

**Narrating Policy Transfer:
Renewable Energy and Disaster Risk Reduction in ECOWAS**

Submitted by Titilayo Soremi to the University of Exeter
as a thesis for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Politics
In May 2018

This thesis is available for Library use on the understanding that it is copyright material and that no quotation from the thesis may be published without proper acknowledgement.

I certify that all material in this thesis which is not my own work has been identified and that no material has previously been submitted and approved for the award of a degree by this or any other University.

Signature:

Abstract

The thesis contributes to the policy transfer literature through the examination of narratives presented by policy actors engaged in policy transfer. The actors' policy narratives are analysed through the application of the Narrative Policy Framework (NPF). With the use of the NPF, the research investigates the portrayal of narrative elements, including, setting, character, plot, and moral, by the transfer actors, in depicting their perception of the transfer process and object, and of the other actors involved in the policy transfer. The investigation is aimed at having a better understanding of factors that facilitate the occurrence of policy transfer i.e. transfer mechanisms, such as, conditionality, obligation, and persuasion, and how they manifest and drive the transfer process.

To examine how policy narratives may inform the manifestation of transfer mechanisms, the research studies two cases of policy transfer involving international governmental organisations (IGOs) as transfer agents. These are i) the transfer of renewable energy policy by the European Union to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and ii) the transfer of disaster risk reduction (DRR) policy by the United Nations International Strategy for DRR (UNISDR) to ECOWAS. The thesis argues that the mechanisms of conditionality and persuasion were involved in the transfer of renewable energy policy, while the mechanism of obligation can be observed in the transfer of DRR policy. It further argues that the portrayals of the narrative setting, character, plot and moral, in the policy narratives of the transfer agents and recipient, shaped the manifestation of these transfer mechanisms. The application of the NPF to the two case studies enabled the identification and association of different policy narrative elements that will likely characterise specific transfer mechanisms. In addition, the study highlights the opportunity of broadening policy transfer research beyond a limited geographical reach, through covering two instances of policy transfer to a region in sub-Saharan Africa. It also broadens the group of actors that are often studied in the literature by considering policy transfers initiated and led by IGOs.

Acknowledgements

It takes a village to raise a child and my PhD journey is the consequence of myriads of intended and unintended influences and support of diverse persons. I will especially like to acknowledge the remarkable influence of my supervisors, Prof Claire Dunlop and Prof Claudio Radaelli, in not only helping to stretch my analytical capability and give form to my green research thoughts, but also encouraging me as I tackled one hurdle after the other. Under their tutelage, I have benefitted immensely from their wealth of knowledge, networks, and wit. Importantly, I will like to thank Prof Claire Dunlop for accepting to supervise my PhD research. Your first email to me has changed my life.

I will like to appreciate my parents, Bayo and Olaiya Obisesan, who have always been my inspiration for tenacity and pursuit of a productive and meaningful life. They have sacrificed immeasurably in building the foundation for who I am today and they continue to give their all, just so that their children would have all they never had. Thank you, mum. Thank you, dad. Words are not enough to express my sincere gratitude. My fabulous siblings have also been to me a pillar of support. They extended substantial assistance to me and my family and offered listening ears whenever I called. In addition, I acknowledge my uncles and aunties, who took great care of me as a child and continue to be very fond of me. Notably, my beloved Uncle Olu, your unrivalled care and dedication to my academic pursuit are greatly appreciated. Also, I wish to thank my amazing friends, who stuck close like brothers and constantly checked on me throughout this process.

To my darling life partner and husband, Babatope, and my adorable kids, Temi and Erin, I cannot but say that you are the reason I took on challenges that seemed insurmountable, the reason I persevered, the reason I laughed through it all, and the reason I arrived at the finishing line unscathed. Babatope, you are the definition of what and how husbands should be and I love you lots. As this journey ends, perhaps Temi and Erin would cease stating, 'my mummy loves typing and doing PhD'.

Finally, to Him who orders my steps and leads me in the right path, I say thank you.

Table of Content

Chapter 1 – Introduction	12
1.1.1 Limited Focus on the Interaction among Policy Transfer Actors	17
1.1.2 Emphasis on Developed Countries and Statism	19
1.2. The Case for Examining Narratives in Policy Transfer Research	22
1.3 Why Narrative Policy Framework (NPF)?	26
1.4 International Governmental Organisations (IGOs) and Policy Transfer	27
1.5 Research Questions and Research Design	29
1.6 Thesis Structure	32
Chapter 2 – Literature Review: Policy Transfer	34
Introduction	34
2.1 Evolution of Policy Transfer Research and Differentiating Policy Transfer from Similar Concepts	35
2.2 Policy Transfer Literature Review and Evidence of Growth in Policy Transfer Research	40
2.3 Definitions of Policy Transfer and Delimitation of Policy Transfer Process	44
2.3.1 Definition by Dolowitz and Marsh	44
2.3.2 Definition by Evans and Davies	45
2.3.3 Delimitation of Policy Transfer	46
2.4 Policy Transfer and Rational Decision-Making	49
2.4.1 Policy Transfer Studies Centred on Rationality	50
2.4.2 Expansion of Policy Transfer Studies beyond Rational Decision-Making	54
2.5 Beyond Rationality: Multiplicity of Policy Transfer Agents and Transfer Mechanisms	58
2.5.1 Policy Transfer by Learning	63
2.5.2 Policy Transfer by Persuasion	64
2.5.3 Policy Transfer by Obligation	67
2.5.4 Policy Transfer by Conditionality	69
2.5.5 Policy Transfer by Imposition	71
2.5.6 Does Multiplicity of Transfer Mechanisms Obscure Explanations of the Policy Process?	72
2.6 New Directions in Policy Transfer Research	74
2.6.1 Use of Institutional Approaches in Policy Transfer Research	75
2.6.2 Use of Relational Approaches in Policy Transfer Research	79
2.6.5 Relevance of a Relational Approach	87
Conclusion	88

Chapter 3 – The Narrative Policy Framework (NPF) and its Application to Policy Transfer Research	90
Introduction	90
3.1 Narratives: From Literature Studies to Public Policy Research	91
3.2 The Narrative Policy Framework (NPF).....	101
3.3 Narrative Elements	107
3.4 Application of the NPF	119
Conclusion	136
Chapter 4 – Methodology	138
Introduction	138
4.1 Case Selection.....	139
4.1.1 <i>Data Richness</i>	140
4.1.2 <i>Significance of Policy Areas</i>	142
4.1.3 <i>Limitations of Case Selection</i>	143
4.2 Data Collection	144
4.2.1 <i>Narrative Analysis</i>	146
4.2.2 <i>Ethics Approval</i>	155
4.2.3 <i>Interviews</i>	155
4.3 Data Analysis	161
Conclusion	164
Chapter 5 – Renewable Energy and Disaster Risk Reduction in ECOWAS	166
Introduction	166
5.1 What are these Transfers Cases Of?.....	167
5.2 Background on ECOWAS	170
5.2.1 <i>The Formation of ECOWAS by Local Actors</i>	170
5.2.2 <i>The Involvement of External Actors in ECOWAS and the Revision of ECOWAS Treaty</i>	172
5.3 Background on the Policy Areas: Renewable Energy and DRR	175
5.3.1 <i>Promoting Use of Renewable Energy in ECOWAS</i>	175
5.3.2 <i>Disaster Risk Reduction in ECOWAS</i>	182
5.3.3 <i>Disaster Management as Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution</i>	184
5.3.4 <i>ECOWAS’ Interest in DRR and Development of the Africa Regional Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction</i>	186
5.4 Policy Transfer Agents and Transfer Mechanisms	188
5.4.1 <i>The EU and the Creation of ECOWAS Centre for Renewable Energy and Efficiency (ECREEE)</i>	190

5.4.2 The EU and the Development and Adoption of the ECOWAS Renewable Energy Policy	191
5.4.3a The Transfer Mechanism of Conditionality	194
5.3.3b The Transfer Mechanism of Persuasion	197
5.4.4 Actors and Transfer Mechanism Involved in the Transfer of the DRR Policy to ECOWAS	201
5.4.5 The Transfer Mechanism of Obligation	204
Chapter 6 – Setting the Scene	210
Introduction	210
6.1. Setting the Scene in Renewable Energy Policy Transfer to ECOWAS	214
6.2 Setting the Scene in DRR Policy Transfer to ECOWAS	225
Conclusion	236
Chapter 7 – Casting Characters	239
Introduction	239
7.1 Casting Heroes and Allies by Policy Transfer Agents	242
7.2 Casting Heroes and Allies by Policy Transfer Recipient	249
7.3 Casting Victims by Policy Transfer Agents	253
7.4 Casting Victims by Policy Transfer Recipient	259
7.5 Casting Villains and Antagonists by Transfer Agents	261
7.6 Casting of Villains and Antagonist by Transfer Recipient	264
Conclusion	268
Chapter 8 – Plot and Moral of the Story	270
Introduction	270
8.1 Use of Narrative Plot and Moral in the Case of Renewable Energy Policy Transfer	273
8.2 Use of Narrative Plot and Moral in the Case of DRR Policy Transfer	280
Conclusion	292
Chapter 9 – Conclusion	294
9.1 Key Findings: Transfer Mechanisms	295
9.2 Key Findings: Narrative Elements	298
9.3 Key Findings: Narrative Elements and Transfer Mechanisms	299
9.4 Conceptual Contribution	302
9.5 Avenues for Future Research	306
9.6 Reflection on Policy Transfer by IGOs to Sub-Sahara Africa	309
Appendices	313
Appendix 1: Description of Parameters Used in the Review of the Policy Transfer Literature	313
Appendix 2: Documents used in Narrative Analysis	314

Appendix 3: Coding of Narrative Elements in Documents Analysed	319
Appendix 4: Events and Activities Related to the Policy Transfers	324
Appendix 5: Certificate for Ethics Approval	329
Appendix 6: Interview Questions and Information and Consent Form	330
Appendix 7: Chi-Square and T-Test Analysis	335
Appendix 8: Picture of UNISDR’s Representative Meeting with President Olusegun Obasanjo	349
References	350

List of Tables

Table 1.1 - Policy Transfer Framework.....	15
Table 2.1 – Number of articles shown in Scopus and % increase between 1996 and 2016.....	42
Table 2.2 - Number of articles shown in Google Scholar and % increase between 1996 and 2010.....	42
Table 2.3 - Number of articles in strands of policy transfer literature	42
Table 2.4 - Number of articles with instances of intentional policy transfer	48
Table 3.1 - Definition of Narrative Characters in Some NPF Studies	113
Table 4.1 - Comparison of Features in Selected Cases	140

Table of Figures

Figure 2.1: Policy Transfer Pathways	46
Figure 2.2: Policy Transfer Continuum.....	55
Figure 2.3: Rate of Identification of Different Mechanisms in Policy Transfer Studies	62
Figure 2.4: Graph Showing Temporal Increase in Number of Studies Focused on International Organisations as Policy Transfer Actors.....	82
Figure 5.1: Energy Access in ECOWAS as at 2009 and 2012.....	181

Abbreviations

ACP – African, Caribbean, and Pacific

ADB – Africa Development Bank

AEEP – Africa-EU Energy Partnership

AIE – Access to Environmental Information Directive

AIE – Access to Information on the Environment

AU – African Union

CEEC – Central and Eastern European Countries

CPS – Centre for Policy Studies

DFID – Department for International Development

DRR – Disaster Risk Reduction

EC – European Commission

ECA – Economic Commission for Africa

ECOWAS – Economic Community of West African States

ECREEE – ECOWAS Centre for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency

EEC – European Economic Community

EU – European Union

EUEI PDF – EU Energy Initiative Partnership Dialogue Facility

FCTC – Framework Convention for Tobacco Control

GYA – Greater Yellowstone Area

IEA – Institute of Economic Affairs

IEA – International Energy Agency

IGO – International Governmental Organisation

IMF – International Monetary Fund

INGO – International non-governmental organisations

ITU – International Telecommunications Union

LDC – Least Developed Countries

MDGs – Millennium Development Goals

MS – Member State

NEPAD – New Partnership for Africa's Development

NPM – New Public Management

OAU – Organisation for African Unity

OECD – Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

RECP – Renewable Energy Cooperation Programme

RECs – Regional Economic Communities

SAP – Structural Adjustment Programs

SSIS – Social Science and International Studies

UK – United Kingdom

UNCTAD – United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

UNDP – United Nations Development Programme

UNECA – United Nations Economic Commission of Africa

UNFCCC – United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

UNIDO – United Nations Industrial Organisation

USAID – United States Agency for International Development

USSR – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

WAEMU – West African Economic and Monetary Union

WAPP – West African Power Pool

WHO – World Health Organisation

WTO – World Trade Organisation

YNP – Yellowstone National Park

Chapter 1 – Introduction

Once upon a time, there was severe famine in a village. So, one day, the tortoise suggested to the other animals that they should go to the neighbouring village to find food to eat, and they agreed to this proposition. The animals set out very early the next morning, and as they approached the village, the tortoise again suggested that they should all identify specific names by which they will be addressed by the villagers. All the animals took turns to mention what they would like to be called and when it was the tortoise's turn, he named himself - everybody. Upon narrating their plight to the villagers, the animals were welcomed and settled in a house. Then, the villagers took all kinds of food to the house and said, "all this food is for everybody".

- A West African Folktale

Storytelling is a universal means of communication (Shanahan et al., 2011; Jones et al., 2014). According to Jones et al. (2014), human beings use stories in order to “organize, process, and convey information” (Jones and McBeth, 2010, p. 329). Policy actors also organise information through stories presented in policy narratives (Kaplan, 1986; McBeth et al., 2014b; Radaelli, 1999; Roe, 1994). These narratives are seen to be relatable, easy to comprehend (Shanahan et al., 2008, 2011b), and represent “generalizable (*form of*) knowledge ... and universal principles” (Hajer and Laws, 2006, p. 251). Policy narratives can also reflect pertinent aspects of a policy issue, as events and places are webbed around actors, thereby affording the portrayal of how the actors influenced the present state of events and/or how they are morphing the state of the events and places that are captured in the story. With the use of narrative elements - comprising the setting, character, plot, and moral - policy narratives also allow a narrator to relay messages in a form that is more likely easier to grasp by the audience (Jones et al., 2014; Jones and McBeth, 2010).

Based on the relevance of policy narratives, this thesis investigates the role of policy narratives in policy transfer, particularly, how the narratives used by actors

shape the mechanisms that drive the occurrence of policy transfer. According to Dolowitz and Marsh (2000, p.5), policy transfer is “the process by which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in one political setting (past or present) is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in another political setting”. In line with this definition, policy transfer research is often structured around key research questions on why transfer, who is involved in transfer, what is transferred i.e. the transfer object, the degree of transfer, and the source of the transfer object (Benson and Jordan, 2011; Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996, 2000; Marsden and Stead, 2011). The policy transfer framework, which is shown in Table 1.1, highlights these key research questions and the features that can be identified while addressing them.

Primarily, this thesis focuses on one of the key research questions identified in the policy transfer framework i.e. why transfer. Looking at Table 1.1, the possible answers to ‘why transfer?’ can range from voluntary to coercive reasons, whereby voluntary reasons are often hinged on a jurisdiction’s own attempt to draw lessons from external sources, or persuasion by an external party to do so, coercive reasons are primarily based on international pressures, such as obligation to an international accord, conditionality for receiving external support, and direct imposition. These different voluntary or coercive reasons for engaging in policy transfer are termed as policy transfer mechanisms (Bulmer and Padgett, 2005; Evans, 2009a; Ladi, 2011; Nutley et al., 2012; Schroeder et al., 2013). Specifically, the research focuses on the involvement of International Governmental Organisations (IGOs) as transfer agents and the transfer mechanisms that are often linked to this set of actors namely, persuasion, obligation, and conditionality (Benson and Jordan, 2011; Dolowitz and Marsh,

2000; Stone, 2004). Focusing on IGOs as transfer agents addresses a gap in the policy transfer literature on studying policy transfers that do not occur at the national level. This is discussed further in the next section.

Given that these mechanisms of themselves cannot materialise in transfer instances outside of its expression by actors, this makes the examination of interaction among policy actors imperative. It also presents the need to focus on what was communicated by the actors in relations to their perception of the transfer object, the recipient jurisdiction, and expectations of what the transfer would accomplish. To investigate how policy narratives shape policy transfer mechanisms, two instances of policy transfer are used as case studies. These cases are:

- I. Transfer of renewable energy policy to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) by the European Union (EU)¹
- II. Transfer of disaster risk reduction (DRR) policy to ECOWAS by the United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR)

¹ The European Union supported the development and adoption of a renewable energy policy in ECOWAS through the European Union Energy Initiative Partnership Dialogue Facility (EUEI PDF).

Table 1.1 - Policy Transfer Framework

Why Transfer? Continuum			Who Is Involved in Transfer?	What Is Transferred?	From Where			Degrees of Transfer	Constraints on Transfer	How To Demonstrate Policy Transfer	How Transfer leads to Policy Failure
Want To.....	Have To			Past	Within-a Nation	Cross- National				
Voluntary	Mixtures	Coercive									
Lesson Drawing (Perfect Rationality)	Lesson Drawing (Bounded Rationality)	Direct Imposition	Elected Officials	Policies (Goals) (content) (instruments)	Internal	State Governments	International Organizations	Copying	Policy Complexity (Newspaper) (Magazine) (TV) (Radio)	Media Reports	Uniformed Transfer
	International Pressures		Bureaucrats Civil Servants	Programs	Global	City Governments	Regional State Local Governments	Emulation	Past Policies		Incomplete Transfer
	(Image) (Consensus) (Perceptions) Externalities	Pressure Groups	Institutions			Local Authorities		Mixtures	Structural Institutional	(Commissioned) (uncommissioned) Conferences	Inappropriate Transfer
	Conditionality (Loans) (Conditions Attached to Business Activity)	Political Parties	Ideologies					Inspiration	Feasibility (Ideology) (cultural proximity) (technology) (economic) (bureaucratic) Language	Meetings/ Visits Statements (written) (verbal)	
	Obligations	Policy Entrepreneurs/ Experts	Attitudes/ Cultural Values Consultants Think Tanks Transnational Corporations Supranational Institutions	Negative Lessons			Past Relations				

Source: Dolowitz and Marsh (2000, p.9)

The two cases are examined by applying the Narrative Policy Framework (NPF) to identify and analyse the narratives used by the transfer agents and recipient involved in the process. Using the NPF, specific narrative elements including, setting, character, plot, and moral, are identified in communication materials authored by the actors prior to the adoption of the transfer object. This application of the NPF to policy transfer case studies enabled making arguments about the transfer mechanisms that facilitated the two cases and the narratives that led to the emergence of these mechanisms. I argue that the portrayal of the narrative characters of heroes and allies; the plot of rags to riches; moral of incentives and sanctions, and situating a bureaucratic and community setting shaped the manifestation of the transfer mechanisms of conditionality and persuasion in the transfer of renewable energy policy to ECOWAS by the EU. I also argue that the portrayal of the narrative character of allies and victims; plot of overcoming the monster; morals of value reorientation and managing cost and benefit; as well as situating a bureaucratic setting shaped the manifestation of the transfer mechanism of obligation in the case of transfer of DRR policy to ECOWAS by the UNISDR.

With regards to the focus of this thesis, the research contributes to the literature by presenting a basis for delineating policy transfer from its analogous concepts, primarily through exploring the stories told by policy transfer actors. It also draws attention to other transfer instances that are not solely state-inclined and emphasises the involvement of IGOs as transfer agents. In addition, the study covers a geographical region that has hitherto been given limited attention in the policy transfer literature and highlights the experience of a less developed jurisdiction as a recipient of obligatory and conditional transfers. The next section discusses in more detail the gaps in the literature which are addressed by this thesis.

1.1 Gaps in the Policy Transfer Literature

1.1.1 Limited Focus on the Interaction among Policy Transfer Actors

The policy transfer framework has often been criticised for having limited additionality to public policy studies because of the challenge of distinguishing the process of policy transfer from its analogous concepts i.e. lesson-drawing, policy diffusion, and policy convergence, and rational decision making (Dussauge-Laguna, 2012a; Lodge and James, 2003). The concept is also sometimes questioned as implying a literal package and delivery of policies from one jurisdiction to another (Dussauge-Laguna, 2012a; Massey, 2009). To address these concerns, Evans (2004, p.4; 2009a) emphasises the need for policy transfer research to “focus on the ... intermediation of agents of policy transfer”. Also, Wolman and Page (2002, p.477) state that policy transfer should be “conceptualized as occurring through a communication and information framework”. In addition, Evans (2009b) recommends the recognition of a multi-level dimension that typifies the movement of ideas from one jurisdiction or system to another e.g. from transnational to national level, or from national to sub-national level, in order to give distinction to the budding concept and ensure its recognition as a research agenda. Building on the multi-level approach, scholars have drawn from other theories, frameworks, and concepts to address policy transfer research questions. For instance, to address who is involved in policy transfer, different approaches including, epistemic community, information theory and public relations theory have been applied (Dunlop, 2009; Park et al., 2014; Stone, 2004; Wolman and Page, 2002). Also, in addressing the constraints to policy transfer, the concepts of institutionalism, cultural theory and Europeanization have been applied (Common, 2013; Greener, 2002; Ladi, 2011; Lodge, 2003). With respect to this development,

Benson and Jordan (2011, p. 374) conclude that “[e]vidently a concept like policy transfer has an innate capacity to combine with many different theoretical toolkits”.

However, the application of other concepts and frameworks to policy transfer research has been mostly channeled towards explaining policy transfer outcomes (Greener, 2002; Jordan et al., 2003; Common, 2013), resulting in a limited focus on examining the “the intermediation of agents of policy transfer” (Evans, 2004, p. 4). With less attention on the interaction among policy transfer actors, there has also been a very limited investigation of how the communication among policy transfer actors can shape the transfer process. In a way, this shortcoming accounts for why the first question presented in the policy transfer framework shown in Table 1.1 i.e. why transfer?, seems to be the least addressed among the key policy transfer research questions (Benson and Jordan, 2011). Marsh and Sharman (2009, p.270) have also noted the need “to pay greater attention to the mechanisms involved in ... transfer”. As mentioned earlier, transfer mechanisms are of themselves not tangible entities, instead, they can be said to be embodied in what policy transfer agents and recipients have expressed about their engagement in the transfer process. This highlights the relevance of examining the content of communication among transfer actors, particularly their direct or indirect references to their intent for engaging in policy transfer, their portrayal of the transfer process and other actors involved therein.

It is on this premise that I draw from the Narrative Policy Framework (NPF) (Jones and McBeth, 2010), which regards narratives as a means of policy communication (Jones and Radaelli, 2015; McBeth et al., 2014a). Since use of narratives can represent “a seemingly universal device for individuals to sharpen certain elements of reality while levelling others” (Jones and McBeth, 2010, p. 329), the analysis of narratives used by policy transfer actors can help in understanding how the mechanisms that are

observed in the transfer process take form and manifest as the policy transfer framework posits. The NPF and how it will be applied for the purpose of this research will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. While in the next section, I discuss the second identified gap in the policy transfer literature that will be addressed by the research i.e. the emphasis on developed countries and state actors in policy transfer studies, resulting in limited attention to African jurisdictions and their involvement as recipients of coercive transfer mechanisms.

1.1.2 Emphasis on Developed Countries and Statism

The second gap identified in the policy transfer literature is its emphasis on developed countries leading to a focus on policy transfers that are state-led and targeted and giving limited attention to less-developed jurisdictions, such as sub-Saharan Africa. The literature's uneven emphasis on developed countries can be observed from the collections of policy transfer studies published in books or dedicated journal issues. For example, in the January 2000 issue of *Governance*, the countries covered were primarily developed countries in North America, Europe, and Australasia. In a 2009 special issue on policy transfer, in *Policy Studies*, of all the eight research articles published, only one article on the restructuring of Kenya Airways (Massey, 2009), relates to an instance of policy transfer to an African country. Two other collections follow this trend. The foremost academic book on policy transfer research, which is edited by Mark Evans (Evans, 2004), highlights the case of policy transfer in health sector reform in Tanzania. Also, a 2013 book edited by Peter Carroll and Richard Common showcases an article discussing challenges in the transfer of health policies to Malawi.

The inclusion of just a few case studies on policy transfer in Africa, in the journals and books, seems to be as a result of the dearth of policy transfer studies focused on African countries. This has also been reiterated in the literature, and there have been calls for increased volume of accounts of policy transfer in African jurisdictions (Evans, 2004; Marsh and Sharman, 2009). The call, in particular, has been based on the need for policy transfer study to not be solely hinged on the assumption of rationality by decision makers, and narrowly focused on the participation of state actors in voluntary policy transfers facilitated by the mechanism of learning (Benson and Jordan, 2012; Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000; Mossberger and Wolman, 2003). According to Marsh and Sharman (2009), the reason for shying away from researching African countries may be due to the difficulty in gathering data and the reluctance to travel to these countries. However, the authors maintain that either “excuse seems thin” (Marsh and Sharman, 2009, p. 281), and conclude that many of these countries now upload statistical data on government websites, and are often surveyed by international organisations. They also add that travelling “too far from home to examine the experiences of policy-makers on the receiving end of Western models should represent a tremendous opportunity” (Marsh and Sharman, 2009, p. 281). Although the most recent collection on policy transfer cases features three African countries (Hadjiisky et al., 2017), none of these highlight the involvement of coercive mechanisms in transfers to sub-Saharan Africa. As such, this thesis addresses this gap by presenting cases of transfer to sub-Saharan Africa that involve the mechanisms of obligation and conditionality.

In addition to the bias toward developed countries, the policy transfer literature is also often criticised for its inadequate reference to non-state actors, especially those with significant influence on multiple countries (Stone 2004, 2010). It is noteworthy that there have been efforts to highlight the roles of this group of actors and an example of

this is the 2014 dedicated issue of *Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice*, which focuses on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and its role as a transfer agent (Pal, 2014). Another international organisation that is widely investigated in policy transfer literature is the EU and some scholars have proposed an integrative approach for studying the policy transfer dynamics within the EU (Unalan 2009; Clavier 2010).

Despite these contributions, the focus on the role of international organisations has yet to fully extend to policy transfers to African countries, even though this domain of investigation can highlight the diversity of transfer mechanisms. For instance, commenting on the transfer of privatisation policy to African countries by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Massey (2009, p.389) notes that “African governments were persuaded and sometimes coerced into copying Western patterns of liberalisation and state restructuring, with loans, aid and favourable trading agreements being contingent upon such reforms”. From this statement, we can see that multiple mechanisms were employed and it highlights the opportunity for examining the assortment of mechanisms that can be observed when examining transfers by IGOs to African jurisdictions. Therefore, it is on this premise that this thesis investigates the observation of the mechanisms of obligation, conditionality, and persuasion, in transfers facilitated by two IGOs, the EU and UN, to ECOWAS, by examining the narratives of the transfer agents and recipient in a bid to understand what may have informed the emergence of the different mechanisms.

Later in the chapter, we will look at the importance of IGOs as transfer actors, but before that, the next section gives a more detailed discussion on the relevance of

analysing narratives in policy transfer research and doing this through the application of the NPF.

1.2. The Case for Examining Narratives in Policy Transfer Research

Some transfer studies have recognised the need to attend to the interaction that takes place among actors (Evans and Barakat 2012; Legrand 2012b; Stone 2004), the content of their communication, and characteristics of such content (Dussauge-Laguna, 2013a; Legrand and Vas, 2014). This attention can be regarded as imperative, as policy transfer of itself will likely not occur without the communication of the intent to do so, either among policy actors within a jurisdiction or between them and external policy actors. In addition, the process that ensues in introducing policy-relevant knowledge from another jurisdiction, is also more often not, hinged on communication among policy actors within and/or without the recipient jurisdiction. This shows that communication among policy transfer actors, especially through conversations and documentations, seem to represent lifelines through which policy transfers are initiated and realised. This is not to assert that all there is to policy transfer is communication, but to emphasise that the “effects of interactions” (Padgett, 2003, p. 240) among transfer actors, constitute an integral aspect of policy transfer, as it can inform whether the transfer process will progress, or not (Dunlop, 2009); the form of policy or other transfer object that will emerge at the end of the process (Dussauge-Laguna, 2013b); and the transfer mechanism by which the transfer process will be driven (Park et al., 2014; Savi and Randma-Liiv, 2013).

With respect to transfer mechanisms, narratives used by policy transfer actors can highlight what they perceive of other actors involved in the process, where they expect

the transfer object to take effect, and what they envision the transfer will accomplish. Their depiction of other actors, for instance, can give an insight into the mode of relationship between transfer recipients and agents that will likely dominate the transfer process. A narrative could depict a story of a hero helping a victim; or a hero conquering a villain; or a hero helping victims to conquer a villain; or a hero working with an ally to help victims or conquer a villain, and from these different stories, we can attempt to decipher the relationship dynamic that will characterise the transfer process. Also, we can attempt to deduce the transfer mechanism that will likely encompass this relationship dynamic. As such, examining the narratives of actors provides insights into the emergence of the mechanism driving a transfer process. For the purpose of examining narratives, the NPF offers a coherent structure for analysing narratives, precisely through the identification of narrative elements, which are setting, character, plot, and moral. The next section further discusses the basis for drawing from the NPF.

Having highlighted the relevance of the NPF to this study, it is also important to mention other frameworks that may have been applied to this research, what they may have contributed to it, and discuss why these were not selected. With respect to the use of the policy transfer framework, other approaches that could have been applicable to this research include norm diffusion, and Europeanization. It is noteworthy that similar to policy transfer, these two approaches are linked to the spread of policy-relevant knowledge. Norm diffusion addresses the propagation of internationally-recognised practices in the absence of a global government (Gilardi, 2013; Hyde, 2011). It identifies the importance of international organisations as norm diffusers and how they influence states to adopt certain norms and practises through avenues of socialization (Park, S.). While norm diffusion may have helped to examine

the roles of the international organisations based on expectations of how these organisations act, and this may have led to the identification of norm entrepreneurs, the focus of the approach on appropriate or acceptable behaviour in the international community, the limitation of the interaction between the IGOs and ECOWAS to codification of policy ideas does not adequately fit into the broader notion of norms. Also, with the target of diffusion studies to highlight the path of uptake, this study would have understudied how the two policy areas have journeyed across multiple jurisdictions, and this would have limited the possibility of delving into how the influence of the IGOs and their interaction with a specific recipient, shaped the transfer mechanisms. With regards to Europeanization, this approach is often broadly focused on the top-down or bottom-up influence that the EU has on its member and applicant states, and vice-versa, in terms of policy, politics, and polity (Börzel, 1999; Börzel and Risse, 2000; Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003). Albeit, it has been contended that this explanation is more suitable to EU-ization (Radaelli, 2003; Flockhart, 2010) because Europeanization can extend to the influence of the EU on non-member or applicant states through policy transfer (Radaelli, 2003). Applying the concept of Europeanization with a view of the EU's influence on ECOWAS may have benefitted this research by its likely consideration of the likelihood of if the policy transfer has precipitated any possibility of ECOWAS' imbuelement of EU's values and/or culture and vice-versa. However, since the primary transfer agent in both cases is not the EU, the utilisation of the concept of Europeanization would apply to only one of the cases and exclude the other, as the EU was not actively involved in the drive for the official adoption of the ECOWAS DRR policy i.e. before 2007, even though it later became actively involved in the support of DRR issues in developing countries by 2009.

As we would later see in chapter 3, there are other approaches in the field of public policy that favour the analysis of narratives and could have been considered for examination of the two cases. Some of these approaches include the narrative policy analysis (NPA) (Roe, 1994), discursive institutionalism (Schmidt, 2008), and discourse coalition (Hajer, 1993). NPA centres on policy formulation and the use of narratives to develop and streamline policy options. On the other hand, discursive institutionalism and discourse coalition are linked to institutions, as the former helps to identify institutionalised discourse, and the latter explains institutionalization of discourse. However, to consider the possibility of going with these approaches, there would be a need to find a common basis for examining the narratives of actors on both ends of the transfer, ensure that this basis can offer explanation for the manifestation of the identified transfer mechanisms, and that the approach is tenable to the two cases. The use of NPA will likely pose the challenge of highlighting the relations among policy actors in addition to focusing on the core aspects of the policy area. Also, the challenge with analysing the two cases on the basis of institutions would be the difficulty of linking what obtains in the recipient jurisdiction to that of the source, as the social and political contexts of the two sides differ in no small measure. The basis for use of the NPA instead of these other approaches is discussed further in Chapter 3. Despite highlighting the challenges that the use of the alternative approaches may pose, it can be noted that the study could also have benefitted from the possibility of delving into the individual context-specific discourse of the parties playing key roles in the transfer process. This would have allowed broadening the study's focus from primarily the interaction of the actors, to cover internal complexities in the individual parties and how these may have contributed to what is observed in the interaction of the actors. Albeit, with the constraints of duration and resources, the study has focused on the

communication of the transfer actors and applied the NPF as the analytical framework for examining the communication content of the actor based on its of structure of narrative and possibility of providing a common basis for investigating the two cases, through the examination of narrative structure.

1.3 Why Narrative Policy Framework (NPF)?

The NPF is a framework for examining the role of narratives in policymaking, and analysing policy narratives methodically, through the identification of narrative elements (Jones and McBeth, 2010; Jones et al., 2014). It has a broad applicability and it has been used for explaining diverse features of the policy process, such as, policy change (Shanahan et al., 2011a), policy development (Lawton and Rudd, 2014), public opinion (Shanahan et al., 2011b), policy learning (McBeth et al., 2014b), an individual's policy opinions (Shanahan et al., 2014) and policy actor strategies (Crow and Berggren, 2014). This potential, in a way, helps position the framework as a considerable tool for addressing features that are relevant to policy transfer process. The basis for drawing from NPF is partly because it is congruous with the call for policy transfer research to focus on relations among actors involved in policy transfer, and NPF can serve as a means for achieving this, since narratives represent a form of communication and “a seemingly universal device for individuals to sharpen certain elements of reality” (Jones and McBeth, 2010, p. 329).

Applying the NPF to policy transfer research also resonates with the multi-level perspective presented by Evans and Davies (1999), which identifies structure – i.e. from where and to where is policy-relevant knowledge being transported – and emphasises the input of actors in the transfer process. In this regard, using the NPF

to examine narratives of actors will entail identifying the source of the narratives and who the stories are being told to. The content of the narratives can also point to what the transfer object will be and what it will be expected to accomplish in the recipient jurisdiction. In particular, with the use of NPF, many of the key questions that are addressed in policy transfer research can be answered, including who is involved in the transfer, what is transferred, why transfer, and the constraints of transfer. While the analysis of narrative setting can highlight where the actors will focus their efforts within the recipient jurisdiction and point to the transfer object, the analysis of narrative character can show who is taking which role in the transfer process. In addition, the analysis of narrative plot, which portrays a journey that a story takes its audience on, can give an indication of why embark on transfer and the constraints to be encountered in the process.

As mentioned earlier, this research examines the use of policy narratives in the transfer of renewable energy and DRR policies to the ECOWAS region by the IGOs, EU and UNISDR, and the identification and analysis of the narrative setting, characters, plot, and moral, show how the depiction of these elements contributed to shaping the mechanisms observed in both transfers. In order to explain the emphasis on the involvement of the IGOs, the next section discusses the relevance of IGOs as transfer agents.

1.4 International Governmental Organisations (IGOs) and Policy Transfer

Pal (2014, p. 195) notes that “of all the ‘hawkers’ of policy transfer, IGOs are among the most important: they typically have more resources than NGOs, their members are typically governments, they can claim special expertise and prestige, and they

sometimes can carry a big stick in the form of conditionalities attached to aid and loans.” The contributions of international actors that are backed by resources, reach, and access to decision makers, to the proliferation of policy problems and agendas, has been seen to be gaining traction across geographical and social spheres (Levi-Faur and Vigoda-Gadot, 2006; Stone, 2010; Stone and Ladi, 2015). This often involves the identification of a policy problem or idea within a political setting, or by an organisation, or a group, which is then transported to multiple jurisdictions, either in duplicate or modified form. Such policy problem or idea could have been generated from diverse sources, including within an epistemic community, where the idea may have been informed by research or superior knowledge (Dunlop, 2009), or within an international policy arena, such as the UN or OECD, where the idea may have been informed by the deliberations of the conglomeration of member states (Smith, 2004; Turhan et al., 2016). However, notwithstanding the innovator of the policy idea, the incentive for the involvement of international actors in the proliferation of policy ideas could be a range of factors including, solving problems bound on externalities, controlling behaviours, ending a political or economic threat, strengthening alliances, or easing the distress of poor countries (Risse, 2007; Stone, 2003).

This spread of public policy across geographical boundaries can be identified in the two policy transfer instances being examined. In the case of the transfer of renewable energy policy to ECOWAS by the EU, the transfer agent not only focused on the adoption of the policy to ECOWAS, but also directed efforts at ensuring that other regional organisations in South Africa, East Africa, Central Africa, Pacific Islands, and the Caribbean, develop energy policies that are favourable to the use of renewable energy sources (EUEI PDF, 2016a). Also, in the instance of policy transfer of DRR

policy by UNISDR, the policy was not only directed at ECOWAS, but also to Latin America, the Caribbean, Southeast Asia, Central Asia, and Europe (UNISDR, 2016a).

These activities of the EU and the UNISDR can be said to be reminiscent of 'large-scale' proliferation of public policy (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000; Holden, 2016; Stone, 2004). The peculiarity of these two actors as IGOs underpins the breadth of their intended reach and influence, and why it is necessary to study how the actors facilitate policy transfers, particularly to African jurisdictions, where they will likely have the upper hand in relating with the domestic policy actors in the region, as a result of their resources and capabilities.

Having introduced the focus of the thesis and the gaps in the literature that it addresses, the next section discusses the research questions and highlights the research design. Afterwards, the structure of the thesis is presented.

1.5 Research Questions and Research Design

Based on the earlier discussion on NPF, we can see that the framework is aimed at studying "the role of policy narratives in the policy process" (Shanahan et al., 2013, p. 453). Therefore, I will be relating this to policy transfer and will consider the role of policy narratives in policy transfer, and specifically, the role of policy narratives in shaping transfer mechanisms in the two cases of policy transfer to ECOWAS i.e. transfer of renewable energy policy by the EU and transfer of DRR policy by UNISDR.

As such, the aim of this research is:

- To examine how policy narratives influence the manifestation of transfer mechanisms.

With respect to this, the overarching question is posed as:

- What is the role of policy narratives in shaping policy transfer mechanisms?

Addressing this overarching question will entail identifying the transfer mechanisms involved in the transfer cases, the narrative elements in policy narratives used by entities involved in the transfer process, and the influence of policy narratives in the emergence of the transfer mechanisms. Based on this, the research answers three sub-questions outlined below.

- Which transfer mechanisms were drivers of the transfer of renewable energy policy and DRR policy to ECOWAS?
- What are the narrative elements used by transfer agents and recipients involved in the policy transfer instances?
- How did policy narratives inform the transfer mechanisms operational in the policy transfer instances?

To answer the research questions, a qualitative approach is adopted for investigating how the narrative elements used by the actors are associated with the transfer mechanisms. Narrative analysis of 86 documents with the aid of NVivo software, and six elite interviews, are used for data collection and analysis. The use of these methods aided the arguments made in the thesis on the mechanisms that led to the occurrence of the policy transfers i.e. the transfer of renewable energy policy was driven by the mechanisms of conditionality and persuasion, while the transfer of DRR policy was driven by the mechanism of obligation. In addition, the use of the methods also aided the argument that the narrative elements portrayed by the actors did convey messages that can be linked to what the mechanisms entail. The research approach adopted, therefore, enabled answering the research questions.

It is important also to highlight the limitations of the research. Firstly, in the case of DRR policy transfer, it was not possible to identify documents that had been generated directly by ECOWAS, in relations to its activities in developing and adopting DRR policy, as well as engaging with UNISDR. ECOWAS' website did not have links to documents it may have authored prior to when the policy was adopted i.e. before 2006. Also, after speaking with an official of the Disaster Management Unit, it was also confirmed that there are no documented reports of the engagement between ECOWAS and UNISDR for this period (Interview 5). To address this, the study used documents that were authored by ECOWAS states, and had been submitted to and published by UNISDR, to represent the narratives by ECOWAS. In addition, the identification of similarities in the type of narrative elements depicted in the documents, highlight the shared perceptions within the ECOWAS community, on the transfer agent, the transfer object, and the expected involvement of the transfer recipient.

Secondly, as a result of experiencing difficulties in gaining access to and interviewing more officials of the EU, UNISDR, and ECOWAS, the number of elite interviews conducted was limited. However, with the exception of the interview with the official of ECOWAS Disaster Management Unit, all the elite interviews involved key persons who were directly involved in the policy transfers, and they gave first-hand information on what transpired between the transfer agent and recipient. In addition, to investigate how narratives shape transfer mechanisms, it would be more beneficial to use documents that were authored at the time of the transfer process, rather than relying on recent utterances. This is because the responses of the interviewees may be marred by inaccurate recounting of past sentiments and activities. Lastly, this research has focused more on the transfer agent and recipient as the actors involved in a transfer process, and as such, has paid less attention to other actors that played

intermediary roles. Albeit, further research can assess the direct contributions of these other actors and investigate how they contributed to shaping the transfer mechanisms.

In the next section, the structure of the thesis is presented.

1.6 Thesis Structure

This first chapter has introduced the research topic and given the background information that serves as the basis for the research. It highlighted the focus of the research, identified the gaps in the literature that the research is aimed at addressing and indicated what is addressed in the other chapters. Following this, in Chapter 2, a review of the policy transfer literature is presented. The chapter gives an overview of how the concept of policy transfer evolved and the scope of the literature. It particularly argues that the focus on a multidisciplinary and multi-level perspective of policy transfer calls for the application of communication approaches. It also noted that this will enable the observation of various mechanisms and the roles of various actors involved in a transfer process. Chapter 3 introduces the Narrative Policy Framework (NPF), explains the aspect of the framework that will be utilised for analysis of the two cases, and highlights the links that can be observed between narrative elements and transfer mechanisms, based on an elaboration of other cases in the policy transfer literature. Chapter 4 presents the methodology adopted for the research. It explains the basis for the case selection and discusses the process of data collection and analysis, as well as highlight the limitations of the case selection. Chapter 5 gives an introduction on ECOWAS and its position as a regional body for West African countries. It highlights significant events relevant to the organisation and to the two cases examined. Based on the findings of the research, the chapter also discusses the involvement of the transfer agents, EU and UNISDR, and argues for the

observation of the mechanisms of conditionality and persuasion in the case of renewable energy policy transfer by the EU, and the mechanism of obligation in the case of DRR policy transfer by UNISDR. Chapters 6, 7 and 8 present and analyse the findings from the data collected for the research on the use of narrative elements of setting, character, plot, and moral. The chapters also discuss how the respective narrative elements used by the actors can be linked to the transfer mechanisms observed in the two cases. In addition, it considers the disparity or similarity between the two cases. Chapter 9 summarises the discussions in the thesis. It looks again at the research questions and shows how these have been answered. Also, it reiterates the conceptual and empirical contribution of the thesis and the opportunities for furthering the research. In addition, based on the findings of this research, the chapter presents a reflection on policy transfers to the region of sub-Saharan Africa.

The next chapter presents a review of the policy transfer literature.

Chapter 2 – Literature Review: Policy Transfer

Introduction

This literature review presents an analysis of the policy transfer scholarship. It outlines pertinent debates in the literature, presenting different sides of the debate and highlighting the positions that will guide the application of policy transfer for the purpose of this research. Its broad objectives include i) to illustrate the concepts and propositions on which the field has grown, ii) to present the findings of the studies in the field, and iii) to highlight gaps in the literature that need to be addressed. Specifically, the review emphasises the mechanisms of policy transfer by elaborating on different mechanisms of transfer that have been identified in the literature including obligation, conditionality, and persuasion. It also argues for the application of relational approaches, which focus on the role and contributions of actors in policy transfers, as well as the interactions among them. In addition, the chapter does a critical review and coding of 18 parameters² from a selection of research articles that were published after the highly acclaimed policy transfer paper by Dolowitz and Marsh (1996).

The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.1 discusses the emergence of policy transfer as a research area in public policy, it showcases the growth of the policy transfer literature since its re-introduction in 1996, examines what policy transfer portends and also the delimitations of policy transfer research. In addition, it gives a brief description of how the articles used in the literature review were selected. After this, we will look at the definition of policy transfer and some of the drawbacks of policy transfer study based on the tendency to restrict the concept to a process guided by rationality. Then, Section 2.5 points to the identification and analysis of different

² These parameters are listed and described in Appendix 1.

transfer mechanisms as one of the benefits of opening up multiple pathways to policy transfer study. Afterwards, the chapter refers to the incorporation of institutional and relational approaches in policy transfer studies and argues for the relevance of relational approaches based on the possibility of answering the policy transfer research questions and distinguishing policy transfer from its analogous concepts and other research areas of public policy. A summary of the various discussions concludes the literature review.

2.1 Evolution of Policy Transfer Research and Differentiating Policy Transfer from Similar Concepts

Policy transfer was introduced as a distinct research area through the first review and synthesis of literature on the phenomenon of different jurisdictions adopting similar policies, in an acclaimed 1996 journal article by David Dolowitz and David Marsh. Their review encompassed publications that made reference to the term policy transfer, such as Wolman (1992), as well as those that were deemed to have implied it, notably Rose (1993). It is, however, debatable to establish that Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) represent an inaugural paper or the first literature review on policy transfer, since prior to that publication, other scholarly papers had been published, which focused on the phenomenon policy transfer sought to explain.

The first attempt to capture the phenomenon has been credited to the early studies of policy diffusion in the 1960s (Rose, 1991), but the concept has been widely criticised for its narrow focus on process rather than substance, and structure rather than agency (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996; Marsh and Sharman, 2009). Later attempts to explain the observed phenomenon saw the publication of two prominent papers in 1991. One of the papers titled 'What is lesson-drawing?' and authored by Rose (1991),

introduced the concept of lesson-drawing explaining how policymakers in a specific country voluntarily adopt policy features that are similar to those obtainable in other countries. The second paper titled 'What is policy convergence and what causes it?' was authored by Bennett (1991b). It presents the concept of policy convergence, which is focused on identifying changes over time in policy features of political jurisdictions towards increased resemblance among them. The paper also explains what causes the convergence observed and in particular, reviews existing literatures that highlight the phenomenon being addressed by the concept. Commenting on the literature review in Bennett (1991b), Dolowitz and Marsh (1996, p.343) note that their own review:

is both narrower and broader than the major existing review by Bennett. Bennett's approach is broader in that he concentrates upon the general pattern of convergence between the policies adopted by nations. In contrast, our focus is more narrowly upon the transfer of specific policies as a result of strategic decisions taken by actors inside and outside government. At the same time however, our approach is broader, particularly because we consider transfer within nations as well as between nations; acknowledge the significance of actors outside the government machine in the process; and place more emphasis upon how governments, international organizations and transnational companies can push other governments into policy transfer.

Policy convergence can be said to be focused on a temporal approach whereas, policy transfer is focused more on events and actions leading on to the observed phenomenon of similarities in public policy of multiple political jurisdictions. Ascertaining policy convergence is also dependent on diverse measures, which leaves the concept with a "partially inconsistent theoretical literature" (Knill, 2005, p. 764), but occurrence of transfer is hinged on the use of policy-related knowledge from another jurisdiction, as stated in the definition by Dolowitz and Marsh (1996, 2000). Lesson-drawing as presented by Rose (1991), primarily captures domestic activities in a government's endeavour to learn from policies deployed in other jurisdictions, and this

makes it restrictive to instances of policy transfer that are recipient-initiated and led. Policy diffusion on the other hand, even though not limited to internal processes, is more concerned with the rate and direction of movement of policies among locations, which makes it more attuned to statistical representations rather than narrative inclined or content focused. Despite these differences, however, some policy scholars have continued to attempt to establish relationships among them or blend two or more of the different concepts into one.

Evans and Davies (1999) maintain that policy convergence, policy diffusion and lesson-drawing are different forms of policy transfer. This assertion seems to be a far-reaching one, considering that some of the other concepts, particularly policy diffusion and policy convergence, have carved a distinct research area along with methodologies and hypotheses (Marsh and Sharman, 2009). Also, unlike lesson-drawing, policy convergence and diffusion are quite distinguishable from policy transfer, as they present snapshots of similarities among multiple countries, whereas policy transfer delves into the processes and causes that have led to the observed similarity.

Contrary to the likelihood of policy transfer encapsulating all the other analogous concepts, Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) refer to only lesson-drawing as an aspect of policy transfer, specifically, voluntary transfer. Lesson-drawing, as presented by Rose (1991), is limited to incidents of similarities in policies that come about as a result of the action of policy actors within the recipient jurisdiction, and it primarily gives sole attention to the recipient jurisdiction. On the other hand, policy transfer as presented by Dolowitz and Marsh (1996), emphasises not only voluntary actions of recipient political jurisdictions but also, the role of external policy actors in coercively compelling or imposing on the jurisdiction to engage in policy transfer. As such, despite the

difference in the nomenclature of the two concepts, the consideration of lesson-drawing as part of policy transfer seems plausible. This is because lesson-drawing's focus on recipient-led transfers can be said to be duly within the purview of policy transfer's definition of how policy-relevant knowledge in one political setting is used in "developing policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas" (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000, p. 5) in another political setting.

Stone (2004) gives a more suitable depiction of the relationship between policy transfer and some of the other concepts. She notes that policy transfer can serve an explanatory role in understanding policy convergence and policy diffusion. This positions policy transfer as a possible independent variable of policy convergence and policy diffusion, and also negates the notion that these concepts are one and the same. Positioning policy transfer as an independent variable is also in line with Dolowitz and Marsh's (1996, 2000) situation of the concept as an independent variable for explaining policy development and policy change. Stone (2004) also refers to lesson-drawing as a form of policy transfer and based on the possibility of drawing negative lessons while embarking on the process, she further differentiates between policy transfer and policy convergence. She notes that policy transfer will not always lead to policy convergence since negative lessons will likely result in divergence. This explanation goes a long way to not only identify the differences between the concepts, but also specify the relationship that can exist between them, which helps to link, but not merge them.

As mentioned above, lesson-drawing is largely subsumed within policy transfer (Legrand, 2007; Lodge and James, 2003). Also, policy transfer is now seen and approached as a distinct research area, while the 1996 literature review by Dolowitz and Marsh is regarded as an inaugural paper in policy transfer research. The 1996

paper can be said to have led to standardisation of what to investigate in policy transfer research. It achieved this by consolidating research findings over time under seven key questions, which are outlined below.

Policy Transfer Key Research Questions

- What is policy transfer?
- Who transfers policy?
- Why is there policy transfer?
- What is transferred?
- Are there different degrees of transfer?
- From where are lessons drawn?
- What factors constrain policy transfer? (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996, p. 344)

In addition, the 1996 paper led to the development of the policy transfer framework (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000), which presents the classification of transfers based on transfer mechanisms, and has since guided empirical analysis by policy transfer scholars. Based on the above, this literature review sees the 1996 paper by Dolowitz and Marsh as a pivotal publication in positioning policy transfer as a distinct research agenda in public policy and christening the concept.

Dussauge-Laguna (2012a, p.314) contends the notion of referring to Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) as landmark, and as representing the “birth of a new concept”. He reiterates the view that there had been other references to policy transfer prior to the 1996 paper and does not assign any remarkable novelty to the contributions put forward in the paper. The position by Dussauge-Laguna (2012a) had been prompted by the claim made by Benson and Jordan (2011, p.367), in their review of the policy transfer literature where they state that “David Dolowitz and David Marsh (1996, p. 344) coined a new term, to encompass both ‘voluntary’ and ‘coercive’ forms of (*policy transfer*) practice”. They had also set the 1996 paper as the commencement period of their literature review. A more appropriate appellation for the 1996 paper can be

seen in the description by Carroll and Common (2013). They recognise the paper as the foundation of modern policy transfer research and regard their own work as an addition “to the growing corpus of contemporary studies on policy transfer, whose modern lineage can be traced back to Dolowitz and Marsh’s (1996) seminal article” (Carroll and Common, 2013, p.1).

Against this background, in addition to the landmark paper by Dolowitz and Marsh, other studies that will be covered by this literature review comprise “post-1996” (Benson and Jordan, 2012, p. 333) policy transfer publications. The next section highlights the process of selecting the 68 articles used in the literature review and shows how the policy transfer literature has fared post-1996.

2.2 Policy Transfer Literature Review and Evidence of Growth in Policy Transfer Research

To identify the specific literatures to be included in the review, an academic search engine, Google Scholar, and two research databases namely, Web of Science Social Science Citation Index (SSCI) and Scopus were utilised³. Google Scholar was used to get a broad overview of references to policy transfer and after inputting the search term and operative “policy transfer”, and selecting the start year of the search to be 1996, the results from the search were a total of 16,800 articles. A further search was then conducted on the two research databases, SSCI and Scopus, for the term - policy transfer, with the search start year specified as 1996. The search yielded a total of 474 publications for SSCI and 332 for Scopus. A further limitation was done by selecting specific journals that included the words policy, public policy, public administration, politics and governance; and this reduced the results to 52 articles in SSCI and 68 in

³ The internet search was carried out on the 21st of January 2016.

Scopus. Due to the more diverse sources covered in Scopus, the inclusion of articles with high citation as identified from the earlier Google Scholar search, and the feature of journals⁴ with relevant policy transfer articles, Scopus was selected as the preferred research database. The literatures from the Scopus search, which also represent the articles covered in this review, comprise 61 journal articles and seven book chapters from the same book, making 68 publications.

As shown in Table 2.1, of the 68 publications, about 40% had been published over fifteen years post-1996, while 58% were published between 2011 and 2016, over five years. One may say that the distribution of the publications may be dependent on the coverage of the research database and may not have included numerous articles published between 1996 and 2010. However, in 2011, David Benson and Andrew Jordan had suggested that the “heat had gone out of” (Hudson and Kim, 2014, p. 495) policy transfer research based on their findings from Google Scholar, which is presented here in Table 2. They mentioned that there had been a decline between 2005 and 2010, in articles making reference to policy transfer. This led them to question the “analytical value of the concept” and suggest the decline might result in “conceptual decay” (Benson and Jordan, 2011, p. 373). Contrary to their submission, however, policy transfer research experienced a jolt from 2011 as Table 2.1 shows a percentage increase of 167% from the period 2006-2010 to the period 2011 to 2016. The sustained and increased inquisition into policy transfers seems to show the relevance and viability of the concept as a distinct research focus. Revisiting the issue of decline of interest in policy transfer, Benson and Jordan reneged on their earlier concerns and stated:

⁴ One of the significant difference in the results from both databases was the non-inclusion of book chapters on policy transfer, the SSCI search result at the time.

“How wrong we were! ... As a research topic, policy transfer is very much alive and kicking” (Benson and Jordan, 2012, p. 333).

Table 2.1 – Number of articles shown in Scopus and % increase between 1996 and 2016

Year	Number of articles	% Increase between periods
1996-2000	6	
2001-2005	7	17%
2006-2010	15	114%
2011-2016	40	167%
Total	68	

Table 2.2 - Number of articles shown in Google Scholar and % increase between 1996 and 2010

Year	Number of articles	% Increase between periods
1996-2000	20	
2001-2005	35	75%
2005 -2010	20	-33%

Source: Benson and Jordan (2011)

Table 2.3 - Number of articles in strands of policy transfer literature

Strand	Number of articles	% of total
Conceptualisation	11	16%
Conceptualisation and application	16	25%
Application only	41	59%
Total	68	

The sustained interest has also been observed and highlighted by other policy transfer scholars. Notably, Dolowitz and Marsh commented on the number of citations generated by their work and extent of application of the policy transfer framework. In their own words, they remark that:

our two articles have over 2,000 citations between them and many authors have used our framework in their empirical research ... (policy transfer) has been, and should be, developed/improved by those who use it (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2012, p. 339).

With reference to their recommendation for continued improvement to the concept, we can say that many policy transfer scholars have heeded this counsel. With reference to Table 2.3, this literature review identified three dominant strands of article direction. The first being further conceptualisation of policy transfer, the second, empirical application of the concept, and thirdly, articles incorporating the two strands i.e. conceptualising and application of the concept. Most of the articles in the first strand often involved the introduction of another framework or concept to explain certain aspects of policy transfer process and this approach can be said to have given policy transfer its multidisciplinary identity. Examples of this approach include drawing from epistemic communities to identify sources of knowledge of transfer object (Dunlop, 2009; Stone, 2004); information theory and public relations theory to explain role of transfer agents and relationship between them (Park et al., 2014; Wolman and Page, 2002), Europeanisation and accession to clarify why transfer occurs (Carroll, 2014; Ladi, 2011; Martinsen and Wessel, 2014) and institutionalism to explain policy transfer challenges (Greener, 2002; Jordan et al., 2003; Lodge, 2003; Common, 2013). Articles in the second strand solely rely on the policy transfer framework to address empirical research without drawing from other theories or concepts and such studies include Padgett (2003), Smith (2004), Savi and Randma-Liiv (2013), Tambulasi (2013), Blum (2014) and Zhang and Marsh (2015). The first and second of these three identified strands have also been noted in Benson and Jordan (2011) and the observation of nearly the same result five years after their work, tends to emphasise that the trend of

having further conceptualisation of the framework alongside its empirical application, still continues in the policy transfer literature.

In addition to the use of the selected articles for this chapter's examination of the policy transfer literature, the latter sections of the review also consider recent contributions to the literature. Having earlier presented an overview of the history of policy transfer research and of the literature landscape, the next section goes into more detail to explain policy transfer based on definitions developed in order to specify its delimitations and highlight what the concept portends.

2.3 Definitions of Policy Transfer and Delimitation of Policy Transfer Process

2.3.1 Definition by Dolowitz and Marsh

The pioneer definition of policy transfer was put forward in Dolowitz and Marsh (1996).

It states that policy transfer is:

a process in which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions etc. in one time and/or place is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements and institutions in another time and/or place.

The definition was, however, modified in a 2000 article, which served as an update to the literature review published in 1996. The revised definition states that policy transfer is:

the process by which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in one political setting (past or present) is used in development of policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in another political setting (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000, p.5)

This definition is the most cited definition of policy transfer and it is often featured in policy transfer articles (Benson and Jordan, 2011; Dussauge-Laguna, 2012b; Marsh


and Evans, 2012). As against the 1996 definition, the definition is modified to express where policy transfer occurs i.e. in political settings, and the presentation of specific policy features that can be transferred, i.e. transfer objects. The definition, however, seems to preclude the involvement of agents engaged in the transfer process. It answers the question of what is transferred, where is transfer taking place from and to where, but, it does not address any question relating to 'who' or 'whom'. This may be said to be answered by the phrase 'process by which', stated at the start of the definition. However, providing for no participating actors can leave room to assume policy actors in the recipient political setting can stumble on knowledge of the transfer object, and do not necessarily interact with policy actors in the source political setting. Again, the primary activity identified is the use of knowledge of transfer objects, and this focus makes it seem as though the initiation and realisation of policy transfer is mainly driven by the recipient political settings.

2.3.2 Definition by Evans and Davies

To address the challenge of focusing on the recipient side of a policy transfer process, Evans and Davies (1999, p.383) refer to policy transfer as “an action-oriented intentional activity that takes place within a multi-organisational setting”. Their definition highlights the involvement of multiple organisations and eliminates the ambiguity of where the knowledge of transfer object can be sourced, as considering the definition in Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) can imply little or no need for examining other policy actors aside those in the recipient political jurisdiction. Also, in order to further elaborate on the involvement of multiple organisations, the authors introduced a multi-level structure approach to policy transfer research, shown in Figure 2.1, which

showcases not only the recipient political settings but the organisation that might be at the source end of the transfer process.

Figure 2.1: Policy Transfer Pathways



Source: (Evans and Davies, 1999, p. 368)

2.3.3 Delimitation of Policy Transfer

Another contribution from the definition by Evans and Davies (1999) is the specification of intentionality of the transfer agent. In line with this perspective, Evans (2009, p.244) refers to policy transfer as an “action-oriented intentional learning ... which takes place consciously and results in policy action”. The inclusion of and emphasis on intentionality was aimed at addressing some of the criticism of policy transfer framework in casting doubts on its additionality to public policy research. In commenting on the use of lesson-drawing and policy transfer as conceptual frameworks, Lodge and James (2003) questioned if the frameworks bring anything new to what is known about policymaking. To them, being aware of and making use of knowledge of policy features from a different political setting can easily be identified as part of decision-making in the policy process. In particular, they remark that lesson-

drawing, as presented by Rose (1991), can be easily equated with rational decision-making, and infer that policy transfer cannot be easily ascribed a space to occupy in policymaking based on its unclear process and consequences. They also surmise that policy scholars “may be better off selecting from a range of alternative approaches than limiting themselves to these conceptual frameworks” (Lodge and James, 2003). Their criticism of the policy transfer framework, in a way, highlights the ambiguity associated with the initial definition put forward for policy transfer. With the consideration of intentionality, however, alongside conscious involvement of all sides involved in the transfer process, there is an implication of a relational process ensuing between the user of the knowledge of transfer objects and other policy actor(s) within whom the knowledge is embodied.

Evans and Davies (1999) and Evans (2009) clearly distinguish policy transfer from rational decision-making, since the transfer agent at the onset of the transfer process, sets out to use knowledge that is sourced externally or to introduce knowledge of transfer object to an external political jurisdiction. Rational decision-making, however, gives limited focus to the bearer of the knowledge of alternatives and little or no consideration to the interaction that may be experienced in the process of applying knowledge of policy features. With respect to situating policy transfer in the field of public policy, the acknowledgement of multiple actors aside from the policy transfer recipient, their conscious intent and involvement in the transfer process has made it possible to link the framework to policy change (Cairney, 2009; Common, 2013; Greener, 2002; Jordan et al., 2003; Ladi, 2011; Lodge, 2003), policy development (Bray et al., 2011; Carroll, 2012; Goldfinch, 2006) and agenda setting (Evans, 2009b; Stone, 2010). Although there is yet to be a revised definition incorporating the views of Evans and Davies (1999) and Evans (2009) into the pioneer definition, most policy

transfer articles work with the pioneer definition but take cognisance of the relevance of attending to intentional and conscious transfer instances. Table 2.4 shows the level of alignment with this recommendation and one can say that this direction has helped the policy transfer framework bring to fore different dimensions of relations among cross-national, international political jurisdictions and policy actors, in policymaking. It seems imperative, however, that policy transfer definition by Dolowitz and Marsh (1996, 2000) be revised and this feat might be achieved by putting forward a putative definition in a journal or book collection dedicated to policy transfer, which will be backed through inclusion of articles that reflect the contextual and empirical implications of the revised definition.

Table 2.4 - Number of articles with instances of intentional policy transfer

	Number of Articles	% of total
Articles with only instances of intentional transfer	51	75%
Articles with only instances of unintentional transfer	0	0%
Articles with instances of intentional and unintentional policy transfer	5	7%
Not applicable (Articles with no case studies)	12	17%
Total	68	100%

Based on the reference to rational decision-making and the contention in the literature on the difference between rational decision-making and policy transfer, the next section explores how some policy transfer research embed rationality as a characteristic of the transfer process, and how others distance policy transfer from rationality. In particular, the section argues that emphasis on rationality in early policy

transfer research contributed to limiting the scope of policy transfer research to voluntary and recipient-led transfer instances, and hindered the possibility of exploring multiple transfer mechanisms that could manifest in diverse instances of policy transfers.

2.4 Policy Transfer and Rational Decision-Making

The opening sentence in Dolowitz and Marsh (1996, p.343) reads, “(a)s Rose argues, policy transfer or lesson-drawing is common”. The statement seemed to lend itself to the reasoning that lesson-drawing can be juxtaposed with policy transfer, and with the close link between lesson-drawing and rational decision-making, as observed by James and Lodge (2003), many of the successive policy transfer research papers were hinged on the assumption of rationality on the part of the transfer agent. Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) drew heavily from Rose (1991)’s “What is lesson-drawing” article and noted that they “did not think the difference in nomenclature (*was*) overly significant” (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996, p. 344). However, as the paper elaborates further on what policy transfer entails, the authors clarify that lesson-drawing applies more to the voluntary form of policy transfer and specify that they “do not use the terms policy transfer and lesson-drawing interchangeably” (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996, p. 344). Despite this later assertion, however, the reliance on postulates from lesson-drawing, in a way (unintentionally) made policy transfer study to be aligned with and sometimes undistinguishable from lesson-drawing and rational decision-making. In addition, it prompted the assumption of rationality and prescription of perfect or bounded rationality as an underlying guide by which transfer agents engage in policy transfers (Evans, 2004; Hudson and Kim, 2014), leaving little or no attention to other possibilities such as ‘policy windows’ or ‘pure interest’ (Cairney, 2009, p. 472). This

assumption of rationality is often portrayed with the focus on recipient-led transfers, and was prevalent in the early days of policy transfer research (Dolowitz, 1997; Legrand, 2012b; Mossberger and Wolman, 2003).

2.4.1 Policy Transfer Studies Centred on Rationality

Following this line of thought of rationality in policy transfer, Mossberger and Wolman (2003, p.428) propose that policy transfer should be seen as a “form of prospective policy evaluation” and identified key stages that will occur during the transfer process, including awareness, assessment and, application. Again, just like Dolowitz and Marsh (1996), they draw heavily from Rose (1991) and affirm that the terminology of their proposition was “a term coined by Richard Rose” (Mossberger and Wolman, 2003, p. 428). Being cognisant of the limitation of attaining perfect rationality, and perhaps, in trying to prevent equating policy transfer with rational policymaking, they base their proposition on bounded rationality and avoid inclusion of a search process that may lead to generating alternatives, as the first step in policy transfer. Instead, they note that transfer agents only need to have awareness of the transfer object and prescribed gathering information from multiple sources, except if the transfer object only exists in a lone political setting. This process of information gathering is then expected to lead to an assessment that considers the difference in political settings of the recipient and that of the lending jurisdictions; the problems and goals that the intended transfer object was aimed at addressing and; the performance of the transfer object. It is interesting that upon review of policy transfer studies, Mossberger and Wolman (2003) find that many of the instances of policy transfer did not play out the template they were propounding. Of the three stages, assessment seemed the most lacking, as they

observed that most transfers had occurred without consideration of the concerns highlighted above. It was noted that this shortcoming may have been caused by factors such as non-readiness or availability of relevant information from the jurisdiction where knowledge is being sought and, transfer of policy ideas prior to policy implementation in source jurisdiction. Perhaps, these shortcomings represent the prevalent reality in policy transfer. Therefore, rather than broadly specifying a rationality or bounded rationality approach to policy transfer (an approach that seems to obscure (Lodge and James, 2003) disparity in varying forms of policy transfer mechanisms), it may be better to attend to rationality as an issue to observe, but not prescribe, since such prescriptions might best be left in the domain of decision-making.

Legrand (2012, p.333) also maintains that “rationality and bounded rationality play a key role in the model of voluntary policy transfer” and refers to the search process in evidence-based policy-making (EBPM), guided by rationality or bounded rationality, as an important impetus of policy transfer. Citing his own words, he states:

My central assertion is straightforward: I suggest that policy transfer is fundamentally driven by the search for evidence of what works, therefore the pronounced resonance of EBPM in contemporary public administration facilitates the possibility and scope of policy transfer.

His position may be said to be the flipside to that of Mossberger and Wolman (2003). The latter position policy transfer as a process that can be embarked on through rational decision-making, while the former posits that policy transfer can be a by-product of rational decision-making. Legrand’s (2012) position seems the more plausible one, particularly with respect to clarifying the link between policy transfer and rational decision-making. In addition, it also situates rationality as a feature to be observed, rather than being the prescriptive model for policy transfer. On the other

hand, however, Legrand's position also in a way, obscures the entirety of policy transfer, as the occurrence of policy transfer resulting from EBPM, will more likely than not, feature only in the voluntary form of policy transfer. The case studies presented in both Mossberger and Wolman (2003) and Legrand (2012), mostly of voluntary, recipient-led transfers from the United States of America (USA) to the United Kingdom (UK), also go to show the restrictive coverage a rationality approach might unintentionally impel on policy transfer research.

Commenting on the prevalent practice in policy transfer study, Marsh and Sharman (2009, p.271) point out that "[I]n most transfer literature, learning implies a 'rational' decision by governments to emulate foreign institutions and practice to the extent that these measures produce more efficient and effective policy outcomes than the alternatives". Focusing on rationality and in effect, limiting attention to recipient-led policy transfer instances, in the early days of policy transfer research, could have been as a result of scholars being cautious of the potential for empirical incidences showcasing events that are otherwise. However, three major circumstances present munificent opportunities for policy transfer studies that go beyond the limitation of rationality and recipient-led transfer instances. These circumstances are: i) emerging economies, particularly those in South East Asia and South America, seeking to achieve similar economic and social development results with those of their western counterparts and the desire to borrow transfer objects without little or no concern for rationality (Clifton and Díaz-Fuentes, 2014; Goldfinch, 2006; Nakano, 2004; Sharman, 2010; Zhang and Marsh, 2016); ii) the increasing influence of transnational actors in policy development in developing countries (Legrand, 2012a; Stone, 2000a, 2004, 2010) and; iii) accession of central and eastern European countries to the European

Union (Attard and Enoch, 2011; Ladi, 2011; Martinsen and Wessel, 2014; O'Dolan and Rye, 2012).

In a notable criticism of the concept of policy transfer, Peck and Theodore (2015) maintain that the basis for the policy transfer research agenda is the assumed rationality of the actors involved. They also questioned the assumption of linear and intact transfer of policies across jurisdictions and suggest that the concept of policy mobility is a more suitable substitute for policy transfer. To the authors, what is essential in the studying the phenomenon of various jurisdictions having similar policies is following the movement of what is transferred and how they morph as they are transmitted and translated in different spaces and persons that they inhabit at different times. Based on this, they propose that the relevant research approach for studying this phenomenon should take account of the social and political complexities involved in the mobility of policies. Specifically, they recommend a social constructivist approach in a bid to take account of social and political complexities. The notion of giving attention to the social and political complexities of the phenomenon of uptake of similar policies in multiple jurisdictions is not without its merits, since policy actors do not act in a vacuum, and outside of their analytical minds are environmental factors such as social practices, that underlie their understanding of what should be or should not be. However, advocating for the uptake of policy mobility as against policy transfer is beyond the needed criticism for what the policy transfer proposes and espouses. Even if this was to be, the term policy mobility is unlikely to serve as an adequate alternative, as the focus of this area constitute an aspect of the specified phenomenon, and not its entirety. Also, the criticism of rationality holds policy transfer research to its past trends, as the research area has now broadened to accommodate transfer instances that are not underpinned by lesson-drawing (Evans, 2004; Park et al., 2013).

Nonetheless, there are beginning to emerge transdisciplinary conversations and collaborations across the fields of policy transfer and policy mobility (Hadjiisky et al., 2017). Also, comments by one of the proponent of modern policy transfer studies i.e. David Dolowitz, on the widely-acclaimed book by Peck and Theodore (2015), *Fast Policy*, favours the relevance of considering social and political complexities in the movement of policies across varying jurisdictions (Dolowitz, 2017).

2.4.2 Expansion of Policy Transfer Studies beyond Rational Decision-Making

Identifying the problem of assuming rationality on the part of transfer agents, some of the later contributions to policy transfer literature sought to distinguish policy transfer from rational decision-making. In 2000, Dolowitz and Marsh introduced the policy transfer continuum, which is presented in Figure 2.2. The continuum identified rationality and bounded rationality as an occurrence that may be observed in transfers that are based on lesson-drawing, and gave allowance for occurrence of other types of policy transfer not associated with rationality. This distinction was also emphasised in the first chapter of a 2004 book aimed at showcasing diverse forms of policy transfer based on Mark Evan's multi-level perspective. The chapter, titled "Is policy transfer rational policy-making?" maintains that rationality can be observed in voluntary transfer, but most likely not in other forms of policy transfer. In particular, it went further to associate transfers driven by rationality with developed countries and the other forms of transfer with "developing countries, transition societies" and countries that are "emerging from conflict" Evans (2004, p.3).

With reference to the earlier argument, it is opined that reference to rationality do not necessarily need to be a requirement for identifying a transfer instance, even voluntary recipient-led transfers. Some policy transfer scholars have also criticised the

Source: Dolowitz and Marsh (2000, p.13)

Some case studies of voluntary recipient-led policy transfer also highlight the non-consideration of rationality by transfer agents. Cairney (2009) in a study on instituting smoking bans in countries of the United Kingdom, comprising England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. He finds that the transfer of tobacco control policy to the different countries were not founded on rationality, but on the emergence of “an idea whose time has come” and opening of “windows of opportunity” (Cairney, 2009, p. 471). Drawing from the multiple streams approach developed by Kingdon (1995), which presents distinct streams featuring in decision-making, Cairney (2009) identified four windows of opportunity that led to transfer of tobacco control policy to the four countries. These are i) limited familiarity with policy area, ii) contributions of political parties and the legislature, iii) contribution of pressure groups and, iv) opinion of the public and media. Although Cairney’s contribution goes a long way to depict instance of policy transfer not focused on rationality, the application of the multiple streams approach however, may benefit other policy transfer studies if the streams leading to the windows of opportunity had been identified. This would have made room for explaining the intersection of these different streams and how it evolved into the window of opportunity that led to the policy transfer. Perhaps, some of the factors captioned as windows of opportunity in Cairney (2009) may have instead represented the streams. For example, the problem stream could be applied to policy transfer to imply the problem underlining the need for policy transfer and as such, this can be represented by the first window of opportunity i.e. limited familiarity with policy area. Also, the politics stream could have aptly been the second window of opportunity i.e. contributions of political parties and the legislature.

Another policy transfer case study that highlights the possibility of policy transfer not being guided by rationality, can be seen in the case of adoption of reform and open door policy in China (Zhang and Marsh, 2016). The findings from the study seems to reflect that of Cairney (2009) as a politics stream, which is the strong influence of the ruling political party; a problem streams, which is the need to end isolation and join the open world, and a policy stream, which is New Public Management (NPM), can be identified. The intersection of these streams can be said to have been operative in facilitating policy transfer. This observation supports the argument being made that not all policy transfer instances conform to rational decision-making. Zhang and Marsh (2015, p.1) also specifically note that "... the reforms under study have not been characterised by rational policy design underpinned by evidence-based policy-making". In addition, shifting away from the assumption of rationality also helped in the case study's capture of an instance of policy transfer that is voluntary, but characterised by both multiple transfer mechanisms, namely, lesson-drawing and conditionality. This mechanism of conditionality was observed based on China's engagement in policy transfer in a bid to meet conditions for its membership of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The case study, also in a way highlights the benefit of not narrowing the underlying assumptions of policy transfer to rationality.

Moving away from an instinctive assumption of rationality can be said to have contributed to the expansion of the policy transfer literature and its maturing process. This is because insisting on rationality would likely have projected policy transfer as a mechanical, calculated and perhaps, error-proof process. It also might have implied the transfer process as a literal process of seeking and receiving (Stone, 2012). Albeit, with the new wave of policy transfer literature, the avenue to investigate other pertinent issues including coercive transfers and diverse transfer mechanisms, has been

explored. According to Hudson and Kim (2014), this new wave is acclaimed to have evolved through the introduction of the multi-level perspective, shown in Figure 2.1, to policy transfer study and it has helped to reemphasise agency and allow focusing on the relationships between actors involved in policy transfer, activities of transfer agents and, factors that influence their contributions. In addition to the multi-level perspective, the new wave can also be linked to the development of the policy transfer framework (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000), which elaborately highlights the different mechanisms and degrees of policy transfer that can materialise, alongside the distinct transfer agents, jurisdictions and transfer objects that will feature in the different modes of policy transfer.

The next section elaborates on the contribution of the multi-level perspective to policy transfer analysis, particularly in directing attention to the multiplicity of transfer agents and transfer mechanisms. It also highlights the acknowledgement of a multi-level perspective in Dolowitz and Marsh's policy transfer framework and discusses in detail the different policy transfer mechanisms identified in the framework.

2.5 Beyond Rationality: Multiplicity of Policy Transfer Agents and Transfer Mechanisms

Building on the notion of policy transfer occurring without necessarily being informed by rationality, there has been further conceptualisation of policy transfer based on the multi-level perspective and most of the approaches developed seek to address one or two of the key research questions presented in Dolowitz and Marsh (1996). This new wave of policy transfer literature has also helped in addressing certain pertinent concerns raised by some critics of the policy transfer framework, which are that of relevance and additionality (Lodge and James, 2003; McCann and Ward, 2012;

McCann and Ward, 2013). It also seems as though the use of the multi-level perspective has been based on acknowledging the admonition by James and Lodge (2003, p.190) for policy transfer research to focus “on certain elements of the ‘policy transfer’ concept”.

Although James and Lodge (2003) specifically recommended themes that a new wave of policy transfer research can focus on, these were based on the view of policy transfer from the perspective of voluntary recipient-led transfers. However, with policy transfer scholars presenting case studies covering developing countries and countries-in-transition, terms such as coercive transfer are no longer being solely interpreted from the perspective of an internally-led process, to represent pressure from political parties or the public (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996; Lodge and James, 2003). Instead, they are now used in expounding occurrence of externally-driven transfer process. In addition, with regards to another recommendation, which calls for possibly attending to “concrete practice or policy instrument” (James, 2001, p. 242) rather than knowledge and ideas, ignores the multifaceted attributes of policy transfer and multiplicity of types of actors that can be involved in a transfer process. For example, policy transfers initiated by international organisations will likely not involve transfer of policies or policy instruments, a policy transfer category now referred to as hard transfer (Evans and Davies, 1999; Stone, 2000a), but transfer of knowledge and ideas, a category referred to as soft policy transfer (Evans and Davies 1999; Stone 2000b). Also, concrete practices or policy instruments as transfer objects can promote the notion of possible comparison of alternatives, since the transfer object will be in a form that is obtainable in more than one country. Aligning with this recommendation will likely have led to policy transfer research focusing on states; deciding on the choice of transfer source and object; and lesson-drawing.

The application of multi-level perspective without the notion of policy transfer being limited to domestically-initiated instances, however, enables the consideration of the involvement of multiple actors in a transfer process and the investigation of the interaction between them. In addition, considering the influence one actor may have over the other opens up the opportunity to examine how the influence is utilised in ensuring that policy transfer takes place. Importantly, these considerations have enabled policy transfer to serve as not only an independent variable but also as a dependent variable, in research. The ability to situate policy transfer as a dependent variable, allows for questions such as how was policy transfer facilitated?, and the factors that can inform the process or outcome of the transfer process, to be examined. Particularly, it has allowed the exploration instances of policy transfer that may be termed as uninformed transfer, whereby the recipient does not have sufficient information about the transfer object; or incomplete transfer, whereby a vital aspect of the model of the transfer object is omitted; or inappropriate transfer, whereby there's a mismatch between the purpose and function of the transfer object (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000).

Drawing from these possibilities, Dolowitz and Marsh (2000), in a sequel to their 1996 policy transfer landmark article, presented the policy transfer framework, outlined in Table 1.1. The framework showcases the diversity of transfer mechanisms, transfer agents, transfer sources, and degrees of transfer that can characterise instances of policy transfer. More importantly, it consolidates the reach of policy transfer beyond voluntary lesson-drawing, and in view of the relationship between transfer sources and intended recipients, identifies other transfer mechanisms, which are grouped as coercive, mixtures, and coercive mechanisms. With reference to Table 1.1, while coercive transfer comprise only transfer by imposition, the mixture group comprise

lesson-drawing (bounded rationality), international pressures, externalities, conditionality and obligations. After the presentation of the framework, continued contributions to the literature led to the identification of persuasion as an additional mechanism, based on the extensive works of Diane Stone (1999, 2000a, 2000b, 2003, 2004, 2010) on transnational actors in policy transfers.

With regards to the policy transfer literature, transfer mechanisms are identified as underlying factors that drive the transfer process and explain why policy actors within and/or without a particular political jurisdiction engage in policy transfer (Benson and Jordan, 2011; Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000; Marsden and Stead, 2011; Nutley et al., 2012). They are also sometimes used to summarily describe a transfer process. For example, a reference to obligated transfer would imply a transfer process driven by the mechanism of obligation (Bugdahn, 2007; Bulmer and Padgett, 2005). All the different mechanisms are often widely classified into two groups, voluntary and coercive, with the mechanisms identified under mixtures in Dolowitz and Marsh (2000), included in the coercive category (Benson and Jordan, 2011; Bulmer and Padgett, 2005; Park et al., 2014; Sharman, 2010). Also, many policy transfer scholars refer to learning as a policy transfer mechanism, rather than use the term lesson-drawing (Evans and Davies, 1999; Marsh and Sharman, 2009; Zhang and Marsh, 2016). This change in appellation seems to be directed at addressing the criticism on subsuming lesson-drawing, and also, at differentiating the concept from which their studies are being drawn from. In line with this, this study will also refer to the transfer mechanism of lesson-drawing identified in the policy transfer framework, as learning.

Figure 2.3 highlights the degree to which each of the transfer mechanism has been identified in policy transfer case studies presented in the articles selected for the literature review. It shows that learning accounts for the largest share of transfer

mechanisms covered in the case studies, while imposition has the least coverage. Obligation also has a limited level of coverage of about a quarter of that of learning, while conditionality and persuasion also share between them, about a quarter of the value for learning. This reiterates the focus on domestically-initiated voluntary transfers driven by the mechanism of learning and limited coverage of coercive transfers. It also highlights the need for policy transfer study to cover case studies that will likely feature other transfer mechanisms, to enable a better understanding of the diverse mechanisms, and how they are employed by transfer agents. In addition, the coverage of coercive transfer mechanisms can also go a long way in distinguishing policy transfer from rational decision-making.




Figure 2.3: Rate of Identification of Different Mechanisms in Policy Transfer Studies

The next section discusses each of these different policy transfer mechanisms in detail, and also provides examples of policy transfer instances where these mechanisms have been observed.

2.5.1 Policy Transfer by Learning

As earlier noted, many post-1996 policy transfer research implicitly assume that the main factor driving policy transfer is learning. Interestingly, the focus on a sole transfer mechanism persisted in many articles despite the continuum showing the diversity of mechanisms, and this can be said to have contributed to the 64% level of coverage for the mechanism of learning among the articles selected for the literature review.

Based on studies on policy transfer by learning, what drives the intention to draw policy lessons usually include dissatisfaction and seeking legitimacy for policy ideas (Benson and Jordan, 2011; Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996; Dolowitz, 1997). According to the literature, policy transfer through learning can be prompted by elected officials. An example of this is the case of the UK, whereby New Labour, upon their ascent to power in 1997 had charged policymakers to search for what works (Evans, 2009a; Legrand, 2012b), and this charge had informed the transfer of American welfare policies to the UK under the banner of the New Deal (Legrand, 2012b). It can also be prompted by commercial interests, as seen in the case of transfer of urban revitalization policy across multiple countries through the efforts of business associations and individual business owners (Hoyt 2006; 2008).

Embarking on policy transfer via the mechanism of learning can involve contact with and/or active engagement of the transfer source, and it can also be limited to desk studies and 'window shopping' trips. Nakano (2004) presents the case of transfer of agencification model from the UK to Japan and he notes that Japanese embassy officials in the UK had prepared detailed reports of the practice of agencification in the UK at the time it was unfolding in the late 1980s, and government officials back in Japan drew lessons from the reports. By 2011, Japan had adopted agencification in managing its civil service and between the time the model was deployed in the UK

and adopted in Japan, there is no record of contacts or visits between officials from both countries, for the purpose of aiding Japan's design and implementation of its agencification model. In contrast to this scenario, the transfer of employment policies to the UK in the 1980s was characterised by diverse forms of contact with transfer sources. According to Dolowitz (1997), the UK government sought to transfer employment policy from the US and efforts aimed at drawing lessons from the transfer source involved organising a conference to facilitate direct contact between British policymakers and experts from the source jurisdiction. In addition, British officials also "consulted with American academics and officials" and made numerous visits to the USA (Dolowitz, 1997, p. 31).

The examples of policy transfer case studies highlighted above show the coverage of diverse transfer actors involved in voluntary policy transfer by learning, and even though state actors are often the transfer agents, there is also reference to other transfer actors such as businesses. The focus on diverse transfer agents also emphasises the benefit of the multi-level perspective and Dolowitz and Marsh's framework, which designates policy transfer as a distinct research area different from decision-making.

2.5.2 Policy Transfer by Persuasion

Following the introduction of non-governmental policy transfers by Stone (2000b), the role of transnational actors as transfer agents have since been duly recognized in policy transfer literature. According to Stone, this group of transfer actors have limited ability to compel states or other jurisdictions to adopt a particular policy. As a result, the group often relies on its proximity, access to governments and credibility, to persuade them to engage in policy transfer.

Stone (2000b) discusses the involvement of think tanks in transferring privatisation policies. The paper notes that the promotion of privatisation ideas in the UK can be traced back to the 1970s, and in particular, to activities of think tanks including the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) and Centre for Policy Studies (CPS). These organisations had developed proposals detailing an implementation plan for liberalising certain publicly-funded and managed organisations, and were able to influence government to launch and follow through a privatisation program. To show that the transfer source in the case had been think tanks rather than another political jurisdiction, the paper refers to the appointment of a member of the think tank, based on his contribution to discussions and documents, as the head of the Policy Unit and charged with developing the official privatisation program. This case highlights not only multiplicity of transfer agents and mechanisms, but also multiplicity of transfer sources and objects. It will be noted that the transfer source in this instance is not a political jurisdiction or government, but non-state actors. Also, the transfer did not follow a “transposition of ‘policies’ and ‘practices’ already in operation in one system” (Lodge and James, 2003), instead the case features the transfer of an idea by the transfer agents. In addition, the case signifies the importance of policy transfer study. With the knowledge that Germany had already embarked on privatisation prior to the wave of privatisation in the UK in the 1970s, one could have swiftly assumed the transfer agent would be the government of Germany. Albeit, with policy transfer’s focus on investigating what transpired in transfer instances, it was possible to identify the involvement of different transfer actors.

In addition to Stone’s contributions in highlighting non-governmental policy transfers and role of transnational actors, there are other studies showing instances of policy transfer by persuasion. However, these studies are far and in between. According to

Figure 2.3, persuasion as a transfer mechanism constitutes 7% of the transfer mechanisms referred to, across all the 68 studies included in this review. In addition, although voluntary transfer makes up 71% of all the transfer mechanisms identified, while 29% coercive transfers are reported, 90% of the voluntary transfers are focused on transfers driven by learning, while persuasion accounts for only 10%.

Despite the limited number of cases, the few instances of policy transfer by persuasion show the variation of transfer agents and variation of transfer objects. In the case of policy transfer of New Public Management (NPM) to Georgia, international consultants and unilateral and multilateral funding organisations such as United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), UK Department for International Development (DFID) and United States Agency for International Development (USAID), were identified as major transfer agents (Common, 2013). Tambulasi (2013) also shows how a supranational organisation, the European Commission (EC), opted for persuasion as a preferred transfer mechanism in transfer of health reforms to Malawi.

Persuasion as a transfer mechanism also seems to have the tendency to prompt the manifestation of assortment of transfer mechanisms. It can precede lesson-drawing instances where the recipient jurisdiction demonstrates willingness and interest in learning from experiences of jurisdiction prior to adopting the transfer object. Acting as transfer agents in policy transfer of NPM to Saudi Arabia, Ford Foundation consultants, with the support of World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), kick-started the transfer process, but, afterwards, the Saudi government embarked on lesson-drawing by considering the experience of other countries such as Kuwait, Malaysia and South Korea (Common, 2013). Persuasion can also precede coercive transfer mechanisms and an example of this was observed in the abovementioned transfer of health reforms to Malawi. Having experienced delay in the persuasive

transfer process and lack of interest to release control of health services by the central government to regional levels, another transfer agent, DFID, opted for conditionality in a bid to ensure the actualisation of the transfer.

Again, identifying multiple mechanisms has enabled the possibility of observing connections between the different mechanisms. Also, the examples of combination or evolution of transfer mechanisms in one transfer instance addresses the concern raised by Marsh and Sharman (2009, p.270) on the need to study the “interactions between them (*transfer mechanisms*) and how they evolve over time”. Having discussed the mechanisms of learning and persuasion, we will consider the mechanism of obligation.

2.5.3 Policy Transfer by Obligation

With increasing conglomeration of states at global and regional levels, many countries commit themselves to addressing pertinent economic, social, political or environmental concerns. In ensuring that assurances given to address these concerns become reality, multilateral bodies often headed by international governmental organisations (IGOs), act as transfer agents and facilitate policy transfers. The transfer agents often have to their advantage, binding or non-binding agreements that had been signed by the intended recipient jurisdiction, and they employ this advantage to compel domestic adoption of solutions agreed at the international level. In addition, sub-national units can also be in a position where they are bound by national legal frameworks to injunctions from the national government. National governments can thus take advantage of the existing legal provisions to facilitate policy transfer.

19% of the case studies considered for the literature review report on instances of policy transfer facilitated by the mechanism of obligation, as shown in Figure 2.3, and many of them refer to IGOs as the transfer agents. Eccleston and Woodward (2013) report on policy transfer of tax transparency initiative by Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to its member states. Based on its findings, the study highlights that in pursuing solutions for international challenges and maintaining their credibility as effective arbiters, IGOs often engage in transfer of policies that do not necessarily represent the best solution for addressing the challenge. Instead, the solutions peddled are sometimes the weak option or 'lowest common denominator' (Eccleston and Woodward, 2013, p. 216), and they referred to this form of policy transfer as pathological. Considering this limitation from another perspective, the dynamic of pathological policy transfer can also lead to increased policy transfer. This is because after signing-off a weak policy, IGOs are often inclined to continue pursuing the ideal solution for the policy problem, and as such, more agreements are reached, which will entail additional policy transfer instances for domestic alignment of the agreements.

The position stated above on policy transfer by obligation prompting more obligated transfers is also supported by Bugdahn (2007), although she links such transfers to additional voluntary transfers. In a study of policy transfer within the EU, she notes that "binding EU policy of ambiguous nature and/or with a limited scope of application creates policy space for additional voluntary transfers in member states" (Bugdahn, 2007, p. 123). The study presents cases of policy transfer of Access to Environmental Information Directive (AIE) to Portugal and Ireland and it finds that in addition to obligated transfer of the Directive from the EU, Portugal engaged in voluntary transfer

by drawing lessons from France, while Ireland also drew lessons from Australia and New Zealand.

With reference to the multi-level perspective and policy transfer framework, Eccleston and Woodward (2013) identified a limitation that may characterise transfer pathways with IGOs at the source end and powered by obligation i.e. adoption of a weak policy option. As mentioned earlier, the feedback from this limitation may be in the form of additional obligated transfer and Bugdahn (2007) notes that the feedback from obligated transfer can be voluntary transfers. These observations go to show that giving attention to the involvement of both the transfer agents and recipients can enable studying different links between multiple transfer mechanisms.

2.5.4 Policy Transfer by Conditionality

Policy transfer can be driven by conditionality when transfer agents prescribe the adoption of certain policies as a condition for rendering support to the intended recipient jurisdiction. In developing countries, adoption of specific policies is often stipulated as a loan conditionality (Stone, 2010), while countries intending to accede to membership of an IGO, such as OECD or International Energy Agency (IEA), can be prescribed adoption of certain policies before they can become members of the IGOs (Carroll, 2014; Clifton and Díaz-Fuentes, 2014).

Particular reference has been made to Bretton Woods institutions, notably, the World Bank and IMF, with respect to instances of policy transfer by conditionality (Marsh and Sharman, 2009; Stone, 2010), however, there is very limited coverage of such instances in the literature. Commenting on the limited coverage of this form of transfer, Marsh and Sharman (2009, p.280) remark that “this neglect reflects the fascination

with the topics of Europeanization and globalization” and they emphasised the need for policy transfer scholars to diversify the coverage of case studies, so as to include studies from “states of Africa, the Middle East and most of Asia”. Studies from these regions will also go a long way to examine the effects of transfer mechanisms on attempted policy transfers, and the observation of possible feedbacks that can inform additional transfers or alteration of the transfer mechanism. For example, it will be interesting to examine if conditional policy transfers do facilitate non-transfers, or can inform the degree of transfer.

Despite the fascination with Europeanization and globalization as opined by Marsh and Sharman (2009), instances of policy transfers marked by conditionality for accession to IGOs, on the other hand are also not widely reported in policy transfer literature, as there are more cases of post-accession transfers (which are mostly driven by obligation), than there are of pre-accession (Carroll, 2014). On policy transfers during pre-accession to IGO membership, Carroll (2014) notes that countries are sometimes provided with requirements to comply with, particularly in cases of accession to the EU and OECD. In the EU, these requirements are compiled as part of the EU’s *acquis communautaire* (Radaelli, 2000), and an example of accession of eight former Soviet states to the EU in 2004, show that the recipient countries embarked on major reforms across its political, constitutional, economic and social spheres, primarily to meet the accession requirements (Carroll, 2014). These radical changes, which border on democratisation, freeing up of trade, and opening of markets, are noted to be necessary in ensuring the recipient jurisdictions do not renege on the adopted policies, upon attaining membership status in the IGOs (Carroll, 2014).

Based on the aforementioned comment by Marsh and Sharman (2009), on the need to extend coverage of policy transfer to African and Asian countries, one can infer that opening up the study of transfer mechanisms can expand the reach and sphere of policy transfer research. This is because the multiplicity of transfer mechanisms and transfer agents can elicit both geographical and economical dimensions to policy transfer study, whereby the possibility of observing certain diverse mechanisms can be associated with countries in particular geographical region or of economic status.

The next section will discuss the mechanism of imposition.

2.5.5 Policy Transfer by Imposition

Policy transfer by imposition is situated at the end of the transfer continuum as shown in Figure 2.2. Imposition will play out in instances of transfer where the recipient jurisdiction's sovereignty is dependent on another jurisdiction for approval of its policies. However, with the modern political structure of independent nation states, "direct imposition of policy transfer on one country by another is rare" (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996, p. 348). Its occurrence in present times may be associated with sub-national units, in instances where a top-down approach is employed in dictating decisions and directions to the sub-national units. Nutley et al. (2012) give the example of transfer of NPM practices, specifically, performance auditing, to Scotland and Wales from the central government based in England. He notes that even though the intent was to achieve improvement of local government services, the approach to achieving this, as perceived by the sub-national⁵ units, was top-down imposition.

⁵ Scotland and Wales are individual countries within the United Kingdom. The term 'sub-national units' is used to depict the two countries as jurisdictions under the United Kingdom, and to allow the term to confer similar meaning across the document.

The unique hierarchical structure characterising the relationship between empire states and their territories in the early 20th century also present a scenario for the occurrence of policy transfer by imposition. In an analysis of policy transfer experience of Australia, Carroll (2012) refers to the imposition of policies on Australia by the United Kingdom, while the former was a colony under the authority of the latter. He points to the example of Maritime sector whereby the imperial English government overturned policy decisions that had been taken by local authorities within the colony. This example highlights a feature of policy transfer by imposition, whereby the transfer agent initiates and holds the reins in the transfer process, with the transfer recipient having limited or no say in debating or declining the intended policy transfer.

In the next section we will consider if, according to a claim by James and Lodge (2003), the identification of multiple transfer mechanisms obscure explanations of the policy process.

2.5.6 Does Multiplicity of Transfer Mechanisms Obscure Explanations of the Policy Process?

James and Lodge (2003, p.184) argue that the policy transfer continuum combines “forms of rationality and degree of coercion” to generate varying kinds of transfer mechanisms, and by doing so, obscures different dimensions for explaining the policy process. As stated earlier, policy transfer was viewed mainly as a process entailing voluntary and domestically initiated activities, and primarily involving domestic policy actors, in its early days, and the concept was criticised by James and Lodge based on this former dominant approach.

In their 1996 landmark paper, Dolowitz and Marsh describe coercive transfer as policy transfer that occurred because of pressure from within the jurisdiction of the transfer recipient, however in the later update in 2000, they sought to make clear the distinction between voluntary and coercive transfers. In doing this, they cited the identification of the role of transnational actors in non-governmental policy transfer and highlighted their influence in limiting the “degree of freedom to choose the version of ... policy best suited to (the recipient’s) situation” (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000, p. 11). Despite their acknowledgement of this group of transfer agents and the likely transfer mechanism that will characterise their involvement in policy transfers, the authors did not exclude internal pressure on policymakers as an explanation of coercive transfer. Instead, it was presented as one aspect of coercive transfer, while external pressure was seen as another aspect.

Based on the above, one may say that the criticism by James and Lodge (2003) is tenable. Albeit, with the further conceptualisation of policy transfer and introduction of the multi-level perspective (Evans and Davies, 1999), intentionality (Evans, 2009b) and focus on externally-driven transfers (Evans, 2004), we can see that the diverse transfer mechanisms do not simply pertain to domestic policy process, but highlight the role of external policy actors on domestic policymaking. Also, by broadening policy transfer research beyond internal processes, one can conclude that multiplicity of transfer mechanism does not obscure domestic policy process of a jurisdiction. Instead, it plays a key role in understanding how transfer occurs and analysing the relations between actors involved in the process.

As though foreseeing the future of policy transfer research, James and Lodge (2003) recommend that policy scholars turn to alternative concepts, particularly institutional approaches. At present, policy scholars do use institutional approaches, but, rather

than substituting these for policy transfer, the institutional approaches are used complementarily as explanatory variables in policy transfer research. In the following section, I argue that although the institutional approach does make ample contribution to policy transfer research, it may not guarantee it research distinction, and an alternative approach, a relational approach, is preferable, as it will go a long way to confer additionality on policy transfer, and enable investigation of its broad aspects, notably transfer mechanisms.

2.6 New Directions in Policy Transfer Research

As mentioned earlier, with the introduction of the multi-level perspective, a new wave of policy transfer literature evolved, and this opened up multiple directions for policy transfer study, and addressing the key policy transfer research questions put forward by Dolowitz and Marsh (1996, 2000). Two major directions can be observed in the new wave of policy transfer literature. The first direction applies institutional approaches, specifically to address the question: what facilitates or constrains policy transfer (Benson and Jordan, 2011)? While the second direction investigates the relational aspect of policy transfer, including how specific group of policy actors interact and engage with other actors in policy transfers, to address almost all of the key questions.

Although the new directions in policy transfer research are not limited to these two approaches, many of the recent conceptual contributions to the literature either aid the observation of pertinent components or arenas of transfer or represent a stance, rather than serve as a specific approach for answering the policy transfer research questions. Notably is the introduction of policy mobilities and its acknowledgement as “one of the most recent contributions to transfer studies” (Hadjiisky et al., 2017, p. 4). This

approach to transfer studies enables the consideration of the evolution of the transfer object and process, from its originating site to its expected abodes, based on the influence of transfer agents, intermediaries and recipients (McCann and Ward, 2013; Peck and Theodore, 2015; Stone, 2012). As such, policy mobilities advances a “socially contextualised analyses” (Peck and Theodore, 2015, p. 4) of policy transfers and the examination of translation and mutation of transfer objects (Erdoğan and Visier, 2017; Stone, 2017; Vigour, 2017). In a way, policy mobility can be associated with a relational approach as the investigation of the “complexity of context that modifies exports of policy” (Stone, 2012, p. 483) often involves observation of social relations by conducting ethnography studies, discourse analyses, or network analyses (Hadjiisky et al., 2017; Peck and Theodore, 2010).

The above-mentioned two major approaches, the use of institutional approach and the investigation of relational aspects in policy transfer, are expatiated in the sections below. I also highlight the comprehensiveness of relational approach to studying the different modes of policy transfer, and restrictiveness of institutional approach to voluntary transfers and the recipient end of the transfer process.

2.6.1 Use of Institutional Approaches in Policy Transfer Research

In answering the questions on constraints on policy transfer, many scholars apply institutional approaches to identify issues that mitigate transfer or shape the transfer process from within the recipient jurisdiction. Lodge (2003) applies the institutional approach to explain how recipient jurisdictions are influenced to make a choice from policy options they can transfer. He highlights three features namely, impact of coercive pressures, organisation of the political-administrative nexus and, access of societal actors, as institutional factors that can inform the choice of policy option that

will be borrowed. The inclusion of coercive pressures as likely institutional factor, seems to distract from the remarkable contribution of the approach presented by Lodge (2003) and its replicability in other policy transfer studies. Referring to the impact of coercive pressures as a factor that can influence choice of policy options, leaves one to assume that the recipient jurisdiction upon whom coercive pressure is being exerted, has at its disposal multiple policy options from which it can choose. Many case studies of coercive transfers, particularly to countries that are not economically buoyant, however, show otherwise. Tambulasi (2013) presents the transfer of health reform policy to Malawi and from his account, there were no multiple options from which the country could choose. The source end of the transfer process seems to be the side endowed with the possibility of making a choice, but with respect to the transfer mechanism. The study shows the EU favouring persuasion and the DFID favouring conditionality. Stone (2004, p.554), commenting on policy transfers initiated by international organisations and targeted at developing countries, argues that compulsion often comes to play “to ensure compliance and convergence” in instances where there are “no shared norms that shape collective behaviour”. She also refers to limited awareness of policy area by local experts in these intended recipient jurisdictions and as such, the possibility of having options of an unfamiliar policy is limited. Carroll (2012, p.659) writes on the mode of policy transfer that occurred in Australia in early 19th century and part of his observation can be seen in the quote below.

A major characteristic of transfer trends in the period up to the middle of the 19th century was the transfer from the imperial, British power to its new colonies ... This was the case because the Australian colonies were regarded as “settled colonies,” where for the most part the laws and customs of the indigenous, “primitive peoples,” were considered inapplicable, with English law prevailing.

These examples go to show that incorporating coercive pressure as an institutional factor may not be relevant to all modes of policy transfer. Excluding the instances of coercive transfer, the other two factors on the other hand i.e. organisation of the political-administrative nexus and, access of societal actors; can be said to be applicable factors for investigating how policy transfer recipients select a choice of transfer object from policy options. Applying the institutional approach as presented by James (2001) can be said to be relevant, as it emphasises the availability of choice of transfer object. Albeit, this element of choice seems to be more appropriately suited to voluntary transfers, and not the whole scope of policy transfer research. Notwithstanding this limitation, other studies have applied a similar approach and they are highlighted below.

Following James' (2001) use of institutional approach to examine the choice of transfer object, Jordan et al. (2003) also employ the institutional approach, but in addition to ideational and garbage can approaches to identify factors that facilitated and constrained the transfer of three new environmental policy instruments, comprising eco-taxes, eco-labels and voluntary agreements on emission reduction, to the EU. They find that path dependency based on EU's character of ensuring competitiveness and drive for harmonization among member states (MS), shaped the transfer process and concluded that:

While we see indications of elements for all three ... approaches in the three cases, the impact of the institutional factors is strongest in affecting instrument choice by the EU (Jordan et al., 2003, p. 572).

Greener (2002) also applies the institutional approach to explain an instance of non-transfer. He identifies path dependency as a constraining factor in preventing the adoption of United States' (US) health policies in NHS reform, thereby limiting the

intended policy transfer to an instance of soft transfer of ideas. He explains that continued relationship between the NHS and UK's medical profession hindered the introduction of US market based health policies. Similar to the application of institutional approach by Greener (2002) to explain instances non-transfer, Common (2013) also draws from historical institutionalism to identify the reasons for non-transfer of NPM to Georgia. He surmises that despite the involvement of numerous international agencies in promoting NPM in Georgia, nothing had changed in the country. He also linked this non-transfer to Georgia's historical experience in the Soviet Union prior to its independence, and its influence on administrative arrangement and policymaking, which had informed the sustenance of a non-devolved public service, unreasonably large workforce and inefficient service delivery. Tambulasi (2013), in his study of the challenges encountered in transfer of health reform policies to Malawi, also notes that there was substantial delay in implementation of the reform as a result of history of centralized governance in the country and this led to central government not being comfortable with giving control to local governments.

With the exception of Tambulasi (2013), all of the studies applying institutional approaches give more consideration to the recipient side of the transfer and voluntary transfers. This observation is also stated in Benson and Jordan (2011), and the authors make reference to the focus on peer-to-peer transfers and states. Without undermining the relevance of the institutional approaches used in these studies, this observation in a way reiterates their limitations, particularly in their applicability to all instances of policy transfer, and the ability to capture the multi-level dimension of policy transfer. These approaches further reiterate the involvement of states, while the contributions of transnational actors are often overlooked. This is seen from the

example of transfer of NPM to Georgia cited above, whereby despite the involvement of numerous transnational actors, little is known of their contribution and their impact on mitigation or facilitation of the transfer process. One can therefore infer that, on their own, these institutional approaches are not sufficient for capturing policy transfer process from the perspective of all or most of the parties involved in the transfer process. In addition, with respect to the issues that are addressed with the approaches i.e. choice of policy option and constraints of policy transfer; the question of concrete additionality of policy transfer might still come to the fore. This is because the consideration of policy options reemphasises rationality and links to rational decision-making. Also, in addressing constraints to policy transfer, many studies make use of these institutional approaches to examine policy implementation (Benson and Jordan, 2011), and this consideration can also be regarded as an aspect to be covered in implementation studies. These approaches can as a result, easily present an overlap of rational decision-making and policy implementation studies, and may not be able to deliver on distinct additionality to public policy research, or enable examination of different dimensions of policy transfer.

Having pinpointed the limitations of applying institutional approaches in policy transfer research, the next section presents another approach used in the literature, the relational approach.

2.6.2 Use of Relational Approaches in Policy Transfer Research

The second dominant direction in the new wave of policy transfer literature is the use of relational approaches. This focus often involves identifying discrete parties involved in both ends of the transfer process that show from where to where knowledge is being

transferred; connection between organisations; communication by actors and; interaction among the actors. Based on the focus of this direction, the relational aspect emphasises externality in policy transfer processes. Taking cognisance of the contributions of external policy actors to policymaking within a particular jurisdiction, gives room for studying the complexities and diversity of activities and contacts involved in the process; and how these can impact on the possibility of incorporating externally sourced knowledge in policymaking, and future contributions of domestic policy actors. In addition, acknowledging externality can ensure that all modes of policy transfer can be examined within the framework, be it voluntary or coercive. It can also ensure the use of consistent and replicable research methodologies, since relevant features for utilising the methodology will more likely than not be present in policy transfer instances to be investigated. Externality, in a way holds the key to unlocking distinct additionality that policy transfer can bring to public policy research. Echoing this position, Evans (2004, p.5) argues:

Policy transfer analysis must become more distinctive from the analysis of normal forms of policymaking if it is not to simply rearticulate other ideas ... the survival of policy transfer as a framework of understanding relies on its ability to be adapted into a multi-level, interdisciplinary perspective which both recognizes the importance of global, international, transnational and domestic structures and their ability to constrain and/or facilitate policy development and allows for the possibility that policy transfer may purely be the product of interpersonal relations in a policy transfer network.

Some examples of studies that have followed this approach include Stone (1999), and she notes that taking into account other levels of involvement beyond states, makes policy transfer to “escape methodological nationalism” (Scholte, 1996 cited in Stone, 1999, p. 54), and enables the identification and examination of multiplicity of actors involved in a transfer process. Relational approach has also enabled the author to extensively expound the role of non-state actors in policy transfer. In Stone (2000a),

she draws from the concept of epistemic communities and highlights the strategies of independent policy institutes. She describes how this set of actors often assume the role of an epistemic community based on their expertise and how their likely insider status with government and elite networking enable them to contribute to the proliferation of policy ideas to different jurisdictions. Walker (2018) also builds on the works of Diane Stone and focuses on the involvement of corporatist practises in policy transfer, and this led to the observation of a two-way movement of ideas and administrative systems between the source and the recipient, which the author referred to as collaborative policy transfer.

Similar to the approach in Stone (2000a), Dunlop (2009) also draws from the concept of epistemic communities to illustrate the role of an external epistemic community in policy transfer and she elaborates on the interaction between domestic decision makers and an epistemic community. Using a case study of policy transfer of use of recombinant bovine somatotropin (rbST) to the EU, the paper addresses the complexity of learning that can take place as a result of interaction between decision makers and an epistemic community, and presents four main learning modes that can be observed based on the interaction. According to the model presented, when the role of an epistemic community is moderate, informal and non-formal learning modes can be observed; when the contributions from the epistemic community is not significant, then a self-directed learning is observed and; when the role of the epistemic community is strong, then a formal learning mode can be observed (Dunlop, 2009).

Stone (2004) draws attention to the involvement of international actors, and activities of some state-sponsored establishments, such as aids-awarding organisations and research institutes, in initiating policy transfer to other countries. The author refers to

the activities of international organisations such as the United Nations, OECD and the EU. These actors belong to the band of IGOs and their recognition in the policy transfer literature has also prompted examination of their intent in engaging in policy transfer, and the dynamics of their operations aimed towards actualizing policy transfer (Carroll, 2014). Stone (2004) notes that the rationale for IGOs to engage in policy transfer is often the need to achieve policy harmonisation and convergence among jurisdictions that are influenced by the IGOs. It also highlights their proclivity to employ the transfer mechanism of conditionality, in impressing transfer objects on the intended recipients.




Figure 2.4: Graph Showing Temporal Increase in Number of Studies Focused on International Organisations as Policy Transfer Actors

Attending to the identification of these sets of transfer agents have indeed led to broadening of the policy transfer literature to showcase activities of diverse international actors, as Figure 2.4 shows an increase over time in the number of studies capturing the role of international actors in policy transfers. In fact, the identification of international organisations has helped to generate sub-topical areas in policy transfer research. One notable branch is the dedicated research area of policy

transfer in the EU. Scholarship in policy transfer in the EU has contributed to further conceptualisation of the framework, and has shown how the use of relational approaches can help in addressing most of the key policy transfer research questions, as against only few of the research questions with the use of institutional approaches.

Beyond identifying how different groups of policy actors engage in policy transfer, the relational approach also allows looking closely into what goes on or what might go on between different parties when involved in policy transfer and the roles that each party plays in the process. Deviating from the norm of ex-post studies of policy transfer instances, Timms (2011) introduces an approach that considers prospective policy transfer. He addresses five of the key questions in policy transfer research namely, “what is transferred?; why do actors engage in policy transfer?; who are the key actors involved in the policy transfer process?; from where are the lessons drawn?; and what restricts or facilitates the policy transfer process?” (Timms, 2011, p. 513). The paper sought to identify the propensity to transfer urban transport policies from the EU to MS, by marrying data from interviews held with state officials on information needs, with that of analysis of policy documents published by the EU. As explained by Timms (2011), this approach ensured that perspectives from both sides of the transfer process i.e. source (which was termed top-down) and recipient (termed bottom-up) were acknowledged and incorporated into the study. The study has also made a distinctive methodological contribution to policy transfer research in fashioning a prospective research that involves data collection from intended recipient through interviews, and data collection from prospective source through analysis of published policy documents.

The unique characteristic of the relational approach, which ensures that different parties involved in the transfer process are not overlooked, has enabled the policy

transfer framework to develop from being only a descriptive concept to an explanatory one. In the early studies of policy transfer, the focus had been identifying and categorising how, why and through whom transfer had occurred, however, with redirected focus on some of the “complexity of the context” (Stone, 2012, p. 487), policy transfer framework has extended to an explanatory mode. This explanatory mode can be seen in attempts to establish links of process and outcome, and causal variables that influence the how, why and through whom transfer had occurred.

This explanatory mode is demonstrated in the study of transfer of social policy (Rodgers, 2014), which considers how social policy has moved over time between nations. Based on the focus of the study, one may have expected an explanation of the progression of adoption of the target policy i.e. social policy. However, with the introduction of how narratives used by actors drove the transfer of social policy, there was a specific example of policy transfer, an emphasis on the perceptions of actors, and how the perceptions culminated in the occurrence of policy transfer. The author cites the example of social policy transfer to the USA from Germany and notes that “German universities opened their doors far wider to American students in the natural and social sciences than did the closed corporations of the elite British university system” (Rodgers, 2014, pp. 308–309). Some of the American students expressed their fascination for a “socialised Germany” and described what obtains back at home as “anarchic, ... torn apart by the unrestrained ambitions of aggressive capital, crippled by the weakness of its public agencies, unable to imagine a politics larger than mere property rights” (Rodgers, 2014, p. 310). With reference to these observations, the author was able to explain that the contrast in the narratives of what Germany had as against what existed in USA, helped facilitate the adoption of social policy in the USA.

In addition to the identification of multiplicity of transfer agents and possibility of addressing most of the key policy transfer research questions, the relational approach also enables identifying different roles that actors involved in policy transfer can play, and the communication types that emerge from their interaction. Wolman and Page (2002, p.477) posit that “policy transfer be conceptualized as occurring through a communications and information framework”, thereby considering what transpires among actors in a policy transfer process, as an important substance in policy transfer analysis. To enable such analysis, they allotted specific roles that actors assume in facilitating and engaging in policy transfer. The roles are based on the reference to the existence of and use of policy-related knowledge in the definition of policy transfer, and the notion that policy transfer process is underpinned by exchange of knowledge among actors involved in the process. As such, they identify the roles of knowledge producers, receivers and senders and facilitators. These roles are briefly discussed below.

Role of Producers of Information:

The producers represent the person or organisation in whom or which the knowledge to be transferred is embodied. They may deliberately make information accessible in text form or have it available in ‘materialised’ form i.e. ideas that have been converted to policies, policy instruments or established institutions. Recognising producers enables the identification of the source end of a policy transfer process. It can also facilitate the study of how information from producers is framed and how the framing can inform the manner of transfer mechanism that may manifest in the event of policy transfer occurring.

Role of Senders and facilitators of Information:

Senders are involved in peddling knowledge that had been produced, as information to be translated into potential policy transfer objects. Producers on their part may present information without directly identifying for whom the knowledge would be for, but senders carry out their activity from the perspective of use of the knowledge by a recipient. Senders play the role of disseminating or transporting knowledge, while facilitators play a part by initiating and supporting activities that can ensure delivery of the knowledge. For example, actors such as supranational bodies, international governmental organisations, non-governmental organisations, and epistemic communities, can play essential roles in providing platforms for producers and potential recipients to meet and exchange information, through the organisation of conferences, exhibitions, symposiums, and exchange programs (Legrand, 2012a; O'Dolan and Rye, 2012).

Role of Receivers of Information:

The key parties involved in the transaction of knowledge in a policy transfer process can be said to be the producers and receivers. This is based on the definition of policy transfer, in a transfer process, there will be need for the existence policy-relevant knowledge, a prerequisite that can be fulfilled by producers. Another prerequisite is the utilisation of the knowledge, and this cannot be fulfilled without the involvement of a party receiving the knowledge i.e. receivers. Considering the roles of receivers can enable identifying factors that can influence the readiness, interest or willingness of intended receivers to accept knowledge borne by producers and senders. It also enables the identification of institutional factors that can facilitate or hinder policy

transfer; and also, how the transfer object fares in the new jurisdiction where it is being applied.

Park et al. (2014) focuses on receivers in their case study of congestion charge policy transfer to Manchester and Stockholm. They extensively address the different modes of interaction that can transpire between receivers and other actors in a policy transfer process and between receivers and policy stakeholders within the recipient jurisdiction. They also link these communication modes to policy success and identify two major communication styles that can be observed namely i) one-way communication and ii) two-way communication. Whereas one-way communication involves limited or no feedback, two-way communication entails active participation and feedback from the different actors involved in the transfer process. The authors also note that the latter is the preferable choice.

2.6.5 Relevance of a Relational Approach

As seen from the above discussions, the use of relational approaches opens up obscured spaces, and directs attention to features of the transfer process that can confer additionality on the budding concept. Specifically, the recognition of diversity of policy transfer actors and transfer mechanisms, examination of the key policy transfer research questions, and identification of different actor roles, go to show that policy transfer process can be assessed in multiple dimensions. This is in contrast to the limited examination space afforded by institutional approaches; whereby there is primary focus on one side of the transfer process i.e. source or recipient, and possibility of addressing very few questions.

In addition, this approach confers a broader language that can be commonly used in the study of policy transfer. For example, the different transfer mechanisms that are associated with externally-initiated and led policy transfers can be more succinctly addressed by use of the terminologies of the roles of actors. This is because by referring to the roles of the actors, we can note what transpires between them, identify what influence an actor wields over another and over the transfer object, and how an actor can hamper or hasten the occurrence of policy transfer. Conversely, an emphasis on the roles of policy transfer actors and the interaction between the actors, can also promote the recognition and citing of transfer mechanisms in policy transfer studies, so that terms like obligation or obligated transfer and conditionality or conditional transfer, can remain flagbearers of the policy transfer literature.

Conclusion

This chapter introduced the concept of policy transfer as presented by Dolowitz and Marsh (1996, 2000) and explained how it evolved from analogous concepts that had been previously introduced by other policy scholars. It also identified the limitations associated with how the concept was conceived in its early days, with its assumption of rationality in occurrence of policy transfer, and highlighted the criticisms that have been targeted at policy transfer. In addressing these criticisms, the review showed that the further conceptualisation of policy transfer through the introduction of the multi-level perspective, enabled a multidimensional application of the concept that allows paying attention to both the source and recipient ends of the transfer process. The review also considered institutional and relational approaches to studying policy transfer, and argued for the relevance of the latter, based on its “attention to ... communicative processes” (Park et al., 2014, p. 397), possibility of examining what

transpired in the transfer process, its capacity to facilitate further development of policy transfer framework, and confer additionality by carving a research niche that makes ample contribution to public policy study and practice.

In particular, viewing policy transfer from this dimension gives room for identifying and studying different transfer mechanisms, because as mentioned in Chapter 1, transfer mechanisms are of themselves not tangible, but are embodied in what is expressed by the actors involved in the transfer process. Based on this chapter's argument for the application of relational approaches, we can attempt to unearth how transfer mechanisms materialise by focusing on the communication among actors. For instance, mechanisms such as persuasion, obligation, and conditionality, are underpinned by the involvement of an external actor and we can expect that the eventual occurrence of transfer will be dependent on the transfer agent convincing the prospective recipient. As such, the application of a relational approach can allow us to explore how this convincing is done. In addition, we can examine how the external actor presents the transfer object and relates with the recipient, in a bid to identify how specific transfer mechanisms can be perceived and strategically employed. This is a promising pathway for the adoption of the NPF to investigate how narratives shape transfer mechanisms. The next chapter explains the NPF, discusses its applications, and illustrates the narratives that can be associated with the transfer mechanisms often employed by IGOs, in facilitating policy transfers.

Chapter 3 – The Narrative Policy Framework (NPF) and its Application to Policy Transfer Research

Introduction

In the previous chapter, we looked at the policy transfer framework, the different transfer mechanisms that are identified in the literature, and the call for the framework to emphasise the roles and contributions of the actors involved in policy transfers and the interrelations among them. Likewise, this chapter builds on the contributions from other policy transfer scholars who have drawn from communication approaches, such as information theory (Wolman and Page, 2002) and public relations theory (Park et al., 2014), and introduces the Narrative Policy Framework (NPF). The chapter presents the NPF as an approach that can be applied to policy transfer research based on the possibility for examining the interaction that transpires among actors engaged in policy transfer. Guided by the claims of the NPF that policy narratives influence the policy process, the chapter shows how NPF allows us to infer the meanings of what is communicated by policy transfer actors and how these shape transfer mechanisms. Particularly, with the identification of narrative elements namely, setting, character, plot, and moral, and explanation of what they likely imply, the NPF allows us to gain insights into how actors perceive their roles and expected contributions to the policy transfer process, their notion of the transfer object, and the narrative contexts in which their relationship with other actors are cast.

With reference to this thesis, the NPF is applied for identifying narrative elements used by the transfer agents and recipient involved in the transfer of renewable energy and DRR policies to ECOWAS, and examining how the narrative elements shaped the transfer mechanisms of obligation, conditionality, and persuasion. This chapter

presents the emergence of the NPF in the field of public policy and explains what the NPF entails. The application of the NPF centres on delineating the narrative structure by identifying the key narrative elements namely - setting, character, plot, and moral. For the NPF, narratives constitute identifiable elements that are common in policy discourses and these embed depictions that portray messages which the narrators intend to communicate (Jones and McBeth, 2010; Shanahan et al., 2011a, 2011b). As such, the chapter goes on to argue that the NPF can be usefully applied to policy transfer research through linking the narrative elements that will likely be associated with specific transfer mechanisms and this can aid the conscientious facilitation of different modes of policy transfer like obligated policy transfer or persuasive policy transfer. Also, by looking again at the policy transfer literature and considering the NPF literature, there is a detailed discussion of the narrative elements that will likely be associated with the transfer mechanisms of obligation, conditionality, and persuasion. The next section discusses the emergence of the study of narrative in the field of public policy, and after this, we explore the NPF, followed by a discussion of its application to policy transfer research.

3.1 Narratives: From Literature Studies to Public Policy Research

The contemporary study of narratives emerged from the field of literary studies, through an effort of categorising folktales based on perceived similarities in story structures (Bal, 2009; Onega and Landa, 2014; Propp, 1968). Moving beyond the field of literary studies, narratives are now studied in other fields, including the humanities, social sciences, and natural sciences, to contribute to scholarly investigation and knowledge, through means such as deriving explanations from historical accounts,

analysing speeches of a political actor, and generating records of individual clinical experiences of medical patients (Czarniawska, 2004; Frank, 2010; Roe, 1994). In political science, the study of narratives is often employed analytically for providing insight into the role of discourse in politics, public policies and organisational behaviour (Patterson and Monroe, 1998; Shenhav, 2006). The study of policy narratives emphasises human participation since what is considered as the object of analysis is a product of an individual, group or organisational discourse (Patterson and Monroe, 1998) and “there is something about ... narrative that feels uniquely human” (Jones et al., 2014, p. 1). As such, narratives are said to be relevant in understanding identity depiction and contestation, construction of political issues by political actors, and their beliefs about varying issues (Czarniawska, 2010; Patterson and Monroe, 1998).

Do narratives provide insights into the intent, actions, or perceptions of actors? This is sometimes considered controversial. Rorty (1989) contends that the text credited to a storyteller may not necessarily represent the intention of the writer or portrayal of actual events. van Fraassen and Sigman (1993) also refer to the analysis of an actor’s narratives as another process of creating a different account of narratives. Countering these criticisms, Czarniawska (2010) argues that from a researcher’s perspective, when a person writes a literature review, she will seek to present the texts in a manner that the readers would have the feeling that they have read through the literature, and also, when writing a field research report, the researcher would expect the readers to have the feeling that they have been on the scene of the research. As such, the subject being studied can be maintained as the focus of a research. She also asked, what would be the essence of research if facts drawn from texts produced by a research subject cannot speak for themselves? Patterson and Monroe (1998, p.316) maintain that “[n]arrative is especially useful in revealing the speaker’s concept of self” and that

organising information with narratives “reveals much about the speaker’s mind”. This line of argument can be buttressed by taking note of how the re-telling of many folktales often never deviates from the message embedded in the story, thereby preserving the original narrative. For example, several re-creations of *Cinderella* have presented the plot of rags to riches, cast the stepmother and her daughters as villains, and portrayed the prince as the hero who would rescue Cinderella from the shackles of her stepmother and stepsisters (Harris, 1991; Hickox, 1998; Robinson and Wildermith, 2016; Waley, 1947). Indeed, within these portrayals lie the heart of the story and what draws emotions when the story is told. So, while different versions may arise whilst analysing or retelling a narrative, the core aspects of the narrative, which embed the message it carries will, more likely than not, remain the same. Also, with respect to the possibility of irregularity in stories presented by research subjects, this can be addressed by accumulating stories derived at different instances and from multiple mediums prior to affirming the narratives being purported by the subject. Another consideration is that if there is a likelihood that the texts produced by an actor do not portray actual intent or perceptions, this observation can of itself be a relevant finding that is worthy of further narrative investigation to ascertain why alternative information is presented to mask the actual reality.

Thus, today the analysis of narratives is a common approach across several disciplines (De Fina and Georgakopoulou, 2015) and the field of public policy has not been left out. In 1994, Emery Roe recounted a story about his admonition to the head of the research centre where he worked, about presenting the stories collected during a research at the start of a book that was soon to be published, rather than relegating the stories to the back of the book. Speaking with his superior at the research centre, Emery Roe said “[b]ut, Percy, the book should be starting with all these stories, not

ending with them” (Roe, 1994, p. ix). His advice was however turned down at the time, but Roe did not deter. He later developed the Narrative Policy Analysis (with Percy’s support) as an approach that integrates contemporary literary theory with public policy. Narrative Policy Analysis maintains that policy narratives are relevant in policy analysis because “stories commonly used in describing and analysing policy issues are a force in themselves” (Roe, 1994, p. 2) and these stories provide information that can be used to assess the veracity of different policy choices and help in making decisions on policy issues. To carry out a narrative policy analysis, policy analysts are advised to identify stories and non-stories or counter stories, and by comparing these stories, a metanarrative⁶ can be generated which will then be attributed to a policy option. Also, the metanarrative identified can be reshaped so that it is presented in a form that can be subjected to policy intervention (Roe, 1994). In a way, the proposition of identifying stories told by policy actors for the purpose of weighing the significance of policy options illustrates that policy actors are not immune to employing stories as a communicating device. Different case studies that have been examined with the use of Narrative Policy Analysis also go to show that policy actors do use policy narratives to express their notions of policy issues (Roe, 1991; Ngoasong, 2009; McBeth et al., 2010).

Another momentous foray into the application of narratives is credited to Deborah Stone. Opposing the notion of rationality, Stone (1989) introduced the four types of causal stories that can be associated with problem definition in public policy. These are accidental, intentional, mechanical, and inadvertent. She explains that the identification of a specific policy problem is often in line with the realisation that an

⁶ Metanarrative, as specified by Roe (1994), differs from the general connotation of the term, which often implies a foundational narrative that supports narratives of policies. For example, a market economy narrative underlines the preferred climate change policy of the USA.

unwholesome situation can be tackled by human action. Similarly, the type of stories that are associated with the problems influence how they emerge on the systemic agenda and/or proceed to the formal agenda. In addition, in her acclaimed book, *Policy Paradox: The Art of Political Decision Making*, Stone (2002, 2012) demonstrates how policy stories can shape policy goals, problem definition, and policy solutions. Policy goals are said to be mainly hinged on motherhood issues i.e. values that are intrinsically appreciated within society; policy problems can be expressed with symbols and numbers, causes, interests, and decisions; while policy solutions can be presented in the form of incentives, rules, facts, rights, and powers. The explication of how stories can guide the emergence of policy goals, problems and solution highlights the possible use of an emotive apparatus by policy actors as they try to make sense of and be part of the policy process. It further emphasises that stories do matter in public policy and by relating with the stories told by policy actors, we can gain understanding into what their stories imply and what they might be aimed to attain.

As mentioned in Chapter 1, another approach that advances the relevance of narratives in public policy is discursive institutionalism, and it is applied for investigating and explaining policy choices, policy change, and the policy process (Cooper, 2016; Ladi, 2011; Palmer, 2010). Although this approach is not primarily specific to public policy but extends to the broader field of political science to explain institutional change, it lauds the importance of interaction among policy actors through its advancement of the logic of communication and claims that discourse encompass ideas and the conveyance of ideas (Schmidt, 2008; Schmidt, 2012). Discursive institutionalism therefore serves a dual purpose of extolling the relevance to ideas and emphasising the communication of ideas, thereby preventing the neglect of one in favour of the other. Based on this, discursive institutionalism aims to show that the

examination of discourse focused on ideas communicated and that of the communication of the ideas, do provide an explanatory lens for understanding institutional change or continuity. With respect to ideas communicated, the explanation could be the salience, coherence, consistency or vagueness of the discourse (Schmidt, 2008). Also, with respect to the communication of ideas, the causal inference could be the persuasive portrayal of the argument supporting the idea and its delivery by political actors to their counterparts and the public (Carstensen and Schmidt, 2016). While discursive espouses the relevance of ideas and discourse in politics, the NPF emphasises the role of a form of communication i.e. narratives in the policy process. In doing so, the NPF focuses on the affecting dimension of communication of ideas, through the examination of the use of story elements by policy actors and explaining how this emotive apparatus reflects and/or conjures perceptions such as alliance, disaffection, empowerment, disenfranchisement, challenge, victory, or flaws, with regards to a particular policy issue. With reference to expounding transfer mechanisms, it may be difficult to establish the institutional dimension of a transfer instance, since there will be a need to situate from whose perspective is the examination being founded? Should it be that of the source, or agent, or multiple intermediaries, or the recipient, or all of these? Indeed, at the level of examining institutional change in the recipient jurisdiction based on the adoption of a transfer object, we may pinpoint where to look at and what to look for. However, at the level of explaining transfer mechanisms, especially coercive transfer mechanisms, the involvement of international actors, and existence of multiple jurisdictions, histories, sociological backgrounds, ideas present a muddled scenario that may be difficult to sort through from an institutional perspective. Albeit, the interaction among the actors, and the narratives told about this and the transfer object, represents a

thread that connects the varying actors to the transfer process, and thus can serve as a site of examination for understanding transfer mechanisms.

Fischer and Forester (1993, p.3) also advance an argumentative turn. They state that “arguments are practical productions” (Fischer and Forester, 1993, p. 3) and that they play roles in describing and substantiating claims made by policy analysts on policy “problems and possibilities”. Similar to the Narrative Policy Analysis, the authors highlight the relevance of analysing how policy problems are shaped based on discourse and language in a bid to understand what informed the identification of possible alternatives for addressing the problem. However, contrary to Stone (1989, 2002)’s assertion that policymaking has little or nothing to do with informed choices or decisions, but is more based on the expressed preference of policy actors, the authors remark that the policy process is not all about written or oral texts, even though they constitute an integral part of it and are deserving of examination. In line with the argument by Fischer and Forrester, Hajer (1993) also introduced the discourse coalition approach. It explains how the similar social construct on a policy issue by actors, may endure and lead to its institutionalisation. A discourse coalition is said to constitute a set of storylines, actors that adhere to these storylines, and the practices that operate in line with the storylines (Hajer, 1993; Pautz, 2017). The approach identifies with the existence of multiple discourses, from which specific features can be drawn and a more coherent or whole discourse can be presented. It also advances the use of discourse analysis for examining how “meaning ... given to social and physical phenomenon is reproduced through an identifiable set of practices” (Hajer, 2006:67). To explain policy change in the area of renewable energy in the recipient jurisdiction, the approach of discourse coalition and application of discourse analysis may have sufficed, and they may have explained the outcome as the inclusion of

ECOWAS' local actors in an existent discourse coalition and adoption of an international storyline. It would also have helped to explain the expansion of the discourse coalition on environmental use of renewable energy for climate change mitigation with the inclusion of West African countries in the along with its storyline on economical use of renewable energy for poverty alleviation. However, the approach would not be able to serve the purpose of explaining what transfer mechanisms manifested during the policy transfer process and how it came about, as there will not be an examination of the mode of relationship between the actors.

Building on some of the above-mentioned contributions, Jones and McBeth (2010) developed the Narrative Policy Framework (NPF) (McBeth et al., 2016). They introduce NPF as a framework for investigating the role of policy narratives in the policy process, with its application aimed at detecting the intended or unintended strategies that are employed by policy actors in positioning a policy issue, promoting their policy preference, and situating their relationship with other actors. Notably, the NPF encompasses a template for researchers on what to look out for in policy narratives, specifically, narrative elements i.e. narrative setting, character, plot, and moral, and it also explains the import of these elements in relations to shaping public policy.

Over the years, the NPF has become a relatively consistent theoretical framework for the study of the policy process. Although it might not exist without the seminal work of Emery Roe, Deborah Stone and the other authors mentioned above, today, it is considered a distinctive framework. Unlike Stone's (2002, 2012) *Policy Paradox*, which is not aligned to major public policy theories, the NPF has been used for examination of case studies that are hinged on these theories. Some of the public policy theories that have been linked to the NPF include the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF), Multiple Streams Framework (MSF), and Social Construction of Target Populations

(Husmann, 2015; McBeth et al., 2014a; Shanahan et al., 2011a; Warnement, 2016). Also, as against the target of the Narrative Policy Analysis being the development of metanarratives for the identification and selection of alternatives that can solve a policy problem, NPF is less normative and more far-reaching in its applicability. The framework has been applied for understanding how policy actors present policy problems (McBeth et al., 2012; Gupta et al., 2014), deciphering and analysing conflicting positions on a specific policy issue (McBeth et al., 2010), comprehending relations among policy actors (McBeth et al., 2005; Shanahan et al., 2013b) and explaining how policy narratives can carry through a policy preference to become policy reality (Shanahan et al., 2013b; Smith-walter et al., 2016). In addition, the NPF has been applied for explaining diverse features of the policy process, such as, policy change (Shanahan et al. 2011), policy development (Lawton and Rudd 2014), public opinion (Shanahan et al. 2011), policy learning (McBeth et al., 2014b), an individual's policy opinions (Shanahan et al. 2014) and policy actor strategies (Crow and Berggren 2014). It is in this light of recognising the relevance of the NPF for the study of narratives in public policy, that the 2014 edition of the *Theories of the Policy Process* (Sabatier and Weible, 2014) featured a dedicated chapter on the NPF, and so did the 4th edition published in 2017 (Weible and Sabatier, 2017).

The interdisciplinary attribute of the study of narratives, which is also inherent in the NPF, as well as the alignment of the NPF to public policy theories, have informed the application of the NPF to policy transfer research. The rationale for drawing from NPF to examine how narratives shape policy transfer mechanisms i.e. how narratives influence the observation of obligation, conditionality, or persuasion, in instances of policy transfers, is partly because it is congruous with the call for policy transfer research to focus on the relations among actors involved in policy transfer. NPF can

serve as a means for achieving this since narratives represent a form of communication and “a seemingly universal device for individuals to sharpen certain elements of reality while leveling others” (Jones and McBeth 2010, p.329). Applying the NPF to policy transfer research also aligns with the multi-level perspective to policy transfer presented by Evans and Davies (1999), which identifies from where and to where is policy-relevant knowledge transported and emphasises agency in a policy transfer process. In this regard, by examining narratives used in a transfer process, NPF identifies the policy actors presenting narratives and their expected audience. In particular, with the use of NPF, most of the key questions that are addressed in policy transfer research, including those that require identification (such as who is involved in transfer? and what is transferred? i.e. transfer object), and others that call for in-depth analysis (such as why transfer?), can be addressed. For example, by identifying the narrative characters that are depicted in a policy narrative relating to an instance of policy transfer, the parties involved and the roles they play in the transfer process can be identified. Also, the question of why transfer can be deciphered from the plot and moral of the policy narrative, as the plot portrays the change that is expected to occur in the prospective recipient jurisdiction and the moral will likely indicate how the change is expected to come to fruition.

As mentioned earlier, this thesis draws on the NPF’s claims about the structure of policy narratives by identifying and aggregating narrative elements. In the next section, an overview of the NPF is presented and we see how the narrative elements i.e. character, plot, moral and setting, constitute the bedrock for the NPF. Afterwards, there is a detailed discussion on each of these. Then we look at how the narrative elements have been portrayed with specific reference to the transfer mechanisms of

obligation, conditionality, and persuasion, by drawing from the policy transfer and NPF literatures.

3.2 The Narrative Policy Framework (NPF)

Similar to other approaches for narrative analysis in public policy, NPF asserts that “[p]olicy narratives are the lifeblood of politics” (Shanahan et al., 2011a, p. 373), as they are used by diverse policy actors, including elected officials, civil servants, interest groups, media, activists, and international governmental organisations, in expressing preferences, engaging in debates, disseminating information to the general public, and mobilising support. NPF also posits that there are identifiable features that constitute a narrative structure and are common to most stories. These features can be compiled, compared, and contrasted, for the purpose of examining how policy actors make use of narratives in communicating policy issues and assessing the role of narratives in the policy process. The identifiable features are grouped into narrative setting, narrative character, narrative plot, and narrative moral (Jones and McBeth, 2010; Jones et al., 2014), and an important NPF claim is that narratives are based on these four major elements. According to the framework,

[p]olicy narratives have (i) a setting or context ... (ii) a plot that introduces a temporal element (beginning, middle, end) ... providing both the relationships between the setting and characters, and structuring causal mechanisms ... (iii) characters who are fixers of the problem (heroes), causers of the problem (villains), or victims (those harmed by the problem) ... and (iv) the moral of the story, where a policy solution is normally offered (Jones and McBeth, 2010, p. 340).

Although some of the elements have been introduced to the field of public policy through the works of Stone (2002) and Roe (1994), they are also identifiable fundamental components in the more general literature on storytelling (Booker, 2004;

Chatman, 1978; Ninan et al., 2016; Propp, 1968). Particularly, in relations to folktales, which is the origin of the study of narratives, these elements have been used to classify folktales across various languages and cultures (Abbott, 2016; Berger, 1997; Ninan et al., 2016). As such, the study of narratives through the identification of narrative elements can be regarded as a recognized approach (French et al., 2017) that goes beyond the earlier works on use of narratives in public policy.

In addition to the narrative structure, the NPF maintains that the narrative content can be generalised according to belief systems and narrative strategies. These other two aspects of the NPF however, are primarily based on the narrative structure and the identification of the four different narrative elements. For example, a study by McBeth et al. (2005), which presents findings on measuring policy beliefs on the issue of the management of the Greater Yellowstone Area (GYA) in the US, identified the policy belief that a group can hold by quantifying the depiction of allies, which is part of the narrative element of character. This approach was also used by Shanahan et al. (2013) for the analysis of policy beliefs through the identification of heroes and victims, which are also part of the narrative element of character.

With respect to narrative strategies, the NPF utilises concepts such as the angel or devil shift to ascertain the narrative strategy of a group. The angel shift implies that a group will aim to “win (or not lose) in public policy battles” (Jones et al., 2014, p. 9) by depicting itself as a hero and an opposing group as the villain, and likely overstating these positions. The devil shift on the other hand, implies that a group will portray itself as weaker than a strong, evil, opposing group (Crow and Berggren, 2014). These depictions are aimed at drawing emotions from the audience that will favour the particular group using these strategies, so that with the use of the angel shift, the group will aim to attract praise and adulation from the audience, and with the use of the devil

shift, they aim to attract sympathy and compassion from the audience. The determination of what narrative strategy is present in a policy narrative, whether an angel or devil shift also relies on the narrative structure, and again, primarily, on the narrative element of character. As such, one can say that the narrative structure represents a fundamental and foundational building block of the NPF. This makes it a highly value-adding aspect of the NPF and it is based on this that this study applies the narrative structure in examining narratives of policy transfer actors. In particular, the narrative element of character sheds light on dynamics of the relationship among actors, and the likely pursuit of policy actors. As this study shows from the discussion in chapter 6, the depiction of a prospective transfer recipient by the transfer agent as both an ally and a victim hints at a call to the transfer recipient to come on board and contribute to the efforts being directed or promoted by the transfer agent, whereby such joint contributions will also help to address a challenge which the recipient is presently facing. This further highlights the relevance of the narrative elements constituting the narrative structure.

Having established that the NPF is useful, we have to be mindful that it has limitations too. Weible and Schlager (2014, p. 240) argue that the framework needs to present a consistent meaning and measurement of narrative elements and what should constitute a policy narrative. In particular, they note that the prescription of what a policy narrative is i.e. having setting, character, plot and moral, may not hold true in all communication content of policy actors, since not all policy narratives will likely be adeptly and strategically prepared to adhere to recommendations for effectively communicating a narrator's views on a policy issue. They also remark that the inability to feature all the narrative elements in a policy narrative could be because developing complete narratives is resource-dependent. To address the concern of incomplete

feature of narrative elements, the delineation of a policy narrative has been revised. Notably, Shanahan et al. (2013b) states that a policy narrative must refer to a policy issue and should include at least one character.

Another explanation for the presence or absence of a narrative element in an actor's policy narrative can be an intended exclusion to communicate a specific intent or perception. For example, the findings from this study suggests that the narratives of policy transfer actors are often ally-seeking, whereby villains and/or victims are rarely portrayed. This is unlike the narratives of policy groups that are debating a domestic policy issue and where the emphasis is often to win or prevent losing on a certain domestic concern (McBeth et al., 2010; Crow and Berggren, 2014). The use of ally-seeking narratives will mostly feature in instances of coercive policy transfer where the transfer recipient has less economic or political power than the transfer agent. With the agents in need of acquiescence from the recipients, and the recipients being aware that they can get support from the agents, the stories told by the actors do not employ policy battle tactics with effective portrayal of all the narrative elements. Instead, there is a careful omission of elements that may present other parties in a bad light or prompt uncomfortable realisations and this is aimed at depicting a state of 'no winners, no losers'. The ally-seeking approach is further discussed in chapter 6.

By delineating policy narratives to be consisting of at least one character and referring to a policy issue, the scope of the type of actors and scenarios to be investigated using the NPF broadens. It helps to ensure that policy narratives originating from diverse actors can be acknowledged and analysed, be they resource-rich or resource-poor. It also enables the application of NPF to extend beyond problem definition to other and aspects of public policy.

While much of this discussion has centred on the use of narratives for organising information, there is yet the limitation of what narratives can achieve beyond portrayals and perception. What power can they have or give? How do they, of themselves, drive policy transfer and prompt policy change? “Shanahan et al. (2011, p. 549) contends that “a new policy narrative may be so powerful in and of itself as to precipitate policy change”, and also, there are numerous accounts of how narratives have produced significant actions and positions. For example, Jones et al. (2014) relay how the stories publicised to the military troops of the United Kingdom and the public during World War II pumped their belief and ability to win the war against all odds. Also, many stories, which are now regarded as myths, in several cultures, were used in the past to exercise power over societies. For instance, stories of oceans and forests operating as spiritual beings gave power to rulers, such as priests and chiefs, to exercise control over these natural resources and sometimes own the property (Brockington, 2004; Fagunwa, 1982; Masquelier, 1993). According to Brockington (2004:426), stories “can generate money, gain the support of the elite, and prompt widespread public sympathy. ... (Therefore,) policies underpinned by immensely powerful stories are almost bound to succeed”. With this assertion, the policy outcome is linked to stories and the certainty of success can be propelled by powerful stories. In another light, stories are also said to instil power dynamic and power relations. Lewis (2017:2) refers to power dynamic as the “specific ways in which power is exercised or experienced in a given context and/or interaction”, while power relations is broadly seen as relationships in which one party is able to direct or influence the behaviour of the other party (Contu and Gire, 2014; Dawson et al., 2016; Wood, 2016). “Narratives are inextricable from power” (Matute, 2016:127) and one contribution of narratives to the manifestation of power dynamic is its ability to both bestow as well as to suppress the

power to be assumed by actors. Stories focused on weaknesses of an actor can produce weakened identities (Bishop, 2003) and stories focused on strengths of an actor can lead to emergence of bold identities (Zeng, 2017). An illustration of how narratives can embolden, or undermine actors is presented in China's policy narrative on its 'One belt One road' initiative. The narrative strategically seeks to create a "new type of great power relations" (Zeng, 2017: 1162), whereby China leads and Europe is marginalised, in Chinese domestic policy discussions.

Underlying the above assertions however, is a conundrum. With the numerous accounts of how narratives have led to significant actions and positions of power, there is also a need for the explanation of how these come about, particularly, an explanation of the isolated effect of narratives. With reference to facilitating policy transfer and achieving policy change, while it may be easily agreeable to argue that stories give power and can prompt the occurrence of policy transfer and facilitate policy change, demonstrating such a claim may be difficult. Also, if we consider the input of actors with significant financial resources and their ability to use this to facilitate policy transfer and/or tell powerful stories, there is then the challenge of deciphering at which point is the outcome dependent on resources, and which point is it attributable to narratives. In this study, we can also observe in one of the case studies, that narratives of powerful actors may empower a less-powerful actor. This can be seen in the EU's emphasis on the narrative character of ally in referring to ECOWAS, instead of the character of victim, which emboldened the recipient to engage in the transfer as though it was an equal partner with the transfer agent. Being that it will be difficult to neglect the resources of the EU, the possibility of arguing for the sole effect of narratives on ECOWAS' disposition and action as a transfer recipient, therefore may be challenging. It is in consideration of this limitation that narrative is not regarded as

the one and only explanatory variable leading to shaping transfer mechanisms and occurrence of policy transfer, but a contributing variable nonetheless.

The next section turns to each of the narrative elements in the NPF i.e. setting, character, plot, and moral. It explains these elements in more detail, how they have been portrayed in the literature and the connotations that are linked to their portrayals. It also highlights the narrative elements that will be identified in the policy narratives to be analysed in this research.

3.3 Narrative Elements

3.3.1 Setting

Jones and McBeth (2010, p.340) refer to the narrative setting as a policy setting or context and remark that “the setting need not be bound by geography or institutional venue (*and*) ... the basic assumptions of the policy controversy ... will provide a suitable setting”. According to McBeth et al. (2014a, p. 228), narrative setting indicates the “legal and constitutional parameters, geography, economic conditions, and other factors regularly deemed relevant by policy actors involved or associated with a public policy”. Jones et al. (2014) also describe the settings in relation to a stage set for a performance, showing that the narrative setting situates the background and establishes the boundaries for the story that is being told. There have been varied directions taken by different studies in operationalising narrative setting. Ney (2014) operationalises setting in the study on identification of major narratives on social innovation to be basic assumptions about social innovations, and specifically, stances on what innovation means, and these⁷ were coded in the study’s analysis of

⁷ Examples of the different settings identified in the study are i) Innovation is more than path-breaking innovation, ii) Innovation is about doing good while doing well, iii) Innovation is about emancipating and empowering people (Ney, 2014).

documents from individuals such as academics and organisations such as the European Commission. Pierce et al. (2014) present findings on the extent of use of the NPF as an analytic framework and in order to identify the use of narrative element of setting, they code the policy domains and levels of government that featured in the 19 studies. Gray and Jones (2016, p.203) present narrative setting as the “physical, ideational, and discursive space in which regulation takes place”, in their study on regulating election campaign finance, and to identify the narrative setting in the data collected from interview sessions, the responders’ implication of what the regulations should mean was used. Based on this, they identified two narrative settings namely, equality and individual expression. This operationalisation of settings is synonymous with that of Ney (2014) and is informed by using the meaning of or stance on a particular topic to represent the narrative setting. However, this approach seems to have shortcomings in aligning with some of the descriptions of narrative setting as highlighted above, as it does not capture underlining attributes surrounding the policy issue. One can also say that it implies the specificity of the narrative rather than the context guiding the narrative.

Acknowledging the underlining circumstances necessitating a particular policy, including the nature of the policy problem and its likely target population, can help to contribute to operationalising narrating setting. This is especially in line with ensuring that the setting of a policy narrative highlights the policy context (Jones and McBeth, 2010). French et al. (2017, pp.6–7) remarked, “(*narrative*) settings have not been an NPF research priority thus far” and “only a few NPF scholars have explored settings”. So, in a bid to address this shortcoming in NPF scholarship, they draw from the field of literary studies and argue that the designation of narrative settings needs to project “the spatial dimension of policy narratives” (French et al., 2017, p. 13) and imply the

boundaries for the influence and actions of the characters introduced in the narrative. To exemplify their proposition, they present a case study on the issue of disaster preparation on the Yellowstone River in the United States and identify these narrative settings – bureaucratic, community, private, and river. The actors who situate the setting of their narrative as bureaucratic based their narration on concerns of government's broad action over a jurisdiction through coordination of the activities of agencies and making rules. Those who situate a community setting based their narrative on actions confined to a specific group or location. The private setting was concerned with a section of business activity or a specific practice, while the setting of river encompassed the influence of the river on the environment and the people within its reach.

This operationalisation of narrative setting gives an insight into how we can visualise the focus or targeted perimeter of policy transfer actors, or the space that they intend to influence when engaging in policy transfer (Shanahan et al., 2017a). Following the introduction of spatial narrative setting in French et al. (2017), Shanahan et al. (2017b) identified the setting of policy narratives by asking the question - where does the action take place? For a policy actor who is intending to engage in policy transfer, because the transfer object is yet to be domiciled within the recipient jurisdiction, the question will more likely read – where will the action take place? This could be in a bureaucratic space, whereby there will be an influence on governments to alter the coordination of government activities or how rules are made. The setting could also be in a community space where the action is focused on a group of people based on their location or particular characteristics or in a sectoral space where influence and action will be bound to a sector (Shanahan et al., 2017b). Unlike the other three narrative settings, the setting of river can be said to be specific to the case study in French et al. (2017)

i.e. the Yellowstone River. Albeit, to draw insight from the space attributed to the setting, with the river being noted to flow through ten countries and the description of the river setting as “a more expansive perspective” (French et al., 2017, p.30), one can say that the designation of a collective setting may be more depictive. This is because the term helps to show that the setting encompasses a collective environment and population.

With the application of these different spatial narrative settings i.e. bureaucratic, community, sectoral, and collective, we identify from the narratives of policy transfer actor, the intended extent of coverage of the transfer object, whether it will be directed at how government works within the jurisdiction, or at a certain group of the population, or at a specific sector, or focused on diverse groups within the jurisdiction. The identification of the narrative setting that is portrayed in the narrative of the policy transfer actors also helps to show where the transfer object is expected to take effect within the recipient jurisdiction i.e. where the action will take place, and where the efforts of the transfer agent will likely be directed.

The next section discusses the second narrative element, character.

3.3.2 Characters

In NPF, there are three broad categories of policy narrative characters namely, “heroes (and allies), villains (and enemies), and victims” (Jones and McBeth, 2010, p. 341). With reference to the origins of the NPF in literature studies, these characters are primarily drawn from the mainstream storytelling practice, whereby stories feature protagonists and/or antagonists (Booker, 2004). The application of this to public policy, however, in understanding the positioning of who needs to benefit from a public policy,

who or what is suffering from a problem, and who is capable of fixing a policy problem, can be credited to Deborah Stone (2012). Ascribing narrative characters to persons, groups, organisations associated with a policy issue relieves the limitation of capturing everyone under the caption of policy actors. By denoting a specific character, this identity carries with it the role such an actor plays or is purported or expected to play, in relations to the policy issue.

Specifying the role of actors by casting them as characters in policy narratives can also help to distinguish who or what qualifies to assume a particular role. In particular, the debate on whether inanimate and non-human entities can be cast as characters in a policy narrative (Patterson and Monroe, 1998; Jones et al., 2014; Weible and Schlager, 2014) can be addressed by considering what is expected of the character being designated to a specific entity i.e. the role of the character. For instance, with the character of a hero often being specified to mean the fixer or potential fixer of a problem in many NPF studies, as can be seen in Table 3.1, the material and mental resources therefore that will need to be utilised by the character will most likely be available only within the reach of a human entity. So, one can say that it will be likely impossible to rely on non-human characters like the environment or certain animals to solve policy problems. This is also because policy narratives pertain to real life and real issues, instead of fictional stories, and as such inanimate or non-human entities cannot be beckoned to take on extraordinary powers and address issues such as disaster risk reduction or use of renewable energy for climate change mitigation.

With a contrary stance to the exclusion of non-humans as policy narrative characters, Weible and Schlager (2014, p.240) state that:

any person, place, or thing could be a character ... The motivation to extend characters beyond humans makes perfect sense and can be justified at a

conceptual level as many non-human nouns are often characters in stories, especially animals or nature in environmental issues.


The extension of the multiple capabilities to fix, cause, and suffer harm to non-human entities seems to be a case of overstretching what non-humans can do. Non-humans may readily be seen in a harmed position and in need of help, and they might also be responsible for causing harm to victims, but to be able to fix a policy problem, will be unlikely. Some of the non-human entities identified as victims in NPF literature include wildlife and air quality (Shanahan et al., 2011b), bison (McBeth et al., 2010), and sacred grounds and the environment (Shanahan et al., 2013b). Indeed, across the NPF studies, there are hardly studies where non-human entities are cast as heroes, or designated as villains (Lawton and Rudd, 2014; Lybecker et al., 2013; McBeth et al., 2010; Shanahan et al., 2011b), rather, the character of who is fixing or can fix a problem, and who is causing the problem have often been ascribed to human entities or entities with human reference such as corporations or society. For example, Shanahan et al. (2011b) finds that some policy narratives cast a named judge, a government agency, and environmentalists supporting the ban of use of snowmobiles in a national park as heroes, while Gray and Jones (2016) also show findings where individuals and groups fighting for freedom of expression are cast as heroes. Also, casting of villains in McBeth et al. (2010), Lybecker et al. (2013), and McBeth et al. (2014b), have focused on humans. While non-humans may be accommodated as victims or villains, taking on the role of hero in a policy narrative may not be easily agreeable because “[w]hen narrative emphasises human action that is directed toward goals, it provides insight on how different people organise, process, and interpret information and how they move toward achieving their goals” (Patterson and Monroe, 1998, p. 316).

Table 3.1 - Definition of Narrative Characters in Some NPF Studies

	McBeth et al. (2005)	Shanahan et al. (2011)	Gupta et al. (2016)	Gray and Jones (2016)
Heroes	Potential fixers of a problem	Supporters of the preferred policy	Fixer of the problem	Those that will correct the situation
Villains	The groups or persons responsible for a policy problem	Who are to blame for thwarting the policy preference	Causer of the problem	Those that perpetuate the harm
Victims	The one harmed by the villain and worthy of policy attention	Who suffer without the enactment of the policy preference	Those harmed by the problem	Those that are harmed

Source: Author's Elaboration on Five NPF Studies

The identification of relevant human entities as heroes of policy narratives aligns with the diverse definitions of the character as shown in Table 3.1. These definitions are taken from selected NPF studies that have slightly varied interpretation of the narrative characters and they show that despite having different expressions for the definitions of the characters, the likelihood of whether humans or non-humans can fit into the different characters remains the same. For example, the character of heroes, whether it is represented by supporters of a preferred policy or those that will correct a situation, will most likely only be represented by a human entity. The standpoint of which narrative characters human and non-human entities can represent, also helps to highlight what non-humans can and can't be responsible for, since it will not be practical to rely on the monetary or mental capabilities of non-human entities or expect them to give direction on what to do to address a policy problem, as portrayed in the image shown below.



Source: Star Tribune (2015)

In line with Jones and McBeth (2010), the characters identified in this study are heroes and allies, villains and antagonists and, victims. Their descriptions are also drawn from the definitions given above in Table 3.1. As such, a hero is seen as an entity designated as fixing or being able to fix a specified problem; an ally is an entity that supports or acts together with the hero; a villain is an entity that causes harm; an antagonist is an entity that is opposing the stance or action of another actor; while a victim is an entity hurt by a specified condition.

3.3.3 Plot

A narrative plot links the characters to the setting (Jones and McBeth, 2010) by indicating the actions that the characters will take within the boundaries of the setting. It also represents the basis for the provision that a narrative should have a beginning, middle, and an end (McBeth et al., 2012; Jones et al., 2014). This temporal dimension signifies the journey that the narrative characters within a story embark on and also encompasses the narration of events occurring within stories. Importantly, it is based

on the element of plot that a turn of events can be captured in a narrative, and this helps to identify how and/or when circumstances or actions of characters differed from what obtained at the beginning of the story. As such, in the application of NPF to public policy, the determination of causal mechanisms is often hinged on the identification of a narrative plot that alludes to the type of characters and their actions, alongside events occurring within a particular setting (Jones and McBeth, 2010; Lawton and Rudd, 2014; Stone, 2012), to indicate “the source of the (*policy*) or policy problem and assign blame” (Shanahan et al., 2013a, p. 18).

The NPF does not stipulate specific plot types that can feature in policy narratives and these element is not often featured in NPF studies (Pierce et al., 2014). However, the NPF recognises the plots that are presented in Stone (2012), which are plots of decline, stymied progress, helplessness and control, conspiracy, and blame the victim. These narrative plots have been utilised only in few studies (McBeth et al., 2012; Shanahan et al., 2013), and in most of these, the plots did not enable the portrayal of the temporal dimension of the stories being told by the policy actors. As a result, in studies like McBeth et al. (2012), which analysed YouTube videos, the prescribed plots were designated as story types, and the authors had to rely on narrating the beginning, middle and end of the story, to discuss the plots of the narratives.

The plots in Stone (2012) can be said to primarily depict a status quo as against highlighting the temporal dimension of narratives. In particular, with respect to policy transfer, the narratives used by transfer agents are often aimed at convincing the recipients that there is a need to change their present status, by indicating a current undesirable circumstance and highlighting the possibility of being in a more desirable circumstance or position. For instance, the narratives used by the UNISDR to emphasise the relevance of adopting a DRR policy for ECOWAS region highlighted

the sufferings of many West Africans from floods, desertification, and diseases, and then, how these sufferings can be allayed should ECOWAS governments join other countries and the UNISDR, in addressing the issue of disasters from an environmental perspective. The plots stipulated in Stone (2012) will likely not enable the depiction of such stories and the proponents of the NPF have also maintained that these plots have not been endorsed by the NPF and that it is possible to identify plots through other sources while applying the NPF (Jones and McBeth, 2010; Shanahan et al., 2013; Jones et al., 2014).

O'Bryan et al. (2014) draw from the field of literature and drama to portray the plot identified in their study. They note that some US policy actors portrayed a 'doomsday scenario', to insinuate that their jurisdiction was at the risk of an imminent danger of terrorism based on the occurrence of the Arab spring in the Middle East, and to encourage the US President to take action on the issue of terrorism by making changes to foreign aid offered to the countries experiencing the Arab Spring. The doomsday scenario can be likened to one of the plots stipulated as part of the basic plots in the literature (Booker, 2004) i.e. the plot of 'overcoming the monster'. The plot also highlights the temporal dimension of storytelling by illustrating the likelihood of change in circumstance from peace to terror, as a result of potential acts of terror facilitated from the Middle East. In addition to the plot of overcoming the monster, other plots from the field of literature that reflect a temporal flow of events or circumstance can be seen in Booker (2004), and these are plot of rebirth and plot of rags to riches. These plots can be said to be in line with the notion that narratives "describe change over time" (Kaplan 1986, p.768).

The study uses these narrative plots to identify the plots portrayed by policy transfer actors in the transfer of renewable energy policy and DRR policy to ECOWAS. With

reference to policy transfer, the use of the plots is also based on the observation that, stories which highlight the transition from the status quo, such as stories of policy reform, often project journeys leading to triumph or happy endings (Pollitt 2013; Mayer 2014). The plot of rebirth highlights a turnaround in the perceived identity or image of a jurisdiction. It is based on the reorientation of values and represents a “change of heart” (Booker 2004, p.26). The plot of rags to riches implies an economic reference and a shift from a state of economic deprivation or lack to buoyancy, and the plot of overcoming the monster portrays a story of tackling an imminent threat to a society and achieving victory.

3.3.4 Moral

While the plot connects some of the elements of a narrative, the moral sums up the narrative by indicating what to take away from it (Jones and Radaelli, 2015). The narrative moral therefore is like the story’s lesson, which indicates what the story aims to demonstrate to or instil in its audience. This feature of the narrative moral shows its link to the narrative plot, as such lessons cannot be drawn from just the narrative character or setting on their own, but from the plot which uses a storyline to connect the narrative character and setting. Stating the relevance of and relationship between the plot and moral, although in the context of a policy battle among advocacy groups, Shanahan et al. (2011b), note that “the strategic use of how the plot and moral of the narrative are used will reveal how different groups manage conflict”. Also, Jones and Radaelli (2015) remark that the narrative moral “often refers to the ethical aspects of the policy solution proposed within the plot”. The emphasis on the plot and moral is also because the other narrative elements of characters and setting are embedded within the plot and it is from the plot that the narrative moral emanates. This also

highlights the relevance of attempting to identify the moral when plots are depicted in narratives.

The narrative moral is often defined as a policy solution (Jones and McBeth, 2010; Jones et al., 2014; Lawton and Rudd, 2014; Smith-walter et al., 2016), and, in its operationalisation in NPF studies, the moral has been represented by policy problem (Pierce et al., 2014), legislation (O’Leary et al., 2017), and policy preference (Gupta et al., 2016; Shanahan et al., 2011a). Realising that not all policy narratives may be targeted at debating rival policy preferences, the specification of moral to imply a policy solution may be limiting on studies where policy narratives are aiding attestation rather than contestation. The explanation of a narrative moral by Jones and Radaelli (2015) as “the takeaway of a policy narrative” can be said to be more encompassing of what policy actors may portray in policy narratives focusing on varying public policy concerns or process. This is also reiterated by Gray and Jones (2016) and the authors described a narrative moral as what to be gleaned from the story. Also, as shown in the quote below, Jones et al. (2014, p.7) recognise that a narrative moral may not always feature in a policy narrative based on what the narrative is targeted at.

However, it is possible that a communication would be considered a policy narrative without a solution. The goals of such policy narratives might include focusing on the uncertainty of a piece of evidence or a specification of a problem to which a solution is needed. Thus, some forms of communication have other elements of a policy narrative but no solutions.

By referring to gleaning, Gray and Jones (2016) show that the narrative moral is dependent on the type of story being told and as such, the operationalisation of a narrative moral is not constrained to identifying a policy solution, but identifying what the narrator will like the audience to draw from the narrative. According to Verweij et al. (2006), the narrative moral is the culmination of the narrative, as it sums up what

the narrative hopes to convey through the use of the different narrative elements. Based on this, the study takes the moral of a narrative to imply what the narrative implores or recommends with regard to its specific setting, characters, and plot, and presents three possible morals that can be drawn from the narratives of policy transfer actors, namely, managing cost and benefit, incentives and sanctions, and value reorientation. These are premised on what the narratives suggest needs to be done, and what the occurrence of policy transfer can achieve within the recipient jurisdiction. With the moral of managing cost and benefit, the highlight of the policy narrative is on weighing the cost of intervening on the policy issue against the benefit to be derived from doing so. The moral of incentives and sanctions focuses the policy narrative on the possibility of offering support as an incentive to address a policy issue and the possibility of withdrawing the support if the issue is overlooked. Also, the moral of value reorientation centres the policy narrative on the need to alter a preferred policy stance. The next section discusses how the NPF is applied for this research.

3.4 Application of the NPF

The NPF is used in this study to analyse the narratives used by actors in the transfer of renewable energy policy and DRR policy to ECOWAS by the EU and UNISDR, respectively, by identifying the narrative elements portrayed by the transfer agents and recipient. This is in a bid to investigate how the actors' narratives shaped the transfer mechanisms that are identified in the two instances of policy transfer. Specifically, the NPF is employed so as to know what to look for in documents pertaining to the policy transfer cases, to describe the depiction of the narrative elements, and explain how

the particular narrative elements depicted by the transfer actors contributed to the shaping of the transfer mechanism.

It is necessary to note that there are other relational approaches that can benefit the examination of policy transfers, and may have been employed in this research. It is therefore, important to address why the NPF was utilized instead of other relational approaches. One of the relational approaches that was mentioned in Chapter 2 is discourse analysis. Discourse analysis is about studying what actors say, do, and are through their use of language (Brown and Yule, 1983; Gee, 2014; Hajer and Versteeg, 2005; Van Dijk, 1997). With this approach, there is the assertion that there is a political sense to language use and thus, it seeks to look for deeper meaning of what is communicated in speech, text, and pictorial form, how these are expressed, and what their functions are (Wodak and Krzyżanowski, 2008). It therefore encompasses the examination of what underpins the words, images, or body language that is used by actors. In this regard, discourse is conceived of as a social practice (Fairclough, 1992) and to engage in discourse analysis will require considering specific attributes including the cohesion of words, coherence of meaning between different parts of the discourse, intentionality of who is communicating, and intertextuality of the discourse with what has been communicated before (Gee 2014; Wodak and Krzyżanowski, 2008). One wouldn't necessarily say that NPF is a better framework to be applied to policy transfer than discourse analysis, but it is a more fitting framework for unpacking transfer mechanisms. This is because the analysis of discourse is often specific to the communication about an event, actor, or policy issue and its findings are mainly applicable to the matter at hand (Hajer and Versteeg, 2005), but the NPF allows the coordination of findings in themes that can be observed across board in diverse cases of policy transfer and can be linked to what different mechanisms convey, including

motive, expectations, and relationships. This makes discourse analysis more suitable for descriptive purposes (Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012), whereas the NPF can offer predictive functions to transfer actors and scholars (Jones et al., 2010; 2014). Also, since transfer mechanisms are built-up from various interactions and actions, making them pliable and fluid, but discourse analysis is more linked to wider social and cultural reality (Fairclough, 1992), its application would likely make it difficult to observe swift or subtle shifts in mechanisms, as policy transfer is a far less enduring process than social reality or identities. This is not to say that altogether, this study could not have benefitted from the use of discourse analysis, but that the use of the approach would be limiting in addressing the overarching research question. One way however that discourse analysis may have contributed to this study, is enabling another layer of examination i.e. of language use, in order to reiterate the findings from the narrative analysis. For example, the EU's reference to the Lome Convention between itself and African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries in its narratives demonstrates a feature of intertextuality and this is used to orchestrate the positioning of ECOWAS as an ally and this, but this functionality however, does not apply across board in all the texts, and on its own, is limited in explaining the interconnections among the actors.

In addition to discourse analysis, another relational approach that could be considered for combining with policy transfer is social network analysis (SNA). This approach is concerned with the connections among persons, groups, organisations, or states and using this to explain the "important contours of opportunity and constraint that shape social, political, or economic behaviour" (Ward et al. 2011:246). It presents actors as nodes and highlights the links that join them, in order to establish the network structure operational in a community, field of special interest, or an institution. It also seeks to explain the implication of the patterns observed in the representations of nodes and

links (Ward et al., 2011) such as constraining or enabling intermediation in policymaking (Raab and Kenis, 2007). While the application of network analysis is recognised in the field public policy, it is now beginning to gain traction in policy transfer research. The combination of narrative analysis and network analysis has also been explored in NPF (Heikkila et al., 2014) to demonstrate the alignment or otherwise of actors and their narratives on a policy issue. Similarly, this combination is also used in the application of discourse coalition. For this study, this may have informed the identification of links between different international actors involved in promoting the policy issues in sub-Saharan Africa, as well as identify the actors that are engaged locally, and perhaps the ties that may be existing among them and the international actors. However, for the purpose of narrative analysis and particularly for attempting to unpack transfer mechanisms that can be linked to IGOs, the use of SNA would have necessitated an extended research into actions and relationships of individual transfer agent, recipient, and intermediaries, in order to plot the pattern of links and the structure of network driving the policy transfers. This can possibly be covered by future research and it would benefit the study of transfer mechanisms.

Similar to the application of SNA, ethnography is another approach that holds possibility of application for studying transfer mechanisms and the narratives of actors. Although ethnography primarily emerged from the field of anthropology, it has also made inroads into the discipline of politics where it is often aided by semi-structured and unstructured interviews (Bayard de Volo, L. and Schatz, 2004). Notably, this approach has been used in both policy transfer and NPF research (Evans and Barakat, 2012; Jones, 2017). The application of ethnography entails getting immersed in the activities, routines, coordination, and discussions of policy transfers by the actors involved. Essentially, this would involve being on location and co-living the

experience of the research subjects in order to collect data for the study. However, with the field of policy transfer being dominated by ex-post studies (i.e. scholars mostly investigate policy transfers that have occurred), rather than ex-ante studies (where scholars conduct research when policy transfer is occurring or expected to occur), ethnography is often used when identifying new insights such as ambassadors of participation (Porto de Oliveira, 2017) or studying peculiar cases (Evans and Barakat, 2012). However, the identification of transfer mechanisms is not a new notion in the field as different mechanisms have already been identified by other scholars (Benson and Jordan, 2011; Bulmer and Padgett, 2005; Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000; Stone 2000b). In addition, with the focus of this research on the consideration of narratives for explaining transfer mechanisms, reliance on ethnography would have likely required having privileged knowledge of the intention of actors to engage in policy transfer, and particularly transfer that would involve specific mechanisms.

The explanation of how the narrative elements depicted can inform the transfer mechanism observed is based on the NPF's description of how the narrative elements are often used by policy actors. For instance, the depiction of a victim is mostly associated with the identification of a policy problem and the designation of who is deserving of support (Husmann, 2015; McBeth et al., 2005). While the portrayal of the narrative character of villain is for the purpose of identifying who should be blamed for a policy problem or giving a non-desirable portrayal of an actor (Gupta et al., 2016; Shanahan et al., 2011b). As such, when a jurisdiction is portrayed as a victim by an external actor that is also a potential transfer agent, one can note that the jurisdiction is possibly being positioned as a prospective recipient of an externally-initiated policy transfer. NPF case studies also help to shed light on the links between narrative elements. For example, in the case study of floodplains in Montana, decision makers

were interviewed on how they viewed the problem, who they thought was responsible and how they thought it should be addressed (Shanahan et al., 2017b). The study found that when the setting is situated as bureaucratic, federal assistance was considered important and the government was depicted as a hero. “Similarly, the private sector setting includes no federal assistance as a policy solution and remains silent with regard to federal assistance and public hazards education. The heroes in this setting are citizens and the local community, not governmental entities” (Shanahan et al., 2017b, p. 18). According to the authors, the study demonstrates that how a policy problem is viewed informs what likely solutions are proffered and who will be championed as capable or worthy of delivering the solution. Findings such as this are used to explain and buttress what is observed from the analysis of the two cases of policy transfer to ECOWAS.

As mentioned in Chapter 1 and argued in Chapter 5, the transfer of renewable energy policy to ECOWAS was facilitated through the transfer mechanisms of conditionality and persuasion, while the transfer mechanism manifesting in the case of DRR policy transfer to ECOWAS is obligation. With the focus on the involvement of IGOs as policy transfer agents and as shown from the explanation of the different transfer mechanisms presented in Chapter 2, the mechanisms of obligation and conditionality can be seen as the go-to transfer mechanisms that IGOs often employ, while persuasion is also sometimes associated with IGOs like the EU and UN. Whereas with the use of the mechanism of obligation, IGOs rely on an existing accord with the intended recipient jurisdiction (Ladi, 2011; Steinbacher, 2015), the use of conditionality is based on a promise of support upon the adoption of the policy transfer object (Alou, 2009; Chapman and Greenaway, 2006; Koeberle et al., 2015). Also, persuasion is employed when there is limited basis for exerting power over the recipient jurisdiction

or if the transfer agent chooses to persuasively make a case for the significance of the policy transfer (Schroeder et al., 2013; Stone, 2000a, 2010). To highlight which narrative elements have been linked to these transfer mechanisms, the next section draws from studies in the policy transfer literature to discuss instances of policy transfer that are driven by obligation, conditionality, and persuasion, and illustrates how the narrative elements of setting, character, plot, and moral have been depicted in these cases. In addition, based on explanations from the NPF literature, the discussion also highlights what the depiction of the narrative elements implies and how it may have contributed to the shaping of the transfer mechanisms observed.

3.4.1 Policy Narrative Elements and the Transfer Mechanism of Obligation

As mentioned earlier, policy transfer by obligation is predominantly a process driven by an external party, and as the term implies, often instigated by an organisation to which the prospective transfer recipient is bound by previous agreements and accords.

The focus of this type of policy transfer is often related to policing specific activities within the recipient jurisdiction, for the purpose of addressing challenges that impact on lives and livelihoods, not only domestically, but also beyond the geographical borders of the recipient jurisdiction (Jordan et al., 2003; Smith, 2004; Sobaci, 2009). It is also often directed at ensuring standardised solutions that have been developed are adhered to (Bennett et al., 2015). As such, policy narratives used in policy transfer by obligation are often aimed at emphasising the existence of a challenge that needs to be addressed, and also strengthening the existing bond between the transfer agents and the prospective recipient jurisdiction (Bennett et al., 2015; O'Bryan et al., 2014; Radaelli, 2000). This is to ensure that the recipient jurisdiction aligns with specific

principles or policy preferences of the transfer agent, and alter prevalent domestic policy positions and policies.

In the policy transfer literature, obligation is discussed with respect to a jurisdiction's allegiance to agreements and accords, and in most instances, with IGOs such as the UN, EU, and OECD, which sometimes engage in policy transfers in order to "protect and expand their global relevance" (Pal, 2014, p. 196). Based on the case studies in the literature, the policy transfer proposition by such organisations mostly lays a stage for a collective action against a challenging predicament in particular sectors like financial, telecommunications, and environment (Humphreys, 2006; Bulmer et al., 2007; Eccleston and Woodward, 2013). Also, because the transfer agents and the prospective recipient jurisdictions have an existing alliance between them, the narrative character of allies is often emphasised. The portrayal of this narrative element in obligated policy transfer cannot be better exemplified than with the representation of the EU and its MS. With the issues covered as case studies in the literature ranging from instituting ombudsman to environment concerns (Blum, 2014; Bugdahn, 2007; Gorton et al., 2009; Ladi, 2011; Radaelli, 2000), the EU and the MS are often portrayed as working together to achieve "common goals" (Blum, 2014, p. 362). Also, in their pursuit to arrive at the common goal, the message that drives the initiation of policy transfer is usually directed at addressing a concern that is presented as a looming danger.

For instance, in the case of transfer of telecommunications policy to EU Member States (MS), the drive for embarking on the policy transfer was in a bid to counter the perceived competitive threat from the USA and Japan (Bulmer et al., 2007). Even though there is no compulsory injunction for EU MS to adopt the same policies in all areas, these narrative tactics are employed to evoke a sense of obligation to cooperate

and support a policy preference. Importantly, the depiction of a looming danger, which can be captured with the narrative plot of overcoming the monster, portrays a dramatic representation (Jones and Radaelli, 2015) of what might be, should EU MS not adopt similar policies. An example of this can be seen in the quote below.

If EU countries do not act together—the narrative goes on—a political time bomb will disintegrate the welfare state. Capital income taxes will spiral down to zero, corporations will move profits to special tax regimes and governments will be left with the sole option of asking for more revenue from low-skilled labor (Radaelli, 2000, p. 33).

In addition to the EU, other IGOs such as World Trade Organisation (WTO), World Health Organisation (WHO), and other UN agencies also employ these narrative devices to identify a policy problem, illustrate its grimness, and call for a collective action to address the challenge (Chapman and Greenaway, 2006; Eccleston and Woodward, 2013; Nay, 2010; United Nations Development Programme, 2005). Studies on the adoption of tobacco control policy in signatory countries to the Framework Convention for Tobacco Control (FCTC) help to demonstrate the narrative elements that underpinned the transfer mechanism of obligation in driving the adoption of the measures recommended by the WHO (Cairney and Mamudu, 2014; Cairney and Yamazaki, 2017; Kurzer and Cooper, 2016; Mamudu et al., 2015). To make a case for tobacco control, WHO in conjunction with the World Bank published a report titled *Curbing the Epidemic* (Mamudu et al., 2015; The World Bank, 1999), which linked the issue of tobacco control to public health and emphasised the negative effects of “direct smoking, second-hand smoke exposure, and nicotine addiction” (Mamudu et al., 2015, p. 864). The positioning of tobacco use as a health crisis represented a shift from its hitherto economic dimension whereby tobacco production was viewed as a relevant source of income to countries (Cairney and Yamazaki, 2017;

Kurzer and Cooper, 2016). The focus on a story of health epidemic instead of economic sustenance can be seen to be reminiscent of the plot of overcoming the monster. Also, the recommendations of policy instruments including tax, price and non-price measures, specify a sectoral setting with its direct target of reducing demand for tobacco, rather than seeking to establish a new agency or administrative department (Cairney and Yamazaki, 2017; Mamudu et al., 2015; WHO, 2003). To further consolidate the argument for tobacco control, the IGOs then turn to an economic consideration, by arguing for the benefits that will accrue to the population as against the cost of maintaining the status quo (Kurzer and Cooper, 2016; The World Bank, 1999), and this presents the narrative moral, which is aimed at spurring the audience into action (McBeth et al., 2012).

Narratives that express obligation also appear in a study of the South African National Climate Change Response, which features the expected contributions by sub-national jurisdictions towards tackling climate change. The jurisdictions were tasked with conducting a review of existing policies, legislations, regulations and plans, to ensure full alignment with the national policy (Fløttum and Gjerstad, 2013). With regards to how this expected contribution was portrayed by the national government, the authors highlight the deliberate portrayal of a common problem and common responsibility to address climate change and they remark that “[w]hen expressing an obligation ... there is a collective voice ... a (*depiction*) of a common point of view”. A repetitive use of ‘we’ and ‘our’, along with casting the sub-national governments as co-heroes, emphasises the alliance that is expected by the national government. Notably, the depiction of the plot of overcoming the monster could not be missed. The national government spelt out a looming danger followed by a call to action. It stated that:

[s]hould ... the average global temperature increase to below at least 2 °C above pre-industrial levels, the potential impacts on South Africa in the medium- to long-term are significant and potentially catastrophic ... Given the significance of these impacts, it is clear that urgent and decisive ... local action is required to achieve a real reduction of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere and in so doing limit the impacts of climate change into the future (The Government of The Republic of South Africa, 2010, p. 5).

In another study by Lawton and Rudd (2014), the importance of the use of narrative elements to ensure that governments honour obligations to international commitments on environmental conservation is reiterated. They point out that the use of narrative moral will provide an argument for taking policy action and advocate for the use of narrative that expresses “coupling of ... economic evidence to ... narratives of ecosystem” (Lawton and Rudd, 2014, p. 854). This is in line with the moral of managing cost and benefits as the authors remarked that monetary quantification helps to give a backing to claims and prompt action. In a similar vein, Takao (2014) presents a case study on the policy transfer of carbon emissions cap and trade measures to municipalities in Japan by the national authority. He notes that part of the motivation that led to adoption of the cap and trade policy was the assessment of opportunities that will be gained and forgone, alongside the need to bring about a “change in beliefs (*of political elites*) from voluntary to mandatory reduction” (Takao, 2014, p. 326) of greenhouse gas emissions for combating climate change. Thus, the narrative moral in the policy transfer study by Takao (2014) can be seen to be managing costs and benefits, and value reorientation.

The identification of narrative elements in the studies highlighted above, notably, the depiction of allies as narrative characters, plot of overcoming the monster, and sectoral or collective narrative settings, go well to show that there is “an appreciation that information is communicated through simple and memorable stories” (Lawton and

Rudd, 2014, p. 854). The next section discusses instances of conditional policy transfer and the narrative elements that can be identified in case studies from the policy transfer literature, and how these elements are portrayed in the NPF literature.

3.4.2 Policy Narrative Elements and the Transfer Mechanism of Conditionality

With reference to the discussion of transfer mechanisms in Chapter 2, the mechanism of conditionality is synonymous with a stick or carrot arrangement and this differs from the mechanism of obligation whereby the recipient is abiding by an initial commitment. Policy transfer by conditionality is characterised by a dependent relationship between the transfer agents and recipient organisation (Bulmer and Padgett, 2005; Delpuech and Vassileva, 2017; Holden, 2016; Pereira, 2014) and hinged on a transactional agreement. In many instances, the prospective recipient in policy transfer by conditionality finds itself liable to the transfer agent and/or also in need of material support, military support or affiliation. However, they often have the liberty to succumb to or reject proposed policy transfers. To achieve an intended transfer by conditionality, the transfer agent takes advantage of the needs of the prospective transfer recipient to stipulate the adoption of a specific policy as a condition for benefitting from its support (Bulmer and Padgett, 2005; Lavenex, 2008).

The story of conditional policy transfer is often of a policy actor being a hero to a victim, whereby the transfer agent possesses the wherewithal to meet the perceived need of the recipient jurisdiction. According to the NPF, and with regards to the earlier discussion on narrative character, the implication of being cast as victim is often based on the premise that an entity is being harmed by certain conditions or circumstances, or by another character that has been portrayed as a villain (Shanahan, McBeth and

Hathaway, 2011; Shanahan et al., 2013; Heikkila et al., 2014). The precarious situation of the victim, therefore, positions an entity cast as a victim as one in need of, or deserving of support (Fløttum and Gjerstad, 2017; Weible et al., 2016). Since this portrayal of an entity that is being hurt by a condition or another entity emphasises the existence of a societal challenge that needs to be addressed, it therefore opens a space for the introduction of a hero in a narrative.

Alou (2009) describes the dynamics of conditional policy transfer. He notes that the prevalence of “manifold economic crisis of African states” (Alou, 2009, p. 6) prompted the transfer of structural adjustment programs (SAP) to sub-Saharan Africa, which was stipulated as a condition for receiving development aid. He highlights the role of the World Bank as the transfer agent facilitating the conditional policy transfer and “proposing the desired solution for tattered African economies” (Alou, 2009, p. 6). As such, the dire economic condition of the African states heralds the action of the World Bank as the party that devises and executes a solution. Expounding further on conditional policy transfer to developing countries in Africa, Pereira (2014) describes the conditional policy transfer facilitated by the EU through the EU-ACP Lome Convention, as an arrangement that offers support for African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) states on account of political and institutional reforms in the recipient jurisdictions. By providing an incentive for embarking on reforms that will alter how government functions in the recipient jurisdictions, the EU laid out a bureaucratic setting. Also, for countries that adhered to the reforms, like Cape Verde, they benefitted from having special relationships with the EU, while others are left out of this opportunity (Pereira, 2014). A narrative of a victim in need of a hero and a plot of rags to riches can be observed from these descriptions. Along with the portrayal of the narrative moral of incentivising reforms by rewarding jurisdictions that comply with

specified conditions and withdrawing support from others that did not, this, in a way, sums up what conditional policy transfer portends.

If we consider other examples of conditional policy transfers that do not have outright financial connotations, we will notice similarities in the use of narrative elements. The cases of IGOs facilitating policy transfers by taking advantage of accessions to membership of the organisations serve as good examples. One of these is the case of transfer of market liberalisation policy to the Republic of Korea (Carroll, 2014). Upon applying to join the OECD, and after agreeing to free up trade and open markets, the Republic of Korea became a member of the OECD. The country's foreign minister narrated the process as a move from isolation to internationalisation, with the OECD being the medium for attaining international standing and acquiring the status of a developed country, thereby guaranteeing stability and prosperity for its citizens. The depiction of the transfer process highlights the narrative character of a hero and a plot of rags to riches. Another example is that of the accession of Greece, Spain, and Portugal to the European Economic Community (EEC) (Carroll, 2014). The narrative used in describing the transfer process presents a portrayal of a jurisdiction in need of support i.e. character of victims, as it is noted that these countries, having been under military rule, were faced with "significant requirements regarding their progress to stable, functioning democracies, as well as changes to economic policies" (Carroll 2014, p.284). The challenge faced by the countries presented the opportunity for external policy actors to intervene, and "promote economic development, democratic government and political stability" to turnaround their "radically different political and economic structures" (Carroll 2014, p.284). Such narration of the intent for engaging in policy transfer reflects a story of a victim in need of a hero and a plot of rags to riches.

The insistence on a bureaucratic setting in most conditional policy transfer is also reiterated by Delpuch and Vassileva (2017). They contrast the focus of Bulgaria's policy transfer experience with the EU as against its policy transfer experience with USAID, which was based on the mechanism of persuasion. The authors note that "unlike European cooperation, which insisted on the transformation of institutional structures and values, American assistance stressed concrete change in work processes inside judicial organisations and improvement in the daily activities of case management and adjudication, particularly in local jurisdictions" (Delpuch and Vassileva, 2017, p. 37). So, while conditional policy transfer was characterised by a bureaucratic setting, which called for changes in institutional structures, the setting of the persuasive policy transfer was confined within one sector. The next section discusses further, how narrative elements are portrayed in policy transfers driven by the mechanism of persuasion.

3.4.3 Policy Narrative Elements and the Transfer Mechanism of Persuasion

The use of policy narratives for the purpose of persuading a specific audience is widely recorded in NPF literature, particularly with respect to attempts of interest groups to convince the general public and win on a policy issue. The primary focus on interest groups is in a way synonymous with the categories of policy transfer actors that are usually transfer agents in instances of policy transfer by persuasion, including think tanks (Stone, 2000a), international corporations (Kolk, 2015) and, IGOs (Foli et al., 2017; Pereira, 2014; Schroeder et al., 2013). With respect to policy transfer, rather than directing policy narrative elements at persuading the general public, narrative elements are used to convince prospective transfer recipients and make a case for the

validity and benefits of the transfer, rather than exploiting a possible vulnerability of the prospective recipient.

According to the NPF literature, policy narratives by non-state actors often involve a broad use of narrative elements (Crow and Berggren, 2014; McBeth et al., 2012). An example that shows the use of narrative elements by this group of actors is the study of the policy narratives of the Buffalo Field Campaign (BFC), an American non-governmental organisation that is dedicated to the preservation of bison in Yellowstone National Park in the US (McBeth et al., 2010, 2012). In convincing the general public to stand for protection of this species and curtail demands for culling them by ranch farmers, BFC makes use of the different narrative characters by situating the bison as a victim, the farmers as villains and itself alongside members of public fighting for the cause of keeping the bison alive, as heroes. It also advances a policy solution of value reorientation to view the bison as a natural world asset and the issue at hand, as an environmental concern rather than a commercial issue.

The use of policy narratives in policy transfers by persuasion can be seen to manifest in a similar fashion. Diane Stone (2000; 2004; 2010) elaborates on non-governmental policy transfers. She does not use the NPF language, yet, she helpfully highlights the involvement of these organisations in transferring ideas and ideologies and providing intellectual background documents that can be used to support or represent the policy position. In the example of transfer of privatisation policy to the UK (Stone, 2000a), transfer agents including the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA), Centre for Policy Studies (CPS) and the Adam Smith Institute (ASI), positioned a welfare system as the villain, the conservative party as heroes and taxpayers as victims. With their plot of rebirth hinged on a move from dependence on welfare to embracing market principles,

the organizations advocate for reorientation of the economic system in order to reduce government spending and save taxpayers' funds.

Instances of persuasive policy transfers have also been prompted by the alleged failure of aid conditionality in less-developed countries, particularly sub-Saharan Africa (Easterly, 2005; Mkandawire and Soludo, 2003; Pereira, 2014; Tambulasi, 2013).

According to Pereira (2014, p.389), the use of aid conditionality in EU-ACP accord is as though the EU was:

trying to 'buy' political and institutional reforms through aid and cooperation programmes relying on political and economic conditionality. It failed. The failures ... led to the signing of the Cotonou Agreements ... The Cotonou rhetoric places emphasis on the concept of 'ownership' and argues that the donor-beneficiary framework is no longer the basis for EU-Africa relations but rather that of promotion of common interests.

As we can see from the above quote, the alleged failure of aid conditionality instigated the preference for employing the mechanism of persuasion by IGOs like the EU, in engaging with developing countries (Foli et al., 2017; Pereira, 2014; Tambulasi, 2013; Zardo, 2017). In particular, this persuasive approach showed a move away from the dominant story of victims in need of heroes to emphasise a story of heroes working together. The case study on the adoption of cash transfer policy to Ghana highlights how IGOs attempt to lay out this story. According to the findings from the study, it was "international partners such as the World Bank, UNICEF, ... and DFID" that identified and proposed the need for developing a cash transfer policy in Ghana, however, the policy transfer was undertaken by promoting a "technical cooperation" between Ghana and Brazil (Foli et al., 2017, p. 6). This strategic positioning of actors de-emphasises the power of the IGOs over the recipient jurisdiction and the likely weak economic position of the recipient jurisdiction. Instead, it directs attention to a story of partners with similar circumstances working together within a space that will focus on the poor,

aged, and disabled. This space reflects a community setting, whereby the policy transfer is focused on a particular group in the society's population and is designed to alleviate their challenges.

From the NPF literature, actors depicted as allies are often shown to be knit based on a cause, rather than financial interest. McBeth et al. (2005) depicted the character of allies to signify a joint stance by the actors on banning the use of snowmobiles in the GYA in the USA. Also, the interest group, Buffalo Field Campaign, designated certain individuals and groups as allies because they were involved in activities targeted against hunting or culling bison (McBeth et al., 2012). The depiction of heroes working together or that of allies in policy transfer, also highlights the commitment of the actors to a particular cause and their involvement in supporting the cause. By altering narrative elements, we can see that the overriding narrative that informs the relationship between two transfer actors and the basis for a policy transfer can be presented differently, and this goes on to inform the transfer mechanism that we observe as facilitating the instance of policy transfer.

Conclusion

As remarked by Nowlin (2011 pg. 53), “[n]arratives could ... be employed by policy entrepreneurs to ... hasten policy diffusion and adoption”. Likewise, this chapter has attempted to show that narratives matter in policy transfers, by drawing from the review of both the policy transfer and NPF literatures. Narratives matter in situating the role of actors, in delimiting the space where the actors will influence with their action, and in presenting an overview of what the policy transfer will entail. The chapter discussed

the study of narratives in the field of public policy and the introduction of the NPF. It highlighted the relevance of narrative elements in the analysis of policy narratives and elaborated on how these have been studied in the NPF literature. Notably, the use of NPF for the analysis of policy narratives for this study is shown to be based on the ability of the framework to capture relations among policy actors, as against the focus in other narrative approaches, which is mostly based on the analysis of and the decision-making over a policy issue. Also, the NPF can be and has been used alongside other public policy theories and incorporating it to policy transfer goes in line with the application of NPF for studying narratives of policy actors.

In elaborating on the narrative elements, the chapter has argued for the importance of associating humans with narrative characters that perform roles which can only be assumed by humans. It has also emphasised the relevance of identifying narrative plots that portray a journey rather than a static position. In addition, the chapter has highlighted the type of narrative elements that can be identified in policy transfers that pertain to the involvement of IGOs as transfer agents i.e. obligated policy transfer, conditional policy transfer, and persuasive policy transfer. Following this, the next chapter presents the methodology that is employed in examining the two policy transfer cases investigated in this research, which are the transfer of renewable energy policy to ECOWAS by the EU and the transfer of DRR policy to ECOWAS by UNISDR.

Chapter 4 – Methodology

Introduction

This chapter presents the methodology employed in this thesis and details the process for carrying out the empirical research. It discusses the rationale for case selection and the process for data collection and analysis. More importantly, it demonstrates the relevance of the methodology and the methods applied to addressing the research questions.

Chapter 1 presents the overarching research question underpinning this study i.e. what is the role of policy narratives in shaping policy transfer mechanisms? It also highlights the components to investigate in order to answer this overarching question. The first component is noted as policy transfer mechanisms; the second is narrative elements, while the third is the association between these first two components. A contemplation of the research question therefore prompted the need for identifying appropriate occurrences that will allow the observation and analysis of the three components highlighted above. This informed the design of a case study approach and the selection of two cases namely i) transfer of renewable energy policy to ECOWAS by the EU, and ii) transfer of DRR policy to ECOWAS by UNISDR. To examine the two case studies, this research primarily uses a qualitative methodology for data collection and analysis, but, before discussing this process, it will be important to elaborate on what informed the use of the two cases that were investigated in order to address the research questions posed. Based on this, the next section explains the basis for selection of the two cases.

4.1 Case Selection

As noted earlier, the research design follows a case study approach. Gerring (2008, p. 1) notes that “case-study analysis focuses on one or several cases that are expected to provide insight into a larger population”. With reference to this explanation, engaging in a case study will likely raise the question, what is a case? Gerring (2007) infers that a case is a representative of a general phenomenon. Also, George and Bennett (2005, p. 17) define a case as “an instance of a class of events”. In addition to having a representative role, a case also has an investigative function and gives beneficial insight for understanding similar occurrences. According to Seawright and Gerring (2008), representativeness and analytical capability do go hand in hand in determining what a case is. For this study, the two cases are representative of the general phenomenon of the propagation of global public policy through policy transfers facilitated by IGOs, and they serve as typical cases (Gerring, 2007; Yin, 2014) for the analysis of this phenomenon. There is a further discussion of this general phenomenon in the next chapter.

With reference to the research questions, the investigation of typical cases aims to give insight into understanding the mechanisms that drive the process of propagation of public policy by IGOs, and the narratives that shape the transfer mechanisms. As shown in Table 4.1, the two cases lend themselves to comparison based on their similarities in terms of the category of transfer agent and recipient, and also the differences in their observed transfer mechanisms. The comparison of these two typical cases allowed the demonstration of the shaping power of narratives, particularly with the observation of differences in the combination of narrative properties that typified each of the cases as against similarities in other aspects of the two cases. The differences identified helped to ascertain the link between the

narratives used by policy transfer actors in communicating a transfer process and the transfer mechanism that manifests.

Table 4.1 - Comparison of Features in Selected Cases

	RE Policy Transfer by EU	DRR Policy Transfer by UN
IGO as type of policy transfer agent	Yes	Yes
Climate change as policy area	Yes	Yes
ECOWAS as policy transfer recipient	Yes	Yes
African Union as mediating agent	Yes	Yes
Externally-initiated policy transfer	Yes	Yes
Narrative Elements	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Setting - Bureaucratic, Community • Plot - Rags to riches • Characters - Hero and ally, Victim • Moral - Incentives and sanctions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Setting – Bureaucratic, Sectoral • Plot - Overcoming the monster • Characters - Hero and ally, Victim, Villain • Moral - Managing benefits and cost, Value reorientation
Transfer Mechanisms	Persuasion and Conditionality	Obligation

4.1.1 Data Richness

Another factor that has informed the case selection for this study is the availability of data. This consideration is based on the reference to logistical expediency and data richness as criteria that can inform case selection (Evera, 1997; Gerring, 2008). In the two instances of policy transfer, there are publicly available documents that present records of direct input of the IGOs in promoting the global propagation of renewable energy and DRR policies, and ensuring the introduction and adoption of the policies

by ECOWAS. In the case of the transfer of DRR policy, the venture was part of UNISDR's Africa outreach programme (Basher and Briceno, 2005; UNISDR, 2003a), and this led to the establishment of an African office of the UNISDR, and subsequently, interactions with African regional bodies including, African Union (AU), New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), and ECOWAS. To inform the different bodies on the relevance of DRR, and facilitate knowledge and information exchange, UNISDR Africa published newsletters biannually, and developed series of educational magazines.

In the case of the renewable energy transfer, the venture was a definite project, which ran from October 2011 to May 2012, and was tagged the "development of a regional renewable energy policy" (EUEI PDF, 2016b). The project was delivered by the EU Energy Initiative Partnership Dialogue Facility (EUEI PDF), a development aid instrument of the EU dedicated to addressing sustainable development by facilitating universal access to sustainable energy. As a development aid instrument, the EUEI PDF also situated the policy transfer project as part of interventions under the Africa-EU partnership. To mobilise support and create awareness for this partnership, the EU commenced publication of a quarterly newsletter, titled *Links*, in 2009. The newsletter covers EU's contributions and involvement in specific areas, including renewable energy, and highlights its relationship with regional bodies within the continent. To communicate the activities of the EUEI PDF, the unit also published research reports, strategy documents, factsheets, and organisation reports.

The documents published by the actors are available publicly via web repositories and they were downloaded for the purpose of the research. The next section discusses the limitation of the two cases selected.

4.1.2 Significance of Policy Areas

In addition to the merits of these cases for analytical purposes, the choice of these policy areas i.e. renewable energy and disaster risk reduction, is based on their significance to addressing the environmental challenge of climate change. According to the United Nations, climate change is “the most systemic threat to humankind” (United Nations, 2018) and numerous groups of actors including states, businesses, IGOs, INGOs, local NGOs, and local communities continue to exert funds, time, and energy towards solving this challenge, particularly through introducing, advocating for, and applying mitigation and adaptation solutions. The focus on these policy areas in a policy transfer research, therefore emphasises the externality trait that is associated with climate change, as it reiterates the importance of policy transfers, the involvement of international actors, as well as the need for strategically devising transfer mechanisms.

Another reason for the selection of these policy areas is that, unlike other policy areas of similar international importance, such as HIV/AIDS, budget transparency, or money laundering, there is a pressing time constraint to address the issue of climate change. This pertinence is also in view of the crucial role of the environment in supporting human endeavours and subsistence. So, while these other policy areas may be of competing or even more importance in their analytical value and potential for harvesting interesting policy stories with dramatic twists and turns, especially in the policy content, the looming danger of climate change informs the selection of these policy areas despite their technical language they command. Indeed, this attribute of technicality also presents the two cases as worthy of examination of how narratives are used to portray issues that may not be easily grasped by non-technical persons. The study thus contributes to understanding how the communication of technical

policy issues are brought to fore, how concerns are presented in story terms and how this go on to capture an intended audience and securing interest for a policy preference.

4.1.3 Limitations of Case Selection

The selected cases may be said to be limiting in their capability to capture the whole range of policy transfer mechanisms that can be observed in both voluntary and coercive transfer modes. However, the selected cases are focused on policy transfer instances involving IGOs and, from Chapter 2, we can see that three of the five policy transfer mechanisms namely, persuasion, obligation, and conditionality, are most likely to feature in the involvement of these actors as transfer agents. The focus on this set of actors reemphasises the non-limitation of policy transfer to domestically initiated policy transfers, and non-assertion of rationality of transfer agents. Another omission that is predicated on the selection of these cases is the transfer mechanism of imposition. As remarked by Dolowitz and Marsh (1996), policy transfer by imposition represents a rare occurrence. This rarity is also corroborated with the number of cases that identified this mechanism in the articles reviewed in Chapter 2. Based on the chart in Figure 2.3, only 3% of the total articles featured imposition as the transfer mechanism, this is just two of the 68 articles. With this level of rarity, the transfer mechanism of imposition does not seem to be prevalent in policy transfers and its exclusion may not directly hinder the utility of the findings of this research. Nonetheless, the excluded transfer mechanisms can be examined in future research, in order to gain more insight into how policy narratives inform transfer mechanisms.

Furthermore, the selection of typical cases highlights the absence of a deviant case of the general phenomenon i.e. case that deviates from what should be (Seawright and Gerring, 2008; Yin, 2014). Whereas the typical cases draw attention to the involvement of IGOs in a jurisdiction, which culminate in the occurrence of policy transfer, a deviant case would have been able to demonstrate a possible alternative outcome. The involvement of IGOs may not always lead to policy transfer, and attempts at propagation of public policy, may result in non-transfer. The inclusion of a deviant case can as such, prompt questions that ask – what will the involvement of IGOs in domestic policymaking within a jurisdiction lead to? What other policy process can be identified in the examination of the global propagation of public policy by IGOs, aside from policy transfer? Addressing these questions may also result in the identification of other resultant effects of the activities of IGOs within a particular jurisdiction. However, with the case selection targeted at answering the research questions posed in the introduction of this thesis, the selection of a defiant case may impede the likelihood of differentiating and affirming the contribution of narrative elements in shaping the transfer mechanisms that are observed in policy transfers facilitated by IGOs.

In summary, the case selection demarcates the area of empirical research, denotes the aspects of policy transfer that will be studied, emphasises the set actors that will be focused on, and points to the general phenomenon which the cases represent.

4.2 Data Collection

To commence data collection, the major actors involved in the two cases of policy transfer were identified, specifically, the policy transfer agents that facilitated the instances of transfer and the recipient. In the case of transfer of renewable energy

policy, the EU was designated as the transfer agent, with ECOWAS being the recipient jurisdiction. Within the EU, the unit that was directly involved in facilitating the policy transfer was the EUEI PDF, and within ECOWAS, the ECOWAS Centre for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency (ECREEE) was responsible for relating directly with the EU during the transfer process. The specific unit within the EU was identified through the ECOWAS renewable energy policy document (ECREEE, 2013a), as the logo of the EUEI PDF was imprinted on the document⁸, and the EUEI PDF's website also stated its involvement in and sponsorship of the development of the ECOWAS renewable energy policy (EUEI PDF, 2016b). Also, in the case of DRR policy transfer to ECOWAS, the UNISDR was designated as the transfer agent, and the UNISDR African regional office based in Nairobi, Kenya, facilitated the transfer process. The unit within ECOWAS that related with UNISDR Africa during this process was the directorate of humanitarian and social affairs, and after the adoption of the ECOWAS DRR policy, the Disaster Management Unit was created to manage DRR issues in ECOWAS. In this case of policy transfer however, there was no indication of the transfer agent in the policy document, even though the document stated that the policy was developed in line with UNISDR's Hyogo Framework of Action (HFA). The specific unit within the UNISDR was eventually identified from a meeting report highlighting the progress made by the newly formed regional office in Africa in establishing connection with ECOWAS and promoting the DRR within West Africa (UNISDR, 2008, 2003b).

⁸ The EUEI PDF's logo can be distinctly seen on the renewable energy policy transfer document and beside it; the logo of UNIDO can be seen. However, the contributions of the EUEI PDF to the policy development process is more significant than that of the UNIDO, as the EU financed the process of developing the policy. The inclusion of UNIDO's logo alongside that of the EUEI PDF may be a way of acknowledging the existing cooperation between the EU and UNIDO, whereby the EU and EU MS finance some of UNIDO's activities, notably, the creation of the ECOWAS Centre for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency (ECREEE).

The designation of the transfer agent and identification of the specific units within the IGOs involved in the transfer process, enabled contacting these units directly for the purpose of sourcing relevant documents and requesting for interviews. After contacting these units, suitable documents for narrative analysis, and relevant individuals that could participate in interviews were identified. Eighty-seven documents were selected and analysed for the examination of the use of narratives by the actors during the policy transfer process, while six elite interviews were conducted. The next section describes in more detail the selection and analysis of the documents, and after this, the identification of interviewees and the conduct of elite interviews are discussed.

4.2.1 Narrative Analysis

4.2.1.1 Source of Documents

As mentioned earlier, in order to identify suitable documents for the narrative analysis, the EUEI PDF, ECREEE, UNISDR Africa, and ECOWAS Disaster Management Unit, were contacted via email and social media to request for documents related to the policy transfer instances. At the onset of contacting these units, only EUEI PDF responded and they provided a web address for accessing documents related to the development and adoption of the ECOWAS renewable energy policy. For the others, the search function on their websites was used to select the appropriate documents. On UNISDR's website, a dedicated search function of archived documents allowed the specification of type and subject of the document, and also the geographical continent of interest. By specifying all types and subjects of documents, and Africa as continent, the search yielded results from which relevant documents were selected. For ECREEE, the publications and news and events tabs on their website contained newsletters and reports with information on the development and adoption of the

ECOWAS renewable energy policy, and from these, relevant documents were selected. The webpage for the directorate overseeing the ECOWAS Disaster Management Unit on the other hand, did not contain links to any document pertaining to the development and adoption of the ECOWAS DRR policy. In addition, ECOWAS' website did not include any information such as the policy document, meeting reports, or presentations regarding the adoption of the DRR policy and the organisation's interaction with UNISDR. As a result, there was a need to fall back on the information available from UNISDR's website in order to identify narratives authored by ECOWAS and its MS. Upon searching the documents sourced from UNISDR's website, 22 articles by ECOWAS countries were found published in some of the editions of the *ISDR Informs* newsletter and the content of these articles were used to represent contributions from the recipient jurisdiction.

Upon establishing contacts with UNISDR and ECREEE, they referred to the weblinks used on their sites as the appropriate source for accessing information on the respective policy transfers. With respect to ECOWAS Department of DRR, one of the officials confirmed that there was no document available from the organisation in relation to the transfer process (Interview 5, 2017).

4.2.1.2 Selection of Documents

To select the documents used for analysis from the available documents accessed on the websites, the date of policy adoption was used as a benchmark, so that documents that were published after the official adoption of the policies and did not contain information relating to the policy transfer were removed. This is because the adoption of the policies by ECOWAS authorities can be seen as a consummation of the efforts by the transfer agent directed at introducing the policy to the recipient jurisdiction, and

an indication of the “use of knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in one political setting (past or present) for the development of policies ... in another political setting” (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996, p. 5). Also, the documents unrelated to the specific policy and/or relationship between the transfer agent and recipient were disregarded. For example, at the time of the EU’s facilitation of renewable energy policy transfer, ECREEE was also working with other development partners including the UN and the World Bank, on projects such as the Strategic Program for West Africa and development of the ECOWAS Energy Efficiency policy. To delineate the events, discussions, decisions, relating particularly to the development and adoption of the renewable energy policy, documents that covered such other projects were not included in the analysis. In addition, documents that were likely not to be presented in a narrating, reporting, or descriptive styles were not selected. This meant that documents that contained only lists such as programme agendas, or presentations that contained only headings of slides and bullet points were not included in the narrative analysis. Documents with only technical information were also not selected.

As a result, 56 documents were selected for the case of transfer of renewable energy policy and 31 documents were selected for the case of DRR policy transfer. These documents comprise newsletters, research reports, meeting reports, flyers, and policy documents. Although policy documents may be regarded as technical, their introductory sections were useful in identifying narrative elements. Regarding the disparity in the number of documents examined for the two cases, this can be said to be indicative of how long the actors involved in each case of policy transfer have been relating. Interaction between the EU and ECOWAS dates back to the 1975 Lome I Convention between the European Economic Community (EEC) and African,

Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries (Adetula, 2008; Watts, 1998), while relations between the UNISDR and ECOWAS set off around 2002 when the UNISDR established an African regional office in Nairobi, Kenya (UNISDR, 2003b). In addition, the number of documents identified for the case of DRR policy transfer can be explained by ECOWAS' limited documentation during the DRR policy development process.

The total number of documents linked to the actors involved in the two instances of policy transfer is also within the range of the number of documents that is often assessed in NPF studies where analysis of publicly available documents is done. For instance, Heikkila et al. (2014) identified and analysed 177 documents from 19 organisations⁹ to examine the narratives of interest groups that are for and against hydraulic fracturing in New York, US. In the investigation of the narratives used by opposing coalitions on the issue of collective bargaining rights of public sector workers, 284 articles from 67 actors¹⁰ were assessed (Kear and Wells, 2014). Also, McBeth et al. (2007) examined 105 documents relating to three policy areas, to investigate the use of narratives by two interest groups¹¹ in communicating about the different policy areas. In addition, in a study of India's nuclear energy debate on the situation of a nuclear energy plant in Jaitapur, Gupta et al. (2014) analysed 55 documents from 21 organisations¹². With reference to these NPF studies, the identification of 87 documents for the analysis of two cases of policy transfer and attributed to the four IGOs are within the range of the number of documents analysed in the studies. A list of all the 87 documents is provided in Appendix 2.

⁹ Approximately, nine documents were analysed for each organisation.

¹⁰ Approximately, four documents were analysed for each actor.

¹¹ Approximately, 18 documents were analysed for each interest group per sector.

¹² Approximately, three documents were analysed for each organisation.

4.2.1.3 Coding Selected Documents

According to Krippendorff (2013), analysing the content of a document is to be based on answering a research question. By focusing on the research questions, coding of the selected documents was primarily directed at identifying narrative elements as indicated by the NPF i.e. setting, character, plot, and moral. Table 4.2 shows the different narrative elements and how these were identified in the documents. A qualitative data analysis software, NVivo, was used to code the documents. In line with the recommendation of Johnson et al. (2015), the coding was informed by the descriptions of what to identify in the documents as presented in Table 4.2. The different items were setup as nodes and when statements from the documents fit any of the descriptions, these were added to the nodes. The primary four narrative elements as identified in the NPF, i.e. setting, character, plot, and moral were established as the nodes and they constituted the tree node used for the NVivo analysis. In addition, based on the different types of these elements as identified in the NPF literature, each narrative element was setup with children nodes. As such, for narrative setting, the children nodes were bureaucratic, community, sectoral, and collectives; for narrative character, the children nodes were hero, ally, villain, victim, and antagonist; for narrative plot, the children nodes were rags to riches, overcoming the monster, and rebirth; and for narrative moral, the children nodes were incentives and sanctions, managing cost and benefit, and value reorientation. Examples of statements linked to the different nodes can be seen in Appendix 3. Some of these are also cited in Chapters 6, 7, and 8, which discuss the research findings.

In many instances, it was straightforward to identify the depiction of a narrative element, however, in some documents, when a statement indirectly implies the

portrayal of a narrative element, such expressions were coded to the relevant nodes. For example, in the UNISDR documents, there were references to the occurrence of disaster events in African countries without directly stating how the people are affected by these events. From such descriptions, one can deduce that the people within the countries would have been affected by the disaster event through the loss of properties and/or lives. Based on this, statements about occurrence of disaster in a location were linked to the narrative element of victim, to imply that the residents were victims of the disaster events. Also, where statistics of people lacking a service or amenity, along with the negative impact of such deprivation, are presented, these expressions are coded as the use of narrative character of victim, even though they don't specifically describe how the victims are being hurt. This is because such expressions emphasise that a population is experiencing difficulty as a result of what they lack.

Table 4.2: Narrative Elements Coded in Content Analysis

	Item	Description
1	Character: Hero	An actor that has made a notable achievement, attained success, or has a remarkable capability
2	Character: Victim	Who or what is affected by a situation or challenge
3	Character: Villain	Who or what is causing or contributing to harm
4	Character: Ally	A supporter of another actor, in relations to its identity, position, policy position, vision, or project. Or actors that are partnering together towards achieving an objective
5	Character: Antagonist	Who is antagonising/opposing another actor, or a policy stance or solution, or a project
6	Setting: Bureaucratic	Situating the policy transfer as a focus on institutional and administrative frameworks
7	Setting: Community	Situating the policy transfer as a focus on delivering service to a specific group in the population
8	Setting: Sectoral	Situating the policy transfer as a focus on a particular sector and addressing a challenge within the sector
9	Setting: Collective	Situating the policy transfer as a focus on providing service to all groups of the population
10	Plot: Rags to riches	Telling a story of a present state of lack and the possibility of achieving a better economic standing or prosperity
11	Plot: Overcoming the monster	Telling a story of the presence of an imminent threat and the possibility of overcoming it
12	Plot: Rebirth	Telling a story of archaic identities or positions, and the possibility of reinventing these.
13	Moral: Incentives and Sanctions	Recommending award of incentives and/or sanctions
14	Moral: Managing costs and benefits	Recommending managing cost and benefits
15	Moral: Value reorientation	Recommending a change in stance about, or understanding of, an issue or identity

Discerning the use of narrative elements from statements that may indirectly express such depictions can also be seen in other NPF studies. For example, an analysis of the quote below linked the Legal Action Project to the narrative character of hero, and the family of Simone Kim to the character of victim.

The Legal Action Project is asking the Alaska Supreme Court to reverse a trial courts dismissal of a case brought by the family of Simone Kim...the trial court incorrectly ruled that the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (“PLCAA”) shields the dealer from liability (Smith-Walter et al., 2016, p. 1073).

The authors designated the Legal Action Project as a hero because it was taking action on an issue of gun violence, and referred to the family of Simone Kim as a victim because the family had been affected by gun violence. Even though these are not stated outright in the quote, they can be deduced from the statement. Such indirect expressions may not readily come across to the reader as a depiction of the narrative element, but when the description of the narrative element being coded is considered based on the policy issue and the actors involved, one can see that such expressions can imply the portrayal of the narrative element.

However, to avoid overstressing the assumption of portrayals, there was conscientious referral to the codebook to ensure that the coded statements aligned with the given descriptions. In addition, after coding about half of the documents, a review was carried out to appraise what was emerging from the coding exercise. In looking at the coding for hero as a narrative character, certain discrepancies were noted. Particularly, the activities initiated and/or implemented by the actors were coded alongside grand depiction of actors, and this showed that there was limited consistency in the coding of hero. To clarify this, the activities that had been coded to the node were moved to annotations and then compiled with other list of events and activities shown in Appendix 4. In addition to the discrepancy noted, the review also

showed that there was nothing coded to villain under the node of character. This informed the decision to identify another character that seemed less malevolent than villain, in order to capture and observe the depiction of any oppositional or negative portrayals of the agent, recipient, or other actors involved in the transfer. Consequently, the codebook was corrected by describing the items more clearly. The documents containing the discrepancies were then coded a second time. The remaining documents were also coded and checked again based on the recommendations of the review session. Another means of cross-checking the coding exercise would have been by increasing the number of coders and determining the inter-coder agreement to ascertain reliability (Johnson et al., 2015). However, due to financial constraints, it was not possible to employ ad-hoc personnel.

In addition to finding narrative elements, the analysis also involved identifying specific actions, events and decisions carried out by the actors. The information gathered was collated separately from the codes and used to generate a sequence of activities leading up to the adoption of respective policies. A list of these activities is presented in Appendix 4.

After coding the documents, interviews were scheduled with relevant officials. By completing the coding exercise before conducting the interviews, I was in a good position to understand and engage with the responses of the interviewees, as I had gathered sufficient information about the cases of policy transfer before speaking with them. The use of interviews for the research is discussed in more detail below, but before this, the ethical consideration for the research is summarised in the next section.

4.2.2 Ethics Approval

Following the guidelines for the involvement of humans in research, an ethics application was submitted to the Ethics committee of the College of Social Science and International Studies (SSIS) at the University of Exeter. The application was approved on 25th January 2017 and the ethics certificate is attached in Appendix 5. In line with the approved application, the interviewees were assured that their input will be on an anonymous basis and neither their names nor positions will be disclosed in the thesis or other materials that will be produced from the research. An information sheet about the research was also shared with them prior to the interviews. After the discussion, the interviewees gave their consent on the use of the information they had given verbally and/or on consent forms, which were signed and returned via email.

All the interviews were held through telephone and online calling services, except one face-to-face meeting, and before commencing the session, the interviewees were informed about the recording of the discussion and their permission was sought for the recording to proceed. All the recordings were transcribed and the documents were stored on the university's U:Drive and on Microsoft OneDrive using an official account. After storing the transcripts, the recordings were deleted. Also, to preserve anonymity, the names of the interviewees were not stated in the transcripts.

4.2.3 Interviews

When the identified units within the organisations were contacted to request for documents relating to the development of the respective policies, they were also asked about the possibility of visiting their offices to speak with relevant officials. At the initial contact with the EUEI PDF, the request to visit their office in Brussels, Belgium was

turned down on the basis that relevant information that will be required for the research can be readily accessed from their online repository, and that the members of staff were not available to give interviews because of their busy schedule. Although this denial was unexpected, it prompted the realisation that “it can be quite difficult to secure interviews with busy officials who are widely sought after” (Aberbach and Rockman, 2002, p. 673). To counter this challenge, individual messages were sent to some members of staff and one of them responded and indicated interest in the research. The interest and willingness of the interviewee to participate in the research can be attributed to the interviewee’s value for academic studies and this ensured that the interview was not seen as a burden, but as a valuable exercise (Feldman et al., 2003; Laurilla, 1997). In addition to the official interviewed, a past consultant and a past employee of EUEI PDF, who were mentioned in some of the documents analysed, were contacted after getting their emails through an online professional profile and an event organiser respectively. The interview with the past consultant was held through Skype, while a face-to-face interview was held with the past EUEI PDF employee.

UNISDR Africa on the other hand, did not respond to the message sent to their official email address and a call was made to their Nairobi office at different times in a bid to speak with not only the front desk official, but a person with knowledge about the ECOWAS DRR policy transfer. Eventually, the call was directed to a senior manager within the organisation who agreed to be interviewed for the research. Attempts to contact specific persons who were past employees or consultants of the UNISDR and who had been mentioned in some of the documents relating to the policy transfer, were however unsuccessful, as there was no response to all the messages sent to the past officials. In addition, a past UNISDR official who was contacted via telephone was

not willing to freely share information if there would no compensation for his participation in the research, even though the past official alluded to being the author of the ECOWAS DRR policy document.

The challenging experience in gaining access to the officials of EU and UNISDR, is similar to what is often experienced when using elite interviews in research and making attempts to seek, locate, contact, and secure convenient appointments with the officials (Lilleker, 2003; Mikecz, 2012; Rivera et al., 2002). However, these challenges proved more difficult when trying to gain access to relevant officials of the transfer recipient, ECOWAS. Getting any foot through the door (Goldstein, 2002) was arduous as none of the calls to the official telephone numbers connected successfully and most email messages were not replied. In the words of Aberbach and Rockman (2002, p.673),

[t]his points to an important problem facing those wishing to interview elites. One must get access.

Just as identifying documents to attribute to ECOWAS' input to the DRR policy transfer depended on using information sourced from UNISDR's website, contacting ECOWAS Disaster Management Unit was made possible through the interaction established with the UNISDR official based in Nairobi. The Nairobi office provided the personal telephone number of one of the two officials managing the department and the interview involved exchange of emails and a follow-up call. This was because the interviewee did not think the internet access available at the organisation's location in Abuja, Nigeria, would allow a good connection for a Skype video or voice call.

To get access to ECREEE, emails were sent to several officials within the organisation, but all of them mentioned that they were not the appropriate personnel

to interview and recommended a specific official. The official was contacted and an arrangement was made to hold the interview in Accra, Ghana during a renewable energy conference. Unfortunately, the meeting was cancelled due to the review of the ethics application and the official could not be reached until many months later. A Skype call was scheduled after re-establishing contact with official, but this was also cancelled. After rescheduling the appointment a number of times, particularly because of the official's very busy schedule, the interview was finally conducted via telephone. Table 4.3 below gives a summary of the number of people interviewed for the research.

Table 4.3: Number of Interviews Conducted

	No of Persons	Mode of Interview	Duration (minutes)	Date
Case: Transfer of Renewable Energy Policy to ECOWAS				
EUEI PDF Official	1	Telephone	30	04/04/2017
ECREEE Official	1	Telephone	30	18/05/2017
Past EUEI PDF Official	1	Face-to-Face	55	05/04/2017
Past EUEI PDF Consultant	1	Skype	70	09/02/2017
Sub-Total	4			
Case: Transfer of Renewable Energy Policy to ECOWAS				
UNISDR	1	Telephone	30	16/08/2017
ECOWAS Disaster Management Unit	1	Email and Follow-up on Telephone	N/A	18/05/2017
Sub-Total	2			
Total	6			

The above discussion highlights the constraints on the mode of interview and the number of interviewees. Given the EUEI PDF's refusal to offer an invitation to their office in Brussels, the inability to meet ECREEE's official at the renewable energy

conference in Accra, the administrative barrier in accessing senior personnel within UNISDR Africa's, and the technical difficulty in reaching ECOWAS Disaster Management Unit, it was necessary to optimise available chances for securing contacts and conducting interviews. This involved reliance on use of ICTs for communication and ensuring the interviews are held with officials who can give accurate and cogent information about the relevant policy transfers. As a result, multiple modes of interviews were utilised and number of interviews conducted was limited to six, but this comprised at least one interviewee from each of the identified organisations.

Looking at Table 4.3, there is a notable difference in the number of persons interviewed for each of the two cases. Similar to the explanation for the difference in the number of documents analysed for the two cases, the difference in the number of interviewees reflects the amount of activities that led up to the adoption of the respective policies based on the duration of interaction between the transfer agents and recipient. Within the period of engaging with ECOWAS, the EUEI sponsored research activities by consultants for developing a scope report for the establishment of ECREE and a baseline report for ECOWAS Renewable Energy Policy. The EU also contributed significantly to the development of the first joint renewable energy policy document by the Anglophone and Francophone countries in West Africa. However, there was less activities led/or supported by UNISDR within ECOWAS compared to that of the EU, considering that the duration between the establishment of UNISDR Africa in 2002 and adoption of ECOWAS DRR policy in 2006 is four years, while the duration between the establishment of EUEI PDF in 2004 and adoption of ECOWAS renewable energy policy in 2013 is nine years.

As mentioned earlier, in line with the ethics approval, the participants were informed that the discussions will be recorded prior to the start of the interviews, and that their input will be confidential and anonymised. However, despite expressing this caveat, many of the interviewees did not mind being identified with participating in the research and they noted that what their contributions could be readily accessed in public documents. They often remarked, “[I] look at our website” (Interview 5, 2017). Nonetheless, they were assured that their names or positions would not be divulged in the research outputs. Eschewing the offer of anonymity and reiterating the accessibility of relevant information, emphasises the viability of using public consumption documents for research. Also, contrary to the notion that public consumption documents do not fully express the viewpoints of policy actors, the referral to these documents by the interviewees shows that these sources can provide significant information on the perceptions of their authors (McBeth et al., 2005).

The interviews lasted between thirty and seventy minutes. The interviewees were asked open ended questions. These were directed at pinpointing the intent of the transfer agent and recipient in engaging in the policy transfer and understanding the view of the interviewee regarding the policy transfer. In addition, the questions sought to decipher the relationship between the transfer agent and recipient and their perception of each other i.e. the perception of EU on ECOWAS and vice versa, and the perception of the UNISDR on ECOWAS and vice versa. The interview guide as well as the consent form are presented in Appendix 6. The duration of the interviews was primarily due to the availability of the interviewee, as the officials in full employment with the organisations could only spare thirty minutes for the interviews while others who were self-employed could afford to spend more time and as such, had longer interviews. All the interviews with current officials of the organisations were

held over the telephone, but others were face-to-face and via video call on Skype. After transcribing the interviews however, the relevance of the information from the telephone interviews was as valuable as that of the face-to-face and Skype interviews, despite the difference in the duration. With the use of open-ended questions, the discussion during the face-to-face and Skype interviews sometimes digressed from the focus of the research, as such, the extra time used on these interviews did not result in a major difference in the extent of relevant data from the telephone interviews. This observation also supports the conclusion by Holt (2010) and Mikecz (2012). They surmise that for elite interviewing, telephone interviews can be as useful as face-to-face interviews and that telephone interviews can also be beneficial if the interviewees are located in different regions. Indeed, the use of telephones played a key role in conducting interviews with persons located in four countries across two different continents.

4.3 Data Analysis

The use of the data from the interviews centred on supporting arguments on the transfer mechanism that facilitated the occurrence of the policy transfers and the depiction of narrative elements, as well as verifying assertions for the data drawn from the documents. Also, when conflicting information is observed in some of the documents, the responses from the interviews were used for clarification. For example, the question of who initiated the renewable energy policy transfer was a tricky one. This was because some of the documents claimed that ECOWAS requested the assistance of the EU, while the information in other documents suggested otherwise. To clarify the contradictory information and identify the precise entity that initiated the policy transfer, specifically in a bid to identify the transfer

mechanism, the responses from the interviews with EUEI PDF and ECREEE provided the needed clarification. The interview responses gave explanation to the use of the term 'request'. It also led to the knowledge of the decision made by the EU and other international actors at the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in 2002, to setup centres for renewable energy in low and middle-income countries (Interview 3, 2017; Interview 4, 2017; Meier and Haarstad, 2014). This helped to confirm that ECREEE was neither the brainchild of ECOWAS¹³ and nor was the development of the ECOWAS renewable energy initiated by domestic actors within West Africa.

With regards to coding for narrative elements using NVivo, the data drawn from the documents was aggregated for each of the 87 documents according to the different nodes that were set up. The number of types of narrative elements identified in the documents was then summed up for each case of policy transfer. The reason for aggregating the use of the different narrative elements at the level of individual case of policy transfer instead of at the level of individual actor, was to enable linking the use of narrative elements directly to a specific case of policy transfer. Also, since the input of both the transfer agent and recipient contribute to the emergence of the transfer mechanisms observed, aggregating the narrative elements for each case emphasise the intermediation by the policy transfer actors. It also negates the possible presumption that the transfer agent and recipient operated in different directions during the policy transfer, as this would have been the situation if these were cases of non-transfer. Rather, it is the agreement of or consent to the proposition of policy transfer

¹³ As part of the decision made at the 2002 WSSD, several centres of renewable energy and energy efficiency were setup across African, Caribbean, and Pacific regions including East African Centre for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency (EACREEE), SADC Centre for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency (SACREEE), Caribbean Centre for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency (CCREEE), Pacific Centre for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency (PCREEE) and ECOWAS Centre for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency (ECREEE).

that culminates in the occurrence of policy transfer and allows the identification of transfer mechanisms. In addition, aggregating the narrative elements per case study, enabled the observation of the difference in use of narrative elements and understanding how the transfer mechanisms employed in the two policy transfers differ.

To corroborate the findings from the analysis with NVivo, some basic statistical tests were also carried out. A chi-square test was used to assess the varying values generated for each type of narrative elements. The result of the chi-square (X^2) helped to show the independence of these values. So, instead of selecting a visibly highest value and linking it directly to a transfer mechanism, the chi-square test ensured that this value was indeed different from the rest and can be linked to the respective transfer mechanism. Also, a t-test was carried out to ascertain the difference observed in the use of narrative elements between the two cases. The test assessed the values generated from NVivo for each of the difference types of narrative element and the results showed whether the difference observed between the DRR policy transfer and renewable energy policy transfer is significant or not. Importantly, the confirmation of differences in the depiction of narrative elements across the two cases helped to substantiate the argument for the shaping power of narratives on policy transfer mechanisms. The analysis of the chi-square test and t-test are presented in Appendix 7.

Having discussed the case selection, data collection, and data analysis for this research, the next section concludes the methodology chapter and highlights the relevance of the methods utilised.

Conclusion

The chapter outlined the research design for the study and described how the research was carried out using narrative analysis and elite interviews. It presented the number of documents analysed using NVivo and discussed the identification of narrative elements depicted in the documents. It also stated the purpose of utilising elite interviews in addition to the narrative analysis. To ensure that the findings of the research are discussed accurately, the chapter notes the use of chi-square test and t-test for confirming the independence of values generated from the content analysis and the difference observed between the two cases.

Considering the challenges experienced in conducting the interviews, one might question if the analysis of publicly available documents would have been solely sufficient for the research. Based on the significance of the information gathered from the interviews and its key role in establishing the transfer mechanism operational in the renewable energy policy transfer, as a result of the decision made by international actors at WSSD, the use of elite interviews for this study is without a doubt, highly relevant. It is however, also plausible that none of the organisations and individuals contacted agreed to participate in the research and in such instance, it would be necessary to proceed with only the narrative analysis and refer to the absence of first-hand information as a limitation of the research.

This chapter also highlighted the incorporation of statistical techniques, in line with the practice in most NPF studies, as a relevant component for answering the overarching research question on the shaping power of narrative elements on transfer mechanism. Notably, the incorporation of NPF in this research helps to show the possibility of applying other theoretical frameworks with policy transfer and also demonstrate the

claim that “[t]he study of policy transfer has a truly interdisciplinary character” (Evans, 2004, p. 4).

Chapter 5 – Renewable Energy and Disaster Risk Reduction in ECOWAS

Introduction

This chapter introduces the two cases to be examined. The two cases are: i) the transfer of renewable energy policy to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) by the European Union (EU) and ii) the transfer of Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) policy to ECOWAS by United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR). ECOWAS consists of fifteen West African countries, and it is a supranational organisation with oversight function in diverse policy areas.

We noted in the last chapter that the two cases represent instances of policy transfer facilitated by IGOs and targeted at global propagation of public policy. Chapter 1 also highlights the importance of IGOs as policy transfer agents and emphasises that their resources enable them to engage in large scale policy transfers across multiple jurisdictions. Following these, this chapter presents the general phenomenon that the two cases exemplify and gives an overview of the involvement of IGOs in global propagation of public policy. Secondly, based on the findings from the analysis of selected documents and elite interviews, it narrows in on the two specific cases that are investigated in this research. It describes the involvement of the two IGOs, EU and UNISDR, in the adoption of renewable energy policy and DRR policy respectively. It also focuses on the activities of actors within the recipient jurisdiction, ECOWAS, by presenting background information on the establishment of ECOWAS as a regional organisation and its activities in the specific policy areas. Importantly, by narrowing in on the activities of the IGOs and what transpired within the recipient jurisdiction, the first component of the research sub-questions is answered in this chapter through the

identification of the transfer mechanisms operational in the two cases of policy transfer.

As mentioned earlier, the next section discusses the general phenomenon that the cases examined in this research represent.

5.1 What are these Transfers Cases Of?

For this research, considering the family of cases to which the study belongs to first invoked the area of literature and theoretical inclinations within which the study is positioned, and this prompted the suggestion that these are policy transfer cases. Albeit, based on the possibility of engaging in policy transfer in manifold dimensions, as can be seen from Chapter 2, it was necessary to identify the sub-family within policy transfer to which the cases pertain to. To do this, the transfer mechanisms and type of actors involved were identified. If we consider the different transfer mechanisms, we can note that the transfer mechanisms of persuasion, obligation, and conditionality have in common, the involvement of IGOs, and being externally-facilitated policy transfers. This sub-family differs from policy transfers facilitated by learning, as it does not identify the transfer recipient as the initiator and driver of the policy transfer process. The sub-family also differs from policy transfers driven by imposition, as it does not feature a command or order from a hierarchical authority mandating the transferred policy as operational in the recipient jurisdiction, nor the displacement of the transfer recipient's freedom to adopt or decline the proposed policy. Identifying this category of policy transfer, where the process is externally-initiated and often involve IGOs as transfer agents, is also in line with the remark by Ragin and Becker (1992, p.

10) that identification of cases may be informed by theoretical categories where the cases represent “an important subset of instances with many common characteristics”.

In addition to conceptual categories, Ragin and Becker (1992) also state that empirical considerations can inform addressing the concern of what is this a case of, and specifying the general population that the case study can give insight to. With respect to the two cases being studied for this research, the empirical consideration of case selection is hinged on the propagation of public policy through the involvement of international actors¹⁴. The contributions of international actors that are backed by resources, reach, and access to decision makers, to the proliferation of policy problems and agendas, has been seen to be gaining traction across geographical and social spheres (Levi-Faur and Vigoda-Gadot, 2006; Stone, 2010; Stone and Ladi, 2015). This often involves the identification of a policy problem or idea within a political setting, or by an organisation, or a group, which is then transported to multiple jurisdictions, in duplicate or modified form. Such policy problem or idea could have been generated from diverse sources, including within an epistemic community, where the idea may have been informed by research or superior knowledge (Dunlop, 2009), or within an international policy arena, such as the UN or OECD, where the idea may have been informed by the deliberations of the conglomeration of member states (Smith, 2004; Turhan et al., 2016). However, notwithstanding the source of the policy idea, the incentive for the involvement of international actors in the propagation of policy ideas could be a range of factors including, solving problems bound on externalities, controlling behaviours, ending a political or economic threat,

¹⁴ Based on Stone (2003), international actors encompass international governmental organisations (IGOs), international nongovernmental organisations (INGOs), states, and non-state actors.

strengthening alliances, or easing the distress of poor countries (Risse, 2007; Stone, 2003).

This phenomenon can be identified in the two cases. In the case of the transfer of renewable energy policy to ECOWAS by the EU, the transfer agent directed efforts at ensuring that multiple regional organisations in West Africa, South Africa, East Africa, Central Africa, Pacific Islands, and the Caribbean, develop energy policies that are favourable to the use of renewable energy sources (EUEI PDF, 2016a). Also, in the instance of policy transfer of DRR policy by UNISDR, the policy was not only introduced to ECOWAS, but also to Latin America, the Caribbean, Southeast Asia, Central Asia, and Europe (UNISDR, 2016a). These activities of the EU and the UN can be said to be reminiscent of 'large-scale' proliferation of public policy (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000; Holden, 2016; Stone, 2004). The peculiarity of the two organisations as IGOs can also be said to underpin the breadth of their intended reach, as IGOs "typically have ... resources ..., their members are typically governments, (*and*) they can claim special expertise and prestige" Pal (2014, p. 195). Based on the involvement of the two IGOs in facilitating the transfer of renewable energy and DRR policies to multiple jurisdictions, and the consideration of categories of policy transfer mechanisms driving the transfer process, it can be surmised that the two cases are associated with the phenomenon of propagation of public policy through policy transfers facilitated by IGOs.

Having shown the general phenomenon that the two cases represent, next, we will look at the specific policy transfer instances i.e. transfer of renewable energy policy and DRR policy to ECOWAS. However, in order to adequately demonstrate what transpired between the transfer agents and recipient, it is necessary to first give an overview of ECOWAS, its emergence as an IGO and how it relates with international

actors. Based on this, the next section gives a summary of how ECOWAS was formed and afterwards, there is a discussion on its evolution as a West African supranational organisation

5.2 Background on ECOWAS

5.2.1 The Formation of ECOWAS by Local Actors

Across many African countries, the 1960s was marked by the desire for self-actualisation and self-reliance which accelerated the drive to demand for independence and regain control of economic and political powers from European colonial powers (Biney, 2008; Ojo, 1980). In a bid to ensure that the independence brokered by the different countries are longstanding, many African leaders saw the need for strategic alliance among African countries, for strengthening ties and forming a strong union to surmount possible imperial incursions (Ojo, 1980; Thompson, 1969). In West Africa, the subcontinent comprising 18 countries¹⁵ and with English, French and Portuguese as dominant official languages, Nigeria and Ghana were the leading voices in this campaign, and deciding on how best to structure such alliance often put both countries and their leaders at loggerheads (Ojo, 1980).

Most literature on ECOWAS refer to Yakubu Gowon, former Nigeria's Head of State, as the frontrunner in the creation of ECOWAS in 1975 (Adeleke, 1995; Afolayan, 2016). However, prior to the 1970s, there had been plans to establish a union among West African countries. As at early 1960s, the then Prime Minister of the newly-independent Nigeria, Tafawa Balewa, canvassed for a study to be carried out by the

¹⁵ The 18 West African countries and their national languages are Benin (French), Burkina Faso (French), Cape Verde (Portuguese), Gambia (English), Ghana (English), Guinea (French), Guinea-Bissau (Portuguese), Ivory Coast (French), Liberia (English), Mali (French), Mauritania (French), Niger (French), Nigeria (English), the island of Saint Helena (English), Senegal (French), Sierra Leone (English), Sao Tome and Principe (Portuguese) and Togo (French).

United Nations Economic Commission of Africa (UNECA) on setting up an African Common Market and the creation of an African Development Bank (ADB). Although Nigeria's intent in promoting African integration was for it to become "the industrial heart of an African Common Market" (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1964, p. 24) and in particular to lead the West African sub-region (Akiba, 1998; Ojo, 1980), some members of the Nigerian Parliament and business community did not support the plan for a West African integration. This was because they feared that associating with West African Francophone countries would imply associating with France and in effect, the European Economic Community (EEC). Also, with Britain set to join the EEC, they were concerned that Nigeria may be welcoming Britain to interfere in its affairs (Ojo, 1980). Outside of Nigeria, Balewa's proposal for an economic union also faced a gridlock (Hancock, 2015a).

In opposition to Balewa's proposition for an economic union, the prominent Ghanaian leader and president, Kwame Nkrumah, proposed a political union similar to that of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), and called for the creation of a United States of Africa (Biney, 2008; Thompson, 1969). However, most of the countries feared losing their sovereignty and objected to the idea, which is often termed 'negative Nkrumanism' (Biney, 2008; Kumah-Abiwu and Ochwa-Echel, 2013). Despite the initial unwillingness to associate with the EEC, West African leaders eventually drew lessons from "[t]he formation of the EEC and its undoubted success" (Gowon, 1984, p. 8) in devising the formation and functioning of ECOWAS. Gowon 1984 (pp.102–103) notes that

"[w]e were fortunate, too, in being able to draw on the recent history of cooperation and integration among the West European nations, whose Common Market stimulated much interest and debate in Africa and in other parts of the developing world."

Fifteen West African Heads of state eventually signed the ECOWAS treaty in Lagos, Nigeria on the 28th of May, 1975 (Bach, 1983) and the treaty was registered with the UN in June 1976. Since signing of the treaty by the fifteen countries, an additional West African country, Cape Verde, has joined the community (Adeleke, 1995), but one of the founding countries, Mauritania, opted to leave (ECOWAS, 2015a), thereby making the total number of ECOWAS states, fifteen¹⁶. To operationalise the new organisation, a secretariat was setup in Lagos, Nigeria and headed by an Executive Secretary. An Authority of the Heads of States and Government, which is headed by a Chairman, was given the mandate to provide direction to the community and control the activities of the secretariat (Bach, 1983; ECOWAS, 2015b; Gowon, 1984). Other institutions that were setup include, a Council of Ministers, Defence Council, Executive Secretariat, Tribunal of the Community, and Technical and Specialised Commissions (Gowon, 1984).

5.2.2 The Involvement of External Actors in ECOWAS and the Revision of ECOWAS Treaty

After its creation, ECOWAS functioned with little or no interference from international policy actors. Albeit, this liberty was not to last long. Based on the archives of the final communique of meetings of the Authority of the Heads of States and Government, the first and second meetings held in 1978 and 1979 respectively, had in attendance only leaders of ECOWAS Member States (MS) and observers from African organisations (ECOWAS, 2015c). However, by 1981, there was attendance of representatives of

¹⁶ The fifteen ECOWAS Member States are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.

international organisations such as, the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) and United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), as observers. Altogether, the 1981 meeting had in attendance six international observers and by 1982, the number of international observers present had risen to ten.

The increase in the involvement of international organisations can be linked to two major reasons. First is the voluntary invitation of persons from these organisations to work as external consultants (Gowon, 1984) and second is the 1980s global drive by developed countries to address the impact of 1970s oil crisis on poor countries and actualise accelerated development in these countries (Alter et al., 2013; UN, 1981). Gowon (1984, p.467) comments on the involvement of external influence in ECOWAS and notes that the Executive Secretary of ECOWAS secretariat was prepared “to sub-contract ECOWAS work to other organisations already in the field and having compatible or parallel goals - including the entire gamut of United Nations agencies”.

Going into its second decade, ECOWAS continued to be influenced by external actors and in 1993, the community went ahead with a revision of the treaty establishing the organisation at its summit of ECOWAS Heads of States, a decision that is said to be informed by external influence and aligning with neoliberal economic directions and market integration (Alter et al., 2013; Bach, 2004; Nwogu, 2007). The 1993 revision of the treaty also led to the restructuring of ECOWAS into a supranational authority rather than the intergovernmental arrangement favoured by the founding fathers (ECOWAS Commission, 2015a; Kufuor, 2006; Yaya, 2014). ECOWAS “member states agreed to a series of institutional changes that emulate the EU” (Alter, 2012, p. 150) with the 1993 ECOWAS treaty establishing the ECOWAS Court of Justice, ECOWAS Parliament, and ECOWAS Council of Ministers. Also, in 2006, the ECOWAS

secretariat was “transformed” into a commission and the position of the Executive Secretary metamorphosed into that of President of the Commission (ECOWAS 2015b, p.1).

Bach (2004) opines that the revision of the ECOWAS treaty was likely imposed on it by external influence, in a bid to see the region align with neoliberal economic directions. Kufuor (2006) and Alter et al. (2013) also refer to the influence of conditionality of economic liberalisation given by Bretton Woods institutions such as the World Bank for awarding aid to the region, as the reason for the institutional changes embarked upon by ECOWAS. Also, the below excerpt from an official remark on the transformation by ECOWAS assert to the influence of international actors in the restructuring of the organisation.

Changes have already been underway with the support of development partners. These initiatives were boosted by the Heads of State and Government when they endorsed institutional transformation covering all ECOWAS Institutions (ECOWAS 2015b, p.1).

Since the revision of the ECOWAS treaty in 1993 and restructuring of ECOWAS institutions, ECOWAS has continued to work with international development partners on diverse policy issues and these relationships have often evolved into the use of knowledge or adoption of policies that had been operational in other jurisdictions. The next section gives an overview of how the policy areas of renewable energy and DRR have evolved within the ECOWAS community, and after this, we will delve further into the specific policy transfer instances to discuss the contributions of the transfer agents and identify the transfer mechanisms involved in the two cases.

5.3 Background on the Policy Areas: Renewable Energy and DRR

5.3.1 Promoting Use of Renewable Energy in ECOWAS

The 1975 ECOWAS treaty provided for the establishment of a transport, telecommunications and energy commission and Article 48 of the treaty directed ECOWAS MS to harmonise their energy policies and formulate a common energy policy (United Nations Treaty Series, 1976). Following the two oil crises in the 1970s, the issue of energy was of prominent concern (Chapman, 2014; Grossman, 2015) particularly in West Africa, considering that the region constituted “the world's largest concentration of least-developed economies” (Hanink and Owusu 1998, p.363). In line with this, energy was given special attention at the fourth summit of the leaders of MS, held in 1981 (ECOWAS, 2015d). The leaders made the decision to adopt an energy programme that will focus on “short-term ‘survival’ measures as well as a long-term development programme for the Community” (ECOWAS 1981, p.6).

To ensure this survival, there was a call for support in the form of increased staffing of ECOWAS institutions with capable personnel from the civil service of MS, even if for brief periods. Also, the leaders did not hesitate to call for reinforcement from external sources. They considered the possibility of reaching out to international development organisations such as the UN, for consultancy support and for addressing a seeming shortage of domestic expertise (ECOWAS, 1981). Taking up the latter suggestion for mobilising external support, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) was invited in 1981, to provide consultancy services on an energy programme (USAID, 1982). As part of the programme, a symposium was held in November 1981 and USAID helped to setup a team of energy experts from the USA to serve as resource persons. It also sponsored the documentation of the proceedings at the symposium. The ECOWAS symposium was tagged ‘Energy for Survival’, and it

had in attendance representatives of all the MS alongside representatives of several donor organisations. The report prepared by the USAID team showed that there was an unanimous decision by the delegates to the symposium, that ECOWAS should prioritise renewable energy sources, particularly, hydropower and solar. The community's secretariat was also tasked with the role of policy coordination, so that MS would take steps "to encourage energy savings and bring renewable energy sources into the mainstream" (USAID, 1982, p. v).

The 1981 symposium report by USAID (USAID, 1982) notes that it was not until 1981 that energy was included as part of the policy areas to be covered by ECOWAS. Also, Hancock (2015, p.108) ascribe the introduction of energy as a policy area in ECOWAS to the 1993 restructuring of ECOWAS. However, as noted earlier, Article 48 of the 1975 treaty establishing ECOWAS called for the formulation of a common energy policy. In addition, following the 1981 meeting of Authority of Heads of States and Government and the 'Energy for Survival' symposium had taken place, there was an increased attention to renewable energy sources within ECOWAS. ECOWAS had also associated with the global drive for use of renewable energy sources at the time. Notable West African leaders participated in the 1981 United Nations conference on new and renewable sources of energy, which issued the Nairobi Programme of Action for the development and utilisation of new and renewable sources of energy (Akinbami, 2001; UN, 1981). In line with the Nairobi Programme of Action, ECOWAS released the Conakry Declaration in 1982 where it mandated MS to setup energy commissions in their countries for "coordinating and supervising all energy functions and activities within each member state" (Energy Commission of Nigeria, 2012). In addition to the creation of energy commissions, ECOWAS, at its meeting of Authority of Heads of States and Government in 1982, also discussed the development of an

ECOWAS energy policy and creation of an ECOWAS Energy Resources Development Fund (ECOWAS, 1982). Unfortunately, neither of these initiatives materialised. Nonetheless, we may imply that energy was on the agenda at time ECOWAS was founded in 1975 and that the topic of renewable energy had been broached before the 1993 revision of the ECOWAS treaty.

Similar to the experience of decreased interest in renewable energy on the global scene as a result of glut in oil prices (Bourodimos, 1990; Cowan, 1985), there was also diminished interest in use of renewable energy in the region. In the late 80s, the notes from the meetings of the Authority of Heads of States and Government show that issues such as free movement within the community, cultural integration, MS' financial contributions and economic concerns particularly, debt financing remained recurring themes on the agenda. However, with the eruption of violence in Liberia in 1989, the 1990s was marked by attending to the brewing conflict and its spread to other parts of the region.

On the other hand, the 1990s was a period of global reawakening to the use of renewable energy in response to the threat of climate change (Bulkeley and Betsill, 2013; Tsoskounoglou et al., 2008). Albeit, ECOWAS did not readily identify with the need to address this challenge and as such, was not on board the new drive for promotion and use of renewable energy as at the time it regained traction internationally (Beg et al., 2002). In 1992, the United Nations had organised the Earth Summit in Rio, where more than a hundred countries committed to “changing the traditional approach to development” (UN, 1997, p. 1), and signed the legally binding convention on climate change. As part of the convention, which is domiciled with the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), countries are urged to promote and apply technologies in energy and other sectors that can help

prevent climate change. The UNFCCC also created the Africa Renewable Energy Initiative, to promote the use of renewable energy in addressing climate change within African countries. Within ECOWAS however, the issue of climate change did not appear as a topic discussed during the meetings of the Authority of Heads of States at the time the Earth Summit was organised and through the rest of the 1990s.

ECOWAS' non-alignment with the drive to address climate change rules out the possibility of the transfer of renewable energy policy being facilitated by an obligation to the UN's convention on climate change in the 1990s, since the adoption of the policy was not an obligatory response to the requirement of this convention (Benson and Jordan, 2011; Bulmer et al, 2007). In particular, at a UN meeting on climate change and development in Africa, an official of ECOWAS Commission stated in his presentation that the "issue of climate change is not addressed specifically" (Djeri-Alassani, 2011, p. 3) within the community. Expectedly, when the issue of energy resurfaced on the agenda in 2003, it had no bearing with the concerns of climate change.

At their 2003 meeting, West African Heads of States highlighted the persistence of energy challenges in the region and made the decision to develop and sign an ECOWAS Energy Protocol, which stipulates the guidelines for economic transactions of aspects of energy exploration, generation, distribution and transmission (ECOWAS, 2003a). It was on the premise of the energy protocol that a West African Power Pool (WAPP) and a West African Gas Pipeline project emerged. WAPP was granted a status of an ECOWAS specialised institution in 2006 and has been functioning actively since then. The Power Pool is a conglomerate of energy companies of the MS and works towards a regional coordination of electricity generation and provision. The pipeline project involves four countries (Benin, Ghana, Nigeria and Togo) and it seeks

to supply purified natural gas produced in Nigeria to the other countries. The energy protocol also provided for giving due consideration to “developing and using renewable energy sources” (ECOWAS, 2003b, p. 26), but this recommendation was not linked specifically to climate change.

In 2005, ECOWAS teamed up with the dominant Francophone West African regional group, West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU)¹⁷, to sign a convention on joint implementation of actions in the energy sector, and this led to both organisations adopting a White Paper targeted at the provision of modern energy services to people living in rural and peri-urban locations (ECOWAS and UEMOA, 2006). The policy document is primarily based on the objectives of the UN’s Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and is expected to augment the Energy Protocol. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) provided technical support for development of the White Paper, while the French government provided funding assistance. The White Paper heralded the accommodation of environmental and climate change concerns in ECOWAS’ energy-related policies, with the mention of sustainable development as one of its guiding principles. However, as against the major narrative plot often associated with the issue of climate change, which is one of a catastrophic threat that needs to be stopped (Lowe, 2006; Wright et al., 2006), the ECOWAS/UEMOA White Paper, is instead directed at ending energy poverty in ECOWAS MS. The excerpt below from the White Paper portrays what it aims to address.

This (*White Paper*) reflects our vision for 2015 and will play a critical role in the improvement of the conditions and well-being of the ECOWAS rural and peri-urban populations. These populations jeopardize their health and that of their children by burning harmful domestic fuels; they spend a great part of their day trekking several kilometres with heavy loads; they give birth in semi-darkness;

¹⁷ WAEMU consists of eight French speaking countries namely Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo. It is also referred to as UEMOA in French.

in short, they are deprived of economic opportunities because they do not have access to or cannot afford adequate energy services. In short, it is needless to say that our populations deserve better and we have to free them from these hardships (ECOWAS and UEMOA, 2006, p. ii).

The involvement of the UN as a transfer agent can also be noted in the development and adoption of the White Paper, however, the intervention of the UN was not linked to ECOWAS being a signatory to an international regime or structure (Unalan, 2009), or to a climate change policy and renewable energy agreements, thus the transfer mechanism in this instance cannot be said to be obligation. Also, since the MDGs were developed so as to secure funds for poverty eradication from international donors (United Nations, 2016; United Nations Development Programme, 2005), the White Paper does not vie for attainment of victory over a villain, but it focuses on reducing the burden of victims of energy poverty (ECOWAS and UEMOA, 2006).

As mentioned earlier, the White Paper signalled a renewable energy policy direction which is informed by the challenge of climate change, but not directly aimed at stopping climate change, instead, it is focused on ending energy poverty. Despite the targets set in the White Paper however, ECOWAS MS continue to grapple with the challenge of energy provision for their population and ensuring energy activities within the region are sustainable. Cumulatively, the region also represents the area with the least access to energy globally (Hancock, 2015b). Based on a 2011 assessment of the level of achievements of the ECOWAS/WAEMU energy White Paper, results of which are shown in Table 5.1, the West African region seems to continue to lag behind in access to electricity in rural locations and access to modern cooking fuel. Among developing countries globally, West Africa represents the region with abysmally low level of energy access at 17% in contrast to what obtains in Latin America (85%), Middle East (79%) and, North Africa (99%) (International Energy Agency (IEA), 2015).


In addition, despite the existing efforts by ECOWAS and other international donors involved in ensuring the availability of energy services within the region, there seemed to have been no visible improvement in the conditions in the region. As shown in Figure 5.1, as at 2009, 58% of the population across the region had no access to electricity, and by 2011, the percentage of people living in West Africa without energy access had increased to 63%. It is against this background of dire circumstances and unsuccessful attempts at addressing the situation of lack of energy access in West Africa, that the EU facilitated the transfer of renewable energy policy to ECOWAS.

Table 5.1: Achievements of the ECOWAS/UEMOA White Paper on Energy Access

White Paper Goals	Goals Target	Achievement of Goals
Access to modern cooking fuel	100% of the population	17% of the populations (30% urban, 7% rural)
Individual electricity access	66% of the population	42%
Electricity access in urban and peri-urban areas	100%	70%
Electricity access in rural areas	36%	11%

Source: Adapted from ECREEE (2012)

Figure 5.5: Energy Access in ECOWAS as at 2009 and 2012



Sources: ECREEE (2012), International Energy Agency (2015)

The next section introduces the emergence of DRR as a policy issue in ECOWAS and discusses how disasters was perceived within the region prior to the adoption of the ECOWAS DRR policy.

5.3.2 Disaster Risk Reduction in ECOWAS

Having little or no experience in managing large scale ravaging natural disasters, most ECOWAS countries paid little or no interest to DRR issues or pursued the adoption of DRR policies, at the time such concerns emerged on the international policy agenda in the 1960s (UNECA and UNISDR, 2013). The world's attention was turned to DRR concerns after the occurrence of multiple natural disasters in Asia and the Americas (UNISDR, 2012a). The disasters, which included earthquakes in Iran and Macedonia, and hurricanes in Cuba, Haiti, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, ravaged lives and livelihoods of thousands of people. In response to this, the United Nations General Assembly, in 1965, mandated the UN secretariat to assist countries experiencing natural disasters, by providing emergency services (Pelling and Uitto, 2001; Tchalenko et al., 1974; UNISDR, 2012a). However, after the occurrence of another earthquake in Iran, in 1968, which killed about 12,000 people, the UN General Assembly in 1970, identified the need for disaster prevention and reducing damages and deaths in the event of disasters which could not be prevented (Pelling and Uitto, 2001; UNISDR, 2012a). The General Assembly therefore requested that the Secretary General propose recommendations for:

[p]re-disaster planning at the national and international levels, including the definition of machinery and contingency arrangements capable of coping immediately with disaster situations; ... (d) The application of technology to, and scientific research for, the prevention and control of natural disasters, or a mitigation of the effects of such disasters, including arrangements to

disseminate effectively to all countries the fruits of research from satellites and other sophisticated technology with a view to strengthening international co-operation to determine the causes and early manifestation of impending disasters and the development and improvement of early warning systems (United Nations General Assembly, 1970, p. 83).

The recommendations put forward by the Secretary General in 1971, in response to the request from the General Assembly, led to creation of a United Nations Disaster Relief Office. The new arm facilitated the incorporation of disaster risk reduction into development objectives through the UNDP in a bid to ensure that "[n]ew International Development Strategy ... take into account, matters concerning disaster relief, preparedness and prevention" (United Nations General Assembly, 1979, p. 94). Despite the 1971 recommendation by the UN on the incorporation of DRR to development efforts, ECOWAS, in its first Treaty signed in 1975, did not make reference to any disaster-related issue (United Nations Treaty Series, 1976). This omission can be based on the intent of the founding fathers of the community in creating an economic union hinged on intergovernmental cooperation, rather than instituting a supranational authority. As such, while the world continued to grapple with disaster issues in the late 1980s, with the occurrence of floods, hurricanes and typhoons across the Caribbean islands, South-East Asia and Southern Africa, DRR did not appear on ECOWAS' policy agenda (ECOWAS, 2015d).

These 1980s disasters prompted the UN to christen the forthcoming decade, the 1990s, the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (UNISDR, 2012a). During the decade however, the disasters challenging ECOWAS were not natural, but man-made. They also were not environmental, but political. With the break out of civil wars and attempted toppling of sitting governments in three of its MS i.e. Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea Bissau, managing the political crises ensuing from the war and

ending the war altogether, topped ECOWAS' agenda in the 1990s (Alter et al., 2013; Kufuor, 2006).

5.3.3 Disaster Management as Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution

To address these challenges, ECOWAS Authority of Heads of States and Government followed in the step of the Organisation for African Unity (OAU), which is now restructured as the African Union (AU) (Souaré and Handy, 2013). In 1993, the Africa-wide organisation adopted a Central Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in Africa, primarily to prevent and end eruption of violence on the continent, and provide legal backing for military and non-military interventions (OAU, 1993). To stem the spread of conflicts within West Africa, ECOWAS also signed a Protocol on Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-Keeping and Security in 1999 (ECOWAS, 2000), which it tagged "The Mechanism" (ECOWAS, 2015b, p. 1). The Mechanism focused on conflict issues and created new institutions for the community, including an armed military force, the ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), and a Council of Elders. In addition to addressing violent political conflicts, The Mechanism goes a step further than the provisions of the OAU protocol, and mandates the development of "effective policies that will help alleviate the suffering of the population and restore life to normalcy after complex humanitarian emergencies and disasters" (ECOWAS, 2006, p. 2).

The adoption of The Mechanism can be described as an instance of policy transfer from a continent to sub-continent political setting, and informed by "dissatisfaction and problem with the status quo" (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996, p. 346) of politically-motivated violence. Also, The Mechanism's target of ending violent conflicts and

maintaining security in West Africa seems to reflect ECOWAS' understanding of and approach to reducing disasters, such that by setting up a military arm, it specifically sought to focus on conflict perpetrators. In addition, with the introduction of the Council of Elders, it hoped that complex humanitarian disasters could be avoided through resolving disputes between warring factions (ECOWAS, 2006).

The adoption of the conflict prevention and resolution policy, which provides a humanitarian support component, can also be linked to the restructuring of ECOWAS to a supranational authority through the revision of its treaty in 1993, as this enabled the broadening of the policy areas overseen by the Community, to include issues that are not directly related to economic concerns. As opposed to the provisions of the 1975 treaty, the revised treaty provided for cooperation in non-economic environmental issues. Article 29 of the treaty explicitly mandates the community's MS to "protect, preserve and enhance the natural environment of the region and cooperate in the event of natural disasters" (ECOWAS, 1993, p. 21), while Article 25 on Agricultural Development And Food Security calls for the establishment of an early warning system to prevent food shortages and the "strengthening of existing institutions for the management of natural calamities, agricultural diseases and pest control" (ECOWAS 1993, p.17). With reference therefore to the humanitarian aspect of The Mechanism, alongside cooperation in environment and food security policies as stipulated in the 1993 treaty, the ECOWAS Commission setup the humanitarian affairs department, in 2000 (ECOWAS Commission, 2015b).

Although the department established an early warning system, this was however, directed at envisaging the eruption of violence in ECOWAS MS, instead of addressing concerns of natural disasters. The department also dedicated efforts to managing the deployment of a civilian response team to locations where the armed peacekeeping

forces, ECOMOG, were engaged in ending conflicts. The decisions and actions of ECOWAS, especially, in borrowing a conflict prevention and resolution policy from the OAU, reiterate that the disasters that mattered to the organisation in the 1990s and early 2000s were not necessarily those that were prioritised by the UN in its International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction, but those of non-environmental causes.

5.3.4 ECOWAS' Interest in DRR and Development of the Africa Regional Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction

There was however, a turnaround in ECOWAS' assumed policy preference on the issue of disasters, by 2003. Based on the occurrence of natural disasters (particularly floods, droughts, and pests infestations), in Africa, through the 1990s and early 2000s (AU and NEPAD, 2004a; ECOWAS, 2006; Olowu, 2010), the UN again called for the incorporation of a DRR component in development initiatives at its World Summit on Sustainable Development held in 2002 (UNISDR, 2012a). In response to this call, the AU and its New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), with the support of UNISDR, UNDP and Africa Development Bank (ADB), introduced activities that were targeted at developing continent-wide food security and disaster management policies (AU and NEPAD, 2004a). These efforts led to the involvement of eight sub-continental organisations such as ECOWAS, referred to as Regional Economic Communities (RECs). ECOWAS contributed to the development of the African Regional Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction, which was developed in 2003 and adopted at the African Ministerial Conference on the Environment in 2004 (AU and NEPAD, 2004a; ECOWAS, 2006). In view of this commitment, ECOWAS made the decision to setup

its own Technical Committee on Disaster Management, in 2003. In a comment on the new focus on DRR issues, the organisation noted that:

over the last couple of years, ECOWAS has increasingly focused its attention on disaster issues culminating in the establishment of disaster risk reduction as an operational theme (ECOWAS, 2006, p. 4)

Also, taking note of ECOWAS' newly pitched interest in DRR issues, the UNISDR in its November 2004 newsletter edition, remarked that:

ECOWAS ... [is] also planning to increase their involvement in disaster risk management (UNISDR Africa, 2004a, p. 51)

The development of the African Strategy for DRR and ECOWAS' interest in DRR issues can be linked to the establishment of an African office of the UNISDR, in 2002 (UNISDR, 2003a; Vordzorgbe, 2006). The African office identified and worked with relevant stakeholders such as continent-wide organisations, like AU and NEPAD, and RECs, like ECOWAS. With an established relationship with the UNISDR, and continued involvement in continental activities, ECOWAS was able to place DRR on its agenda and show interest in DRR policy decisions made at the global and regional levels.

Having presented the background on the ECOWAS and the two policy areas in focus, we will now turn to the involvement of the transfer agents in these policy areas and the transfer mechanisms operational in the two transfer instances.

5.4 Policy Transfer Agents and Transfer Mechanisms

In addition to the direct involvement of the EU in the transfer renewable energy policy to ECOWAS and the involvement of UNISDR in the transfer of DRR policy to ECOWAS, various actors were also involved in the transfer process. The importance of highlighting the other international actors involved is so much so because these policy issues are not particular to the local recipient domain i.e. West African countries, but are pertinent international concerns primarily based on their link to the global environmental challenge of climate change. In the case of renewable energy policy transfer, UNIDO, the governments of Austria and Spain through their development cooperation arms i.e. the Austrian Development Cooperation (ADC) and the Spanish Cooperation, Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo (AECID) respectively, played different roles in facilitating the policy transfer, mostly through their contribution to the establishment and operations of ECREEE. In the case of DRR policy transfer, in addition to the input of the AU and NEPAD, the UNEP directly supports the activities of UNISDR Africa through secretariat support and also partners with UNISDR Africa as a member of the UN Inter-Agency Task Force on Disaster Reduction (IATF-DR). The UNDP also partners with UNISDR Africa as part of the IATF-DR. The World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) was also involved in promoting DRR through its WMO Programme for Natural Disaster Prevention and Mitigation. A notable contribution to the promotion of DRR in ECOWAS, particularly the adoption of the Hyogo Framework of Action, is the Global Facility for Disaster Risk Reduction (GFDRR) which is a multilateral funding mechanism for managing DRR in developing countries. The organisation is managed by the World Bank and mainly funded by the EU and Japan.

On the receiving end of the policy transfer, the ECOWAS Member States on their own participated in the process through their alignment with the decisions and activities of the ECOWAS Commission, as well as assigning focal points for the policy issues, joining sub-regional coalitions to promote a particular position, and carrying out public awareness activities in their respective jurisdictions. The countries along the Sahel region of West Africa formed the Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS), which is focused on the issue of droughts in the sub-continent and their influence likely led to the emphasis on drought in the policy document (CILSS, 2018). Also, the countries of Senegal, Mali, Nigeria, and Ghana, welcomed the activities of UNISDR Africa by holding formal events to sensitise local policy actors and the public on the relevance of DRR and creation of national platform of DRR, as recommended in the HFA. Notably, the Francophone West African countries, which are grouped under the auspices of UEMOA, contributed to the adoption of the renewable energy policy through their formal cooperation with ECOWAS on developing a White Paper on energy access, which served as the foundation for developing the regional renewable energy policy document.

The involvement and contributions of these diverse actors to the transfer process reiterate the point that policy transfer is not a direct, facile process, but it is multilateral, multi-level, and multifaceted. It is therefore characterised by intermediaries or interlocutors co-driving or interjecting the process, which may result in halting, abrading, or smoothing the path to the eventual occurrence of policy transfer. Without undermining the activities and contributions of all the various actors, the significant roles of funding and driving or 'project managing' the transfer instances by the EU and UNISDR go to show that these organisations played leading roles in facilitating the transfer of renewable energy policy and DRR policy to ECOWAS

respectively. Also, ECOWAS acted as the primary contact and conduit to these transfer agents and other international actors, in their effort to promote these policy issues in West Africa. Another thing to note is the alignment of purpose among the international actors, and among the different countries of the West African region. This can be seen in the decision made at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002 by the varying international organisations to ensure the development and adoption of environmentally-friendly policies in African regions and countries. Also, the formal assent by individual ECOWAS countries to decisions that led to the development of the policies as well as the formal assent of the policy documents points to the actors as very likely being of one mind. It is based on this that the narratives of the EU and UNISDR are taken as a representative voice of the transfer agents for the two cases, and the ECOWAS as a representative voice of the recipient.

The next section will focus on the events and actions facilitated by transfer actors, and which led to the adoption of the ECOWAS renewable energy.

5.4.1 The EU and the Creation of ECOWAS Centre for Renewable Energy and Efficiency (ECREEE)

At the 2007 meeting of Authority of the Heads of States and Government, the leaders of ECOWAS MS raised the issue of rise in oil prices and lack of electrical power in some parts of the region, and in a bid to address this challenge, they endorsed the establishment of an ECOWAS Centre for Renewable Energy and Efficiency (ECREEE) (ECOWAS, 2008). At the meeting, the leaders also persistently called for international financial and technical support for the realisation of the objective of the newly formed agency (ECOWAS, 2008; Kappiah and Lugmayr, 2011). In response to this, the Austrian Minister for European and International Affairs and a representative

from the United Nations Industrial Organisation (UNIDO), who were present at the meeting, pledged their support for setting up and managing ECREEE (ECREEE, 2013b).

In a presentation delivered by the Executive Director of ECREEE to the Austrian business community and experts on renewable energy, in June 2011, he announced that four additional partners will be supporting the agency in delivering on its mandate (Kappiah and Lugmayr, 2011), and among these was the EU. The EU supports ECREE through the EUEI-PDF's Renewable Energy Cooperation Program (RECP). As noted in the earlier chapter, this funding instrument is linked to the Africa–EU Energy Partnership, which is also a part of the broader EU pact with ACP states and positioned under the international cooperation and development arm of the European Commission.

5.4.2 The EU and the Development and Adoption of the ECOWAS Renewable Energy Policy

The idea of the establishment of regional centres of renewable energy and energy efficiency in developing countries, primarily originated from international actors (Interview 4, 2017; Meier and Haarstad, 2014). The EU had also been engaged with the process from its introduction at the World Summit on Sustainable Development, which was held in Johannesburg in 2002 (European Commission, 2001). With respect to the creation of ECREEE, the EU sponsored a research study on the establishment of a West African regional agency for energy access in 2006 and the report from the study informed the setting up of ECREEE (Brew-Hammond et al., 2006). So, in conjunction with UNIDO and the government of Austria, the EU also contributed to the initiation of ECREEE. Its role however became more prominent with the launch of the

project 'Development of a Regional Renewable Energy Policy' by the EUEI under the Africa-EU RECP. As part of the project, a baseline report for the policy was published in 2012 (ECREEE, 2012a). The report identified existing institutional frameworks in West Africa, comprising regional and national organisations, and on-going initiatives that will serve as a springboard for the policy and also inform quantitative goals and benchmarks. Afterwards, the policy document was developed by European experts who were selected by ECREEE officials, but funded by the EU (Interview 2, 2017).

The notable input of the EU to the development of the renewable energy policy is also echoed by the President of ECOWAS Commission. As we can see in the below excerpt from his foreword address written for the policy document, he addresses the EU as a major partner, while the other international development partners could be taken to be additional supporting organisations.

I wish to express appreciation to the European Union (Renewable Energy Cooperation Program (RECP) of the Africa–EU Energy Partnership with technical support from the Partnership Dialogue Facility of the EU Energy Initiative (EUEI-PDF) for their support in the development of this policy. We are also grateful to the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO), the Global Environment Facility (GEF), and the Governments of Austria and Spain (ECREEE, 2013a, p. 5).

The policy document developed was presented to ECOWAS Ministers of Energy in October 2012 at a forum held in Accra, Ghana and the policy was adopted by the ministers (ECREEE, 2013a). Afterwards, the Authority of the Heads of States and Government also endorsed the policy at their 43rd Ordinary Session which held in July 2013 (ECREEE, 2013a).

The ECOWAS renewable energy policy can be said to mirror the provisions of the 2009 EU Directive on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources. Two key characteristics form the basis of the structure of the 2009 EU Directive (European

Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2009). The first is the specific numerical targets set for MS, representing the share of renewable energy expected to contribute to total energy consumption in the countries. The second characteristic is the demand for development of national action plans by each MS and submission of the plans to the regional body. In similar fashion, the 2013 ECOWAS renewable energy policy sets numerical targets which MS are expected to align with and from which they can determine their national targets. It also mandates MS to develop individual national action plans to be submitted to ECREEE and which is to be revised every five years. In addition, the emphasis paid to energy efficiency in the ECOWAS policy reflects similar viewpoint expressed in the EU Directive. For example, the ECOWAS policy states that the document is aimed at “creating synergies with other ECOWAS policies, and particularly the ECOWAS Energy Efficiency Policy (EEEP)” (ECREEE, 2013a, p. 24), while the EU Directive claims that “the development of energy from renewable sources should be closely linked to increased energy efficiency” (European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2009, p. 16). Also, based on the quote below from an ECREEE official, the relevance of EU’s renewable energy directive in the development of the ECOWAS renewable energy policy is noted.

We saw from the experience of the European Union that they had a renewable energy policy in place, they had the renewable energy directive. Basically, we followed, we towed the line to replicate what had been done in the EU, to do it here and we thought EUEI PDF will be the right partners based on their experience in the EU, to support us in this endeavour (Interview 2, 2017).

Although the policy objectives of both regional bodies are quite different, with the EU’s renewable energy policy primarily aimed at complying with the UN emission reduction commitments and that of ECOWAS targeted at addressing energy poverty, the

similarity in the approach and reference to drawing inspiration from EU's directives signify an evidence of policy transfer. The approach of reviewing policy documents for similarities in content and style can also be seen in other policy transfer studies. Bray et al. (2011) analyse the transport strategy documents of five capital cities in mainland Australia. They identify similarities and differences in the approaches (such as use of scenarios and share targets), proposed programs (such as investment program), and language, in order to show evidence of policy transfer. Sharman (2010) specifically set out to identify similarities in texts of policy documents on tax blacklists from different countries and the study was able to reveal direct duplication of wordings of policy documents, including errors in some instances, in order to show evidence of dysfunctional policy transfer. Also, Dussauge-Laguna (2013a) presents a case study showing similarities in the nomenclature of new public management policies in Chile and Mexico, but with both countries preferring different approaches for achieving the same objective. In this instance, the policy transfer of renewable energy policy transfer to ECOWAS seems to be more suited to a case of dissimilar objectives, but analogous approaches.

The next section expatiates further on the involvement of the transfer actors and identifies the mechanisms that led to the occurrence of renewable energy policy transfer to ECOWAS by the EU.

5.4.3a The Transfer Mechanism of Conditionality

Policy transfer by conditionality involves the introduction of a transfer object as a condition for securing particular support that is needed by the recipient. According to the business plan developed for ECREEE in 2011, the agency intended to generate

about 70% of its budget for funding renewable energy activities in West Africa from international donors and technical partners. Emphasising the international context of ECREEE's operations, the business plan notes that:

[i]nitiatives to support the promotion of renewable energy and energy efficiency in Africa have gained prominence in the context of international development, energy and climate policy processes in recent years. At ... international forums, the world's leading economies identified as critical priorities debt relief for Africa and coordinated action to address the threat of global climate change ... [s]ince then, the major donor agencies allocated fresh resources to support renewable energy and climate change activities in the region. ECREEE itself is the beneficiary of donor programmes focused on Africa that have emerged since 2005 (ECREEE, 2011, p. 17).

With the intent of ECREEE to generate 70% of its budget externally, and the knowledge of the availability of fresh resources to support renewable energy in West Africa, the ECOWAS renewable energy policy was designed to serve as a guarantee for prospective funders and investors (Interview 1, 2017; Interview 2, 2017). The policy was aimed at giving the assurance of making provision for relevant institutional and regulatory frameworks for a renewable energy market, which are requirements for accessing funds from donors and international partners interested in the promotion of renewable energy in West Africa (ECREEE, 2013a; Interview 4, 2017). This signifies that the transfer process was driven by the mechanism of conditionality. This conditionality, according to one of the interview respondents, is not synonymous with the mechanism of conditionality which was employed by the World Bank in the introduction of structural adjustment programs to African countries, and could be referred to as indirect conditionality (Interview 1, 2017). The respondent also remarked that that the conditionality was more of a business arrangement whereby an investor is interested in ensuring that the funds to be released will be appropriately utilised.

Nonetheless, the EU's basis for engaging in transfer of renewable energy policy is somewhat synonymous to the World Bank's view in the 1980s, that developing countries needed assistance to adjust to the looming debt crisis (Koeberle et al., 2015). For the EU, it reasoned that West Africa countries needed institutional frameworks to attract investments in renewable energy. This is also highlighted in the quote below from the baseline report sponsored by the EU.

Funding ... does not appear to be a major problem for the diffusion of clean technologies. Private investors have already shown their interest in those technologies when projects are implemented within a transparent and stable institutional framework and with financial guarantees. As far as the ECOWAS region is concerned, the lack of an appropriate regulatory framework enabling RE (renewable energy) promotion, constitutes a significant barrier for private investors (ECREEE, 2012a, p. 73).

To further emphasise what ECOWAS may stand to benefit upon adoption of the renewable energy policy, the report shares the story of the experience of other jurisdictions, and how they have benefitted from funding from international funding bodies and private investors. It noted that:

[i]n Turkey, IFC (*International Finance Corporation*) financed a 135 megawatt wind farm enabling an increase of 30% of the country's capacity in wind energy while reducing pollution levels; In Chile, IFC financed the construction of a wind farm, the largest to date in the country. ... In South Africa, Proparco financed a 1MW solar plant while in Burkina Proparco intends to finance a 20 MW solar plant (ECREEE, 2012a, p. 73).

From the quotes above, the potential investors are showcased as actors with the means to offer economic support to those in need of energy services, while ECOWAS countries are considered to be in need of funds for investments in renewable energy infrastructure, and requiring institutional and regulatory frameworks to prevent hindrances to accessing the needed funds. We can see that ECOWAS was particularly made aware of the possibility of accessing funds through the emphasis on other

jurisdictions that had received similar support, and this likely made ECOWAS realise the significant opportunity for providing modern energy services to the citizens of its MS. It therefore influenced its acceptance of the condition for setting up institutional and regulatory frameworks and informed ECOWAS' engagement with the EU as a transfer recipient. Consequently, ECOWAS' vision for the renewable energy policy was to setup of institutional and regulatory frameworks in ECOWAS MS in order to create a flourishing renewable energy market and achieve universal energy access for citizens of all ECOWAS countries by 2030 (ECREEE, 2013a).

5.3.3b The Transfer Mechanism of Persuasion


As the name implies, the mechanism of persuasion involves the use of persuasive tactics to ensure the adoption of the transfer object in the recipient jurisdiction. Going back to the remark by one of the interview respondents on the difference between the type of conditionality engaged by the EU as opposed to the World Bank's conditional transfer of structural adjustment policy to developing countries, there was indeed an undertone of mutual respect and dialogue in the relations of the transfer agent and recipient, unlike the World Bank's 'take it or leave it' approach (Clegg, 2013; Phillips, 2009).

Based on the mode of operation of the arm of the EUEI PDF directly involved in the transfer of renewable energy to ECOWAS i.e. the Africa-EU RECP, the EU engages in dialogue with African jurisdictions on energy issues, and this is expected to lead to provision of advisory services on sustainable energy solutions to domestic policy actors, and then to policy transfer (EUEI PDF, 2016c). Primarily, this approach is to the end that a renewable energy market will be created in the prospective recipient

jurisdiction (EUEI PDF, 2016b, 2016d). The EU's approach is succinctly illustrated in a 4-step engagement process and shown in Figure 5.2. With the EU providing advisory services to domestic policy actors, it makes the prospective recipient jurisdiction warm to its preferences, and accept that there is a need to develop favourable policy and regulatory framework for promotion of renewable energy. This also makes room for involving private businesses in Europe and in the African jurisdiction, in a dialogue expected to result in investment commitments and access to finance, as well as presenting the conditionality that will ensure the receipt of the funds.

A key observation from RECP's strategy is that the EU's approach seeks to benefit both the transfer agent and recipient. The strategy, as it is presented in Figure 5.2, signifies a win-win situation for both the EU and the transfer recipient, with EU businesses gaining access to new renewable energy markets, and the recipient jurisdiction acquiring technical and business skills and benefitting from improved energy access. The strategic structuring of this engagement highlights a non-domineering approach by the EU and signifies the involvement of the mechanism of persuasion in this case of transfer of renewable energy policy to ECOWAS.

Figure 5.2: EU RECP Strategy



Source: EUEI PDF (2016a)

In particular, the EU's manner of addressing ECOWAS countries and their leaders reaffirms the incorporation of the transfer mechanism of persuasion in the conditional arrangement to secure investments for use of renewable energy in West Africa. In the newsletters published by the EU and directed at fostering a strategic relationship with African countries on specific policy areas, including energy, through the Africa-EU Energy Partnership, there is an emphasis on working together and drawing from the experience of the relationship that has existed between Europe and Africa (AEEP, 2014; European Commission, 2010). Also, the EU stressed the intended goal of improving access to modern and sustainable energy and building a mutually beneficial relationship with the recipient, instead of presenting its engagement as a 'take it or leave it' affair (African Union and European Union, 2007; The Africa-EU Partnership, 2010). A similar approach is observed in the case of transfer of health reform policy to

Malawi by international organisations, whereby the EU sought a participatory approach in its relations with the transfer recipient, as opposed to the intervention by the USAID with its introduction of conditionality to ensure that the transfer recipient adopts the proposed health policy reform (Tambulasi, 2013).

Another interesting observation in EU's communication to African countries, which further highlights the manifestation of the transfer mechanism of persuasion, and reiterates how the EU related with the recipient, is the attempt to present the concern of energy challenge as a common problem to both continents. In trying to show that the EU's proposal is not a condescending offer, there is a remark on the challenge of energy security in European countries and that of energy access in African countries (EUEI PDF, 2015). This sends the message of 'you have problems, we have them too', and strengthens the argument for the need for "mutual support" and "a move away from a donor-recipient relationship" (European Union Delegation to the African Union, 2010b, p. 4).

In some official communication documents, the EU states that it got involved in the development of the ECOWAS renewable energy policy based on an invitation by ECREEE (EUEI PDF, 2016b). This seems to negate the suggestion of the policy transfer being externally-initiated and the involvement of the mechanisms of conditionality or persuasion. However, based on the EU's role in the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD), the establishment of AEEP, sponsoring a scoping report in 2006 for the establishment of ECREEE, the commissioning of a baseline report for the renewable energy policy, and funding the development of the policy development, we can see the involvement of an external actor in the development of the ECOWAS renewable energy policy. Also, the

preparation and submission of the said invitation to the EU by ECOWAS, was done on the request of the EU (Interview 1, 2017). Perhaps, stating that the involvement of the EU was on the premise of an invitation by ECOWAS, was in a bid to preserve ECOWAS' ego and again, prevent highlighting a victim status in regard to West African countries. This also suggests a conscious effort to make it seem that ECOWAS holds the reins in the policy transfer process, and be perceived in a good light by ECOWAS. Indeed, this can be said to have been achieved, as ECOWAS appears to have the notion that this was a partnership led by ECOWAS (Interview 2, 2017) and "spear-headed by ECREEE" (RECP and AEEP, 2014, p. 1), even though it was funded by the EU. In summary, we can describe this case of policy transfer as a conditional policy transfer that was presented persuasively to the transfer recipient.

The next section discusses the involvement of UNISDR in the transfer of DRR policy to ECOWAS and how obligation is the transfer mechanism engaged in the process.

5.4.4 Actors and Transfer Mechanism Involved in the Transfer of the DRR Policy to ECOWAS

In the earlier section on the emergence of DRR as a global policy issue, it was noted that during the course of the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction i.e. the 1990s, there was an onset of the debate on the relevance of climatic factors in the increase of natural disaster events and human influence on climatic conditions (UNISDR, 2012a). In an AU report on the status of DRR in sub-Saharan Africa, which was also supported by the World Bank and UNISDR, it was stated that:

[e]pidemics and famine, the next most significant causes of loss of life in SSA (*sub-Saharan Africa*), are strongly linked to meteorological and hydrological conditions. The ongoing climate change process will result in increased intensity, frequency and variability in the patterns of hydro-meteorological hazards (Bhavnani et al., 2008, p. vi).

This concern further highlighted the need to target regions that will likely be hardest hit by the effects of climate change (Adeniyi, 2016; James and Washington, 2013) and as a result, the decade for DRR initiative culminated in the development of an International Strategy for Disaster Reduction and the establishment of UNISDR (UN General Assembly Economic and Social Council, 2001; UNISDR, 2012a). The UNISDR was mandated to coordinate disaster risk reduction activities across all UN agencies and ensure harmonisation of DRR activities organised and implemented by regional bodies (United Nations General Assembly, 2012).

In a bid to achieve the objective of a collective global response to DRR, UNISDR organised a world conference in 2005, which held in Hyogo, Japan. The conference addressed pertinent issues, including building resilient communities to reduce damages and deaths during disasters, mainstreaming DRR and sustainable development, and implementing DRR activities at global, regional and national levels. The conference also referred to past global efforts at addressing DRR issues, such as the development of a strategy document at a world conference on natural disasters, the Yokohama Strategy for a Safer World. In addition, there was a review of this document with regards to the realisation of its provisions, and based on the outcome of the review, five concerns were identified as the key challenges to ensuring reduction of disaster risks globally. These include:

- (a) Governance: organizational, legal and policy frameworks;
- (b) Risk identification, assessment, monitoring and early warning;
- (c) Knowledge management and education;
- (d) Reducing underlying risk factors;
- (e) Preparedness for effective response and recovery (UNISDR, 2005a, p. 2).

Specific activities that will be carried out in order to address these challenges were also identified at the conference, and these were compiled in a document tagged the

Hyogo Framework of Action (HFA). Importantly, the HFA highlighted the need for the involvement of global, regional and national organisations in achieving its desired outcome of reduced disaster risks.

Although ECOWAS was not present at the Hyogo conference (United Nations, 2005), it had earlier participated in an Africa consultation meeting on the Hyogo conference organised by NEPAD (UNISDR Africa, 2004b). Also, the African outreach of the UNISDR invited the Francophone ECOWAS MS to a workshop to sensitise them on the importance of DRR (UNISDR Africa, 2004a). This sustained involvement in the continent-wide DRR efforts helped to secure ECOWAS' interest in DRR concerns, and as a result, it sought to domesticate the HFA within the community even though it was not present at the Hyogo conference. Notably, NEPAD identified the commitment of ECOWAS to DRR and stated that:

The top leadership of the ECOWAS Secretariat recognizes the urgent need for a common sub-regional disaster management strategy and intends to pursue its development. Efforts are underway with the support of NEPAD Secretariat and the UNISDR to initiate this process (AU and NEPAD, 2004b, p. 16).

However, despite ECOWAS' involvement in different activities and recognising the need for a disaster management strategy, its interest in DRR was still with reference to the issue of conflict, as it notes that its contribution to the international effort “addresses disasters triggered by natural hazards that may be exacerbated by conflict” (ECOWAS, 2006, p. ii).

Nonetheless, after the Hyogo conference, the African outreach of the UNISDR set out to coordinate the domestication of the recommendations from the conference in African countries. It setup the Africa Advisory group “to advise and provide technical support for mobilising political commitment and resources for DRR from national, sub-

regional and regional authorities (e.g. ECOWAS, AU/NEPAD)” (UNISDR Africa, 2005a, p. 44). It also broadened the membership of an existing Africa Working Group on DRR to include eight African RECs, thereby making ECOWAS an official member of the Working Group and bound to its terms of reference (UNISDR, 2011).

In a document presenting the activities of the Working Group, it was reported that ECOWAS had commenced activities towards developing a DRR policy, by holding a meeting with DRR experts to deliberate on the content of an ECOWAS DRR policy, and drafting a policy document (UNISDR, 2005b). The drafted policy specifically focuses on the earlier stated five major issues addressed by the HFA (ECOWAS, 2006). As stipulated in the HFA, the ECOWAS DRR policy aims for supporting the development of national platforms for DRR, establishing early warning systems in ECOWAS MS, engage in public education on DRR, incorporate DRR to ECOWAS’ Agricultural policy and national development programmes of MS, and develop capacity for effective disaster response (ECOWAS, 2006).

In August 2006, ECOWAS presented the draft DRR policy (ECOWAS, 2006) and the document was approved by Heads of States of MS at their 31st summit in January 2007 (Bhavnani et al., 2008; UNECA and UNISDR, 2013).

5.4.5 The Transfer Mechanism of Obligation

The mechanism of obligation involves reliance on previous accords and agreements that have been assented by the recipient, to ensure the occurrence of policy transfer. Unlike the case of transfer of renewable energy, whereby the involvement of the transfer agent, the EU, was informed by market creation for renewable energy technologies, the involvement of UNISDR in transfer of DRR policy was informed by

the need for the domestication of the HFA. Also, with the EU facilitating the transfer process through a direct relation with ECOWAS, the UNISDR relied on ECOWAS' relationship with the AU as one of its eight RECs, for the actualisation of the transfer. With the intent of domestication of the HFA, UNISDR facilitated the development of the African strategy (ECOWAS, 2006), actively involved all the RECS, so that, even though ECOWAS was not a signatory to the HFA, nor was it present at Hyogo in 2005, it became bound by its assent of the African strategy, and this led to the development and adoption of an ECOWAS DRR policy.

UNISDR's involvement is also in line with its mandate to coordinate DRR efforts globally, including within the United Nations and regional organisations (UNISDR, 2016b). In doing this, UNISDR facilitates DRR activities at different levels working with global, regional, sub-regional and national platforms (UNISDR, 2016c). Based on this, ECOWAS is referred to as a sub-regional body in the DRR policy developed. This is unlike the description of ECOWAS as a regional body in the case of renewable energy policy transfer (ECREEE, 2013a), and it emphasises the relational perception underlying the DRR policy transfer. While the EU related with ECOWAS directly and mostly on economic terms, UNISDR related with ECOWAS on account of its membership of the AU and NEPAD. In particular, UNISDR employed the obligatory apparatus of the AU with its RECs based on the hierarchical component inherent in the relationship. According to Bulmer and Padgett (2005), a hierarchical approach to policy transfer can be associated with the transfer mechanisms of obligation and conditionality, but if obligation is the operating mechanism, it is often directed at domestication of policies. As such, the transfer mechanism operational in this case can be seen to be obligation, primarily because the transfer agent ensured the domestication of the HFA through ECOWAS' fulfilment of its initial assent to the African

Strategy for DRR, which was developed by the AU and NEPAD with the support of UNISDR. This attempt of influencing an African sub-regional organisation through a more highly-placed regional organisation, is an approach that is also noted to be a favourite of many IGOs and international donors, as shown in the quote below.

NEPAD is primarily implemented at the Regional Economic Community (REC) level. It is widely used by international financial institutions, UN agencies and Africa's development partners as a mechanism to support African development efforts (African Union, 2003, p. 1).

Another observation of interest in this case of policy transfer is that the mutual comradeship that features in the case of renewable energy policy transfer is missing in this instance. Despite UNISDR providing support for the development of the DRR policy, this support is not acknowledged or appreciated by ECOWAS in the policy document (ECOWAS, 2006). Commenting on the ECOWAS DRR policy, the UNISDR noted that:

UNISDR Africa provided its support in the development of the [ECOWAS] Policy framework, whose implementation would focus on areas of importance to the West African situation under the guidance of the Africa Union Strategy for disaster risk reduction and the Hyogo Framework for Action (UNISDR, 2015, p. 1).

On the other hand, giving an overview of the DRR policy, ECOWAS mentioned that:

This document presents ECOWAS policy framework for disaster risk reduction in the sub-region. The Policy would focus on areas of importance to the West African situation under the guidance of the Africa Union Strategy for disaster risk reduction and the Hyogo Framework for Action. ... Issues of conflict and their humanitarian implications are at the centre of ECOWAS interventions currently and are providing the impetus for developing sub-regional capacities in disaster risk reduction (ECOWAS, 2006, p. 9).

Looking at both statements, although both the UNISDR and ECOWAS acknowledged that the policy aligns with the DRR policies of the UN and AU, the UNISDR ascribed

a notable role to itself in describing the development of the DRR policy, whereas ECOWAS omits this depiction. So, rather than regard UNISDR as a benefactor, ECOWAS sets itself as a major actor taking action on ECOWAS DRR issues, particularly, by linking the development of the DRR policy to its efforts in managing conflicts in the region. Also, both statements mention that the ECOWAS DRR policy “would focus on areas of importance to the West African situation” (ECOWAS, 2006, p. 9; UNISDR, 2015, p. 1), which suggests that the recipient jurisdiction sought to maintain a distinct identity in the domestication of the HFA and African Strategy for DRR. This disposition is similar to the quest for distinction sought by the transfer recipients in the case of obligated transfer of energy policy by the EU to its MS (Padgett, 2003). In this instance, the EU MS demonstrated different levels of assertiveness in their compliance with the domestication of the EU directive on liberalisation of the electricity sector based on their country’s peculiar situation.

With regards to this case, the assertion by the recipient that the ECOWAS DRR policy was developed because African RECs “are required to design disaster reduction policies and programmes under the Africa Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction” (ECOWAS, 2006, p. 8) helps to appropriately identify the mechanism operational in the policy transfer as obligation. Also, since the Africa Strategy for DRR was developed with the support of UNISDR, this explains why in fulfilling its obligation, ECOWAS aligned its DRR policy with the provisions of UNISDR’s HFA.

Having discussed the involvement of policy actors in the transfer of renewable energy and DRR policies to ECOWAS and identified the policy transfer mechanisms operational in the two cases of policy transfer, the next section concludes this chapter and reiterates the different approaches that led to the policy transfers.

Conclusion

As indicated in the introduction, the two cases represent instances of externally-initiated policy transfers by IGOs, and based on the discussions about the transfer recipient, evidence of transfer, and transfer source, the chapter has highlighted the diversity of mechanisms observed in the two cases. The case of the renewable energy policy transfer showed the EU building on activities of the Austrian Development Cooperation and UNIDO in establishing ECREEE, to facilitate the development of a renewable energy policy, in order to provide the institutional framework for attracting investments and creating a renewable energy market in West Africa. On the other hand, the UNISDR was the dominant and seemingly the first organisation to involve ECOWAS in DRR concerns with an environmental perspective. Also, while the EU had a direct engagement with the recipient in relations to the transfer, UNISDR channelled its engagement with the recipient through organisations with which ECOWAS had hierarchical association and commitments i.e. the AU and NEPAD. In addition, whereas the primary objectives of the EU's and ECOWAS' renewable energy policies differed (with EU's policy targeted at emission reduction and climate change mitigation, while ECOWAS's policy was targeted at developing peri-urban areas), ECOWAS' DRR policy objective aligned with that of UNISDR's HFA, as the transfer object domesticated the provisions of the HFA.

The chapter has therefore shown that the transfer mechanisms at play in both instances of transfer are not similar. An instance of transfer by obligation can be readily seen in the case of transfer of DRR policy, which was driven through involving ECOWAS in the development of the African Regional Strategy for DRR, and in awareness and training forums on DRR issues. Also, the transfer mechanisms behind the transfer of renewable energy policy to ECOWAS are identified as conditionality

and persuasion. In particular, the status of the EU as a donor for development activities hints at its possible potential for using financing opportunities as a bait for promoting its policy preferences, which in this case was the promotion of use of renewable energy for climate change mitigation and putting in place institutional frameworks for establishing renewable energy markets. However, the disparity in the objectives of the EU and ECOWAS renewable energy policies suggest a degree of freedom given to ECOWAS in deciding the content of the policy, and this was attributed to persuasive tactics to confirm to ECOWAS policy actors that the policy will be focused on development and not just climate change mitigation.

From this chapter, we have seen that the transfer mechanisms differ in the two cases, but, what about the narratives that support them? To examine this, Chapters 6, 7 and 8 present a detailed analysis of the policy narrative elements used by the actors. Drawing from the narrative analysis conducted for the research, the narrative setting, character, plot, and moral, which are portrayed by the actors are identified, and the chapters go on to discuss how the depiction of these narrative elements informed the transfer mechanisms.

Chapter 6 – Setting the Scene

Introduction

The last chapter described the events and actions that led to the transfer of renewable energy and DRR policies to ECOWAS. It also identified the transfer mechanisms that were at play in these two cases, and argued that the EU employed the mechanisms of conditionality and persuasion to facilitate the transfer of renewable energy policy to ECOWAS, while UNISDR employed the mechanism of obligation to ensure adoption of the ECOWAS DRR policy. In this chapter and in Chapters 7 and 8, we consider the influence of the transfer actors' policy narratives on the manifestation of these mechanisms. Specifically, this chapter will discuss the influence of the narrative setting depicted by the actors, Chapter 7 will examine the influence of the narrative characters, while Chapter 8 will discuss the contribution of the narrative plot and moral portrayed in the policy narratives.

With reference to the earlier explanation of the NPF, the use of narrative setting portrays the boundaries for the influence and actions of the characters introduced in the narrative. It outlines the target of the transfer object and its intended extent of coverage within the recipient jurisdiction. It also points to where the action of the actors will be directed. As noted, the narrative setting can be situated as bureaucratic, community, sectoral, or collective. If the setting is bureaucratic, this implies that the transfer object is targeted at institutional frameworks, and if the setting is collective, this implies that the transfer object is directed at the whole population of the jurisdiction. The use of these settings, therefore, can be seen as an indication that the intended extent of influence of the transfer agent on the recipient jurisdiction will be far-reaching, as the influence will be exerted on how government functions and the

people living in the jurisdiction. Conversely, if the narrative setting depicted is community or sectoral, this implies that transfer object is targeted at a particular group of the population or a specific sector within the jurisdiction, and it indicates that the transfer agent's influence within the recipient jurisdiction will mostly be restricted to the group or sector.

In both cases, the narrative setting was seen to be dominantly situated as bureaucratic as can be seen in Table 6.1. In the case of renewable energy policy transfer, community and sectoral settings were also used in the narratives, but the depiction of a community setting was more substantial. Also, in the case of DRR policy transfer, in addition to the depiction of a bureaucratic setting, a sectoral setting was depicted, but this was very minute in comparison to that of a bureaucratic setting. As such, to discuss the findings, the use of the narrative setting in relations to the transfer of DRR policy to ECOWAS is taken to be primarily bureaucratic setting, while in the transfer of renewable energy policy to ECOWAS, the depiction of setting is taken to be bureaucratic and community settings.

With reference to the depiction of a bureaucratic setting in the two cases, one can say that the actors position the challenges to be addressed as those necessitating government actions that include administrative interventions, and changes to organisational structure and practices. This is aimed at influencing how things are done across the recipient jurisdiction, rather than on a select group within the population. The preference for this setting, particularly by the transfer agents, can in a way, be linked to the need to maximise the efforts and resources deployed for the actualisation of policy transfer, so that these contributions can be seen to be impactful and having the potential for a long-term effect.

Table 6.1: Depiction of Narrative Setting

	Renewable Energy Policy Transfer by the EU		DRR Policy Transfer by UNISDR			
Total No of Documents	56		31			
	No of Documents	%	No of Documents	%	Test of Difference (t-test) P<=0.05	
Narrative Element: Setting					*s – Significant *ns - Not Significant	
Bureaucratic	17	30%	24	77%	t= -5.07, p= 0.00	S
Community	8	14%	0	0%	t= 2.41, p= 0.02	S
Collective	0	0%	0	0%	n/a	n/a
Sectoral	4	7%	2	6%	t= 0.12, p= 0.90	ns
	X ² (d.f=2) = 21.59, p<0.001		X ² (d.f=1) = 18.62, p<0.001			

We can also infer that the level of influence that a transfer agent can wield within a recipient jurisdiction, also denotes the degree of access the transfer agent has. This is because being able to influence administrative arrangements and organisational structures within the recipient jurisdictions, will likely require reaching the top or central level of decision-making. This level of access can be seen in the two cases, as the IGOs utilised their access to the heads of states of ECOWAS Member States, and this access delivered the eventual adoption of the renewable energy policy and DRR policy by ECOWAS (ECREEE, 2013a; EUEI PDF, 2015; GIZ, 2017; Kan, 2005; UNISDR Africa, 2005a). The similarity in the demonstration of the level of access of the transfer agents is also noteworthy as there was an emphasis on high-level engagement in both cases, and this specifically referred to heads of states, leading figures in regional bodies, or highly positioned ministers. As shown in the picture in Appendix 8, the UNISDR held a meeting with President Olusegun Obasanjo, who was at the time not only the President of Nigeria, but also the president of the African Union (AU) summit

and a very influential figure in ECOWAS (Alter et al., 2013; Kan, 2005; Ojo, 1980). They then utilised their access to him to ensure that DRR is placed on the agenda within the African continent (Kan, 2005). The EU also facilitated a meeting of all African heads of states in Lisbon in 2007, where European heads of states were present and the two parties agreed to form the Africa-EU Energy partnership for promoting the use of renewable energy in Africa (GIZ, 2017), and this led to EU's involvement in facilitating the transfer of renewable energy policy to ECOWAS. In addition, the EU had initially established connection with a key decision maker on energy issues within the region through its support for the West African Power Pool (WAPP), which had been setup by ECOWAS in 1999, and aimed at forming a single electricity market for the different ECOWAS MS (European Union Delegation to the African Union, 2009a; WAPP, 2017). The initiative, which was mainly driven by the Head of ECOWAS Energy Division, Mr Mahama Kappiah, received £3m from the EU in 2009 and Mr Kappiah went on to become the head of ECREEE and helped to facilitate the adoption of the ECOWAS renewable energy policy (ECREEE, 2015; European Union Delegation to the African Union, 2009a).

Unlike the needed involvement of high-level officials when a bureaucratic setting is situated in a policy transfer narrative, a community or sectoral setting will likely not necessitate a similar involvement of highly placed officials, because it is aimed at a specific group or section rather than managerial functions. Accordingly, the access that is accorded transfer agents within a recipient jurisdiction sets the boundaries of what is to be done and who is to be involved over time, and these go on to inform the type of story to be told (Shanahan et al., 2017a). The next sections elaborate on the depiction of setting by the transfer agents and recipient in the two cases of policy transfer to ECOWAS, and discuss how the use of the narrative element may have

informed the transfer mechanisms that were operational in the policy transfers. The next section examines the case of renewable energy policy transfer to ECOWAS by the EU.

6.1. Setting the Scene in Renewable Energy Policy Transfer to ECOWAS

“There are several things, there are never just one thing” (Interview 4, 2017)

In the case of renewable energy policy transfer to ECOWAS by the EU, the narratives of the transfer actors predominantly depict bureaucratic and community settings. While a bureaucratic setting was observed in 30% of the documents analysed, 14% of the documents featured a community setting, making their combination to account for 44% out of the 52% of documents that featured the narrative element. As discussed in Chapter 3, the situation of the narrative setting as bureaucratic is seen in examples of conditional policy transfers, however, the situation of a community setting can be said to be more reflective of the mechanism of persuasion. This depiction of a community setting was primarily observed only in documents authored by the transfer recipient, but both the transfer agent and recipient portrayed a bureaucratic setting. First, we will look at how the bureaucratic setting was portrayed and examples of its depiction are presented in the quotes below.

[T]here is a need to support Africa in strengthening its political and economic governance, and in reinforcing the regulatory, fiscal and business environment that allows better mobilising of the continent's own assets in a sustainable way (European Commission, 2010, p. 3).

The inappropriate policies, targets and regulations are some of the constraints that limit the dissemination of RE (*renewable energy*) in these countries. The existence of comprehensive policy frameworks for the promotion of RE and incentive instruments like tax relieves are needed in ECOWAS states for favourable market conditions (N'Guessan et al., 2011, p. 3).

However, so far, West Africa is not attracting substantial investment in the renewable energy and energy sectors ... This requires that governments support an enabling business environment to encourage financial institutions, private banks and private investors to come into the market to invest in green technologies ... by catalysing the introduction of the necessary legal and regulatory reforms (ECREEE, 2012b, p. 4).

The EU welcomed the efforts of ECOWAS to establish a common energy and electricity market ...The Parties emphasised the importance of regional economic integration for ... the eradication of poverty, and the development of all economic sectors in West Africa (Council of the European Union, 2009, p. 10).

These quotes highlight the degree of structural change that the renewable energy policy was expected to deliver. Whereas the need for adopting a renewable energy policy may literally be perceived as a means to achieve climate change mitigation, the setting portrayed by the actors however, suggest more. Chiefly, the policy transfer was expected to create a favourable investment or market environment in ECOWAS countries. Furthermore, the transfer agent also intended for the proposed policy to be an instrument for regional integration (EUEI PDF, 2015; European Commission, 2014). According to Shanahan et al. (2017b, p. 7), “the choice of settings and their descriptions are not neutral but rather are meaningful and purposive”, and as such, with the EU’s depiction of a bureaucratic setting, it aimed for conditioning the market environment within the region through reforms that cut across regulatory, fiscal and legal operations. This was to the end that there will be a “common energy and electricity market i.e. create a West African market as opposed to markets of individual countries” (Council of the European Union, 2009, p. 10).

In addition to seeking to modify the market environment at the regional level, the transfer object’s area of influence was also expected to extend to individual countries in the region. As one of the interviewees noted, “regional policies translate to national policies” (Interview 4, 2017) and another confirmed that “based on the regional policy,

there's a mandate ... (to) encourage all MS to develop RE policies" (Interview 2, 2017), we can therefore envision the spatial dimension underlining the policy transfer, since the adoption of the policy will bind individual MS to the provisions of the policy and oblige them to develop and adopt national renewable energy policies. To the transfer agent, the EU, such degree of intervention is necessary because it is "one of the boosters Africa needs to accelerate sustainable growth and lift its people out of poverty" (European Union Delegation to the African Union, 2010a, p. 9). As a result, the EU's achievement of transfer of renewable energy policy to ECOWAS is not regarded simply as a feat towards climate change mitigation, but is often heralded as a gain for West African regional integration and poverty eradication (ECREEE, 2013a; European Commission, 2015).

Can such degree of external interference that accompanies a bureaucratic setting be the reason that conditional transfers are not usually observed in developed countries (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996; Randma-Liiv and Kruusenberg, 2012)? One may have expected that in cases of accession to IGOs, developed countries may have been at the receiving end of conditional transfers. However, it seems that the countries prefer affinity to IGOs where the conditions for membership are already met based on their past domestic efforts, and this prevents them from having to significantly alter what is already existent domestically, just in a bid to join an IGO. For example, in the case of accessions to the EEC in 1961, where the candidate countries were mostly developed countries, these countries already had in place the core requirements for joining the EEC i.e. "functioning democracies and largely market-based economic systems" (Carroll, 2014, p. 284). Also, in the instance of accession of Australia to the OECD, the country did not embark on any significant change domestically in order to fulfil the requirement for accession, primarily because the country's legislation was already

consistent with the demands of the OECD (Carroll, 2014). The likelihood of the use of a bureaucratic setting in conditional policy transfer, therefore, may explain why the manifestation of the mechanism of conditionality used to be considered a rarity in policy transfer studies (Randma-Liiv and Kruusenberg, 2012). Albeit, with the increased attention paid to less developed countries and transitional countries, conditionality has been given more attention as a probable transfer mechanism (Pereira, 2014; Randma-Liiv and Kruusenberg, 2012; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004).

We may allude that situating a bureaucratic setting suggests a demand being placed on the recipient jurisdiction, such as embarking on institutional reforms, and this reflects the power dynamics that is associated with the relationship between the transfer agent and recipient. While the transfer agent is positioned as the party possessing significant wherewithal to meet certain needs of the transfer recipient, such as membership of an IGO, debt cancellation, or project sponsorship, the transfer recipient is positioned as the party in need of benefits that will be accrued to it upon meeting the demand(s) stipulated as conditions for receiving the benefits. This is also portrayed with the status of the EU vis-à-vis ECOWAS, as the EU is accorded to be the largest donor of funds to West African countries (European Commission et al., 2008; Vervaeke, 2010) and “the motivation on the EU side is about influencing, ... sort of soft power” (Interview 4, 2017). Also, the possession of the wherewithal to address the challenge of energy provision in West Africa is a key feature in EU’s heroic depiction of itself, and this will be elaborated in the next chapter on casting characters. This extent of influence that a bureaucratic setting portends, which echoes the power dynamic among the actors, thus sets the stage for a policy transfer with a hierarchical

dimension like conditional policy transfer (Bulmer and Padgett, 2005; Bulmer et al., 2007).

Moreover, considering that the proposition by an external actor to influence administrative arrangements within a jurisdiction will not be an easy one to agree to by domestic policymakers, this prompts the transfer agent to present an offer that will make it more attractive for the recipient to accede to the transfer object. This then sets in motion the manifestation of the mechanism of conditionality. Therefore, in the case of renewable energy policy transfer to ECOWAS, the EU offered the facilitation of private investments to the region on the condition that a regional renewable energy policy is developed and adopted. Perhaps this may also explain why the level of depiction of other settings, specifically sectoral and collective settings, are at 7% and 0% respectively, since what is promised will be of substantial value, and this likely makes the transfer agent to aim to secure a substantial rather than a localised influence.

Based on this examination of the narrative element of setting, we can argue that different recipient jurisdictions will have different policy transfer experiences because of the level of their economic power and/or political position. So, with a bureaucratic setting characterising the mechanism of conditionality, developed countries will likely not find this favourable because such countries would not want to be viewed as being dictated to on domestic administrative arrangements. Also, since these countries will likely possess the wherewithal to maintain a relatively equal balance of power with the transfer agent, they can influence the preferable narrative setting and consequently, the preferred transfer mechanism. Albeit, with the power dynamics tipped in the favour of the transfer agents in instances of policy transfer to less developed countries, these

recipient jurisdictions are often left with no choice but to concede (Interview 2, 2017) to the use of bureaucratic setting and the conditions stipulated by the transfer agent.

According to Singh (2002), the rise of the debt crisis in developing countries prompted the proposition of aid and loan conditionality by donor institutions and countries, and this was because the debt crisis led to a change in the balance of power in the relations between the donors and recipients. Also, the fall of the Soviet Union, and the 1997 Asian financial crisis led to an increase in the number of countries in vulnerable positions and this broadened the array of possible recipients of conditional policy transfers, and with emphasis on a bureaucratic narrative setting, transfer agents facilitated conditional policy transfers to Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC) and some Asian countries. As remarked by Tews (2009, p. 133),

[t]he joint notion is that there exists a kind of asymmetrical power relationship between the importer and the exporter of policies – usually resulting in the form that the ‘weaker’ one wishes to gain resources from the ‘stronger’ one, who then conditions access to its resources by making the ‘weaker’ one import a policy. This mechanism is relatively easy to identify. It is used regularly by international organizations – for instance, the World Bank – to force developing countries to adopt certain – sometimes even environmental – policies. Moreover, it is utilized by the EU as well in order to transfer the entire *acquis communautaire* to the accession countries.

Bearing in mind the power dynamics between the actors in this case, the policy transfer can be said to be premised on the EU being “a major international donor and a ... normative power” (Pereira, 2014, p. 389) and aware that ECOWAS is one of the poorest regions in the world (Ogbonna et al., 2013; Porter and Osei-Hwedie, 2015), and this informed the proposal for the adoption of a regional renewable energy policy focused on creating a favourable market environment, as a condition for facilitating investments from the private sectors for development of renewable energy projects in the region. This shows that the narrative setting tends to lay out the context upon which

a policy transfer is hinged, comprising the status of the recipient jurisdiction, an assumption of what problem there is, and what needs to be done. With regard to a bureaucratic setting, this context can be seen to be that of a jurisdiction that is weak in one form or the other and is in need of support, and the assumption that there is a necessity for altering administrative arrangements within this jurisdiction. These culminate in the manifestation of conditionality, whereby the transfer agent can exploit the need(s) of a jurisdiction to request for a change in the way things are done within the jurisdiction.

The above description is unlike what may occur if focusing on other narrative settings, whereby the context may be the need to regulate how persons or businesses operate within a sector, providing universal assistance to a population, or meeting a specific need of a community, and with these contexts, the transfer agent will have less influence in how the affairs of the recipient jurisdiction is directed. We can assume that these other settings will inform the manifestation of mechanisms where the power dynamics does not heavily favour the transfer agent, such as obligation or persuasion.

We can however question if the actors' narratives do indeed reflect the narrative setting attributed to them. Considering the precise demarcation of the sector in some of the quotes stated above, we can simply assume that the setting implied is sectoral and not bureaucratic. However, this assumption would hold if the quotes were examined on the basis of individual words or phrases. Also, since narratives differ from lists, where individual words may hold cogent meanings, singular words in narratives are examined as part of a broader expression (Crow and Berggren, 2014; Gray and Jones, 2016). In addition to the findings from the narrative analysis, the interview responses also point to the intended far-reaching influence of the transfer object and its target on altering existing bureaucratic arrangement within the recipient jurisdiction.

An interviewee opined that the ECOWAS renewable energy policy was aimed at “translating energy to long-term frameworks and, finding financiers, for increased private sector involvement” (Interview 4, 2017), while another interviewee claimed that the policy was intended for maintaining peace and security through provision of electricity, in a bid to address the refugee crisis (Interview 1, 2017). Although, the latter might be taking it too far, but, the findings go to show that the stage set for the policy transfer i.e. “the focus (*for*) the audience attention” (Shanahan et al., 2017a, p. 4), was not confined to just renewable energy.

As mentioned earlier, 30% of the documents analysed for this case portray a bureaucratic setting, and after considering who said what, it was noted that these documents were not only those of the transfer agent, the EU, but also that of the recipient, ECOWAS. However, the observation of community settings, which featured in 14% of the documents, was only in ECOWAS’ narratives, and this was used for designating specific groups in the region that the transfer object should focus on. Some examples of the depiction of a community setting are shown below.

The conclusion is that to achieve the regional policy objective, ECOWAS Commission and relevant institutions engaged in the implementation process should adopt a comprehensive strategy that put more emphasis on ECOWAS’ LDCs (*Least Developed Countries*) (N’Guessan et al., 2011, p. 1)

The ECOWAS Regional Renewable Energy Policy aims to ensure increased use of renewable energy sources such as solar, wind, small-scale hydro and bioenergy for grid electricity supply and for the provision of access to energy services in rural areas (ECOWAS, 2013, p. 5).

This finding is in contrast to the consistent depiction of a bureaucratic setting by the transfer recipient in the case of DRR policy transfer, as will be seen in the next section. In addition, this finding is also contrary to what is observed in most accounts of policy transfer driven by conditionality, whereby the transfer recipient has minimal leeway to

change the transfer object and/or present an alternative narrative setting (Gorton et al., 2009; Mkandawire and Soludo, 2003). For instance, in many of the cases of conditional policy transfer to Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC), based on their candidature for accession to the EU, the form in which the criteria for political and market reforms were presented were not negotiable nor liable to amendment by the recipient countries, as they could not re-situate the setting or specify that the criteria will be applicable to only selected sections of the society instead of the entire nation (Gorton et al., 2009; Lavenex, 2002; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004). Also, looking at an example of policy transfer to developing countries based on loan or aid conditionality, specifically the transfer of SAP by the IMF and World Bank, it brings to light the rigidity that is often woven into the narrative setting associated with conditional policy transfers. With the policy transfer involving recipient countries in diverse geographical settings ranging from Asia to the Caribbean, these recipient jurisdictions had no choice in presenting alternative contexts for the transfer object. (Easterly, 2005; Mkandawire and Soludo, 2003). This is so much so that the nomenclature of the transfer object, which of itself unveils a bureaucratic narrative setting, remained the same across most of the recipient jurisdictions (Bacha, 1986; Idris et al., 2013; Foli et al., 2017). As Mkandawire and Soludo (2003, p.2) put it, the transfer agents, IMF and World Bank, “foreclosed the debate by literally insisting that it was either their way or nothing”.

However, in this case of renewable energy policy transfer to ECOWAS by the EU, ECOWAS was able to put forward a narrative setting that is different from what is portrayed by the transfer agent. With the depiction of a community setting, the recipient jurisdiction was making a case for a particular group within the region i.e. ECOWAS' LDCs and those living in rural and peri-urban areas, and this was acknowledged by

the transfer agent (ECREEE, 2013a). We can say that the EU took this setting on board as a persuasive approach to ensure that ECOWAS adopts the renewable energy policy, so that even though its intent is emphatically presented as structuring the market environment in ECOWAS to be favourable for renewable energy investments, it still agreed to channel the policy for helping deprived communities in ECOWAS. This flexibility by the EU and its alignment with a community setting, signify a difference that can be observed between the transfer mechanisms of conditionality and persuasion. The often insistent and rigidity of transfer agents that use bureaucratic narrative setting and facilitate conditional policy transfers, as against the malleability of the transfer agents employing the mechanism of persuasion, shows that while the mechanism of conditionality engenders dictating to the recipients and making demands of them, persuasion espouses listening to them. This difference also seems inherent in the narrative settings, because a bureaucratic setting can be said to be impersonal since its focus is mostly structural, while with a community setting, there is a personal focus on a group within the society. Aptly put by French et al. (2017, p. 28), a “[b]ureaucratic setting is characterised by coordination and rules”, while a “[c]ommunity setting is characterised by cultural and social boundaries”.

This attribute of the transfer mechanism of conditionality raises the question of whether a transfer agent’s engagement in conditional policy transfer connotes a tyrannical intent. With the exception of the examples of financial conditionality to poor countries, one can say that even though the transfer agent mostly takes advantage of the recipient’s vulnerability, what the policy transfer is expected to achieve sometimes necessitates the use of conditionality (Interview 1, 2017). So, in cases of accession to the EU, the conditions are prescribed because they are the key criteria for joining the EU and they are also aimed at ensuring the recipient countries demonstrate

commitment to the accepted tenets of the EU (Schimmelfennig et al., 2003; Sedelmeier, 2010). Also, in this instance of renewable energy policy transfer to ECOWAS, the aim of attracting private investments for deployment of renewable energy projects in West Africa necessitates the condition of creating a favourable market environment (Interview 1, 2017).

It seems that what matters is, to what end is conditional policy transfer being employed and a bureaucratic setting used in narratives. With the example of the transfer of SAP to developing countries by the World Bank and IMF in the 1980s, the transfer object was mainly targeted at ensuring the ability of recipient countries to pay back loans and so it was limited to administrative ramifications (Easterly, 2005). However, the transfer object in this case was not only intended for creating the necessary market environment, but also for poverty eradication. Indeed, this case of renewable energy transfer by the EU might have been a similar experience of transfer of SAP, since it was also aimed at securing investments, particularly from European private investors (Interview 1, 2017; Interview 4, 2017). Albeit, with the accompaniment of a community setting debuting the mechanism of persuasion, what would have likely been another harsh policy transfer instance was averted. The mechanism of persuasion helped to present a less intimidating narrative setting and perhaps more acceptable to the transfer recipient. What may have also enabled the EU to be at home with the situation of a community setting is its prior involvement in awarding unconditional aid to African states. This involvement took off from the time of the Schuman Declaration in 1950 (European Union, 2017), continued after the signing of the Lisbon Treaty in 2007, but was halted in 2011, when a new EU development policy, the Agenda for Change, was introduced, which stipulated that EU would now have political input in the affairs of its aid recipients (European Commission, 2011).

The depiction of the narrative setting by both the transfer agent and recipient tends to provide the backdrop for the role of characters, as well as the plot and moral of the story. So that with the consistent situation of a bureaucratic setting by both sides, just like in the case of DRR policy transfer and discussed in the next section, one can anticipate a policy transfer story where the agent and recipient are in sync with the acknowledgement of the need for a far-reaching action. On the other hand, the depiction of a bureaucratic setting by the agent and community setting by the recipient sets the stage for the involvement of a very influential transfer agent and a recipient that still has the ears of this powerful actor.

Having considered the use of the narrative element of setting in the case of renewable energy policy transfer to ECOWAS by the EU, the next section will discuss the narrative setting portrayed in the instance of DRR policy transfer to ECOWAS by the UNISDR.

6.2 Setting the Scene in DRR Policy Transfer to ECOWAS

“If you move to the national level of community level, there are specific issues which are different, but we’re looking at the whole or bigger picture” (Interview 5, 2017).

With reference to Table 6.1, more than 70% of the documents related to the ECOWAS DRR policy transfer depicted a bureaucratic setting and these depictions were observed in the narratives of both the transfer agent and recipient. In setting the scene for the problem of DRR in developing countries, the transfer agent, UNISDR, stated that:

Strong legal, institutional frameworks (*are*) needed for disaster management (Kamara, 2004, p. 61).

UNISDR Africa will continue to encourage and assist national governments to create enabling environments consisting of national policies, legislations, strategies, institutional frameworks, human capacity and financial resources through advocacy, technical support, information-sharing and knowledge (UNISDR Africa, 2004a, p. 54).

(African governments) have to demonstrate their commitments through providing national policies and strategy on disaster reduction to its population and involve all stakeholders in all processes (UNISDR Africa, 2004b, p. 49).

With the use of a bureaucratic setting in its narratives, the UNISDR sets the scene for an obligatory policy transfer that will entail the creation of a new agency, specifically the establishment of national platforms on DRR in West African countries (AU and NEPAD, 2004a; ECOWAS, 2006; Interview 5, 2017; UNISDR Africa, 2005b). Based on the cases of obligated transfer discussed in Chapter 3, situating a bureaucratic setting for the DRR policy transfer is unexpected, since the likely settings that are noted to be associated with obligation are sectoral and collective settings.

The incongruity of this finding can also be seen in the difference in the relations of UNISDR with other recipient jurisdictions of its DRR policy transfer that are in Western countries. With the activities of the UNISDR reaching across all the continents and several countries, and also aimed at securing acknowledgement and implementation of its international accords, notably the Hyogo Framework of Action (HFA), a consideration of how its influence is deployed in developed countries, shows that when the recipient jurisdiction is a developed country or region, the policy transfer experience seems to be different from what obtains in less developed countries and regions. In the developed countries, the transfer object is mostly in the form of policy ideas, while its access is often with street level bureaucracies and non-state actors in the recipient jurisdictions (DKKV, 2017; UNISDR, 2017a). This undoubtedly will limit its ability to facilitate the adoption of a new policy, much less being able to situate its narrative setting as bureaucratic. As such, in most of these recipient jurisdictions, the

policy idea was incorporated into existing government structures and the obligated policy transfer did not result in the creation of new administrative arrangements (UNISDR, 2017a). For instance, in Germany, the government designated a NGO, Deutsches Komitee Katastrophenvorsorge e.V. (DKKV), to work with UNISDR as fulfilment of its obligation to the UNISDR's HFA (DKKV, 2017). Also, some other countries incorporated the recommendations from the UNISDR within existing government agencies instead of developing new policies for the establishment of a DRR national platform, and it is these existing agencies that relate with the UNISDR. In the UK, the Civil Contingencies Secretariat operates as a focal point for liaising with the UNISDR; in Australia, it is the Attorney-General's Department; in Denmark, it is the Danish Emergency Management Agency (DEMA); while in the United States, it is the U.S. Department of State (UNISDR, 2017a).

If we look again at the above examples of the depiction of narrative setting, we may question if the UNISDR's inclusion of providing a policy for the population does refer to a collective setting rather than a bureaucratic setting. While UNISDR's statement may have indicated interest in the population, it is unlikely that its expected action would be directly focused on the population. The second line of the third quote notes that the policies have to be provided for the sake of the population, but does not say what will immediately accrue to the population as the governments demonstrate their commitment. The primary intent therefore, was the development of a national policy and strategy, and as such, the place of action for the policy transfer was with the government. In addition, the stated objectives¹⁸ in the policy document also indicate

¹⁸ "The objectives of the ECOWAS Policy for Disaster Risk Reduction Policy are to:

- Provide an inter-governmental framework for collaboration and partnership for ECOWAS Member States in Disaster Risk Management;
- Promote integration of disaster risk reduction into ECOWAS Member States National Development Policies, Plans and Programmes;

the specific deliverables of the transfer object and they are primarily focused on administrative arrangements and managerial functions (ECOWAS, 2006). Further interaction between UNISDR and ECOWAS may deliberately target the population, such as introducing taxation for disaster relief, but it can be seen that this instance of policy transfer was situated with a bureaucratic setting.

Returning to the unforeseen finding of the depiction of a bureaucratic setting in this case of obligated transfer, this choice of setting in UNISDR's narratives can somewhat be explained by its "significant involvement" (Marshall, 2005, p. 673) in the transfer process i.e. the direct and indirect contribution of funds to facilitate the transfer process (Interview 5, 2017; Interview 6, 2017; UNISDR Africa, 2006a; UNISDR and NEPAD, 2004; UNISDR Africa, 2003). This manner of intervention in ensuring the occurrence of policy transfer gives the UNISDR an edge in relating with ECOWAS. With this advantage, the UNISDR is able to put forward the need for establishing and coordinating institutional frameworks for managing DRR issues within West Africa. So, contrary to what played out in the DRR policy transfer to the developed countries by UNISDR as highlighted above, in the case of policy transfer to ECOWAS, UNISDR was able to push for the adoption of a new policy calling for the creation of a DRR National Platform in each of the ECOWAS MS. As such, even though the same mechanism of obligation was operational in these policy transfers, the creation of a new administrative unit was advocated for in the less developed countries, while the transfer object in many of the developed countries was more in the realm of introducing an idea within the existing structure.

-
- Facilitate ECOWAS Member States to develop and strengthen institutions, mechanisms and capacities for building resilience to hazards;
 - Promote incorporation of risk reduction approaches in emergency preparedness, rehabilitation and recovery programmes of ECOWAS Member States;
 - Enhance the contribution of disaster reduction to peace, security and sustainable development of the sub region" (ECOWAS, 2006, p. 9).

It may be argued that the reason for the different contexts for the DRR policy transfer by UNISDR, is because the developed countries may already have the relevant DRR organisational structures in place, while this was not so in the less developed countries. However, in the narratives of many of the ECOWAS countries, there was expression of existing organisational structures, such as the National Risk Observatory and National Disaster Prevention and Management Programme in Cameroon (Directorate of Civil Defence, 2006); National Disaster Management Organisation in Ghana (Odei, 2005); National Commission for Predictive Flood Management in Senegal (Dia, 2004); and National Environment Management Agency in Nigeria. Despite these, setting up new national platforms for DRR were advocated for by the UNISDR, thereby situating the problem of DRR in ECOWAS MS as one requiring altering the existing administrative arrangement.

One would have expected this finding of situating a bureaucratic setting to be more in line with the transfer mechanism of conditionality, but the significant involvement of the transfer agent, which seems to be based on the economic circumstance of the recipient jurisdiction, likely informed the wielding of substantial influence by the transfer agent. This tends to show that there can be a difference in the manifestation of the mechanism of obligation depending on the recipient jurisdiction being targeted by the policy transfer. Such that when the transfer recipient has a weak economic standing and an expectation of support from the transfer agent, it is likely that the setting in the narratives of the transfer agent will be a bureaucratic setting, while obligated transfers to developed countries will likely feature other settings.

In addition to the significant involvement of the transfer agent in the policy transfer, some of the African recipients maintained a disposition that made it seem as though they were at the receiving end of conditional policy transfers. Some of the countries

forthrightly expressed expectations of financial support from the UNISDR and other international development partners, upon their acknowledgement of the relevance of DRR and approval of a DRR policy. For instance, the Chad government asserted its dependence on the international community for dealing with “hazards with disastrous impact on ecosystems” (Ibrahim, 2004, p. 10), while the Nigerian government emphasised its reliance on the international community, particularly the UNISDR, in order to fulfil some of the provisions of the HFA (Ojo, 2004, p. 20). Also, the African Union’s NEPAD, as though forewarning the UNISDR on what should be their additional contribution after playing a “critical role ... in shaping the agenda in disaster risk reduction” (Rukato, 2004, p. 4), advised the transfer agent that it should not absolve itself from bearing some of the responsibilities of carrying out the agenda. Such expressions, which can also be detected in ECOWAS’ consistent depiction of the character of victim in the two instances of policy transfer, as will be shown in the next chapter, made it seem that the recipient jurisdictions had conditioned themselves to expect conditional policy transfers. This further highlights the possibility of the narrative setting to inform the casting of characters, as was also observed in the case of renewable energy policy transfer and other NPF studies (Gray and Jones, 2016; French et al., 2017).

With respect to ECOWAS MS’ expectation of engaging in a conditional policy transfer, as opposed to policy transfer by obligation, this may not be farfetched from their experience with some international development partners, as can be seen in the quote below.

Often, international donor agencies tend to treat the national recipients of aid as being in an inferior bargaining position. There are many examples of inappropriate donor actions that were either useless or counterproductive For effective and timely disaster reduction, therefore, international donors and

recipients must interact as equal negotiating partners (UNEP et al., 2000, p. 17).

We can see from the quote that there is a caution against relying on demeaning tactics in promoting the concern of DRR, and it may be that the UNISDR in reaching out to African countries sought not to employ the mechanism of conditionality in advocating for the adoption of DRR policy, so as to heed to the above admonition. However, many African jurisdictions did not necessarily position themselves as equal partners, because if they did, they would not have viewed fulfilling their obligation to the HFA as an act that warrants (financial) support from the transfer agent in return. With such a disposition, the UNISDR may have had the leeway to situate its narrative setting as bureaucratic in communicating about the policy transfer. As shown below, the often culmination of reporting on DRR issues within their jurisdiction, with the request for support, or argument for inability to independently tackle their share of the solution suggest that the recipient jurisdiction is likely not yet at home with the idea of relating with international partners as equals.

Given the critical role of development partners and institutions in shaping the agenda in disaster risk reduction, they should not be seen to absolve themselves from the outcomes of the implementation of these agendas, but rather embrace a shared responsibility between all partner institutions and the respective governments (Rukato, 2004, p. 4).

Even though desertification is a hazard with disastrous impact on ecosystems, the Government's meagre resources cannot help to handle it efficiently. Hence the need to mobilize the population and the international community (Ibrahim, 2004, p. 11).

To bring about decentralization in disaster risk reduction to the lowest community level in Nigeria, NEMA would need the support of relevant stakeholders locally and internationally, including the UNISDR (Ojo, 2005, p. 20).

Perhaps, the economic standing of the recipient jurisdiction may have hampered their possibility or capability of reciprocating the gesture of the UNISDR in facilitating the

policy transfer through obligation rather than conditionality. It could also be that upon the UNISDR realising the recipient jurisdiction will yet require significant support from it after acquiescing to acknowledge the policy issue of DRR, the transfer agent then sought to situate the bureaucratic setting in a bid to ensure there is a definite action taken (i.e. development and adoption of a policy document and creation of national platforms) in the recipient jurisdiction, and this can be recorded as part of the success of its advocacy effort. Other examples of obligated transfer to more economically advanced countries, in addition to those of DRR policy transfer to developed countries by UNISDR, show that this is unlike the prevailing scenario, whereby the recipient jurisdiction is often at liberty to decide how to meet its obligation and incorporate the transfer object within the governmental functions in its domain. For instance, in the introduction of the Freedom of Information to Ireland and Portugal, which was informed by an EU directive on Access to Information on the Environment (AIE), the two recipient jurisdictions were at liberty to devise the appropriate mode of incorporating the directive, so that Portugal went for enacting the Access to Documents Act, an act which also had a mix of French imports, while in Ireland, the directive was “implemented through regulations” (Bugdahn, 2007, p. 134). In addition, the transfer agent situated a collective narrative setting, as the policy was contextualised as an effort to give all citizens access to information on government activities and decisions (EUR-LEX, 2017; European Commission, 2016).

However, in this instance of policy transfer, the target was specifically the adoption of a new DRR policy document and the establishment of national platforms in ECOWAS MS (AU and NEPAD, 2004a; ECOWAS, 2006; UNISDR Africa, 2005b), and this prescription gave the recipient jurisdiction little or no leeway in deciding how to meet its obligation to the Africa Regional DRR Strategy and HFA. The limited flexibility in

interpreting and actualising the obligation can also be seen in the prescription of the preferred language to be used, as the African recipient jurisdictions were told by UNISDR that “they need to speak in the language of donor countries”, even if they “may feel more ownership towards the Africa Regional Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction than towards the HFA” (UNISDR Africa, 2005a, p. 42). The advice was given based on the expectation that the recipients would reach out to donors for assistance in meeting their obligations, and it further highlights the likelihood that although this instance of policy transfer was orchestrated to be driven by the mechanism of obligation, the economic situation in the recipient jurisdiction was taken into consideration. This consideration must have informed the nature of the relationship that existed between the transfer agent and recipient, and the use of narrative elements by the transfer agent to communicate the transfer process, which then shaped the mode of obligated transfer that manifested i.e. policy transfer by obligation and aided by significant involvement of the transfer agent.

It can be argued that ECOWAS and its MS did not necessarily position themselves as equal partners with the UNISDR mainly because of their economic circumstance and this led them to lay emphasis on their needed dependence on the transfer agent and other international partners, for meeting their obligation to the Africa DRR Strategy and HFA. As mentioned earlier, this expectation of support may have conditioned the transfer recipient for the manifestation of a conditional transfer, and the situation of a bureaucratic setting, based on their experience with conditional transfers facilitated by international development partners (Koeberle et al., 2015; Tambulasi, 2013). As such, policy actors in the transfer recipient jurisdiction readily presented a bureaucratic setting in their narratives and examples of this depiction are highlighted below.

In the past, effective national disaster prevention and management came under serious criticisms due mainly to the existing structural and policy defects inherent in the process. This led to a conscious effort to review the policies and structures to bring disaster management in line with modern practices (Odei, 2005, p. 10).

To support the above proposals, further policy recommendations include the establishment of a formal institutional structure to manage a proposed National Disaster Risk Mitigation Fund (Olokesusi, 2006, p. 18).

(We will be) re-energizing the institutional and strategic framework by establishing a National Platform for DRR ... and ... [s]trengthening the legal and sectoral framework in line with ongoing challenges in the fields of environment, land use and town and regional planning (Ndiaye, 2006, p. 41).

We can assume that the depiction of a similar narrative setting implies that the transfer recipient acknowledges the existence of a common problem and agrees to the recommendation for addressing the challenge. However, this again, is not always the case in instances of obligated transfer, particularly to developed countries. With reference to the earlier mentioned instance of obligated policy transfer to Portugal and Ireland, there was disparity in the setting assumed for the transfer object. Although the EU designated a collective setting, Ireland went for a sectoral setting and Portugal favoured a community setting. The approach by Portugal was described as falling “short of the ambitions of the 1990 AIE Directive” (Bugdahn, 2007, p. 133) and it led to a contention between the transfer agent and recipient (Bugdahn, 2007). In contrast, decision makers in ECOWAS and its MS did not depict an alternative narrative setting that may reflect a possible “series of conflicts and negotiations” (Dussauge-Laguna, 2013b, p. 686) during the policy transfer process, despite some domestic actors bemoaning the notion of developing a new DRR policy document and recommending that “[e]mphasis should ... be put on testing existing policies and ... implementing available policies ... before coming up with new ones” (Ziervogel, 2006, p. 22). The absence of contestation of the setting situated by the transfer agent is quite noteworthy, knowing that the policy issue to which DRR is linked i.e. climate change,

is often a contentious topic between African policymakers and international actors. More so, the view that African nations need to make commitments to addressing climate change has often been countered with the concept of climate justice to maintain that the region had not contributed to the state of the climate, and because it would still be impacted negatively by the effects of climate change, it needs to be compensated (European Union Delegation to the African Union, 2010d).

As noted earlier, an explanation for the situation of a bureaucratic setting by the transfer recipient in an obligated policy transfer could be that perhaps, the recipient jurisdiction was unaware of, or was not familiar with the possibility of having the liberty to meet up its obligation and situate its setting as it thinks best, and instead, it resorted to what it had been conditioned to expect from policy transfers. This then begs the question of whether this case of DRR policy transfer to ECWOAS can be regarded as an instance of obligated policy transfer, and if there is an element of conditionality involved therein, thereby making it an instance of policy transfer that is partly obligatory and partly conditional? To address this, there is a need to consider that the transfer agent does not present the transfer object as a condition to be fulfilled by the transfer recipient and neither does it offer a promise of support to reciprocate the fulfilment of the condition. Rather, UNISDR sought to engage with the topmost echelon of authority in ECOWAS and relevant officials in a bid to secure alignment with the HFA. UNISDR's approach can be seen in these quotes:

[T]o lobby heads of state ... it was proposed that UNISDR participates in the upcoming AU summit by presenting results of the WCDR, reminding African heads of state of what they pledged in Kobe and what needs to be done for the implementation of the HFA (UNISDR Africa, 2005a, p. 42).

UNISDR supports regional and national implementation of the Global Framework and catalyses action and increases global awareness to reduce disaster risk. Actually, UNISDR has a consultant attached to ECOWAS Commission (Interview 6, 2017).

You'll find that in each and every regional organisation, we have our person there If you look at most of these (African) countries, they have now their policies, they have their strategies and plans, and we have been involved (Interview 5, 2017).

With the engagement of the African heads of states, UNISDR was able to ensure that the transfer recipient acquiesced to not only the idea of obligated policy transfer on a contentious issue by securing their commitment to the HFA, but also to align with its preferred context for domesticating the HFA. In addition, the UNSDR did not concede to committing funds in order to placate the recipient jurisdictions into adopting the DRR policy, as would have been the case in a conditional policy transfer, but it maintained that the African countries were obliged to honour the pledges they made (Interview 5, 2017; Interview 6, 2017). Based on these, the possibility of the manifestation of the mechanism of conditionality can be negated even though the transfer recipient tacitly insinuated this approach. As a result, it can be asserted that the transfer mechanism operational in this instance of policy transfer was obligation.

Conclusion

At the start of this chapter, we looked at what the use of narrative setting implies in a policy transfer actor's narrative, and noted that it lays down the area of influence and sets the boundaries of where the transfer object will take effect. It also contextualises the access and reach of the transfer agent, and its influence over the transfer recipient. According to the findings, both the EU and UNISDR depicted a bureaucratic setting, which hints at the target of altering bureaucratic structures in the recipient jurisdiction. While the use of this narrative setting was expected to be associated with the use of mechanism of conditionality in ensuring the adoption of the ECOWAS renewable

energy policy, the finding was however unexpected for the obligated policy transfer facilitated by UNISDR. As mentioned, UNISDR's involvement in advocating for DRR takes a different approach in some developed countries, where the issue of DRR is absorbed within existing structures in the recipient jurisdictions, instead of creating a new department or developing a new policy document for the establishment of a new agency. ECOWAS' use of a bureaucratic setting in its narrative on the development of DRR policy was also an unexpected finding, as this portrayal seemed to highlight an asymmetrical relationship between the transfer agent and recipient, and perhaps an expectation of receipt of support from the transfer agent upon adopting the transfer object.

On the other hand, the narrative setting used by ECOWAS in the case of renewable energy policy transfer sometimes differed from that of the transfer agent. With the EU's narrative depicting a bureaucratic setting, ECOWAS depicted both a bureaucratic and community setting. The incorporation of these two settings sets the stage for a conditional policy transfer that is unlike what is often observed, for example in the transfer of SAP to developing countries. Even though the transfer agent in this case possessed the clout and wherewithal to exert a broad influence on the recipient jurisdiction, the preference of the recipient was still put into consideration and this can be said laid the foundation for an amiable relation between the actors, and shaped the materialisation of the mechanism of persuasion. Therefore, this chapter argued that the narrative setting depicts the intent of actors with regards to where a transfer object would take effect in the recipient jurisdiction, which also illustrates the degree of access and influence of the transfer agent, and go on to shape the mechanism that is observed in policy transfers.

The next chapter focuses on the characters that are depicted in the narratives of the transfer agents and recipients in the cases of transfer of renewable energy and DRR policies to ECOWAS.

Chapter 7 – Casting Characters

Introduction

Stories, be they original or fictional, are imbued with messages. Such messages are directed at an audience and can be aimed at possibly convincing, contesting, or attesting. As observed in the last chapter, the use of the different narrative elements by policy transfer actors served as a conveying tool for messages that are targeted at a designated audience and intended to generate action. In both cases, the depiction of the narrative setting highlighted where the focus of the policy transfer will be centred. While the depiction of a bureaucratic setting was used in DRR policy transfer, to specify the target of creating national platforms for DRR in ECOWAS states, both bureaucratic and community settings were used in renewable energy policy transfer to stipulate the target of creating an enabling market environment and providing energy services for Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and rural locations in ECOWAS.

Likewise, the actors used the element of narrative characters to portray who plays what role in the policy transfer process. With reference to the earlier discussion on narrative character in Chapter 3, and the explanation of the different characters in Table 4.2, the hero is said to be an entity designated in the policy narrative as the fixer of a purported problem; allies are actors that are collaborating; the villain is the entity causing harm; while the victim is an entity that is negatively affected by a situation. As such, the characters of victim and villain are used to emphasise the existence of a problem that needs addressing, and the character of hero is used to showcase prowess and identify who is capable of solving the problem. EU's narratives featured the story of a hero assisting an ally, UNISDR told a story of allies working together to

save victims from a villain, while ECOWAS' narratives portrayed a victim in need of a hero.

Table 7.1: Depiction of Narrative Characters

	Renewable Energy Policy Transfer by the EU		DRR Policy Transfer by UNISDR			
Total No of Documents	56		31			
	No of Documents	%	No of Documents	%	Test of Difference P<=0.05	
Narrative Element: Character						
Hero	36	64%	16	52%	t= 1.15, p= 0.25	ns
Ally	32	57%	20	65%	t=-0.96, p= 0.34	ns
Victim	11	20%	16	52%	t= -3.23, p=0.002	s
Villain	11	20%	17	55%	t= -3.57, p= 0.001	s
Antagonist	0	0%	0	0%	n/a	
	X ² (d.f=3)= 160.28, p<0.001		X ² (d.f=3)= 15.69, p<0.005			

The findings in this study show that rather than employ stories of contest as seen in many studies on policy narratives, and as often associated with policy actors (McBeth et al. 2010; Shanahan et al. 2013; Shanahan et al. 2014; Lybecker et al. 2013; Gupta et al. 2014), the stories by the actors were often meant for convincing an audience and/or attesting to the storyteller's capabilities. This can be seen through the actors' use of endearing tactics, such that the analysis shows 0% depiction of antagonists and more than 50% depiction of allies, as highlighted in Table 7.1. In addition, there is hardly any depiction of human villains and the recipient is often cast in positions contrary to their present predicament and station¹⁹. Such endearing tactics emphasise

¹⁹ The character of villain can be seen to feature considerably in the case of DRR policy transfer to ECOWAS, however, these depictions are related to non-human identities, and this is discussed further in the section on villains and antagonists.

a significant message, which is that these are ally-seeking stories. The use of this tactic meant that there was a conscious attempt to avoid condescending expressions, be it from the transfer agent to the recipient, or the otherwise, and instead, there was a focus on working together and/or providing assistance.

We may ask if the involvement of the mechanism of persuasion made EU's narrative to be almost on par with that of UNISDR, with regards to the depiction of allies. Or, if at all the transfer mechanisms in the two cases are more similar than earlier observed? A close examination of the actors' use of the individual narrative character, therefore is necessary. To do this, the chapter is structured to enable analysis of the depiction of each narrative character by the transfer agents, UNISDR and the EU, and then by the recipient, ECOWAS. This will allow the observation and comparison of how the actors apportioned the characters of heroes, allies, victims, villains, or antagonists (Jones and McBeth, 2010; Jones et al., 2014; Shanahan, Jones and McBeth, 2017). It will also enable the examination of the perception of the transfer agents towards the transfer recipient and vice-versa, and how this may have informed the transfer mechanisms observed in instances of policy transfer. Based on this, the next section will discuss the casting of heroes and allies by the transfer agents, and this is followed by a section discussing the casting of heroes and allies by the recipient.

7.1 Casting Heroes and Allies by Policy Transfer Agents

Plan with Africa, not for Africa (Interview 1, 2017).

To identify the character casting of the policy transfer agents, the introductory editorials of the newsletters published by the EU and UNISDR seem to portray their envisioned roles of and relationship between the transfer agent and recipient. The first edition of the newsletter published by the EU, *LINK!*, features an introductory message from the Ambassador of the EU to the AU and it reads:

I'm proud to present to you LINK!, the first newsletter from the European Union Delegation to the African Union, in joint cooperation with all EU Member States representations to the AU.

The establishment of the EU Delegation to the AU last year was an important political statement by the EU: the recognition that the AU and its Commission had become a strategic partner in our relations with Africa, and that, if we wanted to be taken seriously in this partnership, we had to strengthen our presence in Addis. As many of our partners in the AUC put it: "now we know you take us seriously." In that sense, the Delegation will be an even stronger LINK! between Addis and Brussels.

We are almost halfway through the first action plan of the Lisbon partnership. I'm confident that in the coming months we will be able to show that many new projects are ready to deliver. Our monthly newsletter aims also at raising awareness of important ongoing activities and mobilising further support.

... Together we have to ensure that Africa recovers the momentum of economic expansion it has been building up for several years and that the important progress in the field of governance is strengthened (Vervaeke, 2009, p. 1).

This story positions the EU in the heroic seat and as the driver of the Lisbon partnership, an agreement between the EU and African countries which also forms the basis for the engagement of the EU in the development of the ECOWAS renewable energy policy (Interview 2, 2017). It heralds the establishment of an EU Delegation that is dedicated to the organisation's operations in Africa and the introduction of the newsletter. It also emphatically situates who is in charge of the newsletter and the projects on the Lisbon partnership. It can be argued that the mention of 'we' in the third

paragraph implies a collective expression and a sharing of the heroic status with the African strategic partner. However, the second sentence tends to clarify further which actors the 'we' in the earlier sentence refers to, as it directly links it to the publisher of the newsletter i.e. the EU. This bold declaration of the ownership of the *Link!* newsletter and leadership of project delivery under the Lisbon partnership however differs from how the UNISDR positions itself with respect to addressing DRR issues in Africa. The below excerpt shows the story told by the UNISDR in its introductory message of the newsletter, Disaster Reduction in Africa: ISDR Informs:

Our initiative, your publication

... Published by ISDR Africa, the present publication called "Disaster Reduction in Africa" seeks, in its own little way and in its own area of activity, to narrow the gap between the two camps in Africa: between those who "can" help to prevent and those who "cannot" circumvent; between those who "can" help to avert and those who "can't" help being hurt.

Therefore ADR Review is meant not only for disaster scholars, scientists, experts, policy makers, but also for grassroots "practitioners", NGOs, communities and citizens, especially the vulnerable ones.

On the same ground, it is not only published for all the above, but also owned by all the above. They are called upon to contribute to and shape, actively, ADR Review. The publication is theirs (Valency, 2003a, p. 1)

This introductory message opens a space for co-ownership of the publication with its target audience, and with its call for a joint effort and shared responsibilities, it highlights the necessity of the direct contribution of other parties in addressing the gap identified, and portrays an envisioned alliance with those who are vulnerable to disasters. In particular, the UNISDR underplays its role and rather than make grand statements about its identity and endeavours, it opts for a modest narration. In many of the documents, it barely situates itself in a more significant position or assume supremacy over the intended transfer recipients, instead it relies on casting itself and the prospective transfer recipients as allies. In particular, many of the 52% depiction

of a hero, are in reference to the DRR activities of a specific individual, Mrs. Tadzong, a Cameroonian woman, and her receipt of an international UN award.

We may assume that the difference in the manner of expression of the transfer agents' achievements and actions, is primarily due to the styles of language that may be prescribed within the organisations to which the actors belong i.e. a UN or EU communication style. However, it seems that the reticence of the UNISDR reflects the assumed joint ownership of the problem, while on the other hand, the EU's proactive tone seems to signal a bold ownership of the actions for addressing a problem that is existent in another jurisdiction. In general, the EU did not shy away from singing its own praises and this can be seen in the quotes below.

The EU stands ready to allocate EUR 8M to ...guide the integration of climate information into development planning and ensure the mainstreaming of climate considerations into policies aimed at achieving the MDGs (Vervaeke, 2010, p. 1).

The EU stands with countries in difficulty. We are a reliable partner even in times of economic downturn (Barroso, 2010a, p. 3).

The European Union has not only been the largest provider of financial support ... it has also been the most predictable one (European Union Delegation to the African Union, 2009b, pp. 9–10).

The European Union is by far the largest donor of funds in the (*ECOWAS*) region, accounting for close on two thirds (64.9%) of the total regional aid committed, with 57% coming from the EC and 7.9% from the Member States (European Commission et al., 2008, p. 38).

It is as though the knowledge of possession of the means for addressing a problem in the recipient jurisdiction may have informed the EU's proactive expression of a heroic status, while on the other hand, the acknowledgement of joint ownership of the problem of DRR, and the required joining of resources to realise the solution, may have informed the less proactive expression of UNISDR's achievements and actions. This notion was also observed in the interviews. The EU was often regarded as a

financial bigwig capable of providing support because it has the resources, and its acclaimed support to ECOWAS “in terms of infrastructure, free movement, road, energy, health and the rest” (Interview 2, 2017) could not go unnoticed. However, it was the collaboration with African regional bodies like ECOWAS that was emphasised about UNISDR (Interview 5, 2017; Interview 6, 2017).

This observation can contribute to the understanding of and distinguishing between transfer mechanisms of obligation and conditionality. Owing that what prompts policy transfers driven by obligation is a drive for joint action to address a common challenge (Bulmer and Padgett, 2005; Sobaci, 2009), the emphasis on joint effort and shared responsibilities portrays the envisioned role of the participants as allies operating on a similar pedestal. Perhaps, it is based on the aspiration of harmonisation (Jordan et al., 2003; Randma-Liiv and Kruusenbergh, 2012) that obligated transfers will likely employ narrative elements that facilitate the positioning of both the transfer agents and recipients on similar pedestal, despite the clear hierarchy that may distinguish the transfer agent from the recipient (Bulmer, 2007; Bulmer and Padgett, 2005). As Radaelli (2003, p.33) puts it, “[h]armonization reduces ... diversity, typically by providing a level playing field”, and as such, the depiction of the transfer agent and recipient as allies tends to be a means for seeking that level playing field. With the transfer recipient in this case being a regional body consisting of countries that are classified as developing and least developed countries, the recognition of a possible capability of these countries to contribute (even in the least measure) to an international policy further highlights the acknowledgement of a shared problem and shared responsibility.

This is however against the notion that the transfer mechanism of obligation implies a jurisdiction being “forced by some international obligation in a treaty” as remarked by

Lodge and James (2003, p.185). The depiction of the intended recipients by the UNISDR negates this explanation of obligated transfers, rather, the depiction of the recipients as allies by UNISDR reiterate the non-reliance on the use of force by the transfer agents in obligated transfers. So, even though there is a hierarchical difference in the position of the transfer agent and recipient e.g. international and national, this hierarchy is not inculcated into the transfer agent's narration about the recipient. Some examples of the UNISDR's casting of the recipient as allies are presented below.

To face up this challenge, UNISDR Africa has forged a very sound partnership with African national governments and regional organizations to promote understanding of disaster risk reduction (UNISDR Africa, 2006a).

Support nowadays is in the form of partnership. As partnership is about combining assets (strengths) not liabilities (weaknesses), Africa should contribute its assets - not its liabilities (Valency, 2004a, p. 1).

To facilitate the advancement of the disaster reduction process, AU/NEPAD and UNISDR Africa have been taking a leading role in advocating and coordinating disaster reduction initiatives ... in cooperation with ... Sub-Regional Economic Commissions (RECs). (UNISDR Africa, 2004b, pp. 1–2).

From these quotes, the depiction of allies do not only ascribe an associate status to the recipient, but it also implies an emphatic call to the recipients to live up to their responsibility in addressing the challenge of DRR. The intent of association therefore, is made clear to be one of working together to solve a shared problem. In the case of renewable energy transfer, EU's narrative consistently portrays its involvement in the policy transfer from a place of strength even though the intended relations with the recipient is in the form of partners. Its heroic positioning, particularly, the economic show of strength reflects its financial power and the kind of hierarchical relationship that typifies the transfer mechanism of conditionality (Bulmer et al., 2007). This quote below by the then European Commissioner for Development, Andris Piebalgs, also

highlights how conditionality arrangements are predicated on incentives from an entity with significant economic and/or political power.

[R]eforms such as providing a predictable legal framework for investors, improved judiciary or banking systems, are crucial for any economic investment to produce the expected results, and should be therefore pre-conditions for physical infrastructure financing. Without the implementation of the needed policy reforms, investments are not economically justifiable (European Union Delegation to the African Union, 2012, pp. 8–9).

It is noteworthy that the throwing of financial weight is however tempered by the depiction of the recipient as an ally rather than an aid beneficiary. The EU maintained that the relationship was a “two-way process between equal partners that share common challenges and have complementary interests” (The Africa-EU Partnership, 2010, p. 1). The EU’s declaration of African countries as equal partners, and its embrace of geographical and historical similarities (see quotes below) suggest a desire for cordiality, and for this to be a basis for its involvement in influencing the adoption of EU-favoured policy decisions in African countries.

Africa and Europe are bound together by history, culture, geography, a common future, as well as by a community of values (African Union and European Union, 2007, p. 1).

Africa’s 54 countries and the European Union’s soon-to-be 28 member states have a shared neighbourhood, history and future (European Union and African Union, 2012, p. 6).

Europe’s relationship with Africa is not new. Geographical proximity, historic ties, evolving mutual recognition and accountability help to address common interests, would it be green growth or reforms of institutional and social systems (The Africa-EU Partnership, 2010, p. 1).

The EU’s portrayal of the recipient as allies negates the wielding of power and/or the top-down relationship approach that is often linked to conditional transfers to developing countries and transition states. For instance, when the process of accession to IGOs require conditional policy transfers, especially in cases where the

candidate to the IGO happens to be a developing or transition country, the application process usually allows an “asymmetrical relationship” (Grabbe, 2003, p. 303). Also, in cases of policy transfers based on aid or loan conditionality by the World Bank and IMF, the recipients are usually at the mercy of the transfer agents (Chapman and Greenaway, 2006; Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996; Evans, 2009b). Although in the policy transfer literature, the EU is also sometimes banded with other IGOS and financial institutions that facilitate conditional policy transfers (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996; Bulmer et al., 2007), in this instance of transfer of renewable energy policy to ECOWAS however, the disposition of the EU can be said to be a deviation from the typical.

The casting of African countries as allies and the assertion of amity, in a way, indicates the EU’s conscious effort at being persuasive, and avoiding a brash approach and perhaps, its associated consequence of inequality and dispossession (European Union Delegation to the African Union, 2010b). In particular, even though the EU indicated the development of a policy framework as a condition for facilitating renewable energy investments in West Africa (European Union and African Union, 2012; European Union Delegation to the African Union, 2012), it frowns at being associated with the practice of aids and loan conditionality of the World Bank and IMF, because of its severe top-down relations with the recipients (Interview 1, 2017). So, despite its policy transfer approach of “you need to say this, then you get that” (Interview 4, 2017), one can say that the EU tempered the manifestation of the transfer mechanism of conditionality with the touch of the mechanism of persuasion. Also, this seemed to have restrained the hierarchical relations that otherwise might have dominated the conditional policy transfer, thereby making the transfer agent, the EU, to act in a manner expected of international non-governmental organisations (INGOs).

According to Stone (2010), since INGOs do not have similar powers as that of IGOs, in acting as transfer agents, they focus on soft transfer i.e. transfer of ideas, and rely on persuasion and partnerships to facilitate such. Through its reliance on the mechanism of persuasion, the EU therefore partly puts itself in a position more synonymous with INGOs, while at the same time, it maintains the stipulation of adoption of a renewable energy policy as a condition for facilitating investments. As such, in marrying the mechanism persuasion with that of conditionality, the transfer agent conspicuously casts itself as a hero with the wherewithal to solve a problem within the recipient jurisdiction, but still considers the transfer recipient as an ally.

This section has discussed the depiction of heroes and allies from the perspective of the transfer agents and as mentioned earlier, since the manifestation of transfer mechanisms is not only dependent on the actions of the transfer agent but also that of the recipient, it will be important to consider the narratives presented from the different ends of sending and receiving in the transfer process (Wolman and Page, 2002). Based on this, the next section discusses the depiction of heroes and allies by ECOWAS in the two instances of policy transfer, and how this may have shaped the observed transfer mechanisms.

7.2 Casting Heroes and Allies by Policy Transfer Recipient

We worked together from the beginning (Interview 2, 2017).

Policy transfers driven by coercive transfer mechanisms are often externally initiated by the transfer agents, and if the recipients of such transfers are developing countries, the transfer agents will in many instances, not only initiate and drive the process, but also provide the funds that will be needed to ensure the development and adoption of

the policy (Kappiah, 2014; McNamara, 1980; Timms, 2011). With respect to this, one would expect that the heroes of the transfer stories will consistently be the initiator, driver, and funder of the policy transfer. Albeit, in presenting its narratives, ECOWAS and its MS often drew from their domestic endeavours to highlight their achievements thereby, positioning themselves in a heroic status, while the transfer agent is placed as an ally by making mention of their 'support' (ECOWAS, 2006; ECREEE, 2013a; Kappiah, 2014).

In the case of the renewable energy policy transfer, there is no grand depiction of the EU in any similar fashion to how it depicted itself in its own communication materials. There is also no illustration that might suggest the EU's ownership of the wherewithal to tackle the problem that is to be addressed by the policy transfer. Instead, just as the EU drew from historical relations and geographical proximity to ascertain the ally status of African countries, so also did ECOWAS draw from its past achievements and geographical boundaries to ascertain its heroic status. Some examples of ECOWAS' and its MS depiction of hero are presented below and from the quotes, one can see that there is hardly an attribution of external input leading to the attainment of the achievements.

Another major success of ECOWAS in the energy sector is the establishment of the WAGP project, which benefits from the 18 billion m³ of natural gas that Nigeria currently burns off with flare towers (N'Guessan et al., 2011, p. 14).

[T]he pioneering approach of ECOWAS in developing the region's renewable energy and energy efficiency sectors, which subsequently led to the establishment of the first regional renewable energy and energy efficiency (REandEE) promotion agency in sub-Saharan Africa (ECREEE, 2012c, p. 3).

[I]n the relatively short period since its establishment, ECREEE has rapidly built up an impressive portfolio of initiatives (Kappiah, 2012, p. 1).

Today, ECOWAS stands as one of the most dynamic Regional Economic Community (REC) of the continent (N'Guessan et al., 2011, p. 1).

Based on the quotes, there is a self-positioning of ECOWAS as the hero of its own story even though in this instance, it is on the receiving end of a benefactor's initiative and resource. Does this casting of heroes, therefore, portend a desire for the transfer recipient to be regarded as the initiator and driver of its own domestic policies? Or indeed, is it a reflection of an assumption that this instance of transfer of renewable energy was domestically initiated? The likelihood of observing combinations of mechanisms related to both domestically and externally-initiated policy transfers is noted in the literature (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000; Evans and Barakat, 2012; Lavenex, 2002; Unalan, 2009). However, as noted in Chapter 5, the policy transfer was externally-initiated and driven by the mechanisms of conditionality and persuasion, a mechanism mix that perhaps, may be described as soft or indirect conditionality (Interview 2, 2017).

To argue further for the occurrence of an externally-initiated transfer instance with the manifestation of a coercive transfer mechanism, examples of internally-initiated policy transfers from the literature show that the recipients in such instances scarcely refrain from casting the transfer source as a hero in their storytelling. Jacobs and Barnett (2000) provide an example of a transfer recipient's acknowledgement of another jurisdiction's successful policy instruments. In their study of health services reform in New Zealand, there was mention of the expression of admiration for the UK government's dedicated funding of its healthcare reforms and the Oregon approach for defining core services in healthcare (Jacobs and Barnett, 2000). Also, in the case of transfer of welfare-to-work policy to the UK from the US, a UK policymaker lauded the approach of the U.S. and noted that "[t]he reason why I'm actually quite keen that we do use the lessons of the U.S. ... is that ... the U.S. have been very good at ... a

couple of things in the general area of welfare. One is that the programmes that they do run are very effective, they are very business-like, very brisk, they're very intensive" (Legrand, 2012b, p. 342). Even in instances of voluntary policy transfer where the recipient has been depicted as the hero of its own story and show expression such as "we do everything better than the others" (Lodge, 2003, p. 270), this disposition has often been with regards to experiences that end up as non-transfers. In such non-transfer instances, despite considering another jurisdiction as a possible transfer source, there is no eventual adoption of the policy object being considered, because the intended transfer object is regarded as a representation of what not to do (Dunlop, 2009; Lodge, 2003). Therefore, if the transfer of renewable energy policy to ECOWAS was an instance of voluntary transfer, then the recipient would more likely have heralded the achievements made by policymakers in the source jurisdiction, and acknowledged them as heroes.

With regards to the case of the transfer of DRR policy to ECOWAS, as though following in the footsteps of the transfer agent i.e. UNISDR, ECOWAS rarely deployed grand statements or depiction of heroism in referring to its own identify or activities. This is in contrast to the recipient's enumeration of past successes in the instance of conditional transfer of renewable energy policy, such that in the place of heroic achievements, there was mainly an outline of past activities. One might say that this disposition may be in relations to the consciousness of the cooperation and contributions that solving the problem warrants. Whereas, with the instance of conditional transfer, the consciousness that is borne by the recipient is the actualisation of an assurance made by an external party. Based on this, we may infer that what is expected from engaging in the transfer process is a factor that can inform how the transfer recipient depicts itself in a policy transfer process, and how this

depiction shapes the transfer mechanism that plays out. Thus, with the expectation of joining in to address a global challenge, the recipient in an obligatory policy transfer will likely consider itself as a piece that is required to solve a big puzzle, while with regards to conditional transfer, the expectation of receipt of support will likely result in the recipient seeking self-assertion, perhaps as a reassurance of its sovereignty.

In the next section, we will turn to how the actors have used the character of victim in their narratives.

7.3 Casting Victims by Policy Transfer Agents

Many African countries are often readily associated with a narrative of lack and distress, and as a result, these countries and its people are also usually depicted as victims by many external policy actors telling stories about the region, in a bid to emphasise the need for addressing the challenges in the countries (Hopkins, 2014; Piot, 1999). However, contrary to an expectation of casting of ECOWAS as a victim by both transfer agents, the findings show that it was only UNISDR that followed this line of casting, while the EU shied away from depicting ECOWAS as a victim in its narrative. In its narratives, the UNISDR positioned the recipients as a victim by telling stories of catastrophes that are being experienced by communities and persons within the region, even when these are not related to environmental hazards. Some of the depictions by UNISDR are shown below.

All the countries most affected by HIV/ AIDS are in Africa, and nearly half of African countries have been involved in armed conflicts since 1990s (UNISDR Africa, 2003, p. 4).

Sadly, Africa has only about 9% of the world's water resources but 13% of the world's population. It also has the highest population growth rate in the world, which means that the total amount of water available to each person per year is well below that of the world average (UNISDR Africa, 2003, p. 7).

Africa is prone to a wide variety of disasters, especially large-scale floods, drought, tropical storms and volcanic eruptions, with widespread poverty and high HIV/AIDS prevalence leaving a large number of Africans even more vulnerable to disasters ... In the last two decades, African countries were very much overstressed by large-scale social, political and economic problems (UNISDR Africa, 2003, p. 4).

Over the past 40 years, natural hazards, such as earthquakes, droughts, floods, storms and tropical cyclones, wildfires and volcanic eruptions have caused major losses of human lives in Africa (UNISDR and UNEP, 2004, p. 7).

We can see that the threats and dangers, and the level of exposure to threats and dangers referred to in these quotes, are presented with elaborate expressions, such as major losses of life; highest population growth rate; large-scale floods; and widespread poverty. UNISDR's depiction of victims and use of elaborate expressions to describe the circumstances of the victim are aimed at emphasising the existence of a problem by putting a face to it. They are also likely directed at being able to mobilise the necessary support from allies in order to address the problem. This reiteration of diverse challenges on the African continent (both disaster and non-disaster related) in a bid to justify the imminence of natural hazards is, however paradoxical. This is because, although meteorological and hydrological events have been identified as the major drivers for the occurrence of natural disasters globally (Adebayo, 2005), yet, most African countries have been noted to be places that suffer less from such events as compared to other parts of the world (Dilley et al., 2005; Odei, 2006). In particular, one of the editorials of the UNISDR's newsletters noted that "the rest of the world knows that ... Africa is not the most disaster-prone continent" (Valency, 2004b, p. 1). Also, considering the history of the UNISDR, the disasters that had caught the world's attention, and which led to a global commitment by a group of countries to address the issue of disaster, had mainly occurred in Asia and the Americas (UNISDR, 2012a).

Facilitating an obligated policy transfer will likely require the identification of what the proposed policy will address i.e. there will be a need to establish a problem or challenge. It seems that it is in a bid to establish a policy problem and communicate this effectively, that the transfer agent cast the character of victim, and drew from existing non-disaster related circumstances to project the victim status. This is in line with the notion that commitments and contributions for addressing a challenge can be more guaranteed when there is an identifiable victim (Clemons et al., 2012), as this helps to give a face to the problem and clarify who needs to receive or benefit from any assistance to be given. As such, despite the issue of DRR being related to climate-related events (Bojang, 2003), the UNISDR situated African countries as victims of diseases, poverty, armed conflicts, epidemics, and “large-scale social, political and economic problems” (UNISDR Africa, 2003, p. 4), to justify the existence of a problem worthy of attention.

Also, the connotation of DRR with the existence of threats like HIV/AIDS and conflict seems to be a means of highlighting to the transfer recipient, the universality of the occurrence of disasters, so that even though the major disasters within its environs are not typically environmental, the transfer recipient can attempt to associate with the natural disasters that occur in other parts of the world. In addition, rather than its normal focus on the occurrence of major disasters, the message from the UNISDR to African countries centred on the vulnerability of the population based on their limited access to infrastructure and finance (AU and NEPAD, 2004a; Valency, 2005). This approach ensured the consolidation of the victim status, since the countries already suffer from developmental challenges, and this likely prompted an awakening to the reality of the raging problem of natural disasters.

According to Sobaci (2009, p.51) “[t]he emergence of common international problems that require the cooperation of nations inspire governments to implement similar policies for the solution of such problems”. So, beyond establishing the existence of a problem, the stories by the UNISDR also sought to highlight the commonality of the occurrence of disasters across the world²⁰. By painting a picture of shared sufferings, where the African continent suffers from development challenges which could be aggravated by disasters and other parts of the world suffer from the debilitating aftermath of a natural disaster, the transfer agent aimed for the recipient to develop a sense of familiarity with the policy issue and agree to join forces with others to address the challenge. The casting of victims thus informs the manifestation of the transfer mechanism of obligation through its emphasis on the harm being done, which can then make a prospective transfer recipient to realise the need to take part and stop the harm. This quote below surmises the relevance of casting victims in obligated policy transfers.

If a community does not believe it is at risk then it is unlikely to take part in disaster risk reduction programmes” (UNISDR Africa, 2004b, p. 5)

As shown in Table 7.1, in the instance of renewable energy policy transfer to ECOWAS, there were few depiction of victims in the EU’s narrative. Unlike the case of obligated transfer, where there was a considerable effort to paint a picture of people under significant threat in the recipient jurisdiction, by drawing from existing developmental challenges in order to situate the problems that can be posed by disasters, the EU however, was restrained in its depiction of the problems existing

²⁰ This message from the former Secretary-General of the United Nations also points to how the commonality of problem is emphasized in the transfer agent’s narrative: “Water-related disasters – including floods, droughts, hurricanes, typhoons and tropical cyclones – inflict a terrible toll on human life and property, affecting millions of people and provoking crippling economic losses. As ever, it is the poor and vulnerable who are most adversely affected, but as we saw in Central Europe in 2002, even industrialized nations can suffer immensely” (Annan, 2004, p. 33)

within the recipient jurisdiction. This is despite the presence of substantial threats and challenges in the policy area that is the focus of the policy transfer, and the awareness that “Africa's largest infrastructure deficit is in the energy sector” (European Union Delegation to the African Union, 2009c).

With the EU's limited depiction of a victim in its narratives, it refrained from exploiting the prevailing debilitating conditions for emphasising a story of sufferings. This also meant that there was a restrained personification of the reality being experienced in the energy sector and as such, it did not emphatically give a face to the problem. This restraint also prevented portraying the recipient in a weak or bad light. We may link this to the manifestation of the mechanism of persuasion, since an attempt to persuade another party will likely entail genteel expressions and/or flattering, in a bid to maintain cordiality. So that by not referring so much to the sufferings of the recipient, but what the transfer agent and recipient jurisdiction can achieve together i.e. as allies, the transfer recipient can be motivated to accept the proposition by the transfer agent. A message from the EU to African countries that they should cease perceiving themselves as donor recipients, but regard themselves as partners in development cooperation (Barroso, 2010b; European Commission, 2010), also highlight why the character of allies was used more to depict the transfer recipient, than the character of victims. In particular, the recipient jurisdiction was being made aware that it should not see itself in the light of a victim, but as an entity that can make contributions and address its own challenges while working with partners.

Such emphasis on portraying a transfer recipient as an ally rather than a victim is also demonstrated in the involvement of international organisations in the transfer of security policy to Palestinian territories and Liberia (Schroeder et al., 2013). In these instances, there was a marked change in the depiction of the transfer recipients by the

international organisations, the U.S. and EU, from victims to allies. The changes in the depictions were also followed by a change in the transfer mechanism that associated the relations between the transfer agent and recipient. In the case of policy transfer to Liberia, there was a change from the mechanism of imposition to that of persuasion. Also, in the case of policy transfer to the Palestinian territories, the shift in the transfer agents' perception of the territories from one of a victimised and helpless actor in grave need of unconditional support to that of an ally, saw the introduction of policy transfer driven by persuasion (Schroeder et al., 2013). The study also reported that with the manifestation of the mechanism persuasion, there was a warm acceptance of one or more of the multiple policy solutions put forward by the U.S. and EU, and from which the recipient could choose from. Along with the acceptance of the proposed policy solution, the transfer recipients also demonstrated strong ownership of the transfer objects. A similar demonstration of ownership by ECOWAS is also mentioned with regards to the transfer of renewable energy policy to ECOWAS by the EU (Interview 2, 2017), and this can be attributed to the policy transfer process being partly driven by the mechanism of persuasion.

However, unlike the examples of instances of policy transfer by persuasion in Schroeder et al. (2013), where the transfer recipients i.e. Palestinian territories and Liberia, had the choice to select the transfer object from a pot of options, this scenario did not play out in this case. Instead, there was a definite policy solution put forward, which was primarily based on attracting private and public investments for deployment of renewable energy technologies and delivering of energy services. So, even though the story of a victim in need of hero is not reinforced in the EU's narratives, a specific solution was yet put forward, which the recipient had to assent as an indication of willingness to accept the proposed support and agree to the conditions set. The

specification of a condition for attracting investment shows the conditionality dimension of the mechanisms that manifested in this transfer instance, but the story turns away from focusing on a hero backing a victim in need of support. This highlights the nature of the mix of the mechanisms of conditionality and persuasion, such that persuasion tempered what would have been obtained with the sole manifestation of conditionality, as the recipient was 'elevated' from a character of victim to that of an ally.

The next section will discuss the use of the narrative element of victims by the transfer agent in the transfer of renewable energy policy to ECOWAS by the EU.

7.4 Casting Victims by Policy Transfer Recipient

Similar to the casting of itself as the hero of its own story, ECOWAS and its MS also did not shy away from being situated as the victims in their narratives, in both instances of policy transfer. With respect to the case of DRR policy transfer, the opening lines of some of the articles authored by ECOWAS MS started with the information on the occurrence of natural disasters within their jurisdiction. Other events that are non-environmental related were also cited in a bid to link these to an exposure to environmental hazards. Some of the depictions are presented below.

Over the past ten years, The Gambia has experienced a number of natural disasters, man-made catastrophes and other calamities combining both natural and man-made factors, including: extensive flooding in 1999 and 2003, severe drought in 2002 which resulted in widespread and drastic reduction in household food stock and the loss of livestock (Nying and Nyangado, 2006, p. 5)

Over the last decade, Cameroon has experienced toxic gas emissions, two eruptions of Mount Cameroon, tornadoes, floods, landslides, fires, epidemics, locust invasions and damage caused by pachyderms (Directorate of Civil Defence, 2006, p. 22).

Sierra Leone, a West African country widely known for prolonged civil war in a not too distant past, is also prone to various natural and man-made hazards (Disaster Management Department of the Office of National Security, 2007, p. 27).

Also, the narrative on renewable energy policy decried the lack of energy access within the region and the reliance on unsustainable practices for meeting energy needs, as can be seen in the quotes below. These declarations by ECOWAS and its MS, in both instances of policy transfer, reflect not only an attempt to associate with the global challenges associated with the policy areas, but they also seal the status of ECOWAS as an entity worthy of receiving support in dealing with the challenges in the policy areas.

The West African region is faced with interrelated challenges of energy access, energy security and climate change mitigation. About 60% of electricity used in the sub-region is generated through high-cost diesel fuels (ECREEE, 2013c, p. 5).

[E]nergy poverty is a common characteristic of all ECOWAS Member States as more than 75% of the population is deprived of electricity. The energy access situation is worsened by the lack of financing to build appropriate infrastructures to transform the market for modern energy services (N'Guessan et al., 2011, p. 1).

In a way, these depictions signify the recipient's acknowledgement of the existence of challenges in DRR and renewable energy use in West Africa, so that the transfer agents' efforts in mobilising for obligatory responsibility, persuading and offering conditionality, can be assumed to be consolidated by the recipient's depiction of its own identity with the narrative character of victim. The depictions can also connote the validation of the transfer agent's engagement in policy transfer by the recipient, as the alternative to the portrayal of a victim may imply an unwanted or unwarranted intrusion on the part of the transfer agent, in the domestic affairs of a jurisdiction. In the case of DRR policy transfer, ECOWAS MS' use of the narrative element signifies its

association with the global problem of environmental disaster and this helps to readily suggest its acceptance of an obligatory responsibility. Also, ECOWAS' casting of itself as a victim, signifies its assent to the reality of the challenge of energy poverty and climate change, and the need for securing financing for appropriate infrastructure. These portrayals therefore, reiterate the transfer agents' positions on the existence of a DRR problem and the need for renewable energy investments, as well as the possibility for engaging in obligated and conditional transfers in order to address the challenges.

7.5 Casting Villains and Antagonists by Transfer Agents

In the NPF literature, the villain is depicted as the person, group or thing that is responsible for causing or worsening a particular problem (Lybecker et al., 2016). The identification of the villain also signifies the portrayal of who or what should be blamed for a problem, such as “profit-driven corporations that are polluting the environment, (or) radical environmental activists harming economic development and threatening individual liberty” (Pierce et al., 2014, p. 31). The villain is also noted to be the most frequently identified character in policy narratives (Pierce et al., 2014). However, the finding from this policy transfer study, showed a different level of depiction of villains, as most of the documents analysed, particularly those authored by the transfer agents, did not identify a villain, as can be seen in Table 7.1. Also, in all the places where the character of villain was depicted, it was associated with a non-human identity, and when humans are identified, there is no specific person, group, or organisation that is named, but a generalised reference to human beings is made. Examples of these depictions by the transfer agents include:

Climate change, increasing dependence on oil and other fossil fuels, growing imports and rising energy costs are making our societies and economies vulnerable (European Union Delegation to the African Union, 2009c, p. 11).

The cumulated effects of the recent crises – food, energy, economic and financial – are even endangering the gains obtained so far (European Union Delegation to the African Union, 2010c, p. 4).

The vulnerability of communities is growing due to human activities that lead to increased poverty, greater urban density, environmental degradation and climate change (Annan, 2003).

The reason for the difference between the extent to which the character of villain is depicted in NPF studies and what can be observed from this study, may be the absence of “policy battles” (McBeth et al., 2014b, p. 52), whereby opponents with differing policy ideas spar using competitive stories. In policy transfer, especially with regards to the relations between the transfer agent and recipient, we can say that there will likely be no use of competitive stories, as the two parties are not opponents. Instead, the transfer agent will use stories to convince the transfer recipient to adopt a transfer object, while the transfer recipient will also use stories to indicate whether it accedes to the proposition by the transfer agent or not, based on a positive or negative portrayal of the transfer agent and the proposed transfer object. In line with the attempt to convince the transfer recipient, in these cases, the transfer agents sought not to ruffle feathers, and avoided pinpointing who might be causing harm or aggravating it.

In addition to not casting a villain that can be held liable for harm, both the EU and UNISDR also did not cast anybody as an antagonist. They stayed true to the possible use of stories for wooing another party that is resident in a different jurisdiction, and avoided the depiction of a character with a distinctive negative connotation (Lybecker et al., 2016). Unlike the heroes and allies who are depicted as contributing towards addressing a challenge; or the victims, who are depicted as people who are being harmed and in need of support, the character of villain has a distinctive deleterious

connotation. Based on this, and as though following an approach of ‘see no evil, hear no evil, or speak no evil’, the transfer agents turned away their story lenses from capturing past or recent untoward intentions or deeds. This makes it look like there was a careful attempt to ensure that there was no pitting “heroes and victims against villains” (McBeth et al., 2012, p. 163) in the casting of characters. The observation of not capturing untoward deeds, and associating specific persons or groups with the character of villains, emphasise the role of narratives for convincing in transfer driven by the mechanisms of persuasion, conditionality, and obligation. Essentially, since the transfer agent cannot rely on ordering the prospective recipients, it uses narratives to engage in dialogue to ensure the participation of the recipient in the transfer process.

An example that further demonstrates the avoidance of thorny references when aiming to convince can be seen in the case of transfer of language policy to Ireland (Rigg et al., 2013). The NGOs that facilitated the process, took careful precautions to ensure that they did not make reference to any controversial issue, particularly with regards to the dominance of the English language. They, therefore, did not take the story in the direction of positioning who is to blame for the situation where the use of Irish Gaelic language in Ireland had declined significantly from its level of use in 1600, when it was the dominant spoken language, and neither did they make mention of the continued decline from 1922, after the country gained independence from Britain (Rigg et al., 2013). To highlight their careful avoidance of identifying the likely cause of the decline in use of Irish Gaelic language in Ireland, the transfer agents noted that:

the two issues you’d have to be careful with was ethnicity and nationalism ... so you had to be careful with issues around ... identifying language with a political agenda ... certainly we had to be very careful we weren’t anti-English ... it was a very targeted carefully planned strategy (Rigg et al., 2013, p. 155).

The reason transfer agents will likely shy away from casting villains may be because they don't want anything to distract the prospective recipients from the issue at hand i.e. the transfer object, as the casting of villain seems to lean towards emphasising differences in opinions and winning people to one's side of the argument. So, rather than go along the line of what obtains in many cases studied in the NPF literature, where advocacy coalitions use competitive stories, policy transfer agents will more likely opt to unite actors on both ends of the transfer process, regardless of differing opinions, in a bid to achieve a specific goal i.e. adoption of the transfer object. In addition, with many policy transfers by IGOs to developing countries, being facilitated in a project-like manner with specification of schedules and available resources (EUEI PDF, 2016b; UNISDR, 2017b), the transfer agents will also likely want to mind the tasks laid out, rather than introduce controversial topics that might derail the transfer process, such as causing dissent among the policy actors in the recipient jurisdiction. On the other hand, the transfer recipient did not employ the 'see no evil, hear no evil or speak no evil' approach like the transfer agents, as there was identification of specific groups in the depiction of who is causing harm and who needs to take the blame for an existing problem. The portrayal of villains and antagonists by the transfer recipient is discussed in more detail in the next section.

7.6 Casting of Villains and Antagonist by Transfer Recipient

Contrary to the cautious disposition of the transfer agent towards the depiction of who may be the cause of a problem and/or being a threat to victims, the narratives by the transfer recipient showed a portrayal of the character of a villain and in many instances, associated a specific identify with the character. In the case of renewable

energy policy transfer, the World Bank and ADB were cast as who to blame for the continued lack of energy access being experienced among poor people in ECOWAS countries. This can be seen in the quote below.

World Bank and the African Development Bank (AfDB) adopted specific approaches to energy in their countries of intervention ... funds goes (*sic*) to electricity generation or transmission projects that are expected to translate into access for the poor. Such an approach that has been putting emphasis on access only for industry and the well off – left the poor yet again in the dark (N'Guessan et al., 2011, p. 3).

The depiction of the World Bank and ADB was reiterated more than once in the same document to highlight the perception of the action of the actors as harming the poor, even if unintended. In the case of DRR policy transfer, an ECOWAS country depicted youth groups as those who put lives at risk by being involved in criminal activities that threaten passengers plying the inland waterways, while another country cast businesses that put-up buildings along the coast, as villains. These depictions are presented in the quotes below.

However, ... along the nation inland waterways ... the youth have simply create(*d*) a world of their own. Like pirates or militants, they have constituted themselves into a law of which they are both enforcer and the court. To worsen the situation, the miscreants are now operating under the aegis of an unregistered body, like the one in Buruka in the north-central part of Benue State who call their union 'Tombo Maritime Nigeria Workers' Union' (TMNWU), and the same tale in other parts of the country, putting all kind of river crafts not minding of its river worthiness, overloading passengers and goods without a single person using a life jacket (Abbas, 2006, p. 37).

To the south of La Sablière zone, huge buildings have been constructed, including Dialogue and Dowe hotels. Over the years, the construction of these buildings in such a sensitive coastal area has destabilized the beaches. Chain reactions linked to neglect and the subsequent lack of maintenance of the said hotels are visible. Sea waters are accumulating near Dialogue Hotel, creating swampy grounds (Loubamono, 2006, p. 39).

The outright naming of villains can be said to be in line with the narratives of policy actors on domestic issues that are pertinent to them, as against the narratives of

external actors on the same issue. For example, in the policy narratives presented by two American media outlets on the issue of snowmobiling in Yellowstone National Park (YNP), the media outlet which is based around the YNP, cast President Clinton, Judge Sullivan²¹ (a judge who had ruled against snowmobiling), and environmentalists, as the villains in their narrative (Shanahan et al., 2011b). However, the other media outlet which is based outside the location of YNP and operates nationally, used a generalised reference for the villain by casting the Bush administration²² (Shanahan et al., 2011b). We can see that the local media outlet did not mince words in saying who is responsible for causing harm. So, rather than use “vague references” such as “the public” (McBeth et al., 2005, p. 428), or the government, or humans; there is a direct pinpointing of who is to blame and/or shamed for the problem in question. The same is the case with the narratives of the transfer agents and recipient. Whereas the transfer agents portrayed non-human elements like climate change, economic and financial crises, and used vague references like humans and people, in identifying the character of villain, the transfer recipient cast the World Bank and ADB as villains with regards to the problem of energy poverty, and also, specific businesses and youth group, are identified with regards to the problem of disaster risks.

It may be that the clear depiction of the character of villain by ECOWAS, is as a result of the issue upon which the policy transfer is premised, being resident within their jurisdiction, and as such, they have less reason to tread carefully in their utterances, unlike external actors, who may not want to become *persona non-grata* in the recipient jurisdiction. So, while the recipient uses the character of villain along the line of what is often obtained in stories of domestic policy actors, whereby actors engage in

²¹ The article specifies Judge Sullivan’s decision as the villain, but the decision on its own cannot be associated with an action, so since there is a human identity associated with the decision, the villain can be extrapolated to be the Judge.

²² Similar to what is explained in the above footnote, the article specified Bush administration plan as the villain, but a plan cannot on its own take action, and as such, the villain can be inferred to be the Bush administration.

“crafting the story in order to attribute cause, blame, and responsibility” (Shanahan et al., 2014, p. 72), the transfer agents on the other hand, opted for a restrained and vague depiction of the character of villain.

This mode of storytelling with restrained and/or vague depiction of a villain shows an ally-seeking strategy. An ally-seeking story portrays a relatively ‘nice’ story, where the heroes and allies are acknowledged and/or praised, victims are advocated for, and villains and antagonists are hardly mentioned or identified, because the story is targeted at making or winning allies, and securing support. As such, with an ally-seeking strategy, there is not much emphasis on ascribing blame. This identification of an ally-seeking strategy can also help to explain the finding in the NPF case study of opposing groups on the policy issue of hydraulic fracturing in New York (Heikkila et al., 2014), which presented an unexpected finding where a group did not use a devil shift strategy i.e. depict a negative perception of its opponent (Shanahan et al., 2013; Heikkila et al., 2014; Jones et al., 2014). The researchers had expected that the pro-group, made up of mainly of businesses in the extractive industry, would readily cast the anti-group as villains. They commented that “[w]hy the pro- groups are not using the devil shift in their documents is more puzzling” (Heikkila et al., 2014, p. 200). However, knowing that the businesses were looking forward to commence hydraulic fracturing, they were careful not to irk their opponent in the hope of nullifying the rivalry. In addition, even though the pro-group was engaging in a policy debate, and would have had the expectation of winning, the group did not mind sacrificing the policy battle of narratives, for the possibility of gaining support for hydraulic fracturing. The group, therefore resorted to the use of an ally-seeking strategy, instead of the devil-shift approach.

It can also be argued that ECOWAS used an ally-seeking strategy since it did not cast the transfer agents as villains and antagonists, but as allies. In particular, we may infer that this was ECOWAS' suggestion of its willingness to be part of the policy transfer process, since it sought not to antagonise the transfer agents nor refer to any unwholesome past relationship that might ascribe a negative connotation to them or other notable actors that are crucial to the occurrence of the transfer. In a way, this reflects the back and forth that is entailed for effective communication between different parties (Park et al., 2014; Wolman and Page, 2002), since a message from the sender is only an initial step, and for the communication cycle to be complete, the receiver must also have an input in the process. Thus, ECOWAS' use of an ally-seeking strategy shows its contribution to the shaping of the transfer mechanisms. So, just like ascribing the character of victim to itself ceded ECOWAS as a jurisdiction in need of support, its limited depiction of villains and antagonist also portrays its approbation of the policy transfers.

Conclusion

We have seen from this discussion of the use of narrative characters that the actors sought to maintain cordiality through the depiction of heroes and allies, as well as through the omission of antagonists in their narratives, an approach that can be referred to as ally seeking. We have also observed how the emphasis of specific narrative characters may correspond to what a particular transfer mechanism implies. In the case of DRR policy transfer, the actors' emphasis was on allies working together to stop harm being done by villains to victims, and we can infer that these were used to connote a need for collaboration and joint contributions from the transfer agent and prospective recipients in a bid to address a problem. The use of narrative characters

in the case of renewable energy policy transfer was however not so straightforward. While the EU portrayed itself as a hero, there was limited depiction of a victim and therefore limited emphasis on what problem will be addressed. Also, the use of allies in portraying ECOWAS does not reflect the reality of a conditionality arrangement. Being that the use of allies might have made ECOWAS to feel on par with the EU, this likely persuaded ECOWAS to engage in the transfer process, not minding that the EU levied a conditionality on it. As noted, this evolved in a conditional transfer tempered by persuasion, or what can be referred to as soft or indirect conditionality (Interview 2, 2017).

As argued, the characters cast in narratives highlights the roles apportioned to different actors and the essence of the different parts to fulfilling the occurrence of policy transfer. The chapter also shows that examining narrative characters can unmask how transfer agents and recipients perceive themselves and relate together with respect to the policy issue and the transfer process. In particular, we have seen that by using characters, actors specify who is what in the transfer process and this shapes the relational trait that will be observed in the mechanism driving the process.

The next chapter presents the findings on the depiction of plot and moral in the narratives of the policy transfer actors and how this may have informed the policy transfer mechanisms that manifested in the two case studies.

Chapter 8 – Plot and Moral of the Story

Introduction

Scholars assert that narratives should have a beginning, middle, and end (Jones et al., 2014), and this characteristic of narratives can be seen in the narrative element of plot, which also links the characters to the setting. As such, what the storyteller portrays about the characters, with reference to the setting within which they are constrained, signifies a journey that can be envisaged by the audience (Shanahan et al., 2011b). The narrative plot thus represents a summary of what is being told in the story i.e. the long and short of the story, and stimulates inclusion of morals in stories. This is because the plot incorporates the experience of the characters in the story and it is from this that morals can be drawn and recommended. Narrative morals sum up stories, highlight what can be learnt from the story, and it is also referred to as the “takeaway of a policy narrative” (Jones and Radaelli, 2015, p. 341).

Looking at each of the different plots that are outlined in this study and the different morals as well, we can say that the summary that is implied by the plots also leads on to the point that can be learnt from the stories. For instance, with the plot of overcoming the monster, the summary of the plot showcases a story of threat, and this can lead on to a moral of weighing options for getting rid of the threat, as can be inferred from the moral of managing costs and benefits. Also, with the plot of rags to riches, the summary of the plot presents a story of a state of want, and this leads on to a moral that highlights the possibility of provision by receiving an incentive, or denying the incentive and remaining in want (sanction) (Bulmer and Padgett, 2005; Stone, 2004). The plot of rebirth highlights a present state of obsolescence, and what can be learnt from the story is the need for embracing new values or upending existing ones i.e.

rebirth. This link between the plot and moral also helps to explain the reason behind the actions of the characters in the story, as these two narrative elements portray the journey and the summation of the story. They, therefore, underscore the answers often given to the question of why transfer. The plot and moral of a story (which are of themselves informed by the setting and characters) help to point to the causation that underpins the manifestation of transfer mechanisms, even if this is from the storyteller's perspective. For example, if the plot of overcoming the monster and moral of managing costs and benefits are linked to the mechanism of obligation, the causation that underlines the mechanism can be explained as the need to address a threat by identifying an appropriate approach and working with allies within a particular setting. Another example is that if the plot of rags to riches and moral of incentives and sanctions inform the mechanism of conditionality, we will see that the causation that underpins the mechanism will be a perceived need to intervene in meeting the needs of certain victims within a particular setting.

By considering the plot and moral from this dimension, the depiction of these narrative elements by the transfer agents, UNISDR and the EU, and by the transfer recipient, ECOWAS, can be explained with a view to show how they informed the transfer mechanisms manifesting in the transfer of DRR policy and renewable energy to ECOWAS. As shown in the table below, in the case of renewable energy policy transfer, the plot of rags to riches was depicted in 57% of the documents analysed, and even though there is a 7% depiction of overcoming the monsters and 2% depiction of value reorientation, these are minute. As a result, the discussion will primarily focus on the depiction of rags to riches for the case of renewable energy transfer. The case of DRR policy transfer, on the other hand, showed a significant depiction of the plot of overcoming the monster with 94%, while other plots are seen in very few documents.

The plot of rags to riches was identified in only 3% of the documents, while the plot of rebirth was not observed. With respect to the moral, in the case of renewable energy policy transfer, a moral of incentives and sanctions was the most prominent with 25% level of depiction, compared to the other two morals, managing costs and benefits (7%) and value reorientation (5%), while in the case of DRR policy transfer, the morals of managing cost and benefits and value reorientation were primarily depicted by the actors.

Table 8.1: Depiction of Narrative Plot and Moral

	Renewable Energy Policy Transfer by the EU		DRR Policy Transfer to ECOWAS by UNISDR			
Total No of Documents	56		31			
	No of Documents	%	No of Documents	%	Test of Difference P<=0.05	
Narrative Element: Plot						
Overcoming the monster	4	7%	29	94%	t= -15.06, p= 0.00	s
Rags to Riches	32	57%	1	3%	t= 5.80, p= 0.00	s
Rebirth	1	2%	0	0%	t= 0.74, p= 0.46	ns
	X ² (d.f=2) = 212.04, p<0.001		X ² (d.f=2) = 137.03, p<0.001			
Narrative Element: Moral						
Incentives and sanctions	14	25%	2	6%	t=2.17, p= 0.03	s
Managing cost and benefits	4	7%	14	45%	t= -15.06, p= 0.00	s
Value reorientation	3	5%	15	48%	t= -5.45, p= 0.00	s
	X ² (d.f=2) = 21.44, p<0.001		X ² (d.f=2) = 24, p<0.001			

In the next section, the plot and moral that are depicted in the narratives of the transfer agent and recipient in the instance of renewable energy policy transfer to ECOWAS are discussed in more detail and after this, we will turn to the DRR policy transfer.

8.1 Use of Narrative Plot and Moral in the Case of Renewable Energy Policy Transfer

In this case, the emphasis on the plot of rags to riches reflects the perception of a non-desirable condition within West Africa and which requires support to alleviate the suffering of persons within the region. Drawing from the words of the European Commission for Development, Andris Piebalgs, and the ECOWAS Executive Secretary, Mohamed Ibn Chambas, the illustration of the ‘rags’ state within ECOWAS can be seen in the quotes below.

We have just five years to achieve these essential goals before the 2015 MDG Review. We have to succeed. I know that this will be difficult, but they are serious promises, not just vague aspirations. The current picture does not permit any complacency; on the contrary. Some progress has been made in Asia, Latin America, the Caribbean, and in some African countries. But Sub-Saharan Africa is lagging far behind. The cumulated effects of the recent crises – food, energy, economic and financial – are even endangering the gains obtained so far (European Union Delegation to the African Union, 2010c, p. 4).

These populations jeopardize their health and that of their children by burning harmful domestic fuels; they spend a great part of their day trekking several kilometres with heavy loads; they give birth in semi-darkness; in short, they are deprived of economic opportunities because they do not have access to or cannot afford adequate energy services. In short, it is needless to say that our populations deserve better and we have to free them from these hardships (ECOWAS and UEMOA, 2006, p. iii).

This undesirable state within ECOWAS, therefore, prompted the transfer agent, the EU, to present an envisioned journey that can change the state of ECOWAS from one of rags to that of riches. By using the narrative element of plot, the EU does not romanticise the deprived state of ECOWAS countries, but foresees an improvement

and makes a proposition on what can be done to materialise this. Herein lies a general representation of the expectations of policy transfer, as it is presented as a go-between of what is and what can be expected. So, within a jurisdiction, policy transfer is targeted at making a difference in a specific policy area (Interview 2, 2017; Interview 3, 2017) and the narrative element of plot helps to indicate the manner of difference that is being pursued. The aim of making a difference also helps to explain why the plots in policy transfer narratives will likely not portray a static theme but imply a journey that will make a difference. It is also for this reason that Evans and Davies (1999, p.367) “argue that policy transfer is a model of policy change” and “scholars like Claudio Radaelli (2000) have shown how the policy transfer literature contributes to our understanding of policy change” (Béland, 2009, p. 710).

With reference to the above, if we consider the type of plots presented in Stone (2002, 2012) i.e. plots of decline, stymied progress, and helplessness and control, which are also often used in the NPF literature (Jones et al., 2014), we can maintain that these are more relevant to policy actors engaged in competitive policy battles than policy transfer actors, especially, transfer agents. This is because these plots do not indicate from where to where the story will journey to, nor does it paint a picture of the ending that will be arrived at, upon adoption of a transfer object. So, unlike the plots which focus on the present state of a policy area within a jurisdiction, the EU expresses where it hopes intervening in the food, energy, economic and financial crises in sub-Saharan Africa will lead to. This can be seen in these quotes, which show its depiction of the plot of rags to riches in its narratives.

The provision of infrastructure contributes to boosting economic growth and quality of life, reducing poverty and increasing sustainable development. In Africa, a lack of adequate infrastructure results in loss of potential economic growth, especially in low income countries (LICs) where the role of

infrastructure is even more critical in addressing the needs of the poorest (European Union Delegation to the African Union, 2012, p. 9).

In cooperating with the EU, there is indisputable potential for the African renewable energy sector to develop a valuable industry, create jobs, increase energy access and thus contribute to socio-economic development and poverty eradication (AEEP, 2014, p. 9).

It is time to consolidate EU-Africa relations, offering the prospect of a better more prosperous future for 1.5 billion people in 80 countries (The Africa-EU Partnership, 2010, p. 1).

With respect to ECOWAS, it is not surprising that its narratives also portrayed a rags to riches plot. In casting itself as a victim, as noted in Chapter 7, it also portrayed the 'rags' state within the region. Nonetheless, through the expression of a narrative plot, it presented its expectation of what will be achieved. ECOWAS' story, therefore, doesn't end with a portrayal of the undesirable state of its populace, but continues with the proposition of a change, a journey from rags to riches. It could be that ECOWAS' use of rags to riches story, instead of a static plot, for expressing the situation within its jurisdiction, was prompted by its engagement with the EU. Specifically, the promise of support from the transfer agent, for the alleviation of the situation of its people, made ECOWAS join stories with the EU. A demonstration of this can be seen from the quote below, in which the ECOWAS Executive Secretary expressed that the offer for support from the EU prompted ECOWAS to consider addressing the challenge of energy infrastructure within the region.

This ... seeks to show how the region can meet the challenge of change of scale, at a time when our development partners, the UNDP particularly, the European Union and the OECD, show their increasing interest to give us their support and call for a new strategy in terms of energetic infrastructures in order to reduce poverty (ECOWAS and UEMOA, 2006, p. iii).

ECOWAS' non-contention of being in a 'rags' state and the need to move to a state of riches, can also be implied to be an indication of its acceptance of EU's offer of

support, which was promised with a condition of adopting a renewable energy policy. This also shows its consent to engage in a conditional policy transfer along with the trappings that are associated with it, including a vulnerable positioning in relations with the transfer agent, allowing external influence to be centred on a bureaucratic setting, and being cast a victim in need of external support. However, since the EU opted to position ECOWAS as an ally rather than a victim, even though its narrative depicted a plot of rags from riches, an expected conditional policy transfer materialised otherwise, having been tempered with the transfer mechanism of persuasion. As such, the transfer agent did not exercise lofty powers over the recipient but was restrained in its disposition. In particular, by focusing more on the use of plot to show the undesirable state in sub-Saharan Africa, instead of using the narrative element of character to cast the countries and their citizens as victims, the EU did not personify the sufferings being experienced within the countries, and this may have allowed ECOWAS to view itself to be in a less vulnerable position than it really was, and also enabled the situation of a community setting in its own narratives on the policy transfer.

A slight challenge with the depiction of the plot of rags to riches by the EU though, is the likely inability to decipher which mechanism is being reflected, since perceiving a need that is particular to another jurisdiction and developing a keen interest to intervene can be common to persuasion just as it is for conditionality. However, a plausible way to detect what voice is related to what mechanism is that with conditionality, there is a show of strength. Along with its depiction of heroic status and feats, this character is yet reemphasised in the narrative plot, as some of the quotes by the EU show the relevance of its role in the journey that will lead ECOWAS from rags to riches. With persuasion, however, a picture of what can be achieved is presented without referring to a dominant character that will make it happen. It is

possible to think that the plot of rags to riches seems to be the argument for persuading ECOWAS to acquiesce to the need for climate change mitigation, while conditionality was introduced to ensure that this conviction metamorphosed into real actions.

As mentioned earlier, a narrative plot points to the causation for the manifestation of particular mechanisms and also prompts the moral that is depicted in narratives. In this case, the plot emphasised a move from a state of poverty to a more desirable state of prosperity, where infrastructure will be available, jobs will be created and there will be economic growth. The plot highlights the possibility of what can be achieved and this expectation of prosperity can be said to have led the transfer agent to develop an interest in engaging in policy transfer. The pursuit of this expectation was then expressed through the transfer mechanisms of conditionality and persuasion. Particularly, while persuasion was employed to make the recipients come around on the relevance of renewable energy and acknowledgement of climate change, that of conditionality was employed to give an incentive to make sure that they stay true to the new conviction, all to the end that climate change is being mitigated against and poverty in West Africa is addressed (Interview 1, 2017; Interview 4, 2017). The takeaway from the rags to riches story, therefore, was that:

[g]ood governance, in its political, economic, social and environmental terms, is vital for inclusive and sustainable development. EU support to governance should feature more prominently in all partnerships, notably through incentives for results-oriented reform (European Commission, 2011, p. 5).

This summation highlights the moral that is portrayed by the EU, which is the application of incentives and sanctions. Other examples of the depiction of the narrative element of moral in EU's narrative are stated below.

Should a country loosen its commitment ... the EU should strengthen its cooperation with non-state actors and local authorities and use forms of aid that provide the poor with the support they need. At the same time, the EU should maintain dialogue with governments and non-state actors. In some cases, stricter conditionality will be warranted (European Commission, 2011, p. 5).

Reforms such as providing a predictable legal framework for investors, improved judiciary or banking systems, are crucial for any economic investment to produce the expected results, and should be therefore pre-conditions for physical infrastructure financing (European Union Delegation to the African Union, 2012, p. 9).

Such moral, which shows a preference for incentivising reform in ECOWAS by offering support to ECOWAS MS, should they go along with the recommended policy, and withholding this support should they ignore the recommendation, show the build-up to the manifestation of the mechanism of conditionality. So, with the situation of a bureaucratic setting, which entails the engineering of the recipient's institutional and administrative arrangement; and then a casting of the EU as both a hero and an ally capable of addressing challenges occurring in another jurisdiction, the policy transfer instance is already positioned as one that will be characterised with disparate power status, whereby ECOWAS holds a lower power status based on its need of significant support. Also, with the use of plot of rags to riches to tie the setting and cast together, the hero is put in a position for leading the recipient from the undesirable state of poverty to that of prosperity, and then by summing up the narrative with the moral of incentives and sanctions, the recipient jurisdiction is made to know that the possibility of benefitting from the capability and resources of the EU will be depended on fulfilling certain conditions. As for the EU's support to facilitate private investments for renewable energy projects to West Africa, this became dependent on the development and adoption of a regional renewable energy policy, in a bid to put in place the relevant institutional framework that can help guarantee returns on private investments

(Interview 1, 2017; Interview 4, 2017). Altogether, the depiction of the moral of incentives and sanctions along with the use of the other narrative elements culminated in the manifestation of the mechanism of conditionality in achieving the policy transfer.

With respect to the manifestation of the mechanism of persuasion, it can be argued that the limited depiction of a moral that likely corresponds to the mechanism of persuasion, despite aspects of the setting of the scene, casting of characters, and the plot aligning with persuasion, suggests that the transfer agent eventually relied more on the mechanism of conditionality than that of persuasion. Particularly, since the major takeaway from the EU's narrative portrays the ability of the EU to give or withdraw support based on the condition specified. The suggestion that the transfer process was driven more by conditionality than persuasion can also be backed by the depiction of incentives and sanctions as the moral in ECOWAS' narratives, as can be seen in the quotes below. Since ECOWAS followed suit with the EU to portray a narrative moral of incentives and sanctions, as well as give consent to the condition stipulated by the transfer agent in order to ensure access to the promised support, we can also base the argument for the more dominant manifestation of the mechanism of conditionality over that of persuasion, on the contribution of the transfer recipient to the transfer process.

Governments and donors need also to use incentives and appropriate market development tools to leverage private sector interest where the commercial case is marginal (N'Guessan et al., 2011, p. 4).

The right policies backed by incentives can foster renewable energy development in West Africa (Kappiah, 2011, p. 15).

The use of conditionality for engaging in policy transfer is also a deliberate decision by the EU as its Agenda for Change policy specified a move away from giving free aid to engagement in government's budget support and political involvement in the aid-

receiving jurisdiction (European Commission, 2011). As such, with the EU seeking to materialise a shift from poverty to prosperity in ECOWAS, through influencing the institutional and administrative arrangement for the deployment of renewable energy in West African countries, it inclined its narrative moral in line with the view that “[t]he power to grant or to withhold aid money can be used, and should be used to induce governments” (Mosley et al., 1995, p. 29).

8.2 Use of Narrative Plot and Moral in the Case of DRR Policy Transfer

The main plot portrayed in the case of transfer DRR policy transfer is that of overcoming the monster, and the monster in the stories was stipulated to be disasters. These disasters, however, took on varying forms, which were often contested. At the onset of the operations of the UNISDR, the monster being tackled was in the form of environmental hazards such as hurricanes and earthquakes. However, upon its engagement with African countries, the form of disaster being contemplated extended from environmental hazard to conflicts. In particular, having conflict as the monster to be tackled under the issue of DRR was part of the debate that emerged between the transfer agent and the recipient, as the African RECS, including ECOWAS, expressed that “some space had to be provided for digressing views and interests if the synergies and energies of different stakeholders were to be captured” (UNISDR Africa, 2006b, p. 5). So, “[t]he question of whether disaster risk reduction could include conflict prevention was raised” in line with “the African context where it can be said that conflict is a disaster” (UNISDR Africa, 2005a, p. 42). Without refuting the point raised by the RECS, UNISDR noted that “[c]onflict can sometimes be triggered by a disaster; disasters can sometimes represent a means of resolving conflicts - therefore reducing risk and vulnerability can also be applied to conflicts” (UNISDR Africa, 2005a, p. 42).

As such, conflict was accommodated as what will be tackled under the policy issue of DRR and following this, the ECOWAS Executive Secretary, in delivering an address on DRR “reiterated the determination of ECOWAS to reduce not only (*natural*) disasters but also armed conflicts”(UNISDR Africa, 2005b, p. 56). In addition, despite ECOWAS and other RECS being admonished to speak the international language of the HFA rather than that of the Africa Regional Strategy on DRR (UNISDR Africa, 2005a), the inclusion of conflict as what will be tackled under the issue of DRR was upheld (Interview 5, 2017), and as such, the monster to be overcome remained natural hazards and conflict.

This resolution between UNISDR and African countries that disaster will imply natural hazards and conflict, can also be seen from the text of the ECOWAS DRR policy, as it makes a case for addressing natural hazards, right from its first page (ECOWAS, 2006). The policy also maintained that “[t]here exists a two-way relationship between (*natural*) disasters and conflicts” (ECOWAS, 2006, p. 9). To ensure the development and adoption of an ECOWAS DRR policy, UNISDR used the narrative element of plot to depict a story of overcoming the monster to portray the existence of an imminent threat and the need to take action against it. Examples of the expression of this plot are presented below.

Climate change and climate vulnerability ... have added urgency to this understanding. Climatic extremes and their meteorological manifestation may no longer be rare events. The response to this understanding was to encourage “mitigation” - to talk in the long term about reducing the risks from potential disasters, so that fewer and fewer people are exposed over time (Westgate, 2003, p. 13).

Recent news reports ... indicate that, within months, 30 million Africans could be facing starvation, the immediate cause of which is drought (Hartnady, 2003, p. 26).

In Africa, disasters are on the rise as is the impact of disasters on Africans. Each year, disasters not only deprive millions of people of food security, access to clean drinking water, social services, but also reverse past development

gains and impede further socio-economic progress. In addition, the enormous humanitarian relief necessitated as a result of preventable disasters diverts billions of US dollars, which could have been used for poverty reduction and socio-economic development. Disasters, therefore, prevent African countries from achieving sustainable development (UNISDR and NEPAD, 2004).

Disasters in Africa are often a matter of “life and death”, so disaster reduction generates human and social interest and solidarity, as well as result-oriented action. Disaster reduction therefore makes human and social senses (Valency, 2003b, p. 1).

By using a plot of overcoming the monsters, stories of calamities that could happen within the African continent were told by the UNISDR to make the recipient recognise the danger that lurks ahead and motivate the decision makers within the recipient jurisdiction to take action. The portrayal of this plot, needless to say, necessitated presenting vivid pictures and relatable numbers such as “millions of people” (Annan, 2004, p. 33; UNISDR and NEPAD, 2004, p. 1) and “decades” (UNISDR Africa, 2004c, p. 7; UNISDR, 2005a, p. 1; Valency, 2003a, p. 1) of development that will be lost, to depict what might befall the African continent should they not pay attention to DRR. In addition, future climatic events that could wreak havoc or gory stories (McBeth et al., 2012), were also referred to, all in a bid to communicate the possible debilitating effect of the monster, the urgency of dealing with it, and the notion that it will be insufficient for individual countries to go at it alone. It is noteworthy that such dramatic descriptions were however, not used in the case of renewable energy policy transfer by the EU. The use of the plot of overcoming the monster seems to show the essence of the mechanism of obligation, as it indicates the transfer agent’s clarion call to the intended recipient to take action on an imminent danger or threat and for diverse jurisdictions to “come together to understand the problem, to stop the problem of disasters” (Interview 5, 2017). The use of the plot of rags to riches, on the other hand, aims at convincing the recipient that they do need the support being promised and it

encourages them to take the incentive and meet the conditions prescribed. What is at the disposal of the transfer agent, which is also implied through the expression of narrative plot, therefore shapes the transfer mechanism that plays out in particular instances of policy transfer. So, whereby the plot of overcoming the monster shows the transfer agent's reliance on making a call to action to ensure the adoption of the transfer object²³, the plot of rags to riches points to a reliance on promising support to the intended transfer recipient.

Another relevant feature that is portrayed with the depiction of the plot of overcoming the monster is the emphasis on the inability of the transfer recipient to individually tackle the monster and the need for it to come on board an international movement. This realisation seems to have made the UNISDR go an extra length to accommodate the theme of conflict, even when it did not represent the original challenge identified. This also made it possible for ECOWAS to look past its heroic efforts in establishing the ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, and to recognise that:

[w]hile each State has primary responsibility for its own economic and social development, an enabling international environment is vital to stimulate and contribute to developing the knowledge, capacities and motivation needed to build disaster resilient nations and communities (UNISDR, 2005a, p. 13).

The plot of overcoming the monster also points to the acknowledgement of the possibility of the recipient to make an input, rather than waiting to be helped, and this shapes what is manifested in the mechanism of obligation, whereby the transfer agent brings together and motivates willing and/or capable parties, to commit to addressing a challenge by signing an accord or agreement. The transfer agent then invokes the appending of the accord or agreement in engaging with the prospective transfer

²³ An example of this call to action can be seen from this quote – “The vulnerability of communities is growing due to human activities that lead to increased poverty, greater urban density, environmental degradation and climate change. It is well within our power to do something about this” (Annan, 2003, p. 36).

recipient, so as to ensure the domestication of what was agreed. This form of relationship with developing countries and basis for policy transfer, seems to accord the recipient a decent degree of dignity and respect, such that the recipient is not viewed as a liability, but instead as possessing the capability to make contributions for solving the global challenge of DRR.

Although ECOWAS MS stated their limited capability due to their economic status (Odei, 2005; Ojo, 2004), however, they demonstrated their willingness to commit to addressing the issue of DRR, by portraying the same plot presented by the transfer agent i.e. overcoming the monster. Again, this depiction of similar narrative plot points to the transfer recipient's contribution to the shaping of the transfer mechanism, as it shows the recipient's acquiescence to the proposition of engagement in obligated policy transfer. It also underlines how the eventual occurrence of the DRR policy transfer came about, since, should ECOWAS have rebuffed the notion of the mechanism of obligation, then, this would have been an instance of non-transfer. So with the portrayal of the plot of overcoming the monster, ECOWAS MS was giving a communication feedback of approval of the policy transfer proposition by the transfer agent. Some examples of ECOWAS' portrayal of narrative plot of overcoming the monster are presented below.

The economic and social impacts of desertification are alarming in northern Chad. The region, which invariably has experienced desertification, is ecologically vulnerable to wind erosion. In fact, ecological balance has been affected in the region. Reduced rainfall resulted in reduced vegetation and impacted on people's livelihoods and on the relatively general stabilisation of well-established sand dunes (Ibrahim, 2004, p. 10).

[E]mergencies have increased in frequency and intensity in the last decade, especially in recent times. Frequent oil spills within the Niger Delta (southern Nigeria) lead to irreparable damage to coastal biospheres. Global warming and phenomenon such as El Nino have been linked to the sudden rise in the number and severity of recent floods in ... Nigeria. Consequently, Nigeria have become increasingly at risk to a wide number of natural hazards ... and [t]here is now a

growing recognition from the public and private sectors that the only way to address the escalating costs is not a reactive relief doling but a preventive, comprehensive and long-term approach to natural disasters (Ojo, 2005, p. 5).

In 2003, as a result of excessive rainfall, Mali, like several countries of the subregion, experienced important damage as areas deprived of water for several years received an excessive quantity of water. In addition, crops are threatened every year by locust invasion and various epidemics, as was the case in 2004. The immediate consequence of these is poor, if not loss of crops (which often results in famine) and loss of livestock. These two consequences disrupt the national economy based mainly on rural activities carried out by 80 per cent of the population (Traore, 2005, p. 33).

By painting a picture of present dangers and likely future threats in their narratives, ECOWAS MS purport the devastating outcome that can happen if the concern of DRR is not addressed. The alignment with this plot also seem to be as a result of the West African states experiencing environmental hazards at a rate that is higher than the usual (Directorate of Civil Defence, 2006; Ojo, 2005), and also fearing that other environmental hazards that hitherto had not been common to the region, such as earthquakes and volcanic eruptions, might start to occur (Hartnady, 2004). Another explanation for the depiction of this narrative plot might also be that, with ECOWAS MS already using the narrative character of victims to depict themselves, its alignment with the theme of overcoming the monster helps to reinforce this victim status, since the plot of overcoming the monster helps to situate the monster of disaster as a villain causing havoc and inflicting sufferings on victims.

This reinforcement of the status of a victim without a doubt, further positions ECOWAS MS as a party worthy of support from the UN and other donor organisations. This interplay of the narrative elements of character and plot, shows how the use of one element can buttress what is being portrayed in the other, and also, it highlights the shaping power of narratives, as the interplay of narrative elements helps to reiterate the message being passed across by the transfer agent or recipient. For example, a

message highlighting a victim in need of a hero is further reinforced by the depiction of a rags to riches, as it further situates each of the characters in line with what the plot portends, so that the character of victim is seen in a place of rags, while the hero is seen as the character with riches and with the capacity to move the victim from the place of rags to a place of riches. Also, a message showcasing that allies are needed to tackle a villain is reinforced by emphasising the havoc being wreaked by the villain, through the depiction of the narrative character of victims. As such, the plot of overcoming the monster situates the transfer agent as a party seeking allies to help in defeating a monster. This reiteration of narrative characters through the narrative plot that is portrayed, therefore, buttresses the message being conveyed by the transfer agent or recipient and informs the manifestation of the mechanism that is observed.

Returning to ECOWAS' use of narrative plot, the depiction of the plot of overcoming the monster reinforces its portrayal as victims being stricken by a villain (disasters), thereby positioning itself to be in need of support, and we might opine that its expectation of the transfer process was to be incentivised to adopt the DRR policy. However, since UNISDR isn't an aid awarding organisation (Interview 5, 2017), it could neither offer a promise of reward for adopting the policy, nor assume the character of a hero helping a victim. As such, ECOWAS consented to contribute to addressing the global challenge of DRR and fulfill its obligation to the African Strategy on DRR, by giving approval to the development of a regional DRR policy. In addition, since "[s]uch an endorsement by African leaders is the very key contribution that Africa can make" (Valency, 2004b, p. 1), ECOWAS was, therefore, fulfilling its ally role in overcoming the monster of disasters, when it gave assent to the domestication of the HFA and the African Strategy on DRR. Perhaps, if UNISDR possessed the wherewithal to solely provide the required resources for addressing DRR in West Africa, it may have

considered giving conditions to incentivise ECOWAS to adopt the regional policy, in addition to motivating ECOWAS to adopt the policy based on its commitment to the HFA and signing of the Africa Strategy on DRR. This would also have allowed the UNISDR to assume the character of a hero and present a plot of rags to riches, and these depictions may have resulted in a transfer instance driven by a mix of the mechanisms of obligation and conditionality. However, by not having the provision of development aid within its ambit (Interview 5, 2017), the UNISDR used relevant depictions in its narrative that helped to shape the manifestation of the transfer mechanism of obligation.

With the possibility of incentivising ECOWAS beyond the capability of the UNISDR, it was not unexpected that the moral of incentives and sanction could not be depicted as the takeaway from UNISDR's narrative. Instead, the transfer agent presented the morals of value reorientation and managing cost and benefit, as the takeaway from its narrative. In depicting the moral of value reorientation, the UNISDR called for a new approach to addressing disasters, which is focused more on disaster prevention rather than disaster relief, and examples of this depiction can be seen in the quotes below.

To sustain gains in socio-economic development at country level, more and more governments have started to shift their emphasis from disaster response only, to disaster reduction, from an isolated disaster management approach to an integrated one, linking disaster reduction to development issues, such as water resource management, environmental protection, land use and planning, and poverty reduction (UNISDR and NEPAD, 2004, p. 1).

While it is widely acknowledged that hydrometeorological hazards are on the rise due to human activities increasing vulnerabilities, there is still greater attention (and investment) paid to the disasters themselves and the resulting deaths and destruction. Rather, we should be looking at the longer-term investment of disaster risk reduction strategies – incorporating disaster preparedness, mitigation and prevention – that would in fact in the end significantly reduce their impacts and costs. We need to shift our focus: from disaster relief to disaster reduction (Briceño, 2003, p. 37).

Africa has to shift from disaster response to disaster prevention/reduction (Valency, 2004b, p. 1).

Therefore, UNISDR's narrative can be summed up as an affirmation that a change in the disaster management approach in West Africa is crucial, and that more attention should be devoted to disaster prevention. The moral also emphasises the need to move away from an approach where action is focused on post-disaster activities and particularly, pursuing provision for disaster relief after disaster events, to a more proactive approach, where disasters are prevented and vulnerability to disasters are reduced. In addition, by presenting the moral of value reorientation, UNISDR was not only asking ECOWAS to buy into changing its disaster management approach, but also commit to joining the international community in promoting and adopting a DRR approach. This is also because the policy transfer facilitated by UNISDR was not just about domestic affairs in West Africa, but mainly focused on the global platform (Interview 5, 2017).

With respect to the depiction of managing cost and benefit as another narrative moral, the UNISDR tabled possibilities that could be considered in deciding whether or not to accept the concept of DRR. It noted the possibility of the increased cost of humanitarian relief if casualties are not averted in the event of environmental hazards. It also highlighted the development gains that can be achieved if disasters are prevented, especially by saving lives and property (UNISDR and NEPAD 2004; UNISDR Africa and UNDP 2004; Vordzorgbe 2006). By attempting to introduce financial undertones, such as "cost-effectiveness" (UNISDR Africa, 2004c, p. 52; Vordzorgbe, 2006, p. 3) and "investments" (UNISDR Africa and UNDP 2004, p.15; UNISDR Africa 2005, p.26), the UNISDR seemed to show awareness of its audience and their policymaking innings. It gave due regard to considerations that will be necessary for individual governments to make, particularly budgeting, and it also

presented content that can be useful for internal debates within the recipient jurisdictions. Examples of UNISDR's portrayal of managing cost and benefit can be seen in the quotes below.

In Africa, disasters are on the rise as is the impact of disasters on Africans. Each year, disasters not only deprive millions of people of food security, access to clean drinking water, social services, but also reverse past development gains and impede further socio-economic progress. In addition, the enormous humanitarian relief necessitated as a result of preventable disasters diverts billions of US dollars, which could have been used for poverty reduction and socio-economic development (UNISDR and NEPAD, 2004, p. 1).

More effective prevention strategies would save not only tens of billions of dollars, but save tens of thousands of lives. Funds currently spent on intervention and relief could be devoted to enhancing equitable and sustainable development instead, which would further reduce the risk for war and disaster (Vordzorgbe, 2006, p. 2).

The focus on disaster risk reduction is based on the understanding that with proper planning of development programmes and integrating disaster risk reduction in development strategies, the negative effects of development can be reduced, while the positive effects can be enhanced through the reduction of poverty, improvement of human livelihoods and coping strategies and overall reduction of vulnerability (UNISDR Africa and UNDP, 2004, p. 14).

Building a culture of prevention is not easy. While the costs of prevention have to be paid in the present, its benefits lie in a distant future. Moreover, the benefits are not tangible; they are the disasters that did NOT happen (Vordzorgbe, 2006, p. i).

We can see that the UNISDR's narrative moral of managing cost and benefit differs from the EU's moral of incentives and sanctions, in that the former identifies with the need for the recipient jurisdiction to consider the pros and cons of the proposition to adopt a DRR policy, while the latter presents a tough choice. Even though in both instances of policy transfer, the recipient is allowed to choose whether it will adopt the policy object or not, the expression of the narrative moral of managing cost and benefit, which is associated with the mechanism of obligation in this case, shows the transfer agent's regard for the ability of the recipient jurisdiction to make that choice. Whereas the use of the narrative moral of incentives and sanctions, which is associated with the

mechanism of conditionality in the case of renewable energy transfer, restricts the ability of the recipient to make a choice with no strings attached. The morals portrayed in the different instances of policy transfer also point to the display of power by the transfer agent toward the transfer recipient. The portrayal of value reorientation and managing cost and benefit as the morals in UNISDR's narrative, can be linked to the realisation that the transfer agent, in engaging in obligated policy transfers, banks on individual contribution of recipient jurisdictions to address a particular challenge, while the portrayal of incentives and sanctions by the EU can be linked to the realisation that the transfer agent banks on its own resources to address a particular challenge (even if partly). This again points to the difference in the degree of power and pressure that is exerted over the transfer recipient in in obligated and conditional policy transfers, whereby obligated transfers will likely show less display of power and application of pressure to ensure the adoption of the policy object than what will be obtained with the manifestation of the mechanism of obligation.

The narrative of ECOWAS MS, on the other hand, with respect to the transfer of DRR policy, hardly depicted a narrative moral. Having observed similar depictions with that of UNISDR in the use of the other narrative elements by ECOWAS, it was somewhat expected that the moral will conform to what was depicted by the transfer agent. However, there was hardly a mention of what the story will culminate in with reference to the theme of the policy area, or what should be the takeaway from the story. Instead, many of the articles by ECOWAS MS were summed up by reiterating the limited resources at their disposal. Some of these expressions have been culled from the concluding sections of the articles by ECOWAS MS, and are shown below.

Even though desertification is a hazard with disastrous impact on ecosystems, the Government's meagre resources cannot help to handle it efficiently. Hence the need to mobilize the population and the international community (Ibrahim, 2004, p. 11).

To bring about decentralization in disaster risk reduction to the lowest community level in Nigeria, NEMA would need the support of relevant stakeholders locally and internationally, including the UNISDR (Ojo, 2004, p. 20).

Local communities should be provided with a special fund for DRR management (Ndiaye, 2005, p. 8).

The obvious challenge is to provide adequate financial and material support (Odei, 2005, p. 11).

With reference to these expressions, we can again assume that ECOWAS followed suit with telling the story of DRR based on an expectation of engaging in conditional policy transfer, whereby its statement of commitment will be compensated through the receipt of support from the UN and possibly, other aid donors. The narrative moral can be said to portend a reflection of the policy story being told and perhaps, a depth of involvement with the policy area. With the issue of conflicts being more salient in ECOWAS than that of environmental hazards or even climate change (Schipper and Pelling, 2006; Souaré and Handy, 2013), the limited depiction of a narrative moral may be explained by a limited connectedness to the theme of DRR. This, however, did not deter ECOWAS' connectedness to engagement in policy transfer. Having being positioned as a potential recipient of coercive policy transfer since the oil crisis of the 1970s, which had unfortunately weakened the region's economic independence despite gaining political independence from colonial powers a decade before that, ECOWAS countries were indeed no strangers to engaging with IGOs initiating policy transfers (Alter et al., 2013; UN, 1981). So, its depiction of narrative setting, character, and plot, in line with the language used by the UNISDR, can be said to reflect its expectation of "say this so that you can get that" (Interview 4, 2017), which was what

often occurred in its experience as a policy transfer recipient (Alou, 2009; Easterly, 2005). As such, it could be that ECOWAS' depiction of the other narrative elements, but not that of a moral, was its way of saying what needed to be said, and not necessarily a connectedness to the theme being purported in UNISDR's proposition.

Also, since the transfer agent in this case introduced a different expectation from that of the recipient, by requesting a commitment of responsibility rather than requiring the recipient to be incentivised before adopting the transfer object, ECOWAS' disconnectedness is further seen in its depiction of victim to position itself as a group deserving of support and its direct request for funds. Despite the incongruity, we can surmise that the obligated policy transfer process went ahead nonetheless because of the mobilising efforts of the UNISDR, particularly in accommodating conflict in the development of ECOWAS' DRR policy, and routing the obligation to the HFA through ECOWAS' connection to the AU and the African Strategy for DRR.

Conclusion

This chapter has argued that while the narrative plot links the characters to a setting, the narrative moral signifies what to deduce from the role of the characters within the stipulated setting. In the case of renewable energy transfer, both the EU and ECOWAS portrayed a plot of rags to riches to highlight the state of energy poverty in West Africa, and the need for the provision of sustainable energy solutions, which is expected to bring about prosperity within the region. Also, the transfer agent and recipient emphasised the rationale for incentives and sanctions, for actualising the provision of sustainable energy solutions in West Africa. With reference to the similar depictions by the EU and ECOWAS, it was argued that this demonstrates ECOWAS' acquiescence to EU's proposition of conditionality and it shaped the emergence of the

mechanisms of conditionality and persuasion. However, with the narratives of both actors emphasising the relevance incentives and sanctions, it was further argued that conditionality was likely the more dominant in the mechanism mix that facilitated the occurrence of transfer.

In the case of DRR policy transfer, the narratives of UNISDR and ECOWAS MS portrayed the plot of overcoming the monster, but while UNISDR's moral called for value reorientation and managing cost and benefits, ECOWAS' narratives often ended with a call for assistance from the transfer agent and other international development partners. Thus, the chapter argued that ECOWAS was telling the story of overcoming the monster, in line with UNISDR's plot, because it expected to be incentivised and 'rewarded' for the adoption of the DRR policy. As such, it was surmised that even though the transfer agent, in this case, engaged with ECOWAS on an obligatory basis, ECOWAS still bore a perception of conditional transfer, and this was likely so, because conditional transfer was what it was mostly familiar with. Nonetheless, the transfer process went ahead because of the mobilising efforts of the UNISDR and its routing of obligation to the HFA through ECOWAS' connection to the AU and the African Strategy for DRR.

Chapter 9 – Conclusion

The thesis has examined policy transfer from the perspective of narratives. This has allowed us to highlight the underlying portrayals of identities and directions, which reflect the power dynamics and expectations that characterise the transfer mechanisms of conditionality, obligation, and persuasion. Specifically, the examination of actors' narratives in the case of renewable energy policy transfer to ECOWAS by the EU, has shown how the depiction of narrative elements contributed to the manifestation of the mechanisms of persuasion and conditionality. Also, the examination of actors' narratives in the case of DRR policy transfer to ECOWAS by UNISDR, shows how the use of narrative elements informed the manifestation of obligation as the transfer mechanism.

While the preceding chapters of the thesis have presented the conceptual background for the research, the methodology employed, the empirical case studies, and analysis of the findings, this final chapter answers the research questions, summarises the findings, and considers the contribution this study makes to the literature. With reference to the literature on transfer, the thesis of the interaction among policy transfer actors and for the least-addressed policy transfer research question i.e. why transfer?. With reference to the NPF literature, the thesis highlights its relevance and compatibility with various public policy theories, and the possibility of lending its methodological approach to certain aspects of policy transfer research. When thinking of further research, the findings point to the possibility of investigating the transfer object, to see how there have been changes in its configuration, nomenclature, or purpose, based on the perception and comprehension of actors from both the source and recipient side of the transfer process. Furthermore, based on the findings, the

chapter presents a reflection on policy transfers by IGOs to sub-Saharan African jurisdictions.

9.1 Key Findings: Transfer Mechanisms

To address the overarching question of the role of policy narratives in shaping transfer mechanisms, three sub-questions were posed. The first was on the mechanisms facilitating transfers; the second was on identifying the narrative elements used by the policy transfer actors; and the third question was on how the narrative elements are linked to the transfer mechanisms. This section addresses the first sub-question, while the remaining two questions are addressed in the next section. Considering the question on the transfer mechanisms, we can see that Chapter 5 illustrates how the case of renewable energy policy transfer to ECOWAS by the EU was driven by the mechanisms of persuasion and conditionality, and how the case of DRR policy transfer to ECOWAS by UNISDR was driven by the mechanism of obligation. Chapters 6, 7, and 8 corroborated this claim empirically.

Regarding the case of renewable energy transfer, it was noted that hitherto, the relationship between West African countries and the European Union had been hinged solely on a donor-recipient affair, whereby the EU freely donated aid to African countries and the EU was acclaimed as the largest donor to the region. However, with the involvement of the EU in climate change concerns through its contributions to the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development and its creation of the Africa-EU Energy Partnership (AEEP), the EU wanted ECOWAS to commit to addressing the challenge of climate change. On the other hand, ECOWAS and other African countries held the view that since they were not responsible for the problem, they did not have

to contribute to the international efforts aimed at averting climate change. However, by engaging with ECOWAS through the platform of the AEEP, the EU was able to involve ECOWAS in promoting the use of renewable energy. This was based on its reliance on dialogue and laying emphasis on the availability of foreign investments which could be accessed by African countries.

With the EU's strategic use of dialogue, African countries were often tenderly referred to as equal partners, even though the parties involved in this partnership are not at all on equal footing financially or otherwise. Also, unlike the major global message on the promotion of the use of renewable energy, which is centred on mitigating climate change, EU's advocacy for use of renewable energy in ECOWAS was based on a dual purpose of mitigating climate change and reducing energy poverty. This warm approach in EU's relations with ECOWAS and the inclusion of the primary concern that holds sway in sub-Saharan Africa i.e. poverty reduction, likely persuaded ECOWAS to warm up to EU's proposition of developing and adopting a renewable energy policy.

In addition to being persuaded to accept the issue of climate change and use of renewable energy on its policy agenda, ECOWAS was also assured of the EU's assistance in facilitating foreign investments for the deployment of renewable energy solutions, but, on the condition of setting up necessary institutional and regulatory frameworks that are required by private investors. This conditionality and the reward it is expected to bring ensured that ECOWAS did not just buy into the idea of promoting renewable energy, but followed through with the EU's proposition, by adopting a renewable energy policy. As a result, the EU sponsored the development of an ECOWAS renewable energy policy document in 2011, and the heads of states of ECOWAS MS eventually signed the policy in July 2013. Based on the above, we can

surmise that the mechanisms that led to the occurrence of renewable energy policy transfer to ECOWAS by the EU, are persuasion and conditionality.

Regarding the case of DRR policy transfer, UNISDR leveraged on ECOWAS' relationship with the AU and NEPAD to facilitate the adoption of a DRR policy for West Africa. The initiation of the transfer process can also be linked to the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development. At the summit, "concrete set of objectives" were agreed which tasked the UNISDR with turning its "attention and capacities to integrating and mainstreaming risk reduction into development policies and processes" (UNISDR, 2012b, p. 5). Following this, the UNISDR established the UNISDR African regional office in 2002 and set about engaging with all African regional bodies. It first engaged with NEPAD and the AU, which usually serve the role of an umbrella body for regional economic communities across the African continent, including ECOWAS. In 2003, UNISDR facilitated the development and signing of the African Regional Strategy for DRR by the different regional bodies, and ECOWAS' engagement in this process, along with the ensuing responsibilities for implementing and monitoring the strategy in West Africa, led to its interest and commitment to address the issue of DRR. Notably, as part of the activities under the African DRR strategy, ECOWAS participated in a consultation meeting sponsored by UNISDR, to deliberate on the 2005 World Conference on DRR to be held in Hyogo, Japan. Its obligation to the African Strategy on DRR, therefore, necessitated the domestication of the Hyogo Framework of Action, which was agreed at the World Conference on DRR. As a result, ECOWAS developed a DRR policy, in line with the Hyogo Framework of Action and based on its commitment to the African DRR strategy, and the policy was adopted by the heads of states of ECOWAS MS, in 2007. Thus, the transfer mechanism operating in this case can be seen to be obligation.

9.2 Key Findings: Narrative Elements

The findings show how the narrative elements used by the actors underscore the mechanisms that materialized in the transfer cases. Drawing from the narrative analysis in Chapters 6, 7, and 8, we also see that there are some significant differences and few similarities in how the narrative elements were used by the actors across the two cases. By setting the stage for introducing institutional frameworks and administrative arrangements in the recipient jurisdiction, the actors in both cases depicted a bureaucratic setting. However, in the case of renewable energy transfer, there was also an emphasis on targeting rural communities and addressing energy poverty in these areas. As such, while the narrative setting depicted in the case of transfer of renewable energy policy was partly a bureaucratic setting and partly a community setting, the narrative setting depicted in the case of DRR policy transfer was primarily a bureaucratic setting.

With respect to the use of narrative characters, both cases stressed an ally relationship, but there was a self-portrayal of the transfer agent as a hero, in the case of renewable energy policy transfer, but this was not so in the other case. The difference in the depiction of narrative character can also be seen in the portrayal of villain and victim, as the policy narratives of the actors in the case of renewable energy policy hardly included these narrative characters, but were mostly featured in the case of DRR policy transfer. The portrayal of the plot and moral also showed a significant difference. The policy narratives relating to the renewable energy policy transfer featured a plot of rags to riches and moral of incentives and sanctions, while the policy narratives relating to DRR policy transfer featured a plot of overcoming the monster and moral of value reorientation and managing cost and benefits.

9.3 Key Findings: Narrative Elements and Transfer Mechanisms

To address how the use of the different narrative elements by the transfer agents and recipient may have informed the transfer mechanisms, we can start with the narrative element that showed the most similarity between the two cases i.e. narrative character. With the identified emphasis on allies working together to end a menace in case of DRR policy transfer, and that of a hero helping an ally in the case of renewable energy policy transfer, the narratives highlight an underlying ally-seeking message. One can say that the ally-seeking narrative underscores the coercion and/or persuasion that often characterises externally-initiated policy transfers. In particular, the observation of similarities in the use of the narrative characters of hero and ally, across the two cases, point to an intent to befriend rather than an intent to battle. This ally-seeking strategy is perhaps, the first layer of shaping that policy narratives contribute to the transfer mechanisms preferred by IGOs. As seen from the analysis of the findings, the ally-seeking narrative can mask reality by painting a picture of cordial bond and equal standing. It can also downplay problematic conditions, if need be, by avoiding the casting of the transfer recipient as a victim. It suffices to say that the ally-seeking narrative helps to ensure affinity between the transfer agent and recipient, for without this, the eventual adoption of the transfer object may not occur.

Building on the depiction of characters that engender an ally-seeking narrative, the transfer mechanism of obligation can be seen to embody a narrative that directs attention to a call for collective action to solve a common problem; the transfer mechanism of conditionality can be linked to a narrative that emphasises reward; while the transfer mechanism of persuasion prompts a narrative focused on ties and connections and appeal of the transfer object. Mainly, to address how policy narratives contribute to shaping of transfer mechanisms, the thesis has shown that the analysis

of all the narrative elements, namely setting, character, plot, and moral, can give an insight into how policy narratives can shape the mechanisms observed in policy transfers. We have seen that the use of narrative setting helps to situate where the action will take place, the narrative characters indicate what the action will be by defining who is what, while the plot and moral specifies the course of action. Based on the summary of the investigation of the two cases, these outlined roles of the narrative elements depicted in the policy narratives are further highlighted below.

As mentioned in Chapter 6, by portraying a bureaucratic setting in the narratives, the stage was already set for wielding remarkable level of influence through intervening in governmental processes. In the two cases, this laid the foundation for the positioning of the transfer agent vis-a-vis the recipient i.e. it was premised on the superior political or economic prowess of the transfer agent, even if this was not always directly stated in the narratives. In the case of renewable energy policy transfer, where a community setting was also portrayed, this setting helped to soften the expected disposition of the transfer agent. As such, instead of assuming only the position of a superior party with economic and political prowess, there was a communal approach in the relationship between the EU and ECOWAS.

With the narrative setting laying the foundation for the materialisation of the transfer mechanisms, the narrative characters also contributed to the build-up of the mechanism. The casting of the transfer agent and recipient as allies across the two cases suggests that there will be an alignment of their actions. Also, the casting of victim and villain in the case of DRR ECOWAS helped to strengthen the argument for aligned actions, as the UNISDR used these narrative characters to stress why ECOWAS needed to include DRR in its policy agenda and align with global efforts to address the challenge. On the other hand, the casting of the EU as a hero, while there

is also a limited identification of a victim and villain, blurs the realisation of which villain and victim is being tackled by the hero and the manner of alliance between the transfer agent and recipient. However, by considering the EU's reference to ECOWAS as an ally instead of a victim, one could deduce that another transfer mechanism, the mechanism of persuasion, was taking form and co-driving the transfer process along with the mechanism of conditionality. So, rather than tell a story of a hero helping a victim, what was portrayed was a story of a hero helping an ally.

We can therefore see that whereas the narrative setting lays the foundation of what to expect, narrative characters build on this foundation to define the roles of those involved in the transfer process. Turning to the narrative plot and moral, these specify the course of the action by highlighting the expected journey that the policy transfer will instigate and summing up what the policy narrative implies. With reference to the two cases, the use of narrative plot of rags to riches in the case of renewable energy policy transfer and the use of narrative plot of overcoming the monster in the case of DRR policy transfer, show the journey that the recipient jurisdiction will experience. In particular, the plot also illustrates a picture of the present, which further corroborates what is portrayed in the element of narrative characters. Whereas the plot of rags to riches points to an economically-challenged jurisdiction in need of a hero, the plot of overcoming the monster stresses an overwhelming situation in need of an ally. These illustrations therefore led on to painting a picture of an expected future of riches in the former and that of overcoming in the latter. The differences in the narrative plot used in the two cases shows the different directions taken by the actors in engaging in the policy transfers, and underlines the definitive action signified in the narrative moral. For the case of renewable energy policy transfer, the narrative moral of incentives and sanctions further indicated the economic dimension to the policy transfer and the

introduction of a proviso as a determinant of granting support to the recipient jurisdiction. Also, in the case of DRR policy transfer, the narrative morals of value reorientation and managing cost and benefit guided the policy transfer in the direction of changing the dominant perception of disaster management from disaster relief to disaster risk reduction, and vying for the cost-saving benefit of disaster risk reduction, in a bid to challenge a common problem.

Thus, the narrative setting, character, plot, and moral, denote the level of influence by the transfer agent on the recipient jurisdiction; the relational dynamic between the transfer agent and recipient; the expected experience of the transfer process; and the way forward advanced by the actors. As such, the examination of the narrative elements brings to light the features that configure specific transfer mechanisms, as they mirror the intent and expectations of the transfer actors. Chiefly, we have observed how the use of narrative elements by the EU and ECOWAS informed the involvement of the mechanisms of conditionality and persuasion in the case of renewable energy policy transfer, and how the use of narrative elements by UNISDR and ECOWAS in the case of DRR policy transfer, informed the manifestation of the mechanism of obligation.

The next section discusses the conceptual contributions of this research to policy transfer and the Narrative Policy Framework.

9.4 Conceptual Contribution

As noted in Chapter 1, one of the gaps in the policy transfer literature that this research sought to address is expounding on transfer mechanisms in a bid to shed more light on one of the pertinent policy transfer research questions – why transfer? The

research has helped to demonstrate what likely underlies the differences in transfer mechanisms. Beyond the demarcation of mechanisms into voluntary and coercive, the research has shown that the narratives of actors can highlight the mechanisms that will drive instances of policy transfer, and that the difference in the narratives can signal the manifestation of different mechanisms. As a result, by knowing the stories presented by transfer actors, one can succinctly argue for the transfer mechanism at play. Also, by attempting to unfold transfer mechanisms through the examination of policy narratives and identifying the kind of stories that will likely characterise a specific transfer mechanism, the research also points to the possibility of packaging transfer mechanisms through conscious use of relevant policy narratives. This, for example, can be seen in the EU's deliberate choice of words to its African counterpart and the portrayal of policy narratives that clearly aim to persuade and not impose.

As often noted in the policy transfer literature, the answer to question of why transfer may not always be the importance of, or demand for, or likely superior performance of the transfer object, but it may be because of the association between the parties involved in the policy transfer. Regardless of this assertion, there has not been an explanation, which can be widely applied across policy transfer case studies, to demonstrate how the relations among actors contribute to the occurrence of policy transfer. This research has shown the relevance of the relations between the transfer recipient and agent or source, not by describing what transpired among the actors, but by analytically examining what constitute their policy narratives and the ability thereof to inform the transfer mechanisms that facilitate eventual occurrence of policy transfer. Considering the reverse of this contribution, the examination of policy narratives can also help to explain instances of non-transfer. Since the two case studies point to the use of similar policy narratives by the transfer agent and recipient in each specific

instance of policy transfer, so also, the identification of unaligned or dissimilar policy narratives by the transfer recipient and agent can imply friction in their relations and can explain non-transfer. The examination of policy narratives in policy transfer research can as such be used to partly address the research question of the constraints to policy transfer.

Importantly, in line with the introduction of the multi-level perspective by Evans and Davies (1999) and that of the Information-theory approach by Wolman and Page (2002), this study has been able to capture the voice of not only the transfer agent or recipient, but both of these parties. By considering the policy narratives used by these actors in relations to the respective policy transfers, there has been a conscious incorporation of their contributions. This approach has particularly helped to give cognisance to a transfer recipient that may have likely been overlooked. For example, in an earlier study on how an instance of policy transfer to ECOWAS led to the creation of ECREEE, the primary “focus (was) on the actors who created the organization ... three extra-regional states – Austria, Brazil, and Spain – are the key players behind the creation and support of ECREEE” (Hancock, 2015a, p. 105). Albeit, this study has helped to lend a voice to the recipient end of the transfer process, and to show how their input can inform the transfer mechanism that is operational in a policy transfer.

With respect to the NPF, this research reiterates the significance of the framework and the potential of its utility for investigating the role of narratives in the policy process. By using the NPF’s explanation of the depictions of narrative elements to illustrate how the actors’ policy narratives shaped the transfer mechanisms, the research showcases the applicability of the framework for investigating circumstances that are not focused on ‘policy battles’. In the words of Weible and Schlager (2014, p. 239), this study has highlighted that policy transfer research “can both enrich and be enriched by the NPF,

and it points to new policy (*process*) areas to explore, moving the NPF away from its focus on highly conflictual ... problems and policies". Also, following suit in the application of NPF to public policy theories like ACF and MSF, the research highlights an opening for incorporation of the NPF to policy transfer research, by serving as a means for examining the communication content of transfer actors.

In addition, based on the findings from the research, the identification of the ally-seeking narrative adds to the explanation of how narrative elements can be strategically employed by policy actors. It shows that the identification of unexpected endearments among policy actors that otherwise will be pitted against one another is likely aimed at an attempt to draw in an erstwhile opponent, competitor or antagonist. This ensures that avenues for engaging are not jeopardised and there is still a possibility of winning over the opposing individual, group or organisation. Furthermore, by applying the NPF to policy transfer research, this study has enabled the contribution of the examination of international communication among policy actors, as against the communication on domestic issues within a specific jurisdiction. By investigating policy narratives of different jurisdictions, there is a broadened overview of how policy problems are perceived in different jurisdictions. For example, in the case of DRR policy transfer, whereas the international community defined the problem of disasters to be one of environmental concern, the West African community held a perception of disasters that pertained to conflicts. However, ECOWAS was able to come around to the internationally-held view of disasters through its relations with the UNISDR and the drive for the domestication of Hyogo Framework of Action. Again, with reference to Weible and Schlager (2014), one can say that this research has enriched the NPF by highlighting the difference in views held on policy issues by different jurisdictions and

also showing how this might be altered through the intervention of transfer mechanisms powered by ally-seeking policy narratives.

9.5 Avenues for Future Research

A direction for possible further research will be focusing on the transfer object. In the two cases of policy transfer to ECOWAS, this study primarily gave attention to the relations between the transfer agent and recipient, and this leaves room for the opportunity to focus on the specific policies that were transferred and how they have fared after their adoption. Since, “[a]t some point, the policy transfer process ends and endogenous forces of mutation take over” (Stone, 2012, p. 489), the two adopted policies i.e. ECOWAS renewable energy policy and ECOWAS DRR policy, can be investigated based on how they are understood and/or utilised by domestic policy actors. This focus on the transfer object can also lend itself to analysis under the concept of policy transfer and translation, so that the internal interaction with the adopted policies and perhaps, the performance or outcomes of the policies, and how this differs from what obtains in the transfer source jurisdiction, are analysed.

Also, the NPF can play a part in a further research that is hinged on the examination of the transfer object. The use of narrative elements by domestic policy actors within West Africa can be examined for observation of internal conflicts on the policy issue or the policy transfer process, to identify if there is any difference in the outlook towards the transfer agent, or if transfer agent still plays any influential role in the recipient jurisdiction. Further research that is based on the input of the domestic policy actors to how the transfer object is perceived, and how it morphs and stabilises in the

recipient jurisdiction, can again help to provide an avenue for presenting the views of policy actors from sub-Saharan Africa.

In addition to conducting research on the transfer object, another possibility for further research will be focusing on different transfer agents apart from IGOs, and this can be international businesses, INGOs, think tanks, or national governments. Particular cases of policy transfer facilitated by the actors can be investigated, specifically in relations to the type of policy narratives used, and how these may have informed the transfer mechanism observed. It is likely that the research may lead to the identification of other transfer mechanisms that are yet to be introduced or studied in the policy transfer literature, and also additional narrative elements that are yet to be introduced or studied in the NPF literature.

Beyond possible further research in relations to the transfer object, there are other three distinct areas that can further this investigation. Firstly, is the possibility of applying multiple relational approaches to transfer studies, as well as comparing and contrasting these methods in a bid to get insight from varying dimensions. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the peculiarity of involvement of multiple actors, multiple political jurisdictions, and/or multiple geographical regions in policy transfer studies, enables the opportunity for exploring multiple methods, in understanding what goes in a transfer process and answering the research questions. This peculiarity can also enable comparing and contrasting the varying policy research methods that can be applied to policy transfer research. With regards to avenues for future research of this particular study, discursive institutionalism can be applied alongside the NPF in investigating the role of policy narratives in shaping transfer mechanisms. Particularly, this will enable the consideration of institutional factors in what narratives are told by

the actors and can further explain the rationale for the depictions used by the individual actors.

Secondly, with reference to the multilevel perspective introduced by Evans and Davies (1999), this study represents a transfer pathway (i.e. IGO [regional authority] – IGO [regional authority]) and this pathway stems from the coordinated governance of specific activities of multiple states by a supranational regional authority. The relevance of the aggregation of national political jurisdictions at a regional level can therefore link this study with the field of regionalisation. The experience of ECOWAS as a regional organisation and particularly, its transformation from an intergovernmental arrangement to a supranational authority, is crucial to policy transfers to the West African region. This is because, its new position allows it to perform oversight functions in different policy areas, and this gives credence to policies transferred to ECOWAS. Further research in the direction of regionalisation can investigate how the member states are responding to this authority, for example in terms of meeting up their obligations stated in the renewable energy and DRR policies. The research can also examine ECOWAS' oversight role in and question if this has led to further integration or prompted disintegration in the region.

The third area for further research are the other possible cases that were exempted from this study. This includes extending the investigation of the role of policy narratives to other types of cases apart from typical cases. This includes crucial cases, such as where policy transfer unexpectedly happens, or deviant cases, such as when policy transfer does not occur.

In the next section, the thesis concludes with a reflection on policy transfers to sub-Saharan Africa by IGOs.

9.6 Reflection on Policy Transfer by IGOs to Sub-Sahara Africa

“We can no longer continue to make policy for ourselves, in our country, in our region, in our continent on the basis of whatever support that the western world ... or the European Union can give us. It will not work. It has not worked and it will not work” (Nana Akufo Addo, 2017)

The introduction of the concept of policy transfer in public policy research, especially the identification of coercive transfer mechanisms, has provided a conceptual lens to study many of the policy interventions by development partners in sub-Sahara Africa. From a policy transfer perspective and drawing from the findings of this study, many cases of policy transfer by IGOs to sub-Sahara African countries often feature a narrative whereby the transfer agent plays the part of a hero, while the recipient jurisdiction takes the role of a victim. By consciously playing the victim, African countries have often shelved making ample contributions to solve international concerns and are instead, positioned as deserving of special concessions. This can be seen in the climate change policy debate. As noted in Chapter 6, the position held by African countries has been a call for climate justice and this has ensured that the countries were viewed as deserving of support. As a result, the first international agreement on climate change, the UNFCCC Kyoto Protocol, was seen as "an opportunity for African countries to attract new financing for their own sustainable development" (Sebitosi and Pillay, 2005, p. 273). In the interim, this disposition may be beneficial and governments may enjoy the attention and financial support from the international community. However, as shown from the experience of policy-based intervention by the World Bank, engaging in policy transfer on the basis of receiving financial support does not often end well for the recipient. With the transfer agent playing the hero and heading the transfer process, the transfer object is mostly

designed and decided outside of the recipient jurisdiction, and represents the preference of the transfer agent. This reduces the possibility for involving local knowledge and experience, and oftentimes makes the transfer object seem foreign in its expected abode.

Even though coercive policy transfers driven by the transfer mechanism of conditionality can be interesting to research and read about, they “have been substantially criticised for being ineffective and/or having perverse outcomes” (Stone, 2004, p. 554). As the two case studies for this research indicate, IGOs are beginning to adopt alternative transfer mechanisms in engaging with sub-Saharan African countries and this is commendable. Nonetheless, the emphasis on enacting new policies and orchestrating new administrative arrangements can distract governments in the recipient jurisdiction from concentrating on the concerns of and suggestions by domestic policy actors. To limit the interference by external actors, sub-Saharan African leaders will need to adopt an alternative disposition from that of playing the victim when engaging in policy transfer. By assuming the role of an ally or hero, and truly playing the part, the recipient countries will be able to have substantial input in the transfer process, and in deciding what the transfer object will be. This can ensure that the adoption of the transfer object will not only be the fulfilment of the transfer agent’s proposition, but it will purposefully benefit the citizens of the recipient jurisdiction.

Also, while adhering to the plot of rags to riches and playing the hero of the story may be suitable for IGOs facilitating policy transfer to sub-Saharan Africa, the use of these narrative elements emphasises the story of a victim in need of a hero and places the responsibility for developing solutions on the IGO. The onus for addressing a policy challenge involving a jurisdiction should reside with the domestic actors, but the depictions of the characters and plot connotes the lack of adequate capacity by the

recipient to present a policy solution. This approach can make governments assume they are relieved of their responsibility to their jurisdiction and have expectations of development partners to solve the problems that ensue domestically. In a way, the policy narrative of heroic rescuing of a victim plays out with the branding of some policy documents within sub-Saharan Africa with the logos of IGOs (AU and NEPAD, 2004a; ECREEE, 2013a). In a comment about policy transfer to developing countries, Porto de Oliveira (2017, p. 2) notes that “(*international*) organisations intervene in areas where competences should be of national states ... for example ... education, infrastructure and administrative modernisation”. One of the concerns about this approach to policy transfer is whether it can indeed deliver policy change that will be sustained. The experience of some Central and Eastern European countries in public administration reformation supported by the World Bank and EU, shows that although immediate gains can be achieved, such as ascension to membership of the EU, but the countries later get “accused of backsliding or failing to sustain reforms” (Common and Gheorghe, 2017, p. 18). Should this be the experience of African countries, then the time, funds, and efforts committed to the policy transfers by the IGOs, may have been in futility.

Ultimately, what will be desirable for sub-Saharan African countries is to engage in policy transfer on a voluntary basis, whereby they make the choice of the transfer source, transfer object, and transfer mechanism. However, instances of externally driven policy transfer cannot be completely avoided, as there will be issues of international concerns that will necessitate the intervention of IGOs, and in such instances, it will be beneficial for sub-Saharan African countries to be involved on a contributory basis. This will ensure that the region is not viewed as a burden but as a viable and respectable ally. This will also likely ensure domestic ownership of the

transfer object that will be adopted in the recipient jurisdiction and could guarantee its longevity.

In conclusion, changing policy narratives may prompt governments in sub-Saharan Africa to not only engage in voluntary policy transfers that will benefit the jurisdiction, but also assure their participation in international policy debates as a reputable member of the international community. By ceasing to play the victim and aiming to truly be the hero of their policy narratives, governments in sub-Saharan Africa may be inspired to transform the region and empowered to give back to the rest of the world.

Appendices

Appendix 1: Description of Parameters Used in the Review of the Policy Transfer Literature

S/N	Item	Description
1	Author	Name(s) of the people who authored the article
2	Year	Year of publication of the article
3	Title	Title of article
4	Conceptualisation / Case Study	Does the article present further conceptualisation of policy transfer, building on Dolowitz and Marsh (1996, 2000)? Or does it apply the policy transfer framework as it is presented by Dolowitz and Marsh (1996, 2000)
5	Other theories, concepts, or frameworks drawn from	Does the article draw from other theories, concepts, or frameworks in addition to the policy transfer framework?
6	Research Methods	Which research method(s) is/are used?
7	Data collection method / analysis	Which data collection method is used and how was the data analysed?
8	Case(s)	How many cases of policy transfer are featured in the article? What is/are the case(s)?
9	Period of time covered	Specifying the year or period of time when the case occurred
10	Research questions	What are the research questions stated in the article?
11	Conscious/unconscious Transfer	Do(es) the case(s) represent conscious or unconscious policy transfer?
12	New	Does the article introduce any new concept or approach for studying policy transfer? What is introduced?
13	Actors	Which group of actors are featured in the article?
14	Mechanisms	Which transfer mechanism(s) is(are) identified as facilitating the instance of policy transfer in the case(s)?
15	Multiple/Single mechanism	How many mechanisms are identified?
16	Non-transfer?	Does the article highlight any instance of initiation, but non-realization of policy transfer?
17	Hypotheses	Does the article present any hypothesis? What is(are) the hypothesis(es)
18	Findings	What is(are) the finding(s) of the research?

Appendix 2: Documents used in Narrative Analysis

Case 1: Renewable Energy Policy Transfer				
S/No	Documents	Document Type	Author	Year
1	Scoping Report: ECOWAS - Study for a Regional Energy Access Agency	Research report	EU	2006
2	ECOWAS RE Policy	Policy document	EU/ECOWAS	2013
3	2014 Factfile on ECOWAS RE Policy Development	Information flyer	EU	2014
4	EUEI-PDF Annual Report April 2013 – March 2014	Organisation Report	EU	2014
5	EUEI PDF Phase IIbis Report April 2012 – March 2015	Organisation Report	EU	2015
6	EUEI PDF Fact Sheet May 2012	Information Flyer	EU	2012
7	THE AFRICA-EU STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP: A Joint Africa-EU Strategy	Strategy Paper	EU	2007
8	Success stories: Developing renewable energy markets in Africa.	Success story	EU	2014
9	LINK! 1 - July 2009	Newsletter	EU	2009
10	LINK! 2 - September 2009	Newsletter	EU	2009
11	LINK! 3 - October 2009	Newsletter	EU	2009
12	LINK! 4 - November 2009	Newsletter	EU	2009
13	LINK! 6 - February 2010	Newsletter	EU	2010
14	LINK! 7 - March 2010	Newsletter	EU	2010
15	LINK! 8 - April 2010	Newsletter	EU	2010
16	LINK! 9 - June 2010	Newsletter	EU	2010
17	LINK! 10	Newsletter	EU	2010
18	LINK! 11 - September 2010	Newsletter	EU	2010
19	LINK! 12 - October 2010	Newsletter	EU	2010
20	LINK! 14 - June 2011	Newsletter	EU	2011
21	LINK! 15 - August 2011	Newsletter	EU	2011
22	LINK! 16 – December 2011	Newsletter	EU	2011
23	LINK! 17 – March 2012	Newsletter	EU	2012
24	LINK! 18 – September 2012	Newsletter	EU	2012
25	LINK 19! - February 2013	Newsletter	EU	2013
26	3rd Africa - EU Summit, Newsletter nr. 1	Newsletter	EU	2010
27	3rd Africa - EU Summit, Newsletter nr. 2	Newsletter	EU	2010
28	3rd Africa - EU Summit, Newsletter nr. 3	Newsletter	EU	2010

29	3rd Africa - EU Summit, Newsletter nr. 4	Newsletter	EU	2010
30	JAES Newsletter July 2013	Newsletter	EU	2013
31	JAES Newsletter Nov 2013	Newsletter	EU	2013
32	JAES Newsletter March 2014	Newsletter	EU	2014
33	EU-ECOWAS Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Paper 2008-2013	Strategy Paper	ECOWAS, UEMOA, EU	2013
34	16th EU-ECOWAS Ministerial Troika Meeting 2009	Meeting report	EU/ECOWAS	2009
35	Draft Technical Discussion Paper On General Energy Access in ECOWAS for ECREE Regional Workshop 2011	Conference Discussion Paper	UNDP/ECREE E	2011
36	Consolidated Paper on General Energy Access in ECOWAS Region 2011	Research report	UNDP/ECREE E	2011
37	CEDEAO_Briefing_paper_for_Global Forum for Sustainable Energy_final	Conference Briefing paper	ECOWAS	2006
38	ECREEE at a glance	Information flyer	ECREEE	Not Dated
39	2012 Draft Concept Note on High Level Energy Forum	Conference Concept Note	ECOWAS-GFSE-GEF-UNIDO	2012
40	2012 Presentation by ECREEE (Hyacinth Elayo) Renewable Energy Trends in West Africa	Conference paper	ECREEE	2012
41	2011 Increasing the impact of EU Development Policy: an Agenda for Change	Internal memo	EU	2011
42	Factsheet on Energy Sector in West Africa	Information Flyer	EU	Not Dated
43	ECREEE Newsletter Volume 1	Newsletter	ECREEE	2010
44	ECREEE Newsletter Volume 2	Newsletter	ECREEE	2011
45	ECREEE Newsletter Volume 3	Newsletter	ECREEE	2011
46	ECREEE Newsletter Volume 4	Newsletter	ECREEE	2012
47	ECREEE Newsletter Volume 5	Newsletter	ECREEE	2012
48	ECREEE Newsletter Volume 6	Newsletter	ECREEE	2013
49	ECREEE Newsletter Volume 7	Newsletter	ECREEE	2013
50	2010 Press release Africa-Europe in partnership for a better future	Press release	EU	2010
51	COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND	Internal memo	EU	2010

	THE COUNCIL on the consolidation of EU Africa relations			
52	2012 Press release Increasing the Impact of EU Development Policy - an Agenda for change	Press release	EU	2012
53	2006 White Paper on Energy Access	Policy document	ECREEE	2006
54	2011 Presentation by Kappiah Mahama ED ECREEE	Presentation	ECREEE	2011
55	2011 Presentation by ECREEE in Austria stating EU as new partner	Presentation	ECREEE	2011
56	2 Continents 2 Unions 1 Vision Europe-Africa	Brochure	EU/AU	Not Dated

Case 2: Disaster Risk Reduction Policy Transfer

S/N	Documents	Document Type	Author	Year
1	Africa regional strategy for disaster risk reduction	Policy	NEPAD, AU, AfDB, UNISDR	2004
2	Building disaster resilient communities: good practices and lessons learned	Good practices	UNISDR	2007
3	Disaster reduction in Africa: ISDR informs, issue 1, 2003	Newsletter	UNISDR	2003
4	Disaster reduction in Africa: ISDR informs, issue 2, 2003	Newsletter	UNISDR	2003
5	Disaster reduction in Africa: ISDR informs, issue 3, 2004	Newsletter	UNISDR	2004
6	Disaster reduction in Africa: ISDR informs, issue 4, 2004	Newsletter	UNISDR	2004
7	Disaster reduction in Africa: ISDR informs, issue 5, 2005	Newsletter	UNISDR	2005
8	Disaster reduction in Africa: ISDR informs, issue 6, 2006	Newsletter	UNISDR	2006
9	Disaster reduction in Africa: ISDR informs, issue 7, 2006	Newsletter	UNISDR	2006
10	Guidelines for mainstreaming disaster risk assessment in development	Policy	NEPAD, AU, AfDB, UNISDR	2004
11	Lessons learned from the 1997-98 El Niño: once burned twice shy?	Reports	UNISDR	2001
12	Making the case for disaster risk reduction in Africa	Research Report / Policy		2006

13	Programme of action for the implementation of the Africa strategy for disaster risk reduction (2005-2010)	Policy	NEPAD, AU, AfDB, UNISDR	2004
14	Safari's encounter with a landslide	Education materials	UNISDR	2003
15	Towards a culture of prevention: disaster risk reduction begins at school, good practices and lessons learned	Good practices	UNISDR	2007
16	Background Paper on African Regional Consultation on Disaster Risk Reduction	Conference Background Paper	NEPAD/UNISDR	2004
17	ECOWAS DRR Policy	Policy	ECOWAS	2006
18	Hyogo Framework of Action	Policy	UNISDR	
19	International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR) programme forum 1999 - proceedings	Conference proceedings	UNISDR	1999
20	Johannesburg Recommendations for the 2005 World Conference On Disaster Reduction	Position Paper		2004
21	UNISDR Educational Series Vol 1 Iss 4 A school's guide	Education materials	UNISDR	2004
22	UNISDR Educational Series Vol 1 Iss 2 - Safari's encounter with floods	Education materials	UNISDR	2004
23	UNISDR Educational Series Vol 1 Iss 2 Water and risk in Africa - a school's guide	Education materials	UNISDR	2004
24	UNISDR Educational Series Vol 1 Iss 3 - Safari's encounter with drought	Education materials	UNISDR	2006
25	UNISDR Educational Series Vol 1 Iss 3 2004 - A school's guide	Education materials	UNISDR	2004
26	UNISDR Educational Series Vol 2 Iss 2 2004- A community leader's guide	Education materials	UNISDR	2004
27	UNISDR Educational Series Vol 2 Iss 1 A community leader's guide	Education materials	UNISDR	2004
28	UNISDR Educational Series Vol 2 Iss 3 A community leader's guide	Education materials	UNISDR	2004
29	UNISDR Educational Series Vol 2 Iss 5 Dec 2004 Poverty alleviation and DRR	Education materials	UNISDR	2004
30	UNISDR Educational Series Volume 2 Issue 4 2004 DRR Governance and Dev	Education materials	UNISDR	2004

31	UNISDR Presentation at The ProVention Global Forum Dar es Salaam, 13-15 February 2007	Presentation	UNISDR	2007
	Total Number of documents		87	

Appendix 3: Coding of Narrative Elements in Documents Analysed

Code Name	Definition	Examples
Hero	An actor that has made a notable achievement, attained success, or has a remarkable capability.	<p>This policy is a continuation of successful actions already undertaken by ECOWAS and the UEMOA over a decade</p> <p>The EU stands with countries in difficulty.</p> <p>Collaborative efforts being promoted by UNISDR Africa with regional and UN partners are providing significant assistance in advancing better understanding of disaster risk reduction in Africa.</p> <p>The African regional consultations made a substantive contribution to the Second International Conference on Early Warning held in Bonn, Germany, in October 2003. Compared with other regions, the African report was more comprehensive and useful as reference.</p>
Victim	Who or what is affected by a situation or challenge.	<p>Women, especially in rural areas, are affected in a disproportionately severe way by the lack of access to modern fuels and electricity.</p> <p>In Africa, many countries in the region have been hard hit by unreliable rainfalls and drought, negatively affecting hydro-power generation.</p> <p>The Sahel region has been the principal victim of drought-related disasters</p> <p>Mali, like several countries of the subregion, suffered considerable damage as areas deprived of water for several years received an excessive quantity of water.</p>
Villain	Who or what is causing or contributing to harm.	<p>The (World) Bank's approach to energy in developing countries ... leaves the poor yet again in the dark.</p>

		<p>These populations jeopardize their health and that of their children by burning harmful domestic fuels.</p> <p>'Natural' disasters are nature's judgment on what humans have wrought.</p> <p>The vulnerability of communities is growing due to human activities that lead to increased poverty, greater urban density, environmental degradation and climate change.</p>
Ally	A supporter of another actor, in relations to its identity, position, policy position, vision, or project. Or actors that are partnering together towards achieving an objective.	<p>Africa and the EU pursue their common vision and have engaged in political dialogue and an exchange on concrete actions to respond to climate change.</p> <p>The Africa-EU Renewable Energy Cooperation Programme (RECP) has been supporting African governments and regional organisations to develop their renewable energy markets.</p> <p>UNISDR Africa also supported Policy Makers participation to an International Conference on Disaster Reduction to increase their understanding and the integration of disaster risk reduction in development programme, planning at national level.</p> <p>To face up this challenge, UNISDR Africa has forged a very sound partnership with African national governments and regional organizations to promote understanding of disaster risk</p>
Adversary	Who is antagonising/opposing another actor, or a policy stance or solution, or a project.	Not identified in documents. However, it could be a statement such as – Some members are against our collaboration with international partners.
Setting: Bureaucratic	Situating the policy transfer in relations to a need for institutional and administrative frameworks.	<p>There is a need to support Africa in strengthening its political and economic governance, and in reinforcing the regulatory, fiscal and business environment that allows better mobilizing of the continent's own assets in a sustainable way.</p> <p>Sustainable development requires effective institutional coordination among various government, complex, working arrangements and mandates.</p> <p>Strong legal, institutional frameworks needed for disaster management</p>

Setting: Community	Situating the policy transfer in relations to a need for delivering service to a specific group in the population	Give the poorest people greater access to basic social services. Develop, on the basis of national political frameworks, coherent energy policies based on reducing poverty in rural and peri-urban areas
Setting: Sectoral	Situating the policy transfer in relations a particular sector and addressing a challenge within the sector	Having in place the right regulatory framework was considered to be the most important factor in expanding rural electrification. Ensure safety on the waterways ... The regulations also cover operators of vessels who, on inland waterways, are to be examined to determine their competence. EREP (ECOWAS Renewable Energy Policy) is designed to facilitate the development of standards in the region.
Setting: Collective	Situating the policy transfer in relations to providing service to all groups of the population in the recipient jurisdiction	Not identified in documents. Not identified in documents. However, it could be a statement such as – Making everyone safe is our priority.
Plot: Rags to riches	Telling a story of a present state of lack and the possibility of achieving a better economic standing or prosperity	Poverty is a characteristic of ECOWAS and the UEMOA countries, and the Millennium Development Goals will only be achieved by 2015 if at least half the population of rural and peri-urban areas of the region are provided access to modern energy services. There is an overall consensus on that fact that energy services undoubtedly help to reduce poverty and to stimulate economic development. Risk reduction is a developmental imperative for achieving sustainable growth, as well as a strategy that protects the lives and livelihoods of the most vulnerable, and hence a poverty eradication factor.
Plot: Overcoming the monster	Telling a story of the presence of an imminent threat and the possibility of overcoming it	In terms of threat, the daily lives of people around the globe will be affected in a negative and dramatic way. Especially in the least developed countries, and for the most vulnerable countries, climate change makes daily life much harder. We need to act now to minimize such effects If we repeat the mistakes of the developed world by realising African development mainly on the burning of fossil fuels, climate change will have a disastrous effect on our countries”,

		<p>Disasters in Africa are often a matter of “life and death”, so disaster reduction generates human and social interest and solidarity, as well as result-oriented action.</p> <p>Climatic extremes and their meteorological manifestation may no longer be rare events.</p> <p>The response to this understanding was to encourage “mitigation” - to talk in the long term about reducing the risks from potential disasters, so that fewer and fewer people are exposed over time.</p>
Plot: Rebirth	Telling a story of archaic identities or positions, and the possibility of reinventing these.	Not identified in documents. However, it could be a statement such as - We have been on this spot for a long time, present challenges call for a turnaround.
Moral: Incentives and Sanctions	Recommending award of incentives and/or sanctions	<p>EU support to governance should feature more prominently in all partnerships, notably through incentives for results-oriented reform.</p> <p>Governments and donors need also to use incentives and appropriate market development tools to leverage private sector interest where the commercial case is marginal.</p> <p>Long-term investments are a prerequisite for effectively integrating disaster risk reduction in sustainable development. However, such investments can only happen with a coherent and integrated policy and institutional framework with clear mandates for stakeholder involvement.</p> <p>Indeed, Africa will not be able to develop and implement fully - and successfully - its future Programme of Action without some support from WCDR II.</p>
Moral: Managing costs and benefits	Recommending managing cost and benefits	<p>Whatever the conditions, at this stage of its market development, renewable energy is still an expensive solution ... However, when looking at the long-term and considering the full life-cycle of the different energy solutions, renewables prove to be most cost-effective, healthy and environmentally-friendly compared to candles or diesel.</p> <p>Available solar, wind, bioenergy and small-hydro systems are already more cost-effective than the widespread diesel based solutions - particularly when considering the life time costs and negative environmental externalities.</p>

		<p>There is no gainsaying that disaster reduction is cheaper and better than cure.</p> <p>Building a culture of prevention is not easy. While the costs of prevention have to be paid in the present, its benefits lie in a distant future. Moreover, the benefits are not tangible; they are the disasters that did NOT happen</p>
Moral: Value re(orientation)	Recommending a change in stance about, or understanding of, an issue or identity.	<p>Paradigm shift in relations from the donor recipient axis to a strategic engagement of equal and mutually beneficial partners</p> <p>Allow Africa to move away from continuous donor support and find its place in global markets.</p> <p>Africa has to shift from disaster response to disaster prevention/reduction;</p> <p>This will ensure a move away from the “victim” syndrome</p>

Appendix 4: Events and Activities Related to the Policy Transfers

Case 1: Renewable Energy Policy Transfer	
Year	Event
1975	Lomé 1 Convention between the EEC and ACP states, where EEC committed to give aid for the development of ACP states in a five-year agreement (1975-1980). Lomé I prioritised infrastructure; road building, bridges, hospitals and schools and sustainable agriculture
1979	Signing of Lomé 11 for a five-year agreement (1980-1985). The priorities in Lomé 1 continued under Lomé 11
1981	ECOWAS Symposium on Energy for Survival
1982	Adoption of ECOWAS energy policy
1984	Signing of Lomé 111 for a five year agreement (1985-1990). Lomé 111 prioritised rural development projects to promote food security and combat desertification and drought.
1990	Lomé IV. Lomé IV (1990-2000) marked a turning point in Lomé's history. The European Community (EC) embarked on dialogue with the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) on how best to support structural adjustments as a means to economic growth
1995	The EC drew up an initial general policy on regional cooperation strategies and programmes. Under the strategy, the aim was to help to strengthen regional integration and cooperation between the countries of West Africa and to integrate them into the world economy by consolidating the regional economic area
1999	ECOWAS adopted, in December 1999, the principle of setting up a West African Power Pool system (WAPP), a project to be financed by a World Bank facility
2000	End of Lomé agreements. New ACP-EU Agreement signed tagged Cotonou Agreement
2000	191 countries adopted a resolution at the United Nations General Assembly called the Millennium Declaration
2000	First Africa-EU summit was held in 2000 in Cairo
2000	The Cotonou Agreement and Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) are specified as major EU trade and development policy
2002	In 2002, African leaders established the African Union at the Durban Summit. The objective was to replace the Organisation of African Unity with a continental institution capable of meeting the challenges of the 21st century and providing a new vision for the continent, promoting peace, good governance and integration.
2004	launch of the Water and Energy Facilities in 2004 for Africa by the EU
2004	Establishment of EU Energy Initiative Partnership Dialogue Facility (EUEI PDF) by the EU and some EU MS - Austria, Finland, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden
2005	Joint statement on EU development policy is issued by the Council of the European Union, the European Parliament and the European Commission stressing trade instead of aid
2005	A convention signed between ECOWAS and UEMOA in Bamako on the 22nd of August 2005, on joint implementation of actions in the energy sector. A joint ECOWAS/UEMOA Energy Committee was also set up
2006	EUEI PDF sponsored a scoping report on establishment of a West African Regional Agency for Energy Access

2006	Publication of the Consultants' Report for the study on regional agency for energy access
2006	ECOWAS presents briefing paper at 6th Global Forum for Sustainable Energy
2007	Lisbon Summit - Launch of Africa-Europe partnership (adoption of joint strategy and plan of action based on eight areas of cooperation)
2007	Launch of EU-Africa Infrastructure Partnership in 2007 under the framework of EU-Africa Joint Strategy
2007	Approval of EUR 3m grant funding from the Trust Fund to be used by the West African Power Pool (WAPP11) to procure the services of an international consulting firm to conduct the preparatory studies for the planned West Africa Power Interconnector project, which will link power grids in Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone
2008	The 61st Session of ECOWAS Council of Ministers adopted the regulation C/REG.23/11/08 and gave the ECOWAS Regional Centre for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency (ECREEE) a legal basis
2008	Establishment of the EU Delegation to the AU
2008	Creation of African Energy Commission
2009	A joint ACP-EU declaration on climate change is issued in May 2009
2009	EU-ECOWAS Ministerial Troika Meeting held on the 11th of May
2009	ECOWAS participated in a workshop held in Uganda for the Africa-EU energy partnership
2009	Release of EUR 3m grant to WAPP
2009	United Nations Climate Change Conference is held in Copenhagen between 7th and 18th December
2010	Official inauguration of ECREEE
2010	First High Level Meeting of the Africa-EU Energy Partnership (AEEP) in Vienna, Austria. A delegation of ECREEE participated in the meeting
2010	Africa-EU energy partnership held a joint expert group (JEG) meeting in Cairo. The regional power pools were present. One of the outcomes of the meeting was a tentative agreement on setting out objectives for energy access, energy security, renewable energies and energy efficiency.
2010	EU organised a conference on agriculture, food security and climate change for agreeing on a common African position on climate change and formulating key messages from the African continent for the global conference
2010	Two-day technical workshop on the road map for the Africa-EU Energy Partnership is held in Entebbe, Uganda
2010	ECOWAS Regional strategic plan is released
2010	First High-Level Meeting of AEEP in Vienna, in September 2010. The AEEP Political Targets to be reached by 2020 were agreed and the Africa-EU Renewable Energy Cooperation Programme (RECP) was launched
2010	in 2010 the European Commission launched a consultation on EU development policy
2010	Secretariat for ECREEE was established during a six-month preparatory phase in Praia, Cape Verde, with the support of the ECOWAS Commission and the Austrian and Spanish Governments, as well as technical assistance from UNIDO
2011	ECOWAS with support of UNDP organises regional workshop on general energy access in West Africa as part of its contribution to the 2012 International Year of Sustainable Energy For All
2011	EU Member States are asked to align their development activities under a central umbrella of the EU
2011	EU is announced as a new partner for ECREEE

2011	EU undertakes global review of its development policy putting a stronger emphasis on promoting an enabling environment for inclusive growth, private sector investment and job creation, including through innovative means of financing
2011	EU publishes Development strategy - Increasing the Impact of EU Development Policy - an Agenda
2011	EU improves its working relations with African RECS and not focus only on AU
2011	European Commission publishes - Increasing the impact of EU Development Policy: an Agenda for Change
2012	The Government of France provided 60,000EUR to ECREEE for organisation of the High Level Forum where the renewable energy policy was adopted by ECOWAS energy ministers
2012	Adoption of ECOWAS RE policy by the ECOWAS Ministers on Energy during the ECOWAS High Level Energy Forum, held from 29th to 31st October 2012, in Accra, Ghana.
2012	Baseline report for ECOWAS Renewable Energy Policy is published
2012	ECREEE hosted a side event at Rio+20 tagged 'Towards Universal Access to Sustainable Energy Services in West Africa'
2012	EUEI PDF hosted a discussion forum at Rio+20 tagged 'Potential, Challenges and Needs of Private Sector in promoting Energy Access and Renewable Energy Markets in Africa'
2012	EU announces the agreement with the UN, for it to lead the implementation of SE4ALL in Africa
2013	President of the ECOWAS Commission, His Excellency Kadre Desire Ouédraogo, visited the Cape Verde-based ECOWAS Centre for Renewal Energy and Energy Efficiency (ECREEE)
2013	ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government adopts the ECOWAS Renewable Energy Policy in Abuja, Nigeria at the 43rd Ordinary Session, from 17th to 18th July 2013

Case 2: Disaster Risk Reduction Policy Transfer	
Year	Activity/Event
2002	World Summit on Sustainable Development, Johannesburg
2002	The UNISDR Secretariat set in motion a two-year African Regional Outreach Programme, with the financial support of the Government of Germany and in cooperation with the UNEP in Nairobi.
2002	ECOWAS Secretariat participated in discussions on disaster risk reduction organised by the UNISDR
2002	Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Chad sought and secured funding (worth 5 million Canadian dollars) from the Canadian government towards the implementation of a project enhancing adaptation to climate change.
2003	NEPAD Workshop on Disaster Management in April 2003. The Workshop called for interventions to address issues of food security and disaster management in Africa.
2003	Baseline study of disaster reduction potential in Africa was conducted by NEPAD, Africa Union (AU) and UNISDR Africa
2003	Africa DRR Strategy was developed
2003	ECOWAS Council of Ministers 51st Session in December 2003 in Accra established a Technical Committee on Disaster Management to recommend ways to operationalize a disaster prevention and reduction capacity

2003	The NEPAD Secretariat organized a disaster management workshop, sponsored by the World Bank, to enable African and international experts to work with the Secretariat and Regional Economic Communities (RECs) to develop a comprehensive programme on disaster management and food security.
2003	African Regional Consultation in preparation for the Second International Early Warning Conference" (EWC– II) in Nairobi. The consultation was one of a series of preparatory regional consultations held in Asia, Europe and the American continent to provide regional input into EWC II. In consonance with EWC II, the theme of the African regional consultation was "Integrating Early Warning (EW) into Public Policy".
2003	2nd International Conference on Early Warning, EWC II, was held in Germany
2003	Consultative Meeting on Disaster Risk Management in Africa held in Nairobi
2003	The Commission and the NEPAD Secretariat held consultations with some UN agencies, including the Secretariat of the UNISDR, UNDP and UNEP as well as other stakeholders, in June 2003 in Nairobi, to plan the way forward towards the realization of the development of a disaster management mechanism.
2003	Meeting of the UN Inter-Agency Task Force on Disaster Reduction (IATF-DR) in Geneva
2003	The 51st session of the ECOWAS Council of Ministers held in Accra from 15th to 18th December 2003 decided to establish a sub-regional disaster prevention and management mechanism
2003	A meeting of the Technical Committee was convened from 8th to 10th March 2005 to discuss the required institutional and legal framework, common policy, operational framework and resource mobilization, and to outline the modalities for the establishment of a disaster management mechanism in West Africa.
2004	First meeting of the Working Group on Disaster Risk Reduction in Africa was convened from 26th to 27th April 2004 in Johannesburg, South Africa. The Working Group is a consultative forum for representatives of Regional Economic Communities (REC)
2004	National Workshop on Disaster Risk Reduction held in Ghana to discuss national capacity building and the establishment of an ISDR National Platform
2004	UNISDR held a preparatory session for the World Conference on Disaster Reduction (WCDR II) at Palais des Nations, Geneva, Switzerland
2004	Drawing and Essay Contest for children launched in Africa by UNISDR
2004	The first meeting of the African Working Group was held in Johannesburg, South Africa from April 26th to 27th
2004	The second meeting of the African Working Group was set for 3rd June 2004 and held in Johannesburg, South Africa
2004	The Working Group meeting had its third session from the 9th to 10th December 2004.
2004	AU Head of States Summit held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in July 2004. Participants recommended the African Regional Strategy for Disaster Reduction
2004	An African Regional Consultation on Disaster Reduction was held in Johannesburg, South Africa from June 2nd to 3rd and the delegates released the Johannesburg Recommendations on the 2005 World Conference on Disaster Reduction
2004	African Experts' Meeting on Disaster Reduction held at the same venue on 31st May and 1st June 2004 to finalise the draft document of the Africa Regional Strategy for Disaster Reduction developed by the AU and NEPAD with support from AfDB and UNISDR Africa.
2004	African Heads of State 'received' the Africa Regional Strategy for Disaster Reduction

2004	Natural disaster management capacity building project held in Mali by the UNISDR with an objective to work towards developing a coherent national plan for natural disaster management and reduction
2004	The first meeting of ambassadors representing the four countries designated as members of the technical committee (Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Niger and Nigeria) was held on 27th May 2004 at the ECOWAS Executive Secretariat.
2004	UNISDR organised a workshop towards establishing a DRR national platform in Ghana
2005	UNISDR organised a workshop towards establishing a DRR national platform in Nigeria
2005	UNISDR organised a workshop towards establishing a DRR national platform in Senegal
2005	UNISDR organised a workshop towards establishing a DRR national platform in Mali
2005	World Conference on Disaster Reduction (WCDR) in Hyogo, Japan from 18th -22nd January and the development of the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA)
2005	A meeting of ECOWAS technical committee was held in March 2005, in Nigeria, to outline the scope of a disaster management mechanism for West Africa
2005	First African Ministerial Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction was held in December 2005
2005	The International Day for Disaster Reduction - tagged as the International Year of Micro-Credit
2005	Inauguration of the National Platform of Stakeholders in Disaster Risk Reduction in Nigeria
2005	African Regional Consultation on the January 2005 World Conference on Disaster Reduction (WCDR) and review of the draft Africa Strategy for DRR
2006	Inauguration of the Cape Verde DRR national platform is scheduled to take place on 10 October 2006, the International Day for Disaster Reduction.
2006	A second consultative meeting of African National Platforms for DRR was held bringing together Education Ministry Officials and representatives of National Societies of the Red Cross/Red Crescent to discuss the mainstreaming of DRR issues into school curricula and joint actions with National Societies of the Red Cross/Red Crescent.
2006	A meeting to foster interaction amongst regional economic communities (RECs), development partners and specialized institutions to discuss and pave the way forward for the implementation of the "Africa Programme of Action for Disaster Risk Reduction" was held in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa
2006	UNISDR Africa organized a consultative meeting for journalists (television, radio and print) from 13th to 15th June in Nairobi, Kenya.
2006	ECOWAS Expert meeting on DRR for discussing the draft policy document was held from 8th to 10th of August
2006	Inauguration of National Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) in Ghana
2007	West Africa Sub-regional Conference on Hazard Risk Reduction held in Abidjan, Cote d'Ivoire
2007	ECOWAS Heads of States adopted the ECOWAS Policy and Mechanisms for Disaster Risk Reduction at their 31st Summit held on 19th January 2007 in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso

Appendix 5: Certificate for Ethics Approval



COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Ethics Committee
ssis-ethics@exeter.ac.uk

CERTIFICATE OF ETHICAL APPROVAL

Academic Unit: Politics

Title of Project: 'The Role of Policy Narratives in Policy Transfer: The Case of Transfer of Renewable Energy Policy and DRR Policy to ECOWAS'

Research Team Member(s): Titilayo Soremi

Project Contact Point: Ts419@exeter.ac.uk

Supervisor (s): Claire Dunlop

This project has been approved for the period

From: 25th January 2017
To: 31st March 2019

Ethics Committee approval reference: 201617-038

Signature:

Date: 25th January 2017

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Lise Storm'.

(Lise Storm, Chair, SSIS College Ethics Committee)

Appendix 6: Interview Questions and Information and Consent Form

<p>Interview Questions</p> <p>Transfer Agent (Recent and former officials of EUEI PDF and UNISDR, and Consultants)-</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - From your perspective, how did the EU/UNISDR help ECOWAS in having its own RE/DRR policy? - Why did the EU/UNISDR assist ECOWAS in developing and adopting a RE/DRR policy? - Why does ECOWAS need a RE/DRR policy? - How will the ECOWAS RE/DRR policy benefit ECOWAS? - How will the ECOWAS RE/DRR policy benefit the EU/UNISDR?
<p>Interview Questions</p> <p>Transfer Recipient (Recent and former officials of ECREEE and ECOWAS DRR Division)-</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - What led to the development and adoption of the ECOWAS RE/DRR policy? - Why do you think the EU/UNISDR got involved in the process? Or What led to the involvement of EU/UNISDR in the process? - How did EU/UNISDR assist ECOWAS in developing and adopting its own RE/DRR policy? - Why does ECOWAS need a RE/DRR policy? - How will the ECOWAS RE/DRR policy benefit ECOWAS? - How will the ECOWAS RE/DRR policy benefit the EU/UNISDR?
<p>Checks</p>	<p><u>Technology</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Computer speaker and earphones are functioning adequately and set to comfortable volume levels • The recording function of the videoconferencing tool is working appropriately. Attempt a recording of a video chat to a friend/colleague and replay in order to test the function <p><u>Participant</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Information sheet has been sent to the respondent and he/she has acknowledged receipt and given assent • Familiarity with name and position of participant, and their involvement in the policy transfer process • Date and time of interview have been confirmed and Skype or Google Hangout IDs have been exchanged <p><u>Materials</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interview guide • Pen and paper for taking extra notes or identifying probes • Information sheet

<p>Opening 17/01/2017</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Express appreciation to the respondent for their participation in the research. Inform participant again on the anonymity of their contributions and responses, in reporting the findings of the research • If the participant has not received an information sheet, read out its content and ask for a verbal assent • Let the participant be aware of ongoing recording of the interview session and the possibility of asking for the recording to be stopped at any time during the interview. Also, let the participant be aware that they can stop or withdraw from the interview session, if necessary • Restate the title and objectives of the research, and how the interview fits into the overall research, and the expected duration of the interview session • To help a participant relax and freely narrate their experience and perceptions, the participant can be informed of other sources of information that are publicly available, and be made aware that their contribution will be used for additional information and corroboration, which is required for ensuring the validity of the research
<p>Closing/Referral</p>	<p>Thank the participant for his/her kind contribution and ask if he/she can make a referral to other colleagues who can also be participants on the research, and if possible, speak with them to arrange interview sessions.</p>

INFORMATION AND CONSENT FORM

Title of Project: The Role of Policy Narratives in Policy Transfer: The Cases of Transfer of Renewable Energy Policy and Disaster Risk Reduction Policy to ECOWAS

1. What is this project?

This project aims to understand how stories used in depicting a policy transfer process. Policy transfer refers to when a country or other political setting uses policy-related knowledge, which had been drawn from another political setting. The project also examines how stories used in depicting a policy transfer, can inform the factors that aid in facilitating the transfer process i.e. transfer mechanisms, such as obligation, conditionality, persuasion, or learning. In particular, it aims to understand how policy actors involved in policy transfers depict their counterparts, in serving the role of transfer agents or recipients; their understanding of the policy transfer process; and their involvement in it, through policy narratives.

To investigate how policy narratives can inform the transfer mechanism that manifests in a policy transfer, the project will focus on two instances of policy transfer to ECOWAS, namely, the transfer of renewable energy policy and disaster risk reduction (DRR) policy to ECOWAS.

2. Who is conducting this research?

I am a PhD student at the department of Politics, University of Exeter, and this research forms part of my PhD.

My supervisors are Dr Claire Dunlop and Prof Claudio Radaelli. They can be contacted via email at C.A.Dunlop@exeter.ac.uk, and C.Radaelli@exeter.ac.uk, respectively.

3. What does being part of this study mean for me?

It will involve one interview, either face to face or by telephone, which is likely to last about an hour. I would like to record this interview with your permission. You can stop the interview at any time and you do not need to answer any questions that you do not wish to answer.

Sections of the transcript of your interview may be published, either in journal articles or elsewhere, following this research. Your real name, alongside past or current positions held at your workplace will not be used.

4. Who can I contact for further information?

For further information about the research or your interview data, please contact:

Titilayo Soremi
Department of Politics
University of Exeter
Amory Building
Rennes Drive
Exeter
EX4 4RJ
UK

Ts419@exeter.ac.uk

If you have concerns/questions about the research you would like to discuss with someone else at the University, please contact:

Dr Claire Dunlop
Department of Politics
University of Exeter
Amory Building
Rennes Drive
Exeter
EX4 4RJ
UK
C.A.Dunlop@exeter.ac.uk

01392 724690

5. What will happen to my interview data?

Your interview data will be held in accordance with the Data Protection Act.

The information you provide will be used for research purposes and your personal data will be processed in accordance with current data protection legislation. Your personal data will be treated in the strictest confidence and will not be disclosed to any unauthorised third parties. The results of the research will be published in anonymised form and anonymised data may be uploaded to the University of Exeter's data storage system.

a. Interview recordings

The digital recording of your interview will be deleted as soon as there is an authoritative written transcript of your interview.

b. Interview transcripts and contact details

Interview data will be held and used on an anonymous basis, with no mention of your name, but there will be a reference to the particular instance of policy transfer for which the interview is being held. Your personal and contact details will be stored separately from your interview transcript and may be retained for up to 5 years.

If you request it, you will be supplied with a copy of your interview transcript so that you can comment on and edit it as you see fit (please give your email below).

Third parties will not be allowed access to interview tapes and transcripts except as required by law or in the event that something disclosed during the interview causes concerns about possible harm to you or to someone else.

CONSENT

I have been fully informed about the aims and purposes of the project.

I understand that:

- there is no compulsion for me to participate in this research project and, if I do choose to participate, I may withdraw at any stage;
- I have the right to refuse permission for the publication of any information about me;
- any information which I give will be used solely for the purposes of this research project, which may include publications or academic conference or seminar presentations;
- all information I give will be treated as confidential;
- the researcher will make every effort to preserve my anonymity.

.....
(Signature of participant)

.....
(Date)

.....
(Printed name of participant)

.....
Email address of participant

.....
(Signature of researcher)

.....
(Printed name of researcher)


One copy of this form will be kept by the participant; a second copy will be kept by the researchers.

Appendix 7: Chi-Square and T-Test Analysis

Chi-square Analysis for Case 1: Renewable Energy Policy Transfer

Narrative Setting

Type	Category	Frequency	V4	V5	V6	V7
a	Bureaucratic	35	13.67	21.33	35	Bureaucratic
a	Community	24	2.67	21.33	24	Community
a	Sectoral	5	-16.33	21.33	5	Sectoral
b	Bureaucratic	21.33333333333333	13.67	21.33	35	Bureaucratic
b	Community	21.33333333333333	2.67	21.33	24	Community
b	Sectoral	21.33333333333333	-16.33	21.33	5	Sectoral




Total N	64
Test Statistic	21.594
Degrees of Freedom	2
Asymptotic Sig. (2-sided test)	.000

1. There are 0 cells (0%) with expected values less than 5. The minimum expected value is 21.333.

Narrative Character

Type	Category	Frequency	V4	V5	V6	V7
a	Ally	125	58.75	66.25	125	Ally
a	Hero	110	43.75	66.25	110	Hero
a	Victim	15	-51.25	66.25	15	Victim
a	Villain	15	-51.25	66.25	15	Villain
b	Ally	66.25	58.75	66.25	125	Ally
b	Hero	66.25	43.75	66.25	110	Hero
b	Victim	66.25	-51.25	66.25	15	Victim
b	Villain	66.25	-51.25	66.25	15	Villain




Total N	265
Test Statistic	160.283
Degrees of Freedom	3
Asymptotic Sig. (2-sided test)	.000

1. There are 0 cells (0%) with expected values less than 5. The minimum expected value is 66.250.

Narrative Plot

Type	Category	Frequency	V4	V5	V6	V7
a	Overcoming the Monster	6	-36	42	6	Overcoming the Monster
a	Rags to riches	119	77	42	119	Rags to riches
a	Rebirth	1	-41	42	1	Rebirth
b	Overcoming the Monster	42	-36	42	6	Overcoming the Monster
b	Rags to riches	42	77	42	119	Rags to riches
b	Rebirth	42	-41	42	1	Rebirth




Total N	126
Test Statistic	212.048
Degrees of Freedom	2
Asymptotic Sig. (2-sided test)	.000

1. There are 0 cells (0%) with expected values less than 5. The minimum expected value is 42.

Narrative Moral

Type	Category	Frequency	V4	V5	V6	V7
a	Incentives and sanctions	23	12.33	10.67	23	Incentives and sanctions
a	Managing cost and benefits	5	-5.67	10.67	5	Managing cost and benefits
a	Value re(orientation)	4	-6.67	10.67	4	Value re(orientation)
b	Incentives and sanctions	10.66666666666667	12.33	10.67	23	Incentives and sanctions
b	Managing cost and benefits	10.66666666666667	-5.67	10.67	5	Managing cost and benefits
b	Value re(orientation)	10.66666666666667	-6.67	10.67	4	Value re(orientation)




Total N	32
Test Statistic	21.438
Degrees of Freedom	2
Asymptotic Sig. (2-sided test)	.000

1. There are 0 cells (0%) with expected values less than 5. The minimum expected value is 10.667.

Chi-square Analysis for Case 2: DRR Policy Transfer

Narrative Setting

Type	Category	Frequency	V4	V5	V6	V7
a	Bureaucratic	24	11	13	24	Bureaucratic
a	Sectoral	2	-11	13	2	Sectoral
b	Bureaucratic	13	11	13	24	Bureaucratic
b	Sectoral	13	-11	13	2	Sectoral




Total N	26
Test Statistic	18.615
Degrees of Freedom	1
Asymptotic Sig. (2-sided test)	.000

1. There are 0 cells (0%) with expected values less than 5. The minimum expected value is 13.

Narrative Character

Type	Category	Frequency	V4	V5	V6	V7
a	Ally	85	15	70	85	Ally
a	Hero	52	-18	70	52	Hero
a	Victim	88	18	70	88	Victim
a	Villain	55	-15	70	55	Villain
b	Ally	70	15	70	85	Ally
b	Hero	70	-18	70	52	Hero
b	Victim	70	18	70	88	Victim
b	Villain	70	-15	70	55	Villain




Total N	280
Test Statistic	15.686
Degrees of Freedom	3
Asymptotic Sig. (2-sided test)	.001

1. There are 0 cells (0%) with expected values less than 5. The minimum expected value is 70.

Narrative Plot

Type	Category	Frequency	V4	V5	V6	V7
a	Overcoming the monster	140	69.5	70.5	140	Overcoming the monster
a	Rags to riches	1	-69.5	70.5	1	Rags to riches
b	Overcoming the monster	70.5	69.5	70.5	140	Overcoming the monster
b	Rags to riches	70.5	-69.5	70.5	1	Rags to riches




Total N	141
Test Statistic	137.028
Degrees of Freedom	1
Asymptotic Sig. (2-sided test)	.000

1. There are 0 cells (0%) with expected values less than 5. The minimum expected value is 70.500.

Narrative Moral

Type	Category	Frequency	V4	V5	V6	V7
a	Incentives and sanctions	3	-18	21	3	Incentives and sanctions
a	Managing cost and benefits	33	12	21	33	Managing cost and benefits
a	Value re(orientation)	27	6	21	27	Value re(orientation)
b	Incentives and sanctions	21	-18	21	3	Incentives and sanctions
b	Managing cost and benefits	21	12	21	33	Managing cost and benefits
b	Value re(orientation)	21	6	21	27	Value re(orientation)



Total N	63
Test Statistic	24.000
Degrees of Freedom	2
Asymptotic Sig. (2-sided test)	.000

1. There are 0 cells (0%) with expected values less than 5. The minimum expected value is 21.

Test of Difference (T-Test) for Narrative Elements Identified in Case 1 (Renewable Energy Policy Transfer) and Case 2 (DRR Policy Transfer)

Independent Samples Test										
		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
									Lower	Upper
Setting: Bureaucratic	Equal variances assumed	5.698	0.019	-5.071	85	0.000	-0.503	0.099	-0.700	-0.306
	Equal variances not assumed			-5.287	69.894	0.000	-0.503	0.095	-0.693	-0.313
		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
									Lower	Upper
Setting: Community	Equal variances assumed	35.489	0.000	2.408	85	0.018	0.161	0.067	0.028	0.293
	Equal variances not assumed			3.245	55.000	0.002	0.161	0.050	0.061	0.260

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
									Lower	Upper
Setting: Sectoral	Equal variances assumed	0.697	0.407	-5.010	56	0.000	-0.929	0.185	-1.300	-0.557
	Equal variances not assumed			-26.739	55.000	0.000	-0.929	0.035	-0.998	-0.859
		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
									Lower	Upper
Character: Hero	Equal variances assumed	2.604	0.110	1.150	85	0.253	0.127	0.110	-0.092	0.346
	Equal variances not assumed			1.134	59.473	0.262	0.127	0.112	-0.097	0.350
		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
									Lower	Upper


Character: Allies	Equal variances assumed	4.166	0.044	-0.964	85	0.338	-0.106	0.110	-0.325	0.113
	Equal variances not assumed			-0.978	64.700	0.332	-0.106	0.108	-0.322	0.110
		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
									Lower	Upper
Character: Victim	Equal variances assumed	17.540	0.000	-3.233	85	0.002	-0.320	0.099	-0.516	-0.123
	Equal variances not assumed			-3.022	50.948	0.004	-0.320	0.106	-0.532	-0.107
		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
									Lower	Upper
Character: Villain	Equal variances assumed	16.433	0.000	-3.567	85	0.001	-0.352	0.099	-0.548	-0.156
	Equal variances not assumed			-3.337	51.115	0.002	-0.352	0.105	-0.564	-0.140

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
									Lower	Upper
Plot: Overcoming the Monster	Equal variances assumed	0.058	0.810	-15.057	85	0.000	-0.864	0.057	-0.978	-0.750
	Equal variances not assumed			-15.232	64.169	0.000	-0.864	0.057	-0.977	-0.751
		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
									Lower	Upper
Plot: Rags to Riches	Equal variances assumed	274.915	0.000	5.795	85	0.000	0.539	0.093	0.354	0.724
	Equal variances not assumed			7.275	76.092	0.000	0.539	0.074	0.392	0.687
		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
									Lower	Upper

Plot: Rebirth	Equal variances assumed	2.285	0.134	0.742	85	0.460	0.018	0.024	-0.030	0.066
	Equal variances not assumed			1.000	55.000	0.322	0.018	0.018	-0.018	0.054
		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
									Lower	Upper
Moral: Incentive and Sanction	Equal variances assumed	27.119	0.000	2.172	85	0.033	0.185	0.085	0.016	0.355
	Equal variances not assumed			2.519	84.877	0.014	0.185	0.074	0.039	0.332
		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
									Lower	Upper
Moral: Managing Cost and Benefits	Equal variances assumed	0.058	0.810	-15.057	85	0.000	-0.864	0.057	-0.978	-0.750
	Equal variances not assumed			-15.232	64.169	0.000	-0.864	0.057	-0.977	-0.751

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
									Lower	Upper
Moral: Value Reorientation	Equal variances assumed	118.322	0.000	-5.448	85	0.000	-0.430	0.079	-0.587	-0.273
	Equal variances not assumed			-4.475	36.766	0.000	-0.430	0.096	-0.625	-0.235

Appendix 8: Picture of UNISDR's Representative Meeting with President Olusegun Obasanjo



Source: Kan (2005, p. 49)

References

- Abbas, A.M., 2006. Nigeria: Inland Waterways Authority Fit for Waterway Risk Reduction Role. *Disaster Reduction in Africa ISDR Informs*, Issue 7 June, 37–38.
- Abbott, G., 2016. Narrative Structures in Burmese Folk Tales by Soe Marlar Lwin (Review). *Sojourn: Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia* 31(1), 355–357.
- Aberbach, J.D., Rockman, B., 2002. Conducting and Coding Elite Interviews. *Political Science and Politics* 35(4), 673–676.
- Adebayo, Y.R., 2005. Glimpses of Concerns over Hydrometeorological Disasters in Africa. *Disaster Reduction in Africa ISDR Informs*, Issue 5 July, 17–19.
- Adeleke, A., 1995. The Politics and Diplomacy of Peacekeeping in West Africa: The ECOWAS Operation in Liberia. *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 33(4), 569–593.
- Adeniyi, P.A., 2016. Climate Change Induced Hunger and Poverty in Africa. *Journal of Global Biosciences* 5(3), 3711–3724.
- Adetula, V.A.O., 2008. Nigeria and the European Union: the Lome years and beyond, in: Jone, B.R. (Ed.), *Europe at the Crossroads*. Nova Science Publishers Inc., New York, pp. 133–151.
- AEEP, 2014. *The Africa-EU Energy Partnership: Jointly tackling energy challenges*. Africa-EU Energy Partnership, Brussels.
- Afolayan, A.A., 2016. *Immigration and Expulsion of ECOWAS Aliens in Nigeria*. Center for Migration Studies of New York, Inc, New York.
- African Union and European Union, 2007. *The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership: A Joint Africa-EU Strategy*. http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/sites/default/files/documents/eas2007_joint_strategy_en.pdf (Accessed 14 April 2017).
- African Union, 2003. *New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD)*. <http://www.au.int/en/organs/nepad> (Accessed 3 September 2016).
- Akiba, O., 1998. *Nigerian Foreign Policy towards Africa: Continuity and Change*. Peter Lang, New York.
- Akinbami, J.F., 2001. Renewable Energy Resources and Technologies in Nigeria - Present Situation, Future Prospects and Policy Framework. *Mitigation Adaptation Strategies Global Change* 6, 155–181.
- Alou, M.T., 2009. Between Autonomy and Dependence: “Policy Transfer” Dynamics in Sub-Saharan Africa, in: *Policy Transfer or Policy Learning: Interactions between*

International and National Skills Development Approaches for Policy Making. Norrag, Geneva.

Alter, K.J., 2012. The Global Spread of European Style International Courts. *West European Politics* 35(1), 135–154.

Alter, K.J., Helfer, L.R., Mcallister, J.R., 2013. A New International Human Rights Court for West Africa: The ECOWAS Community Court of Justice. *American Journal of International Law* 107(4), 737–779.

Annan, K., 2003. The UN Secretary-General Message for the International Day for Disaster Reduction 8 October 2003. *Disaster Reduction in Africa ISDR Informs*, Issue 2 November, 36.

Annan, K., 2004. The UN Secretary-General Message For The World Water Day 22 March 2004. *Disaster Reduction in Africa ISDR Informs*, Issue 3 April, 33.

Attard, M., Enoch, M., 2011. Policy Transfer and the Introduction of Road Pricing in Valletta, Malta. *Transport Policy* 18(3), 544–553.

AU and NEPAD, 2004a. Africa Regional Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction. African Union, Addis Ababa.

AU and NEPAD, 2004b. Towards Sustainable Development in Africa: Report on the Status of Disaster Risk Management and Disaster Risk Assessment in Africa. United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR), Addis Ababa.

Bach, D.C., 1983. The Politics of West African Economic Co-Operation: CEAO and ECOWAS. *Journal of Modern African Studies* 21(4), 605–623.

Bach, D.C., 2004. The Dilemmas of Regionalization, in: Adekeye, A., Rashid, I. (Eds.), *West Africa's Security Challenges: Building Peace in a Troubled Region*. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Colorado, pp. 69–92.

Bacha, E.L., 1986. The World Bank and Structural Adjustment in Latin America. *World Development* 14(3), 333–346.

Bal, M., 2009. *Narratology: Introduction to the Theory of Narrative*. University of Toronto Press Incorporated, Toronto.

Barroso, J.M., 2010a. Statement of President Barroso at the High Level Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly on the Millennium Development Goals, New York, 20 September 2010. *Link! Inside Africa-European Union Partnership*, Issue 12 October, 2–3.

Barroso, J.M., 2010b. Opening Remarks of the President of the European Commission, Jose Manuel Barroso. *Link! Inside Africa-European Union Partnership*, Issue 10 Special Edition, 1–2.

Basher, R., Briceno, S., 2005. Climate and Disaster Risk Reduction in Africa, in: Low, P.S. (Ed.), *Climate Change and Africa*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 271–286.

Bayard de Volo, L. and Schatz, E., 2004. From the Inside out: Ethnographic Methods in Political Research. *Political Science and Politics* 37(2): 267-271.

Beg, N., Morlot, J.C., Davidson, O., Afrane-okesse, Y., Tyani, L., Denton, F., Sokona, Y., Thomas, J.P., Rovere, E.L. La, Parikh, J.K., Parikh, K., Rahman, A.A., Corfee, J., Davidson, O., Afrane-okesse, Y., Tyani, L., Denton, F., Sokona, Y., Philippe, J., Lèbre, E., Rovere, L., Parikh, J.K., Parikh, K., Rahman, A.A., 2002. Linkages between Climate Change and Sustainable Development. *Climate Policy* 2, 129–144.

Béland, D., 2009. Ideas, Institutions, and Policy Change. *Journal of European Public Policy* 16(5), 701–718.

Bennett, C.J., 1991. Review Article: What Is Policy Convergence and What Causes It? *British Journal of Political Science* 21(2), 215–233.

Bennett, S., Dalglish, S.L., Juma, P.A., Rodriguez, D.C., 2015. Altogether Now ... Understanding the Role of International Organizations in iCCM Policy Transfer. *Health Policy Plan.* 30(2), 26–35.

Benson, D., Jordan, A., 2011. What Have We Learned from Policy Transfer Research? Dolowitz and Marsh Revisited. *Political Studies Review* 9(3), 366–378.

Benson, D., Jordan, A., 2012. Policy Transfer Research: Still Evolving, Not Yet Through? *Political Studies Review* 10(3), 333–338.

Berger, A.A., 1997. *Narratives in Popular Culture, Media, and Everyday Life*. Sage Publications, Inc., London.

Bhavnani, R., Vordzorgbe, S., Owor, M., Bousquet, F., 2008. Status of Disaster Risk Reduction in the Sub-Saharan Africa Region. Commission of the African Union, Addis Ababa.

Biney, A., 2008. The Legacy of Kwame Nkrumah in Retrospect. *Journal of Pan African Studies* 2(3), 129–159.

Bishop, R., 2003. Changing Power Relations in Education: Kaupapa Maori Messages for 'Mainstream' Education in Aotearoa/New Zealand, *Comparative Education*, 39(2): 221-238.

Blum, S., 2014. No Need to Reinvent the Wheel: Family Policy Transfers in Germany and Austria. *Policy Studies* 35(4), 357–376.

Bojang, F., 2003. AU Disaster Prevention, Preparedness, Response Activities in Africa. *Disaster Reduction in Africa ISDR Informs*, Issue 2 November, 6–7.

Booker, C., 2004. *The Seven Basic Plots: Why We Tell Stories*. Continuum, London.

Börzel, T. A., 1999 Institutional Adaptation to Europeanization in Germany and Spain. *Journal of Common Market Studies* 37(4): 573-596.

Börzel, T. Risse, T., 2000. When Europe Hits Home: Europeanization and Domestic Change. *European Integration Online Papers* 4(15): 1-20.

- Bourodimos, E.L., 1990. Beyond Oil: Energy Alternatives for Greece and the Mediterranean. *IEEE Technology and Society Magazine* 9(2), 25–32.
- Bray, D.J., Taylor, M.A.P., Scrafton, D., 2011. Transport Policy in Australia: Evolution, Learning and Policy Transfer. *Transport Policy* 18(3), 522–532.
- Brew-Hammond, A., Dahouénon, M., Häusler, S., 2006. Study on the Establishment of a West African Regional Agency for Energy Access. ECOWAS, Abuja.
- Briceño, S., 2003. The UNISDR Secretariat Message for the International Day for Disaster Reduction 8 October 2003. *Disaster Reduction in Africa ISDR Informs*, Issue 2 November, 37.
- Brockington, D., 2004. Community Conservation, Inequality and Injustice: Myths of Power in Protected Area Management. *Conservation and Society* 2(2): 411-432.
- Brown, G. and Yule, G., 1983. *Discourse Analysis*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Bugdahn, S., 2007. Does the EU Stifle Voluntary Policy Transfer? A Study of the Introduction of Freedom of Information in Portugal and Ireland. *Public Administration* 85(1), 123–142.
- Bulkeley, H., Betsill, M.M., 2013. Revisiting the Urban Politics of Climate Change. *Environmental Politics* 22(1), 136–154.
- Bulmer, S., 2007. Germany, Britain and the European Union: Convergence through Policy Transfer? *German Politics* 16(1), 39–57.
- Bulmer, S., Dolowitz, D., Humphreys, P., Padgett, S., 2007. *Policy Transfer in European Union Governance: Regulating the Utilities*. Routledge, London.
- Bulmer, S., Padgett, S., 2005. Policy Transfer in the European Union: An Institutionalist Perspective. *British Journal of Political Science* 35(1), 103–126.
- Cairney, P., 2009. The Role of Ideas in Policy Transfer: The Case of UK Smoking Bans since Devolution. *Journal of European Public Policy* 16(3), 471–488.
- Cairney, P., Mamudu, H., 2014. The Global Tobacco Control “Endgame”: Change the Policy Environment to Implement the FCTC. *Journal of Public Health Policy* 35(4), 506–517.
- Cairney, P., Yamazaki, M., 2017. A Comparison of Tobacco Policy in the UK and Japan: If the Scientific Evidence is Identical, Why is There a Major Difference in Policy? *Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice* 19, 1–16.
- Carroll, P., 2012. Policy Transfer over Time: A Case of Growing Complexity. *International Journal of Public Administration* 35(10), 658–666.
- Carroll, P., 2014. Policy Transfer and Accession: A Comparison of Three International Governmental Organisations. *Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice* 16(3), 280–296.

- Carroll, P., Common, R., 2013. Introduction, in: Carroll, P., Common, R. (Eds.), *Policy Transfer and Learning in Public Policy and Management: International Contexts, Content and Development*. Routledge, Oxon, pp. 1–10.
- Carstensen, M.B., Schmidt, V.A., 2016. Power Through, Over and in Ideas: Conceptualizing Ideational Power in Discursive Institutionalism, *Journal of European Public Policy*. 23(3): 318-337.
- Chapman, B., Greenaway, D., 2006. Learning to live with loans? International Policy Transfer and the Funding of Higher Education. *World Economics* 29(8), 1057–1075.
- Chapman, I., 2014. The End of Peak Oil? Why this Topic is Still Relevant despite Recent Denials. *Energy Policy* 64, 93–101.
- Chatman, S., 1978. *Story and Discourse: Narrative Structure in Fiction and Film*. Cornell University Press, London.
- CILSS, 2018. Mandate of CILSS. <https://www.cilss.int/index.php/mandat-du-cilss/> (Accessed 25 September 2018).
- Clegg, L., 2013. Introduction, in: *Controlling the World Bank and IMF: Shareholders, Stakeholders, and the Politics of Concessional Lending*. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, pp. 1–29.
- Clemons, R.S., McBeth, M.K., Kusko, E., 2012. Understanding the Role of Policy Narratives and the Public Policy Arena: Obesity as a Lesson in Public Policy Development. *World Med. Health Policy* 4(2), 1–26.
- Clifton, J., Díaz-Fuentes, D., 2014. The OECD and “The Rest”: Analyzing the Limits of Policy Transfer. *Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice* 16(3), 249–265.
- Common, R., 2013. When Policy Diffusion Does Not Lead to Transfer: Explaining Resistance to International Learning in Public Management Reform, in: Carroll, P., Common, R. (Eds.), *Policy Transfer and Learning in Public Policy and Management: International Contexts, Content and Development*. Routledge, Oxon.
- Common, R., Gheorghe, I., 2017. Assessing Strategic Policy Transfer in Romanian Public Management. *Public Policy and Administration*, 1–21.
- Contu, A., Gire, E., 2014. NGOs Management and the Value of ‘partnerships’ for Equality in International Development: What’s in a Name? *Human Relations* 67(2): 205 –232.
- Cooper, S. 2016. *Regulating Women: Policymaking and Practice in the UK*. Rowman & Littlefield International, London.
- Council of the European Union, 2009. *Communique: 16th EU-ECOWAS Ministerial Troika Meeting Abuja, 11 November 2009*. EU Newsroom, Brussels.
- Cowan, I.J., 1985. Solar Energy in Ireland. *International Journal of Ambient Energy* 6(4), 187–194.

Crow, D.A., Berggren, J., 2014. Using the Narrative Policy Framework to Understand Stakeholder Strategy and Effectiveness: A Multi-Case Analysis, in: Jones, M.D., Shanahan, E.A., McBeth, M.K. (Eds.), *The Science of Stories: Applications of the Narrative Policy Framework in Public Policy Analysis*. Palgrave Macmillan, New York.

Czarniawska, B., 2004. *Narratives in Social Science Research*. SAGE Publications Ltd, London.

Czarniawska, B., 2010. The Uses of Narratology in Social and Policy Studies. *Critical Policy Studies* 4(1), 58–76.

Dawson, N., Martin, A., Sikor, T., 2016. Green Revolution in Sub-Saharan Africa: Implications of Imposed Innovation for the Wellbeing of Rural Smallholders. *World Development* 78: 204-218

De Fina, A., Georgakopoulou, A., 2015. Introduction, in: De Fina, A., Georgakopoulou, A. (Eds.), *The Handbook of Narrative Analysis*. Wiley Blackwell, Chichester, pp. 1–18.

Delpeuch, T., Vassileva, M., 2017. Judicial Reforms as a Political Enterprise: American Transfer Entrepreneurs in Post-Communist Bulgaria, in: Hadjiisky, M., Pal, L.A., Walker, C. (Eds.), *Public Policy Transfer: Micro-Dynamics and Macro-Effects*. Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, Cheltenham, pp. 29–50.

Dia, A.M., 2004. Senegal: Flood-prone Coastal Town Promotes Culture of Risk. *Disaster Reduction in Africa ISDR Informs*, 12–13.

Dilley, M., Chen, R.S., Deichmann, U., Lerner-Lam, A.L., Arnold, M., Agwe, J., Buys, P., Kjekstad, O., Lyon, B., Yetman, G., 2005. *Natural Disaster Hotspots: A Global Risk Analysis*. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank, Washington D.C.

Directorate of Civil Defence, 2006. Civil Defence and Disaster Prevention in Cameroon. *Disaster Reduction in Africa ISDR Informs*, Issue 7 June, 22–24.

Disaster Management Department of the Office of National Security, 2007. Sierra Leone: Preparing State Bodies and the Public for Inclusion of Disaster Risk Reduction in School Curricula, in: *Towards a Culture of Prevention: Disaster Risk Reduction Begins at School*. UNISDR Africa, Nairobi, pp. 27–29.

Djeri-Alassani, B.K., 2011. Climate Change Concerns Management and Perspectives in ECOWAS Commission. Paper Presented at First Annual Conference on Climate Change and Development in Africa, Addis Ababa, 17-19 October 2011.

DKKV, 2017. About Us: German Committee for Disaster Reduction (DKKV). <http://www.dkkv.org/en/about-us/the-committee.html> (Accessed 6 November 2017).

Dolowitz, D., 2017. Book Review: *Fast Policy - Experimental Statecraft at the Thresholds of Neoliberalism*. *Journal of Social Policy* 46(1): 195–208.

- Dolowitz, D., Marsh, D., 1996. Who Learns What from Whom: A Review of the Policy Transfer Literature. *Political Studies* 44(2), 343–351.
- Dolowitz, D.P., 1997. British Employment Policy in the 1980s: Learning from the American Experience. *Governance* 10(1), 23–42.
- Dolowitz, D.P., Marsh, D., 2000. Learning from Abroad: The Role of Policy Transfer in Contemporary Policy-Making. *Governance* 13(1), 5–23.
- Dolowitz, D.P., Marsh, D., 2012. The Future of Policy Transfer Research. *Political Studies Review* 10(3), 339–345.
- Dunlop, C.A., 2009. Policy Transfer as Learning: Capturing Variation in what Decision-Makers Learn from Epistemic Communities. *Policy Studies* 30(3), 289–311.
- Dussauge-Laguna, M.I., 2012a. On The Past and Future of Policy Transfer Research: Benson and Jordan Revisited. *Political Studies Review* 10(3), 313–324.
- Dussauge-Laguna, M.I., 2012b. The Neglected Dimension: Bringing Time Back into Cross-national Policy Transfer Studies. *Policy Studies* 33(6), 567–585.
- Dussauge-Laguna, M.I., 2013a. Contested Policy Transfer: When Chile’s “Programa de Mejoramiento de la Gestión” Travelled to Mexico, in: Carroll, P., Common, R. (Eds.), *Policy Transfer and Learning in Public Policy and Management: International Contexts, Content and Development*. Routledge, Oxon, pp. 167–187.
- Dussauge-Laguna, M.I., 2013b. Policy Transfer as a “Contested” Process. *International Journal of Public Administration* 36(10), 686–694.
- Easterly, W., 2005. What Did Structural Adjustment Adjust? The Association of Policies and Growth with Repeated IMF and World Bank Adjustment Loans. *Journal of Development Economics* 76(1), 1–22.
- Eccleston, R., Woodward, R., 2013. Pathologies in International Policy Transfer: The Case of the OECD Tax Transparency Initiative. *Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice* 16(3), 216–229.
- ECOWAS Commission, 2015a. About the Commission. <http://www.comm.ecowas.int/about-ecowas/> (Accessed 1 September 2016).
- ECOWAS Commission, 2015b. Departments: Directorate of Humanitarian and Social Affairs. <http://www.comm.ecowas.int/departments/social-affairs-gender-2/directorate-of-humanitarian-social-affairs/> (Accessed 25 July 2016).
- ECOWAS, 1981. Fourth Meeting of the Authority of Heads of State and Government: Freetown, May 28 - 29, 1981. <http://www.ecowas.int/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/4th-ECOWAS-Summit-Lagos-28-29-May-1981.pdf> (Accessed 30 May 2016).
- ECOWAS, 1982. Fifth Meeting of the Authority of Heads of State and Government: Cotonou, May 28 - 29, 1982. <http://www.ecowas.int/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/5th-ECOWAS-Summit-Cotonou-28-29-May-1982.pdf> (Accessed 30 May 2016).

ECOWAS, 1993. Revised Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 24 July 1993. <http://www.refworld.org/docid/492182d92.html> (Accessed 23 May 2016).

ECOWAS, 2000. Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-Keeping and Security. *Journal of Conflict and Security Law* 5(2), 231–259.

ECOWAS, 2003a. Twenty Sixth Session of the Authority of Heads of State and Government: Final Communiqué. <http://www.ecowas.int/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/26th-ECOWAS-Summit-Abuja-31-January-2003.pdf> (Accessed 1 September 2015).

ECOWAS, 2003b. ECOWAS Energy Protocol A/P4/1/03. ECOWAS Secretariat, Abuja.

ECOWAS, 2006. ECOWAS Policy for Disaster Risk Reduction. Humanitarian Affairs Department (DHA), Abuja.

ECOWAS, 2008. Thirty-Fifth Ordinary Session of the Authority of Heads of State and Government. <http://www.ecowas.int/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/35th-ECOWAS-Summit-Abuja-19December-2008.pdf> (Accessed 28 May 2016).

ECOWAS, 2013. ECOWAS Energy Ministers Adopt Regional Policies on Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency. ECREEE: ECOWAS Centre for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency, Issue 6 March, 5.

ECOWAS, 2015a. Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS): History. <http://www.ecowas.int/about-ecowas/history/> (Accessed 23 March 2016).

ECOWAS, 2015b. ECOWAS Commission. <http://www.ecowas.int/institutions/ecowas-commission/> (Accessed 23 March 2016).

ECOWAS, 2015c. Ordinary Session of the Authority of ECOWAS Heads of State and Government: Final Communiqué. <http://ecoslate.github.io/ecowas-law/application-of-ecowas-law/index.htm> (Accessed 24 May 2016).

ECOWAS, 2015d. Final Communiqués of Ordinary Session of the Authority of ECOWAS Heads of State and Government. <http://ecoslate.github.io/ecowas-law/application-of-ecowas-law/index.htm> (Accessed 25 July 2016).

ECOWAS, UEMOA, 2006. White Paper for a Regional Policy: Geared towards Increasing Access to Energy Services for Rural and Periurban Populations in order to achieve the Millennium Development Goals. ECOWAS/ UEMOA, Niamey.

ECREEE, 2011. The ECREEE Business Plan 2011–2016. ECOWAS Centre for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency, Praia.

ECREEE, 2012a. Baseline Report for the ECOWAS Renewable Energy Policy (EREP). ECOWAS Center for Renewable Energy and Efficiency, Praia.

ECREEE, 2012b. The ECREEE BizClim Project – “Promoting Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Investments in West Africa in the Context of the NAMAs.” ECREEE: ECOWAS Centre for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency, 4.

ECREEE, 2012c. Book Presentation: ‘Africa and Climate Change: The Heat is On’. ECREEE: ECOWAS Centre for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency, Volume 4, 3.

ECREEE, 2013a. ECOWAS Renewable Energy Policy. ECOWAS Center for Renewable Energy and Efficiency, Praia.

ECREEE, 2013b. Overview of ECREEE. <http://www.ecreee.org/page/overview-ecreee> (Accessed 5 March 2016).

ECREEE, 2013c. Austria Deepens Partnership with ECREEE. ECREEE: ECOWAS Centre for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency, Issue 7 July, 4–5.

ECREEE, 2015. Mahama Kappiah: Executive Director ECREEE. <http://www.se4all.ecreee.org/content/mahama-kappiah> (Accessed 10 July 2017).

Energy Commission of Nigeria, 2012. About ECN. http://www.energy.gov.ng/index.php?option=com_contentandview=articleandid=48andItemid=53 (Accessed 31 May 2016).

Erdinç, I., Visier, C., 2017. What is Transfer About? Framing the Content: EU Enlargement and Trade Union Rights in Turkey, in: Public Policy Transfer: Micro-Dynamics and Macro-Effects. Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, Cheltenham, pp. 242–270.

EUEI PDF, 2015. The EU Energy Initiative Partnership Dialogue Facility (EUEI PDF): Phase IIbis Report. EUEI PDF, Eschborn.

EUEI PDF, 2016a. Activity Database. <http://www.euei-pdf.org/en/activity-database> (Accessed 24 November 2016).

EUEI PDF, 2016b. Development of a Regional Renewable Energy Policy. <http://www.euei-pdf.org/en/recp/development-of-a-regional-renewable-energy-policy> (Accessed 2 September 2016).

EUEI PDF, 2016c. About Us. <http://www.euei-pdf.org/en/about-us> (Accessed 2 September 2016).

EUEI PDF, 2016d. About RECP. <http://www.africa-eu-renewables.org/about-recp/> (Accessed 2 September 2016).

EUR-LEX, 2017. Public Access to Environmental Information. <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV%3A128091> (Accessed 14 June 2017).

European Commission, 2001. Commission Launches EU Preparations for the World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-01-167_en.htm?locale=en (Accessed 21 November 2017).

European Commission, 2010. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the consolidation of EU Africa relations. European Commission, Brussels.

European Commission, 2011. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Increasing the impact of EU Development Policy An Agenda for Change. European Commission, Brussels.

European Commission, 2014. EU Support to West Africa Energy Sector. https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/energy_en.pdf (Accessed 20 June 2017).

European Commission, 2015. EU Support to West Africa Energy Sector: Factsheet. European Commission, Brussels.

European Commission, 2016. Register of Commission Documents. <https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/index.cfm?fuseaction=home> (Accessed 16 June 2017).

European Commission, ECOWAS, WAEMU, 2008. Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2008 - 2013. European Commission, Brussels.

European Parliament, Council of the European Union, 2009. Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the Promotion of the Use of Energy from Renewable Sources and Amending and Subsequently Repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC. Official Journal of the European Union, 16–62.

European Union Delegation to the African Union, 2009a. A Few Concrete Projects in Africa. Link!: Inside the Africa-European Union Partnership, Issue 4 November, 20–23.

European Union Delegation to the African Union, 2009b. The EU-Africa Partnership in Peace and Security. Link!: Inside the Africa-European Union Partnership, Issue 3 October, 9–10.

European Union Delegation to the African Union, 2009c. The Africa-EU Energy Partnership: A Framework for a Structured Energy Dialogue. Link!: Inside the Africa-European Union Partnership, Issue 4 November, 11–12.

European Union Delegation to the African Union, 2010a. Regional and Continental Integration. Link!: Inside the Africa-European Union Partnership, Issue 9 June, 9.

European Union Delegation to the African Union, 2010b. Interview with Julia Dolly Joiner, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs. Link!: Inside the Africa-European Union Partnership, Issue 8 April, 2–4.

European Union Delegation to the African Union, 2010c. Discours de M. Andris Piebalgs, Commissaire Européen Chargé du Développement, Prononcé Devant Le Parlement Européen Le 11 Janvier 2010. Link!: Inside the Africa-European Union Partnership, Issue 6 February, 4–6.

European Union Delegation to the African Union, 2010d. Interview with Mrs. Mary Robinson, Former President of Ireland and Former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. Link!: Inside the Africa-European Union Partnership, Issue 11 September, 2–4.

European Union Delegation to the African Union, 2012. Interview with Andris Piebalgs, European Commissioner for Development. Link!: Inside the Africa-European Union Partnership, Issue 18 September, 8–9.

European Union, 2017. The Schuman Declaration: 9 May 1950. https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/symbols/europe-day/schuman-declaration_en (Accessed 26 June 2017).

European Union, African Union, 2012. The Africa-EU Partnership: 2 Unions, 1 Vision. http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/sites/default/files/documents/jaes_en_brochure_final_web.pdf (Accessed 16 April 2017).

Evans, M., 2004. Introduction: Is Policy Transfer Rational Policy-Making?, in: Evans, M. (Ed.), *Policy Transfer in Global Perspective*. Ashgate Publishing Company, Hants, pp. 1–8.

Evans, M., 2009a. New Directions in the Study of Policy Transfer. *Policy Studies* 30(3), 237–241.

Evans, M., 2009b. Policy Transfer in Critical Perspective. *Policy Studies* 30(3), 243–268.

Evans, M., Barakat, S., 2012. Post-War Reconstruction, Policy Transfer and the World Bank: The Case of Afghanistan's National Solidarity Programme. *Policy Studies* 33, 541–565.

Evans, M., Davies, J., 1999. Understanding Policy Transfer: A Multi-Level, Multi-Disciplinary Perspective. *Public Administration* 77(2), 361–385.

Evera, S. V., 1997. *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science*. Cornell University Press, London.

Fagunwa, D.O., 1982. *Forest of A Thousand Daemons: A Hunter's Saga*. City Lights Books, California.

Fairclough, I. and Fairclough, N., 2012. *Political Discourse Analysis: A Method for Advanced Students*. Routledge, Oxon.

Fairclough, N., 1992. *Discourse and Social Change*. Oxford, UK, and Cambridge, MA: Polity Press and Blackwell.

Featherstone, K., Radaelli, C.M., 2003. Introduction: In the Name of Europe In: K. Featherstone, C.M. Radaelli (eds) *The Politics of Europeanization*, Oxford University Press, Oxford. pp. 3-26.

Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1964. *National Development Plan: Progress Report 1964*. Ministry of Economic Development, Lagos.

- Feldman, M.S., Bell, J., Berger, M.T., 2003. *Gaining Access: A Practical and Theoretical Guide for Qualitative Researchers*. Altamira Press, Oxford.
- Fischer, F., Forester, J., 1993. Editors' Introduction, in: Fischer, F., Forester, J. (Eds.), *The Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis and Planning*. Duke University Press, Durham, pp. 1–17.
- Flockhart, T., 2010. Europeanization or EU-ization? The Transfer of European Norms across Time and Space. *Journal of Common Market Studies* 48(4): 787–810.
- Fløttum, K., Gjerstad, Ø., 2013. Arguing for Climate Policy through the Linguistic Construction of Narratives and Voices: The Case of the South-African Green Paper “National Climate Change Response.” *Climatic Change* 118(2), 417–430.
- Fløttum, K., Gjerstad, Ø., 2017. Narratives in Climate Change Discourse. *Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change* 8(1), 1–15.
- Foli, R., Béland, D., Fenwick, T.B., 2017. How Instrument Constituencies Shape Policy Transfer: A Case Study From Ghana. *Policy and Society* 36(1), 1–17.
- Frank, A.W., 2010. *Letting Stories Breathe: A Socio-Narratology*. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
- French, K., Shanahan, E.A., Raile, E.D., McEvoy, J., 2017. Narrative Frames and Settings in Policy Narratives, Paper Presented at International Public Policy Conference, Singapore, 28-30 June 2017.
- Gee, J.P., 2014. *An Introduction to Discourse Analysis: Theory and Method*. Routledge, Oxon.
- George, A.L., Bennett, A., 2005. *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
- Gerring, J., 2007. *Case Study Research: Principles and Practices*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Gerring, J., 2008. Case Selection for Case-Study Analysis: Qualitative and Quantitative Techniques, in: Box-Steffensmeier, J.M., Brady, H.E., Collier, D. (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology*. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 645–684.
- Gilardi, F., 2013. Transnational Diffusion: Norms, Ideas and Policies. In: W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse, B.A Simmons (eds) *Handbook of International Relations*, Sage, London.
- GIZ, 2017. About the AEEP: The Africa-EU Energy Partnership (AEEP). <http://www.aEEP-forum.org/en/aEEP> (Accessed 5 July 2017).
- Goldfinch, S., 2006. Rituals of Reform, Policy Transfer, and the National University Corporation Reforms of Japan. *Governance* 19(4), 585–604.
- Goldstein, K., 2002. Getting in the Door: Sampling and Completing Elite Interviews. *PS: Political Science and Politics* 35(4), 669–672.

- Gorton, M., Hubbard, C., Hubbard, L., 2009. The Folly of European Union Policy Transfer: Why the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) Does Not Fit Central and Eastern Europe. *Regional Studies* 43(10), 1305–1317.
- Gowon, Y., 1984. *The Economic Community of West African States: A Study in Political and Economic Integration*. PhD Thesis, University of Warwick, Warwick.
- Grabbe, H., 2003. Europeanization Goes East: Power and Uncertainty in the EU Accession Process, in: Featherstone, K., Radaelli, C.M. (Eds.), *The Politics of Europeanization*. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 303–324.
- Gray, G., Jones, M.D., 2016. A Qualitative Narrative Policy Framework? Examining the Policy Narratives of US Campaign Finance Regulatory Reform. *Public Policy and Administration* 31(3), 193–220.
- Greener, I., 2002. Understanding NHS Reform: The Policy-Transfer, Social Learning, and Path-Dependency Perspectives. *Governance* 15(2), 161–183.
- Grossman, P.Z., 2015. Energy Shocks, Crises and the Policy Process: A Review of Theory and Application. *Energy Policy* 77, 56–69.
- Gupta, K., Ripberger, J., Wehde, W., 2016. Advocacy Group Messaging on Social Media: Using the Narrative Policy Framework to Study Twitter Messages about Nuclear Energy Policy in the United States. *Policy Studies Journal* 46(1), 119–136
- Gupta, K., Ripberger, J.T., Collins, S., 2014. The Strategic Use of Policy Narratives: Jaitapur and the Politics of Siting a Nuclear Power Plant in India, in: Jones, M.D., Shanahan, E.A., Mcbeth, Mark, K. (Eds.), *Science of Stories: Applications of the Narrative Policy Framework in Public Policy Analysis*. Palgrave Macmillan, New York, pp. 89–106.
- Hadjiisky, M., Pal, L.A., Walker, C., 2017. Introduction: Traversing the Terrain of Policy Transfer: Theory, Methods, and Overview, in: *Public Policy Transfer: Micro-Dynamics and Macro-Effects*. Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, Cheltenham, pp. 1–28.
- Hajer, M., 1993. Discourse Coalitions. The Case of Acid Rain in Great Britain. In F. Fischer & J. Forester (Eds), *The argumentative turn in policy and planning*. London: University College Press. Pp. 43-76.
- Hajer, M., 2006. Doing Discourse Analysis: Coalitions, Practices, Meaning. *Words Matter in Policy and Planning – Discourse Theory and Method in the Social Sciences*, Netherlands Geographical Studies, 344, 65–74.
- Hajer, M., Versteeg, W., 2005. A Decade of Discourse Analysis of Environmental Politics: Achievements, Challenges, Perspectives. *Journal of Environmental Policy and Planning*, 7(3): 175-184.
- Hajer, M.A., Laws, D., 2006. Ordering through Discourse, in: Moran, M., Rein, M., Goodin, R.E. (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Public Policy*. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 251–268.

- Hancock, K.J., 2015a. Energy Regionalism and Diffusion in Africa: How Political Actors Created the ECOWAS Center for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency. *Energy Research and Social Science* 5, 105–115.
- Hancock, K.J., 2015b. The Expanding Horizon of Renewable Energy in Sub-Saharan Africa: Leading Research in the Social Sciences. *Energy Research and Social Science* 5, 1–8.
- Harris, V.J., 1991. Have You Heard About an African Cinderella Story?: The Hunt for Multiethnic Literature. *Publishing Research Quarterly* 7(3), 23–36.
- Hartnady, C., 2003. Water: A focus of UNISDR Africa Programme in 2003. *Disaster Reduction in Africa ISDR Informs*, Issue 1 June, 25–27.
- Hartnady, C., 2004. Geo-Hazards: African Continent Experiences “Separation”, Major Threat of Disasters Feared. *Disaster Reduction in Africa ISDR Informs*, Issue 4 November, 3–6.
- Heikkila, T., Weible, C.M., Pierce, J.J., 2014. Exploring the Policy Narratives and Politics of Hydraulic Fracturing in New York, in: Jones, M.D., Shanahan, E.A., McBeth, M.K. (Eds.), *Science of Stories: Applications of the Narrative Policy Framework in Public Policy Analysis*. Palgrave Macmillan, New York, pp. 185–205.
- Hickox, R., 1998. *The Golden Sandal: A Middle Eastern Cinderella Story*. Holiday House, London.
- Holden, P., 2016. *In Search of Structural Power: EU Aid Policy as a Global Political Instrument*. Routledge, Oxford.
- Holt, A., 2010. Using the telephone for narrative interviewing: a research note. *Qualitative Research* 10(1), 113–121.
- Hopkins, A.G., 2014. *An Economic History of West Africa*. Routledge, Oxon.
- Hoyt, L., 2006. Importing Ideas: The Transnational Transfer of Urban Revitalization Policy. *International Journal of Public Administration* 29(1-3), 221–243.
- Hoyt, L., 2008. From North America to Africa: The BID Model and the Role of Policy Entrepreneurs, in: Morçöl, G., Hoyt, L., Meek, J., Zimmermann, U. (Eds.), *Business Improvement Districts: Research, Theories, and Controversies*. CRC Pres, Florida, pp. 112–138.
- Hudson, J., Kim, B.-Y., 2014. Policy Transfer using the “Gold Standard”: Exploring Policy Tourism in Practice. *Policy and Politics* 42(4), 495–511.
- Humphreys, P., 2006. Globalization, Regulatory Competition, and EU Policy Transfer in the Telecoms and Broadcasting Sectors. *International Journal of Public Administration* 29(4-6), 305–334.
- Husmann, M.A., 2015. Social Constructions of Obesity Target Population: An Empirical Look at Obesity Policy Narratives. *Policy Sciences* 48(4), 415–442.

Hyde, S., 2011. Catch Us If You Can: Election Monitoring and International Norm Diffusion. *American Journal of Political Science* 55(2): 356–369.

Ibrahim, M.A., 2004. Chad: Impacts of Desertification Alarming, New Strategy Deployed. *Disaster Reduction in Africa ISDR Informs*, Issue 4 November, 10–11.

IDRC, 2016. Linking Research to Policy: West Africa Workshop Highlights Use of Evidence to Improve Maternal and Child Health. <https://www.idrc.ca/en/news/linking-research-policy-west-africa-workshop-highlights-use-evidence-improve-maternal-and-child> (Accessed 13 May 2016).

Idris, A., Ahmed, M.A., Kura, S.M., Abba, Y., 2013. An assessment of the Power Sector Reform in Nigeria. *International Journal of Advancements in Research and Technology* 2(2), 1–37.

International Energy Agency (IEA), 2015. *World Energy Outlook 2015*. IEA Publications, Paris.

Interview 1, 2017. Interview with EUEI PDF Official, Telephone, 4 April 2017.

Interview 2, 2017. Interview with ECREEE Official, Telephone, 18 May 2017.

Interview 3, 2017. Interview with Past EUEI PDF Official, Plymouth, 6 April 2017.

Interview 4, 2017. Interview with Past EUEI PDF Consultant, Skype, 9 February 2017.

Interview 5, 2017. Interview with UNISDR Official, Telephone, 16 August 2017.

Interview 6, 2017. Interview with ECOWAS Disaster Management Unit, Email, 18 May 2017.

Jacobs, K., Barnett, P., 2000. Policy Transfer and Policy Learning: A study of the 1991 New Zealand Health Services Taskforce. *Governance* 13(2), 185–213.

James, O., 2001. Business Models and the Transfer of Businesslike Central Government Agencies. *International Journal of Policy and Administration* 149(2), 233–252.

James, R., Washington, R., 2013. Changes in African Temperature and Precipitation Associated with Degrees of Global Warming. *Climatic Change* 117(4), 859–872.

Johnson, J.B., Reynolds, H.T., Mycoff, J.D., 2015. *Political Science Research Methods*. Sage CQPress, Los Angeles.

Jones, M.D., McBeth, M.K., 2010. A Narrative Policy Framework: Clear Enough to be Wrong? *Policy Studies Journal* 38(2), 329–353.

Jones, M.D., McBeth, M.K., Shanahan, E.A., 2014. Introducing the Narrative Policy Framework, in: Sabatier, P.A., Weible, C.M. (Eds.), *Science of Stories: Applications of the Narrative Policy Framework in Public Policy Analysis*. Palgrave Macmillan, New York, pp. 1–20.

- Jones, M.D., Radaelli, C.M., 2015. The Narrative Policy Framework: Child or Monster? *Critical Policy Studies* 9(3), 339–355.
- Jordan, A., Wurzel, R., Zito, A.R., Brückner, L., 2003. European Governance and the Transfer of “New” Environmental Policy Instruments (NEPIs) in the European Union. *Public Administration* 81(3), 555–574.
- Kamara, J., 2004. Strong Legal, Institutional Frameworks Needed for Disaster Management. *Disaster Reduction in Africa ISDR Informs*, Issue 3 April, 63–64.
- Kan, F.M., 2005. UNISDR Africa High-Level Advocacy Makes encouraging Start. *Disaster Reduction in Africa ISDR Informs*, Issue 5 July, 48–50.
- Kaplan, T.J., 1986. The Narrative Structure of Policy Analysis. *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management* 59(4), 761–778.
- Kappiah, M., 2011. Regional Policy and Potential for Renewable Energy Development in West Africa. Paper Presented at Power Kick Africa Conference, Abuja, 30 June 2011
- Kappiah, M., 2012. Message from the Executive Director. ECREEE: ECOWAS Centre for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency, Issue 5 October, 1.
- Kappiah, M., 2014. Sustainable Energy Development in West Africa: Potentials and Challenges, in: Akoutou, A.B., Rike Sohn, M.V., Yeboah, D. (Eds.), *Understanding Regional Integration in West Africa: A Multi-Thematic and Comparative Analysis*. Center for European Integration Studies, Bonn, pp. 179–205.
- Kappiah, M., Lugmayr, M., 2011. ECREEE Investment and Business Promotion Activities: Vienna Stakeholder Meeting 22-6-2011. http://www.entwicklung.at/fileadmin/media/Projektbeispiele/2011_Energie_Sideevent/05_ECREEE_Investment_and_Business_Promotion_Activities.pdf (Accessed 28 May 2016).
- Kear, A.R., Wells, D.D., 2014. Coalitions Are People: Policy Narratives and the Defeat of Ohio Senate Bill, in: Jones, M.D., Shanahan, E.A., McBeth, M.K. (Eds.), *Science of Stories: Applications of the Narrative Policy Framework in Public Policy Analysis*. Palgrave Macmillan, New York, pp. 157–184.
- Kingdon, J., 1995. *Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies*. Addison Wesley Longman, Harlow.
- Knill, C., 2005. Introduction: Cross-national Policy Convergence: Concepts, Approaches and Explanatory Factors. *Journal of European Public Policy* 12(5), 764–774.
- Koeberle, S., Silarszky, P., Verheyen, G., 2015. *Conditionality Revisited: Concepts, Experiences, and Lessons Learned*. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank, Washington D.C.
- Kolk, A., 2015. The Role of International Business in Clean Technology Transfer and Development. *Climate Policy* 15(1), 170–176.

- Krippendorff, K., 2013. *Content Analysis: An Introduction to Its Methodology*. Sage Publications Inc., Los Angeles.
- Kufuor, K.O., 2006. *The Institutional Transformation of the Economic Community of West African States*. Ashgate Publishing Limited, Hampshire.
- Kumah-Abiwu, F., Ochwa-Echel, J.R., 2013. Rethinking the Ideas of Pan-Africanism and African Unity: a Theoretical Perspective of Kwame Nkrumah's Leadership Traits and Decision Making. *The Journal of Pan African Studies* 6, 121–142.
- Kurzer, P., Cooper, A., 2016. The Dog that Didn't Bark: Explaining Change in Germany's Tobacco Control Policy at Home and in the EU. *German Politics* 25(4), 541–560.
- Ladi S., 2011. Think Tanks, Discursive Institutionalism and Policy Change. In: Papanagnou, G. (eds) *Social Science and Policy Challenges: Democracy, Values and Capacities*, UNESCO, France, pp. 205-220.
- Ladi, S., 2011. Policy Change and Soft Europeanization: The Transfer of the Ombudsman Institution to Greece, Cyprus and Malta. *Public Administration* 89(4), 1643–
- Laurilla, J., 1997. Promoting Research Access and Informant Rapport in Corporate Settings: Notes From Research on a Crisis Company. *Scandinavian Journal of Management* 13(4), 407–418.
- Lavenex, S., 2002. EU Enlargement and the Challenge of Policy Transfer: The Case of Refugee Policy. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 28(4), 701–721.
- Lavenex, S., 2008. A Governance Perspective on the European Neighbourhood Policy: Integration beyond Conditionality? *Journal of European Public Policy* 15(6), 938–955.
- Lawton, R.N., Rudd, M.A., 2014. A Narrative Policy Approach to Environmental Conservation. *Ambio* 43(7), 849–857.
- Legrand, T., 2007. *Overseas and Over Here: The Politics and Pathways of Policy Transfer*. PhD Thesis, University of Birmingham, Birmingham.
- Legrand, T., 2012a. The Merry Mandarins of Windsor: Policy Transfer and Transgovernmental Networks in the Anglosphere. *Policy Studies* 33(6), 523–540.
- Legrand, T., 2012b. Overseas and Over Here: Policy Transfer and Evidence-Based Policy-Making. *Policy Studies* 33(4), 329–348.
- Legrand, T., Vas, C., 2014. Framing the Policy Analysis of OECD and Australian VET Interaction: Two Heuristics of Policy Transfer. *Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice* 16(3), 230–248.
- Levi-Faur, D., Vigoda-Gadot, E., 2006. New Public Policy, New Policy Transfers: Some Characteristics of a New Order in the Making. *International Journal of Public Administration* 29(4-6), 247–262

Lewis, E., 2017. Power Dynamics in Research: Considerations for Applied Research in International Development.
https://horticulture.ucdavis.edu/sites/g/files/dgvnsk1816/file/extension_material_files/lewis_power_dynamics_research.pdf (Accessed 19 August 2019).

Lilleker, D.G., 2003. Interviewing the Political Elite: Navigating a Potential Minefield. *Politics* 23(3), 207–214.

Lodge, M., 2003. Institutional Choice and Policy Transfer: Reforming British and German Railway Regulation. *Governance* 16(2), 159–178.

Lodge, M., James, O., 2003. The Limitations of “Policy Transfer” and “Lesson Drawing” for Public Policy Research. *Political Studies Review* 1, 179–193.

Loubamono, E.S.N., 2006. Gabon: Increased Coastal Risks in the Capital City. *Disaster Reduction in Africa ISDR Informs*, Issue 7 June, 38–39.

Lowe, T., 2006. Does Tomorrow Ever Come? Disaster Narrative and Public Perceptions of Climate Change. *Public Understanding of Science* 15(4), 435–457.

Lybecker, D.L., McBeth, M.K., Brewer, A.M., De Sy, C., 2016. Social Construction of a Border: The US–Canada Border. *Journal of Borderlands Studies* 1, 1–19.

Lybecker, D.L., McBeth, M.K., Kusko, E., 2013. Trash or Treasure: Recycling Narratives and Reducing Political Polarisation. *Environmental Politics* 22(2), 312–332.

Mamudu, H., Cairney, P., Studlar, D., 2015. Global Public Policy: Does the New Venue for Transnational Tobacco Control Challenge the Old Way of Doing Things? *Public Administration* 93(4), 856–873.

Marsden, G., Stead, D., 2011. Policy Transfer and Learning in the Field of Transport: A Review of Concepts and Evidence. *Transport Policy* 18, 492–500.

Marsh, D., Evans, M., 2012. Policy Transfer: Into the Future, Learning from the Past. *Policy Studies* 33(6), 587–591.

Marsh, D., Sharman, J.C., 2009. Policy Diffusion and Policy Transfer. *Policy Studies* 30(3), 269–288.

Marshall, A., 2005. Europeanization at the Urban Level: Local Actors, Institutions and the Dynamics of Multi-Level Interaction. *Journal of European Public Policy* 12(4), 668–686.

Martinsen, D.S., Wessel, A.U., 2014. On the Path to Differentiation: Upward Transfer, Logic of Variation and Sub-optimality in EU Social Policy. *Journal of European Public Policy* 21(9), 1255–1272.

Masquelier, A., 1993. Narratives of Power, Images of Wealth: The Ritual Economy of Bori in the Market. In: Comaroff, J., Comaroff, J.L. (eds), *Modernity and Its Malcontents: Ritual and Power in Postcolonial Africa*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago. pp. 1-33.

- Massey, A., 2009. Policy Mimesis in the Context of Global Governance. *Policy Studies* 30(3), 383–395.
- Matute, A.A., 2016 “We're all Stories in the End”: On the Narratives that (un)make Us, *Curriculum Inquiry*, 46(2): 127-131.
- McBeth, M.K., Jones, M.D., Shanahan, E.A., 2014a. The Narrative Policy Framework, in: Sabatier, P.A., Weible, C.M. (Eds.), *Theories of the Policy Process*. Westview Press, Colorado, pp. 225–266.
- McBeth, M.K., Lybecker, D.L., Husmann, M.A., 2014b. The Narrative Policy Framework and the Practitioner: Communicating Recycling Policy, in: Jones, M.D., Shanahan, E.A., McBeth, M.K. (Eds.), *Science of Stories: Applications of the Narrative Policy Framework in Public Policy Analysis*. Palgrave Macmillan, New York, pp. 45–68.
- McBeth, M.K., Lybecker, D.L., Stoutenborough, J.W., 2016. Do Stakeholders Analyze Their Audience? The Communication Switch and Stakeholder Personal versus Public Communication Choices. *Policy Sciences* 49(4), 421–444.
- McBeth, M.K., Shanahan, E. A., Jones, M.D., 2005. The Science of Storytelling: Measuring Policy Beliefs in Greater Yellowstone. *Society and Natural Resources* 18(5), 413–429.
- McBeth, M.K., Shanahan, E.A., Anderson, M.C.A., Rose, B., 2012. Policy Story or Gory Story? Narrative Policy Framework Analysis of Buffalo Field Campaign’s Youtube Videos. *Policy and Internet* 4(3-4), 159–183.
- McBeth, M.K., Shanahan, E.A., Arnell, R.J., Hathaway, P.L., 2007. The Intersection of Narrative Policy Analysis and Policy Change Theory. *Policy Studies Journal* 35(1), 87–108.
- McBeth, M.K., Shanahan, E.A., Hathaway, P.L., Tigert, L.E., Sampson, L.J., 2010. Buffalo tales: Interest group policy stories in Greater Yellowstone. *Policy Sciences* 43(4), 391–409.
- Mccann, E., Ward, K., 2012. Policy Assemblages, Mobilities and Mutations: Toward a Multidisciplinary Conversation. *Political Studies Review* 10(3), 325–332.
- McCann, E., Ward, K., 2013. A Multi-disciplinary Approach to Policy Transfer Research: Geographies, Assemblages, Mobilities and Mutations. *Policy Studies* 34(1), 2–18.
- McNamara, R.S., 1980. Address to the Board of Governors. World Bank, Washington D.C
- Meier, U., Haarstad, J., 2014. Review of Support to the Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership, REEEP. Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD), Oslo.
- Mikecz, R., 2012. Interviewing Elites. *Qualitative Inquiry* 18(6), 482–493.

- Mkandawire, T.P., Soludo, C.C., 2003. Introduction: Toward the Broadening of Development Policy Dialogue for Africa, in: Mkandawire, T.P., Soludo, C.C. (Eds.), *African Voices on Structural Adjustment*. Africa World Press, Asmara, pp. 1–16.
- Mosley, P., Harrigan, J., Toye, J., 1995. *Aid and Power: The World Bank and Policy-based Lending Volume 1*. Routledge, New York.
- Mossberger, K., Wolman, H., 2003. Policy Transfer as a Form of Prospective Policy Evaluation: Challenges and Recommendations. *Public Administration Review* 63(4), 428–440.
- N'Guessan, M., Adeyemo, O., Sarr, S., 2011. *Accelerating Universal Energy Access Through the Use of Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency: Draft Technical Discussion Paper on General Energy Access in ECOWAS*. ECREEE, Accra.
- Nakano, K., 2004. Cross-National Transfer of Policy Ideas: Agencification in Britain and Japan. *Governance* 17(2), 169–188.
- Nay, O., 2010. Policy Transfer and Bureaucratic Influence in the United Nations: The case of AIDS. *Questions de recherche/Research in Question* 33, 1–28.
- Ndiaye, A., 2005. Senegal Seeks to Mainstream Disaster Risk Reduction in Poverty Reduction Strategy. *Disaster Reduction in Africa ISDR Informs*, Issue 5 July, 8.
- Ndiaye, A., 2006. Senegal and World Bank: IDA to Fund Disaster Risk Reduction under Poverty Reduction. *Disaster Reduction in Africa ISDR Informs*, Issue 6 December, 41.
- Ney, S., 2014. The Governance of Social Innovation: Connecting Meso and Macro Levels of Analysis, in: Jones, M.D., Shanahan, E.A., McBeth, M.K. (Eds.), *Science of Stories: Applications of the Narrative Policy Framework in Public Policy Analysis*. Palgrave Macmillan, New York, pp. 207–233.
- Ngoasong, M.Z., 2009. The Emergence of Global Health Partnerships as Facilitators of Access to Medication in Africa: A Narrative Policy Analysis. *Social Science and Medicine* 68(5), 949–956.
- Ninan, O.D., Ajíbádé, G.O., Odejobi, O.A., 2016. Appraisal of Computational Model for Yorùbá Folktale Narrative, in: Miller, B., Lieto, A., Ronfard, R., Ware, S.G., Finlayson, M.A. (Eds.), *7th Workshop on Computational Models of Narrative*. Open Access Series in Informatics, Kraków, pp. 1–11.
- Nutley, S., Downe, J., Martin, S., Grace, C., 2012. Policy Transfer and Convergence within the UK: The Case of Local Government Performance Improvement Regimes. *Policy and politics* 40(2), 193–209.
- Nwogu, N., 2007. Regional Integration as an Instrument of Human Rights: Reconceptualizing ECOWAS. *Journal of Human Rights* 6(3), 345–360.
- Nying, N., Nyangado, A., 2006. The Gambia: Disaster Management for Sustainable Development. *Disaster Reduction in Africa ISDR Informs*, Issue 6 December, 5–7.

O'Bryan, T., Dunlop, C.A., Radaelli, C.M., 2014. Narrating the "Arab Spring": Where Expertise Meets Heuristics in Legislative Hearings, in: Jones, M.D., Shanahan, E.A., McBeth, M.K. (Eds.), *The Science of Stories: Applications of the Narrative Policy Framework in Public Policy Analysis*. Palgrave Macmillan, New York, pp. 107–129.

O'Dolan, C., Rye, T., 2012. An Insight into Policy Transfer Processes within an EU Project and Implications for Future Project Design. *Transport Policy* 24, 273–283.

O'Leary, R., Borland, R., Stockwell, T., MacDonald, M., 2017. Claims in vapour device (e-cigarette) regulation: A Narrative Policy Framework analysis. *International Journal of Drug Policy* 44, 31–40.

OAU, 1993. Declaration of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government on the Establishment within the OAU of a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. Organisation of African Unity, Addis Ababa.

Odei, J., 2005. Ghana: Disaster Risk Reduction Initiatives in the Fields of Governance and Poverty Reduction. *Disaster Reduction in Africa ISDR Informs*, Issue 5 July, 9–11.

Odei, J., 2006. Ghana: Disaster Voluntary Groups Successful, Government to Provide More Funds. *Disaster Reduction in Africa ISDR Informs*, Issue 6 December, 31–32.

Ogbonna, E.C., Aluko, B., Awuah, K., 2013. The ECOWAS Platform and the Persisting Challenges of Integrating the West African Region: A Discourse. *Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development* 4(1), 104–113.

Ojo, O.E., 2004. Towards Comprehensive, Long-term Approaches to Disaster Management in Nigeria. *Disaster Reduction in Africa ISDR Informs*, Issue 4 November, 18–20.

Ojo, O.E., 2005. Nigeria: Towards a National Stakeholders' Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction. *Disaster Reduction in Africa ISDR Informs*, Issue 5 July, 5–7.

Ojo, O.J.B., 1980. Nigeria and the Formation of ECOWAS. *International Organization* 34(4), 571–604.

Olokesusi, F., 2006. Financing Disaster Mitigation in Nigeria: The Imperative of Public-Private Partnership. *Disaster Reduction in Africa ISDR Informs*, Issue 6 December, 17–19.

Olowu, D., 2010. The Hyogo Framework for Action and its Implications for Disaster Management and Reduction in Africa. *Journal of Disaster and Risk Studies* 3(3), 303–320.

Onega, S., Landa, J.A.G., 2014. Introduction, in: *Narratology: An Introduction*. Taylor and Francis, New York, pp. 1–35.

Padgett, S., 2003. Between Synthesis and Emulation: EU Policy Transfer in the Power Sector. *Journal of European Public Policy* 10(2), 227–245.

- Pal, L. a., 2014. Introduction: The OECD and Policy Transfer: Comparative Case Studies. *Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice* 16(3), 195–200.
- Palmer, J., 2010. Stopping the Unstoppable? A Discursive-Institutionalist Analysis of Renewable Transport Fuel Policy. *Environment and Planning* 28: 992-1010.
- Park, C., Wilding, M., Chung, C., 2014. The Importance of Feedback: Policy Transfer, Translation and the Role of Communication. *Policy Studies* 35(4), 397–412.
- Park, S., 2006. Theorizing Norm Diffusion Within International Organizations. *International Politics* 43(3): 342–361.
- Patterson, M., Monroe, K.R., 1998. Narrative in Political Science. *Annual Review of Political Science* 1(1), 315–331.
- Pautz, H., 2017. Think tanks, Tories and the Austerity Discourse Coalition. *Policy and Society* 37(2): 155-169.
- Peck, J., Theodore, N., 2010. Mobilizing Policy: Models, Methods, and Mutations. *Geoforum* 41, 169–174.
- Peck, J., Theodore, N., 2015. *Fast Policy - Experimental Statecraft at the Thresholds of Neoliberalism*. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis.
- Peck, J., Theodore, N., 2015. *Fast Policy: Experimental Statecraft at the Thresholds of Neoliberalism*. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis.
- Pelling, M., Uitto, J.I., 2001. Small Island Developing States: Natural Disaster Vulnerability and Global Change. *Global Environmental Change Part B: Environmental Hazards* 3(2), 49–62.
- Pereira, J.L., 2014. The EU Conditionality Policy and Its Application in West African Countries. The Case of Cape Verde. *European Scientific Journal* 10(12a), 389–403.
- Phillips, D.A., 2009. *Reforming the World Bank: Twenty Years of Trial and Error*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Pierce, J.J., Smith-Walter, A., Peterson, H.L., 2014. Research Design and the Narrative Policy Framework, in: Jones, M.D., Shanahan, E.A., McBeth, M.K. (Eds.), *The Science of Stories: Applications of the Narrative Policy Framework in Public Policy Analysis*. Palgrave Macmillan, New York, pp. 27–44.
- Piot, C., 1999. *Remotely Global: Village Modernity in West Africa*. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
- Porter, J.K., Osei-Hwedie, B.Z., 2015. Regionalism as a Tool for Promoting Economic and Regional Development: A Case Study of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Paper Presented at the 10th International Scientific Conference on Economic and Social Development. Miami, 25 September 2015.

- Porto de Oliveira, O., 2017. Conference Focus: International Conference on Policy Diffusion and Development Cooperation. <https://policydiffusion.com> (Accessed 19 January 2018).
- Porto de Oliveira, O., 2017. International Policy Diffusion and Participatory Budgeting: Ambassadors of Participation, International Institutions and Transnational Networks, Palgrave Macmillan, Cham.
- Propp, V., 1968. Morphology of the Folktale. University of Texas Press, Austin.
- Raab, J., Kenis, P., 2007. Taking Stock of Policy Networks: Do they Matter? In: F. Fischer, G.J. Miller and Sidney, M.S. (eds) Handbook of Public Policy Analysis: Theory, Politics, and Methods, Taylor and Francis CRC Press, Florida. pp. 187-200.
- Radaelli, C.M., 1999. Harmful Tax Competition in the EU: Policy Narratives and Advocacy Coalitions. *Journal of Common Market Studies* 37(4), 661–682.
- Radaelli, C.M., 2000. Policy Transfer in the European Union: Institutional Isomorphism as a Source of Legitimacy. *Governance* 13(1), 25–43.
- Radaelli, C.M., 2003. Europeanization of Public Policy, in: Featherstone, K., Radaelli, C.M. (Eds.), *The Politics of Europeanization*. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 27–56.
- Radaelli, C.M., 2003. The Europeanization of Public Policy In: K. Featherstone, C.M. Radaelli (eds) *The Politics of Europeanization*, Oxford University Press, Oxford. pp. 27-56.
- Ragin, C.C., 1992. Introduction: Cases of “What is a Case?”, in: Ragin, C.C., Becker, H.S. (Eds.), *What Is a Case?: Exploring the Foundations of Social Enquiry*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 1–18.
- Randma-Liiv, T., Kruusenberg, R., 2012. Policy Transfer in Immature Policy Environments: Motives, Scope, Role Models and Agents. *Public Administration and Development* 32, 154–166.
- RECP, AEEP, 2014. Africa-EU Renewable Energy Cooperation Programme: ECOWAS Renewable Energy Policy (EREP). EUEI PDF, Eschborn.
- Richard Jones, I.R., 2017. Policy, Memory and Voice: Re-constructing Narratives of Widening Participation in Higher Education in England. PhD Thesis, University College of London, London
- Rigg, C., Ó Laoire, M., Georgiou, V., 2013. “These are the People to Talk to”: The Role of Non-State Organizations in International Policy Transfer to Ireland’s Official Languages Act (2003), in: Carroll, P., Common, R. (Eds.), *Policy Transfer and Learning in Public Policy and Management: International Contexts, Content and Development*. Routledge, Oxon, pp. 146–166.
- Risse, T., 2007. Transnational Actors and World Politics, in: Zimmerli, W.C., Richter, K., Holzinger, M. (Eds.), *Corporate Ethics and Corporate Governance*. Springer, Berlin, pp. 251–286.

- Rivera, S.W., Kozyreva, P.M., Sarovskii, E.G., 2002. Interviewing Political Elites: Lessons from Russia. *PS: Political Science and Politics* 35(4), 683–688.
- Robinson, L.A., Wildermith, S.M., 2016. From Rags to Splendor: The Evolution of Cinderella Cover Illustrations from 1800 to 2014. *Visual Communication* 15(1), 54–69.
- Rodgers, D.T., 2014. Bearing Tales: Networks and Narratives in Social Policy Transfer. *Journal of Global History* 9(2), 301–313.
- Roe, E., 1994. *Narrative Policy Analysis: Theory and Practice*. Duke University Press, London.
- Roe, E.M., 1991. Development Narratives, Or Making the Best of Blueprint Development. *World Development* 19(4), 287–300.
- Rorty, R., 1989. *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Rose, R., 1991. What is Lesson-Drawing? *Journal of Public Policy* 11(1), 3–30.
- Rose, R., 1993. *Lesson Drawing in Public Policy: A Guide to Learning Across Time and Space*. Chatham House, London.
- Rukato, H., 2004. Accountability, Governance in Disaster Risk Reduction. *Disaster Reduction in Africa ISDR Informs*, Issue 3 April, 4–6.
- Sabatier, P.A., Weible, C.M., 2014. *Theories of the Policy Process*. Westview Press, Colorado.
- Savi, R., Randma-Liiv, T., 2013. Policy Transfer in New Democracies, in: Carroll, P., Common, R. (Eds.), *Policy Transfer and Learning in Public Policy and Management: International Contexts, Content and Development*. Routledge, Oxon, pp. 67–79.
- Schimmelfennig, F., Engert, S., Knobel, H., 2003. Costs, Commitment and Compliance: The Impact of EU Democratic Conditionality on Latvia, Slovakia and Turkey. *Journal of Common Market Studies* 41(3), 495–518.
- Schimmelfennig, F., Sedelmeier, U., 2004. Governance by Conditionality: EU Rule Transfer to the Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe. *Journal of European Public Policy* 11(4), 661–679.
- Schipper, L., Pelling, M., 2006. Disaster Risk, Climate Change and International Development: Scope for, and Challenges to, Integration. *Disasters* 30(1), 19–38.
- Schmidt, V.A., 2008. Discursive Institutionalism: The Explanatory Power of Ideas and Discourse. *Annual Review Political Science* 11: 303–326.
- Schmidt, V.A., 2012. Discursive Institutionalism: Scope, Dynamics, and Philosophical Underpinnings. In: *The Argumentative Turn Revisited: Public Policy as Communicative Practice*, Fischer, F. and Gottweis, H. (eds), Duke University Press, Durham. pp. 85-113.

Schroeder, U.C., Chappuis, F., Kocak, D., 2013. Security Sector Reform from a Policy Transfer Perspective: A Comparative Study of International Interventions in the Palestinian Territories, Liberia and Timor-Leste. *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 7(3), 381–401.

Seawright, J., Gerring, J., 2008. Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research: A Menu of Qualitative and Quantitative Options. *Political Research Quarterly* 61(2), 294–308.

Sebitosi, A.B., Pillay, P., 2005. The Kyoto Protocol: A Sub-Sahara African Perspective. Paper Presented at IEEE Power Engineering Society Inaugural Conference and Exposition in Africa, Durban, 11- 15 July 2015

Sedelmeier, U., 2010. Is Europeanisation through Conditionality Sustainable? Lock-in of Institutional Change after EU Accession. *West European Politics* 35(1), 20–38.

Shanahan, E.A., Adams, S.M., Jones, M.D., McBeth, M.K., 2014. The Blame Game: Narrative Persuasiveness of the Intentional Causal Mechanism, in: Jones, M.D., Shanahan, E.A., McBeth, M.K. (Eds.), *Science of Stories: Applications of the Narrative Policy Framework in Public Policy Analysis*. Palgrave Macmillan, New York.

Shanahan, E.A., Adams, S.M., McBeth, M.K., 2013a. Spin or Strategy?: How Story Construction Matters in the Formation of Public Opinion. Paper Presented at International Public Policy Conference, Grenoble, 26-28 June 2013.

Shanahan, E.A., Jones, M.D., McBeth, M.K., 2011a. Policy Narratives and Policy Processes. *Policy Studies Journal* 39(3), 535–561.

Shanahan, E.A., Jones, M.D., McBeth, M.K., 2017a. How to Conduct a Narrative Policy Framework Study. *The Social Science Journal* 55(5), 1–14.

Shanahan, E.A., Jones, M.D., McBeth, M.K., Lane, R.R., 2013b. An Angel on the Wind: How Heroic Policy Narratives Shape Policy Realities. *Policy Studies Journal* 41(3), 453–483.

Shanahan, E.A., McBeth, M.K., Hathaway, P.L., 2011b. Narrative Policy Framework: The Influence of Media Policy Narratives on Public Opinion. *Politics and Policy* 39(3), 373–400.

Shanahan, E.A., McBeth, M.K., Hathaway, P.L., Arnell, R.J., 2008. Conduit or Contributor? The Role of Media in Policy Change Theory. *Policy Sciences* 41(2), 115–138.

Shanahan, E.A., Raile, E.D., French, K., McEvoy, J., 2017b. What is at Risk?: Community Decision Makers' Narrative Constructions of Flood Hazards on the Yellowstone River. Paper Presented at Midwest Political Science 75th Annual Conference, Chicago, 6-9 April, 2017

Sharman, J.C., 2010. Dysfunctional Policy Transfer in National Tax Blacklists. *Governance* 23(4), 623–639.

- Shenhav, S.R., 2006. Political Narratives and Political Reality. *International Political Science Review* 27(3), 245–262.
- Singh, A., 2002. Aid, Conditionality and Development. *Development and Change* 33(2), 295–305.
- Smith, A., 2004. Policy Transfer in the Development of UK Climate Policy. *Policy and Politics* 32(1), 79–93.
- Smith-walter, A., Peterson, H.L., Jones, M.D., Marshall, A.N.R., 2016. Gun Stories: How Evidence Shapes Firearm Policy in the United States. *Politics and Policy* 44(6), 1053–1088.
- Sobaci, Z., 2009. Regional Development Agencies in Turkey: Are they Examples of Obligated Policy Transfer? *Public Organization Review* 9(1), 51–65.
- Souaré, I.K., Handy, P.S., 2013. The State of Conflict Early Warning in Africa. *African Security Review* 22(2), 1–10.
- Star Tribune, 2015. Solving Climate Change. <http://www.startribune.com/sack-cartoon-the-holiday-shopping-season/360472421/> (Accessed 23 September 2017).
- Steinbacher, K., 2015. Drawing Lessons when Objectives Differ? Assessing Renewable Energy Policy Transfer from Germany to Morocco. *Politics and Governance* 3(4), 34–50.
- Stone, D., 1999. Learning Lessons and Transferring Policy across Time, Space and Disciplines. *Politics* 19, 51–59.
- Stone, D., 2000a. Non-Governmental Policy Transfer: The Strategies of Independent Policy Institutes. *Governance* 13(1), 45–62.
- Stone, D., 2000b. Learning Lessons, Policy Transfer and the International Diffusion of Policy Ideas (Working Paper, No.69/01). University of Warwick, Warwick.
- Stone, D., 2003. Transnational Transfer Agents and Global Networks in the 'Internationalisation' of Policy. Paper Presented for the Internationalisation and Policy Transfer Workshop, Tulane University, New Orleans, 11-12 April, 2003.
- Stone, D., 2004. Transfer Agents and Global Networks in the 'Transnationalization' of Policy. *Journal of European Public Policy* 11(3), 545–566.
- Stone, D., 2010. Private Philanthropy or Policy Transfer? The Transnational Norms of the Open Society Institute. *Policy and Politics* 38(2), 269–287.
- Stone, D., 2012. Transfer and Translation of Policy. *Policy Studies* 33(6), 483–499.
- Stone, D., 2017. Understanding the Transfer of Policy Failure: Bricolage, Experimentalism and Translation. *Policy and Politics* 45(1), 55–70.
- Stone, D., Ladi, S., 2015. Global Public Policy and Transnational Administration. *Public Administration* 93(4), 839–855.
- Stone, D.A., 1988. *Policy Paradox and Political Reason*. Harper Collins, New York.

Stone, D.A., 1989. Causal Stories and the Formation of Policy Agendas. *Political Science Quarterly* 104(2), 281–300.

Stone, D.A., 2002. *Policy Paradox: The Art of Political Decision Making*. W.W Norton and Company, New York.

Takao, Y., 2014. Policy Learning and Diffusion of Tokyo's Metropolitan Cap-and-Trade: Making a Mandatory Reduction of Total CO₂ Emissions Work at Local Scales. *Policy Studies* 35(4), 319–338.

Tambulasi, R.I., 2013. Why You Can't Lead a Horse to Water and Make it Drink: The Learning Oriented Transfer of Health Sector Decentralization Reforms and Bureaucratic Interests in Malawi, in: Carroll, P., Common, R. (Eds.), *Policy Transfer and Learning in Public Policy and Management: International Contexts, Content and Development*. Routledge, Oxon, pp. 80–104.

Tchalenko, J.S., Braud, J., Berberian, M., 1974. Discovery of Three Earthquake Faults in Iran. *Nature* 248, 661–663.

Tews, K., 2009. From Law-Taking to Policy-Making. The Environmental Dimension of the EU Accession Process – Challenges, Risks and Chances for the SEE Countries. *Environmental Policy and Governance* 19(2), 130–139.

The Africa-EU Partnership, 2010. *Africa and Europe in Partnership: Run Up to the 3rd Summit Newsletter*. http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/sites/default/files/newsletter-files/au-ue_newsletter_003.pdf (Accessed 15 April 2017).

The Government of The Republic of South Africa, 2010. *National Climate Change Response Green Paper*. Department of Environmental Affairs, Pretoria.

The World Bank, 1999. *Curbing the Epidemic: Governments and the Economics of Tobacco Control*. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank, Washington D.C.

Thompson, W.S., 1969. *Ghana's Foreign Policy, 1957-1966: Diplomacy Ideology, and the New State*. Princeton University Press, New Jersey.

Timms, P., 2011. Urban Transport Policy Transfer: “Bottom-up” and “Top-down” Perspectives. *Transport Policy* 18(5), 513–521.

Traore, M., 2005. Mali: National Platform for Disaster Reduction Launched. *Disaster Reduction in Africa ISDR Informs*, Issue 5 July, 33–34.

Tsoskounoglou, M., Ayerides, G., Tritopoulou, E., 2008. The End of Cheap Oil: Current Status and Prospects. *Energy Policy* 36, 3797–3806.

Turhan, E., Cerit Mazlum, S., Şahin, Ü., Şorman, A.H., Cem Gündoğan, A., 2016. *Beyond Special Circumstances: Climate Change Policy in Turkey 1992-2015*. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change 7(3), 448–460.

UN General Assembly Economic and Social Council, 2001. *Implementation of the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction*. United Nations, Geneva.

UN, 1981. United Nations Conference on New and Renewable Sources of Energy <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/36/a36r193.htm> (Accessed 8 September 2016).

UN, 1997. Earth Summit: Background. <http://www.un.org/geninfo/bp/envirp2.html> (Accessed 31 May 2016).

Unalan, D., 2009. An Analytical Framework for Policy Transfer in the EU Context. *Policy and Politics* 37(3), 439-452.

UNECA, UNISDR, 2013. Report on Mainstreaming and Implementing Disaster Risk Reduction in West Africa. UNISDR and UNECA, Geneva.

UNEP, NCAR, UNU, WMO, ISDR, 2000. Lessons Learned from the 1997–98 El Niño: Once Burned, Twice Shy? UNISDR, Geneva.

UNIDO, 2013. The Cooperation between UNIDO and the European Union: A Partnership for Inclusive Growth and Sustainable Development. https://www.unido.org/fileadmin/user_media/Publications/Pub_free/12-50176_EU_Brochure_eBook.pdf (Accessed 3 October 2017).

UNIDO, 2015. UNIDO Energy Programme: Sustainable Energy for Inclusive Development and Climate Action. https://www.unido.org/fileadmin/user_media_upgrade/What_we_do/Topics/Energy_access/04._UNIDO_Energy_Branch_Brochure.pdf (Accessed 3 October 2017).

UNISDR Africa, 2003. Water and Risk in Africa: A School's Guide. UNISDR Africa Educational Series, Volume 1 Issue 2.

UNISDR Africa, 2003. Who Are We? Disaster Reduction in Africa ISDR Informs, Issue 1 June, 4–5.

UNISDR Africa, 2004a. UNISDR Africa Activities in 2004 and Priorities in 2005. Disaster Reduction in Africa ISDR Informs, Issue 4 November, 47–54.

UNISDR Africa, 2004a. West and North Africa: French-speaking Disaster Managers Call for Regional Fund for Disaster Reduction. Disaster Reduction in Africa - ISDR Informs, Issue 4 November, 50–51.

UNISDR Africa, 2004b. Background Paper: African Regional Consultation on Disaster Risk Reduction. UNISDR Africa, Addis Ababa.

UNISDR Africa, 2004b. Land Use, Disaster Risk and Rewards. UNISDR Africa Educational Series, Volume 1 Issue 4.

UNISDR Africa, 2004c. Environmental Protection and Disaster Risk Reduction: A School's Guide. UNISDR Africa Educational Series, Volume 1 Issue 3.

UNISDR Africa, 2004c. UNISDR Africa 2003 Activities at a Glance. Disaster Reduction in Africa ISDR Informs, Issue 3 April, 53–64.

UNISDR Africa, 2005a. Africa Advisory Group on Disaster Risk Reduction Established. Disaster Reduction in Africa ISDR Informs, Issue 5 July, 44–45.

UNISDR Africa, 2005a. African National Platforms Hold First Consultative Meeting. Disaster Reduction in Africa ISDR Informs, Issue 5 July, 41–43.

UNISDR Africa, 2005b. ECOWAS: Experts Discuss Establishment of Disaster Management Mechanism for West Africa. Disaster Reduction in Africa ISDR Informs, Issue 5 July, 56–57.

UNISDR Africa, 2005b. UNISDR World in Action: Hyogo Declaration. Disaster Reduction in Africa ISDR Informs, Issue 5 July, 26–27.

UNISDR Africa, 2006a. UNISDR Africa Activities in 2006. Disaster Reduction in Africa ISDR Informs, Issue 7 June, 12–14.

UNISDR Africa, 2006b. African Regional Economic Communities, UN bodies, IFRC Discuss Preparations for Global Platform on DRR. Disaster Reduction in Africa ISDR Informs, Issue 7 June, 3–7.

UNISDR Africa, UNDP, 2004. Disaster Risk Reduction, Governance and Development. UNISDR Africa Educational Series, Volume 2, Issue 4.

UNISDR, 2003a. Inter-Agency Task Force On Disaster Reduction: 7th Secretariat Briefing. UNISDR, Geneva.

UNISDR, 2003b. ISDR Secretariat Briefing, in: Inter-Agency Task Force On Disaster Reduction: 7th Meeting. UNISDR, Geneva.

UNISDR, 2005a. Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015: Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters. UNISDR, Geneva.

UNISDR, 2005b. Progress Report on Africa Working Group. UNISDR, Geneva.

UNISDR, 2008. Annual Report 2007: The Secretariat of the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, Geneva.

UNISDR, 2011. Revised Terms of Reference of the Africa Working Group on DRR (AWGDRR). UNISDR, Geneva.

UNISDR, 2012a. History: Milestones in the History of Disaster Risk Reduction. <http://www.unisdr.org/who-we-are/history> (Accessed 26 July 2016).

UNISDR, 2012b. History. <http://www.unisdr.org/who-we-are/history> (Accessed 4 June 2016).

UNISDR, 2015. ECOWAS Policy and Mechanisms for Disaster Risk Reduction. <https://www.unisdr.org/archive/8754> (Accessed 3 September 2016).

UNISDR, 2016a. Where We Work. <https://www.unisdr.org/where> (Accessed 24 November 2016).

UNISDR, 2016b. Our Mandate. <https://www.unisdr.org/who-we-are/mandate> (Accessed 11 April 2016).

UNISDR, 2016c. We Coordinate. <http://www.unisdr.org/we/coordinate> (Accessed 3 September 2016).

- UNISDR, 2017a. Countries and National Platforms. <https://www.unisdr.org/partners/countries> (Accessed 11 June 2017).
- UNISDR, 2017b. We Advocate. <http://www.unisdr.org/we/advocate> (Accessed 9 August 2017).
- UNISDR, NEPAD, 2004. African Regional Consultation on Disaster Risk Reduction. UNISDR, Nairobi.
- UNISDR, UNEP, 2004. Environmental Protection and Disaster Risk Reduction: A Community Leader's Guide. UNISDR Africa Educational Series, Volume 2 Issue 2.
- United Nations Development Programme, 2005. Investing in Development: A Practical Plan to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals. UNDP, Washington D.C.
- United Nations General Assembly, 1970. Res 2717 (XXV): Assistance in Cases of Natural Disaster, in: Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly during Its Twenty- Fifth Session. United Nations General Assembly, New York, pp. 83–84.
- United Nations General Assembly, 1979. Res 34/55: Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Co-ordinator. United Nations General Assembly, New York.
- United Nations General Assembly, 2012. Resolution adopted by the General Assembly: International Strategy for Disaster Reduction. United Nations, Geneva.
- United Nations Treaty Series, 1976. Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). http://www.internationaldemocracywatch.org/attachments/351_ecowas_treaty_of_1975.pdf (Accessed 23 March 2016).
- United Nations, 2005. World Conference on Disaster Reduction: List of Participants. <http://www.unisdr.org/2005/wcdr/intergover/official-doc/info/list-participants-WCDR-english.pdf> (Accessed 1 September 2016)
- United Nations, 2016. News on Millennium Development Goals. <http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/> (Accessed 1 September 2016).
- USAID, 1982. Proceedings of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Energy Symposium: Energy for Survival. http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNAAR409.pdf (Accessed 26 July 2016).
- Valency, R.A., 2003a. From the Editor: Our Initiative, Your Publication. Disaster Reduction in Africa ISDR Informs, Issue 1 June, 1.
- Valency, R.A., 2003b. From the Editor: The Missing Link. Disaster Reduction in Africa ISDR Informs, Issue 2 November, 1.
- Valency, R.A., 2004a. From the Editor: Partnership is Only as Strong as the Weakest Partner. Disaster Reduction in Africa ISDR Informs, Issue 4 November, 1.
- Valency, R.A., 2004b. From the Editor: From Africa to Japan. Disaster Reduction in Africa ISDR Informs, Issue 3 April, 1.

- Valency, R.A., 2005. From the Editor: “Developmentizing” Disaster Reduction. *Disaster Reduction in Africa ISDR Informs*, Issue 5 July, 1.
- Van Dijk, T.A., 1997. What is Political Discourse Analysis?. In J. Blommaert and C. Bulcaen (eds) *Political Linguistics*, Benjamins, Amsterdam. pp. 11–52.
- van Fraassen, B.C., Sigman, J., 1993. Interpretation in Science and in the Arts, in: Leving, G. (Ed.), *Realism and Representation*. University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, pp. 73–99.
- Vervaeke, K., 2009. Editorial. *Link!: Inside the Africa-European Union Partnership*, Issue 1 May-June, 1.
- Vervaeke, K., 2010. Editorial. *Link!: Inside the Africa-European Union Partnership*, Issue 9 May-June, 1.
- Vigour, C., 2017. *Lean Management in the French State and Judicial System: Resistance and Vigour*, in: *Public Policy Transfer: Micro-Dynamics and Macro-Effects*. Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, Cheltenham, pp. 51–78.
- Vordzorgbe, S.D., 2006. *Making the Case for Disaster Risk Reduction in Africa*. UNISDR Africa, Nairobi.
- Waley, A., 1947. The Chinese Cinderella Story. *Folklore* 58(1), 226–238.
- Walker, C.K., 2018. Policy Transfer in a Corporatist Context: Agents, Adjustments and Continued Innovation. *Public Policy and Administration*, 1–21.
- WAPP, 2017. Creation of WAPP. <http://www.ecowapp.org/en/content/creation-wapp> (Accessed 10 July 2017).
- Ward, M.D., Stovel, K., Sacks, A., 2011. Network Analysis and Political Science. *Annual Review of Political Science* 14: 245–264.
- Warnement, M.K., 2016. Applying the Narrative Policy Framework to the Multiple Streams Framework: Understanding the Role of Focusing Events in Policy Change. Paper Presented at ECPR General Conference. European Consortium for Political Research, Prague, 7-10 September 2016.
- Wasserman, S., Faust, K., 1994. *Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Watts, P., 1998. Losing Lome. The potential impact of the Commission guidelines on the ACP non-Least Developed Countries. *Review of African Political Economy* 25(75), 47–71.
- Weible, C.M., Olofsson, K.L., Costie, D.P., Katz, J.M., Heikkila, T., 2016. Enhancing Precision and Clarity in the Study of Policy Narratives: An Analysis of Climate and Air Issues in Delhi, India. *Review of Policy Research* 33(4), 420–441.
- Weible, C.M., Sabatier, P.A., 2017. *Theories of the Policy Process*. Westview Press, Colorado.

- Weible, C.M., Schlager, E., 2014. Narrative Policy Framework: Contributions, Limitations, and Recommendations, in: Jone, Michael, D., Shanahan, E.A., McBeth, M.K. (Eds.), *Science of Stories: Applications of the Narrative Policy Framework in Public Policy Analysis*. Palgrave Macmillan, New York, pp. 247–260.
- Westgate, K., 2003. Why Poverty Alleviation Should Go Hand-in-Hand with Disaster Reduction. *Disaster Reduction in Africa ISDR Informs*, issue 2 November, 13–15.
- WHO, 2003. WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. World Health Organization, Geneva.
- Wodak, R., Krzyżanowski, M., 2008. Introduction. In: R. Wodak and M. Krzyżanowski (eds) *Qualitative Discourse Analysis in the Social Sciences*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York. pp. 1-29.
- Wolman, H., 1992. Understanding Cross National Policy Transfers: The Case of Britain and the US. *Governance* 5(1), 27–45.
- Wolman, H., Page, E., 2002. Policy Transfer among Local Governments: An Information-Theory Approach. *Governance* 15(4), 477–501.
- Wood, A., 2016. The Politics of Policy Circulation: Unpacking the Relationship Between South African and South American Cities in the Adoption of Bus Rapid Transit. *Antipode* 27(4): 1062-1079.
- Wright, C., Nyberg, D., Grant, D., 2006. “Hippies on the Third Floor”: Climate Change, Narrative Identity and the Micro-politics of Corporate Environmentalism. *Organization Studies* 33(11), 1451–1475.
- Yaya, B.H., 2014. ECOWAS and the Promotion of Democratic Governance in West Africa. *Journal of International Relations and Foreign Policy* 2(1), 85–102.
- Yin, R.K., 2014. *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*. Sage Publications, Inc., California.
- Zardo, F., 2017. Whose Ownership? Explaining EU-Tunisia Policy Transfer From A Negotiation Perspective, in: Hadjiisky, M., Pal, L.A., Walker, C. (Eds.), *Public Policy Transfer: Micro-Dynamics and Macro-Effects*. Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, Cheltenham, pp. 222–241.
- Zeng, J., 2017. Does Europe Matter? The Role of Europe in Chinese Narratives of ‘One Belt One Road’ and ‘New Type of Great Power Relations. *Journal of Common Market Studies* 55(5): 1162–1176.
- Zhang, Y., Marsh, D., 2016. Learning by Doing: The Case of Administrative Policy Transfer in China. *Policy Studies* 37(1), 35–52.
- Ziervogel, G., 2006. Understanding Resilient, Vulnerable Livelihoods in South Africa, Malawi, Zambia. *Disaster Reduction in Africa ISDR Informs*, Issue 6 December, 19–23.