org.uk/content/uploads/2013/05/Annual_Report_2009.pdf.

the very title of the only sections that mention British Muslims (“Fundraising Performance”¹²⁰⁶), which completely eclipse both their identity and their agency under the lens of a monetary-focused indication of success. At this stage, IR is therefore framing its supporter base through what has been called a “Market-Driven Fundraising” frame¹²⁰⁷ that conceptualises engagement mainly (and almost exclusively) in terms of commitment to financial support. In turn, this approach postulates that members of IR’s audience are mainly seen as “potential customers to engage with marketing strategies,”¹²⁰⁸ rather than as proactive citizens to engage in other, non-financial forms of support (such as volunteering or campaigning).

An implicit consequence of the “business model”¹²⁰⁹ dominant in IR’s discourse at this stage is thus the framing of support through what I call a GENEROUS DONOR frame (henceforth, GD). The GD frame taps into traditional understandings of development as a basic chain of aid/services delivery underpinned by the principle of ‘gift giving’. From this perspective, aid is a gift from ‘generous donors’ in the Global North to ‘grateful beneficiaries’ in the Global South—whether a personal gift from individual Muslims in the Global North, with IR serving as a facilitator (through its field projects); or an institutional gift from IR (in the form of its services), with individual Muslims in the Global North serving as facilitators (through their financial support to the organisation).¹²¹⁰ The GD frame is therefore linked to benevolent values and emotions that are traditionally associated with humanitarianism and charitable giving through what has been called the “traditional registers of pity as motivations for action”—i.e. a mix of guilt and indignation, empathy and tender-heartedness, gratitude and generosity.¹²¹¹ Despite its benevolent nature, however, the GD frame is problematic insofar it is based on the “social logic of the gift between unequal parties, which helps to

¹²⁰⁶ Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2005’, 15; Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2006’, 14.

¹²⁰⁷ Darnton, Andrew and Martin Kirk, ‘Finding Frames: New Ways to Engage the UK Public in Global Poverty’ (London: Bond, 2011), 117. More on this in the conclusions of this chapter.

¹²⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁰⁹ Ibid., 27–30.

¹²¹⁰ I borrow this twofold conceptualisation of the role of individual donors and NGOs as being reciprocally facilitators of their ‘gift giving’ from: Marie Juul Petersen, ‘For Humanity or for the Umma? Ideologies of Aid in Four Transnational Muslim NGOs’ (PhD Thesis, 2011), 43, <http://ccrs.ku.dk/phd/phdthesisdefences/mariejuulpetersen/>.

¹²¹¹ Lillie Chouliaraki, ‘Post-Humanitarianism: Humanitarian Communication beyond a Politics of Pity’, *International Journal of Cultural Studies* 13, no. 2 (1 March 2010): 114, doi:10.1177/1367877909356720.

perpetuate the unequal relations of development” by rendering “others the perpetual objects of ‘our’ generosity.”¹²¹² From this angle, the GD frame creates a hierarchical relationship between donors who generously donate and grateful recipients who cannot reciprocate the gift, hence binding the latter into a dutiful gratitude towards the former, whilst simultaneously projecting IR’s supporter base as a “community of virtue.”¹²¹³

Indeed, a microanalysis of IR’s framing of support throughout the years highlights how the GD dominates the organisation’s discourse through four main mechanisms.

Firstly, the GD frame is consistently evoked by characterising the IR’s supporter base explicitly and often uniquely in monetary terms as a ‘donor base’. As the extracts in table B.1 in appendix B highlight, this implies that mobilisation efforts primarily consist in adopting a fundraising/marketing approach that aims to persuade bystanders to donate for the first time, and/or to strengthen existing donors’ commitment to continue donating.

Secondly, the GD frame is systematically conveyed by a consistent emphasis on conceptualising British Muslims as an aggregate of generous individuals (i.e. a donor base, rather than a supporter base) through which IR receive the majority of its funding. As the extracts in table B.2 in appendix B highlight, support is therefore framed mainly through an emphasis on “the generosity of our donors,”¹²¹⁴ which constitute “a supportive individual donor base.”¹²¹⁵

Stemming from the aforementioned, a third way through which IR frames support mainly through a GD frame is by consistently adopting a language of admiration and reverence to praise its donors as role models in generosity and as indispensable source of material resources for the work of the organisation. This is particularly evident in the key discursive moments represented by the annual

¹²¹² Ibid., 113.

¹²¹³ Ibid.

¹²¹⁴ Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2005’, 16; Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2006’, 20; Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2007’, 56; Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2008’, 83; Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2009’, 43; Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Islamic Relief Worldwide 2010 Annual Report & Financial Statements’ (Birmingham: Islamic Relief Worldwide, 2010), 53, http://www.islamic-relief.org.uk/content/uploads/2013/05/Annual_Report_2010.pdf; Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Islamic Relief Worldwide 2011 Annual Report & Financial Statements’ (Birmingham: Islamic Relief Worldwide, 2011), 42, http://www.islamic-relief.org.uk/content/uploads/2013/05/Annual_Report_2011.pdf.

¹²¹⁵ Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2007’, 20; Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2008’, 56.

messages from IR's Chair of Trustees and CEO. As I highlight in table B.3 in appendix B, either one or both of these discursive moments have incorporated these dimensions of praise throughout the years from the moment this specific section was introduced in the format of IR's annual reports in 2007. Notably, both the indispensability and the exceptional generosity of IR's donors are also stressed by other key discursive moments. For example, as the following extracts highlight, in the pre-2010 phase IR's donors are depicted as indispensable precisely from the perspective of the grateful beneficiaries of IR's work in the Global South. This is done by emphasising thankfulness either through the beneficiaries' own voices (first two extracts) or through IR's perspective (last extract):

Many orphans in countries like Ethiopia face strong pressure to drop out of education to work. *Thanks to his donor*, Nabil and his sisters can afford to continue their education and hopefully Nabil will be able to build a nice house for his mother one day.¹²¹⁶

Asmabi faces many daily obstacles: travel is difficult because there are no proper roads or frequent transport and, to get water, she has to go to another house in the village. However, *with the help of the sponsorship scheme* and the waqf fund, life has become easier. As she explains, (...) "We survive only on *the generosity of Islamic Relief and its donors*."¹²¹⁷

The financial support the donors provide allows orphaned children and their families to go to school, have decent housing and access essential medical care.¹²¹⁸

Additionally, in the post-2010 phase IR emphasises the exceptional generosity of its donors by highlighting how they are committed to keep donating despite circumstantial challenges such as the post-2008 financial crisis difficult economic climate (first and second extracts) or the potential sense of donor fatigue that usually stems from prolonged crises (third extract):

Our UK individual donors donated even more generously throughout the challenging economic times.¹²¹⁹

¹²¹⁶ Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2006', 7. Italics mine.

¹²¹⁷ Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2009', 30. Italics mine.

¹²¹⁸ Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2007', 41. Italics mine.

¹²¹⁹ Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Islamic Relief Worldwide 2012 Annual Report & Financial Statements' (Birmingham: Islamic Relief Worldwide, 2012), 19, http://www.islamic-relief.org.uk/content/uploads/2013/05/Annual_Report_2012.pdf.

(...) throughout the challenging economic climate, our UK individual donors donated even more generously.¹²²⁰

The continuing plight of the Syrian people and conflict in Gaza contributed to the increased generous donations from the UK individual donors.¹²²¹

Finally, a fourth mechanism through which IR consistently conveys the GD frame is by emphasising its own obligations to its donors, both in terms of its accountability as a repository of their trust and money, and in terms of its efficacy in using their donations. From this perspective, IR stresses that financial transparency and commitment to rigorous governance systems have the twofold aim to demonstrate “how scrupulous we are with the contributions of our donors”¹²²² and to “maximise the benefits we deliver with the contributions of our donors.”¹²²³ (table B.4 appendix B).

In summary, the GD clearly represents a central feature of IR’s framing of its supporter base throughout the years. In addition to this, a second frame traditionally associated with the charitable sector plays a prominent (though perhaps less dominant) role in IR’s discourse: the VOLUNTEER frame.

8.2. The VOLUNTEER frame

By implying an unequal power relation between ‘generous donors’ and ‘grateful receivers’, the GD frame at the centre of IR’s discourse communicates an understanding of what development/humanitarian work is and of how the public can engage with it mainly through a CHARITY frame (more on this in the conclusions of this chapter).¹²²⁴ Notably, the gift-giving, benevolent premises underlying these frames are connected with two key concepts related to the second major frame in IR’s discourse on support: altruism and voluntarism. Conceived as the opposite of selfishness, altruism implies a “disinterested and selfless concern for the well-being and welfare of others”¹²²⁵ (in the case of IR,

¹²²⁰ Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Islamic Relief Worldwide 2013 Annual Report & Financial Statements’ (Birmingham: Islamic Relief Worldwide, 2013), 35, http://www.islamic-relief.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/IRW_AR2013.pdf.

¹²²¹ Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Islamic Relief Worldwide 2014 Annual Report & Financial Statements’ (Birmingham: Islamic Relief Worldwide, 2014), 40, <http://library.iracademy.org.uk/islamic-relief-worldwide-2014-annual-report-financial-statements/>.

¹²²² Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2012’, 17.

¹²²³ Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2013’, 39.

¹²²⁴ Darnton, Andrew and Kirk, ‘Finding Frames: New Ways to Engage the UK Public in Global Poverty’, 61; 75; 90.

¹²²⁵ Sharon Clancy, ‘Charity, Voluntarism and Philanthropy – New and Redefined Keywords for the Age of Austerity’ (Raymond Williams Foundation, 2016), 4,

the distant ‘others’ in the Global South), which lead better-off individuals (i.e. IR’s supporters in the Global North) to perform acts which are at some cost to themselves. When such actions lead to a financial cost (through the donation of money), support is framed through the GD frame. Conversely, when actions are performed at a cost in non-monetary terms (e.g. time, resources, skills), support is framed through what I call the VOLUNTEER frame.

Playing a key role in charities’ ability to perform their missions, volunteers engage in a form of support that typically stems from and lead to increased levels of involvement between an organisation and its target audience.¹²²⁶ Whilst defining what exactly a ‘volunteer’ is in our age is considered somehow a slippery task, there is a general consensus regarding the type of action conveyed by this frame, which consists of “giving of time, energy and skills freely, often out of an impulse to be ‘other-regarding’,” often springing “from a sense of shared community or associationism, shared interests, even ‘conviviality and fun’.”¹²²⁷

As the following discussion will highlight, IR articulates a VOLUNTEER frame through three main keyings, which amplify different dimensions of what it means to support the organisation in non-monetary ways. I call these dimensions the ‘fundraiser’, the ‘helper’, and the ‘active citizen’ keyings.¹²²⁸ Whilst the first two keyings are ubiquitous throughout IR’s discourse (with the ‘fundraiser’ being the dominant keying, overall), the ‘active citizen’ keying has been only gradually introduced in IR’s discourse, particularly since 2013. I discuss each of these keyings separately in the following subsections, where I also include (whenever relevant) a mention on prompts deriving from IR’s visual framing, too. Given that the active citizen keying is the most recent framing incorporated within IR’s discourse, and that it is also the one which departs more significantly from the

<http://www.raymondwilliamsfoundation.org.uk/pdf/Keywords%20Jan%202016%20docs/CHARITY,%20VOLUNTARISM,%20PHILANTHROPY.pdf>.

¹²²⁶ John Peloza and Derek N. Hassay, ‘A Typology of Charity Support Behaviors: Toward a Holistic View of Helping’, *Journal of Nonprofit & Public Sector Marketing* 17, no. 1–2 (19 April 2007): 140, doi:10.1300/J054v17n01_07.

¹²²⁷ Clancy, ‘Charity, Voluntarism and Philanthropy – New and Redefined Keywords for the Age of Austerity’, 13; 15.

¹²²⁸ In her in her “Typology Of Volunteers” in Canada, Susan M. Arai proposes the similar (though not completely overlapping) concept of “Citizen Volunteers” (in addition to “Techno” and “Labour Volunteers”). Susan M. Arai, ‘Typology of Volunteers for a Changing Sociopolitical Context: The Impact on Social Capital, Citizenship and Civil Society’, *Loisir et Société / Society and Leisure* 23, no. 2 (1 September 2000): 327–52, doi:10.1080/07053436.2000.10707534.

dominant GD frame, I discuss it more at length and outline its chronological evolution in subsection 9.2.3.

8.2.1. The ‘fundraiser’ keying

Generally speaking, fundraising is at the core of the traditional relationship between charities and their volunteer base: from a charity’s perspective, this constitutes an essential area of work because it is key to its own survival; from the public’s perspective, fundraising represents one of the most common type of volunteering among people who wish to support charitable causes.¹²²⁹ In light of these premises, and faced with a growing competition for both funds and volunteers, most charities have increasingly tried to find ways to best realise a synergy between their fundraising and volunteer base-building efforts.

Contextualised against this wider background and informed by the specific dominance of the GD frame in its own discourse (as I outlined earlier), IR unsurprisingly adopts the ‘fundraiser’ keying of the VOLUNTEER frame as its dominant articulation of this frame, overall. Quite self-evidently, the fundraiser keying resonates with the GD frame by conceptualising support mainly through a focus on the mobilisation of monetary resources. However, whilst the GD frame conceptualises support as the individual act of giving, the fundraiser keying of the VOLUNTEER frame projects support as a type of public, non-monetary engagement—i.e. the act of volunteering. In other words, whilst the GD frame identifies the private and often invisible transactional act of donating as the main locus of engagement with IR, the fundraiser keying of the VOLUNTEER frame shifts the focus on the visible, often collective and non-monetary dimension of support for IR’s economic growth.

Five main observations highlight how this particular framing enjoys a dominant role in IR’s framing of support across its annual reports.

¹²²⁹ ‘Most Frequent Volunteer Activities: Fundraising, Tutoring, Teaching’, *U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics*, 26 January 2009, <https://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2009/jan/wk4/art01.htm>; Department for Communities and Local Government, National Centre for Social Research, ‘Citizenship Survey, 2008-2009’ (UK Data Service), 21, accessed 3 June 2017, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20120919132719/http://www.communities.gov.uk/documents/statistics/pdf/1473353.pdf>; John D’Souza et al., ‘Understanding the Drivers of Volunteering in Culture and Sport: Analysis of the Taking Part Survey’ (National Centre for Social Research, 2011), 18, <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/understanding-the-drivers-of-volunteering-in-culture-and-sport-analysis-of-the-taking-part-survey>.

Firstly, the very first time IR introduces the VOLUNTEER frame in the main text of its annual reports,¹²³⁰ it does so precisely through this keying, which is explicitly conveyed by both the title (“Fundraising Challenges”) and the text of the paragraph that mentions IR’s volunteers.¹²³¹

Secondly, this keying is particularly abundant and consistent throughout the years. In order to highlight both the quantitative and qualitative dimensions of this consistency, I reproduce an extensive list of significant extracts from each year’s annual report in table B.5 in appendix B. Notably, the table illustrates how the fundraiser keying conceptualises volunteers as people who decide to support IR through a range of activities that can be divided into four main (often overlapping) action-types: i) organising/taking part to fundraising events (such as fundraising dinners, live TV appeals, the annual student-led Charity Week¹²³²); ii) organising/taking part to charitable collections in public places (such as mosques, streets, tube-stations, community centres); iii) organising/taking part to events that require voluntary purchase of items, payment of registration fees, or a donation as a basis for involvement (such as sport events—runs, indoor tournaments; bazaars; women’s only fashion show; fun/family days; bake sales—such as the ‘Cakes4Syria’ initiative); iv) raising money through pledges (such as sponsored fasts) or sportive challenges (marathons, mountain trekking, sky-diving, bungee jumping).

Thirdly, the fundraiser keying of the VOLUNTEER frame is conveyed by the fact that IR consistently refers to its volunteers within sections or paragraphs whose very titles either include the word ‘fundraising’ (all annual reports), or—even more explicitly—associate the terms “fundraising” and “volunteers” (paragraph titles 2010-14) (table 8.1).¹²³³

¹²³⁰ Outside its standard ‘thank you’ message entitled “Volunteer Help and Gifts in Kind,” which I discuss in subsection 8.2.2, within my discussion of the ‘non-financial helper’ keying.

¹²³¹ “Islamic Relief Worldwide raised funds through Islamic Relief ‘Challenges,’ events that were participated in by our volunteers.” Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2006’, 14.

¹²³² ‘Charity Week’ is as student-led initiative launched in the UK in 2004, with 20 University Islamic Societies (ISOCs) taking part in fundraising appeals to support IR’s work with orphans and children across the world. ‘Charity Week 2016’, *Islamic Relief Uk*, accessed 3 June 2017, <http://www.islamic-relief.org.uk/charity-week-2/>.

¹²³³ Significantly, in 2014 the title of the paragraph concerning IR’s supporters also incorporates two innovative dimensions associated with the VOLUNTEER frame (conveyed by the words “action” and the expression “campaigning for change in the UK”), which contribute to articulate it through an ‘active citizen keying’ (more on this in subsection 8.2.3).

Fourthly, the dominance of the fundraiser keying is highlighted by the fact that this represents the main keying used by IR to frame its supporter base in the Global North in places outside the UK. The examples in table B.6 appendix B illustrate this through three main types of prompts. First, IR often describes its efforts in building a volunteer base outside of the UK through a business-like jargon that emphasises the fundraising dimension of such efforts (“Reaching out to new markets”¹²³⁴; “Building a presence in new markets”¹²³⁵). Second, IR conceptualises its international VOUNTEER base essentially as a network of fundraisers capable of engaging their respective communities through “successful fundraising initiatives.”¹²³⁶ Third, IR does not see its volunteer-base building efforts as solely aimed to develop among volunteers a sense of affective and cultural identification with the organisation, based on shared values and suprapersonal concerns with bigger-than-self issues¹²³⁷ (as conveyed by the expression “to learn about being part of the Islamic Relief Worldwide family”), but also as a means to bring material benefit for IR through a maximisation of its fundraising efficiency [“to learn about (...) how to achieve fundraising success”].¹²³⁸

¹²³⁴ Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2013’, 32.

¹²³⁵ Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2014’, 33.

¹²³⁶ Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2013’, 32.

¹²³⁷ These dimensions of voluntarism are those that Knoke calls “solidarity or affective” and “purposive or normative,” in contraposition to the “material or utilitarian” benefits that individuals may derive from volunteering. David Knoke, ‘Commitment and Detachment in Voluntary Associations’, *American Sociological Review* 46, no. 2 (1981): 141–58, doi:10.2307/2094975., quoted in Arai, ‘Typology Of Volunteers For A Changing Sociopolitical Context’, 328–29.

¹²³⁸ Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2014’, 33.

Table 8.1 The ‘fundraiser’ keying of the VOLUNTEER frame, emerging from the titles of the sections and paragraphs dedicated to IR’s audience in the UK

	Section title	Paragraph title
2005	Fund-raising performance against objectives ¹²³⁹	n.a.
2006	Fundraising Performance ¹²⁴⁰	Fundraising Challenges ¹²⁴¹
2007	n.a.	n.a.
2008	Fundraising and local activities ¹²⁴²	Events in the UK [Unite Kingdom] ¹²⁴³
2009		
2010	The Newsroom ¹²⁴⁴	Volunteers and fundraising in the UK ¹²⁴⁵
2011	Support for our programmes ¹²⁴⁶	Fundraising and Volunteers [volunteering] in the UK ¹²⁴⁷
2012		
2013		Volunteer action, fundraising and campaigning for change in the UK ¹²⁴⁸
2014		

Finally, the fifth indication of the salience of the fundraiser keying of the VOLUNTEER frame in IR’s discourse is represented by its predominance within the imagery the organisation utilises to portray its supporters in the UK.¹²⁴⁹ This keying is conveyed by: i) the use of images’ captions that focus on the fundraising activity being portrayed, rather than on the volunteer themselves¹²⁵⁰ (figure 8.1.a); ii) the superimposing of fundraising-oriented titles (“Fundraising and local activities”¹²⁵¹) with large-size images that portray IR’s supporters in the act of conducting fundraising activities (figure 8.1.b and 8.1.c); iii) the use of captions

¹²³⁹ Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2005’, 15.

¹²⁴⁰ Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2006’, 14.

¹²⁴¹ Ibid.

¹²⁴² Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2008’, 74; Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2009’, 32.

¹²⁴³ Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2008’, 75; Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2009’, 33.

¹²⁴⁴ Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2010’, 40.

¹²⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁴⁶ Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2011’, 34; Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2012’, 21; Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2013’, 32; Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2014’, 32.

¹²⁴⁷ Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2012’, 21; Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2013’, 33.

¹²⁴⁸ Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2014’, 33.

¹²⁴⁹ Notably, significant nuances within the visual framing of the fundraiser keying can be identified over the years. As I will highlight, these nuances suggest the gradually increasing visibility of this keying within IR’s discourse, and also offer prompts that will contribute to the visual articulation of the ‘active citizen’ keying in the years 2013 and 2014.

¹²⁵⁰ E.g. “Cycle Relief in Birmingham, UK.”; “Sponsored walk in Glasgow, Scotland.” Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2005’, 16.

¹²⁵¹ Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2008’, 64; Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2009’, 32.

that frame the identity of IR's volunteers explicitly from a fundraising lens, as individuals who participate to sport challenges to raise money for IR¹²⁵² (figure 8.1.b, 8.1.c) or who "shake their tins"¹²⁵³ during street collections (figure 8.1.d); iv) the implicit association between volunteering and sport-oriented fundraising activities (expressed by captions such as: "The Everest team included UK volunteers"¹²⁵⁴; "Dedicated UK volunteers got stuck in to raise vital funds"¹²⁵⁵) (figure 8.1.e, 8.1.f); v) the central role played by volunteers in conducting IR's fundraising campaigns ("hard-working volunteers delivering chocolate cakes to doorsteps around the country"¹²⁵⁶) (figure 8.1.g).

Notably, whilst the fundraiser keying represents the main declension of the VOLUNTEER frame, overall, this frame is also quite consistently (although perhaps less visibly) articulated by IR across the years through a second nuance: the 'non-financial helper' keying.

¹²⁵² Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2008', 74; Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2009', 32.

¹²⁵³ Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2009', 33.

¹²⁵⁴ Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2010', 40.

¹²⁵⁵ Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2012', 22.

¹²⁵⁶ Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2014', 32.

This image has been removed by the author of this thesis for copyright reasons.

Figure 8.1 Visual framing of the ‘fundraiser’ keying of the VOLUNTEER frame
Sources: adapted from: a) Islamic Relief Worldwide 2005, 16; b) Islamic Relief Worldwide 2008, 64; c) Islamic Relief Worldwide 2009, 32; d) Islamic Relief Worldwide 2009, 33; e) Islamic Relief Worldwide 2010, 40; f) Islamic Relief Worldwide 2012, 22; g) Islamic Relief Worldwide 2014, 34.

8.2.2. The ‘non-financial helper’ keying

As I outlined earlier, an essential component of our understanding of what voluntarism is refers to volunteers’ willingness to share their time, resources, or skills at no cost. This dimension of non-monetary support is at the centre of what I call the ‘non-financial helper’ keying of the VOLUNTEER frame.

Within IR’s discourse, the most explicit example of this keying is represented by the standard ‘thank you’ message that the organisation consistently uses in its annual reports to express gratitude to its volunteers, which I take here as a paradigmatic example to analyse this framing.

Starting from its very title— “Help from volunteers’ in-kind gifts”¹²⁵⁷—IR’s ‘thank you message’ conveys the non-financial helper keying by combining the idea of volunteering with three words (‘help’, ‘gifts’, and ‘kind’) that explicitly frame this form of support through the lens of non-monetary generosity. This differentiates this keying from both the GD frame (which focuses only on monetary transaction as the locus of generosity) and from the ‘active citizen’ keying, which rather emphasises more agentic dimensions of volunteers’ action (as I will discuss in subsection 8.2.3). Notably, however, the non-financial helper keying resonates with the GD frame and the fundraiser keying insofar it is based on the same principle of gift giving that underpins them. In doing so, this keying contributes to conceptualise volunteers as actors who essentially facilitate (through their non-financial help) IR’s ‘donation’ of its own services to beneficiaries in the Global South. Consequently, this keying identifies IR as the main agentic actor, hence contributing to reinforce the HELP US CHANGE THIS WORLD frame discussed in chapter 4. Indeed, this understanding is clearly conveyed by the text of the ‘thank you’ message, which I break down into its opening, central, and concluding sections in table B.7 (i-iii) in appendix B in order to highlight key elements and variations within each part.¹²⁵⁸

¹²⁵⁷ Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2012’, 26; Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2013’, 12; Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2014’, 13. Whilst slight variations can be identified in the exact wording of the titles across the years, this framing essentially remains unvaried in its emphasis on projecting volunteers as a source of generous non-financial help. Variations of the title include: “Volunteer Help and Gifts in Kind” (2005); “Volunteers Help and Gifts In Kind” (2006); “Volunteers’ Help and Gifts In-Kind” (2007-09); “Help from volunteers gifts in-kind” (2010-11).

¹²⁵⁸ The formula in its entirety can be found in: Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2005’, 16; Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2006’, 18; Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2007’, 53; Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2008’, 81; Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2009’, 40; Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2010’, 51; Islamic Relief Worldwide,

As far as the opening section of the message is concerned, the choice of characterising volunteers as “the heart and soul” of the organisation on which IR “relies upon” seems (on the surface) to be intended to foreground their agency. However, such apparent intention is contrasted by the qualifications that contextualise these expressions for three main reasons. Firstly, by referring to volunteers in the third rather than in the first or second-person plural (i.e. as “them,” rather than through a direct ‘you’ or an all-inclusive ‘us’) this framing essentially (and perhaps unwittingly) establishes a distance between them and the organisation. Secondly, the possessive adjectives that follow these expressions (“its”/“our”) essentially projects volunteers in utilitarian terms as means to deliver services and operations that are ‘owned’ by IR, rather than shared between the organisation, its supporter base, and the programmes’ beneficiaries. Thirdly, by adopting an entrepreneurial tone (conveyed by the reference to ‘delivering operations and services’ rather than, for example, to the idea of ‘making a difference’¹²⁵⁹), this framing alludes to a type of contribution that resonates strongly with the nature of paid work—thus projecting volunteers essentially as a source of help in terms of free labour that is donated to the charity.¹²⁶⁰

With regards to the central section of the ‘thank you’ message, table B.7.ii in appendix B highlights how its second part has consistently adopted a non-financial helper keying (alongside a fundraising keying evoked by the reference to “fund-raising activities”) that frames volunteers as a source of non-monetary resources such as time (“by donating their time”) and free labour (through their work in “shops” and “administration”).

‘Annual Report 2011’, 41; Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2012’, 26; Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2013’, 12; Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2014’, 13. For practical reasons, and to avoid being redundant, I will not keep citing these sources in the rest of this subsection when quoting from them.

¹²⁵⁹ Which is conveyed by IR elsewhere, with sentences such as “I would like to thank everyone who has been involved in making a positive difference to so many people around the world” in the 2009 message from IR’s CEO. Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2009’, 4.

¹²⁶⁰ In fact, this will be particularly emphasised by alluding to contribution explicitly in terms “hours of work” from 2009 to 2014. In doing this, the framing resemble the “Techno” and “Labour” volunteers identified in Arai 2010, 344-345. Notably, the utilitarian dimension of the non-financial helper keying embedded in IR’s standard ‘thank you’ message is nuanced in the post-2010 phase (when the active citizen keying will emerge as a competing framing, as I will discuss in subsection 8.2.3) through two mechanisms: i) since 2012, the human (rather than utilitarian) dimension of volunteering is highlighted through an adjective (“dedicated”) that focuses on emotions and behavioural attitudes; ii) in 2014, volunteers are described as being at the centre of IR’s organisational culture (“the heart and soul of Islamic Relief Worldwide”) rather than at merely the centre of its operations.

Finally, the concluding section of the ‘thank you’ message in the years 2005-09 conveyed a non-financial helper keying by positioning volunteers as semi-professional figures “that assisted Islamic Relief Worldwide in achieving its goals and objectives,” and by reproducing the intrinsic distance conveyed by the first part of the section, with volunteers being depicted as instrumental for IR to achieve “its” (rather than their shared) goals and objectives.¹²⁶¹

To conclude this subsection, it is worth highlighting that the non-financial helper keying has been consistently conveyed by IR’s not only through its traditional ‘thank you’ message, but also through other key discursive moments, such as the traditional opening message from IR’s Chair and CEO.¹²⁶² As the following extracts highlight, this keying is conveyed here by focusing on the generosity and dedication of volunteers (“personal sacrifices”; “selfless”) who support the organisation in a non-monetary way that is comparable to the paid work of IR’s staff (“commitment and hard work of our staff and volunteers”; “the hard work of our staff and volunteers”):

As an organisation Islamic Relief relies on the *commitment and hard work of our staff and volunteers*, many of whom make *personal sacrifices in order to help achieve the organisation’s objectives*.¹²⁶³

This report presents the achievements and finances of the organisation, which show the *continued generosity of our donors*. Without this and *the hard work of our staff and volunteers*, none of our relief or development work would be possible, so I would like to thank everyone who has been involved in making a positive difference to so many people around the world.¹²⁶⁴

We thank our dedicated staff, our *selfless volunteers* around the world for all their efforts, our generous donors for their on-going support, and to all

¹²⁶¹ Additionally, it is also worth noting that until 2011 the ‘thank you’ message appeared only at the end IR’s annual reports, just before the concluding financial review. Therefore, the increasing visibility of this message in the years 2012-14 suggests a more prominent role for this keying of the VOLUNTEER frame in IR’s discourse in recent years. The first indication of this trend is in 2012, when IR chooses to visually highlight this frame by presenting the metaphor of the volunteers as “the hearth and soul” of IR’s operations in a visible circular text-box, in addition to the usual textual framing (2012, 25). Subsequently, in 2013 and 2014 the formula is brought forward within each report, in the “Trustees annual and strategic report” that in these years precedes the actual “Strategic report”. (2013, 12; 2014, 13).

¹²⁶² This is particularly significant in light of the fact that the non-financial helper keying is the one adopted to articulate the VOLUNTEER frame the very first time this was evoked in this specific part of the annual report, within the extract quoted above (2008, 4).

¹²⁶³ Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2008’, 4.

¹²⁶⁴ Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2009’, 5.

those with whom we worked in partnership to reduce poverty and suffering worldwide.¹²⁶⁵

Having outlined so far what historically have been the two dominant ways adopted by IR to frame support (i.e. the GD frame and the VOLUNTEER frame through its fundraiser and non-financial helper keyings), I can now proceed to discuss the framing that IR has been introducing in more recent years, which I have pointed to at the beginning of this chapter: the ‘active citizen’ keying of the VOLUNTEER frame.

8.2.3. The ‘active citizen’ keying

I highlighted at the beginning of this chapter how in 2014 (through the Stand Up For Syria! campaign) IR explicitly signalled a growing consciousness of the need to engage its British Muslim audience through a more nuanced approach. Specifically, this consisted in a self-reflective call for more collective, public forms for support and action than those implied by the GD frame and by the fundraiser and non-financial helper keyings of the VOLUNTEER frame. This growing consciousness can be assumed as being simultaneously both a key cause and a key manifestation of IR’s adoption of what I call the ‘active citizen’ keying of the VOLUNTEER frame. This keying distinguishes itself from the two discussed so far by conceptualising voluntarism in qualitatively different terms: not just as a way to generously support IR, but rather as a type of civic engagement that infuses the specific volunteering activity with ideas such as “collective action, citizenship and social capital.”¹²⁶⁶ Emphasising the agency of volunteers, this keying implies that voluntarism occupies a space within civil society “in which citizens come together freely to exercise self-determining collective action (...) usually driven by compassion, conviviality and fun, mutual interests and generally, a determination to make the world a better place.”¹²⁶⁷ Further, whilst sharing its intrinsically altruistic nature with other forms of voluntarism, the active citizen keying emphasises the idea of belonging—both through a sense of “collective ownership over decision-making and opportunities for discussion”;¹²⁶⁸ and through a focus

¹²⁶⁵ Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2013’, 5.

¹²⁶⁶ Arai, ‘Typology Of Volunteers For A Changing Sociopolitical Context’, 327.

¹²⁶⁷ Penny Waterhouse, ‘Thinking out Loud - The Job of Voluntary Services - What Voluntary Services Should Do, Not Do and Might Do’ (National Coalition for Independent Action, 2016), 1, <http://independentaction.net/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2015/12/The-job-of-voluntary-services-final.pdf>.

¹²⁶⁸ Arai, ‘Typology Of Volunteers For A Changing Sociopolitical Context’, 342.

on 'making a difference' within the (local) community volunteers belong to.¹²⁶⁹

Within IR's discourse, this keying seems to be the result of a process started as back as 2008, where an allusion to the collective dimension of efforts and decision-making can be found in the words of the opening message of then CEO Mr. Saleh Saeed:

None of the above [IR's achievements in 2008]—or, indeed, any of our 25 year history—would have been possible without the immense generosity of our supporters and volunteers which continues unabated even in these difficult times. Through this wonderful *collective effort*, I look forward to being able to *jointly develop our shared vision for the future* as we work towards creating a more equitable and just world, Inshallah/God willing.¹²⁷⁰

Indeed, the foregoing anticipates a significant shift occurring in 2009 in IR's work with and discourse about its Muslim audience in the Global North. As the year of IR's 25th anniversary, and as the concluding year of the organisation's first ever global strategy, 2009 constitutes for IR an opportunity for critical self-reflection based on consultations within the whole organisation and with key stakeholders. The result of this process is the revision of IR's approach to its supporter base, through a policy that includes the following point as one of its strategic priorities:

By developing programmes that *communities and individuals in the developed world can easily engage with and be partners in*, Islamic Relief hopes for a future where its core donors and supporters can *more actively participate in and contribute to fundamental changes* that are needed to fully support and empower our beneficiaries around the world.¹²⁷¹

The aforementioned extract highlights how by 2009 IR's operational framework and discursive approach for engagement with Muslims in the Global North ("communities and individuals in the developed world") is gradually incorporating new dimensions. In fact, here IR is for the first time explicitly reframing its relationship with its supporter base: from one that had been mainly articulated through the short-term, transactional ('thin') model of engagement (epitomised by

¹²⁶⁹ Véronique Jochum, Belinda Pratten, and Karl Wilding, 'Civil Renewal and Active Citizenship a Guide to the Debate' (National Council for Voluntary Organisations - NCVO, 2005), 16, https://www.ncvo.org.uk/images/documents/policy_and_research/participation/civil_renewal_active_citizenship.pdf.

¹²⁷⁰ Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2008', 5. Italics mine.

¹²⁷¹ Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2009', 31. Italics mine.

the GD frame and the fundraiser and non-financial helper keyings of the VOLUNTEER frame); to one which incorporates a 'supporter journey' based on 'thick' engagement with the publics over time. From this perspective, in 2009 IR explicitly identifies as a matter of priority the need to develop a range of platforms that can engage different types of existing or potential supporters in ways that are more participatory ("can easily engage with and be partners in"), direct ("more actively participate in"), and agentic ("and contribute to fundamental changes"). Additionally, the introduction of a more specific domestic (British) dimension in IR's discourse and work since 2009¹²⁷² contributes to convey the active citizen keying by focusing on the sense of belonging and "thick trust" at the basis of this type of voluntarism, which occurs through everyday interactions "in small face-to-face communities generated by intensive daily contact between people."¹²⁷³

The gradual incorporation of the active citizen keying in IR's discourse is also signalled by the fact that by 2010 IR starts to understand and represent support not only in concrete, monetary terms, but also as the immaterial social capital deriving from a network of individuals (i.e. a volunteer base, rather than a donor base) that can be easily mobilised on the basis of shared values, a sense of identification with the organisation, and suprapersonal concerns. This is aptly conveyed by the following quote, where a shift towards forms of engagement that characterise the active citizen keying (e.g. advocacy and campaigning) is carried out through the idea of 'mobilisation', at the expenses of forms of support more

¹²⁷² The growing salience of the concept of 'the local' in IR's articulation of the VOLUNTEER frame is signalled by three main signposts in 2008 and 2009. Firstly, in both years the title of the report's section mentioning Muslims in the UK is rephrased from the market-driven framing of 2005-06 ["Fundraising performance" (Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2005', 15; Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2006', 14)], into a framing that incorporates an allusion to local community engagement by showcasing IR's local activities and events [section title: "Fundraising and local activities"; paragraph title: "Events in the UK" (Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2008', 74-75; Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2009', 32-33)]. Secondly, in 2008 IR decides to dedicate for the first time a specific section to "Events in the UK," which is later visibly expanded in 2009: although breadth is not always synonymous of significance, the editorial choice of dedicating a whole page of more than 430 words to the section discussing IR's engagement with British Muslims in 2009 stands out in contrast to the half-page sections of approximately 200, 120, and 250 words in 2005, 2006, and 2008 respectively [Notably, the 400 words-long format will be adopted also in the following years, with exception of 2010 (approx.125 words), and 2012 (approx. 280 words).]. Thirdly, a domestic dimension is also incorporated in the first part of the closing of the 'thank you' formula in the years 2008-09, by explicitly mentioning the expression "in the UK" ["The Trustees extend their gratitude to all volunteers who assisted Islamic Relief Worldwide in the UK [United Kingdom]" (Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2008', 81; Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2009', 40)].

¹²⁷³ Kenneth Newton, 'Social Capital and Democracy', *American Behavioral Scientist* 40, no. 5 (1 March 1997): 575-86, doi:10.1177/0002764297040005004, quoted in Arai, 'Typology Of Volunteers For A Changing Sociopolitical Context', 343.

traditionally associated with other keyings of the VOLUNTEER frame (such as the delivery of fundraising or non-financial services):

Islamic Relief USA launched a Day of Dignity, a 6-month campaign *mobilising volunteers in 22 cities* in North America.¹²⁷⁴

Notably, an appeal to the idea of ‘mobilisation’ as a way to convey the active citizen keying will characterise IR’s discourse about volunteers in the Global North/UK in the following years through a focus on three main indicators of ‘success’, broadly categorizable as: i) ‘many people’; ii) ‘many types of people’; and iii) ‘many locations’ (I highlight prompts to these categories in table B.8, appendix B). Consequently, IR’s growing emphasis on the number and types of people mobilised within the UK, and on the geographical breadth of its domestic activities (in addition to the standard focus on money raised) conveys the active citizen keying by representing IR’s supporter base as a social (rather than monetary) capital to be mobilised also at the collective and public (rather than only at the individual and private) levels.

As I highlighted in chapter 4, 2011 marks a key milestone in the history of IR, with the development and adoption of the 5 years’ strategy “Faith-inspired action.”¹²⁷⁵ As aptly conveyed by its very title, the strategy introduces several significant developments on both the operational and discursive dimensions of IR’s trajectory, most notably an amplification of the faith-based component of its identity (“Faith-inspired”) and an increased focus on agency (“action”). Significantly, this emphasis signals a growing commitment by IR to engage two key dimensions of the active citizen keying: belonging and collectiveness, on the one hand (in terms of belonging to a collective community as Muslims); and direct action, on the other. This shift is particularly clear in IR’s description of its own “Campaigning for change” work, which I quote below. Here, the traditional emphasis on IR’s own agency is intertwined with a more prominent role for its supporters in terms of dynamism and partnership (which I highlight using *‘italics’*), and with an appeal to their Muslim collective identity through references to Muslim discourse (which I highlight using **‘bold’**):

¹²⁷⁴ Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2010’, 36. Italics mine.

¹²⁷⁵ Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Faith Inspired Action. Global Strategy 2011-2015’ (Birmingham, UK: Islamic Relief Worldwide, 2011), <http://library.iracademy.org.uk/islamic-relief-strategy-2007-2009/>.

Islamic Relief is committed to empowering marginalised people so that they can articulate their rights and fulfil their needs. **In accordance with the prophetic example** of speaking out against injustice, we will focus our advocacy work on campaigning for positive social change. In the next five years we will, **God-willing**: (...)

- *Build dynamic advocacy links and partnerships between communities in the north and south.*
- Influence change on behalf of the poor by raising awareness and *creating greater momentum amongst Islamic Relief's supporters* and the communities we seek to help.¹²⁷⁶

In light of the aforementioned developments, by 2011 IR's discourse presents a degree of nuance that was not visible in previous years. This is well illustrated by the following extract, which simultaneously incorporates the three keyings of the VOLUNTEER frame discussed in this section. Here, the active citizen keying is conveyed by the idea of 'community engagement' and by an explicit reference to the concept of "citizenship" (through prompts which I highlight using 'underline'). On the other hand, the extract also includes a dominant non-financial helper keying that conceptualises volunteers as providers of free labour (which I highlight using '**bold**') and a fundraiser keying that highlights the importance of fundraising work in IR's engagement with its "grass-roots" base (which I highlight using '*italics*')

Volunteers are the backbone of our work in Scotland, and we have 150 student volunteers who support our media and marketing activities, as well as help establish vital partnerships and links with other organisations. *Islamic Relief Scotland is proud of its grass-roots fundraising work, which centres on engaging the community in social, sports, and other recreational events. **As well as running a popular charity shop in Glasgow, which is staffed by a diverse team of volunteers,** we regularly work with schools to educate children on the concepts of charity in Islam, as well as cultural diversity and citizenship.*¹²⁷⁷

Notably, the idea of mobilisation introduced in 2010 is conveyed in 2011 not only by retaining the aforementioned tripartite focus on 'many people', 'many types of people', and 'many locations' (as illustrated by extracts in table B.8 appendix B), but also by framing IR' supporter base as a "dedicated army of volunteers" that

¹²⁷⁶ Ibid., 14. All emphasis mine.

¹²⁷⁷ Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2011', 35. All emphasis mine.

can be mobilised across the UK to join IR's efforts ("volunteers from all corners of the UK joined in the efforts"):

Islamic Relief has been working in Scotland since 1994, and were able to reinforce our commitment to our *dedicated army of volunteers* in the country.¹²⁷⁸

Our charity shops are the core focus for a majority of our donors especially during key campaigns such as our Ramadan campaign. What's more, volunteers *from all corners of the UK* joined in the efforts.¹²⁷⁹

Moving on to 2012, the active citizen keying is reinforced by characterising IR's volunteers not merely through a services-oriented/professional lens, but also through an emotional one ("Our passionate volunteers") and through an emphasis on agency and belonging ("to change lives in their own community"):

Our *passionate* volunteers also worked hard *to change lives in their own community*.¹²⁸⁰

Indeed, an increasing emphasis on the local dimension of agency (manifested through community engagement/grassroots work) is crucial to convey the active citizen keying also in 2013, as clearly illustrated by the following passage. Here, the global and local dimensions of IR's work are projected as two sides of the same coin: whilst IR is projected (understandably so) as the main agentic actor internationally ("our international work"), IR's supporters are the main agentic actors locally ("their own communities"), as active members of society who "change lives" through acts such as the distribution of gifts in hospital or the coordination of food banks:

Our volunteers not only work hard for our international work, but also strive to change lives in their own communities—this year, they **distributed Eid gifts** at the Royal Gwent Hospital, in Newport, and **held food bank collections for vulnerable families** in Birmingham.¹²⁸¹

Notably, in 2013 the visual framing also contributes to convey the active citizen keying of the VOLUNTEER frame, too. This is because this year's annual report features a photo of a group of IR's volunteers that are engaging in an act broadly understandable within the remit of active citizenship (i.e. the distribution of gifts

¹²⁷⁸ Ibid. All emphasis mine.

¹²⁷⁹ Ibid., 34. All emphasis mine.

¹²⁸⁰ Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2012', 22. Italics mine.

¹²⁸¹ Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2013', 33. Bold in original.

in a hospital) not merely as private citizens, but as a collective of like-minded individuals that are readily identifiable—for the first time in the history of IR’s annual reports—as IR’s supporters by virtue of their IR-branded t-shirts (figure 8.2).

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Figure 8.2 Visual framing of the ‘active citizen’ keying of the VOLUNTEER frame: emphasis on like-mindedness

Source: adapted from: Islamic Relief Worldwide 2013, 32.

Significantly, at this stage both the textual and the visual framing of IR’s own campaigning work also contribute to develop a milieu favourable to convey the active citizen keying, too. From a textual perspective, the focus on agency that characterises the active citizen keying is mirrored by an emphasis on the ideas of change, its social dimension, and IR’s capacity to effect it—as epitomised by the section-titles “Campaigning for Change. *A strong voice for social change*”¹²⁸² and “Campaigning for Change. *A force for social justice.*”¹²⁸³ From a visual perspective, the focus on civic participation implied by the active citizen keying is conveyed by photos that depict then IR UK’s Director (Mr. Malik) in the act of engaging the political realm—either by personally addressing then UK Prime Minister David Cameron to call for an increased support for disaster risk reduction (figure 8.3.a); or by presenting IR’s report “Syria: Two Years, Too Long” at a panel with UK government representatives (figure 8.3.b).

¹²⁸² The title “Campaigning for change” was introduced in 2011 (Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2011’, 24). In previous years’ reports, the title of the same section was just framed as “Campaigning and advocacy on humanitarian issues” (Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2006’, 13; Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2007’, 6) or “Campaigning and advocacy” (Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2009’, 6; Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2010’, 30). Italics mine.

¹²⁸³ Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2013’, 24. Italics mine.

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a) b)
Figure 8.3 Visual framing of IR engaging the ‘political realm’
a) the then IR UK’s Director (Mr. Malik, on the left) meets the then UK Prime Minister David Cameron during IR’s lobbying efforts at the Conservative Party conference in 2012; b) Mr. Malik (third from the right) sits at a panel presenting IR’s Syria advocacy report to UK Government representatives.
Sources: adapted from: a) Islamic Relief Worldwide 2012, 12-13; b) Islamic Relief Worldwide 2013, 33.

Additionally, insofar frames are not only conveyed through communications, but also embedded in everyday organisational practices,¹²⁸⁴ 2013 signals an important milestone in the incorporation of the active citizen keying because IR begins in this year to solidify its commitment to offer a more diversified platform for engagement to its audience. In fact, it is in 2013 that IR for the first time engages its support base as active citizens (and not merely as ‘generous donors’ or fundraising or non-financial helper volunteers) by exhorting them to “sign a petition urging the global financial powers to relieve Pakistan from its crippling external debt” as part of its efforts within the Jubilee Debt Campaign.¹²⁸⁵ And it is also in 2013 that IR starts to incorporate public campaigning within its platform for engagement, as symbolised by its participation to the IF campaign (as I already mentioned in chapter 6). Notably, this participation is framed by IR through a language that is conducive to the active citizen keying for two reasons. On the one hand, the keying is evoked by emphasising ‘activist’ ideas such as mobilisation, movement, and collective and public action directed at changing policies:

we threw our weight behind a *global day of action* on hunger, delivered as part of our work through the ‘Enough Food for Everyone IF’ partnership. We *mobilised communities* in Bangladesh, Indonesia, South Africa and *the UK*

¹²⁸⁴ Darnton, Andrew and Kirk, ‘Finding Frames: New Ways to Engage the UK Public in Global Poverty’, 34.

¹²⁸⁵ Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2013’, 33.

to lobby for action to address a global food crisis (...) 45,000 people attended the Global Day of Action event in London, UK, organised in collaboration with other leading NGOs.¹²⁸⁶

Islamic Relief was also one of 200 charity organisations across the UK who participated in the ‘Enough Food for Everyone IF’ campaign—a *movement* which pushed wealthier governments to *change the policies* that are keeping almost one billion people hungry around the world.¹²⁸⁷

On the other hand, the active citizen keying is conveyed by representing IR as a leading catalyser of collective action among British Muslims as active citizens that take part in civic/post-political forms of engagement as an expression of their faith-based duty to stand for justice:

Islamic Relief has played a *leading role in mobilising the Muslim community* along with other key Islamic agencies including MADE In Europe and Human Appeal International throughout the campaign since its launch in January this year. (...) Allah tells us in the Qur’an: “O you who believe! Stand out firmly for justice, as witnesses to Allah” (4:135) This Saturday *we were able to do this by being at Hyde Park!*¹²⁸⁸

Against this background, the 2014 annual report represents a climax of the articulation of the active citizen keying of the VOLUNTEER frame for at least six reasons.

First, the idea of mobilisation introduced in previous years (‘many people’, ‘may types of people’, ‘many locations’) is further reinforced here, as I illustrate in table B.8 in appendix B.

Second, in 2014 the very title of the paragraph that focuses on IR’s volunteers (“Volunteer action, fundraising and campaigning for change in the UK”¹²⁸⁹) incorporates for the first time clear allusions to agency (“action”; “campaigning for

¹²⁸⁶ Ibid., 26. Italics mine.

¹²⁸⁷ Ibid., 33. Italics mine.

¹²⁸⁸ ‘Islamic Relief at the Big IF London: A Huge Success!’, *Islamic Relief UK*, 11 June 2013, <http://www.islamic-relief.org.uk/news/islamic-relief-at-the-big-if-london-a-huge-success/>. Italics mine. IR refers here to its participation (along with more than 200 other charities) to the ‘The Big IF London’ in Hyde Park in June 2013, which has been characterised by evaluators of the IF campaign as a “a crucially important moment of public engagement and mobilisation in support of the campaign” Steve Tibbett and Chris Stalker, ‘Enough Food for Everyone IF: Campaign Evaluation’ (The Advocacy Hub, 2014), 4. Notably, the event can be seen as an archetypical manifestation of active citizenship insofar “67% [of participants polled by a survey] said they strongly agreed that they were attending in order to “pressure politicians to make things change” and 60% said they were there “to raise public awareness” [about international development issues].” Ibid., 31.

¹²⁸⁹ Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2014’, 33.

change in the UK”) in addition to the traditional explicit reference to fundraising—thus contributing to project volunteers as active citizens.

Third, for the first time since IR developed a specific paragraph on its British Muslim audience (in 2009), the first line of this paragraph does not have a focus on funds raised,¹²⁹⁰ but rather prioritises the idea of mobilisation by measuring success through an emphasis on the (great) number of volunteers mobilised during the year. In fact, this opening line reinforces the concept of mobilisation not only through its emphasis on number of volunteers involved, but also by adopting a vocabulary of engagement that is more characteristic of the rhetoric of active citizenship (/activism) through the expression “rallied to the cause”:

During the year over 4,000 UK volunteers rallied to the cause in Islamic Relief’s country of birth.¹²⁹¹

Fourth, the aforementioned line also stresses the idea of belonging at the centre of the active citizen keying by deliberately emphasising the Britishness of both IR and its volunteers (“UK volunteers”; “Islamic Relief’s country of birth”). Further, this dimension of this keying is also amplified later in the same paragraph, where IR highlights the novelty of two domestic initiatives it undertook in 2014: a partnership with Age UK (UK’s largest charity working with older people) to support old people during the winter; and the establishment of a fair trade shop deemed by IR to be “the British Muslim community’s very first fair trade shop.” In both activities, the emphasis on the novelty (“new,” “very first”) and on the local dimension (“in the UK,” “British Muslim community”) of these projects indicate IR’s growing commitment to meaningfully engage its British public through an active citizen keying of the VOLUNTEER frame:

In the winter we formed a *new* partnership with Age UK, supporting 4,000 older people suffering from the cold *in the UK*. At the end of the year we opened the *British Muslim community’s very first* fair trade shop.¹²⁹²

¹²⁹⁰ To clarify this point, I quote here the first sentence of each years’ section, as a means of comparison: “To raise funds for development and emergency projects around the world” (Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2009’, 32); “2010 was a record year for online giving in the UK” (Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2010’, 40); “Islamic Relief UK’s key campaigns during 2011 were to raise £1 million” (Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2011’, 34); “This was an incredibly busy and successful year in the United Kingdom. We focused on emergencies (...) – raising a record-breaking total of funds” (Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2012’, 21); “2013 was a busy and productive year for Islamic Relief in the United Kingdom. We focused on raising funds for a number of emergencies” (Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2013’, 33).

¹²⁹¹ Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2014’, 33.

¹²⁹² Ibid., 34. Italics mine.

Fifth, in 2014 IR for the first time explicitly prioritises among its “plans for future periods” a commitment to proactively “cultivate” amongst its volunteers a collective identity based on shared interests and values, in a manner that closely mirrors the thick trust that underpins collective identity-building efforts by active citizens groups and social movement organisations:

Value-driven, responsible, motivated and passionate people enable Islamic Relief Worldwide to continually increase our reach and impact. We therefore *work hard to cultivate people that are driven by the mission* to serve vulnerable communities, and actively build on the experience and expertise of our dedicated staff and amazing volunteers.¹²⁹³

Finally, the visual framing, too, reinforces the active citizen keying.¹²⁹⁴ This is because for the first time in its annual reports, IR represents its volunteers as active citizens engaging in one of the archetypical symbols of public, collective action: a march (figure 8.4).¹²⁹⁵ Further, the contextualisation of this image precisely under the title “Campaigning for Change. Tackling the root causes of suffering”¹²⁹⁶ emphasises the direct dimension of agency conveyed by the active citizen keying, by linking the idea of taking part to collective action (conveyed by the image) with the concept of effecting structural change (alluded to by the part of the title: “Tackling the root causes”).

¹²⁹³ Ibid., 39. Italics mine.

¹²⁹⁴ Although not through the image in the section dedicated to IR’s volunteers in the UK (reproduced in figure 8.1.g, which instead contributes to the fundraiser keying.)

¹²⁹⁵ Despite the original caption clarifies that the specific image refers to IR’s volunteers in the USA (“Islamic Relief took to the streets of New York City as part of the People’s Climate Change March”) the picture is significant because it could as well represent Muslims in the UK, and in any case fall within IR’s framing of its support base in the Global North. Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2014’, 24.

¹²⁹⁶ Ibid.

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Figure 8.4 Visual framing of the ‘active citizen’ keying of the VOLUNTEER frame: emphasis on collectiveness and agency

Source: adapted from: Islamic Relief Worldwide 2014, 24-25.

In conclusion to this subsection, which has highlighted how IR increasingly incorporated an active citizen keying in its discourse, I can now return to the example I used to pinpoint this framing at the beginning of this chapter: IR’s Stand Up For Syria! campaign (henceforth, SUS).

Whilst the 2014 report does not feature any images of the SUS, IR UK’s website provides significant coverage of it through the different lenses of a news item,¹²⁹⁷ a press release,¹²⁹⁸ and a blog¹²⁹⁹ from a IR’s supporter who took part in the handing of the SUS’s petition at 10 Downing Street. Significantly, these pieces reinforce the prominence of the active citizen keying through several mechanisms.

Firstly, the very title of the news item and the press release evoke the active citizen keying by conveying both: i) a sense of belonging, through an emphasis on the Britishness of the actors mobilised by IR (“British Mosques”; “members of British Muslim community”); and ii) a sense of agency, as IR’s support base is

¹²⁹⁷ ‘British Mosques Stand Up For Syria with Islamic Relief’, *Islamic Relief UK*, 10 January 2014, <http://www.islamic-relief.org.uk/news/british-mosques-stand-up-for-syria/>.

¹²⁹⁸ ‘Amid Reports of 11,000 Syria Murders, Members of British Muslim Community Prompt New Approach to Strengthen Action’, *Islamic Relief UK*, 21 January 2014, <http://www.islamic-relief.org.uk/news/british-muslim-community-prompt-new-syria-approach/>.

¹²⁹⁹ ‘My Journey to Number 10 - Stand Up For Syria!’, *Islamic Relief UK*, 29 January 2014, <http://www.islamic-relief.org.uk/news/my-journey-to-number-10/>.

represented through its ability to assert itself (“Stand Up”) and to catalyse change (“prompt new approach to strengthen action”):

British Mosques *Stand Up For Syria* with Islamic Relief.¹³⁰⁰

Amid reports of 11,000 Syria murders, members of British Muslim community *prompt new approach to strengthen action*.¹³⁰¹

Secondly, the press release stresses the direct nature of IR’s supporters’ agency (as opposed to the delegated type of agency that characterises the other keyings of the VOLUNTEER frame). This is aptly conveyed by the following lines, which portray IR’s volunteers as “activists” who have taken action “directly” and “personally” (rather than through IR itself):

British Muslims *engage directly* with government as *activists* hand in petition at Number Ten Downing Street today. (...) British Muslim students and Islamic Relief and community representatives will *personally deliver* a UK-wide call for action signed by thousands to 10 Downing Street.¹³⁰²

Notably, the framing of IR’s volunteers as “activists” also recurs in the description provided by IR for a photo album of the campaign published on its Flickr account, which states:

On the eve of Syria peace talks in Geneva, Islamic Relief *activists* handed in a petition with thousands of signatures to 10 Downing Street, urging the PM to Stand Up For Syria.¹³⁰³

Additionally, the visual framing of the press release contributes to this understanding by portraying an image of IR’s volunteers as a collective of active citizen unequivocally recognisable as IR’s supporters (by virtue of their IR-branded t-shirts) in the act of personally engaging the ‘political realm’ (as symbolised by the handing of the petition at Number 10 Downing Street) (figure 8.5).

¹³⁰⁰ ‘British Mosques Stand Up For Syria with Islamic Relief’. Italics mine.

¹³⁰¹ ‘Amid Reports of 11,000 Syria Murders, Members of British Muslim Community Prompt New Approach to Strengthen Action’. Italics mine.

¹³⁰² Ibid. Italics mine.

¹³⁰³ Islamic Relief UK, *Stand Up For Syria! 10 Downing Street Hand-In*, Flickr, accessed 3 May 2017, <https://www.flickr.com/photos/islamicreliefuk/albums/72157640111364733>. Italics mine.

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Figure 8.5 Visual framing of the ‘active citizen’ keying of the VOLUNTEER frame: emphasis on engagement with the ‘political realm’

Source: ‘Amid Reports of 11,000 Syria Murders, Members of British Muslim Community Prompt New Approach to Strengthen Action’, *Islamic Relief UK*, 21 January 2014, <http://www.islamic-relief.org.uk/news/british-muslim-community-prompt-new-syria-approach/>.

Thirdly, the news item depicts IR’s volunteers as active citizens by characterising their contribution in terms of civic engagement within the public sphere (“stood outside mosques”) through symbols of collective action (“with placards”):

Islamic Relief volunteers *stood outside mosques with placards* emblazoned with the ‘Stand Up For Syria!’ slogan, and a hadith (Prophetic saying) encouraging Muslims to act, speak and pray for positive change.¹³⁰⁴

Finally, the blog by one of IR’s volunteers conveys an active citizen keying by stressing: i) directness of action (“Everyone stood up (...) and took action”; “we continue to stay strong”); ii) the perception of being directly contributing to effect change (“our voices meant something and we were truly able to help those in need”); and iii) a sense of belonging and contribution to both IR and the British Muslim community as a whole:

As we stood outside the famous number 10, we marked a step not only for Islamic Relief, but for the whole of the Muslim community and future generations. I really understood that we were being heard, that our voices meant something and we were truly able to help those in need. (...) I could not believe that I had been part of a historic day for Islamic Relief, for the Muslim community, for our society and potentially for Syria. (...) Everyone

¹³⁰⁴ ‘British Mosques Stand Up For Syria with Islamic Relief’. Italics mine.

stood up for Syria and *took action*—and what’s more, we **continue to stand strong**.¹³⁰⁵

Conclusion

- *Specific frames and keyings*

This chapter has outlined IR framing of its supporter base during the first the decade of operations of its UK branch, IR UK (2005-14). Through an in depth analysis of annual reports and critical discourse moments, the chapter has identified two main frames.

Firstly, the analysis highlighted how IR heavily relies on the GENEROUS DONOR frame (GD),¹³⁰⁶ which has traditionally played and still plays a dominant role in IR’s discourse through four main mechanisms: i) a conceptualisation of IR’s audience mainly as a donor base (rather than as a more generic supporter base); ii) a focus on this donor base as the main source of IR’s funding; iii) a reverential emphasis on the ‘exceptional’ generosity of IR’s supporters; iv) a particular attention on IR’s accountability to its donors in terms of its transparency and efficacy in handling their generous donations. Based on the principle of gift giving, the GD frame represents a “transactional or monetised model of engagement” where aid/development is “the object at the centre of the charitable transaction” between the public (who generously donates in the Global North) and the NGO (which deliver services in the Global South).¹³⁰⁷ Conceptualised through this frame, support for IR becomes a synonym for generously giving money, which, in turn, is projected by the organisation as the best (or even the only) way to engage with issues such as global poverty. Since the GD frame

¹³⁰⁵ ‘My Journey to Number 10 - Stand Up For Syria!’, *Islamic Relief UK*, 29 January 2014, <http://www.islamic-relief.org.uk/news/my-journey-to-number-10/>. Bold in original. Italics mine.

¹³⁰⁶ Notably, this finding nuances (and, indeed, contrasts with) Petersen’s analysis insofar she argues that IR does not prioritise the GD frame (or, at least, not as much as her Gulf-based case studies: the International Islamic Charitable Organization, IICO; and the International Islamic Relief Organization, IIROSA). According to her: “Interestingly, [in IR’s discourse] recipients’ gratitude is not directed at the individual donor, as in IICO and IIROSA. When aid is a moral duty rather than an act of solidarity, there is no sense in praising the giver. This is reflected first and foremost in the fact that donors are not mentioned very often – neither in interviews nor in PR material – compared to IICO and IIROSA where discourses are often, implicitly or explicitly, directed at ‘the generous donors’.” Petersen, ‘For Humanity or for the Umma?’, 205. Whilst it may be true that “donors are not mentioned very often” (Ibid.) in IR’s discourse as specific individuals (i.e. by name), Petersen’s methodological approach (which focuses on broad patterns, rather than on microanalysis) seems to lead her to overlook that, indeed, generous donors (as a category, rather than as specific individuals) are highly visible in IR’s discourse, which evoke them consistently through the GD frame, as I illustrate in this chapter.

¹³⁰⁷ Darnton, Andrew and Kirk, ‘Finding Frames: New Ways to Engage the UK Public in Global Poverty’, 90.

identifies IR as the main agentic actor and confines the publics' engagement in the private, individual realm of charitable donations, this framing contributes to reinforce the HELP US CHANGE THIS WORLD frame conveyed by IR in its mobilisation-oriented discourse (discussed in chapter 6).

Second, the analysis has highlighted that IR also consistently frames support beyond its monetary dimension through a frame that is traditionally associated with the altruistic ethos of the charitable/NGO sector: the VOLUNTEER frame. In particular, the discussion highlighted how IR articulates this frame through three main keyings. The 'fundraiser' keying plays a central role in IR's discourse, conceptualising the non-monetary act of volunteering as being, nevertheless, oriented towards the growth of IR's financial assets. From this perspective, support for IR is understood as organising/taking part to fundraising events, charitable collections, recreational events implying donations as a basis for involvement, or raising money through pledges. This particular keying is consistently reproduced in IR's discourse, which refers to and visually portrays its volunteers mainly in the context of fundraising initiatives. The 'non-financial helper' keying also plays an important (through somehow less visible) role within IR's discourse, by consistently featuring in its standard expressions of thankfulness to its volunteers. This keying conceptualises support as a means to donate to the organisation immaterial resources (such as time), human resources (in the form of skills and free labour), or non-monetary material resources (in the form of gifts in kind).

Notably, both the fundraiser and the non-financial helper keyings of the VOLUNTEER frame refer to a type of support that is distinguishable from that implied by the GD frame (which consists in direct financial contributions), and which is broadly categorizable as a type of "citizenship behaviour" insofar it consists in donating one's time, energy, or possessions for the common good.¹³⁰⁸ However, both keyings also fall short to convey an *active* citizenship behaviour because they essentially share with the GD frame a gift giving conceptualisation of engagement, which focuses on the provision of volunteers' services in the Global North (e.g. running a fundraising event or helping in a charity shop) in exchange for IR's delivery of services in the Global South. Therefore, these keyings still identify IR (and not the volunteers themselves) as the main actor

¹³⁰⁸ Pelosa and Hassay, 'A Typology of Charity Support Behaviors', 140–41.

capable of making a real difference, hence contributing to reinforce the HELP US CHANGE THIS WORLD agency-type frame I discussed in chapter 6.

On the other hand, the analysis also showed that IR has recently introduced in its discourse an 'active citizen' keying that seems, indeed, to convey a conceptualisation of support based on active citizenship behaviour. This is done by articulating the VOLUTEER frame through a set of ideas commonly related to active citizenship, such as: i) a more direct sense of volunteers' agency; an increased awareness of the collective and local dimensions of volunteers' efforts; ii) a commitment from the organisation to engage volunteers through partnership and co-ownership of initiatives; and iii) an increasing engagement of the volunteers with the 'political realm', through advocacy and campaigning activities (such as the IF and the Stand Up for Syria! campaigns). Whilst this keying seems to have started evolving within IR's discourse since 2008, it has become particularly evident in IR's post-2011 phase (with a climax in 2013-14). In this way, the development of the active citizen keying seems to mirror IR's growing self-confidence in this phase (see chapter 4), which is manifested in a more visible role for IR's own advocacy work in these years.

- *Resonance with wider narratives*

The identification of these specific frames enable us to appreciate how IR's discourse on support from and engagement with the publics seems to simultaneously resonate with three main narratives.

Firstly, it is important to note that, being meaning-making carriers, frames tend to tap into and resonate with different 'cultures' in different ways.¹³⁰⁹ From this perspective, the prominence of the GD frame (and the web of meaning related to this frame, which includes the 'charity' and the 'help the poor' frame, see later) within IR's discourse is not surprising, given the rich tradition—narrative and historical—of charitable giving and philanthropy within Islam. Since this topic has been dealt with extensively in the literature¹³¹⁰ and it has often also represented

¹³⁰⁹ Darnton, Andrew and Kirk, 'Finding Frames: New Ways to Engage the UK Public in Global Poverty', 74.

¹³¹⁰ For example, see: R. D McChesney, *Charity and Philanthropy in Islam: Institutionalizing the Call to Do Good* (Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Center on Philanthropy, 1995); Adam Sabra, *Poverty and Charity in Medieval Islam: Mamluk Egypt, 1250-1517* (Cambridge University Press, 2000); Amy Singer, 'Charity's Legacies: Reconsideration of Ottoman Imperial Endowment-Making', in *Poverty and Charity in Middle Eastern Contexts*, ed. Michael David Bonner, Mine Ener, and Amy Singer (SUNY Press, 2003); Amy Singer, 'Serving Up Charity: The Ottoman Public Kitchen', *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 35, no. 3 (1 January 2005): 481–500,

the main lens of analysis of MNGOs,¹³¹¹ I will not elaborate on it here. What is important to note, however, is that the GD frame is particularly resonant with the (limited) ‘positive’ framing received by British Muslims and the BMNGO sector within mainstream discourse in recent years. A couple of paradigmatic examples (which I already introduced at the very beginning of the thesis) can clarify this. In 2013, research based on data from the online fundraising platform JustGiving suggested that Muslims in the UK give more than twice as much to charity per capita as the average Briton (£371 versus £165).¹³¹² The news was quickly picked up by the well-known newspaper *The Times*, which popularised it by using an explicit GD frame in the headline and the first line of an online article that respectively read: “Muslims ‘are Britain’s top charity givers’ (...) Muslims are among Britain’s most generous givers.”¹³¹³ Following this article, the GD frame was then amplified by media outlets specialised in the charitable sector, with expressions such as: “Muslim donors are the most generous religious group in the UK,”¹³¹⁴ and “Muslims Rank as Most Generous Donor Group in British Survey.”¹³¹⁵

The following year, in 2014, then UK Prime Minister David Cameron indirectly referenced the 2013 headlines and prioritised the GD frame in the introductory part of his message to mark the start of Ramadan, when he said:

Charity is one of the things that Islam is all about. Here in Britain, Muslims are our biggest donors—they give more to charity than any other faith group.¹³¹⁶

doi:10.1162/0022195052564252; Amy Singer, ‘Soup and Sadaqa: Charity in Islamic Societies’, *Historical Research* 79, no. 205 (1 August 2006): 306–24, doi:10.1111/j.1468-2281.2006.00363.x; Amy Singer, *Charity in Islamic Societies* (Cambridge University Press, 2008).¹³¹¹ Such as in: Benthall, ‘Financial Worship’; Ajaz Ahmed Khan, ‘Religious Obligation or Altruistic Giving? Muslims and Charitable Donations’, in *Sacred Aid: Faith and Humanitarianism*, ed. Michael Barnett and Janice Gross Stein (Oxford University Press, 2012), 90–114.

¹³¹² JustGiving, ‘Ramadan Donations Cause Spike in Digital Giving: British Muslims Take Zakat Donations Online’, *JustGiving*, 20 July 2013, <http://www.justgiving.com/en/SharedMedia/press-releases/Ramadan%20donations%20cause%20spike%20in%20digital%20giving.pdf>, quoted in: Gabriela Flores and Alveena Malik, ‘What Development Means to Diaspora Communities’ (Bond, 2015), 8.

¹³¹³ Ruth Gledhill, ‘Muslims “are Britain’s Top Charity Givers”’, *The Times*, 20 July 2013, <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/muslims-are-britains-top-charity-givers-c7w0mrzzknf>.

¹³¹⁴ David Ainsworth, ‘Muslim Donors Give More on Average than Other Religious Groups in the UK’, 26 July 2013, <http://www.thirdsector.co.uk/muslim-donors-give-average-religious-groups-uk/fundraising/article/1192969>.

¹³¹⁵ ‘Muslims Rank as Most Generous Donor Group in British Survey’, *The Chronicle of Philanthropy*, 23 July 2013, <https://www.philanthropy.com/article/Muslims-Rank-as-Most-Generous/220057/>.

¹³¹⁶ David Cameron, ‘Ramadan 2014: David Cameron’s Message’, *GOV.UK*, 27 June 2014, <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/ramadan-2014-david-camerons-message>.

More recently, in 2016, the GD frame has been made once again visible within mainstream discourse through a relatively highly publicised¹³¹⁷ blog by the Charity Commission, the governmental department that registers and regulates charities in England and Wales. In what has been interpreted as an acknowledgment that “will go a long way in allaying ill-feelings and even fear in the Muslim charity sector,”¹³¹⁸ the blog not only praised the work of BMNGOs, but also adopted a GD frame by talking about the “*difference* their [Muslim donors’] generosity will make” and by stressing “that all of this charitable work, this change, [led by BMNGOs] is reliant on [Muslim donors’] generosity.”¹³¹⁹

Taken together, these observations highlight how the GD frame is not only understandably dominant within IR’s framing of support in light of its resonance with the Muslim cultural and historical tradition it draws from; it also resonates with the (however limited) positive cultural imagery associated by mainstream discourse with British Muslims, particularly in regards to their relationship with the BMNGO sector.

Secondly, the GD frame resonates with a set of interconnected frames that have been historically at the centre of the development NGO sector’s narrative—and which have been increasingly challenged since the 2010s. This web of meanings can be broken down into three main perspectives. From the publics’ perspective, the GD activates the “charity” and “help the poor” frames, which respectively conceptualise donations to NGOs “as the mechanism for privileged people [in the Global North] to share their wealth with the poor [in the Global South],” through an “hand outstretched” approach to help those in need.¹³²⁰ In turn, this conceptualisation of what it means to support development work is based on and activates (from a ‘system’ perspective) the “giving aid” frame, which implies that “a direct monetary transfer from wealthy nations to poor nations” is seen as “the

¹³¹⁷ For example, the blog was reported by the newspaper *The Independent*, see: Jess Staufenberg, ‘Charity Commission Hails “Sheer Scale” of Fundraising by British Muslims during Ramadan’, *The Independent*, 22 July 2016, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/british-muslims-charity-commission-faith-donation-ramadan-a7149826.html>.

¹³¹⁸ Muhammad Abdul Bari, ‘British Muslims Recognised as the Best Charity Givers - Again’, *Middle East Eye*, 29 July 2016, <http://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/british-muslims-recognised-best-charity-givers-again-142522291>.

¹³¹⁹ Nick Donaldson, ‘Ramadan – Making a Real Difference’, *Charity Commission*, 14 July 2016, <https://charitycommission.blog.gov.uk/2016/07/14/ramadan-making-a-real-difference/>. Italics in original.

¹³²⁰ Darnton, Andrew and Kirk, ‘Finding Frames: New Ways to Engage the UK Public in Global Poverty’, 116.

primary activity for reducing poverty.”¹³²¹ Finally, from an organisational perspective, the aforementioned frames are sustained by and reproduce a “transaction” and a “market-driven fundraising” frames, which respectively: i) conceptualise support as a an exchange between supporters’ money and the NGO’s services; and ii) treat members of the public mainly as “potential customers to engage with marketing strategies.”¹³²² Notably, both the GD and the aforementioned set of connected frames outlined here are aligned with the frame that seems dominating IR’s mobilisation-oriented discourse: the HELP US CHANGE THIS WORLD frame I identified in chapter 6.

Thirdly, IR’s incorporation of three different keyings of the VOLUNTEER frame mirrors the fact that, in recent years, ‘volunteering’ has become “a complex phenomenon that is not clearly delineated and spans a wide variety of types of activities”¹³²³—a multifaceted phenomenon that is at the centre of wider debates about the interrelation between civil society, citizenship, and participation. Notably, the dominance of the fundraising and the non-financial helper keyings in IR’s discourse suggests that the organisation seems to mainly understand civil society (and its role within it) from the most common view on this aspect of public life: that is, civil society as “associational life.”¹³²⁴ On the one hand, this is because the VOLUNTEER frame is key to this understanding of civil society (also commonly referred to as ‘the third’ or ‘non-profit’ sector), which is based on organisations/networks that: i) are based on *voluntary* (i.e. not legally required) membership; ii) use *voluntaristic* mechanisms to achieve objectives (i.e. dialogue instead of legislation); and iii) attract some form of *voluntary* contribution (i.e. in time, skills, or resources).¹³²⁵ On the other hand, this is also because the fundraiser and non-financial helper keyings focus on the nexus that is at the basis of the understanding of civil society as associational life: that is, the nexus between an organisation’s capacity to deliver services and the individual acts of kindness, generosity and charitable giving of its volunteer base.¹³²⁶

¹³²¹ Ibid.

¹³²² Ibid., 117.

¹³²³ Lesley Hustinx, Ram A. Cnaan, and Femida Handy, ‘Navigating Theories of Volunteering: A Hybrid Map for a Complex Phenomenon’, *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour* 40, no. 4 (1 December 2010): 410, doi:10.1111/j.1468-5914.2010.00439.x.

¹³²⁴ Michael Edwards, *Civil Society* (John Wiley & Sons, 2013), 18.

¹³²⁵ Ibid., 20.

¹³²⁶ Paul Bunyan and John Diamond, ‘Creating Positive Change to Reduce Inequality’, in *Taking Action on Poverty. Does Civil Society Hold the Answer?* (New Statesman, 2014), 8,

Interestingly, however, the recent incorporation by IR of an active citizen keying suggests that the organisation increasingly understands civil society also from the view that sees “civil society as the public sphere”—that is, “as a whole polity that cares for the common good and has the capacity to deliberate about it democratically.”¹³²⁷ From this perspective, activities that do ‘politics by other means’ (such as advocacy and campaigning) are not only necessary to raise important questions about the nature of social and political change, but are also crucial to define the ways in which civil-society organisations (such as development NGOs) can develop the ability and legitimacy to engage the publics in the public sphere.¹³²⁸ Notably, this understanding of civil society and the role of development NGOs within it has been increasingly espoused by the mainstream NGO sector’s discourse and practice in recent years, as I have already outlined in chapter 6, through the example of the IF campaign. Inspired by this ‘new’ understanding, and aiming to engage the British publics accordingly, leading voices within the sector have stressed the importance of exposing and breaking prevailing frames (such as the TRANSACTION and CHARITY frames) and business models (built around fundraising-driven approaches and aggressive revenue targets) that have traditionally characterised the relationship between NGOs in the Global North and their domestic audience.¹³²⁹ Consequently, from the perspective of such “new-style NGOs,” supporters are understood and portrayed more like as “change agents” and active citizens than as fundraisers or non-financial helpers, with their engagement being framed around the idea of “transformational experiences, not transactions.”¹³³⁰

Taken together, these findings inform the thesis’ research sub-questions in a number of important ways.

- *Implications for the research sub-questions*

As far as the question ‘how to think about UK-based Muslim NGOs?’ is concerned, the findings of this chapter suggest that IR situates itself within what

<http://www.newstatesman.com/sites/default/files/files/NS%20Poverty%20Supplement%20April%202014.pdf>.

¹³²⁷ Edwards, *Civil Society*, 63.

¹³²⁸ Bunyan and Diamond, ‘Creating Positive Change to Reduce Inequality’, 9.

¹³²⁹ Darnton, Andrew and Kirk, ‘Finding Frames: New Ways to Engage the UK Public in Global Poverty’, 30; 37.

¹³³⁰ *Ibid.*, 105.

the organisation itself calls ‘Islamic humanitarianism’ (discussed in chapter 4) by having ‘a foot in the past and an eye to the future’.

With regards to the past, the dominance of the GD frame aligns IR to popular, traditional understandings of humanitarianism in Islam, which stress notions of charity and philanthropy (rather than, for example, justice and empowerment). This not only allows IR to meet (most of) its public where they are at (thus, enhancing fundraising performances). It also enables the organisation to tap into the limited positive cultural imagery currently associated with British Muslims and BMNGOs, thus (re)producing a framing that may instrumentally be functional to ‘give a better image’ of Islam and Muslims—in a way that, indeed, seems to mirror similar efforts by other types of Muslim civic actors in the UK.¹³³¹ From this perspective, and given the general success and historical rootedness of the GD frame and the related transactional/fundraising model within the NGO sector as a whole, it is not surprising that this frame still plays a prominent role in IR’s discourse.

However, while it is not likely that IR will significantly move away from the GD frame in the short term, a number of factors are somewhat leading IR to ‘have an eye to the future’ by nuancing its use within the organisation’s discourse and practice—as epitomised by the very introduction of an active citizen keying of the VOLUNTEER frame in recent years. One of the factors leading this gradual shift can be plausibly identified with the ‘peer pressure’ deriving from the mainstream NGO sector. As world-leading NGOs are increasingly nuancing their understanding of civil society (as the public sphere, rather than just as associational life), their role within it, and their engagement with the publics, IR has been prompted to fine-tune its own discourse and practices in order to live up to its own expectations to be a leader in the sector (as discussed in chapter 4). From this perspective, thinking of IR as a leader in Islamic humanitarianism means not only to think about an organisation that effectively delivers services in

¹³³¹ For example, in her research on the perspectives on civic engagement articulated by fifteen British Muslim civic organisations, Abida Malik parenthetically mentions IR through the perspective of individual staff members (rather than its official discourse), who affirm that IR’s “moral authority draws on sacred principles and is deeply embedded in religious identity” and emphasise how IR’s embodiment of the Islamic holistic understanding of charity can serve to “‘present’ or ‘perform’” Islam to the rest of British society (as Malik puts it) “in its best light” (as one of her interviewee phrases it). Abida Malik, ‘Identities, Islamophobia, and the State: Diverse Perspectives and Experiences of Muslim Civic Actors from Islamic Organizations in the UK’, in *Islamic Organizations in Europe and the USA. A Multidisciplinary Perspective*, ed. Matthias Kortmann and Kerstin Rosenow-Williams (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 213.

the Global South (i.e. relief work, aid, sustainable development projects), and which is particularly effective with Muslim beneficiaries in light of its ‘cultural proximity’ with them. It also means to think about an organisation that understands its Muslim distinctiveness as an asset to draw from in order engage its domestic publics (i.e. British Muslims) as active citizens that inform and shape relevant policy debates.

In turn, this leads us to the second factor that may have plausibly influenced recent development in IR’s discourse, which also informs the question of how to think about British Muslim civic engagement: the growing emergence of “Muslim active citizenship in the West.”¹³³²

Broadly defined, Muslim active citizenship refers to the increasing eagerness and capability of Muslims in the Global North to positively and proactively engage with the societies they live in, at different levels.¹³³³ Within the UK, this phenomenon has seen British Muslims developing since the early 2000s various (and often new and creative) modes of outgoing and highly confident active citizenship¹³³⁴—from lobbying and marching in anti-war protests,¹³³⁵ to organising civic activism events around the issue of global and local poverty.¹³³⁶ Self-confidently bringing together attachment to faith with ideas and practices related to belonging, participation and contribution to Western societies, this phenomenon has been described by one of the most prominent public figures of European Islam¹³³⁷—Tariq Ramadan—as a “silent revolution in Muslim communities in the West,” whereby “more and more young people and intellectuals are actively looking for a way to live in harmony with their faith while participating in the societies that are

¹³³² Mario Peucker and Shahram Akbarzadeh, *Muslim Active Citizenship in the West* (Routledge, 2014).

¹³³³ *Ibid.*, 4.

¹³³⁴ For an overview of this evolution, particularly in the 2001-05 phase, see: Khadijah Elshayyal, ‘From Crisis to Opportunity – 9/11 and the Progress of British Muslim Political Engagement’, in *Muslims and Political Participation in Britain*, ed. Timothy Peace (Routledge, 2015), 174–92.

¹³³⁵ Jonathan Birt, ‘Lobbying and Marching: British Muslims and the State’, in *Muslim Britain: Communities Under Pressure*, ed. Tahir Abbas (Zed Books, 2005), 92.

¹³³⁶ For an example of this, see DeHanas’s account of the Big IFtar, a Muslim civic activism event concerning the issue of homelessness, organised to raise donations for meals for homeless people in London and displaced communities around the world. Daniel Nilsson DeHanas, *London Youth, Religion, and Politics: Engagement and Activism from Brixton to Brick Lane* (Oxford University Press, 2016), 176-184.

¹³³⁷ Andrew F. March, ‘Reading Tariq Ramadan: Political Liberalism, Islam, and “Overlapping Consensus”’, *Ethics & International Affairs* 21, no. 4 (1 December 2007): 399–400, doi:10.1111/j.1747-7093.2007.00114.x.

their societies.”¹³³⁸ Indeed, the idea of Muslim active citizenship has been central to much of the work of Ramadan himself, who has consistently stressed that the Muslim presence in the Global North (as well as elsewhere in the world) “must be an active presence, involved in the affairs of the community”¹³³⁹ because “Muslims have a [faith-inspired] mission of social reform to accomplish, wherever they are, in their society, with their fellow-citizens.”¹³⁴⁰

Notably, Ramadan’s call to rethink the Muslim presence in the West “from integration to contribution, from adaptation to reform and transformation,”¹³⁴¹ seems to resonate particularly well with Muslims born and raised in the Global North.¹³⁴² Indeed, a growing body of research highlights how, increasingly, for second and third generation Muslims “being a Muslim means clearly being an active citizen.”¹³⁴³ More specifically, with regards to the British publics engaged by IR, recent research suggests not only that there seems to be “an overarching sense of a need to engage”¹³⁴⁴ among young British Muslims, but also that many of them are already “active and engaged, and particularly in issues that concern wider society or that impact upon a broad sense of social justice.”¹³⁴⁵ From this perspective, a growing body of evidence shows that a range of active citizenship activities (from boycotting to the socially-conscious use of new media) are highly popular among young British Muslims.¹³⁴⁶ In fact, this body of literature highlights that many second and third generation Muslims have not only developed “a strong commitment to civic responsibility and participation,”¹³⁴⁷ but have also

¹³³⁸ Tariq Ramadan, *Western Muslims and the Future of Islam* (Oxford University Press, 2004), 4.

¹³³⁹ Tariq Ramadan, *To Be a European Muslim* (Kube Publishing Ltd, 1999), 21.

¹³⁴⁰ Tariq Ramadan, *Western Muslims and the Future of Islam* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 153.

¹³⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 55.

¹³⁴² For example, in his study of Muslim participation in the Alter-Globalisation Movement, Peace finds evidence of young Muslim activists being inspired by Ramadan’s work, and therefore suggests that the activist-intellectual “could comfortably lay claim to the title of ‘chief theorist’ of Muslim participation in this movement through his writings.” Timothy Peace, *European Social Movements and Muslim Activism: Another World but with Whom?*, 2015, 89.

¹³⁴³ Franck Frégosi, ‘Muslim Collective Mobilisations in Contemporary Europe: New Issues and New Types of Involvement’, in *Muslim Political Participation in Europe*, ed. Jorgen Nielsen (Edinburgh University Press, 2013), 133.

¹³⁴⁴ Sughra Ahmed, ‘Seen and Not Heard: Voices of Young British Muslims’ (Markfield: Policy Research Centre. Islamic Foundation, 2009), 50, <http://www.islamic-foundation.org.uk/Resources/SeenandNotHeard-Complete.pdf>.

¹³⁴⁵ Ahmed, Sughra and Siddiqi, Naved, ‘British by Dissent’ (The Muslim Youth Helpline, 2014), 74.

¹³⁴⁶ Mustafa, Asma, *Identity and Political Participation Among Young British Muslims: Believing and Belonging* (Springer, 2015), 186.

¹³⁴⁷ Mustafa, Anisa, ‘Active Citizenship, Dissent and Power: The Cultural Politics of Young Adult British Muslims’ (PhD Thesis, 2015), 277, 311

often developed creative ways to articulate a “dissenting citizenship”—one through which “they sought and found ways to hold on to their sense of entitlement to British (if not multicultural) citizenship by undertaking small, strategic everyday acts, seeking to educate their peers or co-workers, outside engagement with formal political institutions.”¹³⁴⁸ In other words, whilst the nexus between the “*in the West but outside the West*” mentality and “minority consciousness” may still characterise a number of Muslims in the Global North who focus on “protectiveness and action in reaction,”¹³⁴⁹ a growing number of young British Muslims seem to be eager “to be involved in their society and to play their part as Muslims and as citizens”¹³⁵⁰ on the basis of “an emergent Muslim-consciousness [that] connects to the sorts of civic status that Muslims in Britain are *seeking* compared to that they are *presently afforded*.”¹³⁵¹

This phenomenon has particularly significant implications for how BMNGOs such as IR frame their supporter base and engage with them. This is because audiences can influence an NGO’s culture, discourse, and *modus operandi* by “interchangeably forcing, encouraging, pushing or inspiring” an organisation to adjust to their (perceived) expectations.¹³⁵² From this angle, the simultaneous dominance of the GD frame with the presence of an active citizen keying of the VOLUNTEER frame within IR’s discourse and practice can be related to its historical trajectory.

On the one hand, the emergence of IR was linked to the dynamics of migration, settlement, and social mobility of the Muslim diaspora in the UK¹³⁵³—a first generation that often gained economic maturity whilst retaining strong, direct links with their countries of origin (‘home’) in the Global South where most of IR’s beneficiaries live. Consequently, the GD frame resonated (and still resonates) well with a generation of Muslims that prefer supporting concrete, tangible

<http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/30533/1/AnisaMustafa%20%20PhD%20Thesis%2028%20September%202015.pdf>.

¹³⁴⁸ Ben O’Loughlin and Marie Gillespie, ‘Dissenting Citizenship? Young People and Political Participation in the Media-Security Nexus’, *Parliamentary Affairs* 65, no. 1 (1 January 2012): 117, doi:10.1093/pa/gsr055.

¹³⁴⁹ Ramadan, *Western Muslims and the Future of Islam*, 2004, 107. Italics in original.

¹³⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 84.

¹³⁵¹ Nasar Meer, *Citizenship, Identity and the Politics of Multiculturalism: The Rise of Muslim Consciousness* (Basingstoke, England ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 198.

¹³⁵² Petersen, ‘For Humanity or for the Umma?’, 41.

¹³⁵³ Bruno De Cordier, ‘Faith-Based Aid, Globalisation and the Humanitarian Frontline: An Analysis of Western-Based Muslim Aid Organisations’, *Disasters* 33, no. 4 (1 October 2009): 610, doi:10.1111/j.1467-7717.2008.01090.x.

projects (e.g. aid delivery, building of schools, etc.), *there* (in the Global South) through individual donations, rather than more intangible activities related to active citizenship (e.g. lobbying for fairer policies) *here* (in the UK).

On the other hand, IR's recent adoption of the activist keying of the VOLUNTEER frame seems to mirror the emergence of a new type of audience that plays a significant role for IR: those young (often well-educated) second or third generation Muslims who are increasingly articulating a Muslim active citizenship. Feeling at home in the UK, and without strong links to a 'home' in the Global South, these young British Muslims cannot be engaged only through a GD frame that implies donating money to support projects *there* (in the Global South). Rather, having to cater for their appetite for opportunities for engagement *here* in the UK, IR is gradually developing an active citizen keying of the VOLUNTEER frame that might cultivate and reassert their multiple dimensions of identity as Muslims and as (global/British) active citizens.

What is important to note is that, in light of the foregoing, BMNGOs such as IR can play (and to a certain extent, are already playing) a key role as agents and platforms for Muslim active citizenship.¹³⁵⁴ Indeed, by addressing the British Muslim publics in ways which assume that the latter possesses both the eagerness and the capability to engage in active citizenship, IR can contribute to nurture among British Muslims the skills and competences they need to be active citizens. In doing this, IR's incorporation of an active citizen of the VOLUNTEER frames contributes to project British Muslims as 'active-citizens-in-the-making'.

Informed by this context, the next chapter highlights how MADE seems to tap on similar societal dynamics in order to take discourse and practice 'to the next level', by adopting an ACTIVIST frame that positions young British Muslims as 'activist-becoming-activist'.

¹³⁵⁴ For a very recent study on how Muslim community organizations in the Global North (such as including mosques, Muslim umbrella organizations, women's and student associations, and youth groups) are already acting as agents of Muslim active citizenship, see: Mario Peucker and Rauf Ceylan, 'Muslim Community Organizations – Sites of Active Citizenship or Self-Segregation?', *Ethnic and Racial Studies* *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, no. 2 (2016): 1–21.

Chapter 9 . MADE's ACTIVIST frame

Introduction

In its list of frames currently adopted by mainstream NGO discourse, the “Finding Frames” report identifies an ACTIVIST frame that implies that “a person engaged by the NGO is seen as one to be ‘activated’ around a particular issue or campaign.”¹³⁵⁵ From the report’s authors’ perspective, such a frame is “potentially problematic” and needs “careful management” insofar it may convey the idea of support through the lens of the short timescale and the prescribed roles usually associated with the campaigns activists take part to.¹³⁵⁶

Acknowledging the preliminary nature of these comments, however, Darnton and Kirk call for more systematic analysis of NGOs’ source material in order to refine their initial observations and identify additional nuances.¹³⁵⁷ Responding to this call, this chapter engages in an in-depth frame analysis (textual and visual) of MADE’s discourse to illustrate how the organisation frames its supporter base by adopting a dominant ACTIVIST frame. Further, the chapter outlines how MADE’s conceptualisation of the ACTIVIST frame goes beyond the understanding put forward by the “Finding Frames” report. Indeed, MADE’s ACTIVIST frame overcomes the reservations expressed by its authors because it conceptualises support as an ongoing engagement with bigger-than-self issues to be sustained beyond specific campaigns, in the realm of everyday life.

Notably, the difference between the “Finding Frames” report’s understanding of the ACTIVIST frame and that deriving from my analysis of MADE’s discourse highlights how the conceptualisation of “what constitutes ‘activism’ and ‘activist’ is multiple and emergent and operates through diverse sites and processes.”¹³⁵⁸ This multiplicity of meaning derives from the fact that the ACTIVIST frame taps into different traditions, which interchangeably see activists as people ‘making a difference’ through a wide range of milieus, spanning from the labour and the left,

¹³⁵⁵ Darnton, Andrew and Martin Kirk, ‘Finding Frames: New Ways to Engage the UK Public in Global Poverty’ (London: Bond, 2011), 116.

¹³⁵⁶ Ibid., 93.

¹³⁵⁷ Ibid., 95.

¹³⁵⁸ Kye Askins, ‘Activists’, in *The Ashgate Research Companion to Critical Geopolitics*, ed. Klaus Dodds, Merje Kuus, and Joanne Sharp (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013), 528, <http://www.ashgate.com/isbn/9781409423805>.

through the activist subcultures emerged from the 1960s, all the way to the world of NGOs.¹³⁵⁹

Two main understandings of what an 'activist' is spring from this multiplicity of traditions. Traditionally, the ACTIVIST frame has been used to identify "people who care enough about some issue that they are prepared to incur significant costs and act to achieve their goals."¹³⁶⁰ From this perspective, the ACTIVIST frame evokes the image of a contentious, "rebellious figure fighting oppression in demonstrably physical acts of defiance against hegemonic regimes," driven by the aim of structural change, motivated by and organised around key ideological positions and momentous events.¹³⁶¹ However, more recent understandings of what an 'activist' is shift the emphasis on the lifestyle dimension of activism by focusing small scale, personal, everyday acts performed as a way to prefigure societal change in one's daily life (as epitomised by the lifestyle activism advocated by the Social Responsibility movement and the CYCW frame I discussed in chapter 8). Therefore, this perspective adopts a more fluid understanding of what an 'activist' is, emphasising the dynamic and often incomplete nature of the process of 'activists-*becoming*-activists'¹³⁶² (rather than on the static and well-structured nature of activists-*being*-activists).

Taken together, these understandings point to a holistic conceptualisation of the ACTIVIST frame that refer to people as agents of change interchangeably positioned on a continuum that ranges from becoming to being an activist; from the everyday to the momentous; from the lifestyle to the contentious; from the private to the collective.¹³⁶³

As the following analysis will highlight, MADE's framing of support through the ACTIVIST frame fluidly taps from different shades of this continuum. Sometimes, MADE capitalises on cognitive structures traditionally associated with the ACTIVIST frame: this is particularly clear in the textual framing of this frame,

¹³⁵⁹ Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (Cornell University Press, 1998), 14–15.

¹³⁶⁰ Pamela E. Oliver and Gerald Marwell, 'Mobilizing Technologies For Collective Action', in *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory*, ed. Aldon D. Morris and Carol McClurg Mueller (Yale University Press, 1992), 252.

¹³⁶¹ Askins, 'Activists', 529.

¹³⁶² Paul Chatterton and Jenny Pickerill, 'Everyday Activism and Transitions towards Post-Capitalist Worlds', *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 35, no. 4 (1 October 2010): 13, doi:10.1111/j.1475-5661.2010.00396.x.

¹³⁶³ Askins, 'Activists', 530.

which I discuss in the first part of the chapter (9.1). At other times, MADE brings together traditional understandings with contemporary nuances: this is particularly clear in the visual framing of the ACTIVIST frame, which I discuss in the second part of the chapter (9.2), where I identify both a ‘dissenting’ (9.2.1) and a ‘lifestyle’ (9.2.2) keyings.

9.1. The ACTIVIST frame: textual framing

From a textual perspective, MADE conveys an ACTIVIST frame through four main mechanisms that I discuss individually in each of the following sections.

9.1.1. An ACTIVIST

The most visible way through which MADE adopts the ACTIVIST frame to articulate support is by consistently using this term and its cognates within its discourse. Three paradigmatic examples illustrate well this point.

The first example is represented by the “Intro to MADE” video (which I already mentioned in chapter 7). Here, MADE conveys an ACTIVIST frame by applying this concept to characterise its own and its supporters’ ultimate source of inspiration: the Prophetic example. Resonating with the “revolutionary” framing adopted by the Ramadan Revolution campaign (discussed in chapter 7), here the ACTIVIST frame is explicitly evoked in the sentence that precedes the appearance of the text “Prophet Muhammad (PBUH)” at the top of the last scene of the video (reproduced later in figure 9.6):

At MADE in Europe we have a vision of Muslims leading the fight against poverty, injustice, and environmental damage, by raising awareness and campaigning for change, inspired by the teachings of *the greatest activist of all times*.¹³⁶⁴

This contributes to frame support through the ACTIVIST frame because it invites young British Muslims to support MADE in a very specific way: as passionate individuals (“leading the fight”) who are keen to engage in advocacy activities (“by raising awareness and campaigning for change”) inspired by the activist dimension of the Prophetic example.

Notably, whilst MADE is quite unique within the BMNGO sector to adopt an ACTIVIST frame to characterise the Prophetic example, this discursive strategy

¹³⁶⁴ Made In Europe, *Intro to MADE*. Italics mine.

seems to have become increasingly popular amongst Muslims in the Global North. A significant example of this trend is the awareness-raising campaign entitled *Inspired by Muhammad*, which was launched in the UK in 2010.¹³⁶⁵ The campaign was conceived as a response to a national poll commissioned by the agency behind it,¹³⁶⁶ which was aimed at surveying public perceptions about Islam and Muslims.¹³⁶⁷ Since the results indicated that a significant part of the British population seemed to associate Islam/Muslims with what has been called “*wrongful activism*,”¹³⁶⁸ the campaign decided to adopt a (rightful) ACTIVIST frame as its dominant one. On the one hand, the ACTIVIST frame was conveyed by the themes around which the campaign was centred, two thirds of which explicitly evoke an association with activism.¹³⁶⁹ On the other hand, the campaign adopted the ACTIVIST frame to articulate the Prophetic example both through explicit prompts (“Muhammad was a social activist of his time”) and through references to either the confrontational¹³⁷⁰ or the agentic¹³⁷¹ dimensions of the Prophetic social mission. Notably, like in the case of MADE, a natural consequence of the *Inspired by Muhammad*’s adoption of the ACTIVIST frame to

¹³⁶⁵ ‘Inspired by Muhammad’, *Inspired by Muhammad*, accessed 12 June 2017, <http://www.inspiredbymuhammad.com/>. The popularity of this campaign among British Muslims is highlighted by the fact that in subsequent years similar campaigns have been launched by other Muslim charitable organisations. An example of this is the *Taught by Muhammad* campaign launched in 2013 by the Yusuf Youth Initiative, a Muslim youth-led charity based in Dundee, Scotland. Alongside its awareness-raising activities, the campaign offers a platform for young Muslims to be engaged in various forms of active citizenship around poverty issues - for example by running a ‘curry kitchen’ and a food bank for people experiencing deprivation. ‘Taught By Muhammad’, *Taught By Muhammad*, accessed 12 June 2017, <http://www.taughtbymuhammad.com/>.

¹³⁶⁶ The Exploring Islam Foundation, an organisation “managed by a board of talented British Muslims from a diverse range of expertise (...) established in 2009 with the following aims: Challenge misconceptions surrounding Muslims and Islam; Raise awareness about the belief, practice, history, and cultures of Islam; Highlight the contribution of Muslims to society; Collaborate with like-minded organisations.” ‘About’, *Exploring Islam Foundation*, accessed 12 June 2017, <http://eifoundation.net/about/>.

¹³⁶⁷ ‘YouGov Survey Findings’, *Inspired by Muhammad*, accessed 12 June 2017, <http://www.inspiredbymuhammad.com/yougov.php>.

¹³⁶⁸ The expression “wrongful activism” is borrowed here from: Guillermo Márquez-Sterling, *Rise of the Spiritual Activist: A Beginner’s Guide for Integrating Faith and Justice* (Author Solutions, Incorporated, 2012), 35–36.

¹³⁶⁹ Social Justice; Women’s Rights; Environment; Animal Welfare; Human Rights; Coexistence. The remaining three additional themes of the campaign were Charity, Education and Healthcare.

¹³⁷⁰ “He [the Prophet] shook the underpinnings of the unjust society he lived in (...) and crippled an arrogant class and race-based system”; “Racism, oppression, female infanticide, exploitation of the weak – Muhammad denounced them all and fought against inhumane practices that had become part of a decaying system” (‘Social Justice’, *Inspired by Muhammad*, accessed 12 June 2017, http://www.inspiredbymuhammad.com/social_justice.php; ‘Human Rights’, *Inspired by Muhammad*, accessed 12 June 2017, http://www.inspiredbymuhammad.com/human_rights.php.)

¹³⁷¹ “[The Prophet was] bringing about social reforms: he forbade exploitation of the vulnerable, protected the poor by establishing regular charity”; “he championed freedom, equality, and justice for everyone.” (‘Social Justice’; ‘Human Rights’.)

refer to the Prophetic example was that supporters of the campaign were indirectly framed as activists: if the Prophetic model is represented through an ACTIVIST frame, to be ‘inspired’ by it means to emulate the same activist ethos.¹³⁷²

A second significant example of MADE’s use of the term ‘activist’ (and its cognates) to explicitly evoke the ACTIVIST frame is represented by the 5th anniversary event that MADE held in January 2015 at the Houses of Parliament. The event chose “Islam in action!” as its overarching theme, and it was conceptualised through the ACTIVIST frame as a celebration of “5 years of *activism* in Muslim communities.”¹³⁷³ The organisations, groups, and individuals awarded during the event for their outstanding support of/work with MADE were explicitly characterised through the ACTIVIST frame, as “each, through their *activism* has put Islam into action for the betterment of their communities at home and internationally.”¹³⁷⁴ Additionally, the video that was launched during the event to commemorate MADE’s five years through an overview of its key highlights explicitly conveyed the ACTIVIST frame in correspondence of its climax (i.e. the concluding scene of the video, which features the appearance of the oft-quoted Qur’anic verse 13:11¹³⁷⁵). Notably, since the ACTIVIST frame is used in the video to characterise both MADE’s work (“Using the Islamic principles of activism”) and the identity of its supporters (“activists who campaign for change”), it follows that for MADE supporting the organisation represents in and of itself a form of activism:

Using the Islamic principles of *activism* and social justice, MADE is building a movement of *activists* who campaign for change. With your support we can achieve more.¹³⁷⁶

¹³⁷² This is highlighted by the following example, wherein the ACTIVIST frame is articulated in terms of being a ‘contributor to society’: “The Inspired by Muhammad campaign is designed to improve the public understanding of Islam and Muslims. It showcases Britons demonstrating how Muhammad *inspires them to contribute to society*, with a focus on women’s rights, social justice and the environment.” ‘Campaign’, *Inspired by Muhammad*, accessed 12 June 2017, <http://www.inspiredbymuhammad.com/campaign.php>.

¹³⁷³ ‘#5YearsMADE Anniversary’, *MADE*, 15 January 2015, <http://www.made.ngo/updates/news/item/5years-made-anniversary>. Italics mine.

¹³⁷⁴ Ibid. Italics mine.

¹³⁷⁵ “Indeed, Allah will not change the condition of a people until they change what is in themselves.”

¹³⁷⁶ Made In Europe, *MADE’s 5 Year Journey #5YearsMADE*. Italics mine.

Finally, a third example of illustrating MADE's explicit use of the ACTIVIST frame is represented by the fact that in 2015 for the first time MADE also characterised its training programme (which has been traditionally referred to through the idea of 'campaigners'—see next section) as being, indeed, aimed to nurture activists:

MADE is offering a unique *activists training programme* through its newest campaign Green Up My Energy! The training programme will give you the skills and tools you need to be able to go out into the community and be confident to carry out your own environmental awareness campaigns!¹³⁷⁷

9.1.2. An ACTIVIST's cognate: the 'campaigner'

A second strategy utilised by MADE to frame support through the ACTIVIST frame is that of consistently referring to its supporters as 'campaigners'. Notably, despite they belong to the same group of related words, the terms 'campaigner' and 'activist' convey slightly different meanings. 'Campaigner' mainly describes a person in terms of his/her taking part in specific, somehow structured public activities aimed at tackling one or more specific issues, often through the mediation of an organisation or a group of individuals (e.g. (s)he took part in the union's campaign for better wages).¹³⁷⁸ 'Activist' represents a more overarching concept (and, for this reason, it can also better represent a frame), which comprises a web of meanings related not just to a specific type of action, campaign, issue, or organisation, but is more broadly linked to an individual's values and beliefs about social change, one's self-consciousness as an agentic actor, and the resulting behavioural choices—whether in the private realm of everyday life, or in the public arena of civic life (e.g.: (s)he is a green activist). In other words, whilst not every activist is necessarily also a campaigner, all campaigners may be validly considered as activists.

From this perspective, MADE's consistent use of the term 'campaigner' to characterise its supporters implicitly evokes an ACTIVIST frame by virtue of the proximity between the two terms and because the ACTIVIST frame does, indeed, incorporate the idea of 'campaigner'. Two significant examples clearly illustrate this strategy.

¹³⁷⁷ 'Manchester Activist Training', *MADE*, 19 August 2015, <https://www.made.ngo/updates/news/item/activist>. Italics mine.

¹³⁷⁸ 'Campaigner', *Cambridge English Dictionary*, accessed 12 June 2017, <http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/campaigner>.

The first example is represented by the fact that MADE has traditionally referred to the audiences of its training programmes as ‘campaigners’. The clearest instance of this type is the “Ultimate Campaigners” training programme, which MADE launched in parallel with its “Islam in action!” toolkit. MADE’s description of the programme conveys an ACTIVIST frame by characterising MADE’ supporters as skilled (“campaigning and leadership skills”), successful (“as campaign leaders”), agentic actors (“they planned and delivered their own campaigns”) that campaign on behalf/with the support of the organisation (“our campaigners”; “our young campaigners”):

In 2010-11, we partnered up with Oxfam GB to develop Islam in Action: The Ultimate Campaign Toolkit—a unique resource to help equip young Muslims with the skills and information they need to become *successful campaigners* on global poverty issues. We launched the Toolkit in June 2011 with the *Ultimate Campaigner* programme—training 10 young people in *campaigning and leadership skills*, and pairing them up with mentors from Oxfam GB and MADE in Europe while they *planned and delivered their own campaigns* on global poverty issues over the summer. With the support of the Ultimate Campaign Toolkit, *our campaigners* enjoyed considerable *campaign successes*. (...) The summer ended with a public launch of the Ultimate Campaign Toolkit in the House of Lords, hosted by Baroness Dean of Thornton-le-Fylde, where *our young campaigners* spoke to a crowd of MPs, Lords, charity representatives and community leaders about their experiences *as campaign leaders*.¹³⁷⁹

The second example of MADE’s consistent characterisation of its audience as campaigners is represented by the fact that this approach is adopted by MADE to refer to its supporters’ active engagement in a number of fields (rather than just with a specific campaign). The following extracts illustrate this point, evoking an ACTIVIST frame by projecting MADE’s supporters as ‘campaigners’ that interchangeably: i) carry out acts of everyday activism; ii) publicly voice their concerns over “current injustices”; iii) take part in collective action; iv) engage the political realm; v) mobilise communities and put pressure on political representatives:

¹³⁷⁹ MADE in Europe, ‘MADE in Europe. Annual Report 2011/2012’ (London: MADE in Europe, 2012), 9. Italics mine.

- i. If you have ever worn a red bracelet on World Aids Day, had a chat with your mates about climate change or added some Fairtrade bananas to your weekly shop, then you are already a *campaigner!*¹³⁸⁰
- ii. *Our campaigners* formulated a statement expressing their concern over the current injustices in the cotton trade.¹³⁸¹
- iii. DEC 2009 MADE'S FIRST PROTEST! [MADE] *Campaigners* join Christian Aid delegation to the UN Climate Summit in Copenhagen.¹³⁸²
- iv. SEPT 2010 STAND UP FOR OUR MOTHERS! [MADE] *Campaigners* demonstrate outside Parliament for improved global maternal health in lead up to UN Summit¹³⁸³
- v. MADE & THE IF CAMPAIGN (...) [MADE] Trained 50 *campaigners* who held events and lobbied their MPs¹³⁸⁴

9.1.3. The ACTIVIST's role: take action!

A third mechanism through which MADE conveys the ACTIVIST frame is by consistently encouraging its audience to engage in the core element of any understanding of what an 'activist' does: taking action.

I already highlighted in chapter 5 how MADE's emphasis on Muslims' responsibility to take action conveys a consciousness of agency that contributes to articulate the organisation's identity through the MOVEMENT frame. Further, in chapter 7 I discussed how the Ramadan Revolution campaign represents an archetype of MADE's invitation to take action across a wide range of life-areas, through the principle of individualised collective action. In and of themselves, these findings already highlight that MADE understands and frames its audience mainly as activists that it aims to mobilise into taking some form of action.

Additionally, it is also important to note here that MADE's invitation to take action does not completely preclude the co-existence of the ACTIVIST frame with other forms of support or engagement. This is highlighted by statements like the following, which imply that 'taking action' is understood not only as a platform for 'thick' activism ("campaigning"), but also as a means to engage young British Muslims in 'thinner' forms of engagement ("education and volunteering"):

¹³⁸⁰ MADE in Europe and Oxfam GB, 'Islam in Action! The Ultimate Campaign Toolkit' (London: MADE in Europe, 2011), 10. Italics mine.

¹³⁸¹ MADE in Europe, 'Annual Report 2012', 11. Italics mine.

¹³⁸² MADE in Europe, 'MADE in Europe. Annual Report 2013/2014' (London: MADE in Europe, 2014), 4. Italics mine.

¹³⁸³ Ibid. Italics mine.

¹³⁸⁴ Ibid., 6. Italics mine.

MADE in Europe aims to inspire and mobilise young Muslims *to take action* against global poverty and injustice through campaigning, education and volunteering.¹³⁸⁵

The aforementioned highlights that, despite its dominant role, the ACTIVIST frame does not completely jettison the VOLUNTEER frame (discussed with regards to IR in chapter 8) within MADE's discourse. However, the ACTIVIST frame does explicitly challenge the other frame commonly used within the BMNGO sector (which is dominant in IR's discourse, as discussed in chapter 8): the GENEROUS DONOR frame. Indeed, as the following extracts highlight, the GD frame is considered by MADE to be representative of a type of engagement that is deemed to be insufficient from both a utilitarian lens (i.e. in terms of its impact in tackling bigger-than-self issues) and from a faith-based perspective (i.e. in terms of the framework outlined by Islamic principles):

*We believe Islam advocates for more than just giving to charity; we are called upon as citizens, people of faith and as human beings, to stand up and take action against the injustice and suffering experienced by over 3 billion people worldwide.*¹³⁸⁶

*We believe that making a stand in the fight against poverty means more than just fundraising or paying our zakat (2.5% of annual wealth) - it is about promoting justice, equality, peace and human rights which are rooted in the traditions of Islam.*¹³⁸⁷

*Whilst paying our Zakat, providing for the poor during Ramadan and performing Qurbani are all ways that we can alleviate poverty, Allah asks us to do more than that. He demands that as witnesses to the suffering in the world, we must speak out and raise awareness of injustice. The Prophet (PBUH) commanded us to be proactive citizens reminding us that change starts with us. As Muslims, we must set an example to others by acting in a fair, honest and ethical way. So whether through actions, speaking out, or having the will to create change, we all have a duty to make a difference to the lives of people in developing countries.*¹³⁸⁸

In other words, MADE challenges the GD frame that it perceives to be prevalent within the BMNGO sector through an ACTIVIST frame that implies “do[ing] more”

¹³⁸⁵ MADE in Europe and Oxfam GB, 'Islam in Action! The Ultimate Campaign Toolkit', 43. Italics mine.

¹³⁸⁶ Ibid., 5. Italics mine.

¹³⁸⁷ MADE in Europe, 'MADE in Europe. Annual Review 2009/2010' (London: MADE in Europe, 2010), sec. 'What is MADE in Europe'. Italics mine.

¹³⁸⁸ MADE in Europe and Oxfam GB, 'Islam in Action! The Ultimate Campaign Toolkit', 11. Italics mine.

than just donating to initiatives commonly promoted by BMNGOs (alluded to by the references to “fundraising,” “paying zakat,” “providing for the poor during Ramadan” and “performing Qurbani”¹³⁸⁹). Rather, MADE calls upon British Muslims to become activists (or, at least, “to be proactive citizens”) who “stand up and take action” and “make a difference” not through their donations or altruistic behaviour, but through “actions, speaking out, or [by] having the will to create change.”

9.1.4. The ACTIVIST, the MOVEMENT, and the ‘fight’ metaphor

The fourth and final mechanism through which MADE conveys the ACTIVIST frame stems from the organisation’s use of two cognitive structures already mentioned in chapter 5: the MOVEMENT frame and the ‘fight’ metaphor (FM).

I have outlined in the introduction of this chapter how traditional understandings of what an ‘activist’ is imply a contentious, confrontational dimension of opposition to specific structural and/or cultural forces. I have also discussed in chapter 5 how a similar understanding (i.e. the notion of a confrontation of some sort) is traditionally associated with the idea of ‘movement’, and I have illustrated how MADE frames its organisational identity through this frame through different mechanisms. Here, it is also important to note that (partially because of this shared allusion to a contentious dimension) the ACTIVIST and the MOVEMENT frames are inherently connected with each other. In fact, activists traditionally perform their activism as members of a wider movement; and movements are traditionally initiated and sustained by people who perceive themselves or can be described as activists. Like in other cases of widely held associations between ideas and frames, the titles of books on this subject offer a case point to illustrate the pervasiveness of such association in popular discourse.¹³⁹⁰ From this

¹³⁸⁹ Qurbani (or Udhiyah) refers to the sacrifice of an animal performed by Muslims during the period of Eid ul Adha (Festival of the Sacrifice), from the morning of the 10th to sunset of the 12th Dhul-Hijjah, the 12th lunar month of the Islamic calendar. The sacrifice is performed by each of the pilgrims performing the Hajj (the pilgrimage to Mecca) and by Muslims throughout the world who participate vicariously in this ritual by performing their own sacrifices at home. ‘Hajj’, *Oxford Islamic Studies Online*, accessed 12 June 2017, <http://oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e771>.

¹³⁹⁰ Examples of books’ titles highlighting the nexus between the MOVEMENT and the ACTIVIST frames include: Sarah Maddison and Sean Scalmer, *Activist Wisdom: Practical Knowledge and Creative Tension in Social Movements* (UNSW Press, 2006); Stephen Valocchi, *Social Movements and Activism in the USA* (Routledge, 2009); Nora Gallagher and Lisa Myers, *Tools for Grassroots Activists: Best Practices for Success in the Environmental Movement* (Publishing Group WEST, 2016).

perspective, the very fact that MADE frames itself as a MOVEMENT contributes to reinforce the framing of support through the ACTIVIST frame.

Additionally, the co-activation of the MOVEMENT and the ACTIVIST frames in MADE's discourse (to frame the identity of the organisation and of its supporters, respectively) can also be seen as the result of MADE's consistent adoption of the 'fight' metaphor (FM). This is because the FM taps into the confrontational dimension traditionally associated with both the MOVEMENT and the ACTIVIST frames. From this perspective, the FM conveys a web of meanings associated with traditional understandings of what an 'activist' is, which incorporates the allusion to some type of contentious action and the involvement of hot emotions, "deeply felt passions and value commitments that motivate [such] action."¹³⁹¹ In turn, the web of meanings conveyed by the FM can neither be encapsulated by the 'warm' kind-heartedness conveyed by the VOLUNTEER frame, nor by the 'cold' monetary benevolence evoked by the GENEROUS DONOR frame (which are adopted by Islamic Relief in its own framing of support, as discussed in chapter 8). Instead, by projecting supporters as emotional "actors [that] are actually "hot," or passionate about their causes,"¹³⁹² the FM contributes to frame support through the ACTIVIST frame.

I already discussed in chapter 6 (6.4) how MADE consistently adopts the FM at the macro-, meso-, and micro-levels of its discourse. In the same chapter I also used examples from the discourse of the advocacy NGO War on Want (WOW) to further elucidate the association between the FM and the MOVEMENT frame. Building on that finding (i.e. MADE's consistent adoption of the FM) and on that comparison (i.e. WOW's discourse as a case in point), here I use one more time examples from WOW's discourse to elucidate how the adoption of the FM contributes to activate the ACTIVIST frame.

The association between the FM and the ACTIVIST frame is particularly evident in WOW's latest 'manifesto', which incorporates the FM in its very title: "*fighting for justice, mobilising for change.*"¹³⁹³ As the following passages from the document highlight, WOW's supporters are not only framed through an explicit

¹³⁹¹ Myra Marx Ferree and David A. Merrill, 'Hot Movements, Cold Cognition: Thinking about Social Movements in Gendered Frames', *Contemporary Sociology* 29, no. 3 (2000): 457.

¹³⁹² Ibid.

¹³⁹³ 'Fighting for Justice, Mobilising for Change. War on Want Strategic Framework 2015-2020' (War on Want, May 2015), <http://www.waronwant.org/resources/fighting-justice-mobilising-change>. Italics mine.

ACTIVIST frame (I highlight these occurrences using '*italics*'), but also through a FM (which I highlight using '**bold**') that projects them as individuals who “join forces”, “engage (...) in the struggle” and “fight for a better world”:

War on Want is a membership organisation of people who are committed to social justice. Tens of thousands of members, supporters and *activists* give their time and money to take part in War on Want's work each year. Many hundreds of thousands **join forces** in the social movements, trade unions and workers' organisations that are War on Want's partners around the world.¹³⁹⁴

[increasing WOW's impact and influence] also requires us to deepen our membership and supporter base still further, building on the success of recent years so as to engage a new generation of *activists* in the **struggle**. We look forward to meeting these challenges, and we welcome all who will join us in the **fight** for a better world.¹³⁹⁵

War on Want knows that only political action can bring long-term, transformative change. (...) We will reach out to develop new alliances with progressive **forces**, at the same time as developing War on Want's own *activist base* for the future.¹³⁹⁶

These examples highlight how the FM can activate the ACTIVIST frame by emphasising the potentially contentious undertone of a specific type of support. Indeed, WOW's ethos represents the exception, rather than the norm, within the NGO sector—something that WOW self-consciously acknowledges by defining itself as “a unique organisation”¹³⁹⁷ that purposely stresses its identity as “political” and “courageous.”¹³⁹⁸ Regardless of WOW's specificities, however, what is important to note here is that the FM can be adopted by advocacy NGOs (such as MADE) to convey a specific understanding of support. From this perspective, the FM and the ACTIVIST frame adopted by WOW and MADE conceptualise support by identifying direct action by ordinary people (rather than charitable or altruistic initiatives mediated by NGOs) as “the most effective way to bring about the type of change that can challenge the structures of poverty and injustice in the long term.”¹³⁹⁹

¹³⁹⁴ Ibid., 2. Italics mine.

¹³⁹⁵ Ibid. Italics mine.

¹³⁹⁶ Ibid. Italics mine.

¹³⁹⁷ Ibid., 3.

¹³⁹⁸ Ibid., 19.

¹³⁹⁹ 'War on Want and Charity Law', *War On Want*, 26 September 2016, <http://www.waronwant.org/war-want-and-charity-law>.

Notably, if WOW represents an exception within the mainstream NGO sector with regards to its consistent use of the FM and the ACTIVIST frame, MADE seems to mirror such uniqueness within the BMNGO sector. In fact, the latter has only very recently started to incorporate the FM within its own discourse, often only in a secondary and/or extemporaneous manner. The biggest actor in the sector and other case study of this thesis—Islamic Relief (IR)—offers a particularly elucidative case in point. In 2016, IR incorporated the FM in the conclusion of its Ramadan campaign (entitled SubhanAllah), which confidently stated: “Together we are winning the fight against poverty.”¹⁴⁰⁰ In 2014, the FM was given for the first time significant visibility among IR’s annual reports through an opening statement that back-projected this framing to the whole of IR’s existence:

As salamu alaykum Peace be upon you all. Islamic Relief Worldwide marked three decades of *fighting poverty and suffering* in 2014.¹⁴⁰¹

Additionally, the FM was adopted in the “Where we work” section of IR World Wide’s website, with the title: “*Fighting poverty and suffering worldwide.*”¹⁴⁰² Finally, perhaps the most notable example of IR’s incorporation of the FM in recent years is through the title of its 2013 Ramadan campaign, the War on Hunger, which I discussed in detail in chapter 6.

However important, these occurrences of the FM in IR’s discourse remain extemporaneous when compared to the consistency adopted by MADE (which I highlighted in chapter 5), thereby falling short of activating the ACTIVIST frame. This point is well illustrated by the War on Hunger campaign. In fact, despite the visible incorporation of the FM in its very title, the campaign conveyed a relatively weak agency-type frame (the HELP US CHANGE THIS WORLD frame), which postulates charitable giving as the main (if not only) type of engagement—and therefore conceptualises support through a GENEROS DONOR (rather than an ACTIVIST) frame (as I discussed in chapter 6). Somehow paradoxically, however, the inherent association between the FM and the ACTIVIST frame

¹⁴⁰⁰ ‘SubhanAllah We’re Winning!’, *Islamic Relief UK*, 14 May 2016, <http://www.islamic-relief.org.uk/feedback/subhanallah-were-winning/>.

¹⁴⁰¹ Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Islamic Relief Worldwide 2014 Annual Report & Financial Statements’ (Birmingham: Islamic Relief Worldwide, 2014), 4, <http://library.iracademy.org.uk/islamic-relief-worldwide-2014-annual-report-financial-statements/>. Italics mine.

¹⁴⁰² ‘Where We Work’, *Islamic Relief Worldwide*, accessed 11 June 2017, <http://www.islamic-relief.org/where-we-work/>. Italics mine.

discussed in this section is corroborated precisely by the fact that IR's increasing use of the FM in recent years has been accompanied by a growing salience of what can be considered a cognate of the ACTIVIST frame: the 'active citizen' keying of the VOLUNTEER frame (which I discussed in chapter 8).¹⁴⁰³

In summary, so far this chapter has highlighted that MADE consistently frames support through an ACTIVIST frame, by adopting at least four main textual devices: i) explicitly mentioning the term 'activist'; ii) using the cognate term 'campaigner'; iii) consistently inviting the audience to 'take action'; iv) incorporating the MOVEMENT frame and the 'fight' metaphor.

In the next part of the chapter I will focus on how MADE conveys the ACTIVIST frame visually. This will also help to identify two keyings of this frame, which I call the 'dissenting' (9.2.1) and the 'lifestyle' (9.2.2) keyings.

9.2. The ACTIVIST frame: visual framing

From a visual perspective, MADE's conveys the ACTIVIST frame through two types of angles that can be characterised as the 'dissenting' and the 'lifestyle' keyings. The former taps into more traditional understandings of what an 'activist' is, emphasising its contentious, collective, and public dimension. The latter resonates with more contemporary understandings that focus on the

¹⁴⁰³ Space limitations preclude here a comprehensive overview of the use of the FM within the BMNGO sector as a whole. However, it is indicative to pinpoint here how the second biggest BNGO, Muslim Aid, has also recently started to incorporate the FM within its discourse. Two examples include a press release entitled "Fighting poverty to end hunger: Muslim Aid's message on world hunger day" and a blog entitled "Muslim Aid - a charity fighting inequality to help reduce poverty" "Fighting Poverty to End Hunger: Muslim Aid's Message on World Hunger Day", *Muslim Aid*, accessed 12 June 2017, <https://www.muslimaid.org/media-centre/press-release/fighting-poverty-to-end-hunger-muslim-aids-message-on-world-hunger-day/>; 'Muslim Aid- A Charity Fighting Inequality to Help Reduce Poverty', *Muslim Aid*, accessed 12 June 2017, <https://www.muslimaid.org/media-centre/blog/muslim-aid--a-charity-fighting-inequality-to-help-reduce-poverty/>. The former was published on the organisation's website on the occasion of World Hunger Day 2013 (as part of its work as a member of the IF campaign coalition) and does not elaborate the FM beyond to the title. The latter represents a richer example, but has a less prominent/official status by virtue of being a blog, rather than a press release. In addition, Muslim Aid has also started to incorporate the FM not only to conceptualise its development work, but also to articulate monetary and voluntaristic support for its activities:

Just £3 a month *fight*s the battle against diseases. Start your regular contributions with Muslim Aid today and *help Muslim Aid in the fight against poverty*. 'Regular Giving', *Muslim Aid*, accessed 12 June 2017, <https://www.muslimaid.org/what-we-do/regular-giving/>.

Run, walk or jump towards your goals *in the fight against poverty* by taking on a Muslim Aid challenge! 'Challenges', *Muslim Aid*, accessed 12 June 2017, <https://www.muslimaid.org/challenges1/>.

Notably, whilst the aforementioned examples indicate a growing salience of FM in Muslim Aid's discourse, they remain extemporaneous efforts, as suggested by the fact that no allusion to the FM is made in any of the organisation's annual reports for the period 2010-14.

noncontentious, individual, and private dimension of activism (such as those embraced by the Social Responsibility movement discussed in chapter 7).

9.2.1. The ‘dissenting’ keying of the ACTIVIST frame

MADE visually articulates the ‘dissenting’ keying of the ACTIVIST frame both through photos and illustrations. I analyse these separately in the following two sections.

9.2.1.1. Photos

MADE’s photographic repertoire often depicts supporters of the organisation within the archetypical context of contentious activism (i.e. demonstrations and marches), in association with readily identifiable symbols of this type of collective action (such as placards and the megaphone)—in other words, as activists who are “caught in the act of protest.”¹⁴⁰⁴ In doing so, this visual framing conveys the ACTIVIST frame through what I call a ‘dissenting’ keying.

Figure 9.1.a and 9.1.b are particularly significant examples to illustrate this framing.

The photos in figure 9.1.a recur in several instances within MADE’s discourse¹⁴⁰⁵ and refer to an important moment in its history as they depict what the organisation emphatically describes in its 5th anniversary’s timeline as “MADE’S FIRST PROTEST!”¹⁴⁰⁶ More specifically, the images depicts four MADE’s supporters who took part to a trip organised by the organisation (in partnership with Christian Aid) to join the demonstrations held in Copenhagen during the 2009 UN Climate Change Summit, which aimed to pressure world leaders to reach an agreement on a new global climate treaty to replace the Kyoto Protocol.

¹⁴⁰⁴ I borrow this expression from a recent collaborative research project on collective action, entitled “Caught in the act of protest: Contextualizing contestation.” ‘Protest Survey’, *Protest Survey*, accessed 12 June 2017, <http://www.protestsurvey.eu/>.

¹⁴⁰⁵ MADE in Europe, ‘Annual Report 2010’, 5,6; MADE in Europe, ‘MADE in Europe. Annual Report 2012/2013’ (London: MADE in Europe, 2013) back cover; MADE in Europe and Oxfam GB, ‘Islam in Action! The Ultimate Campaign Toolkit’, 12.

¹⁴⁰⁶ MADE in Europe, ‘Annual Report 2014’, 4.

This image has been removed by the author of this thesis for copyright reasons.

a)

b)

Figure 9.1 Visual framing of the 'dissenting' keying of the ACTIVIST frame: emphasis on the collective dimension of agency

a) images from MADE's involvement in the demonstrations held in Copenhagen during the 2009 UN Climate Change Summit; b) images from MADE's participation to the UN-led awareness campaign on MDGs entitled 'Stand Up & Take Action'

Sources: adapted from: a) MADE in Europe 2010, 5-6; MADE in Europe and Oxfam GB 2011, 12; b) 'About', MADE, accessed July 23 2016, <https://www.made.ngo/about>; MADE in Europe and Oxfam GB 2011, 7.

In and of itself, Copenhagen represented a crucial moment of dissenting collective action in the early 2010s. A diverse range of civil society actors from all Europe,¹⁴⁰⁷ grassroots social movements from the Global South,¹⁴⁰⁸ international NGOs,¹⁴⁰⁹ and concerned individuals participated the mobilisation, which brought together between 40000 and 100000 people to march through the streets of the Danish capital to express dissent by "protest[ing] against/lobby[ing] the United Nations "COP15".¹⁴¹⁰ In light of this, representations of this historical moment are intrinsically prone to convey a dissenting keying of the ACTIVIST frame.¹⁴¹¹

¹⁴⁰⁷ Including direct action networks, such as Climate Justice Now!

¹⁴⁰⁸ Such as the small farmer and peasant network Via Campesina.

¹⁴⁰⁹ Such as the aforementioned Christian Aid.

¹⁴¹⁰ Paul Chatterton, David Featherstone, and Paul Routledge, 'Articulating Climate Justice in Copenhagen: Antagonism, the Commons, and Solidarity', *Antipode* 45, no. 3 (1 June 2013): 1–2, doi:10.1111/j.1467-8330.2012.01025.x.

¹⁴¹¹ Chatterton and colleagues point to this phenomenon when they highlight that the mobilisation was "marked by the further development of "climate justice" as a key framing and mobilising discourse," which they argue "articulated a new political agenda for mobilising climate activism" around the axis of "an antagonistic climate politics." In other words, the dissenting keying of the ACTIVIST frame was manifested in Copenhagen through "an antagonistic framing of climate

Additionally, the contentious dimension of the mobilisation is further highlighted by the fact that, despite the event including a large number of peaceful activist-types,¹⁴¹² the mobilisation also witnessed moments of tension and real antagonism between some of the activists¹⁴¹³ and the police.¹⁴¹⁴

Notably, the dissenting keying of the ACTIVIST frame was also incorporated in MADE's discourse through the campaign it launched as a direct offshoot of its involvement in the Copenhagen mobilisation. Following the disappointing results of the UN summit,¹⁴¹⁵ in February 2010 MADE launched its War on Climate Change campaign in order "to keep climate change on the agenda" by offering young Muslims (and Christians) training with leading NGOs, followed by support in carrying out their own "mini climate change campaigns to inspire local people to take action in their communities."¹⁴¹⁶ In this instance, the dissenting keying of the ACTIVIST frame was evoked not only by the incorporation of the fight metaphor within the campaign's title, but also by prompts that emphasised the potential of collective mobilisation in comparison to formal politics ("join forces"; "to give the politicians a run for their money"):

FEB 2010. WAR ON CLIMATE CHANGE. Young Muslims and Christians *join forces* to campaign in their local communities about climate change.¹⁴¹⁷

The 'War on Climate Change', launched in February 2010, offered young Muslims and Christians the chance *to give the politicians a run for their money* and develop their own climate change campaigns.¹⁴¹⁸

Figure 9.1.b is also particularly significant by virtue of both its frequent occurrence within MADE's imagery,¹⁴¹⁹ and because of the specific campaigning moment it

politics that breaks with attempts to construct climate change as a "post-political" issue (...) [and implies] the formation of pre-figurative political activity." Ibid.

¹⁴¹² Such as the "creative", the "professional", and the "occasional" activists identified in: Silas Harrebye, 'Global Civil Society and International Summits: New Labels for Different Types of Activism at the COP15', *Journal of Civil Society* 7, no. 4 (1 December 2011): 407–26.

¹⁴¹³ Those identified by Harrebye as "radical" and "confrontational" activists. Ibid., 414–16.

¹⁴¹⁴ Chatterton, Featherstone, and Routledge, 'Articulating Climate Justice in Copenhagen', 604.

¹⁴¹⁵ The summit resulted in a non-binding Copenhagen Accord that merely 'recognised' the scientific case for keeping temperature rises to no more than 2C but did not contain commitments to emissions reductions to achieve that goal. John Vidal, Allegra Stratton, and Suzanne Goldenberg, 'Low Targets, Goals Dropped: Copenhagen Ends in Failure', *The Guardian*, 19 December 2009, <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2009/dec/18/copenhagen-deal>.

¹⁴¹⁶ MADE in Europe, 'Annual Report 2010', 5.

¹⁴¹⁷ MADE in Europe, 'Annual Report 2014', 4. Italics mine.

¹⁴¹⁸ MADE in Europe, 'Annual Report 2010', 5. Italics mine.

¹⁴¹⁹ For example, variants of this image can be found on different sections of MADE's website (e.g. 'Home', MADE, accessed 23 July 2016, <https://www.made.ngo/>; 'Updates', MADE, accessed 23 July 2016, <https://www.made.ngo/>.) and across published material (e.g. MADE in Europe, 'Annual Report 2010', 1; MADE in Europe and Oxfam GB, 'Islam in Action! The Ultimate

depicts. In fact, the photos refer to a milestone in MADE's history, which is commemorated to this day as the first of the organisation's "campaign success stories."¹⁴²⁰ More specifically, the images refer to a pilot campaign on maternal health run by MADE in 2010 (entitled Stand Up for Our Mothers),¹⁴²¹ which anticipated the organisation's first "flagship campaign"¹⁴²² (the 2011-13 At Our Mothers' Feet campaign, which was titled after a Prophetic hadith¹⁴²³).

The image portrays a group of young Muslim women that convey the dissenting keying of the ACTIVIST frame through three main prompts. First, the activists are visibly shouting/chanting at a public demonstration, with at least one of the participants raising her clenched fist (a symbol that, in and of itself, is traditionally associated to activism, as I outlined in chapter 7). Second, they are holding a banner that aims to keep politicians accountable through the slogan: "Keep your promises—Deliver the MDGs [Millennium Development Goals]." Third, they are expressing their dissent in front of the archetype of UK politics, Westminster Palace (visible in the background of the image).

Here, too, the textual framing accompanying the campaign conveys a dissenting keying of the ACTIVIST frame (despite the participants being referred to as "supporters" and "volunteers"). This is done through prompts that allude to the visibly public ("hit the streets", "wore tshirts [sic], waved banners") and collective ("joining thousands of others", "a global demonstration", "spoke to the crowd") dimensions of dissenting activism:

Campaign Toolkit', 7; 18; MADE in Europe, 'At Our Mothers' Feet Campaign Toolkit' (London: MADE in Europe, 2012), 17.).

¹⁴²⁰ 'Stand up for Our Mothers', accessed 23 July 2016, <http://www.made.ngo/what-we-do/past-projects/item/stand-up-for-our-mothers>.

¹⁴²¹ The campaign was run in parallel to the UN-led awareness campaign on MDGs entitled 'Stand Up & Take Action' (the title of which was re-framed in MADE's own campaign). Initiated and coordinated between 2007 and 2010 by the United Nations Millennium Campaign and the Global Call to Action Against Poverty, the campaign called citizens worldwide "to take action and call upon world leaders to keep the pledge of achieving the MDGs". ('Stand up Against Poverty', *International Labour Organization (ILO)*, 16 October 2009, http://www.ilo.org/global/meetings-and-events/campaigns/WCMS_115403/lang--en/index.htm.) Particularly, the image refers to 18 September 2010, a day when MADE' supporters joined a global 'day of action' under the theme of "Make Noise for the MDGs," in the run up to the UN MDG Review Summit in September 20-22 of the same year (Cara Gold, 'Make Noise for the MDGs This September with Stand Up, Take Action!', *ONE*, 13 August 2010, <https://www.one.org/international/blog/make-noise-for-the-mdgs-this-september-with-stand-up-take-action/>).

¹⁴²² MADE in Europe, 'Annual Report 2013', 6.

¹⁴²³ The hadith referred to by the campaign's title is reported as follows: "It was narrated from Mu'awiyah bin Jahimah As-Sulami, that Jahimah came to the Prophet (ﷺ) and said: "O Messenger of Allah! I want to go out and fight (in Jihad) and I have come to ask your advice." He said: "Do you have a mother?" He said: "Yes." He said: "Then stay with her, for Paradise is beneath her feet." (Sunan an-Nasa'i, book 25, hadith number 20. Accessed online at: <https://sunnah.com/nasai/25/20>)

Our supporters *hit the streets joining thousands of others* around the world in a *global demonstration*¹⁴²⁴

MADE in Europe volunteers *wore tshirts [sic], waved banners, and spoke to the crowd* about the importance of promoting maternal healthcare¹⁴²⁵

Notably, whilst the images in both figures 9.1.a and 9.1.b convey the ACTIVIST frame through a dissenting keying, they do not necessarily convey a confrontational tone. In fact, the mimic and facial expressions of MADE' supporters (which include smiles and convivial looks) emphasise the 'fun' (rather than the contentious) side of activism. As I will highlight in the next paragraph, a playful tone is a constant feature of MADE's articulation of the dissenting keying of the ACTIVIST frame, thus significantly downplaying its potentially contentious dimension.

The dissenting keying of the ACTIVIST frame is also discernible in imagery that focuses on individual (rather than on groups of) MADE's supporters, as exemplified by figures 9.2.a and 9.2.b.

This image has been removed by the author of this thesis for copyright reasons.

a)

b)

Figure 9.2 Visual framing of the 'dissenting' keying of the ACTIVIST frame: emphasis on the individual dimension of agency

Sources: adapted from: a) i) MADE in Europe 2012, 8; ii) *ibid.*, front cover; iii) *ibid.*, 12; b) i) MADE in Europe 2011, front cover; ii) MADE in Europe 2012 b, 12; iii) MADE in Europe and Oxfam GB 2011, 16; 27.

¹⁴²⁴ 'Stand up for Our Mothers'.

¹⁴²⁵ MADE in Europe, 'MADE in Europe. Annual Report 2010/2011' (London: MADE in Europe, 2011), 5.

Figure 9.2.a depicts MADE's supporters engaging in public action as part of the Eat of the Good Things campaign. Entitled after the Qur'anic verse: "O you who have believed, *eat from the good things* which We have provided for you and be grateful to Allah if it is [indeed] Him that you worship" (2:172), the campaign was launched by MADE in July 2011 to raise awareness among young Muslims and their communities about the Islamic concept of *tayyib* (which, as I introduced in chapter 7, is consistently referred to by MADE and refers to a range of meanings related to the idea of 'good and wholesome'), and about its link with "issues of ethical consumerism and sustainable food production."¹⁴²⁶ In particular, the images refer to a specific moment of the campaign, when participants tried to raise awareness about food waste within the Local Authority District with the highest proportion of Muslims in the UK—London's Tower Hamlets.¹⁴²⁷

Here, the dissenting keying of the ACTIVIST frame is evoked through the context of action (the public sphere/ street), and by the presence of symbols associated with this kind of activism (such as placards and a microphone). On the other hand, as in the previous examples, the images also incorporate a playful tone deriving from: i) the use of a 'comics culture' aesthetics, conveyed by the multi-coloured, childlike handwriting on the banners, and by the fact that some of the participants were "dressed as superheroes"¹⁴²⁸ (such as the 'cowboy' in figure 9.2.a.ii); and ii) from the playful body language of the subjects.

Like in the previous example, here, too, the textual framing related to the campaign contributes to evoke the dissenting keying of the ACTIVIST frame. This is done by framing the issue of food waste as an injustice ("global food injustice") and by stressing the visibly public ("hit the streets") and dissident ("protested") dimensions of the moments depicted in the images:

It [the campaign] aims to raise awareness about *global food injustice*.¹⁴²⁹

¹⁴²⁶ 'Aiysha Amin: Eat Of The Good Things', *MADE*, accessed 12 June 2017, <http://www.made.ngo/team/volunteers/item/aysha-amin-eat-of-the-good-things-2>.

¹⁴²⁷ The London Borough of Tower Hamlets is the Local Authority Districts (LADs) with the highest percentage of Muslims (34.5%) in the UK, with a population of 88000 Muslims in 2011. Tower Hamlets is also one of the most deprived LADs in England (ranking number 7 by means of the 2010 Index of Multiple Deprivation measure). Sundas Ali, 'British Muslims in Numbers. A Demographic, Socio-Economic and Health Profile of Muslims in Britain Drawing on the 2011 Census' (The Muslim Council of Britain, 2015), 26; 47.

¹⁴²⁸ 'Aiysha Amin: Eat Of The Good Things'.

¹⁴²⁹ MADE in Europe, 'Annual Report 2012', 7. Italics mine.

On World Food Day, the volunteers *hit the streets* of Whitechapel dressed as superheroes to raise awareness of food wastage.¹⁴³⁰

[MADE's supporters] *protested* on World Food Day against the high levels of food waste in Tower Hamlets.¹⁴³¹

Figure 9.2.b depicts close-ups of MADE's supporters who took part in the already mentioned Step Up for Our Mothers campaign. These close-ups are particularly significant not only because they recur in several key instances of MADE's discourse,¹⁴³² but also in light of their uniquely rich meaning. The semiotic force of these images derives principally by the combination of two powerful cultural symbols—the veil and the megaphone¹⁴³³—which, combined, produce a powerful “condensing symbol.”¹⁴³⁴ By virtue of this very combination, the images challenge the popular perception of “veiled women as *devoid of agency*,” a perspective that equates “the Muslim veil with women's oppression by Islamic patriarchy, and [which] asserts its incompatibility with ‘European values’.”¹⁴³⁵ Instead, resonating with postcolonial and post-Orientalist readings, the dissenting keying of the ACTIVIST frame portrays the veil both as a symbol of “resistant/subversive agency” and “of contest,” and “as a marker of self-authored difference and authenticity.”¹⁴³⁶ In doing this, MADE's imagery positions young British Muslim women as agentic, free-willed subjects capable of reshaping the tradition of British women's activism within the context of contemporary multicultural societies.¹⁴³⁷

Notably, here (like in the previous examples) the potential contentiousness of the dissenting keying is downplayed by a playful tone introduced by the fact that

¹⁴³⁰ 'Aiysha Amin: Eat Of The Good Things'. Italics mine.

¹⁴³¹ MADE in Europe, 'Annual Report 2012', 7. Italics mine.

¹⁴³² Figure 9.2.b.i) MADE in Europe 'Annual Report 2011', sect. front cover; figure 9.2.b.ii) MADE in Europe, 'At Our Mothers' Feet Campaign Toolkit', 12; figure 9.2.b.iii) MADE in Europe and Oxfam GB, 'Islam in Action! The Ultimate Campaign Toolkit', 16; 27.

¹⁴³³ I discuss more in detail the cultural relevance of the megaphone in the next section, dedicate to MADE's illustrations.

¹⁴³⁴ James M. Jasper and Jane D. Poulsen, 'Recruiting Strangers and Friends: Moral Shocks and Social Networks in Animal Rights and Anti-Nuclear Protests', *Social Problems* 42, no. 4 (1995): 497-498. doi:10.2307/3097043.

¹⁴³⁵ Sirma Bilge, 'Beyond Subordination vs. Resistance: An Intersectional Approach to the Agency of Veiled Muslim Women', *Journal of Intercultural Studies* 31, no. 1 (1 February 2010): 10; 14.

¹⁴³⁶ *Ibid.*, 19–20.

¹⁴³⁷ Women's activism in the UK has a long history, epitomised by the 'suffragettes movement' of the 1850s-1900s, which was preceded by a crucial involvement of women activists in the campaign to abolish slavery since the end of the 18th century. 'BBC - History - British History in Depth: Women: From Abolition to the Vote', accessed 4 April 2017, http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/abolition/abolition_women_article_01.shtml..

MADE's activists use a vintage, golden megaphone (rather than a working, transistorized one).

9.2.1.2. Illustrations

The second type of imagery that contributes to MADE's articulation of the dissenting keying of the ACTIVIST frame consists in a range of illustrations disseminated throughout the organisation's public material. Notably, MADE does this through a unique aesthetic that draws from the playful, pictogram-based style of infographics. In doing so, MADE's illustrations (like its photos) contribute to downplay the potential contentiousness of the dissenting keying of the ACTIVIST frame.

The most recurrent icons evoking this framing are two of the most popular symbols of dissenting activism: placards and megaphones. Their first appearance within MADE's discourse stretches back to 2010-11, when they appeared right at the begin of that year's annual report, in the key discursive moment represented by the introductory letter from MADE's CEO and Chair of Trustees.¹⁴³⁸ Since then, icons of placards and megaphones have consistently populated MADE's public material: not only in its annual reviews,¹⁴³⁹ but also in most of its toolkits,¹⁴⁴⁰ and on the cover of the resources it developed for its educational programme.¹⁴⁴¹

Perhaps the richest example of the use of the placard and megaphone icons combined is represented by the pictogram reproduced in figure 9.3, which also appears at the bottom of each of MADE's webpages.

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Figure 9.3 MADE's 'activist pictogram'

Source: adapted from: MADE in Europe and Oxfam GB, 2011, 15.

¹⁴³⁸ MADE in Europe, 'Annual Report 2011', sec. 'What is MADE in Europe?'

¹⁴³⁹ The placard icon appears alone or in association with symbolic 'activists' once in the 2010-11 report, and 6 times in the 2013-14 report. The megaphone icon appears twice both in 2010-11 and 2011-12; and once in 2012-13.

¹⁴⁴⁰ MADE has so far produced 3 main toolkits: placards and megaphones appear repeatedly in the "Islam in action! The Ultimate Campaign toolkit" and in the "At Our Mothers' Feet. The Campaign toolkit" (whereas they do not appear only in "The Green Up Toolkit. A Guide and Award Scheme for Mosques and Islamic Groups").

¹⁴⁴¹ 'Schools', MADE, accessed 23 July 2017, <https://www.made.ngo/2013-02-12-14-07-53/schools>.

On the one hand, this pictogram conveys the dissenting keying of the ACTIVIST frame by the very virtue of featuring the placard and the megaphone icons as the two ends of a spectrum of activist-types, represented by the central icons. The textual context whereby the image was first introduced (within MADE's "Islam in action!" toolkit¹⁴⁴²) also contributes to convey the dissenting keying by associating the composed logo with the reference to "the fight against poverty and injustice" and with the 'hot emotions' conventionally associated with this type of activism (alluded by the expression "All fired up and ready to go").

On the other hand, the very presence of a number of icons between the placard and the megaphone alludes to the comprehensiveness of the type of activism envisioned by MADE (which I already discussed in my analysis of MADE's CYCW frame, in chapter 7): social media activism, alluded to by the mobile icon and the replica of Twitter's logo; creative activism, alluded to by the digital camera icon; civic activism, alluded to by squared 'X', which refers to the act of voting/petitioning/lobbying; and consumer activism, alluded to by the t-shirt icon.

Indeed, such comprehensiveness is perhaps best communicated by the second main keying of the ACTIVIST frame in MADE's discourse, the 'lifestyle' keying. Before moving to this in section 9.2.2, in the next two subsections I offer a more detailed analysis of how both the placard and the megaphone icons play a key role in conveying the dissenting keying when used by MADE individually.

- *The Placard*

The icon of a placard evokes the dissenting keying of the ACTIVIST frame because this particular piece of material culture is commonly associated with visual representations of social movements and collective action—be it in historical pictures, news reports, or on the wide range of online platforms used by activists and movements themselves.

One of the most significant examples of MADE's use of the placard icon alone is that reproduced in figure 9.4. This particular illustration evokes the dissenting keying by depicting placards that display archetypical dissenting slogans, which focus on the activists' desire for change, on the one hand ("We want change"); and on the structural urgency and viability of change, on the other ("Time for change"). Notably, the illustration also offers a significant example of how MADE

¹⁴⁴² MADE in Europe and Oxfam GB, 'Islam in Action! The Ultimate Campaign Toolkit', 3; 15.

attempts to make the dissenting keying of the ACTIVIST frame resonate with a specifically Muslim narrative, by juxtaposing the images of placards to references from the primary sources of Islam, which emphasise the duty for Muslims to both uphold justice (exemplified by the quote from Qur'an, above the "We want change" placard) and proactively effect positive change (exemplified by the quote from the Sunnah, above the "Time for change" placard).

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Figure 9.4 The placard icon and the ACTIVIST frame, example I
Source: adapted from: MADE in Europe and Oxfam GB, 2011, 11.

A second significant example of how MADE evokes the dissenting keying of the ACTIVIST frame through the placard icon is by associating this symbol with silhouettes symbolising 'activists' themselves. A significant instance of this type is represented by a series of pictograms that MADE developed to signpost some of its most significant achievements since its foundation within the annual report that marked its 5th anniversary in 2014 (I reproduce relevant sections of it in figure 9.5).

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a) b) c) d) e)

Figure 9.5 The placard icon and the ACTIVIST frame, example II
Sources: adapted from: a) MADE in Europe 2014, cover; b) MADE in Europe 2014, back cover; c-d-4) MADE in Europe 2014, 4-5.

Figure 9.5.a and 9.5.b enjoy particularly high visibility as they are located on the front and back covers of the annual report, respectively. Both evoke the dissenting keying of the ACTIVIST frame by illustrating MADE's achievements in building support in terms of number of people mobilised, and through a

combination of visual and textual prompts. Visual prompts consist not only in the image of a fictional ‘activist’ holding a placard in the foreground of both illustrations, but also on an emphasis on both the collective dimension of this type of activism (conveyed by the group of individuals represented at the bottom of figure 9.5.a) and on its engagement with the political realm (represented in figure 9.5.b) the by the unmistakable silhouette of the centre of British politics: the Palace of Westminster). Textual prompts are represented by the expressions “campaign leaders” (figure 9.5.a) and “people lobbied MP’s” (figure 9.5.b), both of which clearly identify MADE’s supporters as dissenting activists who are engaged in one sort or another of advocacy work.

The illustrations in figure 9.5.c-e are taken from the “Timeline over the last 5 years” section of the same annual report,¹⁴⁴³ which is given a very high visibility in the form of an infographic spreading over two pages, right after the introductory “Message from Chair & Executive Director.” Here, too, both visual and textual prompts evoke the dissenting keying of the ACTIVIST frame through its collective and political dimensions: in figure 9.5.c, collective action is conveyed by depicting a group of ‘activists’ holding placards in occasion of “MADE’s first protest!”,¹⁴⁴⁴ whilst in figure 9.5.d-e the political undertone of this type of activism is represented (again) by the silhouette of the Palace of Westminster.¹⁴⁴⁵

A third (final) significant example of MADE’s usage of the image of placards to evoke the dissenting keying of the ACTIVIST frame is represented by the concluding scene of the already quoted “Intro to MADE” video¹⁴⁴⁶ (figure 9.6).

¹⁴⁴³ MADE in Europe, ‘Annual Report 2014’, 4–5.

¹⁴⁴⁴ Significantly, both illustrations depicting a collective dimension (i.e. 9.5.a and 9.5.b) also hint to MADE’s inclusive approach to its support base. In fact, here contentious ‘activists’ are represented as belonging to both genders (female ‘activists’ are clearly distinguishable in the pictogram by virtue of the presence of stylised long hair and/or veil and some type of skirt), and from both ‘visibly practicing’ Muslims, identifiable by prompts such as a long loose skirt and what seems to be a veil/hijab, in the case of females; and by the ‘traditional’ topi/taqiyah hat and jubba thobe, in the case of males) and less ‘visibly practicing’ Muslims (or non-Muslims), identifiable by those silhouettes that do not feature any of the aforementioned symbols.

¹⁴⁴⁵ This refers to MADE’s involvement in a youth, inter-faith debate in Parliament about the “Politics of poverty” in 2010 (fig.d); and of the launch of MADE’s ‘Islam in action!’ Toolkit in 2011 at the House of Lords (fig.e).

¹⁴⁴⁶ Made In Europe, *Intro to MADE*.

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Figure 9.6 Concluding scene of the video “Intro to MADE - Muslims campaigning against global poverty & injustice”

Source: adapted from: *Intro to MADE - Muslims campaigning against global poverty & injustice*, YouTube video, 1:50, posted by “Made In Europe,” Dec 17, 2013, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=91FAQRGoMXc>

The scene depicts the fictional “average Muslim” protagonist of the video (at the centre of the image in figure 9.6) joining a public demonstration after having become a supporter of MADE. Here, a number of other supporters of MADE/‘activists’ are waving placards. Two of these placards (on the immediate right of the protagonist) display the archetype slogans of (progressive) activism: “Justice” and “Change.” The remaining placards highlight those bigger-than-self issues that MADE puts at the centre of its work, and on which it has been campaigning over the years: “Animal Welfare,” a theme that MADE has engaged through advocating the concept of *tayyib*, for example through the Eat of the Good Things campaign mentioned earlier; “Fair Trade,” which MADE has consistently supported throughout its work, as I will discuss in the next section; “Maternal Health,” the issue the centre of MADE’s first flagship campaign At our Mothers’ feet; “Workers’ Rights,” which MADE has campaigned on through the Every Garment has a Name campaign, which it launched in 2013 in the immediate aftermath of the Rana Plaza building collapse that led to the death of more than 1100 people and injured more than 2000 in a garment factory in Dhaka, Bangladesh¹⁴⁴⁷; and “Go Green,” the environmentalist slogan that refers

¹⁴⁴⁷ ‘Every Garment Has a Name’, *MADE*, accessed 23 July 2016, <http://www.made.ngo/what-we-do/past-projects/item/every-garment-has-a-name>.

to MADE's second (and, to this day, largest) flagship campaign, titled "Green Up My Community!"¹⁴⁴⁸

The scene is sandwiched between the following two lines, which are read by the voice-over and reinforce the dissenting keying of the ACTIVIST frame through the "fight" metaphor, the reference to "campaigning for change," and the invitation to "join the movement":

At MADE in Europe we have a vision of Muslims leading *the fight against* poverty, injustice, and environmental damage, by raising awareness and *campaigning for change*.

Join the movement: change yourself, to change the world for a better future.¹⁴⁴⁹

Notably, as I already discussed in subsection 9.1.1, the ACTIVIST frame is also reinforced in the video by the sentence: "inspired by the teachings of *the greatest activist* of all times," followed by the appearance of the text at the top of the scene: "Prophet Muhammad (PBUH)."

- *The Megaphone*

The second symbol through which MADE consistently evokes the dissenting keying of the ACTIVIST frame is represented by the icon of a megaphone.

The "semiotic cultural significance"¹⁴⁵⁰ of the megaphone in contemporary society cannot be understated. The inherent capability of this piece of material culture to convey the dissenting keying of the ACTIVIST frame derives from its symbolic (and concrete) function as a tool to 'speak out' and rally support—two key dimensions of dissent. This symbolic function is reinforced by a pervasive historical association in the post-World War II era of megaphones with various forms of dissent. In particular, the rise of social movements in the 1960s and 1970s has contributed to increasingly transmute this object into a symbol of "opportunity and liberation—enabling one's traditionally marginalized voice to be amplified and, no less significantly, recognized and respected."¹⁴⁵¹

¹⁴⁴⁸ 'Green Up My Community!', MADE, accessed 26 April 2017, <http://www.made.ngo/what-we-do/past-projects/item/green-up-my-community-2>.

¹⁴⁴⁹ Made In Europe, *Intro to MADE*. Italics mine.

¹⁴⁵⁰ Bret Edwards, 'The Megaphone as Material Culture: Design, Use and Symbolism in North American Society, 1878-1980', *Material Culture Review / Revue de La Culture Matérielle* 73, no. 0 (1 January 2011).

¹⁴⁵¹ Ibid.

Contextualised against this background, the megaphone has become a “politicized communication device symbolizing widespread disillusionment with the status quo”¹⁴⁵²—in other words, a symbol that evokes the dissenting keying of the ACTIVIST frame not only by expressing a desire for societal change through collective action, but also by alluding to emotions typically associated with this type of activism (e.g. righteous anger and defiance).

In addition to the pictogram discussed in the introduction of this section (figure 9.3), the icon of a megaphone appears in different forms across MADE’s imagery.

As an independent illustration, this icon appears particularly frequently in the “Islam in action!” toolkit, where it actually represents the most repeated icon overall.¹⁴⁵³ In and of itself, this association is already a strong conveyer of the dissenting keying of the ACTIVIST frame: the megaphone becomes here a symbol of the eagerness and capacity of MADE’s supporters to voice their grievances and rally support for change as ‘activists’ who can put ‘Islam in action’ (to use the title of the booklet), in order to tackle bigger-than-self issues.

The megaphone icon is also consistently represented in MADE’s discourse as part of the pictograms represented in fig 9.7.a and 9.7.b. The pictogram in 9.7.a was adopted in the 2011-12 annual report¹⁴⁵⁴ and reproduced the following year (2012-13). It has also been visibly displayed as part of the standing banner that MADE has traditionally used at public events until 2015. The pictogram in figure 9.7.b was adopted in MADE’s website in 2015 and it has been reproduced on a new version of the organisation’s official standing banner.

Here, the dissenting keying of the ACTIVIST frame is conveyed both by: i) the association of the megaphone icon with the tag “Campaigning”; and ii) the distinction between this and other forms of ‘thinner’ forms of civic engagement, such as “Volunteering” or “Ethical Enterprise” (respectively represented by the icon of an open hand (figure 9.7.a) and of an apple (figure 9.7.b)).

¹⁴⁵² Ibid.

¹⁴⁵³ MADE in Europe and Oxfam GB, ‘Islam in Action! The Ultimate Campaign Toolkit’, 17; 23; 27.

¹⁴⁵⁴ MADE in Europe, ‘Annual Report 2012’, pt. cover; 1; 9.

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a) 2011-15

b) 2015-16

Figure 9.7 The megaphone in MADE's tripartite pictogram

Sources: adapted from: a) MADE in Europe 2012, 1; b) 'Home', MADE, accessed 23 July 2016, <https://www.made.ngo>

Finally, a significant appearance of the megaphone is also that in the concluding scene of the "Intro to MADE" video, already discussed in the previous section. Here, the megaphone held by the protagonist at the centre of the scene represents the symbol of his/her mobilisation from an average bystander to a MADE's supporter engaging in dissenting activism. Notably, the megaphone represents the focal point of the scene: whilst placards highlights the issues and demands of other dissenting 'activists' in a somehow static manner, it is precisely through the megaphone of the newly mobilised MADE's supporter at the centre of the collective scene that dissent is actively voiced out.

In conclusion, this section has highlighted how MADE consistently evokes a dissenting keying of the ACTIVIST frame through its visual repertoire. As I pointed out, both photos and illustrations incorporate a playful dimension that significantly downplay (and almost totally eclipse) the potential contentiousness traditionally associated with dissenting activism. Indeed, this corroborates the noncontentious nature of the type of lifestyle activism envisioned by MADE, which I introduced in chapter 7 through a parallel with the Social Responsibility movement (7.2). Such noncontentious, everyday, individual dimension of MADE's ACTIVIST frame is captured by the 'lifestyle' keying, which I discuss next.

9.2.2. The 'lifestyle' keying of the ACTIVIST frame

A second type of imagery used by MADE to convey the ACTIVIST frame focuses on the everyday, individual dimension of activism through what I call the 'lifestyle' keying. This keying resonates strongly with the Social Responsibility activism implied by the CYCW frame (discussed in chapter 7), and it is conveyed through references to two main types of lifestyle activism related to this movement: 'green living' and 'consumer activism'. I discuss these separately in the following two subsections.

9.2.2.1. Green living

Images related to green living occupy a central place in MADE's visual discourse. Two of the most significant examples are the photos reproduced in figure 9.8.a and 9.8.b, which consistently appear in key sections of MADE's website.¹⁴⁵⁵

This image has been removed by the author of this thesis for copyright reasons.

a)

b)

Figure 9.8 Visual framing of the 'lifestyle' keying of the ACTIVIST frame: 'green living'

Sources: adapted from: a) MADE in Europe 2012, 4; b) 'Home', MADE, accessed 23 July 2016, <https://www.made.ngo>

Figure 9.8.a displays three supporters of MADE (clearly identifiable through their MADE-branded t-shirts) from a back view that emphasises their immersion in a green, countryside scenery. They are sitting on the grass on the top of a hill, gazing at the valley before them, and displaying a body language that suggests a sense of harmony and contemplation. Quite surprisingly, whilst the image clearly conveys a focus on green living, it does not refer to MADE's most environmentally-focused campaign (i.e. the Green Up my Community! Campaign). Rather, it refers to the second edition of the Bosnia & Herzegovina: The Journey project, which was launched by MADE in 2011 "to give young British Muslims the chance to learn more about post-conflict reconstruction and reconciliation, and to build bridges with other communities around the world."¹⁴⁵⁶ Notably, insofar the project focused on an issue often tackled by development work (i.e. post-conflict reconciliation), it also adopted the VOLUNTEER frame that is traditionally associated with the development sector. This is conveyed by MADE's characterisation of both the initiative (described as a "unique

¹⁴⁵⁵ For example, figure 9.8.a appears in MADE 'Annual Report 2012', 4; and on the website, next to the main text of the 'What we do' section. 'What We Do', MADE, accessed 23 July 2016, <http://www.made.ngo/what-we-do>. Figure 9.8.b appears as the top banner image of both the homepage and the 'Get involved' section. 'Home'; 'Get Involved', MADE, accessed 23 July 2016, <https://www.made.ngo/get-involved>.

¹⁴⁵⁶ MADE in Europe, 'Annual Report 2011', 4.

volunteering programme”) and its participants (consistently referred to as “volunteers”).¹⁴⁵⁷ However, the VOLUNTEER frame represents only a secondary element of the textual and visual framing of the project, which rather emphasises the lifestyle keying of the ACTIVIST frame. From a visual perspective, the lifestyle keying is conveyed by images that consistently depict MADE’s supporters engaging in everyday gardening/farming activities (figure 9.9). From a textual perspective, the lifestyle keying is conveyed by an emphasis on ideas such as the ‘local’, ‘living and working’ and ‘day to day activities’. These point to ‘locavore’ and ‘slow food’ activist subcultures, which see the support of locally produced food as a means to build environmental sustainable communities¹⁴⁵⁸:

our volunteers went to live with *local families* around Srebrenica, a region devastated by the conflict 15 years ago. There, they *lived and worked* alongside their hosts, supporting them in their *day to day farming activities*. Our volunteers *worked to establish two strawberry farms* which they had fundraised for in the UK. These farms will be a vital source of sustainable income for *local families* who were affected by the conflict.¹⁴⁵⁹

This image has been removed by the author of this thesis for copyright reasons.

Figure 9.9 Visual framing of MADE’s ‘Bosnia & Herzegovina: The Journey’ project

Sources: adapted from: MADE in Europe 2012, 3-4; MADE in Europe 2013, 13.

¹⁴⁵⁷ MADE in Europe, ‘Annual Report 2012’, 3–4.

¹⁴⁵⁸ Ross Haenfler, Brett Johnson, and Ellis Jones, ‘Lifestyle Movements: Exploring the Intersection of Lifestyle and Social Movements’, *Social Movement Studies* 11, no. 1 (1 January 2012): 5, doi:10.1080/14742837.2012.640535.

¹⁴⁵⁹ MADE in Europe, ‘Annual Report 2012’, 4. Italics mine.

Figure 9.8.b depicts two MADE's supporters engaging in farming/gardening activities within the context of the Eat of the Good Things campaign, which also involved young Muslims setting up a food growing project at London's Spitalfields City Farm.¹⁴⁶⁰ Like in the case of the Bosnia & Herzegovina project, here, too, the lifestyle keying of the ACTIVIST frame is conveyed by references that bring together green living with locavore and slow food subcultures, since the image refers to MADE's supporters being trained on "how to grow their own food."¹⁴⁶¹ Additionally, the very context of MADE's supporters' action plays in and of itself a significant role in conveying the lifestyle keying of the ACTIVIST frame since city farms are traditionally associated with: i) 'green living', as they represent an attempt to reclaim green spaces within urban areas and aim to "reconnect people with nature and promote local action on global environmental issues"¹⁴⁶²; and ii) locavore and slow food subcultures, as they represent 'oasis' of anti-consumerism that promote local food production as a means to increase the well-being of individuals and communities, and to have a sustainable impact on local economies.¹⁴⁶³ Finally, from a textual perspective, the lifestyle keying of the ACTIVIST frame is clearly conveyed by the following testimony from one of the project's participants, which brings together an activist outlook ("take action to combat (...) food injustice"; "taking action for a better and just earth") with ideas related to everyday life, such as community engagement and sustainable living:

[Eat of the Good Things] is a project aimed at young Muslims like myself to *engage with our community*, learn valuable campaigning skills and *inspire others to take action to combat the crucial issues behind global poverty and food injustice*. (...) A fascinating fact which we learnt was that there is a house made entirely from straw-bale in America which has been there, and used, since the early 1900's - testimony to the idea that *sustainable living does work!* (...) [we were] all passionate about partaking in this incredible venture into campaigning, and *taking action for a better and just earth* for the Ummah.¹⁴⁶⁴

¹⁴⁶⁰ 'Aiysha Amin: Eat Of The Good Things'.

¹⁴⁶¹ MADE in Europe, 'Annual Report 2012', 7.

¹⁴⁶² Helen Quayle, 'The True Value of Community Farms and Gardens: Social, Environmental, Health and Economic' (Federation of City Farms and Community Gardens, 2008), 1, https://www.farmgarden.org.uk/system/files/true_value_report.pdf.

¹⁴⁶³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶⁴ 'A Day at the Farm', MADE, accessed 23 July 2016, <https://www.made.ngo/updates/2012-11-21-13-50-22/item/a-day-at-the-farm>. Italics mine.

9.2.2.2. Consumer activism

A second type of lifestyle activism often referred to by MADE's visual framing refers to consumer activism—particularly through that strand identifiable as 'Fairtrade activism'¹⁴⁶⁵, as illustrated in figure 9.10. The images refer to MADE's participation to Fairtrade Fortnight in February 2010, when a group of MADE's supporters who had been previously trained by the Fairtrade Foundation held a Fairtrade Tea Party at the popular London Muslim Centre. This was done to raise awareness of consumer activism among local Muslims by encouraging them to (as MADE puts it) "'swap' one of their favourite foods for a Fairtrade brand" and "spread the fair trade message to friends and family."¹⁴⁶⁶

This image has been removed by the author of this thesis for copyright reasons.

a)

b)

Figure 9.10 Visual framing of the 'lifestyle' keying of the ACTIVIST frame: 'consumer activism'

Sources: adapted from: a) 'Fairtrade Fortnight: Take a Step in 2012!', *MADE*, 27 February 2012, <http://www.made.ngo/updates/blogs/item/fairtrade-fortnight-take-a-step-in-2012>; b) 'Trade Justice', *MADE*, accessed 9 July 2017, <http://www.made.ngo/trade-justice>.

In fact, beyond the specific event portrayed by the images in figure 9.10, the theme of consumer activism through the Fairtrade lens has been consistently incorporated in a number of MADE's campaigns and projects since the early days of the organisation, which has been key to bring the Fairtrade issue within Muslim

¹⁴⁶⁵ Fair Trade: Dynamic and Dilemmas of a Market Oriented Global Social Movement. John Wilkinson; Clarke, Nick; Barnett, Clive; Cloke, Paul and Malpass, Alice (2007). The political rationalities of fair-trade consumption in the United Kingdom. *Politics and Society*, 35(4) pp. 583–607.

¹⁴⁶⁶ MADE in Europe, 'Annual Report 2010', 7.

communities. This is because, in addition to consistently organising events with Muslim audiences during the annual Fairtrade Fortnight,¹⁴⁶⁷ MADE has also developed its own campaigns focusing on consumer activism.

In 2011, for example, MADE launched a campaign “on trade justice in the cotton industry”¹⁴⁶⁸ in collaboration with the Fairtrade Foundation and the Christian Muslim Forum (CMF). As the European Commission was preparing for a review of its Common Agricultural Policy in June 2011, MADE and the CMF formulated a statement calling “the UK government to take a lead in ending the EU’s distorting cotton subsidies.”¹⁴⁶⁹ The statement was then presented at a panel alongside then Archbishop of Canterbury (Dr Rowan Williams) and the Fairtrade Foundation’s CEO (Mrs Harriet Lamb), and later handed over to then UK Secretary of State for Environment Food and Rural Affairs.¹⁴⁷⁰ In remembering the event in the “Campaign success stories” section of its website, MADE clearly links an ethical consumer action (i.e. buying Fairtrade cotton) with the ACTIVIST frame by characterising its supporters as “campaigners” who “fight” on behalf of oppressed people:

Buying Fairtrade cotton is one way that our *campaigners* are continuing *their fight for cotton farmers* across the world.¹⁴⁷¹

In 2011 MADE also imbued Fairtrade activism with a distinctive Muslim dimension, by bringing it into mosques during the holy month of Ramadan through its first “ethical’ Iftar” at Godge Street Mosque, as part of the already mentioned Eat of the Good Things campaign.¹⁴⁷² The initiative was then repeated in 2012 (and in the following years), when MADE teamed up for the first time with Zaytoun (a community interest company founded in 2004 with the aim to create and develop a UK market for Palestinian produce¹⁴⁷³) and launched the Fair Trade in Islam campaign, which toured the country with a series of ethical

¹⁴⁶⁷ Ibid., sec. Fair Trade; MADE in Europe, ‘Annual Report 2011’, sec. Ethical Trade; MADE in Europe, ‘Annual Report 2012’, 12; MADE in Europe, ‘Annual Report 2013’, 16.

¹⁴⁶⁸ MADE in Europe, ‘Annual Report 2011’, sec. Ethical Trade.

¹⁴⁶⁹ MADE in Europe, ‘Annual Report 2012’, 11.

¹⁴⁷⁰ ‘Muslim and Christian Youth Get Stitched Up’, MADE, accessed 23 July 2016, <https://www.made.ngo/campaigns/past/muslim-and-christian-youth-get-stitched-up>.

¹⁴⁷¹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁷² MADE in Europe, ‘Annual Report 2012’, 7.

¹⁴⁷³ ‘About Us’, Zaytoun, accessed 23 July 2016, http://www.zaytoun.org/about_us.html.

iftars.¹⁴⁷⁴ Notably, the campaign also featured a partnership with FOSIS¹⁴⁷⁵ Wales & West “to deliver a ground-breaking campaign on Fair Trade to Muslim students,” which MADE frames as lifestyle (Fairtrade) activists by referring to them as “passionate young people [trained] to be Fair Trade Ambassadors in their local communities.”¹⁴⁷⁶

In parallel, 2012 witnesses the start of MADE’s Development Education programme, aimed at helping young Muslims to “develop skills to be able to campaign and take action.”¹⁴⁷⁷ In the same year, MADE also starts supporting Muslim faith-based schools to achieve the Fairtrade Schools Award,¹⁴⁷⁸ and develops the first of a series of Development Education resources precisely on theme of Fairtrade (“Fair Trade and Trade Justice in Islam”¹⁴⁷⁹). Notably, the resource conveys a lifestyle keying of the ACTIVIST frame by characterising young Muslims as agentic actors who can “make a difference” through their everyday life (“both at school and at home”):

The aim of this resource pack is to support teachers to teach the subject of Fair Trade and trade justice from an Islamic perspective whilst mobilising young people to make a difference on local and global levels both at school and at home.¹⁴⁸⁰

Within its Fairtrade in Islam campaign, MADE also published the poster reproduced in figure 9.11, though which the organisation encourages its audience to ask their “local shop or mosque to start selling Fairtrade products and then proudly display this poster!”¹⁴⁸¹ The poster evokes a lifestyle (Fairtrade) keying of the ACTIVIST frame by inviting Muslims to critical self-reflection about their food (through the title-question: “How ethical is your food?”) and by emphasising

¹⁴⁷⁴ ‘Trade Justice’, *MADE*, accessed 9 July 2017, <http://www.made.ngo/trade-justice>.

¹⁴⁷⁵ The Federation of Student Islamic Societies (FOSIS) is one of the oldest Muslim student organisations in the United Kingdom: it functions as the national umbrella organisation aimed at supporting and representing Islamic societies at colleges and universities in the United Kingdom and Ireland.

¹⁴⁷⁶ MADE in Europe, ‘Annual Report 2013’, 8.

¹⁴⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 16.

¹⁴⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁷⁹ ‘Schools’. Notably, this resource has found significant publicity among mainstream Development Education organisations, such as Think Global and One World Week. ‘Fair Trade & Trade Justice in Islam’, *Global Dimension*, accessed 23 July 2017, <https://globaldimension.org.uk/resource/fair-trade-trade-justice-in-islam/>; ‘Schools’, *One World Week*, accessed 23 July 2017, <http://www.oneworldweek.org/v2/>.

¹⁴⁸⁰ Gani, Monowara, ‘Global Education for Muslim Schools. Fair Trade.’ (MADE in Europe, 2012), 3.

¹⁴⁸¹ ‘Fair Trade in Islam Poster’, *MADE*, accessed 9 July 2017, <http://www.made.ngo/what-we-do/resources/item/fair-trade-in-islam-poster-2>.

the identity of the audience not just as Muslims but also as “consumers” who have a religious duty to use their purchasing power to stand for “trade justice”:

Trade justice is an important principle in Islam and *as consumers* we have an Islamic responsibility to ensure that our money is *not supporting injustice*.¹⁴⁸²

A fruit of MADE’s collaboration with Zaytoun, the poster brings together Fairtrade activism and pro-Palestinian solidarity by calling the audience to self-consciously buy Palestinian produce. The potential of this type of lifestyle activism is highlighted by the testimony of a Palestinian farmer, which emphasises the positive impact of consumer activism through its positive dimension of ‘boycotting’:

By buying our products, you are saving our livelihoods, the future of our children and you are helping to save the land.¹⁴⁸³

This image has been removed by the author of this thesis for copyright reasons.

Figure 9.11 MADE’s ‘Fair Trade in Islam’ poster

Source: adapted from: ‘Fair Trade in Islam Poster’, MADE, accessed 15 July 2017, <http://www.made.ngo/what-we-do/resources/item/fair-trade-in-islam-poster-2>.

¹⁴⁸² ‘Fair Trade in Islam Poster’, MADE, accessed 15 July 2017, <http://www.made.ngo/what-we-do/resources/item/fair-trade-in-islam-poster-2>.

¹⁴⁸³ Ibid.

Notably, if the boycotting dimension of consumer activism has been generally promoted by MADE since 2012 through its own online ethical shop,¹⁴⁸⁴ this form of lifestyle activism has been also specifically advocated in relation to the Palestinian issue. This is epitomised by the 2014 campaign #BuyPalestinian, which encouraged Muslims to act both individually and collectively as lifestyle (Fairtrade) activists who can make a difference ‘through trade rather than aid’:

(...) only 6% of Palestinian produce is currently sold abroad. However with nearly 3 million Muslims living in the UK, our numbers and collective action has the potential to make a powerful difference. (...) as part of our Fairtrade in Islam initiative MADE launched the #BuyPalestinian campaign. *By encouraging Muslims in the UK to buy fairly traded Palestinian dates and other items* the campaign was about providing opportunities of TRADE not just AID for Palestinians. This would ensure that Palestinians would be able help build the [sic] own sustainable [sic] economy and future.¹⁴⁸⁵

Indeed, the campaign characterised MADE’s supporters through the lifestyle (Fairtrade) keying of the ACTIVIST frame not only by explicitly referring to them as “Buy Palestinian Activist[s],”¹⁴⁸⁶ but also by emphasising the need for more Muslims need “to adopt an ‘ethical purchasing mind set’” that can enable them to engage in lifestyle activism (“purchase dates and other products produced by Palestinian farmers”) in addition to dissenting activism (“petitions, protests, and boycotts”):

Petitions, protests, and boycotts. Three familiar ways to support the Palestinian cause and stand up against injustice and oppression. But have we ever considered that whilst we embark on these various options (and rightly so) that there is also another, strong way to support the Palestinians; through our purchasing power? (...) There is a market opportunity for Palestinian dates in the UK but for that to become a reality, more Muslims need to adopt an ‘ethical purchasing mind set’ and be willing to sacrifice a few extra pounds to purchase dates and other products produced by Palestinian farmers. We need to make a concerted effort to lobby our local shops to provide the ethical options and support organisations like MADE in Europe who sell ethical Palestinian produce.¹⁴⁸⁷

¹⁴⁸⁴ ‘Shop’, MADE, accessed 23 July 2016, <http://www.made.ngo/shop/>. MADE Shop has been selling both Palestinian Fairtrade produce from Zaytoun, and a range of other “ethical” and “eco” products such as “upcycled” jewellery and organic cotton tote bags.

¹⁴⁸⁵ ‘#BuyPalestinian’, MADE, accessed 26 April 2017, <https://www.made.ngo/campaigns/past/buypalestinian>. Italics mine.

¹⁴⁸⁶ Ibid.

¹⁴⁸⁷ ‘The Muslim Power of Boycotting & Ethical Purchasing - MADE’, MADE, 18 May 2016, <http://www.made.ngo/updates/blogs/item/the-muslim-power-of-boycotting-ethical-purchasing>.

Conclusions

- *Specific frames and keyings*

Through an in-depth textual and visual frame analysis, this chapter has outlined how MADE consistently frames its supporter base through an ACTIVIST frame.

As I outlined in the introduction, the ACTIVIST frame has been already identified within mainstream NGO discourse by the “Finding Frames” report. However, the analysis offered in this chapter suggests that the content of such a frame in MADE’s discourse seems to be qualitatively different. In fact, whilst the former assumes ‘activists’ as individuals to be ‘turned on’ by NGOs at times of specific campaigning activities and within well determined roles, MADE’s ACTIVIST frame appears to refer more holistically to individuals as “change agents”—a conceptualisation that, paradoxically, the “Finding Frames” report sees at the antipodes of the very ACTIVIST frame.¹⁴⁸⁸

Notably, MADE’s conceptualisation of its supporters as change agents goes beyond the identification of individuals simply as ‘activists’ (a mechanism that, nevertheless, is present within MADE’s discourse, as highlighted in section 9.1.1). In fact, MADE’s ACTIVIST frame nurtures a more complex (and open-ended) narrative, which brings together different types of activist identities and practices. For example, MADE’s supporters are consistently referred to as ‘campaigners’ whose engagement goes beyond the specific roles of a specific campaign, and rather implies a spectrum of non-mutually exclusive options ranging from everyday lifestyle actions to community mobilisation (9.1.2). This understanding is corroborated by extracts like the following, which highlights how MADE seems to have adopted the term ‘campaigner’ mainly to emphasise that (in its understanding) being an ‘activist’ is not just about being the contentious individual whose image is more commonly associated with this term (“campaigning is not just for the diehard activist”), but also about ‘lighter’ forms of everyday activism carried out by “ordinary people doing ordinary things”:

Expressing your views and speaking out on behalf of the poor are some of the most important ways that *you can make a difference*. Campaigning is about making your voice heard and *joining others who share your concerns*. But what exactly is campaigning? In this toolkit, we will show you

¹⁴⁸⁸ Darnton, Andrew and Kirk, ‘Finding Frames: New Ways to Engage the UK Public in Global Poverty’, 104.

that *campaigning is not just for the diehard activist*. It is not always about protests, about getting in the news or about changing the world overnight. *It's really about ordinary people doing ordinary things* but with extraordinary results!¹⁴⁸⁹

Further, the ACTIVIST frame in MADE's discourse loosely refers to a broad range of individuals that share "the will to create change" (9.1.3). Finally, the ACTIVIST frame represents more than a slogan within MADE's discourse by virtue of its well-grounded connection with the organisation's wider meaning system, through its cognitive association with the MOVEMENT frame and the 'fight' metaphor (9.1.4).

Informed by the analysis of MADE's imagery, the chapter has also identified how MADE seems to articulate the ACTIVIST frame through two main keyings: the 'dissenting' and the 'lifestyle' keyings.

The dissenting keying of the ACTIVIST frame is conveyed by images that portray MADE's supporters engaging in actions traditionally associated with traditional forms of direct activism (such as holding placards and addressing crowds through a megaphone), in the context of collective action (such as demonstrations or protests), carried out in the public sphere. These images are also paralleled by textual prompts that highlight the visibly public and collective dimensions of dissenting activism. In all cases, however, the contentiousness of this keying is downplayed (indeed, almost eclipsed) by the incorporation of a playful tone conveyed by the body language of MADE's supporters, or by the aesthetics of their gear (9.2.1).

The lifestyle keying of the ACTIVIST frame is evoked by images that portray MADE's supporters engaging in noncontentious, individual, and private actions that are increasingly seen as legitimate manifestations of what it means to be an 'activist'. In particular, this keying contributes to align MADE with the Social Responsibility activism described in chapter 7, and it is conveyed by references to two main types of lifestyle activism associated with this movement: 'green living' and consumer (Fairtrade) activism (9.2.2).

Notably, mirroring MADE's articulation of the POPP injustice-type frame where the lifestyle keying dominates over the structural keying (as discussed in chapter

¹⁴⁸⁹ MADE in Europe and Oxfam GB, 'Islam in Action! The Ultimate Campaign Toolkit', 9. Italics mine.

7), here, too, the lifestyle keying of the ACTIVIST frame dominates over the dissenting keying. This further informs how we can think about MADE and about the type of civic engagement it promotes, as I shall outline shortly. In fact, the dominance of the lifestyle keying and the broad-ranging scope of the ACTIVIST frame in MADE's discourse are clearly summed up by the following extract from its Chair and Executive Director's message in the 2013-14 annual report. Here, supporters are projected through the ACTIVIST frame ("the real drivers of change") and the work of the organisation is explicitly described as an effort to "instilling a culture of consciousness, ethical decision-making and activism that is the core of the Muslim lifestyle":

*We see our campaigns as seedlings by instilling a culture of consciousness, ethical decision-making and activism that is the core of the Muslim lifestyle, and a shifting of the status quo starting from right here, at home. There is an enormous responsibility that comes with being a voice for justice and peace, but we are all too aware that it is in fact our volunteers, supporters and partners who shoulder this responsibility with us, who are the real drivers of change in communities at home and globally.*¹⁴⁹⁰

- *Resonance with wider narratives*

Like in the case of the POPP and the CYCW frames discussed in chapter 7, the articulation of the ACTIVIST frame, too, resonates with both social movement and Muslim discourses.

On the one hand, resonance with social movement discourse permeates MADE's discourse and it is particularly evident in its visual cues, which include archetypal symbols associated to the ACTIVIST frame—both in its dissenting keying (e.g. placards and megaphones); and its lifestyle keying (e.g. images of MADE's supporters engaging in 'green' activities or Fairtrade events).

On the other hand, the chapter has also identified mechanisms through which the organisation makes the ACTIVIST frame resonate with distinctive Muslim discourses. An instance of this is the use of the ACTIVIST frame to characterise the Prophetic example—a discursive strategy that, as I outlined in subsection 9.1.1, has become increasingly popular amongst Muslims in the Global North.¹⁴⁹¹ Another (visual) example of this resonance is represented by the illustration of protest placards juxtaposed with references from the primary sources of Islam,

¹⁴⁹⁰ MADE in Europe, 'Annual Report 2014', 3.

¹⁴⁹¹ As epitomised by the Inspired by Muhammad campaign.

which emphasise the duty for Muslims to both uphold justice and proactively effect positive change (figure 9.4). Finally, a third instance is the synergy developed by MADE between Fairtrade activism and distinctively Muslim traditions—as shown by the promotion of the idea of ‘ethical iftars’ (9.2.2.2).

- *Implications for the research sub-questions*

In order to better understand how these findings inform the way we can think about MADE and about the type of civic engagement it promotes, it is useful here to build on the methodology developed by Hashem to map “the shades” of contemporary ‘Muslim activism’, which suggests that different “generic orientations” (rather than formal groups) can be identified through the intersection of the ideational and structural dimensions of specific types of Muslim activism.¹⁴⁹²

Ideationally, MADE can be understood as having what Hashem calls an “eclectic orientation”¹⁴⁹³ towards both its mainstream and its distinctively Muslim universes of reference. With regards to its mainstream frame of reference, MADE taps into a wide range of ideas and symbols associated with different shades of contemporary activism, which I discussed in chapter 7: from the rhetoric of the clenched fist and of revolution, to the socio-environmentalist critique of the neoliberal order (conveyed by the POPP frame); from the idea of the ‘revolution of the everyday’ (conveyed by the CYCW frame), to images of placards and megaphones (discussed in this chapter). Concerning its orientation towards Islamic references, MADE engages the ethical dimension of key ideas and values in order to advocate an ‘activist’ lifestyle that (though agreeable in principle by a like-minded non-Muslim perspective) is in this way ultimately grounded in faith as the motive and guidance for taking action. Key instances of this eclectic orientation are, for example: i) the rationalisation of the adoption of the CYCW frame in light of Qur’an 13:11; ii) the adoption and adaption of key Islamic references to title campaigns on non Muslim-centric issues (e.g. MADE’s campaign on food production/consumption, named Eat of the Good Things after Qur’an 2:172; MADE’s campaign on maternal health, named At Our Mothers’ Feet after a Prophetic hadith); iii) the framing of mainstream concepts through

¹⁴⁹² M Hashem, ‘Contemporary Islamic Activism: The Shades of Praxis’, *Sociology of Religion* *Sociology of Religion* 67, no. 1 (2006): 23; 25.

¹⁴⁹³ *Ibid.*, 28–29.

Islamic ideas (e.g. MADE framing of the idea of organic food through the Islamic concept of *tayyib*).

Structurally, the type of civic engagement carried out by MADE displays a mix of what, drawing from Hashem, we may call individualistic, local and global orientations.¹⁴⁹⁴ In its individualistic orientation, MADE focuses on refining and reshaping individual Muslims' consciousness and behaviours. In its local orientation, MADE motivates Muslims to take action not only in their individual lives, but also within their community. In its global orientation, MADE is concerned with global issues and it attempts to challenge the global neoliberal order through the "revolution of everyday life"¹⁴⁹⁵ approach.

At the intersection between its ideational eclectic orientation and each of its layers of structural orientation, MADE thus can be understood as an organisation in between what Clarke calls "Faith-based charitable or development organisations" and "Faith-based socio-political organisations."¹⁴⁹⁶ With the former, MADE shares the aim to mobilise the faithful around issues such as poverty and inequality. However, it also differs from this type of organisations as it does not "fund or manage programmes which tackle poverty and social exclusion," but rather promotes change and action among supporters that are conceptualised and treated as direct 'activists'. With the latter, MADE shares the aim of mobilising the faithful in pursuit of broader social change. However, MADE distinguishes itself from faith-based socio-political organisations because it does not "interpret and deploy faith as a political construct," but rather as an ethical framework guiding action in the realm of sub-politics (as I introduced in chapter 7).

In turn, this informs how we can think about British Muslim civic engagement through MADE's perspective. In fact, in light of its eclectic ideational orientation, its individualistic-local-global outlook, and its 'hybrid' nature in between a faith-based development and a socio-political organisation, MADE seems to promote a form of civic engagement that: i) highlights the mismatch between the ideal

¹⁴⁹⁴ Whilst I borrow these categories from Hashem as heuristic categories to help understand MADE, his understanding of individualistically, locally and globally-oriented Muslim activism differs from what I put forward here with regards to MADE. *Ibid.*, 30–35.

¹⁴⁹⁵ Jenny Pickerill and Paul Chatterton, 'Notes towards Autonomous Geographies: Creation, Resistance and Self-Management as Survival Tactics', *Progress in Human Geography* 30, no. 6 (1 December 2006): 738, doi:10.1177/0309132506071516.

¹⁴⁹⁶ Gerard Clarke, 'Faith Matters: Faith-Based Organisations, Civil Society and International Development', *Journal of International Development* 18, no. 6 (1 August 2006): 840, doi:10.1002/jid.1317.

ethical Muslim lifestyle and the reality of contemporary average Muslims' conduct; ii) offers low-threshold access to community engagement guided by Islamic ideas and principles; and iii) prefigures at the small level the 'ideal society' the activists wish to see—one infused with ethical principles derived from an Islamic framework.

Chapter 10 . Conclusions

Despite the heightened visibility of BMNGOs in recent years, there is a lack of research on their discourses—a gap that is all the more significant due to the growing salience of frames theory as a tool to understand NGOs' meaning-making efforts (as outlined in chapter 2). In order to address this lacuna, this thesis has provided an original, detailed analysis of the meaning systems (re)produced by two BMNGOs: Islamic Relief (IR) and MADE.

The overarching objective of the thesis was to inform and enrich our understanding of BMNGOs' discourses. This objective has been addressed by providing empirically-grounded, in-depth case studies of two organisations that were purposively selected as a paradigmatic (IR) and as an atypical case (MADE), in order to bring to the fore a spectrum of frames identifiable within the BMNGO sector—as discussed in chapter 1. The emerging thick descriptions of IR and MADE represent, in and of themselves, the main results of the study, which should enable readers from different disciplinary backgrounds to gain a nuanced insight into BMNGOs' discourses. In fact, conscious that a narrow disciplinary focus cannot help us understanding the complexity of these actors' discourses, the study adopted an interdisciplinary framework resulting from a combination between the frame theory approach (derived from social movement studies) and the post-Orientalist approach (derived from Islamic studies/sociology of Islam and Muslims)—as outlined in chapter 3.

Under this overarching objective, the thesis pursued two interlinked aims. Primarily, the aim of the study was empirical. Driven by the overarching research question 'what frames seem to be at work in the discourse of BMNGOs?', the thesis engaged in an intensive frame analysis of the official representational discourses of the two case studies, mainly following the "micro-frame analysis"¹⁴⁹⁷ approach developed by Johnston (discussed in chapter 3). As a result, the thesis not only identified two sets of organisation-specific frames, but also provided a nuanced discussion of their content, thereby highlighting their contextualisation and resonance within broader discourses (e.g. the Muslim tradition; development and social movements' discourses) and societal trends

¹⁴⁹⁷ Hank Johnston, 'A Methodology for Frame Analysis: From Discourse to Cognitive Schemata', in *Social Movements and Culture*, ed. Hank Johnston and Bert Klandermans (U of Minnesota Press, 2003), 237.

(e.g. the emergence of a Muslim active citizenship in the Global North;¹⁴⁹⁸ the growing appetite for direct activism among young British Muslims¹⁴⁹⁹).

Secondarily, the thesis also pursued the theoretical aim to utilise the frames identified by the analysis as entry points for the introductory exploration of two research sub-questions: ‘how to think about BMNGOs?’ and ‘how to think about British Muslim civic engagement?’

In light of these aims, the thesis put forward a number of suggestions. In the following, I shall summarise and elaborate some of the most salient ones. Then, I will move on to outline some concluding thoughts about how we can understand the two case studies. Finally, I shall briefly outline some of the main limitations of this study and introduce future research possibilities.

10.1. Addressing the research questions

The thesis has provided an original, empirical insight into the discourses of IR and MADE through the identification and analysis of the main frames used by these organisations to articulate: i) their organisational identity (‘the Self’) (part one); ii) their mobilisation efforts (part two); and iii) the conceptualisations of their supporter bases (part three). The analysis has identified two set of frames which I summarise here in figure 10.1, following Johnston’s recommendation to visually represent frames through schematic diagrams that highlight the connections between them.¹⁵⁰⁰

¹⁴⁹⁸ Mario Peucker and Shahram Akbarzadeh, *Muslim Active Citizenship in the West* (Routledge, 2014).

¹⁴⁹⁹ Sughra Ahmed and Naved Siddiqi, ‘British by Dissent’ (Muslim Youth Helpline, 2014).

¹⁵⁰⁰ Johnston, ‘A Methodology for Frame Analysis: From Discourse to Cognitive Schemata’, 238–42; Hank Johnston, ‘Comparative Frame Analysis’, in *Frames of Protest: Social Movements and the Framing Perspective*, ed. Hank Johnston and John A. Noakes (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005), 242.




Figure 10.1 Frame systems (including keyings) identified in IR and MADE's discourses.

The dash-dotted arrows highlight the resonance between different components (frames: block capitals, in rectangular boxes; keyings: sentence case, in rounded corners boxes).

Figure 10.1 also highlights that, despite the thesis did not aim to be (and should not be seen as) a comparative study, the analysis of two parallel case studies inevitably highlights similarities and differences between the respective frame systems. These point to two diverging orientations of how we can think about BMNGOs and British Muslims' civic engagement, which seem to broadly reflect what Lance Bennett refers to as the "tensions between earlier-generation NGO-centered transnational activism and newer, loosely structured direct activist networks."¹⁵⁰¹ Indeed, Bennett's theorisation is particularly useful to elucidate some of the main differences between IR and MADE, and it is therefore adopted (and adapted) here as a general framework to summarise some of the most salient findings of the thesis.

I will specify in each of the following sections how IR and MADE seem to represent exemplars of the NGO-led transnational order, on the one hand, and of loose global justice networks of direct activism, on the other (which, paraphrasing Bennett, I will refer to simply as 'NGO-led order' and 'direct activism era', respectively).¹⁵⁰² Before attending to this task, it is useful to provide here a brief summary of the main characteristics of each of these broad categories. On the one hand, the expression 'NGO-led order' refers to a conceptualisation of engagement with bigger-than-self issues that is: i) organisation-centred; ii) based on centrally organised campaigns that are largely single issue-specific; and iii) aimed mainly at extracting policy reforms.¹⁵⁰³ Contrasted to this, the 'direct activism era' "operate[s] in a more emergent movement environment of large-

¹⁵⁰¹ W. Lance Bennett, 'Social Movements beyond Borders: Organization, Communication, and Political Capacity in Two Eras of Transnational Activism', in *Transnational Protest and Global Activism*, ed. Donatella Della Porta and Sidney G. Tarrow (Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), 211.

¹⁵⁰² *Ibid.*, 213-214. It is important to note that Bennett talks about an "NGO-led transnational activist order" and a "NGO Advocacy Order". *Ibid.*, italics mine. Bennett's emphasis on the notions of 'activist' and 'advocacy' derives from the fact that the author, drawing from Keck and Sikkink, refers mainly to those international NGOs "that are organized to promote causes, principled ideas and norms, and often involve individuals advocating policy changes that cannot be easily linked to their 'interests'." Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, 'Transnational Advocacy Networks in International and Regional Politics', *International Social Science Journal* 51, no. 159 (1 March 1999): 91, doi:10.1111/1468-2451.00179. In other words, Bennett's conceptualisation of the "NGO Advocacy Order" mainly refers to NGOs that dedicate significant efforts to advocacy work (such as Oxfam, for example). IR, as primarily a humanitarian/development NGO, may therefore not fit this category in the strict sense. Nevertheless, IR still presents a number of characteristics that are shared by actors more aptly categorizable within the "NGO Advocacy Order" (i.e. the characteristics that I will highlight in this section) and fits in the broad sense with what can be described more loosely as the 'NGO order' emerged since the 1980s-90s. For these reasons, whilst I do draw from Bennett's observations, I apply them selectively to IR only when appropriate and I use the expression 'NGO order' rather than "NGO Advocacy Order."

¹⁵⁰³ W. Lance Bennett, 'Social Movements beyond Borders: Organization, Communication, and Political Capacity in Two Eras of Transnational Activism', 212-13.

scale direct activism, multi-issue networks, and untidy “permanent” campaigns with less clear goals and political relationships with targets.”¹⁵⁰⁴ With this general framework in mind, I can now move on to review the main findings of the thesis and highlight how these relate to the ‘NGO-led order’ and the ‘direct activism era’.

10.1.1. Framing organisational identity

The analysis of how IR and MADE frame their organisational identity has found two very different conceptualisations of the Self, which represent a strong indication of how IR and MADE seem to represent exemplars of the ‘NGO-led order’ and the ‘direct activism era’, respectively.

- *Islamic Relief*

Chapter 4 highlighted how IR has engaged over the years in a dynamic process of fine-tuning of the articulation of Self through three frames that have enjoyed different degrees of visibility within its discourse.

During the 2005-07 phase, which I characterised with the expression ‘*assuming distinctiveness*’, the ISLAMIC VALUES frame attempted to project IR’s distinctiveness as a Muslim NGO in a somehow sloganeering way, as this was not substantiated by a consistent discursive base capable of articulating a Muslim dimension that, consequently, was taken for granted. Within this phase, my analysis corroborates Petersen’s work on IR insofar as this highlights how IR adopted a “compartmentalized, almost invisible Islam, promoting a largely secularized notion of aid.”¹⁵⁰⁵

During the 2007-09 phase (which overlaps with the implementation of IR’s first global strategy), the ISLAMIC HUMANITARIAN VALUES frame gained prominence within IR’s discourse, representing a deliberate effort of alignment between different traditions (the ‘Islamic’ and the ‘humanitarian’)—an effort that I characterised through the expression ‘*seeking balance*’. In this phase, IR seemed to engage in that process of frame alignment that Petersen refers to as “Islamising development aid.”¹⁵⁰⁶

¹⁵⁰⁴ Ibid., 212.

¹⁵⁰⁵ Marie Juul Petersen, ‘Islamizing Aid: Transnational Muslim NGOs After 9.11’, *Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations* 23, no. 1 (2012): 133.

¹⁵⁰⁶ Marie Juul Petersen, ‘For Humanity or for the Umma? Ideologies of Aid in Four Transnational Muslim NGOs’ (PhD Thesis, 2011), 219, <http://ccrs.ku.dk/phd/phdthesisdefences/mariejuulpetersen/>.

The analysis also identified 2010 as a watershed in IR's discursive trajectory, epitomised by the introduction of the ISLAMIC HUMANITARIANISM frame as part of IR's "new strategic direction"¹⁵⁰⁷ for the 2011-14 phase, which I referred to using the expression '*finding a self-confident synthesis*'. During these years, ISLAMIC HUMANITARIANISM becomes IR's dominant frame to articulate the Self, indicating not a mere quest for balance (as it was the case in the earlier phase), but a self-confident display of Muslim distinctiveness as a source of both internal inspiration and leadership within the development sector as a whole. These findings contrast with Petersen's suggestion that in IR's discourse "Islam is presented as largely invisible,"¹⁵⁰⁸ and qualify such observation as plausible only with regards to the 2005-07 phase.

In the conclusions of the chapter I also highlighted how these phases and frames seem to mirror broader tensions between different understandings of FBOs. In particular: i) the 'assuming distinctiveness' phase (2005-07) and the ISLAMIC VALUES frame resonate with the "same, same—but different"¹⁵⁰⁹ perspective, which focuses on the similarities between FBOs and secular NGOs, preemptively normalising the former against the benchmark of the latter; ii) the 'seeking balance' phase (2007-09) and the ISLAMIC HUMANITARIAN VALUES frame seem to mirror the "coexisting" perspective,¹⁵¹⁰ which understands FBOs as actors that carry an element of distinctiveness (deriving from their faith-inspired nature) and that have a legitimate and equal right to enjoy equal weightage as their secular counterparts; iii) the 'finding a self-confident synthesis' phase (2011-14) and the ISLAMIC HUMANITARIANISM frame echo the 'intersectional' perspective,¹⁵¹¹ which understands FBOs as organisations that have 'feet in both camps' and are firmly rooted in both their religious identity and their compliance to mainstream norms. From this perspective, the increasing visibility of distinctively Muslim references in IR's discourse can be interpreted, as I also suggested in the conclusions of chapter 4 drawing from Clarke's

¹⁵⁰⁷ Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Islamic Relief Worldwide 2010 Annual Report & Financial Statements' (Birmingham: Islamic Relief Worldwide, 2010), 38, http://www.islamic-relief.org.uk/content/uploads/2013/05/Annual_Report_2010.pdf.

¹⁵⁰⁸ Petersen, 'Islamizing Aid', 147.

¹⁵⁰⁹ Matthew Clarke and Vicki-Anne Ware, 'Understanding Faith-Based Organizations: How FBOs Are Contrasted with NGOs in International Development Literature', *Progress in Development Studies* 15, no. 1 (1 January 2015): 42, doi:10.1177/1464993414546979.

¹⁵¹⁰ Ibid., 44.

¹⁵¹¹ Ibid., 41.

classification of FBOs,¹⁵¹² as an evolution from a ‘passive’ orientation (where faith-based distinctiveness is subsidiary to a broader secular narrative) to an ‘active’ orientation (where faith-based distinctiveness provides an important and explicit framework for discourse and action).

Notably, despite these phases and frames differ from each other, all contribute to position IR firmly within the ‘NGO-led order’ precisely because—regardless of the specific nuances—they all focus on the organisational identity of IR through the lens of the NGO paradigm.

- *MADE*

Chapter 5 highlighted how MADE conceptualises the Self through a MOVEMENT frame that is consistently conveyed by four main rhetorical devices. Firstly, MADE consistently uses the term ‘movement’ at the macro-level (to describe what MADE is), at the meso-level (to describe what MADE envisions), and at the micro-level (to describe what MADE does). Secondly, MADE’s discourse conveys a pervasive sense of injustice that is inherently linked with the MOVEMENT frame. This is incorporated in MADE’s call for action (macro-level), in its vision (meso-level), and it is adopted to articulate virtually all the issues MADE has campaigned on over the years (micro-level). Thirdly, the activation of the MOVEMENT frame is reinforced by the consistent incorporation of references to the idea of ‘agency’. These appear in MADE’s name and tag-line (macro-level), its vision and mission (meso-level), and throughout its discourse (micro-level), which emphasises the three main dimensions of agency, namely: i) the viability of change; ii) the capability of individuals and groups to effect change; iii) and a sense of responsibility to take action. Fourthly, MADE activates the MOVEMENT frame by alluding to its traditionally contentious nature through the consistent incorporation of the ‘fight’ metaphor.

In addition, in the conclusions of chapter 5 I also highlighted three main observations. First, MADE’s adoption of the MOVEMENT frame resonates with a wider trend among NGOs that incorporate an advocacy/campaigning dimension (e.g. Oxfam), which are increasingly challenging hard-and-fast dichotomies about

¹⁵¹² Gerard Clarke, ‘Faith-Based Organizations and International Development: An Overview’, in *Development, Civil Society and Faith-Based Organizations*, ed. Gerard Clarke and Michael Jennings, International Political Economy Series (Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2008), 32, http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9780230371262_2.

the nature of movements and NGOs. Second, the adoption of the MOVEMENT frame suggests a self-conscious emphasis on grassroots membership and activism, which in turn implies a deliberate distancing from ‘the establishment’ and a desire to be (and to be seen as) a genuine platform for meaningful participation. This seems to mirror broader societal trends, which increasingly see young British Muslims as individuals that are eager to engage in a wide spectrum of forms of civic engagement but that also seem often to experience a significant degree of alienation with regards to institutional platforms (such as political parties or Muslim ‘representative’ organisations).¹⁵¹³ Third, and stemming from the foregoing, MADE’s adoption of the MOVEMENT frame challenges both: i) the transactional model that still prevails within both the mainstream and Muslim NGO sector; and ii) the reactive, claims-making mode of activism that characterised much of British Muslim civic engagement in the last two decades of the 20th century.¹⁵¹⁴

Taken together, the aforementioned suggest that, by adopting the MOVEMENT frame, MADE situates itself within the landscape of the ‘direct activism era’: one where young British Muslims have come together to form a “hyper-organization” (i.e. one existing mainly in the form of its online presence) that “empowers individuals” through “loosely structured direct activist networks” built on the basis of common grievances, aspirations and motivations.¹⁵¹⁵

10.1.2. Framing mobilisation efforts

The analysis of IR and MADE’s mobilisation efforts (as expressed in their Ramadan campaigns in 2013 and 2013-14, respectively) through the prism of two of the main components of collective action frames identified by Gamson (injustice and agency) has enabled me to identify two systems of organisation-specific frames that significantly enrich our understanding of these actors. Additionally, these frame-sets further contribute to conceptualise IR and MADE as exemplars of the ‘NGO-led order’ and the ‘direct activism era’, respectively.

¹⁵¹³ Ben O’Loughlin and Marie Gillespie, ‘Dissenting Citizenship? Young People and Political Participation in the Media-Security Nexus’, *Parliamentary Affairs* 65, no. 1 (1 January 2012): 115–37, doi:10.1093/pa/gsr055; Ahmed and Siddiqi, ‘British by Dissent’.

¹⁵¹⁴ Zafar Khan, ‘Muslim Presence in Europe: The British Dimension - Identity, Integration and Community Activism’, *Current Sociology* 48, no. 4 (1 October 2000): 31, doi:10.1177/0011392100048004004.

¹⁵¹⁵ W. Lance Bennett, ‘Social Movements beyond Borders: Organization, Communication, and Political Capacity in Two Eras of Transnational Activism’, 218; 212; 214.

10.1.2.1. Injustice-type frames

Both IR and MADE adopt injustice-type frames by expressing moral indignation against a wrongful ‘entity’ that at best neglects and at worst disrespects and undermines the dignity of human life—as summed up by the OVER PEOPLE portion of both the POLITICS OVER PEOPLE (POP) and the PROFIT OVER PEOPLE & PLANET (POPP) frames. However, these organisation-specific frames convey two slightly different perspectives.

- *Islamic Relief*

As I discussed in chapter 6, IR’s POP frame conveys a full condemnation of politics as a corrupted/corrupting (in other words, ‘impure’) entity constituted of a range of forces that fall on a spectrum between ‘the structural’ (expressed by ‘politics of war’ keying) and the and ‘the cultural’ (expressed by ‘politics of greed’ keying), with the media (identified through the homonymous keying) epitomising the interaction between these two poles.

Such a conceptualisation of injustice reflects humanitarian notions related to the ‘purity’ of the ‘humanitarian space’, which is projected as the ideal antipode of the ‘impure’ world of politics.¹⁵¹⁶ One of the consequences of the POP frame is therefore that meaningful action to address injustice can be taken only *outside* the realm of politics, by actors that self-consciously emphasise their *non*-political and humanitarian nature—such as IR. Further, the POP frame’s mono-dimensional character reflects the traditional *humanitarian* focus on PEOPLE (rather than on PEOPLE & PLANET), mirroring the high degree of specialisation of traditional NGOs.

From this perspective, the POP frame contributes to position IR as an exemplar of the ‘NGO-led order’, as this has very limited (if any) ‘political’ goals and rather focuses on achieving “reform” and conducting “crisis intervention” guided by the framework of international norms and regulations.¹⁵¹⁷ Additionally, as I highlighted in the conclusions of chapter 6, the very fact that IR engages the realm of ‘politics’ (essentially, by denouncing it through its injustice-type frame) resonates with wider shifts occurring at the cutting-edge of an NGO sector, which

¹⁵¹⁶ Andrea Paras and Janice Gross Stein, ‘Bridging the Sacred and the Profane in Humanitarian Life’, in *Sacred Aid: Faith and Humanitarianism*, ed. Michael Barnett and Janice Gross Stein (Oxford University Press, 2012), 213.

¹⁵¹⁷ W. Lance Bennett, ‘Social Movements beyond Borders: Organization, Communication, and Political Capacity in Two Eras of Transnational Activism’, 214.

is increasingly moving since the early 2010s towards a more holistic approach that may explore common grounds with alternative, emerging forms of direct activism.

- *MADE*

I outlined in chapter 7 how MADE's POPP frame conveys condemnation for a neoliberal order that is manifested and reproduced by both institutional policies (conveyed through a secondary 'structural' keying) and individual everyday choices (conveyed through a dominant 'lifestyle' keying).

Whilst this frame shares with IR's POP frame the moral condemnation of current cultural trends and their practical implementation, it distinguishes itself by identifying 'profit' (rather than 'politics') as the main culpable force. Consequently, the POPP frame does not unconditionally jettison the idea of 'politics', but rather qualifies it: whilst in IR's POP frame politics represents a culprit in and of itself, MADE's POPP frame condemns *a certain type* of politics—that which puts PROFIT OVER PEOPLE & PLANET. From the perspective of the POPP frame, therefore, meaningful action to address injustice can be taken *within* the realm of 'politics'—although one of a different sort: 'subpolitics' (more on this later).

Further, I highlighted how the two-layered characterisation of the victim of this type of injustice (not only from a *humanitarian* focus, but also from an *environmentalist* perspective) conveyed by the POPP frame aligns MADE with a wider convergence occurred since the early 2010s between contemporary forms of direct activism that have traditionally been either PEOPLE- or PLANET-focused (such as the Global Justice Movement and the environmentalist movement, respectively).

Consequently, the foregoing highlights that the POPP frame contributes to conceptualise MADE as an exemplar of the 'direct activism era', as a loosely structured form of activism that experiments "new kinds of political relationships" in order to advance a diverse agenda framed loosely around social and environmental justice issue.¹⁵¹⁸

¹⁵¹⁸ Ibid., 213-214.

10.1.2.2. Agency-type frames

Both IR and MADE adopt agency-type frames within their mobilisation efforts, by emphasising that positive change in the world is not only desirable but also achievable—as summed up by the fact that both the HUCW and the CYCW contain a CHANGE THIS(/THE) WORLD portion. However, these organisation-specific frames convey quite diametrically opposite perspectives.

- *Islamic Relief*

Since the POP frame adopted by IR implies that meaningful action can be taken only within the humanitarian space, it follows that the type of agency envisioned by this organisation lies precisely with those actors that operate within such space—i.e. humanitarian/development NGOs such as IR. From this perspective, chapter 6 highlighted how IR projects itself as the main actor responsible for and capable of bringing about positive change, therefore articulating agency through a HELP US CHANGE THIS WORLD frame that firmly situates it within the ‘NGO-led order’ by virtue of: i) prioritising the role of the organisation (rather than of individuals) as the actor capable of effecting change; and ii) identifying the provision of humanitarian aid/development work as the main (and almost only) valuable tactic to promote positive change.

Notably, chapter 6 also identified the incorporation of a more significant ‘campaigning’ dimension in IR’s articulation of agency (exemplified by the tripartite slogan and logo of the War on Hunger campaign) This indicates IR’s sensitivity to a broader awareness within the NGO sector about the need to “go beyond the charity approach,”¹⁵¹⁹ therefore bringing IR closer to what Bennett more precisely describes as the “NGO advocacy order”¹⁵²⁰ (i.e. one that does engage in campaigning activities) rather than merely as an exemplar of a broader ‘NGO-led order’.

- *MADE*

Chapter 7 highlighted that one of the implications of MADE’s POPP frame is a qualification of ‘politics’ (rather than its unconditional invalidation) which implies that meaningful action to address injustice can, indeed, be taken within this realm.

¹⁵¹⁹ Darnton, Andrew and Martin Kirk, ‘Finding Frames: New Ways to Engage the UK Public in Global Poverty’ (London: Bond, 2011), 104.

¹⁵²⁰ W. Lance Bennett, ‘Social Movements beyond Borders: Organization, Communication, and Political Capacity in Two Eras of Transnational Activism’, 214.

Stemming from this understanding, MADE articulates agency through a CHANGE YOURSELF TO CHANGE THE WORLD frame (CYCW) that exhorts British Muslims to take “individualized collective action” in the realm of “subpolitics”—i.e. “politics emerging in places other than formal politics.”¹⁵²¹ In particular, MADE brings together visible references to social movement/activist narratives with equally visible references to the Muslim tradition in order to highlight how the ethical guidance of the latter can lead British Muslims to have a positive impact on people and the planet (i.e. to directly ‘make a difference’) through their daily choices and actions on a wide range of life-areas. In doing this, MADE not only strongly aligns itself with the archetypical manifestation of the CYCW frame—the Social Responsibility movement—but also challenges its purely secular nature by extending agency in the spiritual life-area. Consequently, in the conclusion of chapter 7 I suggested that MADE can be broadly conceptualised as a ‘Muslim lifestyle’ social movement organisation.

Notably, the CYCW frame projects MADE as an exemplar of the ‘direct activism era’ by virtue of its: i) focus on “value change”¹⁵²² (firstly within individuals, followed by gradual accumulation of change at a societal level); ii) prioritisation of the role of individuals (rather than the organisation) as actors capable to effect change; iii) identification of everyday life almost as a series of “permanent campaigns”¹⁵²³ through which individuals can directly bring about change on a multitude of issues.

10.1.3. Framing the supporter base

The analysis of how IR and MADE frame their supporter bases has identified two significantly different conceptualisations, which further contribute to understand these organisations as exemplars of the ‘NGO-led order’ and of the ‘direct activism era’, respectively.

- *Islamic Relief*

Chapter 8 identified two main frames in IR’s discourse about its supporter base: the GENEROUS DONOR (GD) and the VOLUNTEER frames.

¹⁵²¹ Michele Micheletti, *Political Virtue and Shopping: Individuals, Consumerism, and Collective Action* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 24; 29.

¹⁵²² W. Lance Bennett, ‘Social Movements beyond Borders: Organization, Communication, and Political Capacity in Two Eras of Transnational Activism’, 214.

¹⁵²³ Ibid.

The GD frame is based on a “transactional or monetised model of engagement” whereby the British Muslim publics in the Global North symbolically commission IR to deliver aid/development on their behalf in the Global South as an expression of their generous (/charitable) ‘gift giving’.¹⁵²⁴ The VOLUNTEER frame conveys a conceptualisation of support that is less monetised and, in fact, broadly categorizable as a type of “citizenship behaviour” insofar it consists in donating one’s time, energy, or possessions for the common good.¹⁵²⁵ However, both the ‘fundraising’ and the ‘non-financial helper’ keyings identified in the analysis fall short to convey an *active* citizenship behaviour because they essentially mimic the GD frame’s gift giving approach to engagement—the only difference being that volunteers’ provide services (rather than money) in the Global North (e.g. running a fundraising event or helping in a charity shop) in exchange for IR’s delivery of services in the Global South.

On the other hand, the analysis also showed that IR has recently introduced an ‘active citizen’ keying of the VOLUNTEER frame. This seems to reflect a growing awareness by the organisation of the appetite for forms of active citizenship behaviour among British Muslims, possibly reflecting the growing salience of the phenomenon broadly described as “Muslim active citizenship in the West.”¹⁵²⁶ Despite the active citizen keying contributes to increasingly project British Muslim as agentic actors, the dominance of the GD and the VOLUNTEER frames in IR’s discourse implies that the type of civic engagement offered by the organisation to its audience (still) mainly consists in helping IR to conduct its own activities—hence reinforcing the HUCW frame discussed earlier.

Consequently, both the GD and the VOLUNTEER frames contribute to conceptualise IR as an exemplar of a ‘NGO-led order’: agency is centralised with the organisation, whilst supporters are “turned on & off”¹⁵²⁷ around strategic campaigning moments, fundraising events or projects wherein they have well-defined and limited opportunities for engagement defined by the organisation.

¹⁵²⁴ Darnton, Andrew and Kirk, ‘Finding Frames: New Ways to Engage the UK Public in Global Poverty’, 90.

¹⁵²⁵ John Pelozo and Derek N. Hassay, ‘A Typology of Charity Support Behaviors: Toward a Holistic View of Helping’, *Journal of Nonprofit & Public Sector Marketing* 17, no. 1–2 (19 April 2007): 140–41, doi:10.1300/J054v17n01_07.

¹⁵²⁶ Peucker and Akbarzadeh, *Muslim Active Citizenship in the West*.

¹⁵²⁷ W. Lance Bennett, ‘Social Movements beyond Borders: Organization, Communication, and Political Capacity in Two Eras of Transnational Activism’, 214.

- *MADE*

Chapter 9 highlighted how MADE frames its supporter base mainly through an ACTIVIST frame.

This is consistently conveyed by both textual and visual cues, and solidly anchored on other components of MADE's meaning system—such as the MOVEMENT frame. In MADE's discourse, the ACTIVIST frame is articulated through two main keyings. The 'dissenting' keying taps into traditional understandings of the idea of 'activist', which resonate with the fact that MADE somehow aligns itself with contemporary 'dissenting movements' (such as the Global Justice movement) through the POPP frame. The 'lifestyle' keying draws from more contemporary, 'everyday' conceptualisations of what an 'activist' is, which resonate with the fact that MADE also strongly aligns with 'noncontentious movements' (such as the Social Responsibility movement) through the CYCW frame.

MADE's adoption of the ACTIVIST frame contributes to situate MADE within the landscape of 'politics by other means', consequently pointing to a significant qualitative shift in the way we can think about BMNGOs and British Muslims' civic engagement. In fact, the spaces for engagement conceptualised and offered by MADE do not seem to constitute "spaces of deference to higher organizational levels"¹⁵²⁸ (which characterise the 'NGO-led order'), but rather spaces where young British Muslim engage in a "process of activist-becoming-activist" by eclectically embracing "a plurality of values and traditions, a pragmatic goal orientation and a growing professionalism."¹⁵²⁹

Consequently, the ACTIVIST frame contributes to conceptualise MADE as an exemplar of the 'direct activism era': agency is mainly located within the realm of direct action by ordinary individuals (rather than with professionals within an NGO), who cannot easily be 'turned on and off' because they approach a broad spectrum of life-areas as platforms to contribute addressing a diverse range of bigger-than-self issues.

¹⁵²⁸ Jenny Pickerill and Paul Chatterton, 'Notes towards Autonomous Geographies: Creation, Resistance and Self-Management as Survival Tactics', *Progress in Human Geography* 30, no. 6 (1 December 2006): 738, doi:10.1177/0309132506071516.

¹⁵²⁹ Paul Chatterton and Jenny Pickerill, 'Everyday Activism and Transitions towards Post-Capitalist Worlds', *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 35, no. 4 (1 October 2010): 487, doi:10.1111/j.1475-5661.2010.00396.x.

10.2. Concluding thoughts

Through the adoption (and adaption) of the concepts of ‘NGO-led order’ and ‘direct activism era’, the foregoing highlighted how the two frame systems identified by the thesis within IR and MADE’s discourses inform our understanding of these organisations and the type of civic engagement they promote. In what follows, I offer some concluding remarks about: i) IR’s simultaneous engagement with and belonging to different areas of civil society; ii) the characterisation of MADE as a unique type of actor within the ‘direct activism era’, broadly understandable as a ‘Muslim lifestyle’ social movement organisation.

- *Islamic Relief*

In the conclusions of chapter 4, I outlined how IR’s framing of the Self suggests that IR can be understood (at the time of writing) as a FBO that adopts both an ‘intersectional’¹⁵³⁰ and ‘active’¹⁵³¹ orientation. The former situates IR with a foot in a distinctive religious tradition and the other in the mainstream NGO narrative; the latter implies that IR’s faith-based distinctiveness plays a key role in motivating and guiding not only its discourse and practice (as a leading Muslim NGO eager to shape the wider humanitarian/developmental sector), but also the support it aims to elicit among the British Muslim publics.

Additionally, the frame-system I identified in IR’s discourse also suggests that the organisation can be understood as an exemplar of an emerging conceptualisation of FBOs. Such understanding sees FBOs as being “constitutive” of a number of spheres that have been traditionally involved in addressing bigger-than-self issues, by virtue of their ability to simultaneously draw “on a range of heritages” and hold “membership within different areas of society,” therefore claiming “relationship to NGOs, religious organizations, civil society organizations and communities.”¹⁵³² This appears to be the case due to five main reasons.

First, the ISLAMIC HUMANITARIANISM frame projects a synthesis between the two most prominent layers of IR’s identity as a FBO that draws comfortably from

¹⁵³⁰ Clarke and Ware, ‘Understanding Faith-Based Organizations’, 41.

¹⁵³¹ Clarke, ‘Faith-Based Organizations and International Development’, 32.

¹⁵³² Clarke and Ware, ‘Understanding Faith-Based Organizations’, 45-46.

its connection with both the worlds of 'religious organisations' (ISLAMIC) and of development NGOs (HUMANITARIANISM).

Second, the POLITICS OVER PEOPLE (POP) frame links IR to both NGOs and civil society organisations insofar as these constitute "civil society as the public sphere"¹⁵³³—i.e. a polity that not only cares for the common good, but which also raises important questions about the cultural and structural underpinnings of the social and political landscape. From this perspective, the POP frame taps into civil society's collective morality in condemning 'politics as usual'.

Third, the HELP US CHANGE THIS WORLD frame (HUCW) contributes to strengthen IR's link to the traditional understanding of civil society as "associational life,"¹⁵³⁴ which sees NGOs and civil society organisations as key actors for providing services neglected by the primary and secondary sectors.¹⁵³⁵ This is because the HUCW frame focuses on IR's own capacity to 'change the world' by providing services in the Global South (i.e. where people are often neglected by local and global political and corporate interests) through the help of its supporters in the Global North. In doing this, the HUCW frame implies that IR's supporters engage in indirect (i.e. mediated by IR) action that is ultimately aimed at providing services and motivated by values such as generosity and altruism.

Fourth, IR's 'constitutive' status within 'civil society as associational life' is also conveyed by the GENEROUS DONOR (GD) and the VOLUNTEER frames. On the one hand, this is because the GD frame conveys ideas of charity and philanthropy that are not only central to the Muslim tradition¹⁵³⁶ (hence stressing IR's identify as a religious organisation), but also to secular conceptualisations of civil society as the sphere where non-state, non-corporate actors have traditionally attempted to provide services and address poverty by mobilising

¹⁵³³ Michael Edwards, *Civil Society* (John Wiley & Sons, 2013), 63–64.

¹⁵³⁴ *Ibid.*, 18.

¹⁵³⁵ Olaf Corry, 'Defining and Theorizing the Third Sector', in *Third Sector Research*, ed. Rupert Taylor (Springer New York, 2010), 15.

¹⁵³⁶ This tradition has been amply discussed in the literature, for example in: R. D McChesney, *Charity and Philanthropy in Islam: Institutionalizing the Call to Do Good* (Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Center on Philanthropy, 1995); Adam Sabra, *Poverty and Charity in Medieval Islam: Mamluk Egypt, 1250-1517* (Cambridge University Press, 2000); Amy Singer, *Charity in Islamic Societies* (Cambridge University Press, 2008).

financial resources.¹⁵³⁷ On the other hand, this connection is conveyed also by the VOLUNTEER frame (particularly in its fundraiser and non-financial helper keyings), as the idea of voluntarism from which it derives is key to mainstream understanding of civil society (both in terms of voluntary recruitment and voluntary participation).¹⁵³⁸

Fifth, the recent incorporation within IR's discourse of an active citizen keying of the VOLUNTEER frame contributes to link the organisation to both the idea of 'civil society as the public sphere' and of 'community'. With regards to the idea of 'civil society as the public sphere', the active citizen keying emphasises IR's volunteers' agency not only by highlighting the collective dimension of their efforts, but also by offering more opportunities to do 'politics by other means' through advocacy and campaigning activities that are typical of this understanding of civil society.¹⁵³⁹ Further, the active citizen keying connects IR to the idea of 'community' by emphasising the relevance of its domestic work within British society, and the capability of its volunteers to 'make a difference' through direct action at the local level (rather than through indirect action mediated by IR at the global level).

- *MADE*

Recent research on the level of engagement with 'the political' among young people in Britain, generally, and among young British Muslims, specifically, is important to inform how we can think about MADE and about the type of civic engagement it promotes. Generally, an increasing body of work suggests that, far from being apolitical and apathetic, young people in the UK are interested in 'the political' and are keen to play a more proactive role within this realm.¹⁵⁴⁰ Yet, the same research also suggests that, despite this appetite, a large number of young people "do not feel that they can influence the decision-making process" and "have little trust or confidence in the political parties and professional

¹⁵³⁷ For example, for an overview of how charity and philanthropy contributed to the emergence of civil society in England, see: Nicholas Deakin, 'Civil Society, Charity and Welfare', in *In Search of Civil Society* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), 24–56.

¹⁵³⁸ Corry, 'Defining and Theorizing the Third Sector', 13–14.

¹⁵³⁹ Paul Bunyan and John Diamond, 'Creating Positive Change to Reduce Inequality', in *Taking Action on Poverty. Does Civil Society Hold the Answer?* (New Statesman, 2014), 9, <http://www.newstatesman.com/sites/default/files/files/NS%20Poverty%20Supplement%20April%202014.pdf>.

¹⁵⁴⁰ Matt Henn and Nick Foard, 'Young People, Political Participation and Trust in Britain', *Parliamentary Affairs* 65, no. 1 (1 January 2012): 52, doi:10.1093/pa/gsr046.

politicians.”¹⁵⁴¹ More specifically, these trends appear to be mirrored among the British Muslim youth, where a considerable appetite for civic engagement (on both Muslim-centric and mainstream concerns) seems to be often accompanied by a “noticeable disquiet concerning political parties and many Muslim institutions.”¹⁵⁴²

Operating within this landscape, MADE offers young British Muslims opportunities for civic engagement outside institutional politics by interchangeably engaging four overlapping forms of “politics by other means.”¹⁵⁴³

First, MADE engages in “sub-politics.” This refers to a “means of shaping society *from below*” by “agents *outside* the political or corporatist system”—such as NGOs and citizens—that engage in ‘political action’ (broadly understood) “not only [as] social and collective agents but [as] individuals as well.”¹⁵⁴⁴ This orientation is well conveyed by MADE’s adoption of the PROFIT OVER PEOPLE & PLANET frame as its main injustice-type frame, because this implies an eagerness to shape society outside a formal political and corporatist system that are deemed to be unjust.

Second, MADE engages in “prefigurative politics.” This refers to a political orientation motivated by a commitment to moral action inspired by the belief that the process is as important as the outcome. An alternative to both vanguardist/revolutionary and structural/reformist strategies, this orientation believes that societal change is possible through an accumulation of small changes carried out by individuals or groups that “embody or “prefigure” the kind of society they want to bring about.” In this sense, prefigurative politics “is based on the principle of direct action, of directly implementing the changes one seeks, rather than asking others to make the changes on one’s behalf.”¹⁵⁴⁵ This orientation is clearly summed up by MADE’s adoption of the CHANGE

¹⁵⁴¹ Ibid., 54; 59.

¹⁵⁴² Ahmed, Sughra and Siddiqi, Naved, ‘British by Dissent’ (The Muslim Youth Helpline, 2014), 72; 75.

¹⁵⁴³ Benjamin Ginsberg and Martin Shefter, *Politics by Other Means: Politicians, Prosecutors, and the Press from Watergate to Whitewater* (Norton, 2002), quoted in: W. Lance Bennett, ‘The UnCivic Culture: Communication, Identity, and the Rise of Lifestyle Politics’, *APSC PS: Political Science & Politics* 31, no. 4 (1998): 749.

¹⁵⁴⁴ Ulrich Beck, ‘The Reinvention of Politics: Towards a Theory of Reflexive Modernization’, in *Reflexive Modernization: Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order*, ed. Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens, and Scott Lash (Stanford University Press, 1994), 22–23.

¹⁵⁴⁵ Darcy K. Leach, ‘Prefigurative Politics’, *The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements* (Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2013), <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9780470674871.wbespm167/abstract>.

YOURSELF TO CHANGE THE WORLD frame as its main agency-type frame,¹⁵⁴⁶ because this encourages young British Muslims to create on a small scale (in their everyday lives and communities) the type of society they envision.

Third, MADE engages in “lifestyle politics.” This refers to individuals and organisations that “increasingly organize social and political meaning around their lifestyle values and the personal narratives that express them.”¹⁵⁴⁷ This orientation is clearly conveyed by the CYCW frame and by the dominance of the lifestyle keying for both the ACTIVIST and the POPP frames. In fact, these articulate agency and injustice by respectively focusing on: i) the reforming potential of lifestyle choices inspired by a personal commitment to an Islamic value-system; ii) the negative impact (at a local and global levels) deriving from a lack of implementation of the aforementioned value-system.

Fourth, MADE engages in the “politics of self-actualization.”¹⁵⁴⁸ This refers to a political orientation whereby the quest for social transformation overlaps with a process that aims to realise one’s individual potential through the dynamic interplay between “moral imagination and moral choice, as well as the resulting activity.”¹⁵⁴⁹ On the one hand, this orientation is epitomised by MADE’s mission “to inspire and enable young British Muslims”¹⁵⁵⁰ to put their “faith in action”¹⁵⁵¹ in order to “lead the fight against global poverty and injustice.”¹⁵⁵² On the other hand, a politics of self-actualization is also conveyed by the adoption of the

¹⁵⁴⁶ Pickerill and Chatterton corroborate the conventional link between prefigurative politics and the CYCW frame when they say that “a belief in prefigurative politics” is “summed up by the phrase ‘be the change you want to see’.” Pickerill and Chatterton, ‘Notes towards Autonomous Geographies’, 738.

¹⁵⁴⁷ W. Lance Bennett, ‘Branded Political Communication: Lifestyle Politics, Logo Campaigns, and the Rise of Global Citizenship’, in *Politics, Products, and Markets: Exploring Political Consumerism*, ed. Michele Micheletti, Dietlind Stolle, and Andreas Follesdal (Transaction Publishers, 2011), 103.

¹⁵⁴⁸ Ross Haenfler, Brett Johnson, and Ellis Jones, ‘Lifestyle Movements: Exploring the Intersection of Lifestyle and Social Movements’, *Social Movement Studies* 11, no. 1 (1 January 2012): 15, doi:10.1080/14742837.2012.640535.

¹⁵⁴⁹ Patrick Maclagan, ‘Self-Actualisation as a Moral Concept and the Implications for Motivation in Organisations: A Kantian Argument’, *Business Ethics: A European Review* 12, no. 4 (1 October 2003): 334, doi:10.1111/1467-8608.00334.

¹⁵⁵⁰ MADE, ‘MADE. Annual Report 2015’ (MADE, 2015), 2.

¹⁵⁵¹ MADE in Europe, ‘MADE in Europe. Annual Review 2009/2010’ (London: MADE in Europe, 2010), sec. ‘Our Mission’; MADE in Europe, ‘MADE in Europe. Annual Report 2010/2011’ (London: MADE in Europe, 2011), sec. ‘Our Mission’; MADE in Europe, ‘MADE in Europe. Annual Report 2011/2012’ (London: MADE in Europe, 2012), 1.

¹⁵⁵² MADE in Europe, ‘MADE in Europe. Annual Report 2012/2013’ (London: MADE in Europe, 2013), 2; MADE in Europe, ‘MADE in Europe. Annual Report 2013/2014’ (London: MADE in Europe, 2014), 2.

ACTIVIST frame in a way that refers to the self-actualising “process of activist-becoming-activist.”¹⁵⁵³

Taken together, these observations corroborate the suggestion I put forward in chapter 7, which consists of thinking of MADE as a ‘Muslim lifestyle’ social movement organisation. As such, MADE promotes a multifaceted form of civic engagement, which is inspired and guided by an Islamic ethical framework/value-system and it is fluidly located at the interstices between sub-politics, prefigurative politics, lifestyle politics, and the politics of self-actualization. In doing so, MADE helps re-conceptualising our understanding of BMNGOs and of British Muslims’ civic engagement within an “era of personalized politics (...) in which individuals are mobilized around personal life-style values to engage with multiple causes.”¹⁵⁵⁴

10.3. Limitations and future research possibilities

This study intended to be an exploratory study of BMNGOs’ discourses. As such (and of course, due to space restrictions), one of its most obvious limitations is that only two organisations were analysed, leaving a large number of actors within the sector unexplored. A similar analysis of a different/larger sample would be useful in that it could confirm and/or refine certain frames identified here, or identify alternative ones. In addition, such an exercise would enhance the systematic study of the BMNGO sector as a discrete (sub-)discipline.

Secondly, the thesis highlighted that the presence of: a) the active citizen keying of the VOLUNTEER frame; and b) of the ACTIVIST frame in the discourses of IR and MADE, respectively, is reflective of the fact that BMNGOs are engaging second and third generation Muslims that increasingly emphasise their British identity by focussing on the issues ‘here’ (i.e. in the UK) rather than only ‘back home’ (i.e. in the countries of origin of their families). This is a finding that could be unpacked further in future research, which would also contribute to potentially contest the characterisation of BMNGOs as ‘diasporic’.

¹⁵⁵³ Chatterton and Pickerill, ‘Everyday Activism and Transitions towards Post-Capitalist Worlds’, 487.

¹⁵⁵⁴ W. Lance Bennett, ‘The Personalization of Politics: Political Identity, Social Media, and Changing Patterns of Participation’, *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 644, no. 1 (1 November 2012): 20, doi:10.1177/0002716212451428.

Thirdly, the thesis examined the discourse of the two case studies from an overarching perspective, rather than through any issue-specific lens. This approach fitted well with the general aim of the thesis (i.e. to enrich our general understanding of BMNGOs' discourses) and its exploratory nature. However, it would also be valuable to understand how BMNGOs frame specific issues—such as climate change, for example. The significance of an issue-oriented approach would be not only theoretical (e.g. by addressing the question: 'how BMNGOs understand and represent climate change?'), but also practical. This is because its results could inform future strategic framing by the BMNGOs themselves on such issues and help mainstream NGOs to develop narratives that may better resonate with a more diverse audience.

This leads to a fourth main limitation of this study: its limited engagement with BMNGOs themselves. In an era where 'impact' and 'co-production' represent important features of almost any project, research about NGOs is increasingly moving towards bringing together academics and practitioners. From this perspective, whilst this study focused on the identification and reconstruction of some of the main frames in the case studies' discourses, these organisations may be more interested (from a pragmatic point of view) in assessing the strategic resonance of such frames—or alternative ones—with their publics. Therefore, a future line of more impact-oriented research could look at using the frame theory approach to improve the quality of the British Muslim publics' engagement with BMNGOs and with bigger-than-self issues. This could build on the model adopted by key studies within the mainstream NGO sector, which have tested alternative combinations of 'values and frames' with different types of public, in order to identify the most effective narratives.¹⁵⁵⁵

For any of these areas of potential future research, the thesis aims to represent a key point of reference and an empirical insight into the potential role that BMNGOs can play in shaping British Muslims' perceptions, attitudes and behaviours about bigger-than-self issues and civic engagement through their own discourses.

¹⁵⁵⁵ For example: InterAction, 'The Narrative Project UK User Guide. Building Support for Global Development', 2014; Bond, 'Change the Record. Exploring New Ways to Engage the UK Public in Tackling Global Poverty', 2014.

Appendix A. Textual extracts for chapter 7

1. Across the Arab world we've watched the power of the people topple political regimes one by one but 1400 years ago there was another revolution starting in Arabia that would change the lives of billions of people for centuries to come. Prophet Muhammad's (pbuh) revolution shook the very foundations of society lifting up the voices of the most marginalised groups including women, the poor, ethnic minorities and slaves, and calling for rights and equality for all, regardless of race, gender or wealth. Pretty radical in a society where slavery, sexism, corruption and exploitation were the daily norm! (...) Flick through a paper today and one headline after the next tells the story of a society not far away from what the Prophet (pbuh) encountered in pre-Islamic Arabia – *the wealthy getting richer with big bonuses and under-the-table deals while the poor struggle for survival and the planet bears the cost*. We think it's time for another revolution. The Qur'an tells us that "Allah does not change the condition of a people, until they change what is in themselves" (Qur'an 13:11). This Ramadan, we're asking you to start a revolution in yourself and challenge the way that you eat, dress and live. Ask yourself, is this how the Prophet (pbuh) would have lived?¹⁵⁵⁶

2. Two leading retailers - Gap and Asda - have still not signed up to the Bangladesh Fire & Safety Agreement. Be part of the #ramadanrevolution and sign the petition now calling on them *to put people before profit*.¹⁵⁵⁷

3. We've reached Day 21 of the #RamadanRevolution and news has surfaced that Topshop owner Sir Philip Green's clothing empire is on the list of companies that have been shunning the initiative to improve safety standards for workers in Bangladesh. His brands including Topshop are absentees from the Bangladesh Safety Accord that was recently backed by 80 top high street brands.

In light of this, MADE in Europe has made the decision to include Topshop in our petition calling upon Gap and ASDA to sign up to the Bangladesh Fire and Building Safety Agreement.

Today's daily action is to sign the Support Ethical Fashion petition on our website if you haven't already!¹⁵⁵⁸

4. As we get ready to enter the last 10 days of Ramadan, take some time today to say a prayer for all the people around the world who are oppressed

¹⁵⁵⁶ 'Prophet Muhammad (Pbuh): The Revolutionary'.

¹⁵⁵⁷ MADE. Facebook post. 20 July 2013.

<https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10151459716572127/?type=1&theater>

¹⁵⁵⁸ MADE. Facebook post. 30 July 2013.

<https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10151476697562127/?type=3&theater>

and exploited. And then head over here to sign our petition to help the exploited workers in Bangladesh.¹⁵⁵⁹

5. In the last 4 decades more than 1 million people have died in the world's *poorest countries* due to climate-related disasters. These *countries* only produce 1% of global carbon emissions which are causing climate change. *What an injustice!*¹⁵⁶⁰

6. #RamadanRevolution #6 “Say, “Not equal are the evil and the good, although the abundance of evil might impress you.” So fear Allah , O you of understanding, that you may be successful.” (5:100)

This ramadhaan [sic], let us become successful by making the pledge to outweigh the good we do as nothing wrong can be equal to goodness as mentioned in this verse. One way to do that is to become more islamically ethical e.g. buying fair trade products, upcycling unused items, buying Palestinian medjoul dates, knowing whether our purchased items are supporting oppression or workers rights etc.

<http://www.madeineurope.org.uk/shop>

JUZ 6 (5:100) MAKE ONE PLEDGE TO BECOME MORE ETHICAL RIGHT NOW *THROUGH YOUR CONSUMER CHOICES.*¹⁵⁶¹

7. It's the 29th day of the #RamadanRevolution and so *much good has been achieved* this month Mashallah! But let's not limit ourselves to Ramadan when *striving to achieve justice!* *These wrongs* will continue to *impact millions of people* after Ramadan as well...¹⁵⁶²

8. #RamadanRevolution #5 “O you who have believed, do not consume one another's wealth unjustly but only [in lawful] business by mutual consent.” (4:29) This Ramadan, check the label behind your dates! *A shocking number of Muslims break their fasts with dates produced on illegal Israeli settlements.* Although these settlers form a minority of the population, *yet they receive the majority of the revenue.* (...) Islam teaches us about justice in all aspects of life, not least of which is *trade.* Help support our Palestinian brothers and sisters by buying their Fairtrade Madjoul dates. Our own boxes are running out so place your orders soon!

<http://www.madeineurope.org.uk/shop>

¹⁵⁵⁹ MADE. Facebook post. 28 July 2013.

<https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10151473263717127/?type=1&theater>

¹⁵⁶⁰ MADE. Facebook post. 7 July 2014.

<https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10152103083007127/?type=1&theater>

¹⁵⁶¹ MADE. Facebook post. 6 July 2014.

<https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10152097454952127/?type=3&theater>

¹⁵⁶² MADE. Facebook post. 7 August 2013.

<https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10151489831967127/?type=3&theater>

JUZ 5 (4:29) BREAK YOUR FASTS ETHICALLY AND SUPPORT PALESTINIAN FARMERS BY PURCHASING FAIRTRADE ZAYTOUN DATES FROM OUR SHOP!¹⁵⁶³

9. #RamadanRevolution #7 “And there is no creature on [or within] the earth or bird that flies with its wings except [that they are] communities like you. We have not neglected in the Register a thing. Then unto their Lord they will be gathered.” [6:38]

We are all the precious creation of Allah, and although certain animals have been made lawful as sustenance for us, and they submit to Allah for this purpose. Surely, *it is our responsibility to show gratitude to Allah and His creation for this favour?* Or have we forgotten that He has made us stewards on the Earth *to guard it and appreciate it, not to mistreat and oppress one another...*

The prophet Muhammad (PBUH) himself was known not to have meat on a daily basis. Which is why we've made today's #RamadanAction: being mindful of this and *the excessive nature of the intensive farming industry*. Eat less meat in your #iftar today and plan at least 1 vegetarian iftar a week, there are lots of great vegetarian recipes to try online!

JUZ 7 (6:38) EAT LESS MEAT IN YOUR MEALS TODAY AND PLAN AT LEAST 1 VEGETARIAN IFTAR A WEEK.¹⁵⁶⁴

10. #RamadanRevolution Juz 11 – “But when He saves them, at once they commit injustice upon the earth without right. O mankind, your injustice is only against yourselves...” [Qur'an 10:23]

We produce enough food on Earth to feed roughly 21 billion people - that is 3 times the world's population! Yet, *1/3 of all food produced is wasted, and most of the food is consumed in the most developed countries. We have surely brought injustice upon ourselves!*¹⁵⁶⁵

11. Ramadan is a blessing from Allah. It is a month of reflection, worship and spirituality. *Unfortunately, it has also become a month of gluttony and over-consumption for many of us.* Tonight follow the sunnah of only filling a third of your stomach with food for Iftar.

FOLLOW THE SUNNAH OF ONLY FILLING A THIRD OF YOUR STOMACH WITH FOOD TONIGHT FOR IFTAR ¹⁵⁶⁶

¹⁵⁶³ MADE. Facebook post. 3 July 2014.

<https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10152095018422127/?type=3&theater>

¹⁵⁶⁴ MADE. Facebook post. 5 July 2014.

<https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10152097406722127/?type=3&theater>

¹⁵⁶⁵ MADE. Facebook post. 9 July 2014.

<https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10152106872377127/?type=3&theater>

¹⁵⁶⁶ MADE. Facebook post. 13 July 2013.

<https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10151447302007127/?type=3&theater>

12. The Quran tells us to 'eat and drink, but avoid excess' (20:81). Yet, *for us Ramadan has become a time of feasting and over-indulgence*. The following is a report from the first day of Ramadan from Qatar where hospitals have started receiving patients after over-eating at Iftar. *This is not a cultural issue, we all fall prey to eating more than necessary during Ramadan*. Let's make a change in our eating habits from today!¹⁵⁶⁷

13. #RamadanRevolution Juz 8: "O children of Adam! Take your beautification at every point of the prayer and eat and drink and don't go over the limits. He does not love those who go overboard." Allah tells us to dress nicely and enjoy our food. It is okay to have delicious food for iftar and sehri, but we mustn't go overboard even in something that is halal for us.¹⁵⁶⁸

14. During Ramadan, Iftar can *turn into a big meal as we prepare more food than we'll eat, and the rest is sometimes just thrown away*.¹⁵⁶⁹

15. The Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) said "Do not disdain any good deed, even your meeting with your brother with a cheerful face." – Muslim

It may sound like a small thing to buy re-usable water bottles and pledge to stop buying plastic bottle water, but did you know that *it takes 3 bottles of water to produce 1 bottle of water?* This is *an unsustainable and harmful way to produce water* but a small deed we do to help reduce this can go a long way, and Allah says that every matter whether small or great is written down - it will not be overlooked of its merits.

Most Mosques give plastic water bottles especially during iftar and taraweeh. Why not describe *the harms and how unnecessary they are* and try to set up alternative water options such as drinking fountains from tap water pipes? You can take it a step further and set up your own free community recycling project in your mosque.

Let us not buy more plastic water bottles when we can simply get the same stuff in taps! (...)

JUZ 27 (54:53) BUY A RE-USABLE WATER BOTTLE AND PLEDGE TO STOP BUYING PLASTIC BOTTLES.¹⁵⁷⁰

16. It's time to ditch plastic water bottles and opt for re-usable ones instead. With only 25% of plastic bottles being recycled, *they are increasingly*

¹⁵⁶⁷ MADE. Facebook post. 13 July 2013.

<https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10151447666172127/?type=3&theater>

¹⁵⁶⁸ MADE. Facebook post. 06 July 2014.

<https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10152101449292127/?type=3&theater>

¹⁵⁶⁹ MADE. Facebook post. 1 August 2013.

<https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10151479993312127/?type=3&theater>

¹⁵⁷⁰ MADE. Facebook post. 25 July 2014.

<https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10152133584662127/?type=3&theater>

harmful for the natural environment and animals, especially sea creatures.
Say no to plastic and buy a re-usable bottle instead

<http://www.madeineurope.org.uk/shop>

BUY THE "I DRINK TAP!" REUSABLE BOTTLE TO TAKE TO TARAWIH PRAYER AND DITCH THOSE PLASTIC BOTTLES WHICH DAMAGE OUR PLANET¹⁵⁷¹

17. Water is an immense blessing from Allah and an essential resource for sustaining life. Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) told us not to use excessive water during wudu even if one was making wudu at the banks of a free flowing stream or river. Today we challenge you to make wudu like the Prophet using just a cupful of water! Do you think you can do it?
[#ramadanrevolution](#)

MAKE WUDU LIKE THE PROPHET (SAW) AND REDUCE YOUR WATER WASTE¹⁵⁷²

18. [#RamadanRevolution](#) Juz 25 "And it is He who sends down the rain after they had despaired and spreads His mercy. And He is the Protector, the Praiseworthy." (42:28)

The Prophet once saw Sa'd performing Wudu and said to him: "Why are you wasting all this water?" Sa'd asked, "Is there wastefulness even in performing Wudu?" The Prophet replied, "Yes, even if you were at a flowing river." (...)

JUZ 25 (42:28) MAKE A PLEDGE TO SAVE WATER TODAY - USE A MISWAK, MAKE SURE TAPS AREN'T RUNNING¹⁵⁷³

19. [#RamadanRevolution](#) Juz 19 "...My Lord, enable me to be grateful for Your favour which You have bestowed upon me and upon my parents and to do righteousness of which You approve"

Of the biggest *blessings we take for granted*, is the clothing that Allah blesses us with. In this day and age, we are so *used to buying new clothes for every occassion*, and *just throwing away what goes 'out of fashion'* - often times *not considering the labour behind the label!* Sometimes we might find it easier to buy a new pair of jeans, than simply getting them cleaned! Particularly during Eid time, we can fall *into the culture of buying clothes that we wear once, and then never again.*¹⁵⁷⁴

¹⁵⁷¹ MADE. Facebook post. 26 July 2013.

<https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10151470078537127/?type=3&theater>

¹⁵⁷² MADE. Facebook post. 14 July 2013.

<https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10151448777202127/?type=3&theater>

¹⁵⁷³ MADE. Facebook post. 24 July 2013.

<https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10152132431507127/?type=3&theater>

¹⁵⁷⁴ MADE. Facebook post. 17 July 2014.

<https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10152120542627127/?type=3&theater>

20. *Eid is not for the one who wears new clothes. Eid is for the one whose obedience rises. Eid is not for the one with beautiful clothes and fine means of transport. Eid is for the one whose sins are forgiven*" (Imam Ibn Rajab) Make a commitment to Allah to change one thing in order *to live more tayyib after Ramadan*. Long live the #ramadanrevolution!¹⁵⁷⁵

21. Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) said: When you hire, compensate the workers and treat them fairly. Unfortunately we see that *this is not the case today*. The recent tragedies in Bangladeshi factories have highlighted the risks that workers in many developing countries face *while manufacturing items that will be used by customers in the West*.¹⁵⁷⁶

22. 3 months ago 1127 people died when Rana Plaza garment factory collapsed in Bangladesh. *Those who died were making clothes for retailers on our high street*.¹⁵⁷⁷

23. "Let there arise from among you a *band of people who invite to righteousness, and enjoin good and forbid evil*" - Qur'an 3:104
Islam calls on us to be advocates for good causes and *encourage action by other people - our family, friends, work colleagues, local leaders - as well as making the change ourselves*.

Help the #ramadanrevolution to grow by getting get 5 of your friends to support the ethical fashion petition!

GET 5 FRIENDS TO BE PART OF THE #RAMADANREVOLUTION BY SIGNING THE SUPPORT ETHICAL FASHION PETITION¹⁵⁷⁸

24. *Let's together* build a more sustainable and just future InshaAllah.¹⁵⁷⁹

25. JUZ 22 (33:72) ENCOURAGE A MEMBER OF YOUR FAMILY TO PLEDGE ONE GREEN ACTION E.G. RECYCLING, SAVING ENERGY.¹⁵⁸⁰

¹⁵⁷⁵ MADE. Facebook post. 8 August 2013.

<https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10151491338462127/?type=3&theater>

¹⁵⁷⁶ MADE. Facebook post. 11 July 2013.

<https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10151443963547127/?type=3&theater>

¹⁵⁷⁷ MADE. Facebook post. 20 July 2013.

<https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10151459716572127/?type=3&theater>

¹⁵⁷⁸ MADE. Facebook post. 15 July 2013.

<https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10151450666402127/?type=3&theater>

¹⁵⁷⁹ MADE. Facebook post. 26 July 2014.

<https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10152133684972127/?type=3&theater>

¹⁵⁸⁰ MADE. Facebook post. 21 July 2014.

<https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10152125871352127/?type=3&theater>

26. GET YOUR FAMILY AND FRIENDS ETHICAL GIFTS FOR EID THIS YEAR AND MAKE THE #RAMADANREVOLUTION LIVE ALL YEAR ROUND¹⁵⁸¹

27. JUZ 16 (18:107) GET YOUR FAMILY AND FRIENDS ETHICAL GIFTS FOR RAMADAN AND EID FROM OUR SHOP¹⁵⁸²

28. JUZ 24 (39:58) TAKE ACTION NOW AND TELL 5 PEOPLE ABOUT THE #RAMADANREVOLUTION TO SHARE THE BENEFITS¹⁵⁸³

29. PRINT OFF THE SUPPORT ETHICAL FASHION PETITION OFFLINE FORM AND COLLECT 50 SIGNATURES¹⁵⁸⁴

30. Islam is all about our balance between spiritual development and practical action. Stay tuned to MADE's Ramadan Campaign *for a daily dose of spiritual reminders, and practical actions* to help turn this Ramadan into your best one yet!¹⁵⁸⁵

31. Ramadan Mubarak everyone! We hope and pray that we're all able to benefit from this blessed month. Today is also the launch of #ramadanrevolution, *30 days of action that will challenge you the way you eat, dress and live.*¹⁵⁸⁶

32. Every day we'll be asking you *to take a small action, make a small change. We don't expect you to do every single one them*, but Insha'Allah *we should all be able to take some of these actions*. It gives us *the opportunity to try out new things* and at the end of Ramadan we can all share which of these new ideas *we'll be continuing with post-Ramadan.*

Remember, Allah does not change the condition of a people until they change what is in themselves!¹⁵⁸⁷

¹⁵⁸¹ MADE. Facebook post. 2 August 2013.

<https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10151481553142127/?type=3&theater>

¹⁵⁸² MADE. Facebook post. 14 July 2014.

<https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10152115596967127/?type=3&theater>

¹⁵⁸³ MADE. Facebook post. 23 July 2014.

<https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10152130362817127/?type=3&theater>

¹⁵⁸⁴ MADE. Facebook post. 3 August 2013.

<https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10151483275842127/?type=3&theater>

¹⁵⁸⁵ MADE. Facebook post. 17 June 2014.

<https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10152061348857127/?type=3&theater>

¹⁵⁸⁶ MADE. Facebook post. 10 July 2013.

<https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10151442500282127/?type=3&theater>

¹⁵⁸⁷ MADE. Facebook post. 10 July 2013.

<https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10151442500282127/?type=3&theater>

33. Make a commitment to Allah *to change one thing* in order to live more tayyib after Ramadan. Long live the #ramadanrevolution!¹⁵⁸⁸

34. RAMADAN MUBARAK

...and let the #RamadanRevolution begin. We have prepared 30 practical actions *that every Muslim can do* during Ramadan to enjoy a greener, more ethical and more spiritual month.¹⁵⁸⁹

35. #RamadanRevolution Juz 10 – “Go forth, light-armed and heavy-armed, and strive with your wealth and your lives in the way of Allah! That is best for you if ye but knew.” [Surah-al-Tawba, 9:41]

Sometimes we look at at striving in the way of Allah *as the big extraordinary things* the sahaba used to do and quite frankly *it can overwhelm us that we can't do the same. But it's also the little things* - helping your mum when you're tired, volunteering for a charity, making sure you waste absolutely no food or plastic.

Help tidy the mosque after iftar today even if your tired, making sure things are recycled and nothing is unnecessarily wasted.

*Make those little everyday struggles a little more extraordinary*¹⁵⁹⁰

36. PLANT A SEED - IN YOUR GARDEN, IN A POT, IN AN UNUSED SPACE - WATCH IT GROW, AND MARVEL AT ALLAH'S CREATION¹⁵⁹¹

37. SIT OUTSIDE FOR AT LEAST 30 MINUTES, READ SURAH AN-NAHL (THE BEE) AND REFLECT ON ALLAH'S WONDROUS CREATION¹⁵⁹²

38. JUZ 13 (14:32) GO PRAY OUTDOORS TODAY AND REFLECT OVER ALLAH'S MAGNIFICENT CREATIONS¹⁵⁹³

39. READ SURAH AL-MA'UN WHICH ENCOURAGES US TO ADVOCATE ON BEHALF OF THE POOR, THEN TELL 5 PEOPLE ABOUT THE #RAMADANREVOLUTION CAMPAIGN¹⁵⁹⁴

¹⁵⁸⁸ MADE. Facebook post. 8 August 2013.

<https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10151491338462127/?type=3&theater>

¹⁵⁸⁹ MADE. Facebook post. 28 June 2014.

<https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10152084053592127/?type=3&theater>

¹⁵⁹⁰ MADE. Facebook post. 8 July 2014.

<https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10152104944782127/?type=3&theater>

¹⁵⁹¹ MADE. Facebook post. 12 July 2013.

<https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10151445571807127/?type=3&theater>

¹⁵⁹² MADE. Facebook post. 6 August 2013.

<https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10151488295547127/?type=3&theater>

¹⁵⁹³ MADE. Facebook post. 11 July 2014.

<https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10152110511722127/?type=3&theater>

¹⁵⁹⁴ MADE. Facebook post. 23 July 2013.

40. JUZ 12 (12:22) ORGANISE A HALAQAH AND *DISCUSS THE MANY LESSONS OF JUSTICE IN SURAT YUSUF*¹⁵⁹⁵

41. JUZ 14 (16:68-69) *READ SURAT AN NAHL TODAY AND SHARE WHAT LESSONS YOU CAN TAKE FROM BEES*¹⁵⁹⁶

42. With only a few hours to iftar to go iA [sic. Abbreviation for: 'inshaAllah', (God willing)], remember to thank Allah for the food and drink he has provided for you. Remember there are those who fast all day long without anything to break their fast with. Keep them in your duas [supplications] before you break your fast. Alhamdulillah. [all thanks and praise is due to Allah]

JUZ 1 (2:60) WRITE DOWN EVERYTHING YOU EAT FOR IFTAR, AND *THANK ALLAH FOR EACH AND EVERY ITEM*¹⁵⁹⁷

43. Today we are reminding ourselves to reflect on our intentions and pray that we become people of sincerity and God consciousness (taqwa) in every action we take. (...)

JUZ 2 (21:52) *MAKE EVERYTHING YOU DO FOR THE SAKE OF ALLAH BY STARTING EACH ACTION WITH BISMILLAH*¹⁵⁹⁸

44. MAKE WUDU [sic, ritual ablution] LIKE THE PROPHET (SAW) AND REDUCE YOUR WATER WASTE¹⁵⁹⁹

45. BUY THE "I DRINK TAP!" REUSABLE BOTTLE TO TAKE TO TARAWIH [sic] PRAYER AND DITCH THOSE PLASTIC BOTTLES WHICH DAMAGE OUR PLANET¹⁶⁰⁰

46. ORGANISE A HALAQAH WITH FRIENDS AND FAMILY AND *MAKE JOINT DU'A FOR ALL OF THE PEOPLE WHO ARE OPPRESSED AND EXPLOITED AROUND THE WORLD*¹⁶⁰¹

<https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10151464792042127/?type=3&theater>

¹⁵⁹⁵ MADE. Facebook post. 10 July 2014.

<https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10152108724147127/?type=3&theater>

¹⁵⁹⁶ MADE. Facebook post. 12 July 2014.

<https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10152112427872127/?type=3&theater>

¹⁵⁹⁷ MADE. Facebook post. 29 June 2014.

<https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10152085970257127/?type=3&theater>

¹⁵⁹⁸ MADE. Facebook post. 30 June 2014.

<https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10152088678252127/?type=3&theater>

¹⁵⁹⁹ MADE. Facebook post. 14 July 2013.

<https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10151448777202127/?type=3&theater>

¹⁶⁰⁰ MADE. Facebook post. 26 July 2013.

<https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10151470078537127/?type=3&theater>

¹⁶⁰¹ MADE. Facebook post. 28 July 2013.

47. Giving Sadaqah Jariyya comes with rewards and that is especially so during Ramadan when the rewards are greater making it a perfect time to start Sadaqah Jariyya. Setting a small monthly donation will bring ongoing benefits and help support project become more sustainable, making Sadaqah Jariyya one of the best forms of charity.

Donate to MADE's campaigns and help empower young Muslims to lead the fight against global poverty and injustice

<https://www.madeineurope.org.uk/donate>

JUZ 4 (3:92) SET UP A REGULAR DONATION OF AT LEAST £3 PER MONTH IN SADAQAH TO REAP ONGOING REWARDS¹⁶⁰²

48. JUZ 23 (36:33) *START PLANTING YOUR OWN HERBS OR VEGETABLES*, WATCH IT GROW AND MARVEL IN ALLAH'S CREATION¹⁶⁰³

49. FIND OUT WHERE YOUR NEAREST MARKET IS AND BUY SOME LOCAL IN-SEASON INGREDIENTS FOR IFTAR TONIGHT¹⁶⁰⁴

50. GO VEGGIE FOR IFTAR! EATING LESS MEAT IS BETTER FOR YOUR HEALTH, THE ENVIRONMENT AND THE GLOBAL FOOD SUPPLY¹⁶⁰⁵

51. JUZ 7 (6:38) EAT LESS MEAT IN YOUR MEALS TODAY AND PLAN AT LEAST 1 VEGETARIAN IFTAR A WEEK¹⁶⁰⁶

52. FOLLOW THE SUNNAH OF ONLY FILLING A THIRD OF YOUR STOMACH WITH FOOD TONIGHT FOR IFTAR¹⁶⁰⁷

53. JUZ 18 (23:51) EAT ON A SMALLER PLATE TODAY AND RE-USE ANY LEFTOVERS FOR SUHOOR OR THE NEXT IFTAR¹⁶⁰⁸

<https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10151473263717127/?type=3&theater>

¹⁶⁰² MADE. Facebook post. 2 July 2014.

<https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10152093035497127/?type=3&theater>

¹⁶⁰³ MADE. Facebook post. 22 July 2014.

<https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10152129427442127/?type=3&theater>

¹⁶⁰⁴ MADE. Facebook post. 24 July 2013.

<https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10151466291837127/?type=3&theater>

¹⁶⁰⁵ MADE. Facebook post. 18 July 2013.

<https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10151456484162127/?type=3&theater>

¹⁶⁰⁶ MADE. Facebook post. 05 July 2014.

<https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10152097406722127/?type=3&theater>

¹⁶⁰⁷ MADE. Facebook post. 13 July 2013.

<https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10151447302007127/?type=3&theater>

¹⁶⁰⁸ MADE. Facebook post. 16 July 2014.

<https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10152118869857127/?type=3&theater>

54. ORDER YOUR MEAT FOR EID FROM WILLOWBROOK ORGANIC FARM FOR A CELEBRATION THAT IS TAYYIB AS WELL AS HALAL¹⁶⁰⁹
55. IT'S A RAMADAN DATE! PUT 18 AUGUST IN YOUR DIARY FOR OUR ETHICAL EID BBQ¹⁶¹⁰
56. BUY A BOTTLE OF FAIRTRADE ZAYTOUN OLIVE OIL AND SUPPORT PALESTINIAN FARMERS TO EARN A LIVING¹⁶¹¹
57. JUZ 5 (4:29) BREAK YOUR FASTS ETHICALLY AND SUPPORT PALESTINIAN FARMERS BY PURCHASING FAIRTRADE ZAYTOUN DATES FROM OUR SHOP!¹⁶¹²
58. SHARE FOOD AND INVITE SOMEONE FOR IFTAR TONIGHT WHO YOU WOULDN'T NORMALLY SPEND TIME WITH - A NEIGHBOUR, SOMEONE FROM THE MASJID, A NEW MUSLIM¹⁶¹³
59. JUZ 11 (10:23) SPLIT YOUR IFTAR MEAL BETWEEN TWO PEOPLE, REVIVING THE SUNNAH OF SHARING AND FILLING YOUR STOMACH 1/3 WITH FOOD¹⁶¹⁴
60. MAKE A PLEDGE TO BUY MORE ETHICAL CLOTHING AND SIGN THE SUPPORT ETHICAL FASHION PETITION¹⁶¹⁵
61. JUZ 6 (5:100) MAKE ONE PLEDGE TO BECOME MORE ETHICAL RIGHT NOW THROUGH YOUR CONSUMER CHOICES¹⁶¹⁶
62. We've launched our special Eid gift packs today featuring activism stickers, Fairtrade chocolate and Zaytoun CIC Fairtrade Palestinian dates. Every Eid pack includes a free gift made by the MADE team ourselves including upcycled tin flower pots!

¹⁶⁰⁹ MADE. Facebook post. 29 July 2013.

<https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10151474955297127/?type=3&theater>

¹⁶¹⁰ MADE. Facebook post. 27 July 2013.

<https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10151471753937127/?type=3&theater>

¹⁶¹¹ MADE. Facebook post. 16 July 2013.

<https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10151452858377127/?type=3&theater>

¹⁶¹² MADE. Facebook post. 03 July 2014.

<https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10152095018422127/?type=3&theater>

¹⁶¹³ MADE. Facebook post. 31 July 2013.

<https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10151478309172127/?type=3&theater>

¹⁶¹⁴ MADE. Facebook post. 08 July 2014.

<https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10152104944782127/?type=3&theater>

¹⁶¹⁵ MADE. Facebook post. 7 August 2013.

<https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10151489831967127/?type=3&theater>

¹⁶¹⁶ MADE. Facebook post. 4 July 2014.

<https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10152097454952127/?type=3&theater>

Help make a difference this Eid by using your money to stand up for justice.
www.madeineurope.org.uk/shop

JUZ 16 (18:107) GET YOUR FAMILY AND FRIENDS ETHICAL GIFTS FOR RAMADAN AND EID FROM OUR SHOP¹⁶¹⁷

63. As consumers we can make a difference! We can put pressure on the companies that we buy our clothes from to insist that proper safety standards are in place. (...) Be part of the [#ramadanrevolution](#) and sign the petition now calling on them to put people before profit.

SHOW YOUR SUPPORT FOR THE VICTIMS OF THE BANGLADESH FACTORY COLLAPSE AND SIGN THE SUPPORT ETHICAL FASHION PETITION¹⁶¹⁸

64. BUY SOMETHING FROM A SECOND-HAND CLOTHES SHOP AND WEAR IT PROUDLY TODAY TELLING PEOPLE THAT YOU SUPPORT ETHICAL FASHION¹⁶¹⁹

65. JUZ 19 (27:19) GO THROUGH YOUR WARDROBE AND DONATE/UPCYCLE ANYTHING THAT YOU NO LONGER USE¹⁶²⁰

66. It's clothes swap shop day! We'll be down at Old Spitalfields Market from 11 - 5 today with a stall full of clothes, shoes and accessories. Come down and see if you can pick up an eid outfit for a bargain price! If you can't make our swap, then organise your own one or give your unwanted items to your local second-hand shop. Happy swapping everyone!

DE-CLUTTER AND DONATE THINGS YOU DON'T NEED TO A SECOND-HAND SHOP OR TO OTHER PEOPLE WHO CAN MAKE BETTER USE OF THEM¹⁶²¹

67. CUT DOWN ON WASTE BY ONLY COOKING WHAT YOU WILL EAT AND RE-USING ANY LEFTOVERS TOMORROW¹⁶²²

¹⁶¹⁷ MADE. Facebook post. 14 July 2014.

<https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10152115596967127/?type=3&theater>

¹⁶¹⁸ MADE. Facebook post. 20 July 2013.

<https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10151459716572127/?type=3&theater>

¹⁶¹⁹ MADE. Facebook post. 22 July 2013.

<https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10151463103197127/?type=3&theater>

¹⁶²⁰ MADE. Facebook post. 17 July 2014.

<https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10152120542627127/?type=3&theater>

¹⁶²¹ MADE. Facebook post. 05 August 2013.

<https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10151486322347127/?type=3&theater>

¹⁶²² MADE. Facebook post. 1 August 2013.

<https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10151479993312127/?type=3&theater>

68. JUZ 21 (30:41) RECYCLE AT LEAST 1 ITEM TODAY, AND MAKE A PLEDGE TO REDUCE YOUR WASTE¹⁶²³
69. JUZ 22 (33:72) ENCOURAGE A MEMBER OF YOUR FAMILY TO PLEDGE ONE GREEN ACTION E.G. RECYCLING, SAVING ENERGY¹⁶²⁴
70. JUZ 25 (42:28) MAKE A PLEDGE TO SAVE WATER TODAY - USE A MISWAK, MAKE SURE TAPS AREN'T RUNNING¹⁶²⁵
71. JANNAH IS AT OUR MOTHERS' FEET. SHOW YOUR MUM HOW MUCH YOU LOVE HER BY COOKING IFTAR FOR HER TONIGHT¹⁶²⁶
72. JUZ 26 (46: 15) SHOW YOUR MUM HOW MUCH YOU LOVE HER BY TAKING OVER THE HOUSEHOLD CHORES TODAY¹⁶²⁷
73. INVITE A FEW FRIENDS OR FAMILY OVER FOR IFTAR AND MAKE A JOINT DU'A OF PRAISE AND GRATITUDE FOR THE BLESSINGS OF FOOD AND REMEMBER THOSE WHO GO HUNGRY¹⁶²⁸
74. JUZ 15 (17:26) CALL SOMEONE YOU HAVE NOT SPOKEN TO IN A WHILE - A COUSIN, AN OLD FRIEND, A DISTANT RELATIVE?¹⁶²⁹
75. JUZ 3 (22:63) CALL ONE PERSON WHO HAS UPSET YOU IN THE PAST, AND WISH THEM A RAMADAN MUBARAK¹⁶³⁰
76. JUZ 10 (9:41) HELP TIDY THE MOSQUE AFTER IFTAR / TARARWIH AND SIGN UP TO DONATE MORE TIME TO VOLUNTEERING¹⁶³¹

¹⁶²³ MADE. Facebook post. 20 July 2014.

<https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10152125871352127/?type=3&theater>

¹⁶²⁴ MADE. Facebook post. 21 July 2014.

<https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10152125871352127/?type=3&theater>

¹⁶²⁵ MADE. Facebook post. 24 July 2014.

<https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10152132431507127/?type=3&theater>

¹⁶²⁶ MADE. Facebook post. 19 July 2013.

<https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10151458191392127/?type=3&theater>

¹⁶²⁷ MADE. Facebook post. 24 July 2014.

<https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10152132461302127/?type=3&theater>

¹⁶²⁸ MADE. Facebook post. 17 July 2013.

<https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10151454564812127/?type=3&theater>

¹⁶²⁹ MADE. Facebook post. 13 July 2014.

<https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10152114235677127/?type=3&theater>

¹⁶³⁰ MADE. Facebook post. 1 July 2014.

<https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10152091185647127/?type=3&theater>

¹⁶³¹ MADE. Facebook post. 8 July 2014.

<https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10152104944782127/?type=3&theater>

77. JUZ8 (7:31) HELP YOUR MOSQUE TO PROVIDE A 'GREEN IFTAR' USING OUR TIPS AND ADVICE. GET IN TOUCH!¹⁶³²

78. JUZ9 (7:181) SIGN UP TO BE AN ECO-AMBASSADOR AND HELP MAKE MOSQUES MORE ECO-FRIENDLY¹⁶³³

79. Let's put a stop to this [environmental damage] helping ourselves and the world around us by walking or cycling to tarawih today. It'll help you burn off the iftar meal, help you refresh for salah and reduce one of the largest contributors to air pollution.

JUZ 17 (21:32) DITCH THE CAR AND USE PUBLIC TRANSPORT/WALK /CYCLE TO TARAWIH¹⁶³⁴

80. Tonight try and walk or cycle to the Mosque instead of taking the car, not only will you gain more barakah and reward, you'll be helping save the environment as well. #RamadanRevolution

DITCH THE CAR AND WALK/CYCLE TO TARAWIH INSTEAD¹⁶³⁵

81. Today we're asking you to do a bit of political lobbying to get your local MP to sign our on-line petition to support ethical fashion. So get your pens out, well keyboards more likely, and write to your MP asking them to sign the petition here: <http://www.madeineurope.org.uk/campaign/ramadan-revolution>

WRITE TO YOUR LOCAL MP TO ASK THEM TO SIGN THE SUPPORT ETHICAL FASHION PETITION¹⁶³⁶

¹⁶³² MADE. Facebook post. 6 July 2014.

<https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10152101449292127/?type=3&theater>

¹⁶³³ MADE. Facebook post. 7 July 2014.

<https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10152103083007127/?type=3&theater>

¹⁶³⁴ MADE. Facebook post. 15 July 2014.

<https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10152117717327127/?type=3&theater>

¹⁶³⁵ MADE. Facebook post. 4 August 2013.

<https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10151484847947127/?type=3&theater>

¹⁶³⁶ MADE. Facebook post. 25 July 2013.

<https://www.facebook.com/MADEinEur/photos/a.10150216033152127.311870.132176847126/10151467989352127/?type=3&theater>

Appendix B. Textual extracts for chapter 8

Table B.1 The GD frame conveyed by IR's framing of its supporter base mainly as a 'donor base', to be mobilised primarily through a fundraising/marketing approach

YEAR(S)	QUOTE
2005	<p>"OBJECTIVES: to communicate with <i>donors</i> and launch appeals effectively in cases of natural and man-made disasters. In order to achieve this objective, Islamic Relief Worldwide employed the following strategies:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. To liaise with <i>individual and institutional donors</i> to raise funds for emergency and development projects 2. To increase awareness and improve <i>the marketing</i> of the Orphan Welfare Programmes. 3. To examine the factors which <i>encourage donors to continue their financial support and tailor marketing accordingly</i>."¹⁶³⁷
2006	<p>"Islamic Relief Worldwide has a wide international <i>donor base</i> that supports our work and ensures that we can continue to help those in need. Just as we work with all communities in need regardless of race or belief, <i>our donors also come from all sectors of the community and they feel confident that we can deliver effective results in developing countries</i>."¹⁶³⁸</p>
2006; 2009	<p>"Campaigning and advocacy Objectives for 2006 [/Aims] (...) To ensure that Islamic Relief Worldwide's [IRW's] Islamic humanitarian values are embedded in our work and are <i>promoted to donors and the public</i>."¹⁶³⁹</p>
2006-11	<p>"The purpose and rationale behind the strategy is to ensure that IRW is adequately positioned to meet any challenges <i>to ensure: (...) • that communication with donors is effective</i>"¹⁶⁴⁰</p>
2009	<p>"Islamic Relief UK ran a number of fundraising campaigns throughout the year to raise money for emergency and development programmes. Emergency appeals were run through <i>mailings, adverts, online and e-marketing campaigns</i>."¹⁶⁴¹</p>

¹⁶³⁷ Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Islamic Relief Worldwide and Subsidiary Undertakings. Annual Report and Financial Statements 2005' (Birmingham: Islamic Relief Worldwide, 2005), 15, http://www.islamic-relief.org.uk/content/uploads/2013/05/Annual_Report_2005.pdf.

¹⁶³⁸ Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Islamic Relief Worldwide and Subsidiary Undertakings. Annual Report and Financial Statements 2006' (Birmingham: Islamic Relief Worldwide, 2006), 14, http://www.islamic-relief.org.uk/content/uploads/2013/05/Annual_Report_2006.pdf.

¹⁶³⁹ Ibid., 13; Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2009' (Birmingham: Islamic Relief Worldwide, 2009), 28, http://www.islamic-relief.org.uk/content/uploads/2013/05/Annual_Report_2009.pdf.

¹⁶⁴⁰ Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2006', 22; Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Islamic Relief Worldwide and Subsidiary Undertakings. Annual Report and Financial Statements 2007' (Birmingham: Islamic Relief Worldwide, 2007), 58, http://www.islamic-relief.org.uk/content/uploads/2013/05/Annual_Report_2007.pdf; Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Islamic Relief Worldwide and Subsidiary Undertakings. Annual Report and Financial Statements 2008' (Birmingham: Islamic Relief Worldwide, 2008), 85, <http://library.iracademy.org.uk/islamic-relief-worldwide-2008-annual-report-and-financial-statements/>; Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2009', 45; Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Islamic Relief Worldwide 2010 Annual Report & Financial Statements' (Birmingham: Islamic Relief Worldwide, 2010), 56, http://www.islamic-relief.org.uk/content/uploads/2013/05/Annual_Report_2010.pdf; Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Islamic Relief Worldwide 2011 Annual Report & Financial Statements' (Birmingham: Islamic Relief Worldwide, 2011), 47, http://www.islamic-relief.org.uk/content/uploads/2013/05/Annual_Report_2011.pdf.

¹⁶⁴¹ Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2009', 75.

	“Throughout the year, Islamic Relief United Kingdom ran numerous campaigns, using a variety of media – including <i>television, online appeals and e-marketing</i> – to fundraise for our international projects.” ¹⁶⁴²
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Table B.2 The GD frame conveyed by IR’s emphasis on the generosity of its donors

2005	“Income and Funding Islamic Relief Worldwide’s voluntary income grew from £18.4 million in 2004 to £35.4 million in 2005. The increase amounting to 92% demonstrates <i>the generosity of our donors</i> in response to numerous appeals (...) <i>The greater proportion of income</i> , amounting to 60% of Islamic Relief Worldwide’s voluntary income that totalled £35.4 million, <i>came from our donors</i> in the UK.” ¹⁶⁴³
2006	“In 2006, Islamic Relief Worldwide generated £27.1 million from <i>the generosity of our donors</i> supporting the o ¹⁶⁴⁴ n-going humanitarian programmes we implement. IRW has a <i>supportive individual donor base</i> , through which it receives <i>the majority of its funding</i> . The three year average shown below in the income and funding section shows an increase from £18.4 million in 2004 to £27.1 million in 2006.”
2006; 2007	“IRW has [We have] a <i>supportive individual donor base</i> , through which we receive <i>the majority of our funding</i> .” ¹⁶⁴⁵
2007	“In 2007, we generated £28.9m from <i>the generosity of our donors</i> responding to ongoing support of the humanitarian programmes Islamic Relief Worldwide is implementing.” ¹⁶⁴⁶
2008 to 2010	“2008 [/2009/ 2010] was a particularly successful year due to <i>the generosity of our donors</i> and this saw our income reach £47.8 [£58 /£64] million. This facilitated Islamic Relief Worldwide to expand its charitable activities in both disaster-response and sustainable development programmes.” ¹⁶⁴⁷
2008 to 2012	“With the downturn in the global economy we are taking measures to manage our cash-flow carefully, strengthen our reserves and provide a greater service to our individual donors through whom IRW it receives <i>the majority of its funding</i> .” ¹⁶⁴⁸
2011	“Through the <i>generosity of our donors</i> , our voluntary income remained consistent. This enabled Islamic Relief to continue to expand its charitable activities in both disaster response and sustainable development programmes.” ¹⁶⁴⁹

¹⁶⁴² Ibid., 33.

¹⁶⁴³ Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2005’, 16.

¹⁶⁴⁴ Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2006’, 20.

¹⁶⁴⁵ Ibid.; Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2007’, 56.

¹⁶⁴⁶ Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2006’, 57.

¹⁶⁴⁷ Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2008’, 83; Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2009’, 43; Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2010’, 53.

¹⁶⁴⁸ Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2008’, 83; Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2009’, 43; Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2010’, 53; Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2011’, 41; Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Islamic Relief Worldwide 2012 Annual Report & Financial Statements’ (Birmingham: Islamic Relief Worldwide, 2012), 26, http://www.islamic-relief.org.uk/content/uploads/2013/05/Annual_Report_2012.pdf.

¹⁶⁴⁹ Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2011’, 42.

Table B.3 The GD frame conveyed by IR's emphasis on the generosity of its donors in either/both the message from its Chair of Trustees or/and the message from its CEO.

	Message form IR's Chair of Trustees	Message form IR's CEO
2007	No mention	<i>None of our relief or development work would be possible without our donors and without the wider Islamic Relief family.</i> ¹⁶⁵⁰
2008	Our internal change process has coincided with a period of ever increasing uncertainty in the worldwide economy. We know that <i>times are hard for everyone, which is why we are more grateful than ever to all our donors and supporters who continue to give so generously to fund our projects. In the spirit of the prophetic teaching that 'charity does not decrease wealth,' they have continued to have faith in the importance of our work. (...)</i> [I] would like to thank all our supporters, donors, staff and volunteers who have shown <i>extraordinary commitment</i> over the past year, and indeed the past 25 years. ¹⁶⁵¹	No mention
2009	No mention	This report presents the achievements and finances of the organisation, which show <i>the continued generosity of our donors. Without this and the hard work of our staff and volunteers, none of our relief or development work would be possible.</i> ¹⁶⁵²
2010	In 2010, with the <i>support of our generous donors</i> , we were able to care for more than 25,000 orphans and vulnerable children around the world. ¹⁶⁵³	In this report, you will discover more about how we are transforming lives around the world – <i>none of which would have been possible without the continued support of our donors, beneficiaries, partners and staff.</i> ¹⁶⁵⁴
2011	I welcome you to this report, which gives you information about our new global strategy and how, with <i>the generous support of our donors</i> , this innovative approach is already allowing us to deepen the positive impact we make on the lives of the poorest people in the world. ¹⁶⁵⁵	No mention
2012	Donors also gave generously so we could support millions of people through our largest ever Ramadan campaign, as well as towards innovative community-led disaster risk reduction initiatives in Bangladesh. (...) As always,	

¹⁶⁵⁰ Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2007', 5.

¹⁶⁵¹ Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2008', 4.

¹⁶⁵² Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2009', 5.

¹⁶⁵³ Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2010', 4.

¹⁶⁵⁴ Ibid., 5.

¹⁶⁵⁵ Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Annual Report 2011', 6.

	our passionate thanks go out to all Islamic Relief stakeholders – who together make all this work possible. Our donors and supporters have been vital in enabling Islamic Relief to get real help to the world’s most vulnerable people. ¹⁶⁵⁶
2013	We thank our dedicated staff, our selfless volunteers around the world for all their efforts, our generous donors for their on-going support, and to all those with whom we worked in partnership to reduce poverty and suffering worldwide. ¹⁶⁵⁷
2014	We thank the big-hearted public around the world – who once more demonstrated their generosity – and multilateral and governmental donors and partners for their support throughout the challenges of 2014. ¹⁶⁵⁸

Table B.4 The GD frame being conveyed by IR’s emphasis on its accountability to its donors both in terms of transparency and efficacy

2006	<i>“We are accountable to: Our Creator in all that we do. Our supporters for the way we use their contributions. Our beneficiaries to provide the assistance they need when they need it, in an appropriate manner. Our colleagues to carry out our responsibilities to the best of our abilities. The governing rules, laws and regulations of authorities.”</i> ¹⁶⁵⁹
2008-2010	<i>“We are dedicated to helping people in need and are accountable to our donors, supporters, beneficiaries, partners and all our stakeholders. (...) To fulfil our vision and mission effectively, to effectively safeguard our staff and beneficiaries, and to meet the obligations to our donors, risks are managed through the following mechanisms”</i> ¹⁶⁶⁰
2010	<i>“Islamic Relief has an obligation to both our donors and beneficiaries to create the most effective and efficient organisational structure and systems that will deliver the best impact in our mission.”</i> ¹⁶⁶¹
2011	<i>“We are determined to fulfil our obligations to donors and beneficiaries to maximise the impact of our work in alleviating poverty and suffering.”</i> ¹⁶⁶²
2012	<i>“We also want to continue to be recognised for our financial transparency, underlining how scrupulous we are with the contributions of our donors.”</i> ¹⁶⁶³
2013	<i>“We continue to be recognised for our financial transparency - and invest in developing ever-more rigorous accountability and governance systems that maximise the benefits we deliver with the contributions of our donors.”</i> ¹⁶⁶⁴

¹⁶⁵⁶ Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2012’, 6.

¹⁶⁵⁷ Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Islamic Relief Worldwide 2013 Annual Report & Financial Statements’ (Birmingham: Islamic Relief Worldwide, 2013), 5, http://www.islamic-relief.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/IRW_AR2013.pdf.

¹⁶⁵⁸ Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Islamic Relief Worldwide 2014 Annual Report & Financial Statements’ (Birmingham: Islamic Relief Worldwide, 2014), 5, <http://library.iracademy.org.uk/islamic-relief-worldwide-2014-annual-report-financial-statements/>.

¹⁶⁵⁹ Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2006’, 2.

¹⁶⁶⁰ Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2008’, 79; Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2009’, 39; Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2010’, 50.

¹⁶⁶¹ Ibid., 39.

¹⁶⁶² Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2011’, 9.

¹⁶⁶³ Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2012’, 17.

¹⁶⁶⁴ Islamic Relief Worldwide, ‘Annual Report 2013’, 39.

Table B.5 The ‘fundraiser’ keying of the VOLUNTEER frame. This is consistently conveyed by framing volunteers as people who decide to support IR through a range of activities which include: fundraising events (which I highlight using ‘**bold**’); charity collections (which I highlight using ‘*italics*’); pledges or sporting challenges (which I highlight using ‘underline’); voluntary purchase of items or payment of registration fees (which I highlight using ‘double underline’).

2005	In order to help support the national Make Poverty History campaign, Islamic Relief Worldwide organised the <u>‘iRUN’ event</u> in Scotland, raising funds in particular for Niger. All age groups took part in the successful project which is now in its second year. In response to the devastating earthquake in Kashmir, numerous activities were carried out across the UK from Scotland to London. People organised <i>street collections</i> , <u>indoor tournaments</u> , <u>bazaars</u> , charity dinners , <u>sponsored walks</u> and <u>concerts</u> . Islamic Relief Worldwide has found the extraordinary generosity of the UK public very inspiring.
2006	Islamic Relief Worldwide raised funds through Islamic Relief ‘ <u>Challenges</u> ,’ events that were participated in by our volunteers. The volunteers of 2006 showed their courage and dedication this year taking on challenges <u>from climbing Mount Everest to jumping out of planes</u> .
2007	n.a.
2008	Gaza emergency appeals were also made through community events around the country, many of them organised by local volunteers. These included dinners , <i>collections in public places</i> and a <u>women’s only fashion show</u> . Each local event raised between £5,000 to £85,000.
2009	To raise funds for development and emergency projects around the world, IRW partners launched a variety of local campaigns in 2009. By <u>running marathons</u> , <u>climbing mountains</u> , <u>crossing deserts</u> and <u>undertaking parachute jumps</u> , daredevil volunteers around the world raised almost £200,000 in sponsorship donations. Fundraising dinners , <i>school activities</i> and <i>educational tours</i> also contributed to raising money and increasing awareness about the issues affecting the communities we support. (...) From <u>bazaars</u> , dinners and <i>street collections</i> , to <i>school activities</i> , <u>sponsored events</u> and live TV appeals , volunteers and donors came together to raise more than £5 million in 2009 to support those affected by the crisis in Gaza. (...) Islamic Relief volunteers <i>toured mosques and community centres</i> around the United Kingdom to share their experiences of their visit to vulnerable communities in Kenya. Their tour raised more than £500,000 for the project, which helped to ensure that around 75,000 people have access to safe, clean drinking water.”
2010	Many people gave up their time too. School-children raised money through <i>non-uniform days</i> . A team of 15 UK volunteers <u>trekked two weeks through the Himalayas</u> , ascending to the Everest Base camp, to raise money for our programmes in Pakistan. University Islamic Societies raised over £420,000 and HRH The Prince of Wales made a personal donation to support our work in Pakistan. Radio appeals were held from mosque radios, and fundraising dinners also generated much-needed money. Many people undertook <u>sponsored fasts</u> , held <u>cake bakes</u> , and <i>pounded pavements</i> , all to raise much-needed money.
2011	in 2011 we raised £28 million in the UK (...) volunteers from all corners of the UK joined in the efforts: from a 26-mile <u>sponsored cycle</u> in the Yorkshire dales, <u>climbing Wales’ highest mountain</u> , to <u>fun days</u> in Blackburn and Rochdale and Eid in the Park in London. (...) Highlights from 2011 include fundraising dinners for Pakistan and East Africa, and 120 <u>volunteers joining in the Great Scottish Runs</u> in Glasgow and Edinburgh.
2012	Regional activity included <i>150 mosque collections</i> , <i>100 street and tube collections</i> , <i>40 iftars</i> , <u>bazaars</u> and <u>family fun days</u> . Special dinners in Bradford

	and the Midlands raised £128,000 for Gaza and Syria. (...) People from all walks of life took part in <u>gruelling challenges, from sky dives to mountain climbing and bungee jumps</u> . Over 600 participants took on <u>five international challenges</u> – including climbing Kilimanjaro – to raise a whopping £600,000. (...) Our volunteers are at the heart of our work: sacrificing finances, time and energy – exemplified during Charity Week , when thousands of students raised a phenomenal £445,500 in just one week!
2013	“Volunteers are at the heart of our work, sacrificing their time, finances and energy. This year, they <i>held collections in over 50 mosques, carried out more than 40 street and tube-station collections, hosted iftar dinners</i> throughout Ramadan, and organised several <u>bazaars and family fun days</u> . Their invaluable contribution was exemplified during Charity Week , when thousands of students raised a phenomenal £232,500 in just one week. <u>Cakes for Syria</u> , an idea sparked by a volunteer in the North, was also a huge success, raising £80,000 in four weeks for the people of Syria. (...) People from all walks of life took part in <u>gruelling challenges, from sky-dives to mountain treks and bungee jumps</u> , raising funds for causes including lifesaving water projects in Africa and vital emergency aid in Syria. Almost 800 participants took part in <u>challenges both UK-based and international</u> – including climbing Mount Kilimanjaro, trekking to Everest base camp and cycling from Leicester to Paris, in which the Riders of Shaam raised over £13,000 for Islamic Relief’s projects in Gaza. In total, <u>our challenges helped to raise a whopping £647,000 in 2013</u> .”
2014	The spirit of 2014 was embodied in the dedicated people who participated in <u>173 fundraising challenges</u> . Haroon Mota ran five <u>half-marathons</u> in a month for Gaza, raising nearly £6,000. <u>Cakes4Syria</u> , in its second year, raised over £200,000 in direct income, with hard-working volunteers delivering chocolate cakes to doorsteps around the country. The campaign also attracted another £200,000 in donations from new donors.

Table B.6 The fundraiser keying being used to frame IR’s support base in the Global North in places outside of the UK

2013	<p>“<i>Reaching out to new markets</i> is integral to our strategy to fight poverty and suffering worldwide, and this year we achieved significant success in both Spain and Ireland. In Spain, we now have <i>fundraising offices</i> in Barcelona and Madrid – as well as <i>strong volunteer teams</i> in five other regions. Over 30 volunteers attended our volunteer launch events in Barcelona, Madrid and Valencia.”</p> <p>“Islamic Relief Ireland held a special launch dinner in June, and now has volunteer teams across the country - as well as over 20 clothing banks and 100 penny boxes. <i>Successful fundraising initiatives</i> included winter fairs and fundraising dinners, with an event in Dublin raising over 50,000 Euros to support our emergency operations for Syria. Another event in the capital saw Islamic Relief engage with a variety of communities to fundraise for projects to help typhoon-affected communities in the Philippines, and we worked with both Muslim and non-Muslim communities in our first strong Ramadan campaign in the country.”</p>
2014	<p>“Building a presence in new markets helps us to increase the reach of much-needed humanitarian programmes. (...) We launched our latest partner office, Islamic Relief Norway, and also supported our newer fundraising offices to build upon grassroots activities and develop volunteer teams in over 35 cities.”</p> <p>“Our first ever Emerging Markets International Volunteer camp brought 60 volunteers from a number of countries together to learn about being part of the Islamic Relief Worldwide family, and how to achieve fundraising success.”</p>

Table B.7 IR's 'Thank you' message throughout the years, broken down into its opening (i), central (ii), and concluding (iii) sections.

i)

<i>Opening section</i>	
2005 - 11	Islamic Relief [Worldwide] considers volunteers the heart and soul of its operations and relies upon them in delivering its services.
2012	Our dedicated volunteers are the heart and soul of our operations, and we rely on them to be able to deliver our services.
2013	
2014	Our dedicated volunteers are the heart and soul of Islamic Relief Worldwide , and we rely on them to be able to deliver our services.

ii)

<i>Central</i>		
	<i>1st part</i>	<i>2nd part</i>
2005 -07	During [year], [number of] volunteers contributed to Islamic Relief Worldwide operations.	by donating their time in Islamic Relief Worldwide shops, administration and fund-raising activities.
2008 -13	During [year], [numbers of] volunteers in the UK alone contributed [number of] hours of work to Islamic Relief Worldwide operations	
2014	During 2014, volunteers contributed substantial hours of work	

iii)

<i>Concluding section</i>		
	<i>1st part</i>	<i>2nd part</i>
2005 - 07	The trustees extend their gratitude to all volunteers that assisted Islamic Relief Worldwide in achieving its goals and objectives.	Furthermore, the trustees extend their gratitude to the public who have been very generous in providing gifts in kind [/ clothing for resale]
2008 - 09	The Trustees extend their gratitude to all volunteers who assisted Islamic Relief Worldwide in the UK [/who helped Islamic Relief in the United Kingdom] and elsewhere in achieving its goals and objectives.	
2010 - 14	none	none

Table B.8 The ‘active citizen’ keying conveyed by a focus on the idea of mobilisation through three broad indicators of success: ‘many people’; ‘many types of people’; and ‘many locations’. I underline relevant prompts.

	MANY PEOPLE	MANY TYPES OF PEOPLE	MANY LOCATIONS
2010	“ <u>Many people</u> gave up their time”; “ <u>Many people</u> undertook sponsored fasts [etc.]”	“ <u>School-children</u> raised money”; “A team of 15 UK [young adult] volunteers trekked two weeks through the Himalayas”; “ <u>University Islamic Societies</u> raised”; “Radio appeals were held from <u>mosque radios</u> ”	“campaign mobilising volunteers in <u>22 cities</u> in North America” ¹⁶⁶⁵ .
2011	“we have <u>150 student</u> volunteers who support”; “ <u>120 volunteers</u> joining in the Great Scottish Runs in Glasgow and Edinburgh”	“ <u>a diverse</u> team of <u>Volunteers</u> ”	“volunteers from <u>all corners</u> of the UK”
2012	“Over <u>600 participants</u> took on five international challenges”; “our core volunteers, <u>150 of whom</u> took part in a residential retreat in Nottingham”; “during Charity Week, when <u>thousands of students</u> raised”; “ <u>More than 250 people</u> attended our informative community health initiative in Scotland”;	“ <u>People from all walks of life</u> took part in gruelling challenges”;	“Regional activity included 150 <u>mosque</u> collections, 100 <u>street</u> and tube collections, 40 <i>iftars</i> , <u>bazaars</u> and family fun days.”
2013	“during Charity Week, when <u>thousands of students</u> raised”; “Almost <u>800 participants</u> took part in challenges both UK-based and international”; “ <u>45,000 people</u> attended the Global Day of Action event in London”	“ <u>People from all walks of life</u> took part in gruelling challenges”	“This year, they held collections in over <u>50 mosques</u> , carried out more than <u>40 street and tube-station</u> collections, hosted iftar dinners throughout Ramadan, and organised several <u>bazaars</u> and family fun days”
2014	“During the year <u>over 4,000 UK volunteers</u> rallied to the cause in	“They included hundreds of intrepid <u>mountain</u> climbers, <u>walkers</u> ,	“volunteers delivering chocolate cakes to doorsteps around the

¹⁶⁶⁵ The concept of ‘many people’ had previously mentioned only marginally in the ‘Volunteers help and gifts in kind’ sections in 2005 (“During 2005, some 950 volunteers contributed to Islamic Relief Worldwide operations”) and 2009 (“During 2009, between 400 and 450 volunteers in the United Kingdom alone”) where, also the concept of ‘many location’ had started to appear (“volunteers around the world”).

	Islamic Relief's country of birth"; "people who participated in <u>173</u> <u>fundraising</u> <u>challenges</u> "	<u>cyclists</u> and other sponsored fundraisers, and <u>a group of students</u> who delivered a petition on Syria to Downing Street."	<u>country</u> ; "children's projects through universities <u>across the</u> <u>country</u> "
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