

Explaining Europeanisation in Turkish water management policy: A sociological institutionalism perspective?

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Abstract

Rational institutionalism's theoretical explanations for external Europeanisation focus on material incentives such as accession conditionality in determining change in non-EU states. However, such exogenous explanations struggle to interpret ongoing Europeanisation where accession incentives have declined or even reversed ('stalled' accession) but institutional adjustment still continues. This Europeanisation phenomenon is evident in Turkey, a state that had actively pursued EU membership between 1999 and 2004, resulting in domestic institutional reform to align governance structures with the EU. Thereafter, Europeanisation has reversed in some policy sectors but nonetheless continued in others such as Turkish water policy, despite a declining accession process. Rational institutional arguments therefore appear to lose explanatory power for such events post-2005.

An alternative theoretical proposition forwarded is that the EU accession process embedded a self-sustaining cycle of socialisation through social learning around water policy norms amongst policy actors that has continued beyond this accession imperative. This thesis therefore aims to test the explanatory value of such a sociological institutionalism perspective for Europeanisation in Turkish water policy. Meeting this aim entailed attaining four main objectives: (i) determining the implementation of EU water policy norms under the Water Framework Directive (WFD); (ii) ascertaining why Turkish policymakers continue to implement the WFD in the absence of credible EU membership incentives; (iii) applying a sociological institutionalism theoretical perspective to analyse whether it can interpret Europeanisation occurring; (iv) examining implications of the research for future policy. To meet these objectives, qualitative research methods, including analysis of documentary sources, semi-structured interviews with policy elites and participant observation, were utilised to examine WFD implementation at national and river basin levels within an embedded case study research design. This thesis concludes that ongoing Europeanisation in this sector can be explained by a sociological institutionalism perspective in terms of social learning leading to

socialisation around EU water policy norms. However, such Europeanisation is evidently slower at the river basin level. Recommendations for enhancing implementation therefore include increasing actor participation and communication in decision-making.

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List of Abbreviations

ANAP	Motherland Party
AECR	Alliance of European Conservatives and Reformists
AKP	Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi in Turkish)
APD	Accession Partnership Documents
BELDES	Municipal infrastructure project
CHP	Republican People's Party
COE	Council of Europe
DG Environment	Directorate-General for Environment
DG NEAR	Directorate-General European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations
GDWM	General Directorate of Water Management
DEFRA	UK Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
DI	Discursive institutionalism
DSI	Directorate General for State Hydraulic Works
DSP	Democratic Left Party
EC	European Commission
EU	European Union
EP	European Parliament
EEC	European Economic Community
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
EHCIP	Environmental Heavy-Cost Investment Planning in Turkey
EPP	European's People Party
GAPSEL	Mitigating Flood Risk in Flooded Areas in the GAP Region

GMP	Groundwater Management Plan
IKV	Economic Development Foundation
IPA	Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance
KOP	Konya Basin Irrigation Project
KOP RDA	Konya Plain Regional Development Administration
KÖYDES	project for supporting rural infrastructure of villages
MARA	Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs
MATRA	Implementation of the Water Framework Directive
MEVKA	Mevlana Development Agency
MHP	Nationalist Action Party
MGK	National Security Council
MoH	Ministry of Health
MoEF	Ministry of Environment and Forestry
MoFAL	Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Livestock
MoFWA	Ministry of Forestry and Water Affairs
MoTMAC	Ministry of Transport, Maritime Affairs and Communications
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGOs	Non-governmental Organisation
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
ORSAM	Centre for Middle Eastern Strategic Studies
RBAPs	River Basin Action Plans
RBMPs	River Basin Management Plans
RI	Rational (choice) Institutionalism
SI	Sociological Institutionalism

SUKAP	Water and Sewerage Infrastructure Project
SEAD	Strategic Environmental Assessment Directive
TAIEX	Technical Assistance Information Exchange Office
TFP	Turkish Foreign Policy
TESEV	Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation
TUSIAD	Turkish Industry and Business Association
UNIKOP	KOP Region Universities Union
UWWTD	Urban Wastewater Treatment Directive
WFD	Water Framework Directive

List of Publications

International Journals

1. DEMIRBILEK, B. and BENSON, D. 2018. Legal Europeanisation in three dimensions: water legislation in Turkey. *The Journal of Water Law*, 25(6), 294-307.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Introduction: Explaining Europeanisation under declining accession incentives

‘...much of European integration can be modelled as strategic exchange between autonomous political agents with fixed interests; at the same time, much of it cannot. Constitutive dynamics of social learning, socialisation, routinisation and normative diffusion, all of which address fundamental issues of agent identity and interests, are not strictly captured by strategic exchange or other models adhering to strict forms of methodological individualism. For these constitutive processes, the dominant institutionalisms in studies of integration – rational choice and historical – need to be supplemented by a more sociological understanding of institutions that stress their interest- and identity-forming roles.’

(Checkel, 2001: 50)

Europeanisation generally refers to the interaction between the European Union (EU) internally with its member states and externally with the non-EU states (Börzel, 2005; Börzel and Risse, 2009). This concept has inspired a broad literature that has sought to understand the nature of such interactions, with several main Europeanisation processes identified (Börzel and Panke, 2016). Some scholars have focused on the ‘uploading’ of domestic policy preferences to the European level and resultant institutional development (Börzel, 2010). However, the majority of this burgeoning literature has investigated the ‘downloading’ of EU rules, norms and values by the member states or the non-EU countries (ibid.). Indeed, this diffusion of EU policy norms to external countries is of interest to this thesis. Here, the thesis argues that while the attention of many Europeanisation researchers has been fixed on how the EU influences domestic institutions through a formalised accession process or through the external diffusion of norms as a global actor, little consideration has been given to how, and indeed why, Europeanisation still occurs in candidate countries after formal accession incentives have declined due to changed

political circumstances. This observation also has implications for how this process of 'stalled' or even reversed accession ('de-Europeanisation') is theorised within Europeanisation studies.

One significant example of this Europeanisation phenomenon comes from Turkey, which has experienced a tortuous accession process. Attempts by Turkey to join the European Economic Community (EEC) began as early as 1959 but it did not receive the candidate status for the EU until 1999. An accession agreement then obliged Turkey to undertake a programme of domestic institutional reforms designed to align it with EU norms, values and rules under the *acquis communautaire*. After 2004, however, shifting domestic political priorities in Turkey witnessed declining enthusiasm for reforms and a gradual rejection of the accession process. In the intervening period, political support for EU membership has fluctuated but overall it has continued to decline, particularly under the current Erdogan presidency. What remains of interest is that, despite reducing accession incentives, Turkey continues to implement accession criteria in specific sectors even though external EU pressures for institutional adaptation are minimal. Indeed, it remains an intriguing question as to how (and also why) Europeanisation via domestic reform continues – particularly now that the EU itself has all but abandoned attempts at negotiating Turkish membership.

In developing this line of argumentation, this chapter provides a brief introduction to the thesis. Firstly, it outlines the history of EU-Turkish relations to show how during the period between 1999 and 2004. Turkey embarked on a process of domestic institutional reform in anticipation of EU accession. However, while domestic enthusiasm for accession declined after 2004, Europeanisation of domestic institutions has continued in several policy sectors.

Secondly, this phenomenon is described in one significant sector, namely water policy. As discussed below and further in Chapter 2, this sector matters because the EU actively sought to directly transfer its water policy norms to Turkey, in the form of the Water Framework Directive (WFD), prior to 2005. The WFD is a flagship EU environmental policy and a subject of continued attempts

by the Union to export its broader *acquis communautaire* to non-EU states globally (Adelle et al., 2015). Europeanisation of Turkish water policy has progressed in the period since, despite declining accession pressure for institutional change.

Thirdly, a key argument presented in the thesis, discussed further in Chapter 3, is that this ongoing Europeanisation process presents problems in applying a more rational choice institutionalism theory, which privileges the role of exogenous accession criteria (primarily conditionality) in forcing institutional change. For example, Sedelmeier (2011: 12) emphasises that conditionality may be inefficient for supporting change when the EU sets the date for the accession, as occurred in the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs), including Poland, Bulgaria, Estonia, Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Hungary. Also, the credibility of accession may suffer if the candidates have doubts about the rewards, for example the situation in Turkey after 2005 (Schimmelfennig, 2008). The apparent problems of applying rational arguments in this context could then lead to the testing of alternative theoretical approaches. Scholars, such as Yilmaz (2014: 303), are now actively questioning whether conditionality is a credible explanation for Turkish Europeanisation: she predominantly focuses on the limits of EU conditionality and questions whether 'domestic drivers of change' are more appropriate. Here, she argues for an actor-based assessment and claims that policy-makers are under pressure from political parties, civil society, media, business and interest groups for changes rather than particularly considering EU conditionality. Although by late 2004 the credibility of EU conditionality decreased, in some areas the reforms continued such as the rule of law, minority rights and civil-military relations (Yilmaz, 2014: 305). Therefore, this thesis focuses on alternative approaches to EU conditionality, and poses the principal question as to whether institutional theories of socialisation (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005b) and social learning (Börzel and Risse, 2000) – as leading scholars such as Checkel (2001) might infer - can potentially explain Europeanisation under conditions of declining accession incentives, as well as pave the way for elucidating whether actors learn and

adjust to EU rules and norms. Aims, objectives, secondary questions and hypotheses are identified.

The remainder of this chapter briefly outlines the research design chosen to examine this theoretical approach, described in more detail in Chapter 4. The chapter then spells out the original empirical, theoretical and normative contribution of the thesis to the academic literature. Finally, it 'signposts' the structure of the thesis. As explained below, the main research puzzle examined is why, given the lack of accession progress in other areas and in view of the lack of credible and timely commitment to full EU membership, does it appear that Turkish water policy is being amended in line with wider European policy objectives, specifically the WFD?

1.2 A brief review of Turkey-EU relations

International relations between Turkey and the EEC started in the late 1950s (Eralp and Torun, 2015). Throughout the intervening decades, this relationship has shifted between positive moves by the EEC/EU to include Turkey in the integration project to periods of more negative relations where Turkish membership has slipped down the political agenda. As discussed above, ultimately this process helped to initiate Turkish accession procedures in the early 2000s but more recent years have witnessed their gradual stalling or even reversal, known as de-Europeanisation (see Yilmaz, 2016; Aydin-Düzgüt, 2016; Kaliber, 2016), resulting in a unique pattern of Europeanisation.

Turkey's Europeanisation process began on the 31st July 1959. After Turkey's application to become a member of the European Economic Community, the Ankara Agreement was signed on 12th September 1963 to implement the Customs Union (Özbudun, 2015). The Ankara Agreement, which was characteristic of a framework convention, entered into force on 1st December 1964 comprising three stages: 'preparatory', 'transitional' and a 'final stage' which was the establishment of the Customs Union (Ökmen and Canan, 2009: 141). This association agreement aims at strengthening economic relations between the EU and Turkey and also ensuring that Turkish economic conditions are compatible with the EU at the preparatory stage. After providing

an efficient economic integration, it then aims to build political integration in the later stages (Akçeken, 2003). The preparatory process initiated after an annexed protocol, which is a part of the Ankara Agreement, entered into force on 1st January 1977 (Ökmen and Canan, 2009). However, the provisions of the annexed protocol could not be implemented by Turkey until the late 1980s because its relations with the EU were suspended after the military coup in 1980. Implementation then occurred after 1988 (Can and Ozen, 2005).

Following the Maastricht Agreement (Treaty on European Union), signed in 1992, the EEC was renamed as the European Union, allowing member states to move forward towards greater political integration. With respect to this political integration process, national leaders entered into a discussion at Maastricht as to whether Turkey could be considered to have a European identity and whether the EU borders should encompass Turkey (Aka and Gürsoy, 2012; Kalegasi, 1995). Subsequent to this discussion, a decision about the continuance of relations with Turkey on the basis of the Customs Union was taken at the Copenhagen Council Summit in 1993 (Akçeken, 2003; Arat, 2001).

Enlargement of the EU continued through the accession process for Eastern European countries from 1997 onwards, which encouraged Turkey to make EU membership a national political objective (Akçeken, 2003). This process started with the 'Agenda 2000' report (Eralp and Eralp, 2012), presented at the Luxemburg Council Summit on 12-13 December 1997. It contained recommendations for how CEECs plus Cyprus could move towards EU accession (European Commission, 1997). At this point in time, Turkey was not considered a credible candidate by EU leaders (Akçeken, 2003; Eralp and Eralp, 2012). One reason was that, despite showing significant progress within the Customs Union, Turkey was experiencing macroeconomic instability as well as receiving international criticism about its human rights record and government policy towards the PKK issue¹ (Akçeken, 2003). The EU process aims to aid the recognition and expression of Kurdish identity (Saylan, 2012) and also towards

¹ Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) emerged in the 1980s and aims to establish an independent Kurdistan (Palabiyik, 2012).

improving cultural rights of the Kurdish minority (Kirişci, 2011). For instance, the 'Kurdish opening' policy was launched in 2009, allowing teaching of Kurdish in private courses plus the establishment of the Institute of Living Languages to allow postgraduate education in Kurdish (ibid.).

As the pace of EU enlargement grew in the Eastern Europe, the Turkish government was prompted to respond. Turkey applied for full membership of the EU in April 1987 without waiting to pass the last stage of the Ankara Agreement (Samur, 2009). However, this application was declined in 1989 by the EU because of the inability of Turkey to meet its economic and political conditions (Özbudun, 2015). Turkey did then receive the candidate status in 1999 at the Helsinki European Summit which was a turning point for the EU and Turkey relations, thereby initiating the start of Turkish EU accession talks (Acikmese, 2010; Usul, 2014). An 'Accession Partnership' document, which is developed by the European Commission for all EU candidate countries, was prepared for Turkey (Republic of Turkey Ministry for EU Affairs, 2011). This document gives directions for short and long-term priorities plus political and economic criteria – the so-called Copenhagen Criteria – that must be satisfied prior to accession. It also includes the *acquis communautaire*, all the rules underpinning the EU, divided into 35 chapters (Republic of Turkey Ministry for EU Affairs, 2011) that Turkey needed to implement before its candidacy could be considered. Turkey responded to this document by preparing its 'National Programme' in 2001, 2003 and 2008 which aimed to adopt the *acquis* and thereby encapsulated the priorities within detailed timetables for legislative changes, plus required legal amendments and policy investments (Sumer, 2016: 201).

In consequence, after 1999 Turkey faced pressure from the EU to change its policies and institutional structures as part of the conditions attached for being a candidate state. This status required Turkey to take on several responsibilities and realise domestic changes, based on conditionality incentives (Soyaltin, 2013a). But domestic change proved difficult due to the political context. Before the Justice and Development Party (AKP) (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi in Turkish) came to power in 2002, there was a coalition government comprising of three parties; the Democratic Left Party

(DSP), the Motherland Party (ANAP) and the Nationalist Action Party (MHP). Problematically, these parties failed to agree on adopting policies that met the Copenhagen Criteria with regards to minority rights, judicial amendments and asylum policy – all key EU values.

However, the demise of this coalition led to a renewed willingness by the Turkish government to undertake reforms (Tocci, 2014). When the AKP assumed power in 2002, it enacted a number of legislative reforms, including enhancement of human rights, explicitly minority rights. For instance, Kurdish minority cultural rights were strengthened (Saatçioğlu, 2010). According to Saatçioğlu (2010) the AKP, which pursued a reformist agenda, seemed more inclined than other parties to meet the EU's rules. As a result, the credibility of EU membership increased between 1999 and 2004, stimulating further domestic reforms. The EU accession process gave added strength to pro-reformist coalitions vis-a-vis some groups favouring the *status quo* such as the 'Kemalists' and 'nationalists'. As a result of this shifting power asymmetry in central government, the AKP had a 'window of opportunity' to circumvent opposition from anti-reformist veto players in the military, bureaucracy and judiciary (Börzel et al., 2015: 225). Several constitutional reform packages were then adopted in order to meet the political conditions of the Copenhagen Criteria (Soyaltin, 2013a). Although the Turkish government struggled to implement aspects of the EU *acquis communautaire* (Börzel and Soyaltin, 2012), the reform process was nonetheless significantly advanced by 2005 that the EU opened negotiations with Turkey on its potential membership.

This period could be considered a high watermark in the accession process, as thereafter Turkish attempts to comply with the EU *acquis* decelerated and some domestic reforms such as freedom of expression broke down (Tocci, 2014; Aydın-Düzgit and Keyman, 2013; Noutcheva and Aydın-Düzgit, 2012; Saatçioğlu, 2009). Several factors could be considered significant in influencing this deceleration of reforms by the Turkish government. Firstly, a changed rhetoric informed the EU's enlargement approach after 2005 that privileged an 'open-ended' structure for accession negotiations that gave few guarantees to Turkey on eventual membership (Soyaltin, 2013a). Secondly, EU

actors became increasingly concerned over the implications for the Union's governability of accepting new member states in the wake of the 2004 'Eastern' enlargement (ibid.). Thirdly, several leading EU states, including France, Germany and Austria, began to favour a 'privileged partnership' arrangement with Turkey rather than full membership (Schimmelfennig, 2009: 426). Usul (2014) notes that some leaders, most notably Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy, gave speeches against Turkey's full membership. This was inevitably acknowledged as a negative signal amongst Turkish policy-makers (Börzel and Soyaltin, 2012), and they never considered this partnership outcome viable. Finally, the territorial and historical issues have clouded the EU-Turkey relations. Resolution of national border disputes is a core requirement for the EU accession but the ongoing disagreement between Greece and Turkey over Cypriot sovereignty has proved an intractable impediment (see Acikses and Cankut, 2014; Schimmelfennig, 2008; Usul, 2014). According to Öniş (2009: 7) the EU has used the Cyprus issue 'as a tool' to obstruct Turkey's accession process. An increase in anti-European sentiments in Turkey has consequently developed (Soyaltin, 2013a). In addition, the EU insistence that Turkey recognise historical responsibility for the 'Armenian genocide' in 1915 has caused significant tension (Arikan Açar and Rüma, 2007: 450). Because this demand is not part of the Copenhagen Criteria nor stipulated in the official accession process, it has also created resentment towards the EU in Turkey.

Another argument for diminishing credible EU membership is the EU's continued criticism of the Turkish government. In 2011, Turkey was severely reprimanded by the EU for jailing journalists critical of the government and reducing political freedoms (Aydın-Düzgüt and Kaliber, 2016). Also, the Turkish government's reaction to opponents at the Gezi protest in 2013, which was staged against the government's policies, was criticised by the EU members (Kaliber, 2014). The president of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, responded by stating that 'the EP prepares a report and we insist on having our own way' (Usul, 2014: 297). Erdogan then strongly blamed the EU for being insincere and biased because in his view Turkey was the only country that had been waiting for 53 years (Le Monde, 2016). More latterly it has been suggested that

the only current concern of the EU is stopping of the Syrian refugees reaching its member states (Kirişci, 2014). For example, France lifted the veto on opening the chapter on economic and monetary policy in December 2015; because this chapter, had been vetoed under the Sarkozy presidency in 2007, it was opened as part of the EU-Turkey agreement on Syrian refugees as well as the prospect of visa liberalisation (Aydin-Düzgit and Kaliber, 2016). In addition, Erdogan blames the EU for breaking its word on the readmission agreement giving visa-free access to the Schengen Zone for Turkish citizens in return for Turkey accepting the migrants who had arrived in Europe (Le Monde, 2016). Therefore, as Aydin-Düzgit and Kaliber (2016: 1) emphasise the Turkish accession process continued at 'snail's pace' and 15 of the 35 chapters were opened and only one chapter (science and research) was closed until January 2016.

As a result of these factors, there was a significant decline in the credibility of EU membership within successive Turkish governments (Soyaltin, 2013a), meaning the impetus for accession was lost amongst political elites and the public (Tocci, 2014). According to Eurobarometer data, Turkish public opinion on whether EU membership is good for Turkey decreased over time: 75% in 2001; 59% in 2005; and 33% in 2015 (European Commission, 2015d). In this respect, reforms were slowly maintained until 2009, although negotiations with the EU then stalled from 2010 to 2013 (Tocci, 2014). According to Saatçioğlu (2013: 21), the EU significantly politicised the negotiation process after 2005, resulting in high political compliance costs ('high electoral and low survival costs'). However, before that low political costs ('low electoral and low survival costs') existed that supported increased public optimism for membership (ibid: 21). Tocci (2014) argues that Turkey consequently is the only case of a country that has been kept waiting for accession for decades, a feature not lost on domestic politicians. Abdullah Gul, who was the prime minister of Turkey in 2002, argued that the EU was in danger of becoming a 'Christian Club' as EU governments maintained their discriminatory attitudes (Associated Press, 2002). President Recep Tayyip Erdogan did not even mention EU membership in this speech setting out his vision of the AKP until 2023 at the party's

Congress in 2012 (Tocci, 2014). He has also emphasised several times that Turkey is 'fed up' waiting for agreement with the EU (Usul, 2014: 297). Therefore, considering all of these arguments, the possibility of Turkey's EU accession still remains uncertain and elusive (Usul, 2014) and EU membership may be many years ahead (Soyaltin, 2013a).

Despite deceleration in the process of EU accession, there were nonetheless some ongoing institutional reforms (Soyaltin, 2013a) in areas, including minority rights and civil military relations (Yilmaz, 2014; Yilmaz, 2012; Kirişci, 2011; Noutcheva and Aydin-Düzgit, 2012), leading to a variable landscape of Europeanisation. This period, in which the AKP selectively carried out reforms after 2011, also entails a transition to de-Europeanisation from Europeanisation (Sipahioğlu, 2017). De-Europeanisation can be described as a 'loss or weakening of the EU/Europe as a normative/political influence and as a reference point in domestic settings and national public debates' (Aydin-Düzgit and Kaliber, 2016: 5), which is explained in Chapter 2 in detail. These reforms have continued, moreover, in the absence of any recognisable material incentives, in the form of declining EU membership conditionality, raising questions over how this process is occurring and, significantly in terms of this research thesis, it can be theoretically interpreted. Reforms have occurred in the areas of ombudsmanship, minority rights, the justice system and the military (Soyaltin, 2013a). This feature is also evident in the adoption of the *acquis communautaire* Chapters, most notably environmental policy, where Europeanisation is still occurring in Turkish water policy, significantly reshaping the domestic institutional structures.

1.3 The Europeanisation of Turkish water policy

Concern regarding water issues is gradually increasing in Turkey. Its water resources are under threat in regions where agricultural, energy and industrial activities take place (Muluk et al., 2013). The reasons are the increasing need for water resources in the face of the growing threats of climate change, rapid population growth, urbanisation and industrialisation. According to the Turkish government, water will become one of the country's main strategic resources in

the 21st Century (Republic of Turkey Ministry for EU Affairs, 2011). Diminishing water resources could potentially have negative impacts on economic and social development, and food security (ibid.). In response, the Turkish government has actively sought to develop its national water policy according to the principles underpinning EU water policy, specifically with regard to integrated river basin management (Republic of Turkey Ministry for EU Affairs, 2011). As with the wider dynamics of Turkish accession, Europeanisation of national water policy initially started with requirements imposed by the accession agreement in 1999 but – conversely – has continued to develop even beyond 2005, when pressures to implement the EU environmental *acquis communautaire* have declined significantly.

Prior to the beginning of the EU accession process, Turkish water policy went through several different phases of management. Before the establishment of the Turkish Republic, water management under the Ottoman Empire was predominantly centralised around state institutions: a situation that continued up until the 1980s (Demirbilek and Benson, 2018). The approach towards Turkish water policy was primarily to improve water resources, exemplified by the establishment of the State Hydraulic Works in 1950 (Bilen, 2008; Sumer, 2013). Following the 1980s, there were attempts to privatise and decentralise Turkish water resources and its management. Thereafter, the quality of water resources, as an organising paradigm, started to gain strategic political importance. A national environmental law was enacted in 1983 in order to deal with increasing water needs, environmental pollution, population growth, industrialisation and rapid urbanisation and importantly, the Ministry of Environment (MoE) was established in 1991 to oversee its implementation. Afterwards, water management in Turkey became more institutionally complex due to a plethora of national legislative innovations such as the Environment Law, Coastal Law, Water Law, Irrigation Unions Law, Underground Waters Law and the law of the Establishment of State Hydraulic Works (Demirbilek and Benson, 2018). Introduction of different institutions such as the Ministry of Health (MoH), the Ministry of Tourism (MoT), the Ministry of Forestry and Water Affairs (MoFWA), the Ministry of EU, the Ministry of Development and the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, each with responsibilities for water management, added to this institutional complexity (Muluk et al., 2013).

In 1998, 1999, 2000 and 2001 regular EU reports on Turkey's progress towards accession emphasise that Turkish law was still very different from the environmental *acquis* in terms of standards, monitoring requirements and measurement methods (European Commission, 1999: 33; European Commission, 1998). The period since the early 2000s has also seen a gradual Europeanisation of water policy around EU water norms, specifically the Water Framework Directive (WFD)² (Demirbilek and Benson, 2018). Domestic institutional reforms have occurred as a consequence of the accession process, reflecting the multi-level characteristics of the policy. For example, the national General Directorate of Water Management (GDWM), based in the Ministry of Forestry and Water Affairs was established to coordinate water management. This directorate has primarily prioritised a regional river basin management approach, a core feature of the EU WFD, to protect water resources and to ensure their sustainable use. It seeks to prevent pollution in water basins and protect and improve water resources with the collaboration of other related institutions (Muluk et al., 2013). Sumer (2011) describes how the adoption of the WFD by the General Directorate has resulted in changes to the domestic legal framework, organisational settings and policy networks and lastly the institutional structures. Specifically, in 2002 Turkey started to adopt the WFD through the EU-sponsored MATRA programme and Twinning projects³, which attempted to provide technical and financial support to Turkey. In the scope of Turkish water policy, between 1999 and 2005, there was very slow progress in rule adoption although adaptation to the *acquis* started in 2002 with a few EU-led projects. Turkey experienced some progress in legal

² Adopted in 2000, the WFD is based on a river basin approach and aims to improve water body quality and protect Europe's water from pressures from economic activities, urbanisation etc. The main features of the WFD are establishment of river basin districts and institutions; characterisation of water resources; development of management objectives and programmes of measures; river basin planning; public participation; monitoring; evaluation of ecologic conditions etc.

³ MATRA (Implementation of the Water Framework Directive (MATO1/TR/9/3) is a training programme for the EU Acquis for governmental officials and Twinning is another training project which aims to strengthen institutional capacities.

changes, however according to EU progress reports from 2006 to 2009, in terms of implementation and water quality improvements, progress remained weak (European Commission, 2009; European Commission, 2008; European Commission, 2007; European Commission, 2006b). There was very low domestic institutional adaptation to the WFD and other water-related directives as well. Regarding this, there were subsequently more legislative regulations adopted, including the by-laws on Bathing Water Quality and Urban Waste Water Treatment in 2006 (Orhan and Scheumann, 2011). Implementation improved after 2010 with the preparation of River Basin Action Plans (RBAPs) and River Basin Management Plans (RBMPs) and additional legal and institutional arrangements. Some limited engagement by Turkey with the EU's Common Implementation Strategy (CIS)⁴ was conducted during this period, with the attendance of Turkish officials at meetings aimed at developing guidelines for WFD implementation. But in Turkey, unlike in other accession states, implementation was almost exclusively achieved through a series of sequential EU supported 'project' learning initiatives, which as discussed in Chapters 5-7 became the main transfer mechanism for the WFD. Therefore, after 2005, Turkey has continued to adopt the WFD and other EU water directives, even though the pace has been slow.

This development suggests that the diminished credibility of EU membership cannot adequately capture the reasons for the implementation of the water *acquis* in Turkey, as there has been low credible commitment since 2005.

⁴ The WFD has common technical challenges including an extremely demanding timetable, its technical requirements, a variety of solutions regarding technical and practical questions, the problem of capacity building and necessity of development based on technical and scientific expertise (Sumer, 2016; European Commission, 2019b). The elements of the Common Implementation Strategy for the Water Framework Directive (CIS WFD), identified at the meeting in Paris on 23-24 October 2000 by the European Community and Norwegian water directors, encompass: sharing information between Member States (MS) and the European Commission; raising the public awareness about WFD; capacity building in MS for the effective implementation of the WFD and other water Directives; development of stakeholder involvement in implementation of the WFD; establishment of working groups developing guidance and supportive documents on key aspects of the WFD; and lastly promoting a common approach in candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe with regards to the possible involvement of activities related to international river basin districts (European Commission, 2001b). The Common Implementation Strategy for the Water Framework Directive was adopted in May 2001 by the European Commission (European Commission, 2006c). The purpose of the CIS is to create a common understanding plus effective and coherent implementation of the WFD by Member States, as they share European river basins (European Commission, 2019b).

Therefore, while the WFD ‘template’ has not been followed exactly, as discussed in Chapter 2, it continues to be highly influential in Turkish water management today despite declining interest in EU accession and limited external pressure to accept the *acquis communautaire* as a set of organising rules for environmental policy.

1.4 Aims, objectives and questions of the thesis

How then can we explain this rather unique pattern of Europeanisation? Börzel and Soyaltin (2012) note that: ‘overall internal shifts in Turkey are less driven by the EU and its fading conditionality, but by the political agenda of the Turkish ruling elites and their preference for consolidating their political power.’ Regarding this, Saatçioğlu (2010) demonstrates the relationship between ‘compliance’ and ‘conditionality’ according to the European Commission’s Progress Reports. She found a negative tie between compliance and conditionality i.e. an increasing trend in compliance was associated with a decrease in conditionality (ibid.). Between 2002 and 2005, as compliance was rising, conditionality fell consistently due to the issues outlined above. No credible EU conditionality therefore now exists for Turkish accession, leading some academics to question its explanatory capacity as an analytical framework (Yilmaz, 2014). Compliance, in this view, has been mostly due to domestically-driven factors that were independent of EU conditionality and rewards (ibid.). Saatçioğlu (2010) claims that after 2005, the AKP’s adjustment to EU rules seem unlikely to be clarified by both credible conditionality and neoliberal political identity which are important drivers necessary for adoption of EU rules elsewhere. Similarly, EU rule adaptation might not be caused by EU encouragement; it may be more triggered by ‘endogenous dynamics’ within Turkey (Börzel, 2012; Héritier and Knill, 2001: 288).

This observation has, as argued in this thesis, implications for conventional rational choice or historical institutionalism theorising of the external Europeanisation of non-EU states. As will be discussed in Chapter 2, such theory, which has typified many past studies on Turkish Europeanisation (Aydin and Acikmese, 2007; Loewendahl-Ertugal, 2005; Akçeken, 2003) argues that

institutional reform will be driven by material incentives provided by the accession process, i.e. conditionality. But in a situation where conditionality has declined post-2005 (Kubicek, 2011), and compliance to EU rules has increased such theory may well lack analytical credibility. In the case of water policy, conditionality clearly could become increasingly inadequate as an explanatory variable over time due to ongoing EU-led projects and legislative and institutional changes in water policy (Chapter 5), necessitating a search for alternative theoretical explanations for this phenomenon. One potential approach, examined in this thesis (Chapter 3), is through the use of sociological institutionalism, more specifically the inter-linked concepts of socialisation and social learning. Drawn from positivist conceptions of 'conventional' constructivism (see Chapter 4), such theoretical arguments focus on the importance of EU norms in shaping domestic actor interests and identities and how they in turn shape institutional development. Sociological institutionalism itself argues that institutional development is more dependent on endogenous factors such as actors' acceptance of external norms (the 'logic of appropriateness': March and Olsen, 2011) than rational, exogenous determinants. In this sense, these arguments *may* well better capture the 'endogenous dynamics' surrounding EU water policy norm adaptation in Turkey – but an in-depth testing is required.

Sociological institutionalism has informed a number of studies into Europeanisation, primarily through the processes of socialisation and social learning (Börzel et al., 2010). Socialisation depends on social learning and persuasion in order to pave the way for changing actors' preferences via motivating them through EU norms, values and identities (Checkel, 2001). According to one leading scholar, social learning 'involves a process whereby actors, through interaction within a broader institutional context (norms and discursive structures such as those provided by the EU), acquire new interests and preferences in the absence of obvious material incentives' (Checkel, 1999: 548). In other words, the interests of agents and their identities form through interaction with international norms, challenging the 'methodological individualism' of both rational choice institutionalism and historical

institutionalism (ibid.). European norms, values, institutions and policies are redefined by European societies in their domestic and European level debates (Aydin-Düzgıt and Kaliber, 2016). The aim of this study is therefore to examine the explanatory value of a sociological institutionalism perspective and domestic effects of established EU norms and values for the Europeanisation of Turkish water policy. As discussed above, the thesis will argue that rational choice and historical institutionalist arguments on the Europeanisation of non-EU states, focusing on accession conditionality and path dependency respectively, largely fail to explain ongoing adoption of EU water norms in Turkey, necessitating an alternative interpretation. A critical research question that will guide this analysis is therefore: *what is the explanatory value of sociological institutionalism for the Europeanisation of Turkish water policy?*

Meeting this aim will entail the attainment of four main objectives. Firstly, the study will determine the extent to which EU water policy norms, in the form of the Water Framework Directive, have been implemented in Turkey. Secondly, the study will ascertain why Turkish policy-makers continue to implement the WFD and carry out domestic reforms in the absence of credible EU membership incentives. Thirdly, the study will apply a sociological institutionalism perspective, in the form of socialisation and social learning theory, in order to analyse the degree to which, in the context of decreasing credibility of Turkish EU accession, it can interpret Europeanisation in water policy implementation. This analysis focuses on learning within ‘project’ based transfer and not the CIS in Turkey. Unlike in other accession countries, the latter process has had limited direct influence on the implementation of WFD norms in Turkey, and is consequently not considered for analysis. Implications for theorising Europeanisation, particularly instances of stalled accession, will then be discussed. Finally, the study will adopt a more normative stance to examine, on the basis of the analysis, the implications of the research for future policy development. In support of these aims and objectives, this thesis seeks to answer the following empirical questions:

- How has the EU Water Framework Directive been implemented in Turkey?

- To what extent can rational theory explain these implementation patterns?
- Even if there is a decreasing credibility of Turkey's EU accession, how can a sociological institutionalism perspective, with its social learning and socialisation mechanisms explain Europeanisation in Turkey's water governance?
- What are the implications for policy recommendations and future policy predictions with regards to the consequences of this study?

1.5 Methodological framework and data collection

1.5.1 Data collection and analysis

The research questions will be tested using analyses of documentary sources plus interviews with policy elites within a multi case design, reflecting the multi-level nature of EU-Turkish water governance (see Chapter 4). The dependent variable of this study is the domestic institutional reforms and rule transfer at ministerial and local levels, while the independent variable is the EU normative structures, which can be traced through the transferring of EU water policy into Turkish water policy as well as the actor's motivations and willingness to adjust the norms and rules and EU-Turkey relations. This study seeks to assess institutional changes in Turkish water policy in response to EU norms as well as the reasons and motivations of key actors, shaping these changes. For this reason, a mixed qualitative approach has been chosen for the analysis, processing and collection of data. Specifically, an embedded case study research design with analysis conducted at national level (Chapter 5) and two cases, the Konya (closed) (Chapter 6) and the Büyük Menderes catchments at local level (Chapter 7). A process tracing technique was then utilised to analyse the semi-structured interview and the documentary data on the implementation of the WFD at both national (i.e. ministerial) and regional (catchment) level, specifically to examine the extent to which the EU water norms have shaped actors' interests and identities and hence the development of water institutions over time.

Primary data sources used consist of official reports, legal documents, including Commission Progress Reports, National reports and the Accession Partnership with Turkey. Besides this, semi-structured interviews were conducted with over 40 policy elites in Turkey (Ankara, Istanbul, Konya and Aydin) and in Brussels including officials and policy-makers from the Turkish Ministry of Forestry and Water Affairs and the European Commission. Secondary sources used include academic journals (regarding Europeanisation, EU-Turkey relations, Turkish water policy), books, plus publications from conferences and seminars. Using the primary and the secondary data, the interaction between Turkey and the EU in the field of water management was examined by identifying the norms, ideas, rules, policies and actors' behaviours. The information collected from individual interviews was cross-referenced between primary and secondary sources as well as triangulated with other interviews.

1.6 The structure of the thesis

The thesis is structured in the following way.

Chapter 1 briefly examines EU-Turkey relations and how EU process has impacted the changes in Turkish water policy. It also includes the main and sub-research questions and hypotheses as well as the rationale for studying Europeanisation in Turkish water policy through the sociological institutionalism. Additionally, it briefly mentions the theoretical framework of the thesis and data collection methods used.

In **Chapter 2**, the existing studies on Turkish accession are reviewed and critiqued to support the underlying argument of the thesis, namely that rational choice and historical institutionalism theories increasingly cannot interpret Europeanisation adequately in the period since 2005, thereby necessitating alternative theoretical explanations. Here, it makes the case that other perspectives such as sociological institutionalism could provide a more credible explanation for ongoing Europeanisation in sectors such as water policy but there is a requirement for testing this argument.

Chapter 3 starts by conceptualising a novel theoretical framework and mechanisms used to explain the impact of the EU on Turkish water policy in this study. In this respect, it focuses on sociological institutionalism as an alternative to rational choice or historical institutionalism explanations, more specifically, the interrelated key theoretical concepts of socialisation and social learning, drawn from the Europeanisation literature. The theoretical framework combines these conceptual-theoretical arguments with insights from the organisational literature on environmental management to assess the degree of change occurring around actors' interests.

Chapter 4 includes the research design and methods. This research mainly focuses on the qualitative data collection techniques, including process tracing, case study and semi-structured interviewing. Also, in this research, participatory observation has been used through attendance at the Büyük Menderes and Konya (closed) river basin committee's meetings. During the meetings, participants were interviewed in order to get their personal opinions on the committee meetings and river basin management approach that Turkey aims to adopt. Participants were contacted in order to crosscheck their comments and answers received during the meetings. Additionally, semi-structured interviews were conducted with officials from the MoFWA, MoEU and EU Delegation to Turkey so as to gain a better understanding of learning processes within the basin management approach in the EU accession process and provide explanations for continued changes in the scope of water policy. Also, officials from the Directorate-General for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR) and the Directorate-General for Environment (DG Environment) were interviewed to get their views about ongoing processes in the water sector in Turkey.

Chapter 5 introduces the fundamental principles of the Water Framework Directive and looks at the implementation of EU water policy in Turkey at national level. The chapter focuses on institutional changes to identify how institutional actors were shaped by EU norms to implement policy changes. The analysis conducted uncovers how policy-makers learn EU water policy by analysing the trainings and the EU-funded projects including IPA I-II and

TAIEX programmes. Finally, it analyses socialisation and social learning as applied to this empirical material to determine how effective they are in explaining the patterns of Europeanisation detected at national level.

Chapter 6 examines implementation of the WFD at regional level in the case study of the Konya (closed) basin by considering the new institutional settings emerging and the institutional actors involved. Also, it analyses the socialisation and social learning, and examines the degree to which they can potentially explain Europeanisation.

Chapter 7 introduces the second subcase study of the Büyük Menderes basin at regional level. It examines the institutional changes and local stakeholders involved. It also examines the degree to which socialisation and social learning have occurred in three historical phases.

Chapter 8 provides a synthesis of the multi-level theoretical analysis by relating the findings back to the literature. This chapter also discusses the added value of sociological institutionalism for explaining Europeanisation in Turkish water policy at national and regional levels, relative to more rational theoretical explanations. A point developed is that different degrees of socialisation and social learning are apparent both at national and regional levels but overall Europeanisation impacts of the WFD are relatively, and surprisingly, strong. Reasons for these patterns are identified, along with a discussion of the explanatory value of sociological institutionalism in this context. The chapter also reflects on what this analysis might predict for the future of institutional development of Turkish water policy.

Chapter 9 concludes the study by reflecting back on the research aims/questions and objectives, situating the findings within the literature and developing some avenues for future research.

Chapter 2: Explaining Europeanisation in Turkish accession: A sociological institutionalism perspective?

2.1 Introduction

As identified in Chapter 1, Europeanisation is still occurring in some Turkish policy sectors, even though conversely the EU accession process itself has largely stalled. This observation presents something of an academic paradox; as to date much of the theoretical explanation for this differential pattern of Europeanisation has reflected a rational perspective based on explaining the effects of conditionality as an explanatory variable. Following on from the arguments developed in Chapter 1, this chapter therefore helps to identify the main research themes and questions through a critique of the existing literatures on Europeanisation in Turkey and begins to bring these debates in relation to Turkish water policy. As explained in Chapter 1, the main research puzzle examined is why, given the lack of accession progress in other areas and in view of the lack of credible and timely commitment to full EU membership, does it appear that Turkish water policy is being amended in line with wider European policy objectives, and specifically the Water Framework Directive? This chapter therefore develops the case that, in conditions of declining accession incentives, namely conditionality, theoretical alternatives to rational theory should be considered in explanations.

Initially, this chapter provides an overview of conditionality to show how it has become the main instrument for supporting the accession process. Different forms of conditionality are then discussed, prior to identifying the main arguments forwarded by scholars on the conditions required for the effective application of conditionality. Although scholars diverge in their arguments, three broad conditions are detected, namely rewards, credibility and domestic conditions.

The chapter then reviews Europeanisation studies on Turkey to show the main arguments forwarded regarding the accession process. In this respect, as the chapter goes on to illustrate, conditionality was only effective in Turkey during the period between 1999 and 2005 due to several supporting factors.

Thereafter, the influence of conditionality has declined in relation to a stalling accession process, resulting in a differential landscape of Europeanisation with some policy sectors paradoxically showing growing convergence around EU accession criteria while others seeing reverses in progress.

However, for several scholars the EU's conditional incentives have played an important role in diffusing its policies and institutional structures to the countries pursuing EU membership (Checkel, 2005a; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005b; Sedelmeier, 2012). One evident criticism of this literature is that, since the majority of Europeanisation studies focus on the rules-based notion of conditionality as their explanatory variable for convergence, they may be increasingly inadequate in explaining the stalled accession process in Turkey since 2005 and the resultant uneven patterns of sectoral Europeanisation, thereby presenting an important research gap. After reviewing arguments in the Turkish accession literature, an alternative hypothesis put forward by the study is that, in the increasing absence of such adaptation pressures, Europeanisation in some policy sectors may be better explained through sociological institutionalism which emphasises the influence of EU normative and ideational structures on actor identities and interests rather than rule-based compliance. However, the point is then made that this rather provisional assumption requires in-depth testing to empirically examine the explanatory power of such a perspective.

As argued in Chapter 1, a major policy sector in which Europeanisation continues, despite little evident conditionality pressures after 2005, is water management. Turkish water policy remained largely indigenously derived until the early 2000s when EU governance norms around integrated water management, primarily in the form of the Water Framework Directive, began to be implemented due to the demands of accession conditionality. Implementation has however continued for the past decade, helping to fundamentally restructure Turkish water policy even though the conditionality rationale has declined significantly, thereby raising questions over how, and indeed why, this pattern of Europeanisation is occurring. Consequently, this

chapter posits the argument that for explaining such water policy development, sociological institutionalism could potentially offer a credible analysis.

2.2 Studies of external downloading

Many studies of external Europeanisation in non-EU states have primarily focused on rational choice institutionalism interpretations that examine accession conditionality as the key independent variable for state downloading of EU policy (see Börzel, 2002; Elbasani, 2011; Börzel and Risse, 2012; Schimmelfennig, 2010; Börzel and Pamuk, 2012; Lavenex and Uçarer, 2004; Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2009; Demirbilek and Benson, 2017). In order to understand why these claims may now be less credible in the Turkish context, the chapter will first conceptualise conditionality in order to establish its key features and rationales. The conditions that, according to academic studies, determine conditionality effectiveness are then reviewed. Although criteria differ between studies, the notions of material rewards, the credibility of promises and rewards made as well as the favourability of domestic conditions are prominent. While these features were evidently visible in the immediate period after 1999 in Turkey, the chapter shows that they lack significant credibility after 2005, thereby presenting significant explanatory problems for rational choice theory.

2.2.1 Conceptualising ‘conditionality’

Conditionality is one of the primary strategies that the EU employs for ensuring accession, and hence is significant for applicant countries in terms of domestic adaptation (Özer, 2012; Sedelmeier, 2011). Conditionality can have an impact on target governments directly via intergovernmental bargaining or indirectly via the differential empowerment of political actors (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004). In essence, ‘it tries to manipulate the cost-benefit calculations of target actors through creating positive and negative incentives’ in the accession process (Börzel and Risse, 2012: 7). Here, the EU obliges candidate states to adopt and implement specific political, economic and administrative criteria, described below, prior to accession negotiations on full membership (European Commission, 2016a). The basic logic of conditionality is to achieve Europeanisation of domestic contexts through their convergence

around EU norms, thereby ensuring harmonisation with existing member states (Ugur, 2013). Only when these conditions are achieved and negotiations closed the EU can move forward to opening accession talks with the candidate country (European Commission, 2016a).

Membership of the EU, called the 'eventual reward', therefore underlies the basic philosophy of the conditionality strategy (Lavenex and Uçarer, 2004: 425; Özer, 2012). Accession requires transposing the *acquis communautaire* into domestic policy in return for eventual membership (ibid.). Consequently, the conditionality mechanism can be seen as a type of positive encouragement to states that adjust to EU rules (Ugur, 2013). Without such positive incentives, states could become politically distanced from the accession process (Sedelmeier, 2011). Kelley (2004: 450) therefore claims that conditionality was a 'strong motivation factor' for convergence in some Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, such as Latvia, Slovakia and Estonia, prior to EU membership. In this respect, candidates are guaranteed the promised rewards after implementing the requirements of the EU. Candidates also recognise that they can get the reward as long as they meet the requirements of the EU. Therefore, conditionality affords countries a certain level of political security in implementing changes, often vital to governments in maintaining domestic support, which is incumbent upon their own compliance to EU regulations (Sedelmeier, 2011).

Conditionality has emerged as the key mechanism for accession through several iterations (Grabbe, 2006). Firstly, between 1989 and 1993 the emphasis of conditionality was placed on trade and aid programmes, beginning with the 'Phare' programme in 1989 (ibid.). This programme aimed to subsidise technical assistance and thereby encourage the economic transformation of post-communist states. A democracy programme was then established in 1992 in order to consolidate the EU's free market agenda in these countries (ibid.). Secondly, the Copenhagen Criteria were added in 1993 in order to enhance political and economic stability in pre-accession states. As identified above, the Criteria include those aimed at convergence on:

- (a) *Political conditions*: improving the stability of institutions, which internalise the protection of minorities, human rights, the rule of law and democracy;
- (b) *Economic conditions*: ensuring the effective functioning of the market economy and the ability to overcome competitive pressures;
- (c) *Administrative and institutional conditions*: the implementation and acceptance of the *acquis communautaire* which is divided into 35 Chapters, including the full body of EU rules, political principles and judicial rules (European Commission, 2014).

Due to these criteria, the accession process is made highly explicit for candidate countries in terms of EU expectations (Grabbe, 2002). They also ensure that candidate countries should have the ability to take on the obligations of membership, consisting of political, economic and monetary union (European Commission, 2014). Thirdly, the EU initiated a period of tightened conditionality (1998-2002) whereby tasks for candidacy were specified in several Accession Partnerships (Grabbe, 2006). These formal agreements with candidate states focused primarily on internalising the EU *acquis* via 'demand driven' conditions created by the European Commission (Grabbe, 2006: 28).

2.3. Conditionality effectiveness

Attempts have subsequently been made by scholars to categorise the conditions for effective conditionality, primarily through studies on CEECs in the period since 1993. In understanding why these arguments lack explanatory power when applied to Europeanisation in Turkey, it is important first to clarify how the conditionality strategy works and is theoretically effective. Although arguments on conditionality differ (see Alessandri, 2011; Aydin and Acikmese, 2007; Börzel et al., 2015; Celik, 2010; Celik and Rumelili, 2006; Dagdeveren, 2014a; Loewendahl-Ertugal, 2005; Oder, 2012; Öniş, 2003; Özbudun, 2015; Schimmelfennig et al., 2003; Schimmelfennig et al., 2006; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2006; Sümer, 2009; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004), a review of the Europeanisation literature shows that there are broadly three main conditions required to implement the conditionality strategy: (1) rewards (such as technical support, economic aids, institutional ties, trade and cooperation

agreements and EU membership); (2) credibility of promises and rewards; and (3) favourable domestic conditions (Coskun, N/D; Schimmelfennig, 2003). Therefore, successful rule transfer is argued to depend on the credibility of conditionality, domestic conditions and rule adoption (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004: 661; Sedelmeier, 2011: 12).

2.3.1 Rewards

As stated above, the EU offers target states incentives, or *rewards*, to fulfil political conditions, these taking the form of financial aids, institutional ties and, most importantly, membership (Coskun, N/D). Firstly, one of the significant factors for applicant countries is *a strategic calculation of rewards versus compliance costs*, suggesting that they undertake a form of cost-benefit analysis (Sümer, 2009). Where rewards are high vis-à-vis costs, then the argument is that implementation will follow (*ibid.*). The core external incentives here are the setting of institutional ties or association by the EU and the opening of negotiations on accession (*ibid.*). Here, the Commission prefers to prioritise the conditionality mechanism during negotiations and also threatens target governments with halting negotiations if there is backsliding in implementation (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004). Governments must then calculate the costs of non-compliance against the higher benefits (or rewards) of accession, providing a powerful incentive for them to observe conditionality.

Different forms of rewards therefore enter this strategic cost-benefit analysis. It has been argued that the EU's 'democratic conditionality', in terms of requirements to adopt its democratic and human rights norms, establishes powerful incentives, including financial assistance, membership and trade advantages (Checkel, 2005a: 809; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004: 669). Democratic or political conditionality is used through 'international reinforcement by reward' (Schimmelfennig et al., 2003: 495; Schimmelfennig, 2008). Schimmelfennig et al. (2003: 496) claim that 'reinforcement is a form of social control by which pro-social behaviour is rewarded and anti-social behaviour is punished.' Here, the anti-social behaviour is equated with non-implementation. Political conditionality then means that the EU has significant

effects on the rules of liberal democracy in the candidate countries, which is affected and restricted by domestic parameters (Sedelmeier, 2011). In parallel, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2004: 670) argue that in order for *acquis conditionality* to provide effective rule transfer, there should be political development within target governments which have the ability to mobilise 'reform-oriented' political forces. A significant driver for rule adaptation, they argue, is cost-benefit analysis undertaken by target governments (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004).

The rewards for effective rule transfer are also observed by Grabbe (2006). Here, the EU has some accession mechanisms to encourage domestic changes through conditionality (Grabbe, 2002; Grabbe, 2006). Most notably, it is suggested that the EU plays a 'gate-keeping' role in which it controls access to successive stages of the accession process (Grabbe, 2006: 1020). Although aid and trade are important mechanisms to push candidates into undertaking initial policy changes, reaching the subsequent stages within the accession process, for example, gaining candidate status, initiating the negotiations and opening-closing the chapters, are important conditionality rewards (Grabbe, 2001). Other incentives include the provision of legislative and institutional templates ('models') for integrating the *acquis* into domestic policies, whereby the EU helps identify legal and institutional gaps in order to ease the adaptation costs of domestic adoption (Grabbe, 2001; Grabbe, 2006). Another obvious reward for countries is access to financial aid and technical assistance, i.e. 'capacity building' (Börzel and Risse, 2012: 7). The EU supplies various resources through programmes such as 'Phare' and Twinning projects from particular members, especially Germany, and dedicated funds managed by the European Commission (EC) (Grabbe, 2006). Twinning projects are highly effective in providing coordination between public administrations of EU member states and accession countries in the latter's implementation of EU policies (European Commission, 2015b). Finally, the European Commission engages in benchmarking and monitoring via 'Accession Partnerships' and regular progress reports. The first Accession Partnership document was prepared for Turkey by the EU in 2001, encapsulating 117 short and medium-

term measures that Turkey was obliged to harmonise with the Copenhagen Criteria (Ugur, 2010: 978). Although not a reward as such, meeting the policy priorities specified can lead to progression to further stages in the accession process (Grabbe, 2001). Conversely, failure to achieve them can slow down accession.

2.3.2 Credibility of rewards and threats

Secondly, *credibility* is essential for carrying out conditionality. Such credibility is based on a realistic assessment of the conditions that candidate countries believe they are able to achieve to gain membership status based on the fulfilment of EU requirements (Coskun, N/D). They also need to be aware of fully meeting the requirement to receive the reward (Sedelmeier, 2011). In addition, there must be objective criteria as to when the fulfilment of conditions have been evaluated (Coskun, N/D). However, in the event of non-compliance the EU can threaten target governments by withholding the rewards, so Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2004: 666) claim that ‘the likelihood of rule adoption increases with the credibility of conditional threats and promises.’ In this respect, if candidates are convinced of receiving rewards when they adopt the required rules, they also ought to be convinced that rewards will be denied if they do not meet the conditions. Thus, in this argument, conditionality should be effective for rule adoption in candidate states where such views exist (Macmillan, 2012: 245). As a result, it is suggested that bilateral trust between the EU and candidates must exist as it can support a more credible conditionality strategy (Coskun, N/D).

2.3.3 Domestic conditions

Lastly, *favourable domestic conditions* must, according to theorists, exist for conditionality to effectively function. These conditions refer to the ability of candidate country governments to fulfil the EU’s conditions, which can depend on the size of adoption costs and their distribution amongst political actors: both held as important factors for domestic actors to accept or deny the conditions (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004: 666). Rule transfer, moreover, requires a decision to be taken by the target state, aiming to balance EU and domestic

pressures to increase its political benefits (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004: 664). In relation to this argument, it is also vital that the expected benefits should be more than the political costs in order to provide these favourable domestic conditions (Schimmelfennig et al., 2003).

In addition to adoption costs, the support of domestic political veto players for EU accession is also another important factor for rule adoption at the domestic level, because these actors are generally not prone to change the status quo (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004: 664). Therefore, supportive veto players and low adoption costs can increase the likelihood of compliance. According to Schimmelfennig (2003: 498), societal actors are also important for enforcing government compliance. The role of societal actors consequently must be strengthened to prevent their exclusion from policy-making on EU accession. Finally, changes can be introduced in response to discontent within society after intervening events, such as economic shocks and corruption where demand for reforms emerge. Therefore, the lower the domestic costs of implementing change and the higher the influence of societal actors, the more likely conditionality is to be effective.

Together, on the basis of these studies, these three conditions are held to be significant for the establishment of active and effective conditionality within countries. However, while they have collectively provided helpful explanatory frameworks for CEE accession states, a review of the literature on Turkish Europeanisation suggests that they have not been entirely evident within this context over the past decade.

2.4 The effectiveness of EU conditionality and compliance in Turkey

In order to determine the functionality of conditionality in Turkey, two periods within the EU accession process need to be analysed using the above conditions. The first period demonstrates that, due to the influence of factors such as rewards and a supportive domestic political context, good progress in implementing reforms occurred immediately after the recognition of Turkey's candidate status in 1999. Yet, these three conditions have manifestly declined in the second period which started after accession negotiations began in 2005,

suggesting the diminishing influence of conditionality (Coskun, N/D; Saatçioğlu, 2010). These two periods will now be considered in turn.

2.4.1 The effectiveness of conditionality on Turkish policy (1999-2005)

Yilmaz (2016) claims that Turkey made several reforms in many areas including civil-military relations, the rule of law, freedom of expression and minority and human rights in parallel with the Copenhagen Criteria so as to enhance democracy and human rights because of strong conditionality, the empowerment of political actors and a membership perspective (see Öniş, 2009; Müftüler Baç, 2005; Narbone and Tocci, 2007). There was a coalition government until 2002, consisting of the Democratic Left Party (DSP), Motherland Party (ANAP) and the Nationalist Action Party (MHP), which undertook some reforms. However, the MHP was resistant to some reforms including minority rights. When the AKP came into power as a pro-EU and pro-reformist government, the EU process was triggered, with support from the main opposition Republican People's Party (CHP).

Using the three indicators, it is possible to show that a conditionality perspective can explain the accession process during this period. In this respect, rewards generated by the granting of candidacy status in 1999 were a clear factor in motivating domestic change. Also, the credibility of EU incentives was high, in turn supporting and supported by a favourable domestic political context.

2.4.1.1 Sizeable rewards

The rewards provided by the accession process were clearly influential during this period and came in two main forms: the promise of EU membership; and material support from the EU. Conditionality driven by rewards was initially a strong driver for domestic reforms and attempts to meet the Copenhagen Criteria (Yilmaz and Soyaltin, 2014: 12). Schimmelfennig et al. (2006: 7) therefore refer to the 'golden carrot' of membership as 'reinforcement by reward'. Under this logic, 'a state adopts EU rules if the benefits of EU rewards exceed the domestic adoption cost' (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004: 664), and it works via intergovernmental material bargaining in which a

government is offered rewards or materials in return for rule adoption (Schimmelfennig, 2003: 495). As such, it is a critical bargaining strategy of EU conditionality and forces states to adopt the *acquis* (Yilmaz and Soyaltin, 2014). It also involves carrots and sticks: the EU delivers the rewards if a target state meets the conditions (Yilmaz and Soyaltin, 2014: 12). If not, the EU prefers to intervene coercively by changing its cost-benefit assessments and uploading extra costs on to states ('reinforcement by punishment'), or supplements them with extra benefits and unconditional support which infers 'reinforcement by support' (Schimmelfennig, 2003: 497; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004: 663-664). In the case of Turkey, these measures were initially aimed at strengthening institutional capacity through financial and technical assistance (Börzel and Schimmelfennig, 2017).

In this respect, the Copenhagen political criteria (democratic conditionality) were employed by the EU as an incentive to open the accession negotiations in this early period (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2006). Regarding this approach, Turkey was being judged objectively against meeting human rights, democracy and rule of law criteria rather than cultural and religious factors. Attainment of these criteria would, it was argued, provide positive incentives for its accession both domestically and across the EU. If Turkey met the EU's criteria then internal political opponents of Union membership would not be able to block the opening of accession negotiations (Schimmelfennig, 2008: 17). Also, the commitment made by the European Council in 2002 in Copenhagen was that as long as Turkey met the Copenhagen political criteria, the accession negotiations would be opened without delay in December 2004 (Commission of European Communities, 2004). Schimmelfennig (2008: 24) therefore claims that:

'... [o]nce Turkey was accepted as a candidate in 1999, when the constellation of member state preferences was particularly favourable, its further progress to membership... only depended on meeting the institutionalised enlargement criteria of the EU. When Turkey had gone a long way in fulfilling the EU's demands, the opening negotiations could

not be denied legitimately, even though member states opposition had increased rather than softened in the meantime.'

The incentives provided by the Criteria therefore established a strong and seemingly transparent reward for compliance. According to Schimmelfennig et al. (2006), the level of EU incentives was certainly high between 1987-1999 and 1999-2003, because Turkey had already joined other European organisations, including the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the Council of Europe (COE) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), alongside the signing of the Ankara Association Agreement in 1964 that consisted of a general membership perspective.

Additionally, the size of domestic costs should be compatible with EU policies and cost distributions among political actors. If domestic actors aim to gain benefits from the domestic changes regarding EU rules, their expectation is for low adoption costs resulting in high political support (Özer, 2012). This feature was certainly evident after the Helsinki Summit in 1999 when the ruling AKP had greater commitment to EU rules and reforms than amongst both left and right-wing parties, and consequently implemented several domestic reforms. These reforms included consolidating civilian power against the military and religious factions which were also compatible with its own preferences and interests (Sipahioğlu, 2017; Özer, 2012). Therefore, it is clear that the EU conditionality strategy had a vital impact on the Turkish democratisation process in this period through the wider rewards it offered. Other types of rewards were prominent during this period as well, these being primarily technical and financial, i.e. 'reinforcement by support'. This incentive refers to technical and financial aids including market access, institutional ties and Twinning projects, plus capacity building under the Instruments for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) mechanism (Schimmelfennig, 2003: 496) which provides technical and financial support to enlargement countries by the EU (European Commission, 2016b).

2.4.1.2 Credibility

One feature of the positive rewards offered by the accession process was increased credibility of EU membership amongst Turkish domestic political

actors after 1999. A clear membership perspective emerged amongst domestic politicians after Turkey received candidacy at the Helsinki Summit (Coskun, N/D). This perspective created pressure for reforms, and enhanced accession credibility took the form of heightened perceptions of the legitimacy of domestic changes within Turkey and the increasing identification of Turkish political elites with the process (Yilmaz and Soyaltin, 2014: 12).

Although the credibility of EU membership was visibly low between 1987 and 1999, it did then increase after Turkey gained candidacy status in 1999 up to 2003. Also, the legitimacy of EU accession was high between 1987-1999 and 1999-2003. After Turkey was declared as a candidate at the Helsinki European Council in 1999, a turning point was reached in Turkey-EU relations (Öniş, 2003: 12). The candidacy status provided what Öniş calls a 'credible membership perspective' that incentivised Turkey to develop its democracy in line with EU values and improving human rights (ibid.). The EU pushed Turkey to undertake reforms via Accession Partnership Documents (APD) in 2000 that comprised the medium and short-term requirements of the Copenhagen Criteria, including around political and economic issues such as minority rights and the abolition of torture (Öniş, 2003). Afterwards, Turkey achieved good progress in adapting to the Copenhagen Criteria through undertaking several domestic reforms (Özer, 2012), including two reform packages adopted by the Turkish government in October 2001 and August 2002 respectively, these abolishing the death penalty and permitting Kurdish language radio and TV broadcasting (Schimmelfennig, 2008: 17). In addition, State Security Courts were abolished and the 'Foreign Language Education Law' was amended to allow teaching of other languages in private courses (Cengiz and Hoffmann, 2013: 422). As a result of these reforms, the European Council affirmed that 'on the basis of report and recommendation from the Commission, that Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria, the European Union will open accession negotiations with Turkey without delay' (Council, 2004: 4). As a result, Özer (2012: 52) states that 'the short-term incentive of the opening of accession negotiations was clear and credible in stimulating domestic reform.' Accession conditionality therefore provided the EU with a transparent and 'powerful tool' to

encourage Turkey to adopt the *acquis communautaire* and implement institutional changes (Heidbreder, 2011: 3; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2006).

While the identification of Turkish elites with Western identity was high when Turkey became a candidate in 1999, compliance was initially slow. However, after the AKP came into power in 2001, norm resonance with the EU was high with domestic political adaptation costs lowered in parallel (Schimmelfennig et al., 2006). There were some endogenous explanations behind the AKP's compliance with EU rules and norms including electoral concerns given how the AKP won national elections by describing themselves as a reformist, neoliberal party. Also, support for accession strengthened the AKP's power against Kemalist elites who recognised conservative Islamist parties as threats to the republican structure of the state. Therefore, Schimmelfennig (2003: 509) claims that in this period compliance was motivated with regard to a cost-benefit calculation taken by the Turkish government on how accession could strengthen its domestic power.

2.4.1.3 Domestic conditions

The subsequent period of 2002-2005 has been described as the 'golden age of Europeanisation' as these conditionality-inspired reforms significantly reshaped domestic Turkish governance (Alessandri, 2011: 71; Öniş, 2008: 37; Grigoriadis, 2016). Following the EU leaders' meeting at the Copenhagen European Council in 2002, member states decided that accession negotiations could be opened in two years' time as long as Turkey domestically harmonised the Copenhagen Criteria (Güney, 2015: 113). Sedelmeier (2011: 14) indicates:

'A special case of low domestic adjustment costs are instances in which governments can expect intrinsic benefits in domestic politics from adopting EU rules. For example, in the case of Turkey, EU demands about civilian control over the military fit well with the preferences of the AKP government.'

The ruling AKP therefore developed a strong commitment to implementing EU rules, adopting several domestic reforms in line with consolidating civilian power against military and religious influences which was compatible with EU preferences. The EU conditionality approach therefore initially proved effective in influencing domestic conditions, particularly when the Turkish Parliament passed several major legislative reform packages (Schimmelfennig et al., 2003). Between 2001 and 2003, these included developing freedom of speech, the abolition of the death penalty and torture, minority protection rules, education in minority languages - especially for the Kurds - plus the broadcasting and teaching of the different languages and dialects traditionally used by Turkish citizens in their daily lives, again including Kurdish (Özer, 2012). Further, reforms on civilian control over the military were made from 2002 to 2004 (Acikmese, 2010). These reforms included changing the composition of and expanding civilian participation in the National Security Council (MGK), a body that the EU always perceived as a disruptive influence in improving democracy due to its military dominance, and through the abolishment of State Security Courts (Güney, 2015; Tocci, 2005).

When we look at the above reforms, it is clear that political actors indicated their strong support for compliance in this period. This is because rewards, particularly membership conditionality, were clear and credible and the possibility of opening negotiations on the Copenhagen Criteria was high. Therefore, in this period it could be argued that the EU conditionality strategy was highly effective in supporting the Europeanisation process in line with the Copenhagen Criteria (Özer, 2012). In the period of 1999-2005, democratic conditionality consequently became an overriding precedent within Turkish politics. However, since 2005 it has become less visible as *acquis* conditionality has also become less prominent. Significant reforms in terms of democratisation in Turkey did lead to negotiations on full membership with the EU being initiated in 2005. Yet, this process increasingly faltered. The factors causing this stagnation of conditionality are reviewed in the following section.

2.4.2 The effectiveness of conditionality after the launching of the accession negotiations (2005-present)

The influence of conditionality altered markedly in the period after 2005, with declines in the domestic perceptions of accession rewards, credibility and favourable domestic conditions. Following 2005, rewards have become much more blurred, credibility of EU incentives is lower and domestic political conditions have become less supportive of accession. According to Yilmaz (2016: 87), after Europeanisation caused domestic changes in several areas including on minority rights, human rights and the rule of law in the period of 1999-2004, domestic reforms decelerated. However, they selectively continued between 2005 and 2010, when domestic reforms were 'cherry picked' by the ruling government, taking into account domestic reasons and political preferences rather than prioritising the EU. Accordingly, as Kaliber (2012: 227) emphasises, '...domestic actors are not mediators, but creators of Europeanisation.' Beside this, de-Europeanisation became dominant from 2011 in several areas including media freedom and the rule of law, civil society, higher education and so on (Yilmaz, 2016). In consequence, this section aims to show that conditionality is potentially less credible as an explanatory variable for Europeanisation under the conditions identified, necessitating alternative explanations.

2.4.2.1 Rewards

A significant issue in the declining influence of conditionality noted by scholars (Sedelmeier, 2012; Schimmelfennig, 2008; Aydin and Acikmese, 2007) is the diminishing rewards it appeared to offer. One reason is that the EU itself sought to change the terms of accession and hence the rewards on offer. This approach contrasts with the experience of other states such as those in CEECs, who have been offered the reward ('carrot') of full membership.

In 2004, a significant proportion of European political actors, including from Germany, France and Austria (e.g. Christian Democratic and Conservative parties), increasingly favoured Turkey's '*privileged partnership*' as an alternative to full membership, owing to its cultural and religious traits (Ananicz, 2007;

Özer, 2012; Sipahioğlu, 2017). This refers to a change in the size of the reward and it was also perceived that the accession date had now become ambiguous and unclear. Rather than conveying the full benefits of EU membership, this reduced status merely covers the free movement of goods, services and capital, market liberalisation and agricultural trade (Hakura, 2005: 1). Usul (2014) notes that rather than supporting full membership some leaders, most notably Angela Merkel and Nikolas Sarkozy, had given keynote speeches against this outcome. For example, Angela Merkel stated in 2004 that “We do not have the power to accept Turkey [in to the EU]. That is why we offer Turkey a privileged partnership.” She also expressed in January 2015 that “I still have concerns on Turkey’s membership of the EU but I always supported the talks to continue” (TRTWORLD, 2017). Nicolas Sarkozy then followed up this sentiment in 2016 by stating that full “Turkish membership in the EU is unthinkable” (Independent, 2016). Given the reduced rewards on offer, Turkey was unsurprisingly against the idea of a privileged partnership (Ananicz, 2007; Tocci, 2007a). One reason expressed by Turkish politicians is that, if Turkey becomes a privileged member, it will only be able to join EU programmes regarding the environment, research and development and education, incorporating the Erasmus programme (ibid.). Conversely, it would not have a voice in the decision-making process (Karakaş, 2007).

A diminishing link between membership and political conditions was apparent after accession negotiations started in 2005 (Coskun, N/D). In relation to this point, the deceleration of Turkey’s alignment with the EU has occurred in conjunction with the ‘open-ended’ structure of the EU accession negotiations, as written into the accession agreement (Tocci, 2014: 4), and the monitoring process designed to ensure fulfillment of the political criteria (Yildirim et al., 2013; Aydin and Esen, 2007; Narbone and Tocci, 2007: 85). This structure refers to the significance of the EU’s capacity to embrace new EU members without risking its governability and minimising the risk of candidates having inadequate compliance performance for the reforms (Soyaltin, 2013a; Ugur, 2010). This open-ended negotiating structure and attendant weak commitment to EU membership by the EU itself caused backsliding in the expectations of the

Turkish public and increased the political costs of reforms (Ugur, 2010: 983) because it infers that the outcome/reward cannot be guaranteed, and timings for rewards become ambiguous. In other words, with no guaranteed incentives (rewards) of membership, trust in EU institutions has increasingly dropped (ibid.). In turn, this cost-benefit decline has had an important influence on the credibility of Turkey's commitment to membership and reform implementation (Ugur, 2010: 971-972).

2.4.2.2 Domestic conditions

The declining importance of conditionality therefore became a significant factor in altering domestic political conditions from supportive of EU membership to, at best, ambivalent, with increasing opposition becoming apparent in recent years. Thus, these 'subjective' and 'political' conditions have had an adverse impact on the cost-benefit calculations of Turkish policy-makers regarding EU accession. They have begun to doubt whether full membership for Turkey is possible even if they adapt to the EU's requirements (Özer, 2012). Due to this perception, reformist forces have lost their power and domestic reforms have halted, while the number of veto players - or 'actors whose agreement is necessary for a change in the status quo' - has risen alongside the consolidation of existing players' power the high costs of rule adoption (Özer, 2012; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004). Although, generally speaking, Turkish elites described themselves as 'western', after the Luxembourg Summit in 1997 they became demoralised and disappointed by Turkey not being considered a possible member state. The EU requirements were mainly designed for Kemalists, disabling internal security and assigning minority groups with greater autonomy, but this caused a separation of the state. Therefore, there was a dissociation between the Kemalists and reform-oriented elites (Schimmelfennig, 2003: 507-508). Besides this, the MHP held a Eurosceptic position after the 2007 elections because of the accession requirements, including on minority rights and the Armenian and Cyprus issues, elaborated upon below, which were seen as threatening to the Turkish identity and unity.

Yilmaz and Soyaltin (2014) focus on domestic factors for the reforms in the post-2005 period, considering them to be a consequence of the lack of capability of conditionality to elucidate change. But even if the credibility of conditionality and external incentives have decreased, there are still ongoing reforms in some areas such as minority rights and corruption. Regarding this point, the authors suggest that these ongoing reforms could be explained by the preferences of domestic actors, including the media, Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs), political elites and the interests of the AKP. However, after 2005, the main causal factor for the continuing reforms, they argue, is 'the AKP's domestic choice of change stemming from its strategic calculations with regard to its electoral fate' (Yilmaz and Soyaltin, 2014: 19). Even though there is a lack of external incentives, the AKP had the enthusiasm to continue reforms to legitimise its rules, receiving recognition from elites and avoiding losing voters given that the AKP gained success in the 2002 elections from 'reform minded' people including minorities, business groups and liberals (Yilmaz and Soyaltin, 2014: 19). Therefore, although weak conditionality effects the reforms and negotiations, interestingly it does not invalidate the effect of Europeanisation, and this effect might vary based on different policy areas, as is explained in the following sections.

2.4.2.3 Credibility

Another critical factor is the credibility of the EU's approach. Due to the fading credibility of conditionality and uncertain rewards (of membership) there was a decrease in domestic reforms. This point is picked up by Dagdeverenis (2014a) who emphasises that from 1999 to 2005, EU conditionality was certainly effective and, as a result, the EU-oriented reforms momentum was high. However, after 2004 the credibility of EU membership declined in the perceptions of Turkish politicians. This is because, even if Turkey was enthusiastic about opening negotiations as long as they fulfilled the Copenhagen Criteria, Turkey received extra pressure from the EU including over meeting an Additional Protocol on Cyprus (Schimmelfennig, 2003), an island that has been the centre of a long-standing land dispute between Turkey and Greece. When Cyprus, 'as a divided island', became an EU member, the

EU commitments to Turkish membership declined due to Turkey's rejection of the extension of the Customs Union to Cyprus (Cengiz and Hoffmann, 2013: 424). Following this event, in 2006 the chapters were not reopened for negotiation because of the Turkish Cyprus conflict and thus this diminished the expected benefits of the Turkish government from the reform process (Cengiz and Hoffmann, 2013). Also, Turkey's confidence regarding membership declined: it was perceived by political elites that even if Turkey met all the criteria, it still would not be accepted as a member (Macmillan, 2012: 247). Therefore, the unpredictability in the perceived long-term gains of EU membership reduced the 'value of benefit' and, in turn, the motivation of political actors to undertake reforms (Schimmelfennig, 2003). One problem within Turkey was that because membership was not immediately forthcoming, political actors actually delayed domestic reforms in some sectors, rather reversing the effects of conditionality (Tocci, 2005: 78). Therefore, the accession process and reforms can be seen symbiotically as 'two sides of the same coin' (Dagdeverenis, 2014a: 15). The 'lack of progress in reforms result[ed] in [a] lack of progress in the accession process' (Dagdeverenis, 2014a: 17).

While there were evident problems with domestic conditions in Turkey, the changed domestic context in EU states has also been a factor in altering domestic political perceptions. Even before the formal accession process was announced, EU countries including France, Germany and Austria, were beginning to express their scepticism over Turkish membership and also questioned the decision of initiating negotiations with Turkey (Öniş, 2010; Börzel et al., 2015). The issue was highlighted by national leaders at the Brussels European Council in 2004 who argued that Turkey's performance in meeting EU accession conditions plus the characteristics of Turkey regarding, for instance, its culture, religion, history, geography and so on, was non-European and this caused concerns about the results of possible Turkish membership in the future (European Commission, 2004: 11; Dagdeverenis, 2014b: 18; Triantaphyllou, 2014). As a result, Börzel et al. (2015) claim that:

'Turkey's size, economic strength and self-understanding as a regional power render its relations with the EU far less asymmetrical than in the case of CEECs and current Western Balkan accession candidates. With the membership perspective losing credibility, its economic and political power makes Turkey the least likely case for Europeanisation among the current candidate countries.'

Beside this factor, Turkey's population is also another reason for member state concern. With its population now reaching nearly 80 million, Turkey is likely to have a significant say in EU decision-making. This situation would arise from the allocation of seats it would receive in the European Parliament (EP), voting rights in the Council and also its veto powers within this (Schimmelfennig, 2008: 1). It is therefore obvious that even if Turkey fulfilled the Copenhagen Criteria, its membership would be remarkably problematic for some countries in the EU (Saatçioğlu, 2011).

In addition to privileged membership and open-ended structured negotiations, another factor decreasing the effectiveness of conditionality is the subjectivity of the Copenhagen Criteria. Regarding this point, the steps Turkey needed to take to meet the Criteria, technical conditions or political conditions, became ambiguous and so member states concentrated on their own interests, including over the Cyprus and Armenian issues (Aydin and Esen, 2007; Coskun, N/D). Even if the Commission's report on Turkey had been positive regarding the country's progress, there were evidently more reforms required. In December 2004, the European Council had two conditions to open the negotiations; Turkey was required to adopt 6 additional pieces of legislation and be ready to sign the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement which enabled the extension of the Customs Union to new members, including Cyprus. Turkey delayed the signing of the Additional Protocol in December 2004 until the actual negotiations opened in 2005 and specified a condition that the signature would not cover the recognition of the Republic of Cyprus (Schimmelfennig, 2008: 19-20). Turkey accepted extending the Customs Union and signed the Protocol on 13 July 2005 without admitting the Republic of Cyprus, representing all of the island (Mirel, 2017: 2). Also, Turkey justified its decision by claiming ports and

airports provide 'services', so were therefore outside of the Customs Union that merely embraces products with the Protocol resultantly handicapping direct trade with Cyprus (Mirel, 2017: 2; Aydın-Düzgit and Kaliber, 2016). However, the European Parliament declined to uphold the Additional Protocol because Cypriot ships were still prohibited in Turkish ports. Afterwards, Turkey was required to respect its contractual requirements to all members and to normalise its relations with the Republic of Cyprus with the condition of full implementation of the Protocol till the end of 2006 (Mirel, 2017: 2; Schimmelfennig, 2008: 21). It is clear that 'the recognition of Cyprus was effectively a link to the negotiation process so the opponent countries tried to block the negotiations' and finally eight chapters were frozen (Mirel, 2017: 2). Moreover, the Commission progress report on Turkey mainly reports small gains and stagnation in some areas (ibid.). Thus, in turn, although Turkey indicated its willingness by meeting the political criteria, it was further compelled to meet additional preconditions and also forced to consider changing the membership perspective with alternatives such as 'privileged membership' being promoted by opponent countries, including Germany and France (Schimmelfennig, 2008: 21).

As mentioned above, after the accession negotiations were formally launched on 3 October 2005, Turkey lost its political impetus for further reforms (Yildirim et al., 2013), and its commitment to the Europeanisation process declined significantly in the key areas of democracy and human rights (Ozer, 2012). After negotiations commenced in 2005, the accession process continued at a 'snail's pace' and stalled again between 2010 and 2013 (Tocci, 2014: 2). Some accession chapters were opened for negotiation, for example in December 2009 regarding the Environment, Statistics and Financial control in June 2007, Taxation in 2009 as well as Regional Policy and Coordination of Structural Instruments in November 2013. Between 2005 and 2014, 14 chapters were opened with only 1 chapter temporarily closed (science and research) (Tocci, 2014). However, 13 chapters, including freedom of movement for workers, financial services, energy, transport policy, justice, freedom and security, amongst others, were blocked by the EU or some individual member states, including Cyprus and France (Chislett, 2015: 5-6). To elaborate, due to Turkey's

non-implementation of the protocol amending the Customs Union and restrictions on Cyprus in opening its ports and airports, 8 chapters were not opened in 2006. The Greek part of Cyprus also vetoed the opening of 6 chapters, including those concerned with energy, free movement of workers, education and culture, justice and so on (Aydin-Düzgit and Kaliber, 2016: 1;10). Also, France blocked the opening of 5 chapters in 2008 regarding its attempts to legitimate the alternative approach of 'privileged membership' for Turkey (Ugur, 2010: 981). The chapters included agriculture and rural development, financial and budgetary provisions, and institutions. France's veto on the opening of the chapter on regional policy and the coordination of structural instruments was lifted in 2013, as was the veto on the chapter regarding economic and monetary policy which was lifted in December 2015 when the chapter covered the EU-Turkey agreement on Syrian refugees (Aydin-Düzgit and Kaliber, 2016: 10).

Another reason was that external pressure for domestic change was very low and it led to unreliable and ineffective conditionality (Özer, 2012). The link between the political accession criteria and Turkey's full membership as a *carrot* became visibly limited and this reduced credibility caused political leaders to roll back the transformative power of the EU in Turkey (Aydin and Esen, 2007; Börzel, 2012). During this period, there have been some vital factors that have caused declining membership credibility and compliance to conditionality that must be considered, namely: national concerns; accession procedures; the nature of Turkey's membership; and the perceived 'double standards' applied by the EU to Turkey.

In respect of the last point, a strong perception developed that the EU had double standards regarding Turkish accession. For instance, Cyprus and Armenia's issues had a major adverse impact on the credibility of incentives (Ananicz, 2007). Regarding Cyprus, the EU, basing its decision on EU trade rules, required Turkey to open its ports and airports to Greek-Cypriot sea and air traffic (Chislett, 2015; Usul, 2014). However, Turkey was uncomfortable with some related issues. Firstly, Turkey and Northern Cyprus had a negative reaction to the representation of southern Cyprus in the negotiations between

Southern Cyprus and the EU. The EU also stipulated a condition which was the recognition of Northern Cyprus, excluded from international trade, by the EU and UN (Schimmelfennig, 2008). Following this event, Turkey's unwillingness to accept the extension of the Customs Union to Cyprus led to the European Council criticising Turkey in 2006 and refusing to open 8 chapters of the accession process for negotiation including fisheries, free movement of goods, financial services and the Customs Union (Chislett, 2015; Macmillan, 2012; Acikses and Cankut, 2014; Schimmelfennig, 2008; Ugur, 2010: 981). This move partly suspended the negotiations (Schimmelfennig, 2008). More specifically, after Cyprus attained EU membership status, the persistency of the Cyprus debate proceeded to undermine relations and dialogue between the EU and Turkey (Tocci, 2014), and the perceived 'double standard' narrative became more significant to domestic political actors (Usul, 2014: 295). Secondly, Turkey resisted external pressure from the European Parliament which emphasised that if Turkey compromised on calling the Armenian issue 'genocide', it would facilitate the removal of one of the major obstacles to Turkey becoming an EU member (Arikan Açar and Rüma, 2007: 450). It was a difficult demand for Turkey to accept for historical reasons as well as it was not part of the Copenhagen Criteria and the official accession process (Arikan Açar and Rüma, 2007: 451). The dispute, where Armenian groups rebelled against Turkey, dates back to the Ottoman period during the First World War, occurring before the establishment of the modern Turkish state (Laçiner, 2005). Therefore, Turkey is unwilling to accept the EU's version of this event and its attempts to use it as a membership criterion.

Politicisation of domestic conditionality by the EU has led to the declining legitimacy, influence and credibility of accession in Turkey. For Yilmaz (2014: 243) therefore:

'EU conditionality is a politicised and subjective tool in many instances. However, the politicisation of conditionality, signifying weak commitment credibility of the EU, leads to a decrease in normative consistency and to an increase in discrimination among candidate states, therefore weakening the credibility of EU conditionality.'

Regarding this, Tocci (2007a: 14) emphasises that the outwardly objective nature of the accession process has been usurped by a process in which:

‘The choice of which conditions to emphasise, how to interpret them and what benchmarks to set is inevitably subjective and ‘political’... At EU-wide level instead, the crisis over the constitutional Treaty, a perceived ‘enlargement fatigue’ and widespread fears of expanding towards the turbulent ‘East’ have all raised the need to tighten accession conditions towards candidate Turkey amongst EU elites and publics alike. In other words, the politicisation of conditionality is inevitable as the product of changing national debates and interests, and the manner in which these intersect in the EU’s complex decision-making machinery.’

Therefore, because of the reasons explained above, opposition parties such as the MHP and the CHP had Eurosceptic views. Pro-EU NGOs, for example the Turkish Industry and Business Association (TUSIAD), also started to indicate their disappointment with the accession process and open-ended negotiations. Accordingly, the AKP revised its position due to weakening conditionality and changed its approach in the domestic arena for its electoral survival since EU accession was no longer a priority (Yilmaz, 2016). President Erdogan, for instance, emphasised that “The EU should mind its own business and keep its own opinions to itself” (BBC News, 2014). Furthermore, in the *Hurriyet Daily News* (24 January 2015), he argued that “If the EU opposes Islamophobia, it must accept Turkey as member” and continued “It is not important whether they (the EU) accept us or not. We keep up with our work. We are testing Europe. Will Europe be able to digest and to accept Turkey, whose people are Muslims? If you oppose Islamophobia, then you must admit Turkey into the EU.”

2.4.3 The increasing trend: De-Europeanisation of Turkish policy

More recent research has engaged with Turkish de-Europeanisation in many policy areas: the rule of law (Saatçioğlu, 2016); media freedom (Yilmaz, 2016a; Yilmaz, 2016); democratisation and human rights (Cebeci, 2016); civil society and Kurdish issues (Kaliber, 2016); higher education (Onursal-Beşgül, 2016); political parties (Wódka, 2017); and foreign policy (Demirtas, 2015). De-

Europeanisation refers 'to reforms reversed from European ways of doing...' (Yilmaz (2016: 148); or 'without the need or obligation to attain alignment with the EU... actors deliberately refrain from referring to the EU in justification of the reforms undertaken' (Aydin-Düzgit and Kaliber, 2016: 6). Yilmaz (2016: 148) claims the period of 2011-2014 is characterised by de-Europeanisation in which the government carried on being selective with its reforms. Aydin-Düzgit and Kaliber (2016: 5-6) describe de-Europeanisation in Turkey as:

'...firstly, as a weakening of the appeal and influential capacity of European institutions, policies, norms and value, leading to a retreat of EU/Europe as a normative/political context for Turkish society and politics; and, secondly, as the growing scepticism and indifference in Turkish society towards the EU/Europe, risking the legitimacy of the EU/Europe as a reference point in cases even where reform is incurred...de-Europeanisation, then is defined as the distancing of society and politics in Turkey from the European system of norms, values and policy expectations.'

After Turkey experienced its golden age of Europeanisation between 2002 and 2005 and a slowing, selective or stagnant Europeanisation between 2005 and 2010, Turkey has experienced de-Europeanisation through a reversal of domestic reforms since 2010 (Saatçioğlu, 2016; Yilmaz, 2016a; Yilmaz, 2016; Kaliber, 2016; Sipahioğlu). In this period, the ruling AKP adopted some reforms on corruption, civil-military relations and the media. Also, the ruling government introduced a democratisation package in 2013 which included incarcerating journalists and academics along with reducing the election threshold by 10%. At the same time, de-Europeanisation was concurrently occurring in other areas around, for example, limits on operations for caesarean sections and abortions which led to protests by women and activists (Yilmaz, 2016a).

Sipahioğlu (2017) claims that following successful Europeanisation resulting from effective EU conditionality in the period 1999-2005, its influence declined. After the AKP increased its power again in its second electoral triumph in 2007, the domestic reforms continued. However, Euroscepticism started to arise and

the Turkish public lost its interest given the questioning of Turkey's possible membership due to the reasons mentioned above. During this era a 'transition period between Europeanisation and de-Europeanisation' occurred, with Turkey undertaking a de-Europeanisation process following the AKP's triumph in the elections in 2011 (Sipahioğlu, 2017: 56). The author then argues that the AKP utilised the EU to increase its position without enhancing liberal democracy and turned away from Europe. She finally claims that the AKP was not pro-EU but was initially a 'modern Islamist' party that aimed to survive by consolidating the economy and increasing political empowerment (ibid: 56).

Furthermore, Sipahioğlu (2017: 51); Boşnak (2016) explain the shift from Europeanisation to de-Europeanisation using both domestic factors including the 'demotivation' of government and reduced public support, Turkey's failure to carry out the 2005 Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement and the AKP's second election victory in 2007, alongside external reasons, including weak conditionality, the EU's enlargement fatigue, and their blocking of negotiations on the accession chapters, the unsolved Cyprus issue as well as a shift in foreign policy in which the AKP's interests on the Middle East, Asia, Africa and Caucasus shifted. Also identified is the AKP's discontent with the EU Parliament's decision on the Gezi protests in 2013 and the AKP's decision to leave the European's People Party (EPP) and join the Alliance of European Conservatives and Reformists (AECR) (Sipahioğlu, 2017: 62). Another important external reason is Turkey's economic concerns, with Turkish foreign policy partly motivated by the global economic crisis and especially the Eurozone crisis that started in 2008.

Some authors explain Europeanisation or de-Europeanisation using a top-down or bottom-up perspective. Saatçioğlu (2016) explains de-Europeanisation in the rule of law by a bottom-up approach which involves 'the usage of European norms, policies and institutions (Europeanisation) by CSOs to frame and justify their deliberative positions and to increase their mobilising power and visibility' (Kaliber, 2016: 61). In so doing, Saatçioğlu (2016) claims that under credible EU conditionality, domestic governments continue reforms otherwise it can be costly when they reverse the domestic changes. However, the Turkish

government has been prone to backslide on some reforms, such as around the rule of law, due to the low credibility of EU membership. Yilmaz (2016) aims to provide an explanation for de-Europeanisation in media freedom in which reforms have been reversed by using process tracing and focusing on four periods, namely: 1999-2002; 2002-2006; 2007-2011 and 2011-onwards. From this, it is found that the media's role in terms of strengthening democracy and as a watchdog agency is becoming more restricted, particularly in recent years. Yilmaz (2016) therefore claims that after 2007, negative reforms in media freedom and its subsequent deterioration started increasing and de-Europeanisation continued.

Kaliber (2016: 60) also focuses on the 'complex constellation of top-down and bottom-up processes' and emphasises how domestic reforms are less driven by EU norms and values in the realm of civil society and regarding the Kurdish question. According to him, legal reforms on the Kurdish question continued after 2011, with four judicial reform packages passed in 2011, 2012 and 2014 which improved freedom of expression, including through limiting the scope of terror-related crimes and permitting education in Kurdish in private schools, as well as by authorising the use of Kurdish in election campaigns (Kaliber, 2016: 64). However, following reforms the implementation of regulations was restrictive, as demonstrated through the arrest of human rights activists, journalists and academics in addition to charging fines to civil society organisations, especially those with links to Kurdish political movements. The author also claims that the EU lost interest in the Kurdish question and human rights, meaning that democratisation aspects of EU accession became ineffective for pressurising the Turkish government in these areas (Kaliber, 2016: 64).

On this basis, Saatçioğlu (2016) takes on a sociological perspective and criticises top-down approaches, also claiming that the argument on EU conditionality as a trigger for domestic reforms (see Tocci, 2005; Müftüler Baç, 2005; Öniş, 2003) is very controversial. The likelihood that compliance with EU rules may occur independently from conditionality is disregarded. In the literature, some studies (see Yilmaz and Soyaltin, 2014; Börzel, 2012) focus on

the problematic relations of conditionality and compliance with continuity of reforms in some areas, including minority rights and corruption, after 2005. Also, the AKP government initially instrumentalised EU accession and then left the EU reform agenda or selectively adopted the reforms, so Europeanisation could be seen as bottom-up and indirect (Saatçioğlu, 2016; Saatçioğlu, 2014; Börzel and Soyaltin, 2012). Lastly, Saatçioğlu (2016: 135) claims that 'Europeanisation is a phenomenon that is as much shaped by politics and formal institutions as it is the product of the actions and discourses of political actors at both European and national levels.' However, Sipahioğlu (2017) argues that rational choice theory helps to explain the AKP's decisions. Within this, the AKP had been prone to adjusting to European liberal values and democratic reforms due to increases in the economy and the scope to legitimise and empower its position against the military and Kemalist sides. In the following section, EU conditionality and its effectiveness are discussed in detail.

2.5 The effectiveness of the conditionality mechanism: A Europeanisation perspective

2.5.1 The limitations of rational theoretical models

As aforementioned in the previous section, the EU conditionality perspective, in the general sense of the Turkish literature on Europeanisation, was high in the period between 1999 and early 2005, after which its influence on reforms gradually decreased despite the fact that domestic reforms, at least in some areas, have surprisingly been carried out. Thus, this section aims to show how rational institutionalism theoretical models have become less credible in the period since 2005, drawing on the arguments of leading scholars in the process.

2.5.2 Rational institutionalist arguments on Turkish accession, 1999-2005 and post-2005

The Europeanisation process causes new adaptational pressures to encourage domestic changes in all policy areas under the command of the EU (Nas and Özer, 2012). Europeanisation theory is taken as an 'explanatory tool' in order to explore the EU-induced domestic reforms, lack of commitments or

non-adaptation in Turkey during the EU accession process resulting from these pressures (Nas and Özer, 2012: 4). While examining this process in Turkey, conditionality, one of the instruments of Europeanisation, will initially be used as a framework to examine its credibility. Credibility can be inefficient when the EU sets the date for candidates' accession, which they do not have to worry about being excluded from, as occurred during the 2004 enlargement of the EU, for example. According to Sedelmeier (2011: 12):

‘Credibility suffers if political conflicts inside the EU make candidates doubt that the EU will deliver the promised rewards (as in the debates surrounding the possible accession of Turkey), or if some actors inside the EU indicate that adjustment in certain issue areas will be assessed very strictly. Credibility also suffers if candidates suspect that political favouritism, ulterior motives, or side-payments led the EU to reward candidates who did not meet (all) the requirements (fully).’

There are some studies focusing on the effectiveness of EU membership conditionality. For example, Celik and Rumelili (2006) evaluate the effectiveness for conditionality concerning the resolution of the Kurdish question in Turkey. The EU had put intensive pressure on Turkey even before the country gained its candidacy. In 1997, subsequent to the Luxembourg Summit of the European Council, political conditions were emphasised and Turkey was warned about the improvement of human rights and initiating negotiations with Kurdish organisations. After Turkey received candidacy status the pressure from the EU continued with it preparing an Accession Partnership Document which mentioned minority rights, the Cyprus issue and similar (Celik and Rumelili, 2006). Following this, Turkey stepped forward and enacted 89 laws and amended 94 others to improve human rights in line with the EU rules. For instance, Celik and Rumelili (2006: 209) illustrate the view that membership conditionality was an important ‘carrot’ for Turkey and it encouraged some reforms after 1999, including the abolition of the death penalty, the release of Kurdish MPs from prison, restructuring post-conflict zones and changing Article 8 of the 1982 Constitution, which is an Anti-Terror Law. Therefore, after Turkey received its candidacy and had a credible membership aspect this led to the

resolution of the Kurdish question and reconciliation with Greece in particular (Celik and Rumelili, 2006: 220).

The 1982 Constitution, on the approval of the president of military governance, was adopted through a national referendum with a 91.37 percentage vote (Özbudun, 2015: 33). There was no major amendment until 1987 (Oder, 2012). After Turkey applied for full membership on 14 April 1987, the first constitutional amendment was approved in the Turkish Parliament and accepted via referendum. Afterwards, 17 constitutional amendment packages that included a number of laws, amendments and abolishment were permitted (Özbudun, 2015). Between the period of 2001-2004, the incumbent government presented 9 constitutional packages which can be accepted as representing rapid and deep transformation' (Alessandri, 2011: 71), and they were highly motivated by the EU accession process (Özbudun, 2015). Following that, constitutional amendment proceeded and several major and minor packages conceded in 1993, 1995 (about developing political participation), 1999, 2001 (increasing the predomination of the civilian side in the National Security Council), 2002, 2004, 2005 and 2008 (abolition of the death penalty in 2004 and dissolving of the headscarf ban in higher education). Therefore, according to Özbudun (2015), in the period of 1999-2006 EU conditionality was very effective for domestic reforms.

In a similar vein, the conditionality strategy which has been mainly focused on the areas of human rights, democracy and foreign policy, has domestic impacts on European integration (Loewendahl-Ertugal, 2005). According to Aydin and Acikmese (2007), the Turkish military used to have a large influence over decisions on foreign and security policies. However, after 1999 EU conditionality played an important role in changing the internal power balance in favour of civilianised foreign policy given the military role in Turkish political life was a sensitive issue for the EU (Öniş, 2003; Cizre, 2000; Tocci, 2007a). The Europeanisation accession process has been seen as a trigger for the recent changes in foreign policy. It was extremely difficult for Turkey to open a discussion on some topics such as the Armenian issue and to improve the relationship with Cyprus (Aydin and Acikmese, 2007). Celik and Rumelili (2006)

also emphasise the importance of the membership conditionality for conflict resolution, for instance over the Greek-Turkish issue in terms of the power of the EU for developing alternative policies and forming the ruling patterns of identities in conflict societies. Turkey, therefore, had some progress in improving its relationship with its neighbours (Aydin and Acikmese, 2007).

As such, according to EIM the reward of full membership must be realistic, but it is more likely that domestic reforms tend to be halted when there is a doubt over full membership (Macmillan, 2012). The ability of the EU to convince Turkey to carry out reforms started to decline after 2005 as a consequence of the lack of credibility of the rewards and the uncertainty of Turkey's EU membership (Chislett, 2015; Soyaltin, 2013a; Yilmaz, 2012; Noutcheva and Aydin-Düzgit, 2012; Saatçioğlu, 2010). It can be observed that the level of external pressure in the first period was considerably greater than the second period (Coskun, N/D). Triantaphyllou (2014) states that Turkey had a very low potential for reform momentum to fulfil the EU requirements in the post-2005 era, and this generally can be explained by the ineffectiveness of conditionality by the EU. Turkish governments have tended to adopt the reforms with regard to decreasing the powers of veto players including the military. Turkish governments prefer to selectively and systematically respond to EU conditionality to increase their power even if the power of veto players is decreased. This shows the AKP's motivation for slow but continuing reforms in some areas including minority rights is in the cost-benefits structure rather than EU conditionality (Cengiz and Hoffmann, 2013: 428). In the next section, the weaknesses found within conditionality mechanism in the post-2005 period will be addressed.

2.5.3 Critiques of RI arguments – declining credibility for the period post-2005

Dagdeverenis (2014a) examines the impacts of the EU's transformative power on Turkey in the period of 2005-2014. He alleges that although the negotiations commenced in 2005, the commitment to EU membership was still controversial and unclear. The difficulty in Turkey-EU relations is that it is unclear what the

causal connection is, namely it is important to understand what induces what. The reforms momentum in Turkey to meet the EU conditions has decreased as a consequence of the effectiveness of conditionality, thus this indicates that the EU is an important factor for the reforms (Dagdeverenis, 2014a). Regarding this point, Cengiz and Hoffmann (2013) analyse the EU-induced changes in the scope of the Kurdish issue from the perspective of the external incentive model of conditionality. The Turkish government adopted the EU reforms when there was a strong commitment to Turkey's EU accession despite the existence of high domestic adoption costs and veto players. Nevertheless, following low credible commitment, the domestic reforms also remarkably decreased even though there was low adoption costs and weaker veto players.

There are, therefore, obvious limitations to employing conditionality as an explanatory variable for Europeanisation in the case of Turkey, which has implications for rational theories. 'Accession conditionality' enabled the EU to impose its *acquis communautaire* on candidate countries. The rationalist mechanism of 'differential empowerment through conditionality' was therefore much more prominent than socialisation (Börzel, 2010: 10). However, there are limits to the EU's effects via conditionality which have been differential (Hughes and Sasse, 2015; Jacoby, 2004; Schimmelfennig, 2005c: 2-3). The impacts of social interaction on compliance are also disregarded by rationalist regimes (Checkel, 2001; Dabrowski and Maliszewska, 2011; Ladrech, 2011). Accordingly, it is possible to show a 'shallow Europeanisation' which refers to an adjustment of the EU policy framework with the encouragement of cost-benefit calculations or restrictions without making core changes (Dabrowski and Maliszewska, 2011; Heidbreder, 2011). In turn, the membership conditionality was not enough to initiate changes in behaviours (Börzel and Soyaltin, 2012: 10; Börzel et al., 2015: 221; Börzel, 2010; Ladrech, 2011; Jacoby, 1999). For example, although the CEE countries focused mainly upon receiving EU funds during the pre-accession stage, which was carried on by conditionality, they were far from the internalisation of the EU-imported rules, policy and standards in line with social learning (Dabrowski and Maliszewska, 2011). This is because of the fact that the policy and institutional mismatch was quite high and it was a

necessity to build institutional capacity in order to apply the *acquis communautaire*, which required huge costs. Also, actors' behaviours remain unaltered (Elbasani, 2012; Börzel, 2012). Regarding this, Grabbe (2001: 1026) claims that:

'There are, of course, intermediate rewards, such as aid and trade liberalisation. But, in the end, accession is tied to overall readiness, and membership benefits are not disaggregated to reward partial readiness. Since the accession reward comes in one big step- and at the end of a very long and highly politicised process- CEE policy-makers may believe that there is time to make up deficiencies closer to the accession date. It is, thus, difficult to use EU membership conditionality as a scalpel to sculpt institutions and policies during the accession process: rather, it is a mallet that can be used only at certain points in the process to enforce a few conditions at a time.'

In the same vein, the success of conditionality has a number of restrictions (Grabbe, 2002). One of them is that candidates aim to receive EU membership as an ultimate reward (Grabbe, 2002). Sedelmeier (2011) emphasises that the credibility of the accession perspective, in which membership is the most sizeable incentive, is the main factor for the effectiveness of conditionality. When the accession reward comes to the fore after a severely politicised process, the EU seems unlikely to use conditionality as a stick to effectively force candidates to implement conditions. After 2005, there has been less credibility of conditionality in Turkey because the signal from EU members (especially Germany and France that saw 'privileged membership' convenient for Turkey) was visibly low for Turkey's full membership, as exemplified when Sarkozy expressed his opposition to Turkey's membership in 2007. Secondly, since 1998 the EU has been unsuccessful in the allocation of CEE resources. The CEE candidates then had difficulties in tackling their domestic resistance owing to unpopular EU demands. The third limit is, as Sedelmeier (2012) claims that as long as the state's motivation for compliance is membership, the consistency of Europeanisation through conditionality is not guaranteed after accession.

Lastly, the nonconformity of the EU's recommendations to candidate countries led to the decreasing effectiveness of conditionality. On the one hand, the EU forces the candidates to resume fiscal and monetary discipline, while on the other hand candidates are required to invest in several sectors, including environmental protection, infrastructure and agriculture (Grabbe, 2002). Also, the use of incentives by domestic actors for particular policies in order to change their behaviours predominantly depends on the membership proposition, because the uncertainty in the membership conditionality with high policy costs makes decision-making complicated (Kelley, 2004). The problem with credibility in Turkey is conspicuous, but also the domestic costs to adapt to conditionality are very high and lead to unfavourable conditions and low state capacity due to veto points, e.g. regarding nationalist politicians. Accordingly, when the EU eliminates the membership incentive, the conditions are not favourable in candidate states (Noutcheva, 2009). Therefore, Grabbe (2001: 1026) indicates that 'The timing of costs and benefits also diffuses influence. The ultimate reward of accession is far removed from the moment at which adaptation costs are incurred, so conditionality is a blunt instrument when it comes to persuading countries to change particular practices.'

As a result, the democratisation process between 1999 and 2005 was carried out as an instrumental adjustment regarding conditionality (Kubicek, 2005) and, therefore, the membership incentive can be seen to provide effective rule adoption in this period. However, after 2005 the Turkish membership perspective became doubtful (Yildirim et al., 2013) due to the reasons mentioned above, including privileged membership and an open-ended negotiation structure, casting doubt on the veracity of the model as an explanatory framework (Özer, 2012). Therefore, regarding the transposition of the EU policies, implementation of the transferred norms is significant. However, the EIM model is not solely adequate to explain and understand the Turkish democratisation process. According to Acikmese (2010: 138), the ups and downs in the Europeanisation process can consequently be explained by the absence/presence of the EU conditionality strategy associated with facilitating factors, namely: (i) domestic factors including 'governmental

commitment, costs of compliance, veto players and societal support'; and (ii) European level factors like 'commitment, member states' commitments and coherent EU conditions and strategies'. Therefore, other factors including domestic politics and the influence of individual actors are clearly significant, suggesting that we need to consider other explanatory frameworks. Thus, although no credibility for EU membership endures, domestic reforms in some areas, have been carried out slowly – something which is examined in the next section.

2.6 Alternative theoretical arguments

How then could we explain Turkey's continued Europeanisation and domestic reforms in specific policy areas under declining conditionality influences? Although some differing alternative arguments have recently emerged in the EU studies and Turkish domestic politics literatures, they remain preliminary and in need of further testing. In classifying these theoretical perspectives, they can broadly be divided into historical perspectives, critical discourse, diffusion/lesson-drawing, domestic political factors and sociological institutionalism.

2.6.1 Historical perspectives

Some authors have been prone to examining Europeanisation from a historical perspective. For example, Yalvaç (2014) largely focuses on a positivist ontology and epistemology to employ a historical materialist approach based on critical realism as a more convenient means to explain changes in Turkish foreign policy. He also focuses on different approaches to explain Turkish foreign policy in the literature, and he argues that historical materialism helps to analyse foreign policy by examining the domestic and international context of foreign policy-making. He also claims power struggle amongst the social classes has impacted on Turkish foreign policy-making. Besides this, Icoz (2011: 519) employs historical institutionalism to examine EU-Turkey relations and questions how Turkey's National Security Council (MGK) has shaped the journey toward EU membership by emphasising path dependency and punctuated equilibrium within two periods. The first period covers 1983 to 1997,

encompassing the interaction between the MGK's state of emergency and Turkey's EU policy from the perspective of path dependency. The second period covers 1997 to 2004, focusing on understanding internal political shifts in the MGK and the process of EU-Turkey relations through the concept of punctuated equilibrium, which aims to explain changes in political process and policies in organisational activities (True et al., 2007: 155). Icoz (2011) highlights the relationship between the MGK's tendency to use state of emergency legislation and Turkey's EU journey accession process.

The MGK attained a powerful position after the coup in 1980, assuming an important role in EU-Turkey relations alongside national defence from both internal and external threats in the first period (Icoz, 2011). The state of emergency in the period 1983-1997 determined the political actions for Turkey's EU membership perspective. Due to the PKK (Kurdistan Worker's Party) aim of creating an independent Kurdistan, Turkey could not achieve progress on its EU journey because it did not have progress on both human rights and the Kurdish issue. After the PKK's attacks, which started in 1984 and were labelled terrorists by the MGK, the Turkish Security Forces and the PKK clashed (Icoz, 2011: 515). The MGK re-extended the state of emergency many times during this period. Therefore, even if political actors (for example Turgut Ozal was elected as prime minister in 1983) had a willingness to join the EU, the MGK restricted their choices. However, its power decreased in the second term and Turkey started a dialogue with the EU. In the EU's regular reports, changes in the MGK, including increasing the number of civilians involved, were emphasised. Considering the decisions of the MGK as a recommendation rather than a 'priority consideration', some other executive responsibilities and powers were also taken from the MGK (ibid.). According to Icoz (2011: 517), the changes were made not just because of the EU but also endogenous factors, including the abolition of the state of emergency in some provinces and the MGK's pressure on Islamist parties (Icoz, 2011: 517).

2.6.2 Discursive approaches

A few authors have eschewed rational explanations altogether, utilising critical theoretical notions of discourse to interpret Turkish Europeanisation (Aydin-Düzgit, 2011; Fisher Onar, 2012; Heper, 2005; Yanik, 2011; Yilmaz and Soyaltin, 2014). For example, Aydin-Düzgit (2011: 50) focuses on a poststructuralist discourse approach in aiming to provide explanations for how European identity shapes Turkey, using critical discourse analysis in the case of German politicians' views on Turkish accession. Kaliber (2013) focuses on political discourses to Europeanisation in modernisation, westernisation and regime debates and examines how the meaning of Europe and Europeanisation changed over time post-1923. He claims that discourses on 'Europeanness' and Europe are related to modernisation (Kaliber, 2013: 54). Additionally, discourses of European level actors shape domestic institutional and normative structures and also how the EU affects the discourses of modernisation and change in Turkey. The discourse of Republican-Kemalists claims that Europe represents modernisation as opposed to an Islamist viewpoint perceives integration with the EU as an assimilation of Islamic identity in Turkey. The leftists' groups in the 1960s, including the Turkish Worker's Party and socialists parties, criticised the EEC common market. After the military coup in 1980, human rights and freedom of expression were suspended. In the 1990s, Turkish society and the EU expressed demands for democratising domestic political life in Turkey. After Turkey received its candidacy status in 1999, the AKP adopted pro-EU attitudes, especially until 2005, and made a number of domestic reforms. However, the discourses of European leaders against Turkey's full membership perspective paved the way for de-Europeanisation, especially after 2011 (see Chapter 1).

Besides, Heper (2005) utilises discursive approaches to Europeanisation to analyse military-civil relations by examining the speeches of Turkish generals and the chief of staff, predominantly from newspapers, to understand the democratisation process in civil-military relations. The Turkish military intervened in political life in 1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997. Heper (2005) analyses speeches of chief and vice chiefs of the general staff. The chief of general staff

in 2002, Hilmi Ozkok, expressed that the military had an important role in the modernisation of Turkey, for example by being a member of NATO, but he criticised the military interventions. This showed the military's respect for constitutionalism and helped the AKP in making reforms of civil-military relations between 2002 and 2005. Similarly, Fisher Onar (2012: 463) examines Turkey's changing political identity through the discourses of the AKP, identifying four themes: *democratisation*, *(post)Islamist*, *Ottomonist* and a *Turkey Inc story*, from a constructivist policy analysis approach. In addition, Yilmaz and Soyaltin (2014) focus on uncovering domestic factors for the ongoing reforms on corruption and minority rights by analysing the discourses of policy-makers, and mainly President Erdogan's speeches regarding minority rights and corruption. The AKP had many reforms on corruption and minority rights especially before 2005. However, the Republican Party acted as veto players against the cultural rights for Kurds as well as the Cyprus and Armenian issues. By analysing the reforms and Erdogan's speeches, the authors examined changes in preferences in the AKP after 2005 especially in minority rights, principally because of its aim to increase its vote the from Kurdish side. However, while offering some insight, these studies remain somewhat marginal to mainstream analyses of Turkish Europeanisation which has increasingly sought to incorporate domestic political perspectives.

2.6.3 Diffusion and lesson-drawing

EU rule transfer can take place by means of conditionality but also through social learning, persuasion and lesson-drawing (see Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004). In this respect, some scholars have employed the traditional public policy theoretical tools of diffusion and lesson-drawing to analyse Turkish Europeanisation.

Domestic explanations of Europeanisation are integrated with rational approaches and the lesson-drawing literature, primarily through the work of Yilmaz (see Yilmaz, 2014: 238). She combines both external incentives and lesson-drawing models which involve searching for alternative options for analysing external Europeanisation. However, she mainly focuses on a lesson-

drawing model that is not commonly used in this literature. Lesson-drawing, which can involve both rationalist and sociological forms (Benson and Jordan, 2011), refers to the 'domestic satisfaction that causes policymakers to search for transferability of other policies' and examines the compatibility of the policies with domestic structures (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005b: 21). Policy-makers therefore learn from abroad about how their counterparts respond to specific problems (Rose, 1991: 4).

Yilmaz (2014) draws upon this literature to emphasise that legal adoption is enforced by EU conditionality, but implementation of EU laws depends on domestic factors, so policy change is successful as long as there is a coupling of implementation and legal adoption. These variations are examined in three periods (Yilmaz, 2012). In the first period of 2002-2004, although legal adoption was high, for instance through the abolishment of the restrictions on broadcasting and learning in different languages and reducing constraints on non-Muslim religious communities and non-Sunni minorities (including the Alevi and their property rights), implementation was low (Yilmaz, 2012). However, minority rights between the periods of 2005-2007 were accelerated and legal adoption revived, for example through the Foundations Law, a circular supporting the right of non-Muslims to practice their cultural beliefs. When compared to the first period, the second period between 2005 and 2007 saw a higher level of implementation. In this period, the EU requested the abolishment of some restrictions such as specifying religion on Turkish ID cards and on the speaking of other languages by political parties. Lastly, in the period of 2008-2010, the 'low level of the AKP's commitment to EU membership, and the strong influence of the domestic pull on AKP's strategic calculations was evident' (Yilmaz, 2014: 251). Between 2002 and 2010 there was consequently a rising domestic pull and decreasing EU push in the scope of minority rights. Yilmaz (2014: 254) summarises these observations as 'different degrees of pull-and-push led to different outcomes in 2002-10: push without pull in 2002-2004 for shallow policy change and pull without push in 2005-07 and 2008-10 selective policy change.' The reforms selectively continued after 2005 in minority rights and corruption because of the incumbent

ruling party's focus on the issues that would bring benefit at the 'ballot box', rather than on the adoption of EU minority rights (Börzel et al., 2015: 229).

Yilmaz claims that EU conditionality is a factor for the legal adoption of minority rules, however implementation, particularly after 2008, mainly depends on government preferences (Yilmaz, 2012: 421). According to Yilmaz (2012), on one hand legal adoption of EU minority rules was driven by EU conditionality, on the other hand the implementation of these rules are mainly driven by the domestic preferences of the Turkish government. For example, although CEECs adopted EU minority rules, even better than older member states, their implementation was controversial and challenging (Kelley, 2004; Sasse, 2008). Therefore, in the CEECs EU conditionality was driving the legal adoption, however implementation was related to domestic politics, i.e. the choices of political parties within government. Regarding this, Yilmaz (2012: 416) claims that EU conditionality in Turkey has credibility only for legal adoption and she focuses on central policy-makers in order to analyse the implementation of minority rules. In her view, there is consequently an opposite relationship between legal adoption and implementation. The domestic incentives of the AKP for adaptation to minority rights were linked more to strategic electoral calculations around gaining support from minority groups such as the Alevis and Kurds (Yilmaz, 2012: 418). The AKP consequently positioned itself as conservative, reformist, pro-EU and economically neoliberal (Taşkin, 2008: 11). We may conclude, therefore, that conditionality is indeed less significant over time, meaning other domestic political factors should be considered.

In this respect, Celenk (2016) focuses on Turkish regional policy in terms of misfits and evaluates changes shaped by EU accession by considering the 'conditionality' and 'lesson-drawing' mechanisms perspective. Two factors are utilised to analyse change: the state tradition in Turkey; and political actors' preferences (Celenk, 2016: 85). On this view, the state tradition is overtly centralist and improvement of local administrative capacity has historically not been a priority. Because of the Kurdish separatism fear and related PKK issue, central government is reluctant to transfer more resources and power to local administrations. Government political actors' preferences are therefore

important factors for explaining the changes. According to Celenk (2016), the AKP preferred to utilise EU funds made available between the periods of 1996-2001, 2001-2006 and 2007-2013. This means that when EU conditionality became weakened, there was still policy transfer and learning occurring in order to obtain EU funds and assistance for regional economic development. Even if changes are triggered by the EU, the results of the accession process therefore heavily depend on the political actors' stance and domestic institutional structures. In the case of regional policy, there was a 'partial convergence' due to path dependency of state tradition and actors' preferences (Celenk, 2016: 91). Besides these factors, the AKP's motivation for adaptation to EU regional policy was to gain more political support through receiving additional EU funds. However, Celenk (2016) does not give an in-depth explanation of precisely how lesson-drawing occurs in regional policy nor how policy learning and rule transfer occurs, although she explains the motivation of the political actors for rule adoption. Consideration of such domestic political factors is therefore another potential approach to explaining Europeanisation.

2.6.4 Domestic politics

In this respect, recent studies have sought to view events through a purely domestic political lens. Börzel (2012), for example, claims that EU rule adaptation may not be caused by EU encouragement, rather it could be triggered by what she calls 'endogenous dynamics'. Several authors (see Alessandri, 2011; Yilmaz, 2012; Börzel, 2010; Börzel and Soyaltin, 2012; Saatçioğlu, 2010; Börzel et al., 2015) have therefore attempted to search for domestically-driven factors to explain patterns of Europeanisation in Turkey. On critically reviewing these studies, several 'motivations' are forwarded around domestic political structures and also the agency of political actors, particularly the opportunism of ruling elites and parties in utilising EU accession for their own strategic objectives.

For example, Börzel et al. (2015: 221) evaluate the scope conditions of *power (a)symmetries*, *regime type* (democracy and autocracy), *domestic incentives* (for change) and *degrees of statehood* (consolidated vs. limited) for EU-induced

domestic institutional change in Turkey, CEECs and Western Balkan countries. *Power (a)symmetries* infers the distribution of material and ideational resources between the EU and accession states. Turkey's size, economic and political robustness mean it is, according to the authors, the least likely case amongst all candidates to be influenced in this way (Börzel et al., 2015: 221). To an extent, this may well be true for Turkey's increasing disengagement from the accession process due to its growing economy, but also the strategic importance of Turkey as a political powerbroker within the MENA region. Put simply, Turkey now has enough power externally for domestic leaders to resist accession demands from the EU. With regards to *regime type* Turkey is still a democratising country. In democratic countries, incumbent governments have more enthusiasm to achieve domestic changes (Börzel et al., 2015; Ademmer and Börzel, 2013). However, as Mansfield and Pevehouse (2006) emphasise, membership of international institutions and conditionality provides support for the democratising country in undertaking reforms. More significantly, *domestic incentives* can also be influential. Even if the credibility of EU membership is limited and domestic changes are costly, the incumbent government is likely to continue domestic changes as a result of political preferences and survival strategies (Börzel et al., 2015; Saatçioğlu, 2010). Lastly, *state capacity* is an important condition for implementing EU norms and rules and achieving legal changes. Candidates are required to have the requisite administrative infrastructure to practice EU laws (Börzel et al., 2015: 222). Where capacity is low or institutions are incompatible, implementation can be variable, as in the case of Turkey.

According to Börzel (2012), even if membership criteria are unclear, incentives are declining and there is an inadequate reform capacity of the government, there are still impacts from Europeanisation in Turkey. The impacts are distinctive depending on the policies due to domestic political factors, most notably around the role of elites and civil society (ibid.). Börzel and Soyaltin (2012: 16) note that '[o]verall, domestic change in Turkey is less driven by the EU and its fading conditionality, but by the political agenda of the Turkish ruling elites and their preference for consolidating their political power.' Regarding this

point, Soyaltin (2013a: 3) claims that the conditions for pursuing domestic reforms are highly dependent on the flexibility of the secular Turkish republic and the willingness of 'grassroots actors' to pursue a more liberal state, as well as on the receipt of support from Brussels to strengthen the reformist actors, particularly as Turkey is seen as a model for rising Arab democracies.

Saatçioğlu (2010) also addresses the question of why implementation of EU rules initially increased but slowed in recent years, proposing three domestic political imperatives. Firstly, it is argued that the AKP has used EU reforms to raise its popularity, both positively and negatively. The party strategically aligned itself with the reform agenda between 2002 and 2003 when the economic benefits of EU membership were perceived as high by voters. However, when Euroscepticism emerged amongst the Turkish public in late 2004, the AKP's willingness to support compliance decreased accordingly, thereby constituting a strategic electoral calculation (Saatçioğlu, 2010). The continued decline in public support for EU membership has also influenced the populist approach taken to accession by the AKP in the period since 2002.

Secondly, the AKP took advantage of the European Commission's demands for greater religious freedom, turning it to its advantage. As it partially draws its constituency from conservative religious groups, it initially supported reform because, ironically, these actors perceived such freedom as a means of challenging secularism, for example by resisting public bans on headscarf wearing which had precluded some conservative female students from entering higher education (Ugur and Yankaya, 2008: 980). The AKP therefore sought to gain electoral advantage from initially promoting EU reforms to religious conservative groups. Votes for the AKP did increase from 34.28% to 41.67% in the elections of November 2002 and March 2004, underlining this argument (Ugur, 2013: 979). EU reforms therefore initially and rather ironically provided hard-core Islamist elements of the AKP with an opportunity to increase their power (Saatçioğlu, 2010). In the period since, increasing support for religious conservatism has contradictorily been employed by the Erdogan government as a reason to resist EU reforms, with the party promoting them as a threat to such values (ibid.).

Thirdly, assistance from the EU provided the means for the AKP to secure its domestic political power and legitimacy in dealing with secularist veto points and secular elites (Kemalists), for example in rescinding court-imposed bans on the involvement of the military in AKP political activities (Yilmaz and Soyaltin, 2014; Noutcheva and Aydin-Düzgit, 2012; Mirel, 2017). Yilmaz and Soyaltin (2014) also claim that tight controls on the Turkish media led to reduced pressure on the government for undertaking reforms. Thus, the interdependency of the EU membership agenda (or reforms) helped the AKP as a party that has Islamic roots to enhance its autonomy over the 'military-judicial secular forces' and isolate them (Saatçioğlu, 2010: 25; Tocci, 2005). Once isolation of the groups had occurred, EU membership became less of a priority for political leaders - a trend that has continued since the 2016 coup attempt. Indeed, as the AKP has cemented its power it has become less enthusiastic about implementing EU demands.

For Alessandri (2011), the stalling of EU reforms post-2005 has several other explanations. The changed EU membership status described above is argued to relate to issues within domestic politics. Because of its inability 'to keep its full commitment to enlargement, the EU has lost not only credibility but also power in Turkey' (Alessandri, 2011: 77). In addition, within some sectors of the domestic economy, there was resistance to changes because some actors were unwilling to adopt EU rules and norms in order to protect their labour rights. Change in the power balance between Islamic, conservative, reformist and military elites is considered another factor. Military intervention in political life is not tolerated within European integration and democratisation. In other words, such reforms are still on the agenda because the power balance in civil-military relations has not been fully resolved in line with EU expectations (Alessandri, 2011: 74). Recent events during the 2016 military-backed coup attempt again underline this argument with the government still trying to assert its power over these elements.

Domestic factors are the focus of other studies. For example, Müftüler-Baç (2011: 281) investigates the changes in Turkish foreign policy in line with its domestic preferences, such as the Turkish public's preferences and domestic

procedures and how they are formed by the EU. She also emphasises that the EU has an indirect influence on Turkish foreign policy because the AKP is mainly formed by a democratisation process and is less motivated by the EU accession process. As discussed above, the AKP government has gained benefits from the reforms which enabled it to change the power balance against secularist factions. Political Islamists, as a result, gained more power and increased their legitimacy, with social preferences shifting in response (Mirel, 2017; Müftüler-Baç, 2011: 288; Tocci, 2005). In addition, the AKP prepared a constitutional amendment package which was deemed to be a good step in the 2010 EU Progress Report (Oder, 2012; Özbudun, 2015). Even if the EU was not addressed directly in the amendment package of 2010 (consisting of improvement to the judiciary and Constitutional Court with regard to core rights and freedoms), the European states were taken as references for the Ombudsman Institution. Regarding this, arguments appear to be heavily grounded in the conditionality mechanism between 1999 and 2006. However, 'domestic political dynamics' are argued to be more significant for reforms in 2007 and 2010 as a result of the declining enthusiasm of the Turkish public for EU membership and the decreasing 'carrot effects' on Turkish westernisation and democratisation processes.

Another good example of this phenomenon is provided by Buhari-Gulmez (2011: 475) who argues that 'domestic motivations for Europeanisation include exogenous factors trespassing upon EU conditionality, that is, global culture/world society.' In this vein, Buhari-Gulmez (2011) claims domestic compliance is not merely related to EU conditionality but wider global norms as well. Focusing on conditionality therefore provides a limited picture of Europeanisation. In some areas such as ombudsmanship where the adaptational pressure is quite low, domestic support is higher than in the others such as free movement of capital. Buhari-Gulmez (2011) then uses macro-sociological insights, considering individual views and preceding interest-based perceptions in her study to examine ombudsmanship in Turkey. She conducted interviews with policy-makers, finding that the participants agreed that Turkey should not implement reforms due to the EU's demands, with political culture

and national interests considered to be more significant than conditionality. Besides this, ombudsmanship was supported by policy-makers due to wider ideas connected with human rights and individual freedoms rather the EU values *per se*. Kaiser and Kaya (2016) also analyse the Europeanisation process in migration and asylum policy, claiming that domestic reforms in line with the EU result from a process of dialogue amongst Turkish and European actors including NGOs, bureaucracies and ministries. Although initially the AKP rationalist approach was dominant for the reforms following 2005, domestic reasons included the incentive of visa-free travel to Europe.

2.6.5 Problems with alternative theoretical approaches

Several issues are apparent with this emergent body of literature, primarily its rather limited analytical focus, preliminary nature and the lack of theoretical engagement in places. Historical institutionalism remains an important theoretical approach with Europeanisation studies generally (Icoz, 2011; Yalvaç, 2014). But, problematically, it also relies on 'rational' rule-based interpretations of Europeanisation in which path dependency is clearly limited as a general explanatory framework post-2005. To elaborate, many Turkish institutions have manifestly not followed a path of positive feedback, institutional lock-in and policy layering typically associated with Europeanisation in EU member states as proponents of these arguments would infer (for example, Pierson, 2002; Peters, 2012). At best, the pattern has been differential and it is difficult to attribute ongoing Europeanisation to EU rule following in some sectors such as water policy. Neither is punctuated equilibrium necessarily a credible alternative, since it infers continued institutional expansion over time in response to specific exogenous events rather than the partial reversal in some policy sectors actually occurring in Turkey. Although we could apply these arguments to single sectors such as Turkish water policy, at best they remain preliminary and it continues to be difficult to substantiate the use of such concepts. For example, exogenous shocks as anticipated by Baumgartner and Jones (2010) are not readily visible in the implementation of EU water policy, suggesting better explanations may be found elsewhere.

In this respect, while poststructuralist approaches provide important insights, they are more ontologically driven and necessarily only focus on uncovering specific discourses rather than explaining the causes of Europeanisation, which is the focus of this thesis. In the case of domestic political explanations, theoretical arguments are also still developing. As Buhari-Gulmez (2011: 479) argues, 'domestic motivations for reform need further investigation.' These more descriptive studies could therefore do more to integrate their arguments with a wider body of public policy theory to explain the pattern of stalled Europeanisation in Turkey. Although such theories abound, actor-based explanations such as pluralism and elitism can be contrasted with more structuralist or governance-focused theorising on the exercise of power within domestic politics (Hill, 2013). For example, pluralism (Dahl, 1961) would perhaps interpret AKP strategic utilisation of EU membership as an attempt to gain power over decision-making at the expense of other political actors within an overall democratic polyarchy. Elite theory or neopluralism (Hill, 2013) could be employed to understand the continuing influence of ruling classes or insider groups, for example conservative Islamists, Kemalists or the military. Meanwhile, governance-oriented approaches (Rhodes, 1996; Pierre and Peters, 2000) may point to the role of policy networks, particularly closed policy communities, within the Turkish political system. This domestic perspective on Europeanisation therefore has significant potential to engage with such a debate, itself representing a specific gap in the literature which also requires manifestly further development.

Another problem with focusing exclusively on domestic political factors for explaining Turkey's continued Europeanisation under declining accession incentives is that this approach necessarily downplays the influence of EU norms as an explanatory variable. This is problematic as the two are inherently inter-related in sectors such as water policy. Moreover, in order to understand long-term compliance and the internalisation of reforms, other factors may need to be considered, particularly the role of individual actors within institutions and actors as institutions. While rational choice institutionalism clearly struggles to explain this type of phenomenon through its focus on coercive rule-based

conditionality, other less 'rational' forms of institutionalism are therefore argued by several leading authors to be potentially significant explanatory frameworks within this context. Most notably among these is sociological institutionalism which has enjoyed some recent popularity within Turkish Europeanisation studies.

2.7 A sociological institutionalism perspective?

As explained in the previous section, within the Turkish Europeanisation literature studies predominantly concentrate on 'political Europeanisation' which means analysing the impacts of European integration on national executives and domestic administrative structures, as well as on political actors and interest groups (Sofos, 2000; Ugur, 2010; Diez et al., 2005: 5). Nevertheless, there are some studies on 'societal Europeanisation' which refers to the 'construction of systems of meanings and collective understandings' surrounding the adoption of EU rules and norms (Cowles et al., 2001: 219). Thus, this section discusses some examples in the literature that are examined through the perspective of sociological institutionalism in order to assess their suitability for guiding the thesis research. It thereby finishes by assessing the potential of this approach for an analysis of Turkish water policy.

Critically, it is argued that the Europeanisation process requires both administrative and technical amendments and a social learning process that involves internalising EU norms and rules, meaning that research should concentrate on analysing the rule adoption of individual or institutional actors via socialisation processes (Nas and Özer, 2012). In this respect, Soyaltin (2013a: 3) claims that 'the role of civil society organisations and social learning mechanism are likely to have greater impact in increasing the acceptance of the adopted EU rules and promoting their internalisation, as this process unfolds.' Using a similar argument and by viewing events from a sociological perspective, Börzel and Risse (2000: 2) suggest that socialisation and social learning enable domestic changes as well as EU norm internalisation thereby creating new European identities. In this respect, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005b: 9) hence claim that 'actors are motivated by their

internalised identities, values and norms.’ Political elites, in this argument, learn their lessons from the EU and internalise its norms, driving forward Europeanisation in domestic contexts (ibid.). After internalising the norms, they subsequently provide a source of guidance for the continuing behaviours of other political actors thereby leading to long-term identity change in support of Europeanisation (Tekin, 2015: 6). Therefore, it is theorised that, over time, social learning on EU norms generates the socialisation of actors around EU accession.

Application of these arguments to Turkish Europeanisation features in several studies, with both social learning and socialisation applied to the accession process. For example, in one early study, Diez et al. (2005) analyse Europeanisation in Turkish civil society from the aspect of societal Europeanisation through examining the formation of individual actors’ interests. A number of other studies have employed such arguments, including: Aydin-Düzgit (2018); Kaliber (2013) who focus on a normative perspective; Bolukbasi and Ertugal (2013) who employ policy learning in studying the Europeanisation of employment policy; Gürkan (2018) who examines the role of the European Parliament in Turkey-EU relations and transferring EU values from the perspective of socialisation and norm internalisation; Bürgin (2016) who provides explanations on domestic reforms within migration policy by conditionality – incentives, including possible visa liberalisation, the opening of new chapters, social learning and socialisation - via IPA projects and changes in actors’ preferences and identities; and Demirtas (2015) who examines de-Europeanisation in foreign policy through a socialisation perspective. The key message of these studies is encapsulated by Börzel and Soyaltin (2012: 15) who emphasise that while ‘the external incentive model and top-down approaches of Europeanisation more broadly, have a hard time explaining domestic change in the absence of Europeanisation pressures’ a sociological approach may provide additional insight.

Using similar arguments, Ustun (2010) examines Turkish foreign policy and accepts that EU conditionality acts as an initial stimulus, especially in financial issues. However, for foreign policy she finds constructivism theory provides a

better explanation for its development in Turkey. She emphasises that learning and (elite) socialisation play important roles for EU policy transfer, bureaucratic restructuring and constitutional shifts in the Europeanisation of this policy sector. Another study featuring learning around EU norms is Jørgensen's (2016) research on misfits between the EU and Turkey's foreign and security policy that analyses Europeanisation in the periods between 1999-2005 and 2005-2014. Jørgensen examines both lesson-drawing and social learning mechanisms. It is argued that lesson-drawing by the government from the EU was ineffective for overcoming prominent domestic security issues because Turkey experienced problems with its neighbours, primarily Armenia, Syria, Israel, Egypt and Cyprus. However, Jørgensen claims that Turkish political elites gradually learned EU norms and internalised them through experience and involvement with implementation but, interestingly, not by means of direct persuasion due to a lack of cultural affinity, i.e. them being non-Christian and non-European (Jørgensen, 2016: 124). However, he does not really provide an in-depth explanation of how Turkish policy-makers learn EU norms through this process.

Meanwhile, Buhari-Gulmez (2011) uses macro-sociological insights, considering how individual views and preceding interests influence the development of ombudsmanship in Turkey. Ombudsmanship in Turkey dates back to the 1970s, so was not new as a concept. However, after 1999 the EU exerted exogenous pressure (conditionality) to adopt a European-style approach with limited compatibility to the domestic model. As identified above, she conducted interviews with policy-makers and found that the participants agreed that Turkey should not carry on the reforms due to the perceived irrelevance of the EU's demands, domestic political culture and national interests. Nonetheless, ombudsmanship was still ideationally supported by policy-makers, resulting in the further development of a more domestically acceptable Turkish interpretation in the absence of such external incentives.

Another example is the study by Macmillan (2012), who aims to give an explanation of the Migration and Asylum policy of Turkey in line with the EU *acquis* by emphasising the importance of the external incentive model and

social learning mechanisms. Macmillan (2012) claims that there is a socialisation process occurring by means of EU twinning projects on controlling borders and migration. These projects, completed in 2006, increased Turkish institutional capacity in line with EU asylum and immigration policy (Macmillan, 2012: 250). However, it is not entirely clear from the study how social learning and socialisation are being perceived and how they actually occurred in this policy area. According to the author, although socialisation appears to impact on rule adoption, it was difficult to carry out the reforms in line with EU Migration and Asylum policy due to the lack of a credible EU membership perspective.

Another important article aims to uncover Europeanisation in Turkish civil society while there is de-Europeanisation in environmental organisation activities (Boşnak, 2016). She interviewed EU and Turkish policy-makers and environmental NGOs, in order to uncover Europeanisation, identifying how environmental organisations use the EU in terms of normative and socio-political aspects and 'EU-isation', referring to more formal and technical processes of conformation with the EU *acquis*, so the changes stem from both adjustment to EU directives and how the EU is used as a mobilisation power for environmental organisations. According to Boşnak (2016), the EU provides financial and technical assistance for capacity building in line with its priorities and agendas (for example, waste and water management, air quality), shaping civil society agendas in a particular way so that they benefit from EU funds. Therefore, the EU stipulates the conditions for the funding of civil society actors to carry out projects in line with the EU's priorities, rather than their organisational agendas in order to convince state actors to legitimise their proposals.

As Boşnak (2016) shows, EU environmental policy-making is very technical and top-down, yet EU experts did not have knowledge on the issues, culture and geographical differences in Turkey. However, interviewees in Boşnak's (2016) study criticised Commission guidelines as too strict and highlighted the lack of expertise in the projects because of this limited knowledge of Turkish culture and national features. And, after transposing the EU rules, implementation of them was highly dependent on the capacity and enthusiasm of political actors.

Therefore, environmental organisations have less incentive to apply for EU funds due to deteriorating relations between the EU and Turkey, so the EU funds can be 'counterproductive' in some cases (Boşnak, 2016: 86). Boşnak (2016) in her article places attention on learning via interaction, which refers to social learning. However, she does not give a comprehensive explanation how this learning occurs when she explains interaction. Based on the above, she claims that after the 2005 domestic reforms environmental organisations became weak (see also Saatçioğlu, 2016; Yilmaz, 2016a).

Finally, other authors (see Rumelili and Boşnak, 2015; Göksel and Güneş, 2005; Tocci, 2005) examine Europeanisation in Turkish civil society from a sociological perspective. For example, Öniş (2003) argues that the benefit of the accession process on civil society is that the EU paves the way for Turkish NGOs (such as TÜSİAD, the Economic Development Foundation (IKV) and Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV)) to build associative networks with their European counterparts which then diffuse European norms and rules, provide partnership in the policy-making process as well as provide funding for civil society (Öniş, 2003: 20). For EU-funded projects, the EU also stipulates coordination with state institutions to build mutual interaction that additionally supports mutual learning around these norms. Interestingly, EU financial support is therefore enacted as a form of social learning mechanism by instructing the NGOs on how to undertake their activities, even though they operate within bureaucratic restrictions (Rumelili and Boşnak, 2015: 136-137).

However, while sociological institutionalism is becoming a more popular approach within this literature, there is ambiguity in the ways in which studies analyse social learning and socialisation (Macmillan, 2012; Ustun, 2010). The authors typically do not provide in-depth explanations of how learning occurs or which kind of learning is evident, while the analysis of resultant socialisation is weak in some studies (Macmillan, 2012). Therefore, while it has evident potential, sociological institutionalism needs to be better analysed. A critical question for the thesis therefore is, on the basis of these emergent arguments, whether sociological institutionalism could then explain ongoing Europeanisation in the Turkish water policy sector under conditions of declining

conditionality. From the above studies there would appear to be some potential to utilise this perspective with some scholars (see Bozdağlıoğlu, 2013; Cos and Bilgin, 2010; Jørgensen, 2016; Rumelili and Boşnak, 2015; Ustun, 2010) focusing on sociological institutionalism for explaining domestic reforms and also interpreting the changes in the preferences and interests of political actors by emphasising the domestic construction of national identities.

In expectation we could then assume that, reflecting the broader claims of Soyaltin (2013a: 3) and others, as Turkish water policy was initially subject to conditionality pre-2005, rational theoretical explanations should be more explanatorily significant during this period. Yet thereafter, as these conditions have declined, initial internalisation of these norms did provide a 'guideline' for the continuing behaviours of decision-makers, thereby generating long-term identity change around EU water norms in the period after 2005, as the wider arguments of Tekin (2015) may suggest. If this view is correct, EU water norms would still support ongoing Europeanisation of the sector through processes such as iterative social learning and socialisation of individual actors. What may result from this sociological interaction is not a continuing direct 'transfer' of EU water norms but, drawing upon (Buhari-Gulmez, 2011), a domestically acceptable hybrid that – just as with ombudsmanship – reflects a composite of pre-existing policy modalities, EU policy norms and subsequent domestic learning and socialisation around those norms. It is these features that are further developed in the next chapter which sets out the theoretical basis to the thesis.

2.8 Summary

This chapter firstly provides an overview of published studies showing the effectiveness of EU conditionality in Turkey between the periods of 1999-2005 and 2005 to present. Generally speaking, in the first period the credibility of an EU membership perspective was high following the Helsinki Summit, showing that conditionality was significant to Europeanisation. Here, rational choice theories that privilege conditionality as their dependent variable do have evident explanatory power. However, after 2005 there was a decrease in EU-related

reforms in some chapter areas whereas change continued in others, including water policy. While authors have attempted to explain this increasingly differential pattern of Europeanisation through various theoretical perspectives, from domestic politics to historical institutionalism, this critical review argues that sociological institutionalism may – on the basis of an emergent literature – offer promising and novel explanations. As emphasised in the previous chapter, the authors in the Turkish water policy literature look at processes and change but they do not focus on how and why political actors alter their perspectives and why they follow EU norms and policies. Thus, this study therefore aims to examine two inter-related aspects of sociological institutionalism (social learning and socialisation), explained in detail in the following chapter, to analyse domestic reasons and motivations for progress in water policy Europeanisation and changes in policy-makers' perspectives where less credible accession incentives exist.

Chapter 3: A sociological institutionalism theoretical framework

3.1 Introduction

This chapter sets out the theoretical grounding of the thesis. Different definitions of Europeanisation are presented to show how this literature has been dominated by rational theoretical interpretations but, more latterly, scholars have argued for further development of a constructivist perspective, primarily involving sociological institutionalism. In testing whether sociological institutionalism can provide a credible explanation for the development of Turkish water policy through its emphasis on institutional cultures and the transfer of EU norms, the chapter then focuses on identifying an explanatory framework drawn from arguments in the Europeanisation and associated literatures on social learning. Here, the argument presented by scholars is that Europeanisation occurs through the acquisition of EU norms by actors situated in domestic contexts. These actors are then socialised into adopting new EU norms and rules through a process of social learning that reshapes their identities and interests in favour of Europe (Börzel and Risse, 2003: 66-67). Instead of acting 'rationally' to self-maximise their gains from the Europeanisation process, as rational institutionalism theorists would maintain, here actors adopt a 'logic of appropriateness' (March and Olsen, 2011) in assimilating these norms thereby pushing forward the Europeanisation agenda. Europeanisation, as Börzel and Risse (2003: 66) argue, then can be understood as a process by which actors are exposed to these norms and gradually 'incorporate [them] into their domestic practices and structures'. In terms of the thesis objectives (Chapter 1), these alternative arguments to rational theory can then be examined to assess whether sociological institutionalism has explanatory power in interpreting the Europeanisation of Turkish water policy; as forwarded in Chapter 2.

The structure of this chapter is organised as follows. Firstly, multiple definitions and 'dimensions' of Europeanisation have been identified, although primarily this thesis will focus on the notion of the external 'downloading' (Börzel and Panke, 2016) of EU norms and rules, which then influences domestic change.

Drivers of such change are identified. Secondly, theoretical arguments on measuring the degree of domestic change under Europeanisation are outlined before, thirdly, introducing the institutionalism perspective. As explained in Chapter 2, theorists have forwarded three main institutionalism theories within the Europeanisation literature, namely rational, historical and sociological (Rosamond 2016: 88-87). Of these theories, rational institutionalism (RI) has featured widely in the Europeanisation debate, with conditionality identified as a key mechanism for influencing domestic change. Arguments of RI theorists are then contrasted with sociological institutionalism to draw out an alternative explanatory framework based on the interlinked notions of socialisation and social learning. Insights from the Europeanisation, organisational, environmental governance, sociological and policy learning literatures are developed for this purpose.

3.2 Conceptualising Europeanisation theory

Europeanisation is a contested concept, with multiple definitions. As we discuss below, a variety of often competing conceptualisations are evident, with research focusing on the effects of the EU on the European, national and external contexts, but no clear distinction of what Europeanisation is. However, as we also discuss, Börzel and Panke (2016: 111) argue it denotes ‘the interactions between the European Union and member states or third countries (including candidate countries and neighbourhood countries).’ As explained, this interaction can occur as states ‘upload’ their preferences to the EU (the bottom-up perspective), ‘download’ EU policy and institutions thereby leading to domestic change (the top-down perspective) or as a result of both processes: a so-called sequential perspective of cyclical change (Kohler-Koch and Eising, 1999; Radaelli, 2003). In general, Europeanisation studies have tended to view EU-state interactions via a ‘downloading’ perspective, whereby there is increasing homogenisation of economic and political values in (EU and non-EU) states (Jokela et al., 2013: xxi). Such top-down processes also extend to non-EU states, where external downloading has resulted in the diffusion of EU norms to third countries (Börzel and Risse, 2009): a critical focus of this thesis. As a result of this research activity, Europeanisation as a term has

progressively increased in the social science, international relations and European literatures in recent years (Major, 2005: 175). One reason is its conceptual malleability in that it helps frame analyses of the impacts of EU governance on members and the EU itself and also domestic and institutional adaptation to the EU (Mannin, 2013).

3.3 Conceptualising Europeanisation: Definitional problems

Before theorising Europeanisation, it is requisite to conceptualise this term through examining how it has been utilised in the academic literature. This aim remains far from straightforward given the significant 'stretching' (see Sartori, 1970) of this concept over time. Indeed, Radaelli and Exadaktylos (2010a: 192) concede that Europeanisation even after significant development of this research area 'is still a contested domain'. Originally, scholars using this terminology in the 1970s had sought to explain legal, institutional and procedural misfits between the EU and national level through a top-down perspective on policy and polity dimensions (Dyson and Goetz, 2002). As Europeanisation research became more popular in the 1990s its meaning expanded to encompass a variety of inter-linked processes (for example, Bomberg and Peterson, 2000; Olsen, 2002; Dyson and Goetz, 2002; Diez et al., 2005; Bache and Jordan, 2006). While there is no overall agreed conceptualisation or unified research agenda (Flockhart, 2010), such diverse research can be broadly categorised into *supra-national*, *national*, and *external* based uses of the term.

Scholars have employed the Europeanisation concept to understand how integration has impacted the *EU level* polity, politics and policy, from a variety of perspectives. Olsen (2002), for example, determines five main interpretations of Europeanisation, including constitutional development at the EU level. This feature is again evident in the work of Cowles et al. (2001) who understand Europeanisation as the creation of new European powers. Scholars such as Lavenex (2002b), working within a Europeanisation framework, therefore examine the normative and institutional challenges in developing new EU policy, in this case on refugees. But Europeanisation is also associated with

new forms of European-level politics (Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003). Della Porta and Caiani (2009) show how the EU level has provided opportunities for mobilisation of new social movements, while Klüver (2010) examines the implications of this policy venue for corporate lobbying activities. Coen and Dannreuther (2003) also discuss how integration has supported the Europeanisation of business representation in EU policy-making. For member states, moreover, there is an active competition to 'upload' their own policies to the EU level to avoid potentially costly readjustment under regulatory harmonisation (Börzel, 2002). Finally, EU policy-making in different sectors has been viewed via the Europeanisation lens (Jachtenfuchs, 2001; Radaelli, 2002).

Primarily, however, Europeanisation is studied in terms of its impacts on *national European contexts*, with Diez et al. (2005: 4) referring to: the Europeanisation of policies, political processes, identities and public discourses. If we examine policies or institutions ('policy-Europeanisation': *ibid.*), much of the literature has focused on how the EU shapes the domestic context (see Radaelli, 2003). Research has encompassed specific policy sectors, for example energy (Bulmer et al. 2007), environment (Jordan and Liefferink, 2004; Jordan, 2012; Knill and Lehmkuhl, 1998), media regulation (Harcourt, 2006), cohesion policy (Bache, 2008; Bache et al., 2011) and agriculture (Montpetit, 2000; Michelsen, 2009). Legal Europeanisation also examines the conditions under which the EU affects legal structures and outputs in member states (Töller, 2010). Indeed, a critical focus of Europeanisation research has been the 'central penetration [of the EU into] national systems of governance' (Olsen, 2002: 923), and the subsequent convergence around EU values, rules and norms (for example, Harcourt, 2006; Harcourt, 2003; Holzinger and Knill, 2005; Holzinger et al., 2008; Dobbins, 2011). Such an emphasis on policies can also involve their horizontal transfer or diffusion between member states (Bomberg and Peterson, 2000; Börzel and Risse, 2012), through the EU providing 'the architectures and... procedures' required (Radaelli and Exadaktylos, 2010b: 193). 'Political Europeanisation' refers to the influence of European integration on domestic political processes (political actors, governments, parties, interest groups, domestic institutional structures and national executives) (Diez et al.,

2005: 4-5). These processes have been studied in multiple national contexts, for example in the UK (see Bache and Jordan 2008). Other authors have focused on the normative aspects of national Europeanisation, from a sociological viewpoint (for example, Radaelli, 2000b; Bulmer, 2007; Flockhart, 2010; Mannin, 2013). Diez et al. (2005: 6); (see also Schimmelfennig, 2000) thereby refer to the Europeanisation of identities ('societal Europeanisation') inferring the construction of social identities, the influence of EU norms on actors, international socialisation and internalisation of beliefs. Finally, Diez et al. (2005: 6) refer to the Europeanisation of public discourses (or 'discursive Europeanisation').

Europeanisation research has also examined the external impacts of the EU, on non-EU states through policy entrepreneurship, diffusion or policy transfer and domestic change. For example, Mannin (2013) provides a historical analysis to elucidate the complexity of shifts in normative, sociological and ideational concepts over time, with the EU becoming a 'normative power' or 'promoter of norms' to diffuse European values and identity formulation externally. This 'external governance' perspective also involves examination of how EU rules influence states beyond the Union's borders (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2009). Using this perspective, Grabbe (2015); (see also Börzel and Lebanidze, 2017) explains the EU's 'transformative power' in Central and Eastern Europe through its imposition of accession conditionality. The external dimensions of Europeanisation also encompass shifts in 'the external territorial boundaries of the EU as it expands via enlargement' (Olsen, 2002: 923). Policy transfer or diffusion arguments have also been employed to explain how Europeanisation involves the export of specific EU policies (Lavenex and Uçarer, 2004; Grabbe and Lehne, 2011; Börzel and Risse, 2009), often via transnational networks (Börzel and Buzogány, 2010; Fritsch et al., 2017). External Europeanisation research consequently seeks to understand how such transfer is likely to affect the domestic policies, politics and polities of non-EU states and through which conditions accession countries comply with or resist norms and rules (Cirtautas and Schimmelfennig, 2010; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2007), in addition to their adaptation to new rules and institutions of European governance (Olsen,

1997). This external dimension to Europeanisation has also been studied in specific non-EU states and policy sectors, for example Turkey (see Alpan and Diez, 2014; Oğuzlu, 2013a; Oğuzlu, 2013b) and Norway (Prøitz, 2015), and foreign policy (Denca, 2009a; Denca, 2009b).

3.4 Reconceptualising Europeanisation processes

A clear problem for the Europeanisation literature in undertaking theoretical analysis is the lack of an agreed definition. In bringing all these disparate conceptualisations back together, Börzel and Panke (2016) therefore argue that Europeanisation processes (rather than outcomes) can be better understood as two main 'notions' or dimensions of interaction between the EU and Member States: *bottom-up* and *top-down* approaches that are linked via an iterative two-level game (see also Börzel, 2002). They also add a third dimension that recognises the mutual interaction between these dynamics: what they refer to as 'sequential' Europeanisation (ibid.) or '*roundabout* effects' (Radaelli and Exadaktylos, 2010b: 192).

The first dimension is the bottom-up approach. It refers to the 'evolution of European institutions as a set of new norms, rules and practices...' (Börzel, 2002: 193). It also refers to analysing the influence of national policy preferences and interests on policymaking at the EU level (Major, 2005: 176). Under this argument, Europeanisation is an intervening variable for explaining the EU, with research analysing 'whether and how member states are able to upload their domestic interests to EU institutions and policies' (Börzel and Panke, 2016: 111). For Börzel (2002: 196), there is an incentive within the EU multi-level governance system for member states 'to upload their policy arrangements to the European level'. However, because of their 'distinct social, political and economic institutions, they often compete for policies' (ibid.; see also Heritier 1996). Regulatory competition at the EU level can then involve a variety of strategies, including 'pace-setting' or acting as 'pioneers' (Börzel, 2002: 197). This first mover aspect has been much discussed by authors such as Liefferink and Andersen (1998); Andersen and Liefferink (1999) and Jänicke (2005) with regards to EU environmental policy. Such strategic interaction can

be contrasted with 'foot-dragging' or 'fence-sitting' (Börzel, 2002: 203-208) where states are either resistant or ambivalent to Europeanisation. While a significant literature has since evolved to understand bottom-up interactions (Börzel, 2003; Radaelli, 2006; McCauley, 2011; Giuliani, 2014), Europeanisation has become more synonymous with the top-down view, both inside and outside of the EU.

Secondly, the top-down approach focuses on the effects of such EU-level interaction on the domestic context. Major (2005: 176) claims that 'top-down studies attempt to explain how and to what extent, communitisation leads to institutional and policy changes at national level and whether it leads to a growing convergence of national policies through commonly defined norms, directives and laws.' In this model, Member States (and non-EU states if external Europeanisation is considered) 'download' (Börzel, 2002) policy from the EU leading to domestic change. The change covers politics as well as encompassing shared beliefs, informal rules and ways of doing changes (Özer, 2012). According to a top-down perspective, Europeanisation formalises governance, encapsulating political, legal and social institutions as well as relationships between actors and policy networks. Europeanisation is therefore an *independent variable* affecting the process of domestic changes and institutions (Börzel and Risse, 2000; Börzel, 1999; Ladrech, 1994; Mendez et al., 2008).

Regarding the causal factors of such change, Börzel (2010) claims that there are five drivers: the costs of adaptation; the external push of the EU related to its conditions; the capacity of the target country; the willingness of the target country and the power of the target country in order respond to the EU's pressure. State capacity is vital to implement the EU's requirements but non-state actors, which are NGOs and civil society, are also significant in pressurising governmental actors in order to carry out reforms. The lack of willingness and state capacity cause the high domestic costs of Europeanisation. Consequently, the degree to which Europeanisation occurs, it is argued, relates to the 'goodness of fit, referring to misfits between domestic structures of the states and EU policy demand' (Mannin, 2013: 16). Where

domestic structures provide a good fit with EU demands the potential for Europeanisation is hypothesised to be limited, while significant misfits can be a precursor to greater change (Mannin, 2013: 16). From a top-down perspective, it is clear that European policy has had significant impacts on political instruments, problem solving methods and political standards of member states (Börzel and Risse, 2000). However, convergence around EU rules, norms and institutions is manifestly variable according to sector and national context.

Such 'downloading' arguments have been extended to encompass external dimensions (see Elbasani, 2012; Elbasani, 2011; Lavenex and Uçarer, 2004; Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2009). Research into 'Accession Europeanisation' (Börzel and Soyaltin, 2012: 7) has generally encompassed understanding misfits and conditionality influences on 'the EU's transformative power' in CEE accession states (for example, Trauner, 2009; Lavenex and Uçarer, 2004; Kelley, 2006). Others have extended Europeanisation to explain institutional adaptation and change beyond accession states, to include European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) countries (Clark and Jones, 2008; Wolczuk, 2009; Browning and Christou, 2010), although there are evident limits to how far geo-political 'stretching' of the concept can reach beyond the EU (Börzel and Soyaltin, 2012). Börzel and Pamuk (2012), for example, apply Europeanisation to Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia to show how they downloaded EU norms on good governance - but the extent to which such countries can be analysed via this approach is debatable given its original emphasis on domestic member state change.

Problematically for the top-down/bottom-up model, it still rather downplays the inter-related nature of the two-level game, although this deficiency is acknowledged by several authors (see Andersen and Liefferink, 1997; Henkens and Van Keulen, 2001; Bulmer and Radaelli, 2004; Major, 2005: 177; Özer, 2012). For Börzel and Panke (2016: 119) a 'sequential' perspective is therefore required for understanding how uploading strategies then subsequently rebound into downloading via implementation of EU policies. Under these arguments, member states can successfully avoid high implementation costs of policy or institutional adjustment through imposing their domestic preferences on the EU

(see Andersen and Liefferink, 1999; Héritier and Knill, 2001). Conversely, research conducted by Börzel (2003) shows how some southern states act as implementation 'laggards' because they lack the power to upload their preferences to the EU, enduring significant domestic policy misfits as a result. While fewer studies have utilised a sequential approach to examine uploading and downloading relations, others have explored the existence of further dimensions. Mannin (2013), for example, claims that a macro approach (or EU-isation) is required as a third perspective after top-down and bottom-up approaches to examine the role of 'political ideas, values, discourse and culture' on EU and domestic level change, offering a system-wide sociological perspective. In this respect, Europeanisation can be undertaken from multiple traditions.

3.5 Theorising Europeanisation: Institutionalism

A diversity of theories has been applied to explaining these top-down and bottom-up dynamics, ranging across a broad continuum of ontological/epistemological approaches. Wiener and Diez (2009: 19) refer to a 'mosaic' of integration theory which has accumulated over time. Each theoretical perspective, while allowing certain aspects of the integration 'picture' to be viewed, complements other theories in understanding this process as a whole (ibid.). In this way, several comparative or domestic politics theories have been integrated into Europeanisation analyses as part of the mosaic. However, as discussed in this section, a new institutionalism and most notably rational institutionalism has underpinned much of this analysis.

While offering theoretical insights in its own right, the broad church of Europeanisation studies has also been colonised by several mainstream theoretical approaches including multi-level governance, policy networks, pluralism and diffusion. Bache (2008), for example, considers 'the extent to which Europeanisation advances multi-level governance within member states' through an analysis of cohesion policy in the UK. In addition, Risse et al. (2001); (see also Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003) refer to the Europeanisation of policy via the interaction of actors within multi-level networks. Some scholars,

however, are critical of the usefulness of a network-focused approach (Kassim, 1994; see also Radaelli, 2003: 29), with Kohler-Koch and Eising (1999) arguing that it remains only one possible approach for understanding Europeanisation processes. Here, they refer to pluralism along with corporatism and statism as alternatives (ibid.). More latterly, researchers have attempted to interpret horizontal Europeanisation between states and externally with non-EU states through policy transfer and diffusion mechanisms borrowed from the public policy literatures (Lavenex and Uçarer, 2004; Börzel and Risse, 2012). However, for understanding domestic change (i.e. downloading), the most common theoretical approach is new institutionalism (Bache, 2010: 3).

New institutionalism encompasses multiple theoretical arguments that examine political institutions as rules, norms and routines rather than explicitly as organisational structures (March and Olsen, 1998: 21-26; Peters, 2012). Four main variants new institutionalism exist within this literature: rational choice, historical, sociological and discursive (Peters, 2011). For rational choice theory, the fundamental argument is that for actors 'utility maximisation can and will remain the primary motivation of individuals' and that such motivations are constrained by rules exogenously given (Peters, 2012: 48). Actors' preferences are therefore fixed by these external constraints. Historical institutionalism meanwhile argues that institutions, both formal (such as rules) and informal (such as ideas) (Pierson, 1999; Aspinwall and Schneider, 2000), emerge over time and that 'path dependency' (Peters, 2012: 70; Pierson, 2000; Page, 2006), which infers actors' preferences rely on what happened in the past and initial policy structures thereby restricting national governments on institutional development regarding the EU (Bulmer, 1994; Thelen, 2004). Positive feedback or self-reinforcing processes mean that institutional change is constrained (Bache, 2008). Regarding this respect, HI aims to elucidate the persistence of institutions, which can be 'concrete' (Thelen, 1999: 371), Understanding present policy change therefore involves investigating previous institutional development.

Significant differences exist between these institutionalism theories in how they interpret institutions. On the one hand, RI focuses on institutional formation and

evolutionary change, on the other hand, HI has tended to emphasise the historical perspective of institutional development. Both theories, however, assume that institutions are shaped by external or exogenous factors, e.g. EU rules. In contrast to these more rational arguments, sociological institutionalism does not assume that actors' preferences are exogenously given and they are essentially socially constructed i.e. endogenous. SI considers (social) institutions more deeply and it has more of a focus on explaining how norms shape actors' identities and interests as well as how institutions are generated and reproduced. Also, SI considers institutions as independent variables leading to political outcomes (Peters, 2012). Individual actors internalise norms (institutions) through processes of socialisation and social learning (see below), thereby leading to interest and identity change (Peters, 2012).

Some authors (see Icoz, 2011; Yalvaç, 2014) focus on historical institutionalism, in explaining Europeanisation, however, in the case of Turkey path dependency is clearly limited post-2005. In terms of water policy, there is no evident institutional lock-in (see Pierson, 2002; Peters, 2012). The critique of HI is that it is not efficient to explain the changes within institutions (Peters, 2012). Applied to Turkey, HI provides limited explanations for Europeanisation in the water policy sector in which actors aim to adopt a new water management system and the EU water acquis. As explained further in Chapter 5, policy actors did not persist with initial policies transferred from the EU, but become open to changes and, as result, a new hybrid water management system has evolved. Path dependency in EU water policy transfer cannot therefore be assumed, questioning the 'rationality' of such theorising. However, since SI focuses on actors' preferences, identity change and learning new things by interaction with EU experts, it may well be better placed to explain the trajectory of water policy development.

Finally, more recently analysts have referred to a fourth institutionalism that focuses squarely on the influence of ideas embedded in discourse (Schmidt, 2008; Schmidt, 2010). Schmidt (2011: 47) describes 'discursive institutionalism as the 'substantive content of ideas and interactive processes of discourse that serve to generate those ideas and communicate them to the public.' It follows a

'logic of communication', which examines how institutions shift and persist (Schmidt, 2008: 303). This so-called discursive institutionalism (DI) builds on earlier insights by prioritising the significance of ideas and the interactions through which they are disseminated, offering a dynamic explanation of how institutions, both internally constructed and externally structured, influence policy development (ibid.). To date, DI has been applied to such processes in various aspects of policy change (Lingard, 2007; Fairbrass, 2011; Widmaier, 2016; Lorenzoni and Benson, 2014).

Schmidt, (2008) identifies ideas regarding their levels of generality, which are policies, programmes and philosophies, and their types. Ideas are divided into two types; normative and cognitive/causal (Schmidt, 2008). While normative ideas refer to 'what is good or bad about what it is', cognitive ideas examine 'what is and what to do' (Schmidt, 2008: 306). Ideas can shape institutions and individuals' behaviours (Peters, 2012). Institutional change in DI explanations infer changes in the ideas and values, generated by the interactive process (of discourse) (Schmidt, 2008), so institutional change refers to changes in the discourse (Peters, 2012). Discourse can be communicative, which examines the interaction between political actors and the public, or coordinative, which elucidates interaction amongst policy actors (Schmidt, 2008).

Discursive institutionalism claims that institutions are shaped by the ideas and ideas are communicated in the institutional structure, which tends to disregard formal structures, and is more related to shared communication and beliefs (Peters, 2012: 112). However, SI in the international studies literature also focuses on values, norms, formative structures as well as defining the appropriate behaviours in the institution (Peters, 2012). SI is related to organisational theory and organisations can be a main focus for the institutional activities. In DI, organisational norms are more flexible and are constructed via interaction, however in SI norms are more defined by the existing norms, culture, and symbols (Peters, 2012).

DI is closely related to SI because of its focus on ideas. However ideas in DI refers to 'dynamic constructs' as opposed to HI, SI and RI which are more static

(Schmidt, 2008: 320). Three older 'new' institutionalism focus on explaining political action; SI focuses on culture, cognitive frames and norms, HI institutional practices and structures and RI rational behaviour and interests of political actors (Schmidt, 2011). However, they have difficulties explaining institutional change because of being economically, historically and culturally deterministic and thereby disregard individual actor preferences (Schmidt, 2011). The ideas have an important role in shaping the policies, however policy areas may not have a clear influence from ideas. Accordingly, DI may be problematic to explain how ideas underpin institutional changes as well as how individual ideas become collective action and why actors act (Schmidt, 2011; 2008). Therefore the causality between ideas (including discourses) and policy changes may be difficult to elucidate by identifying actors' interests (Peters, 2012). Regarding this aspect, the challenge is; there are various ideas and some of them can be selected and become policies, programmes and philosophies and others may not be chosen. However, the selected idea can be chosen temporarily as these ideas can be conflicted, therefore this process is not clear. DI has less interest in the conditions, in which ideas may guide policy (Schmidt, 2008).

DI endorses the logic of appropriateness, which infers the defining of institutions and actions by the participants (March and Olsen, 1989). However, as Peters (2012: 114) claims 'the discursive form of institutionalism is the least structured among the various versions, and provides the greatest ambiguity (and the greatest range of action) for the members of institutions conceptualised in this manner.' Also, while political actors may feel compelled to pursue discourses of policy implications, they may not change their preferences as opposed to SI (Schmidt, 2008).

Also, interaction amongst the member states generates the ideas and discourses which define the institutions, but institutions cannot be easily defined and constrained. The definition of policy and ideas may include the stability of institutions, however this stability may turn to destabilisation when the institutions recruit new members: they may want to bring new ideas and this may destroy stability as opposed to an SI view, which argues that individuals,

coming into institutions, become socialised by them (Peters, 2012). Also, in the DI view it is difficult to elucidate collective aims in the institution, so there is no stability amongst the individuals and amongst their aims and the targets are variable and not clear.

Besides, there can be other factors that are significant for explaining changes, including cultural norms, tradition, timing, national values, and policy viability rather than just focusing of discourse (Schmidt, 2011).

Overwhelmingly the theoretical literature on Europeanisation has employed two main interpretations of institutionalism for explaining downloading dynamics: rational (choice) institutionalism (RI) and sociological institutionalism (SI) (Sedelmeier, 2011; Börzel, 2005; Börzel and Risse, 2003). Rationalist institutionalism, based on the 'logic of consequences' (March and Olsen, 2011), indicates that Europeanisation causes domestic changes (see Figure 3.1) as a consequence of the differential empowerment of political actors stemming from their coercion or incentivising by specific rules, typically conditionality (Börzel and Risse, 2003; Börzel, 2002). It infers that 'adaptational pressure from the EU changes the opportunity structure for utility-maximising domestic actors' (Sedelmeier, 2011: 11). In this approach, institutions are conceived as a collection of rules and incentives, which create the factors determining individuals' behaviours (Peters, 2012). Political actors are supposed to maximise their personal benefits, but the options are constrained by the set of rules. In this approach, the element of rational behaviour refers to how individuals gain benefits from membership in an institution and secure the predictability of other individuals' behaviours (ibid.). They then act 'rationally' in responding to these institutional incentives, fearing the consequences of inaction or utilising such opportunities for strategic gain. The main argument of this approach is that the motivation of individuals, which is utility maximization, and their aims can be achieved via institutional action (Peters, 2012). For example, the leaders of the organisation in government might use their positions to increase their personal utility, including increasing their budgets or the number of personnel (ibid.). Accordingly, this individual maximization may lead to 'dysfunctional behaviour', which may constrain the individuals'

behaviours to produce socially desirable results (Peters, 2012: 50). Two mediating factors affect the capacities of actors: multiple veto points and domestic consensus (ibid.). Institutional veto players have an impact on the domestic actors' capacities to accomplish policy changes and restrict their empowerment, while consensus is necessary to support such change (Börzel and Risse, 2009: 8). Therefore the problem with the rational-choice approach is that it focuses on exogenously constituted institutions, which influence actors' behaviours. However, individuals can be more individualistic and or can behave too randomly. Accordingly, the behaviours of the individuals can be far from normative standards and collective goods (Peters, 2012). Regarding this argument, sociological institutionalism can be considered as an alternative approach.

Sociological institutionalism claims that Europeanisation entails domestic changes via persuasion and collective learning leading to the internalisation (socialisation) of new EU rules and norms (Börzel and Soyaltin, 2012). While a rationalist argument assumes 'power to be zero-sum' and driven by EU goals, sociological institutionalism argues for a more 'positive-sum' view of power with the expectation that 'actors change their preferences through socialisation in a changing environment and ascribe shifts toward multi-level governance to a learning process' (Bache, 2008: 4).

Börzel and Risse (2000) show how these two divergent approaches can explain domestic change under Europeanisation (see Figure 3.1). With the existence of a 'policy misfit' at the domestic level, Europeanisation can occur as adaptational pressure from the EU develops. Depending on the theoretical lens employed, RI or SI, this pressure can create new opportunity structures for actors (or constrain their behaviour) or generate new ideas, norms and collective understandings around EU policy (ibid.). From an RI perspective, where domestic consensus is supportive and veto points are low, actors can act in response to the rule-based opportunity structures imposed or offered by the EU to redistribute resources in order to facilitate change (ibid.). Alternatively, when viewed from an SI perspective, the new norms and ideas generated by EU adaptation pressures create the environment for normative

entrepreneurs to promote change through socialisation via social learning leading to norm internalisation and identity change around EU normative structures as a precursor for domestic-level change (ibid.). We return to this point later in the chapter.




Figure 3.1: Two logics of domestic change (Börzel and Risse, 2000: 22).

While these arguments have been applied extensively for studies of domestic EU downloading (Elbasani, 2011; Radaelli, 2006; Börzel, 2003; Liefferink et al., 2011), they have also supported analysis of external downloading, i.e. beyond the EU's borders. Scholars have turned to the new institutionalism theoretical toolbox to explain external Europeanisation, primarily in CEE accession countries (Börzel and Risse, 2003; Börzel and Risse, 2009; Sedelmeier, 2012; Sedelmeier, 2011; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005a; Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2009). More latterly, such arguments have been extended to non-CEE contexts with RI theory the dominant approach in studies of EU candidate countries (Macmillan, 2012). In the context of Turkey, these approaches have primarily focused on rational choice institutionalism but - as identified in detail in Chapter 2 - RI arguments may lack explanatory power for Europeanisation post-2005, leading some scholars to explore alternative

institutional theory, most notably sociological institutionalism (Macmillan, 2012). Key features of this theoretical approach should therefore be discussed in detail in order to develop a sociological institutionalist framework for analysing Europeanisation in Turkey.

3.6 Sociological institutionalism: Socialisation and social learning

Institutionalism has emerged to become an important theoretical approach to explaining European integration processes, encompassing rational, historical, sociological and more discursive variants (Börzel and Panke, 2016). In terms of Europeanisation, sociological institutionalism would privilege the adoption of new EU norms by actors which are then integrated into their domestic rule structures, thereby furthering the integration process. Critically, as opposed to rational variants, actors intend to fulfil social expectations around these norms instead of specifically enhancing their self-interests (Börzel, 2012). Accordingly, 'Europeanisation is understood as the emergence of new rules, norms, practices, and structures of meaning to which member states are exposed and which they have to incorporate into their domestic practices and structures' (Börzel and Risse, 2003: 66; Börzel and Risse, 2009). Of importance for the study of this thesis is how, theoretically, this process should normatively occur and the types of outcomes that could be expected.

As opposed to rational institutionalism, which focuses on actors' compulsion to act through a rational institutionalist 'logic of consequences' (see Chapter 2), sociological institutionalism primarily is based on the 'logic of appropriateness' (Sedelmeier, 2011: 11; March and Olsen, 1998; Börzel and Risse, 2009; Börzel and Risse, 2003). Instead of rule following being perceived of as 'contractual - an implicit agreement to act appropriately in return for being treated appropriately', such views of appropriateness are embedded in context and hence socially constructed according to endogenous factors (March and Olsen 1996: 251). In other words, actors will adopt new norms only if persuaded of their appropriateness, leading to collective understandings and internalisation of new norms, values and identities through this process of persuasion (Sedelmeier, 2006). Over time, therefore, this process is predicted to lead to a

gradual internalisation of new norms and institutional change (Flockhart, 2004:378).

When related to Europeanisation, sociological institutionalism consequently indicates that ‘the EU’s impact does not (only) depend on the domestic material interest constellations’ (Sedelmeier, 2011: 16) and signifies two main explanations for domestic changes in response to Europeanisation. The first is ‘more structuralist’ in that it connotes the effects of ‘*institutional isomorphism*’ (ibid.). Drawing upon the diffusion literature, this argument suggests that institutions, as organisational forms, have interactions with each other, resulting in parallel homogenisation and creating allied organisational forms, rules of resource allocation and reform standards (ibid.). The second is more related to the agency-centred approach typical of sociological institutionalism, focusing on how the EU integrates European rules, norms and values into the existing institutions as well as focusing on the differences to which domestic norms and institutional changes occur in response to international institutional regulations (Börzel and Risse, 2000). Correspondingly, sociological institutionalism states that Europeanisation causes domestic changes by means of socialisation through norm internalisation derived from social learning or collective learning processes (see Table 3.1) which result in identity change (Börzel and Risse, 2000; Börzel and Risse, 2003).

Table 3.1: RI and SI theoretical arguments.

Institutional theory	Empirical focus	Europeanisation mechanism	Europeanisation indicators
<i>Rational Choice Institutionalism</i>	Rules	Conditionality	Rule compliance
<i>Sociological Institutionalism</i>	Norms	Socialisation Social learning	Norm internalisation Norm acquisition

According to its supporters, this ‘agency-centred’ view of sociological institutionalism is highly evident in Europeanisation. Here, it is argued that from a sociological institutionalism perspective, initially the EU’s ‘domestic impact

results from a process of socialisation in which domestic actors internalise EU norms that they regard as legitimate' (Sedelmeier, 2011: 11). As we explain below, socialisation is theorised to occur where the EU 'socialises' (or teaches) state actors around its norms which, if they deem them 'appropriate' will internalise them. Internalisation in this context 'means the adoption of social beliefs and practices into the actor's own repertoire of cognitions and behaviours' (Schimmelfennig, 2000: 112). Sedelmeier (2011) argues that critical factors for socialisation to occur are the role of '*domestic norm entrepreneurs*' (ibid.; see also Börzel and Soyaltin, 2012) in norm transference, 'as well as normative resonance between EU rules and domestic cultural understandings and informal institutions'. *Persuasion and arguing mechanisms* used by norm entrepreneurs in order to encourage actors for domestic change include moral arguments and strategic constructions (Kleine and Risse, 2005; Börzel and Risse, 2003). Domestic actors can also engage in a *social learning process* through which EU rules redefine their interests and identities (Börzel and Risse, 2000). Learning, as discussed below, is interpreted in this thesis as norm acquisition that occurs within the socialisation process thereby supporting arguments made by integration scholars. According to these scholars, the two processes are integrated: the former aims to persuade actors to redefine their identities and interests, putting pressure on actors to change (internalise norms) by using persuasion and arguing (Börzel and Risse, 2009: 11; Risse, 2000). The latter refers more to the processes by which these norms are internalised leading to the resultant outcomes in terms of identity change and hence Europeanisation (Börzel and Risse, 2003). A critical question that emerges is therefore how does socialisation occur through social learning in theory?

In testing the relevance of SI for analysing Europeanisation in Turkey, it is necessary to develop specific explanations for domestic change. As identified above, an SI perspective argues that Europeanisation causes changes in domestic contexts through socialisation and social learning which then lead to norm acquisition, internalisation and changes in actors' identities (Börzel and Risse, 2009: 2). Initial conceptions of social learning within the Europeanisation literature have tended to focus on learning outcomes drawn from the

organisational learning literature (e.g. Radaelli, 2003) that, while providing a measure of Europeanisation, give only limited insight into learning as a process. More latterly, scholars have therefore focused on the role of individual interaction and 'entrepreneurship' in the acquisition of EU norms in explaining external Europeanisation under socialisation (Börzel and Soyaltin, 2012) although this aspect remains theoretically underdeveloped in the literature. In providing novelty to these established SI interpretations, that tend to treat institutional change as limited, they can therefore be developed as a more dynamic theory of institutional development in order to explain how water policy has evolved over time. A critical focus is the role of actor learning around EU water norms and how this in turn shapes their internalisation through a process of socialisation. Learning then, theoretically, becomes the main 'engine' of change. By reconceptualising Europeanisation in this way, SI can potentially account for the hybridising nature of water policy development in Turkey. This chapter therefore draws upon existing conceptions of socialisation and social learning to develop a framework for analysing norm internalisation within Europeanisation processes such as the WFD implementation.

3.6.1 Socialisation

Socialisation is a contested concept, with multiple meanings evident in the political science, IR and Europeanisation literatures, therefore definitional clarity would be both timely and necessary for the purposes of this study. Socialisation in IR theory, for example, encompasses 'the formation and change of preferences, national identity formation, the creation, diffusion of, and compliance with international norms; the effects of international institutions' and actors 'changing the minds of others, of persuading, cajoling, or shaming them to accept, and hopefully internalise new facts, figures, arguments, norms and causal understandings about particular issues' (Johnston, 2001: 489). For other authors, it may refer more specifically to norm internalisation and diffusion (Alderson, 2001; Schimmelfennig et al., 2006; Gheciu, 2005); changes in the preferences of agents (preference formation) (Johnston, 2014: 5); or social interaction (Checkel, 2006); ongoing and ubiquitous cognitive and social processes (Finnemore, 1996); moral persuasive and social pressure (see Price

and Reus-Smit, 1998; Kelley, 2004; Johnston, 2001: 487); norm development (Price and Reus-Smit, 1998); the process of inducting political actors into a given community's rules and norms (Zürn and Checkel, 2005: 1046; Müller and de Flers, 2009: 10); collective identity formation and learning (see Schimmelfennig, 2003; Flockhart, 2010; Risse-Kappen, 1995; Checkel, 2003; Checkel, 1997; Checkel and Moravcsik, 2001); and constituting actors' interests and identities (Flockhart, 2004: 363; Checkel, 2005a). Risse-Kappen et al. (1999: 11) also indicates socialisation is a process of 'moral consciousness-raising, shaming, argumentation, dialogue and persuasion, lead changes in identities, interests and behaviours, accordingly the aim of socialisation is for actors to internalise the norms.'

Socialisation has evolved to mean a specific set of processes, which is initiated and shaped by the norms (Sikkink, 1993; Risse-Kappen et al., 1999: 12; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 898) in order to elucidate 'how actors internalise a given social norm' (Risse, 2000: 6). Some authors perceive socialisation as internalisation and institutionalisation (see Alderson, 2001; Checkel, 2005a), others perceive socialisation as a (norm transfer) process and this may cause norm internalisation at the end of the process (Schimmelfennig, 2005a; Schimmelfennig, 2012; Flockhart, 2004; Checkel, 2001). As Börzel and Risse (2000: 2) indicate socialisation causes norm internalisation (see also Schimmelfennig, 2005d: 69). Therefore, Schimmelfennig (2000: 112) also indicates 'socialisation results in the actors' internalisation of beliefs and practices.'

The important question then is what does (norm) internalisation mean? Norms which are defined as 'shared expectations about appropriate behaviour held by community actors' (Finnemore, 1996: 22), or 'to describe collective expectations for the proper behaviour of actors with a given identity' (Jepperson et al., 1996: 5) are vital to create shared understandings rather than limiting behaviours (Alderson, 2001) as well as guide actor decision-making. They are therefore more critical to understand the socially situated context of Europeanisation. Internalisation was presented as the individual compliance of rule adoption by Max Weber and Talcott Parsons and accordingly, individuals who are able to

internalise the rules or socialisation have tended to be linked with rule adoption by the governments or states (Schimmelfennig et al., 2006; Checkel, 2005; Alderson, 2001). Peshkopia and Imami (2008: 356) also indicate that 'international norm internalisation means that a state complies with a certain normative behaviour... and socialisation represents belief changes', accordingly normative behaviour should be 'in parallel with actors' belief systems rather than "blindly" following the norms (see also Flockhart, 2004). Regarding this point, Schimmelfennig (2000: 112) describes internalisation as 'the adoption of social beliefs and practices into actors' (see also Alderson, 2001) own repertoire of cognitions and behaviours. A fully socialised actor regards these beliefs and practices as their own and follows them autonomously.' Accordingly 'the norm set and associated values and procedures become internalised to such a degree that following the norm set is no longer a source of dispute, but is performed on a habitual basis' (Flockhart, 2004: 362). Also, beliefs and practices should be sufficiently institutionalised in decision-making processes and effectively protected by domestic sanctioning mechanisms (Schimmelfennig, 2000: 112), accordingly in the long term the new norms are institutionalised and internalised (Flockhart, 2004: 362).

Also, a further debate related to norm internalisation concerns who internalises the norms; elites, the public or states? According to Alderson (2001) individual internalisation, which is the fundamental component of state internalisation, indicates shifts in worldviews about beliefs, attitudes and principles of business leaders, political actors, students and public members (Alderson, 2001: 418). Domestic actors can attempt to persuade and pressure governments in order for political actors to correspond with new international norms. State socialisation is a design of political, domestic and social actors. In the same vein, according to Peshkopia and Imami (2008), for state socialisation with internalisation norms, socialisation of elites is not enough - political and societal actors/public/societies of target countries should also adopt the norms. Accordingly, socialisation should go beyond elites and has influence on the societies/public. Therefore, the interests and roles of societies with international norms are also important (Peshkopia and Imami, 2008). Also, Schimmelfennig

et al. (2006) indicate that individual internalisation is not an effective condition for successful socialisation of states unless socialised individuals have attempted to create their direction in the organisation. So in this thesis, it is important to understand how domestic political actors/elites socialise with EU norms, rules and values (Chapter 5) as well as elucidate how local actors and organisations are affected by international norms (see Peshkopia and Imami, 2008). This is achieved in two case studies by using process tracing and interview records, examined in Chapter 6-7. However, this study also focuses on changes in the attitudes and beliefs of elites, which are not actually transmitted to societies.

This observation raises the evident question of how does the EU engage in such socialisation as a Europeanising strategy? In the Europeanisation literature a number of such conceptualisations are present. From an SI perspective, socialisation is generally interpreted as a process of EU norm transferring (persuasion or teaching) that leads to norm internalisation and identity change. However, conceptualisations differ regarding *how* such socialisation leads to norm internalisation, with multiple explanations evident. For some authors, socialisation is primarily the process by which the EU teaches domestic actors about such norms, resulting in internalisation (Schimmelfennig et al., 2006). Therefore, scholars refer to the EU socialising such actors through persuading them of the appropriateness of its norms, leading in turn to their internalisation or acceptance. In the literature, there are argued to be three target groups, namely publics, elites and non-member state societies (Schimmelfennig, 2005d). For Schimmelfennig (2015: 9) the term:

‘... comprises all EU efforts to ‘teach’ EU policies-as well as the ideas and norms behind them- to outsiders, to persuade outsiders that these policies are appropriate and, as a consequence, to ‘social learning’, ‘constructive impact’ and ‘communication...’

Accordingly, the EU does not – as RI theorists would maintain – directly manipulate ‘the cost-benefit calculations of external actors’ but instead ‘teaches them the principles and rules of European governance’ (Schimmelfennig, 2015:

9). In this way, the EU is perceived as a 'teacher of norms' (Börzel and Risse, 2012: 7; Finnemore, 1993; Gheciu, 2005). For Checkel (2005a: 804) socialisation therefore refers to 'a process of [the EU] inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community'. Socialisation then becomes the main means by which the EU diffuses its governance through promotion of its norms and values (Schimmelfennig, 2010). In this approach, actors only accept or internalise EU norms if they deem them legitimate and appropriate (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004: 676; see also Börzel and Risse, 2009). This argument therefore links back to the 'logic of appropriateness' (March and Olsen, 1998; March and Olsen, 2011) inherent in SI conceptions regarding identity change. Checkel (2005) emphasises that socialisation infers passing from the logic of consequences to the logic of appropriateness. Regarding this argument, Börzel and Risse (2009: 10) also describe socialisation as working:

'...through normative rationality or *the logic of appropriateness* which differ from strategic and instrumental behaviour in that actors seek to do 'the right thing' rather than maximising or optimising their given utilities. Actors learn to internalise new norms and rules in order to become members of (international) society in good standing.'

Some argue that socialisation is distinct from social learning and can be measured in parallel. For example, Lavenex (2014: 890) claims 'learning can be both supply (EU teaching activities) or demand driven (at the request of third countries).' Börzel and Risse (2000: 2) suggest that according to sociological institutionalism, Europeanisation causes domestic changes via socialisation and 'collective learning', which leads to norm internalisation and development of new identities. Flockhart (2004: 362) also emphasises 'internalisation will be facilitated through processes of social learning and socialisation taking place within multiple structures in the transforming society.' Socialisation, in contrast, follows the logic of appropriateness and is less choice driven, which refers to 'a process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community' (Checkel, 2005a: 804).

Others suggest that social learning is integral to socialisation, with one 'subsuming' the other (see Schimmelfennig, 2012: 8). On the one hand, confusingly, in some studies social learning is described as preceding socialisation, for example Checkel (2005: 807) states that 'socialisation can also begin via a process of social learning, in which state agents learn new roles and interests from the start and in the absence of social mobilisation' (see also Checkel, 2000; Risse-Kappen et al., 1999). Accordingly, Thielemann (2002: 12) argues that 'social learning through processes such as socialisation can lead to the internalisation of norms.' On the other hand, for Dunlop and Radaelli (2017: 313) 'socialisation is a driver of learning because it can change norms and attitudes and anchor new ones' and it has been linked to learning in international organisations. In the same vein, Börzel and Risse (2009) indicate actors aim to fulfil social expectations rather than maximising their self-interests, thus, in turn, the socialisation process often causes complex or double-loop learning, which infers actors redefine their interests and identities (see also Börzel and Risse, 2012). Dunlop and Radaelli (2013) also claim that 'socialisation in bureaucratic settings creates preconditions for learning and ways to reduce veto players considerations in what has been labelled an emergent European executive order.' This point is reiterated by Börzel et al. (2010: 1364) who also state that:

'Social constructivists stress legitimacy, socialisation, and norm internalisation through processes of social learning and persuasion as explanations for compliance. Although these three approaches provide different explanations for why states comply, they have paid less attention to the question of why some states comply better than others.'

By taking this line of argumentation, we then need to theorise how a norm transfer/diffusion process (socialisation) can occur via social learning and how this process finally may lead to norm internalisation. The next sections therefore draw out measures of socialisation to guide the analysis followed by constructing a framework for social learning.

3.6.1.1 The levels/classification of socialisation

There are different types of socialisation discussed in the literature which draw upon rational and sociological perspectives (see Table 3.2). For example, Checkel (2005a: 804) distinguishes two types of internalisation that are both different from the logic of consequences. Type I internalisation/socialisation implies agents represent an appropriate behaviour of learning a role and gaining the knowledge to act in line with the expectations, rather than considering whether they agree with the role and like it. In other words, there is a replacement of instrumental calculation with role playing for the agents who are aware of 'what is socially accepted in a given setting or community' (Checkel, 2005a: 804). In this degree of socialisation, strategic action is the key mechanism: actors have a tendency to comply with the rules and norms, so they can reach their national goals, therefore there is no internalisation of EU norms at this level (Müller and de Flers, 2009: 16). Type 2 internalisation/socialisation implies that a logic of appropriateness is likely to encourage further role playing and the agents can be prone to adopt organisational norms because of perceiving them the 'right thing to do', in contrast to 'taken-for-grantedness'. Checkel (2005a: 804) claims 'Type II internalisation implies that agents adopt new interests, or even possibly the identity, of the community of which they are a part.' Norms are likely to constrain actors' behaviour, so EU institutions and norms have constitutive impacts on the applicants as well as causing changes in the actors' behaviours and values (Müller and de Flers, 2009: 16). Besides, agents have a tendency to change interests or adapt to the new national identity. For this reason, there is a shift through socialisation from the logic of consequentialism.

In a similar argument to Type I and Type II categories, socialisation can be *thin*, which is based on a rationalist perspective, and *thick* (see Lewis, 2003; Quaglia et al., 2008). Thin socialisation refers to 'evidence of continual cost-benefit calculations to determine normative compliance' (Hurd, 1999: 396) and 'strategic use of incentives' (Schimmelfennig, 2000). Thin socialisation also infers *decoupling* effects (Checkel, 2002), which take place 'when agents learn to talk the talk and avert the potential socialisation force of group pressure or

arguments' (Checkel, 2002: 12; Lewis, 2003). The second type is thick socialisation which is based on a constructivist perspective and also overlaps with Type II socialisation/internalisation (see Checkel, 2005a), which indicates persuasion, internalisation of norms with cognitive/attitudinal impacts via social learning or imitation and norms viewed as legitimate (Lewis, 2003: 104; Lewis, 1998; Egeberg, 2000). Thick socialisation has two levels; partial and deep (see Schimmelfennig, 2005a; Lewis, 2003). Lewis (2003: 104) indicates that 'partial socialisation comprises: multiple role conceptions, role playing (and possibly role conflict), evidence of 'habitual compliance and incremental internalisation', so there is limited norm compliance at this level (see Checkel, 2005a). Secondly, deep socialisation refers to 'taken-for-grantedness (evidence of automatic compliance to group norms and rules and holistic internalisation' (Lewis, 2003: 104). These two types can be summarised in Table 3.2.

Table 3.2: Types of socialisation.

Socialisation type	Socialisation approach	Socialisation levels
Thin/Type I	Rational	Low
Thick/Type II	Sociological	Partial Deep

3.6.1.2 Socialisation processes – scope conditions and mechanisms for institutional change

Given this divergence in socialisation perspectives, both rational choice and sociological institutionalist arguments are evident in the Europeanisation literature on both the scope conditions and mechanisms for socialisation. With regards the latter, a key role is ascribed to social learning as a socialisation mechanism: the approach adopted in this thesis. For example, Schimmelfennig (2005d: 64) indicates that the key socialisation mechanisms are *imitation* and *social learning* within the logic of appropriateness; but *social influence* and *bargaining* are critical within the logic of consequentiality. Regarding this point, Warkotsch (2007) states that the main mechanisms for socialisation are

external incentives and social learning. Schimmelfennig (2012), meanwhile, stresses the role of social learning, communication and what he calls constructive impacts. Flockhart (2004: 366-367) also focuses on two other strategies to examine how socialisation of new norms occurs; *social influence*, which focuses on pro-norm behaviour via distribution of rewards and punishments; and *persuasion*, which refers to 'norm-consistent behaviour through a social process of interaction that involves changing attitudes without use of either material or mental coercion.' Accordingly, it aims to shift actors' beliefs and attitudes rather than simply changes the behaviours.

Often these mechanisms are combined together within studies, forwarding explanations for socialisation from rational choice, social constructivism and social psychology (see Zürn and Checkel, 2005; Checkel, 2005a). Accordingly, Checkel (2005a: 805) indicates three scope conditions of socialisation; *role playing*, *strategic calculation* and *normative situation*, for state/agent socialisation and under which conditions policy-makers internalise the norms. *Role playing* means agents have a tendency to comply with the new roles in parallel with the community norms because they are appropriate for the setting (Checkel, 2005: 810); however, a reflective internalisation process that operationalised via communicative process does not exist (Checkel, 2005: 810); *strategic calculation* refers to under what conditions incentives and reward can cause shifts in the behaviour of the state in parallel with community norms; and finally *normative situation*, inferring social agents, represents a behaviour of promoting arguments and mutual persuasion rather than cost-benefit calculations (Checkel, 2003; Checkel, 2005; Risse, 2000).

For RI theorists, again conditionality is significant as a scope condition, establishing incentives/rewards and strategic actor calculations as key mechanisms in determining how EU norm persuasion can occur (see e.g Schimmelfennig et al., 2006; Zürn and Checkel, 2005; Checkel, 2006; Kelley, 2004; Jupille et al., 2003a; Checkel and Moravcsik, 2001; Adler, 1997; Fearon and Wendt, 2002) represented the behaviour of combining rationalist-constructivist debates to characterise international socialisation as opposed to Johnson (2001). Schimmelfennig (2005b), for example, uses a predominantly

rationalist approach to explain the socialisation of CEECs, focusing on membership conditionality and the mechanism of strategic calculation, accordingly he claims that two mechanisms are vital for successful socialisation which are *reinforcement* and *party constellations*. Here, successful conditions for socialisation are argued to be reinforcement rewards (of membership of the EU and NATO as incentive) under conditionality for domestic change but also party constellations successful international socialisation (ibid). Checkel (2005a: 805) also refers to the importance of strategic calculation of actors in the socialisation process in relation to social and material incentives and rewards. These arguments are further developed by Schimmelfennig et al. (2006), who argue that a credible EU membership incentive and low domestic adaptation costs are important for norm internalisation in socialisation.

However, some have criticised such scope conditions and mechanisms for socialisation in CEE countries, particularly the emphasis placed on conditionality. According to Gheciu (2005), guaranteed membership could not provide an adequate explanation for socialisation processes in the Czech Republic and Romania. Similarly, Sasse (2008: 17) argues that the incentive model of conditionality does not readily explain socialisation in European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) states Moldova and Ukraine since 'the vague long-term possibility of membership' is not an attractive and credible tool for compliance. Few links were found between EU rewards and compliance by government officials, particularly in Moldova (Popescu, 2006; Sasse, 2008). Flockhart (2004: 361) states 'It is assumed that the complex process of new identity constructions as part of the effort of joining the dominant in-group cannot be explained purely by reference to the usual theory of the agent based on rationality, but that it has more to do with less tangible factors such as positive self-esteem and a desire to belong to a positively valued in-group.' This view raises a debate over how to analyse successful socialisation in the absence of conditionality, for instance the lack of credible EU membership in Turkey. Alternatively, socialisation could be understood through a sociological perspective.

The use of socialisation alone in the Europeanisation literature is – this thesis argues – highly problematic for measuring the impacts of the EU on domestic change, for two reasons. Firstly, is there empirical/methodological problem of measuring contested concepts such as individual perceptions of the legitimacy and resonance of EU norms? Schimmelfennig (2006) himself only superficially tests these measures in his high level analysis of CEECs using a positivist approach, when they require more in-depth, qualitative testing with individual actors. Secondly, as explained above, another evident issue is the way in which scholars use socialisation and social learning interchangeably (and rather uncritically) to explain domestic change. As a result, Schimmelfennig (2012: 8) argues that social learning is integral to socialisation, with one ‘subsuming’ the other. But questions emerge then about how socialisation and social learning can occur in theory?

In addition, Warkotsch (2007: 838) indicates ‘since behaviour can be discarded once incentive structures change, socialisation through the social learning mechanism is considered to be more enduring than socialisation through external incentives, as actors have begun to truly internalise new values.’ Therefore, constructivist explanations of socialisation tend to focus around how EU norm internalisation occurs through normative entrepreneurship, normative suasion through social learning and interaction, which can occur via consulting, training programmes, workshops and expert panels (see Warkotsch, 2007: 839). Rather than strategic calculations, socialisation is argued to occur through the EU teaching the external actors the rules and principles of European governance (Schimmelfennig, 2012: 9). A critical role is ascribed to ‘domestic norm entrepreneurs’ (Sedelmeier, 2011: 11; see also Börzel and Soyaltin, 2012) or actors that promote such norms to others through social interaction. However, Checkel (2001) criticises the way in which constructivists have tended to downplay the role of social interaction in socialisation because of methodological problems of measurement, additionally identifying social learning as critical. He argues that instead, socialisation studies have tended to focus on its end-point (internalisation of norms) (e.g. Alderson, 2001) but disregard ‘the intervening processes of social interaction through which agents

reach such an outcome' (ibid.: 561). Warkotsch (2007) also indicates social interaction is a scope condition of socialisation through social learning which implies a reflective process of norm internalisation (see Risse-Kappen et al., 1999). Accordingly, elites are argued to internalise norms through a social learning process (ibid.). This point is further developed by Börzel and Risse (2007: 493)'s emphasis who state that:

'... two mediating factors account for the degree to which misfit leads to processes of socialisation by which actors internalise new norms and develop new identities: norm entrepreneurs and cultural understandings. First, *norm entrepreneurs* mobilise at the domestic level to persuade actors to redefine their interests and identities in the light of new norms and rules by engaging them in *processes of social learning*.'

Accordingly, how can socialisation can be measured? Where actors adopt to EU community rules and perceive norms as legitimate or identify with them, norm internalisation is argued to have occurred. Schimmelfennig (2005d: 69) also specifies three conceptions of the normative effects of socialisation, including formal, behavioural, and communicative/cognitive around EU rules. Formal changes include the transferring of community schemata or rules into national laws (Schimmelfennig, 2005d: 69), which also refers to legal internalisation, making domestic legal structure and adopting the new norms via legislative process (Alderson, 2001). Behavioural conception can occur as domestic actors comply with such rule transference (Schwellnus, 2005) and also infers a shift in actors' attitudes, principles and beliefs (Alderson, 2001). Communicative or cognitive conception infers that socialisation influences actors' discourses and communication, meaning socialisation is effective if domestic actors justify their proposals by referring to community rules (ibid.). Finally, this study focuses on formal and behavioural concepts of socialisation to measure at which level socialisation occurs, which is analysed in Chapter 5-7.

It is therefore more logical to argue that while socialisation in Europeanisation, defined as the EU's attempts to teach domestic actors of the legitimacy of

European norms (Schimmelfennig, 2015) social learning around EU norms can be induced where socialisation processes are evident, for example in the EU's attempts to 'persuade' non-EU states to accept the legitimacy of accession norms. Accordingly, social learning takes place 'where a clear teacher–learner relationship seems to be in place' (Flockhart, 2004: 366). However, Checkel (2001: 561) argues that constructivists offer only limited guidance on how elites internalise norms through social learning, necessitating further theoretical development. In this respect, a focus on social learning, or norm acquisition, under wider conditions of EU socialisation, or norm internalisation, provides a more coherent indicator of external Europeanisation for further analysis, particularly in the Turkish context. Accordingly, the next section aims to examine social learning mechanisms.

3.6.2 Social learning: A Europeanisation perspective

Dunlop and Radaelli (2013: 923) define learning 'as a process of updating beliefs about policy based on lived or witnessed experiences, analysis or social interaction', accordingly, the process of learning is a focus in many studies (Dunlop and Radaelli, 2016a; Heikkila and Gerlak, 2013). Again, learning is interpreted in different ways. Learning can mean a mechanism of policy diffusion between states (Berry and Berry, 2014). Regarding this argument, Meseguer (2005: 72) indicates that 'learning is considered a horizontal mechanism of diffusion primarily because policy is passed or diffused from one nation to another by means of influence....By contrast, with top-down mechanisms of diffusion, a supranational or international entity drives diffusion with the use of coercive mechanisms.' However, Hecló (1974: 306) perceives learning at an individual level and indicates that it is shaped by social interaction with organisations or institutions: 'social learning is created only by individuals, but alone and in interaction these individuals acquire and produce changed patterns of collective action.' It is this feature of acquiring norms through interaction between actors which is developed in this thesis (Hall, 1993: 278).

Social learning, as a mechanism of socialisation (see Schimmelfennig, 2005d), is now widely used to explain the acquisition of norms by individual actors,

encompassing a broad range of theoretical arguments within the social sciences, from policy and EU studies to philosophy, ethnography, geography and environmental governance (for example, Hall, 1993; Radaelli, 2003; Muro and Jeffrey, 2008; Benson et al., 2015; Newig et al., 2010). It comprises arguments around how actors learn, embedded in a wider literature of policy learning theories (see Radaelli and Dunlop, 2013; Dunlop and Radaelli, 2017).

Originally the term was derived from Miller and Dollard (1941) who stated that individuals learn behaviours by observing others and perform them with regard to benefits and rewards. Most famously, Bandura and Walters (1977) expanded this theory by integrating cognitive and behavioural perspectives to explaining individual learning, as well as investigating how individuals learn. Bandura also developed a new model of social learning, namely social cognitive theory, which emphasises the important role of cognition to learning (Muro and Jeffrey, 2008). According to Bandura and Walters (1977), social learning refers to the acquisition of knowledge between one individual and another by means of observation and imitation. Furthermore, human behaviours can be explained by a triadic reciprocal determinism that involves a three-way relationship between cognition, behaviour and environmental influences (Wood and Bandura, 1989). Social learning was then further theorised in the organisational management literature, most famously by Kolb (1984) and Argyris and Schon (1978) who, as discussed below, developed the notion of learning as a cyclical, critically reflective process. These arguments have proved hugely influential in multiple academic disciplines and have since been extended to encompass Europeanisation.

Scholars have since drawn upon social learning theory to show how Europeanisation could be explained from a sociological perspective. Here, social learning is linked to the fundamental principles of *social constructivism* (see Chapter 4) and is presented as an alternative to rationalist models of material-based incentives (Checkel, 2000; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004; Kahler, 1992). Compared to RI based accounts, focusing on bargaining about threats and rewards, this model integrates the 'logic of appropriateness' (i.e. the right thing to do), arguing that Europeanisation may occur through

individual social learning (Warkotsch, 2007: 838; Schimmelfennig, 2012; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005a). Accordingly, Börzel and Risse (2007: 493) emphasise that ‘actors are guided by collectively shared understandings of what constitutes proper-socially accepted behaviour in a given rule structure.’ These collective understandings or intersubjective structures influence the way actors define their goals and their perceptions of rational action. From this perspective, ‘Europeanisation entails a process of social learning by which domestic actors and organisations incorporate new rules, norms, practices and meanings... [as they] are socialised into European norms and rules of appropriateness through processes of persuasion and social learning and redefine their interests and identities’ (ibid.). In an early study, Checkel (1999: 548) describes social learning in the EU context as:

‘... a process whereby actors, through *interaction* with broader institutional contexts (norms and discursive structures), acquire new interests and preferences - in the absence of obvious material incentives. Put differently, agent interests and identities are carved out through interaction.’

Social learning is consequently understood as a process (see Schimmelfennig, 2005d) of gaining new EU norms and understanding others’ beliefs and ideas by means of active involvement rather than just downloading new norms and institutional systems (Börzel and Risse, 2012). Regarding this point, ‘the social learning mechanism emphasises the authority of the socialisation agency, the legitimacy and domestic resonance of its norms, and the identity and cognitive prior attitudes of the target actors’ (Warkotsch, 2007: 830). Concerning this process, actors are persuaded by the legitimacy of the norms and rules, and thereby change their identity and interests. Accordingly, social learning implies a reflective process of norm internalisation (see Risse-Kappen et al., 1999).

Therefore, domestic actors learn via social interaction. In the EU context, this can occur through various means, for example interaction with EU agents via training and workshops etc. (see Warkotsch, 2007). If actors find EU community rules legitimate and have aspirations to belong to the rules and norms of the EU

community, which implies identification (see Schimmelfennig, 2005b: 10) as well as normative resonance between EU rules and domestic cultural understanding and informal institutions, then such learning can lead to socialisation (see Sedelmeier, 2011: 11).

One of the discussions regarding social learning in the Europeanisation literature is under which conditions social learning takes place. Checkel (2001: 564) indicates the scope conditions of social learning, which facilitate socialisation. Accordingly, social learning is more likely to lead to rule adoption if the persuader-persuadee interaction occurs in a less politicised and non-coercive environment (Checkel, 2001: 564); when the persuader/socialisation agency, is an authoritative member of the in-group, to which the persuadee belongs or desires to belong (see Flockhart, 2004), which also includes authority and identification (see Schimmelfennig, 2005d: 66) and if rules are legitimate (see Schimmelfennig, 2005d: 66). It is also more likely to be effective when the socialisee has few prior, ingrained beliefs that are inconsistent with the persuader's message (Checkel, 2001: 564), and the rules of the community resonate well with domestic political cultures, rules and traditions (see Schimmelfennig, 2005d: 66). Put differently, novice agents with few cognitive prior beliefs will be relatively open to persuasion; the process is more likely to be effective when the persuader does not lecture or demand but, instead, 'acts out principles of serious deliberative argument' (Checkel, 2001: 564).

Another discussion in the literature is whether learning causes policy change. Learning in this sense is considered 'a key mechanism that drives Europeanisation and leads to policy adaptation' (Müller and de Flers, 2009: 13). Hall (1993: 278) indicates that 'learning is indicated when policy changes as the result of such a process.' Regarding this point, according to Tippet et al. (2005) social learning may cause shifts in organisational behaviours and structures when there is a convenient environment, guaranteeing commitments and enthusiasm from managers and stakeholders. Dunlop et al. (2018) also make a connection between policy change and learning and indicate that policy learning may encourage policy actors towards behavioural changes. However, they claim that the connection between the two is not totally theorised and

demonstrating causality is still not very clear, so it is methodologically difficult to operationalise. Rietig and Fasois (2018) also indicate policy change may take place without learning because of the actors' motivations or other reasons, including reacting to political pressure and the compatibility of external pressure with organisational interests. On the other hand, non-learning, meaning no learning takes place where policy changes appear, may occur as well as a consequence of obstacles, preventing individuals or organisations reflecting their experience in the learning process (Rietig and Fasois, 2018).

However, Heikkila and Gerlak (2013: 491) emphasise that policy change is not equal to learning and also indicate that as a result of the learning process, two kinds of learning products: *cognitive changes*, referring to gaining new or strengthened ideas, beliefs or values amongst the group; and *changes in collective behaviours or actions*, including new shared strategies, rules, policies, programs, institutions and routines. Regarding this, Flockhart (2004: 366) indicates that social learning refers to 'a change of beliefs at the individual cognitive level, either in relation to values, norms, procedures or new routines.' But there is no specific requirement that learning always results in changed behaviour or policy outcomes (Flockhart, 2004: 375; see also Radaelli, 2009). Therefore, social learning may not cause a change and may not be seen in actor behaviours in contrast to socialisation (Flockhart, 2004: 366; see also Checkel, 2001).

Attempts, then, were made to theorise how Europeanisation should normatively occur through social learning, although the focus was primarily on learning outcomes rather than process. For example, Radaelli (2003: 52) emphasises two kinds of learning in this context, which are 'thin' learning and 'thick' learning. Thin learning appears as political actors readjust their strategies in response to EU normative influence to accomplish their goals but without significant internalisation of norms (Radaelli, 2003), which also equates to simple learning, inferring actors acquire information to alter strategies, but not preferences that are given (see Checkel, 2001: 561). Such arguments draw heavily upon organisational theory notions of 'single loop' learning, which denotes individual responses to external demands by incrementally adjusting their decision-

making strategies rather than their core beliefs (Argyris and Schon, 1974; Argyris and Schon, 1978; Argyris, 2005). Learning in the EU context is therefore restricted to strategic actions, for example implementing EU norms, without significant norm internalisation and the impacts of Europeanisation consequently are judged limited. In contrast, 'thick' learning around EU norms not only leads to strategic adjustment but also causes alterations in the actors' belief systems and preferences thereby reshaping their identities towards greater Europeanisation (Radaelli, 2003). Such 'complex' learning (or double-loop learning) (see Börzel and Risse, 2000) usually occurs following policy failure or crises, when actors are prone to change their interests and identities rather than just adjust their strategies (Börzel and Risse, 2009; Checkel, 1999). Again, these arguments are analogous with 'double-loop' learning (Argyris and Schon, 1978; Medema et al., 2014; Börzel and Risse, 2000), whereby individuals re-evaluate their beliefs in response to problems in order to change how decisions are made rather than only adjusting strategies. Internalisation of EU norms is therefore more pronounced under 'thick' learning, meaning Europeanisation is considered more advanced.

Yet, these arguments are relatively simple compared to later conceptualisations of social learning in the EU, organisational and associated literatures, suggesting that they can be supplemented or strengthened in examining an SI perspective. Radaelli (2003) does not really expand upon notions of thin or thick learning in his brief explanation meaning they remain difficult to apply theoretically. Another evident problem with the thin/thick, simple/complex (see Levy, 1994) or single-loop/double-loop conceptions of social learning (see Argyris and Schon, 1978) is their focus on Europeanisation outcomes rather than process and norm acquisition (see Heikkila and Gerlak, 2013). While these theoretical concepts tell us about *what* type of Europeanisation occurs (thin or thick) they allow little in-depth analysis of *how* Europeanisation develops through normative *interaction*: a critical feature of how SI explains social learning (for example, Checkel, 1999). To an extent, other Europeanisation studies have attempted to address this gap by focusing more on individual actor norm acquisition via social learning. Under these arguments, 'agents – typically

elite decision-makers – adopt prescriptions embodied in norms; they become internalised and constitute a set of shared intersubjective understandings’ (Checkel, 1999: 553). The mechanisms for such intersubjective learning are contested. Checkel (1999) himself focuses on the role of domestic political structures in the diffusion of European citizenship norms, although arguing that citizen preferences present more powerful influences (see also Checkel, 2001). For Börzel and Soyaltin (2012: 3), EU ‘norm entrepreneurs’ are considered significant in socialising ‘domestic actors into new norms and rules of appropriateness through persuasion and learning, a process through which they redefine their interests and identities accordingly.’ However, they provide little detail on how such interaction occurs other than citing the role of epistemic communities and transnational policy networks in norm transference.

To address this gap in the Europeanisation literature, we could draw upon parallel notions of social learning to strengthen existing SI arguments. For example, Lave and Wenger (1991) forward a theory of *situated learning* that places emphasis on learning – norm acquisition – via interaction with others. They describe learning as social participation that can pioneer sharing of knowledge and understandings (ibid.). Participation in this sense refers not just to engagement in certain activities, but also to more encompassing processes of being active participants in the practices of social communities and constructing identities in relation to these communities. These arguments coincide with Habermas (1984)’s notion of communicative learning whereby actors learn in critical dialogue with others (see Mezirow, 2000) for a discussion on ‘communicative learning’. According to Wenger (1998) we all belong to ‘communities of practice’, for example, at home or work. From this perspective, individuals learn through engaging in the practices of their communities, providing them with new members and refined practices (Dunlop and Radaelli, 2013: 604; Reed et al., 2010). Learning may occur at multiple levels and these levels interact; from individual levels to groups, organisations and networks (Heikkila and Gerlak, 2013). Medema et al. (2014: 29) identify the importance of vertical and horizontal stakeholder integration of ideas, knowledge, experiences and practices; and therefore multi-level systems, cross-scale interactions and

informal networks connecting actors/stakeholders at multiple levels as significant for multi-loop social learning.

Here, we can draw upon more in-depth analysis by Reed et al. (2010: 1) who synthesise multiple studies on social learning to argue that researchers have often confused it 'with the conditions and methods necessary to facilitate social learning or its potential outcomes.' Therefore, the single/thin/simple and double/thick/complex learning arguments are too simplistic since they do not capture all types of potential learning as a basis for measuring Europeanisation, and also they generally focus on the outcome rather than the process of learning, which is not well defined and do not account for 'theoretical and conceptual challenges in studying learning in policy contexts and processes' (Heikkila and Gerlak, 2013: 485). Accordingly, Heikkila and Gerlak (2013) understand the process of learning as being important in order to measure learning. Using this view, we could move beyond self-limiting thick and thin notions of learning, to examine the relationship between individual and collective learning and the role of individual learning in collective learning (Heikkila and Gerlak, 2013: 484). Also information acquisition is the main feature of collective learning. In the policy processes, it is important therefore how groups of individuals learn *in collective policy contexts* including interest groups, coalitions and commissions, rather than just how individuals learn.

Heikkila and Gerlak (2013: 484) indicate three processes of collective learning. *Acquisition* infers the collection of the information, which may stem from within a group (internal sources) or outside of the group (external sources) or related groups (across groups) through practice or experiences of actors (ibid.). Individuals may seek information from external environments, which could be international organisations, commissions, inferring transmission of knowledge from outside sources. Besides, individuals can receive knowledge from internal and external sources in collective context via dialogue and deliberation (information acquisition via collective actions) amongst the members of organisations or across networks of actors (Heikkila and Gerlak, 2013: 488).

Translation infers interpreting/evaluating the meaning of new information or application of existing information to a new context by individuals within a group (Heikkila and Gerlak, 2013: 489). At this stage, the information has been understood and become knowledge; the individuals evaluate and explore new information based on their existing information via searching for sources. They can be helped by technical experts and advisors who can assist to interpret and analyse the information (ibid.). Individuals, via deliberation and dialogue, examine different alternative meanings of information to apply existing information so that the first two phases, acquisition and transition, can occur simultaneously (ibid.). Also, translating information may shape their pre-existing beliefs and attitudes (ibid.).

Lastly, *dissemination* infers acquired knowledge at the individual level developed into shared knowledge amongst the members of the policy group (Heikkila and Gerlak, 2013: 489). Key members of the group (the 'decision-making authority') should accept and adopt the idea, and may be facilitated by communication and dialogue. The individuals then distribute the information to a critical mass of individuals or key decision-makers (Heikkila and Gerlak, 2013: 490), so they may need to convince other people in the group that the ideas are legitimate. Shared communication processes, including formal/informal meetings and informing (debriefing) sessions that individuals can share their experiences and opinions, can help in diffusing information (ibid.).

Therefore, the important question related to the thesis is, how and at which level does SL occur in Turkish water policy in the process between 1999-present? We can generate different modes/types of social learning by categorising the three processes of learning identified above (Heikkila and Gerlak, 2013). Firstly, a *superficial level of learning* equates to limited acquisition of EU norms in both individuals and wider communities, through such interactions. It occurs when actors passively take information leading to superficial cognitive understanding of EU norms (see Krajcik and Blumenfeld, 2006: 317). Also, assessing and sharing the information are limited, as well as learning remains at an individual level.

A *partial level learning* refers to an understanding of EU norms and values with more active information acquisition and transition expected at this level, meaning actors' preferences may change. They start interpreting and processing new information and alter their interests, beliefs and preferences via communication and interaction. They interpret the information, however there is limited sharing of information across the organisation and other related organisations, so it may not be accepted by the key actors and most of the individuals that the norms and rules are appropriate.

A *transformative level of learning* denotes 'acquiring deeper knowledge of EU rules and norms and uncovering cognitive structures of deeper level conceptual understanding' (see Krajcik and Blumenfeld, 2006: 317). In this stage, proactive acquisition and assessing of information ('transmission') can be observed as well as knowledge or experience should be diffused/disseminated/shared to larger groups within the community (Heikkila and Gerlak, 2013: 490). Moreover, shared understanding, interpretation and collective routines can also be observed. Learning should move from individual to collective levels; amongst groups, organisations and networks. Regarding this feature, communication via formal or informal meetings can pave the way for actors to share their experiences and knowledge, and also convince each other of the appropriateness of the norms and rules.

Meanwhile, learning leads to acquiring new or developing ideas and beliefs (cognitive changes). However, if it occurs at a transformative level, it may also lead to behavioural changes including new plans, programmes, policies and strategies (see Heikkila and Gerlak, 2013: 487; Flockhart, 2004; Schimmelfennig, 2005a), which can result in norm internalisation as an outcome of the socialisation process (Schimmelfennig, 2005a). Regarding this outcome, *transformative* learning is reflective of greater norm internalisation whereas *partial* and *superficial* learning result in partial and low norm internalisation respectively. Therefore, when applied to Europeanisation in Turkish water policy, it could be assumed that if social learning was occurring, such responses would not only be evident at the 'individual' level of norm acquisition but also

across wider ‘community’ levels through learning interaction. These arguments can be summarised in Table 3.3.

Table 3.3: A theoretical framework for analysing social learning as a mechanism for the socialisation of EU policy norms in Turkish water policy.

Levels of learning	Norm acquisition	Norm internalisation
Superficial	Acquisition,(limited translation)	Low
Partial	Acquisition, translation (limited dissemination)	Partial
Transformative	Acquisition, translation and dissemination	Deep

Here we can also take the notion of EU actors as socialising ‘norm entrepreneurs’ (Börzel and Soyaltin, 2012) to examine, through individual interaction within policy communities, the processes by which they have supported norm acquisition by Turkish actors. Translated to the implementation of the Water Framework Directive in Turkey, we could forward several hypotheses. Firstly, where domestic cultural or institutional factors are constraining, domestic norm entrepreneurs’ attempts to socialise (persuade) Turkish policy actors around internalising WFD norms will lead to ‘superficial’ learning in both individuals and wider communities, meaning norm internalisation will subsequently be low. Europeanisation, in this respect, measured as policy changes, institutional changes and behavioural changes, will be very limited. Secondly, where domestic cultural or institutional factors are accommodating, norm entrepreneur attempts to socialise Turkish policy actors into internalising WFD norms will lead to ‘partial’ or ‘transformative’ learning at an individual and community level with norm internalisation more advanced, leading to stronger Europeanisation. In this respect, at a broader level, such SI explanations could – theoretically – help better interpret patterns of WFD implementation than RI in both national and river basin context, if the theoretical perspective has value to explain external Europeanisation: a critical focus of the thesis. In particular, if effective it should explain why Europeanisation has

continued in this Turkish policy sector through socialisation and social learning processes despite declining accession incentives. Operationalising this theoretical approach is outlined in the next chapter.

3.7 Summary

Europeanisation is a broad church encompassing multiple impacts of the EU on national contexts. These themes, in this chapter, have been synthesised into uploading, downloading and more integrated forms, although studies on external Europeanisation have focused primarily on the downloading of EU rules and norms to accession states. Theorising downloading has been undertaken from a variety of theoretical perspectives, although institutionalism has proved popular. Many studies have interpreted external Europeanisation through the lens of rational choice institutionalism, which privileges the role of material incentives such as conditionality in determining how actors adopt EU rules. However, as discussed in Chapter 2, the declining influence of conditionality in Turkish accession may mean it lacks explanatory power when used to analyse WFD implementation. Sociological institutionalism potentially provides an alternative through its notions of socialisation of actor identities around EU norms through normative persuasion, norm entrepreneurship and social learning in facilitating norm internalisation. In this respect, this chapter further develops mechanisms for social learning within socialisation as a basis for analysing SI in the WFD case. Linking this theory to the analysis through a methodological approach is discussed in the next chapter.

Chapter 4: Research design and methods

4.1 Introduction

Chapter 3 identified the theoretical framework of the thesis and along with Chapter 2, presented arguments that conventional rational choice institutionalism and historical institutionalism give only limited explanations for Europeanisation under conditions of stalled or partially reversed EU accession as identified previously, particularly in the water policy sector. In response, Chapter 3 developed a potential explanatory framework from the sociological institutionalism literature in order to examine whether constructivist notions of socialisation and social learning offer a credible alternative interpretation for this phenomenon. Examining these arguments required a dedicated research design that could be employed to link the theory to data collection and its analysis in order to answer the questions, posed in Chapter 1.

Differentiating between domestic institutional change caused by EU normative pressures and other factors, including international and national norms, around water policy could potentially be problematic: an inherent methodological issue for all Europeanisation researchers. For example, Mendez et al. (2008: 281) refer to the need to isolate ‘the net impact of the EU on domestic institutions and policies, particularly in terms of separating and disentangling global and domestic factors from European pressure as well as generalising findings across time and space.’ Mindful of these challenges, the thesis research drew upon pre-existing studies that have adopted socialisation and social learning perspectives to Europeanisation in order to develop a coherent research design. As explained in this chapter, an embedded case study approach, utilising process tracing of the evolution of Turkish water policy since 1999 and mixed qualitative methods, was considered the most effective design to test the theoretical propositions.

The methodology chapter proceeds as follows. Firstly, it presents the research paradigm and philosophy underpinning the research design. For social science research, it is important to ground the methods employed in the appropriate philosophical context. Here, the chapter discusses constructivism and social

constructivism to differentiate them from more realist ontological approaches prevalent in the Europeanisation literature. An important point made is that although constructivism is (stereo)typically grounded in a relativist ontology, which necessitates a post-positivist epistemology, some constructivists employ a theory-testing positivist epistemology. Such 'conventional' constructivists accept that norms – specifically EU norms – are intersubjectively constituted and therefore have a reflexively structuring influence on domestic policy actors' interests and identities, which in turn shape how these norms are constructed via domestic institutions in practice (e.g. Checkel, 2001; Wiener, 2006). Secondly, examining how EU norms intersubjectively influence domestic patterns of socialisation and social learning leads to a specific research design. Drawing on scholars such as Checkel and Schimmelfennig, this chapter shows how a process tracing and embedded case study design were considered appropriate for testing the theoretical framework and establishing causal mechanisms. A national level study was supplemented by research into socialisation and social learning in two river basin subunits: the Büyük Menderes and Konya (Closed) river basins. Thirdly, implementing this design was supported by qualitative methods. Data collection techniques included semi-structured interviews with policy elites, in Turkey and Brussels, and documentary analysis of key government and EU reports. In addition, the study used participant observation of current planning meetings to also understand how EU norms were currently shaping actors' identities within government institutions. Their resonance with EU norms, identification of common targets and development of joint actions were examined, beside different types of learning occurring. Finally, this chapter outlines how the methods were employed to collect data and analyse it in order to provide a comprehensive understanding of learning processes and collaborative actions, and motivating factors amongst stakeholders. Research biases and limitations to the research are also discussed.

4.2 Overview of research philosophy paradigms

In social science research, the underlying philosophical context impacts the epistemological approach and, in turn, the research design and data collection,

analysis and interpretation (Robson, 2002). Such research is guided by paradigms or theoretical perspectives that link these features together (Guba and Lincoln, 1994). Within these paradigms in social science, three inter-linked questions are raised; firstly, an *ontological question* relates to how social entities should be perceived (objectively or subjectively). Crotty (2003: 10) defines ontology as 'the study of being'. According to Guba and Lincoln (1989: 83), ontological assumptions require answering the questions of 'what is there that can be known?' or 'what is the nature of reality?' An ontology therefore sets out the 'worldview' of the researcher in terms of how objective or subjective reality is perceived (see Marsh and Furlong, 2002). Ontologies moreover inform how, theoretically, reality can be researched, i.e. the epistemology. Secondly, *epistemological question* therefore relates to how social reality can be known or understood? Crotty (2003: 3) defines epistemology as 'a way of understanding and explaining how we know what we know' as well as a philosophical context for determining what kind of information is required to measure the research phenomenon (Maynard, 1994: 10). Epistemologies therefore determine not only how research should be conducted but also the specific methods employed. Here, the *methodological question* within a research paradigm relates to how social processes can be studied. Methodology, which can be understood 'as a science of studying how research is done scientifically', is the techniques employed to answer the research question in a systematic way (Kothari, 2004: 8). Researchers must design their methodology in order to test specific assumptions. Also, researchers need to consider which techniques are relevant to the research problem. The methods must also integrate with the philosophical approach in terms of its underlying ontology and epistemology, i.e. the research paradigm.

Within social sciences, there are several broad paradigms (Corbetta, 2003). The classification and categorisation of ontological and epistemological stances within them differ according to scholars, with an overlapping array of terminology (see Lewis and Ritchie, 2003; Guba and Lincoln, 1994). However, in simplifying these complex philosophical approaches, they can be divided into two fundamental positions that have emerged in traditional western science,

which are positivism and post-positivism (Galliers, 1991). Positivism is an epistemology based on a realist or foundationalist ontology (Marsh and Furlong, 2002). Positivists argue that a 'real' world exists externally beyond individual knowledge of it, meaning that social processes can be measured through direct observation and subject to experimentation, i.e. reality can be objectively studied. Primarily associated with a natural science worldview, positivism also became popularised in the early development of social science in the 20th century, particularly through the growth of behaviouralism (Sanders, 2002). Typically, such deductive research is engaged in hypothesis testing and direct scientific observation of social phenomena and statistical analysis of data.

Despite the apparent 'objectivity' which positivists aim at, post-positivists represent a critical alternative perspective that believes social structures are not totally objective from the worldview of agents that create them, and that social relationships cannot be differentiated from causes and effects (Price and Reus-Smit, 1998; Hurd, 2008). Ontologically, such approaches are founded on a relativist worldview that diverges with more realist approaches typical of early social science. Relativism argues that all knowledge is relative to the context in which it is created and, in this sense, subjective or context-specific (Moore, 2004). Methodologically, post-positivists refute hypothesis testing in pursuit of statistical generalisations about social processes and favour more inductive investigation via qualitative approaches. Both these paradigms are evident in the development of international relations (IR) theory, which in turn has influenced the study of the EU (Hurd, 2008: 307).

Realism became the dominant theoretical approach in IR after World War II (Wiener, 2006: 2; Wæver, 1997: 22; Lapid, 1989). Realism focuses on the notion of materialism in which rational state actors are driven by incentives, power and material requirements. From the realist perspective, state actors are primarily interested in external autonomy and power and accordingly they, under conditions of international anarchy, seek to follow utility or power maximising interests or preferences (Hobson, 2000: 145). In this respect, the preferences of self-interested state actors are predominantly related to the international security environment (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2006).

State actors' identities and interests are externally determined by this hostile international system in which they attempt to maximise their power in order to gain security (Hurd, 2008). Early realist IR scholars therefore adopted a positivist epistemology based upon theory testing and observation of how states pursue or utilise power, although they were not generally engaged in statistical analysis.

Despite the early dominance of realist and neo-realist approaches within IR, a post-positivist reaction has emerged around the notion of constructivism. Based on a relativist ontology, constructivism challenges the 'rational' perception that state interests are exogenously fixed. Derived from sociological institutionalism, constructivism has become an important 'empirical analysis' based upon several features (Reus-Smit, 2009: 219-222). Primarily, rather than seeing material structures as shaping states' interests, constructivists argue that norms and ideas are central in this respect (ibid). For Wendt (1995: 73) 'material resources only acquire meaning for human action through the structure of shared knowledge in which they are embedded', i.e. they socially constructed and endogenous. Normative structures in the international system therefore are critical in determining how these interests and the identities that are informed by them, are developed. Another important aspect of constructivist explanations is the notion of inter-subjectivity, whereby normative and ideational structures at the international level influence state identities and interests but such structures in turn are mutually constituted by these actors (Hurd, 2008). These arguments relate strongly to Giddens's notion of structuration, in which structure and agency are mutually inter-linked (Giddens, 1984). Hence, Wendt (1992: 406) refers to 'reciprocal interaction' in defining this structure-agency relationship. Such ideas have now come to underpin a significant body of IR analysis (for example, Hurd, 2008) but have also jumped disciplines to inform empirical analysis in national and supranational studies, most notably research on EU political processes (Christiansen et al., 2001; Wiener, 2006). They also inform specific types of methods, depending on which form of constructivism is employed.

4.3 Constructivism in EU studies

At this point, it is important to note that constructivism now constitutes a broad epistemological church which is visible in how EU scholars have employed its arguments for empirical analysis. Reus-Smit (2009) notes that within International Relations how originally constructivism was initially developed from critical theory but has evolved as an ontological approach within IR to encompass different foci. Primarily, it focuses on the structuring power of norms – ‘soft institutions’ (Wiener, 2006: 43) – on state identities and interests, or how these identities and interests shape institutional development. This diversity of approaches is replicated within EU studies, where constructivism now informs different epistemological positions across a ‘middle ground’ between rationalist (i.e. realist) and reflectivist (i.e. relativist) ontologies (Christiansen et al., 2001: 9-10). This emerging ‘communicative bridge’ (Wiener, 2006: 42) between otherwise opposing ontological positions can be used to locate the thesis methodology. In this section, the thesis therefore identifies the main forms of constructivism that have emerged in IR and EU studies, with particular reference to ‘conventional’ forms of social constructivism, and what types of methods they imply.

4.3.1 Constructivism variants

For the thesis research it is particularly important to align the philosophical context with the theory and hence the methods adopted. According to Checkel (2006: 2), there are three main versions of constructivism, namely: *conventional*, *interpretative* and *critical/radical*. Constructivism, as described above, initially emerged from critical international theory in the late 1980s. Scholars then employed more interpretative and discursive approaches to examine how state identities and interests are ‘constructed’ within IR (Reus-Smit, 2009: 221). In this approach, political actors/states and structures (institutions and shared meanings) are argued to be socially constructed, and research mainly focuses on beliefs expectations and interpretations in IR as opposed to materialism which rejects the causal significance of norms and ideas (Hurd, 2008: 303).

In the 1990s, constructivists began to explore other epistemological approaches, particularly more positivist approaches around how normative or ideational structures shape social identities and thereby created 'conventional constructivism' (Hopf, 1998: 181). Conventional constructivists, despite adopting a theory-testing approach, do share some principles of critical constructivism. They both consider the intersubjectivity of structure and agency, and regard meanings as essential data in order to have a comprehensive understanding of the social world (Ashley, 1987; Hopf, 1998). However, for Hopf (1998: 199) the difference is found in the way that conventional constructivism searches for 'communities of intersubjectivity in world politics, domains within which actors share understandings of themselves and each other, yielding predictable and replicable patterns of action within a specific context' as opposed to critical constructivism that focuses on 'the unique and the differentiating' between actors (Hopf, 1998: 199). Conventional constructivists (see Ruggie, 1998; Jupille et al., 2003a; Flynn and Farrell, 1999; Baltes and Smith, 2004; Lewis, 2005; Sedelmeier, 2005) are therefore positivist in their epistemological position, as opposed to the post-positivism of interpretative or critical approaches. Here, they attempt to explain the structuring role of international norms to uncover how identities, and hence interests, are created and which norms and social practices influence this construction (Hopf, 1998). They also ascribe an important role to theory, thereby going beyond interpretivist methods to consider how theory can explain causality. This type of constructivism therefore does not refute causal explanation: its quarrel with mainstream theories has more to do with theoretical specification than ontology or epistemology (Checkel, 1998: 327). Some authors have predominantly given more attention to theory rather than ontology in their research (see Jupille et al., 2003a; Jepperson et al., 1996). As a result, this form of constructivism is well-placed to bridge and integrate other perspectives, including institutionalism (Jupille et al., 2003a; Checkel, 2002).

These different forms of constructivism are now evident in EU studies where scholars have employed sociological theorising, i.e. social constructivism. The 'constructivist turn' first filtered into European integration studies in the late

1990s as scholars sought to understand how the EU was impacting and impacted by state actors' identities and interests (Christiansen et al., 2001). A range of research then emerged, spanning an epistemological continuum between conventional and interpretative constructivism, forming semi-distinct 'stations' on the 'communicative bridge' identified by Wiener (2006: 42). For some authors, such as Diez et al. (2005) European integration is bound up in language and the nature of the political discourses it informs. Others however have focused more on the structuring role of EU rules and norms, using more conventional approaches. Koslowski (2001), for example, argues that the EU can be re-interpreted as a federal polity, if the way in which its constitutional rules and norms shape actors' interests is examined using federalism concepts. In this respect, Benson and Jordan (2014) subsequently show how the EU subsidiarity norm intersubjectively shaped national policymakers' interests, using federal theory. Conventional constructivists also began to adopt theoretical concepts drawn from mainstream institutionalism in order to explain norm construction, particularly sociological theory, within a social constructivism perspective (Wiener, 2006). Checkel (2001), for example, contrasts rational choice and sociological institutionalism to explain how domestic norms are changed in response to EU normative structures. In explaining integration, Checkel develops the notion of social learning as a mechanism of norm change (Chapter 3). These arguments have subsequently proved influential within EU studies, particularly Europeanisation debates, through the inter-linking of constructivism and sociological institutionalism (Wiener, 2006). However, what does such an approach imply in terms of research design and methodologies?

4.3.2 Constructivism – research design and methods

While social constructivism is therefore evident within the EU studies literature, different approaches to constructivism imply specific methodologies, meaning maintaining consistency with epistemology is important. Indeed, as Reus-Smit (2009: 227) describes, a significant 'discontent' has emerged amongst their critics around how constructivists employ certain methods without providing proper justification.

Constructivism originally emerged from a critique of realist IR research to provide a critical perspective that employed interpretative methods in ‘the study of ideas, norms and other meanings’ (Reus-Smit, 2009: 227). Interpretative or critical/radical variants of constructivism therefore privilege the role of language and discourse in constituting actors’ identities (for example, Schwelldnus, 2005). Here, research aims at explaining “the relationship between ‘intersubjective meanings’ which derive from self-interpretation and self-definition, and the social practices in which they are embedded and [...] constitute” (Neufeld 1993: 49). Methods within such studies typically involve qualitative data collection principally through documentary analysis (see Unalan, 2009; Sanders et al., 2012; Crombag et al., 2014) and to a lesser extent interviews (see Ackrill and Kay, 2011; Bache and Olsson, 2001; Rumelili, 2007; Tocci, 2007b), which are subjected to discourse analysis and coding (see Erjavec et al., 2009; Tonra and Christiansen, 2010; Rumelili, 2003; Diez et al., 2005).

Conventional (social) constructivism within Europeanisation studies also implies specific methodologies in understanding how normative structures shape the identities and interests of actors in EU and also non-EU states through processes such as socialisation and social learning (see Chapter 3). Social constructivist theoretical approaches, drawn from sociological institutionalism, necessitate qualitative process tracing of the impacts of norms within specific case studies (for example, Checkel, 2004). Process tracing, discussed further below, aims at testing theoretical propositions through ‘tracing’ causation in complex political processes over time (Bennett and Checkel, 2014). For example, Lewis (2005) focuses on the causal effects of norms via a socialisation mechanism and its indicators of strategic calculation, role playing, and normative suasion. His aim was to test whether national officials become socialised over time using a case of decision-making in the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) by tracing how EU norms shape actors’ identities. Another leading exponent of such methods is Checkel, who draws on the traditional positivist methodological tool kit, including process tracing, triangulation across sources and interviews, to research the influence of norms on social learning within specific cases (Checkel, 2003; 2006). With this

in mind, the next section describes how the theory on socialisation and social learning, identified in Chapter 3, was linked to the qualitative data collection and analysis through research methods within a case study design.

4.4 The case study research design

Multiple research design exists in political science, from quantitative to qualitative approaches (see Burnham et al., 2008). Choosing the right design depends not only on the ontological and epistemological basis to the research but also the research questions themselves. Without an appropriate design, addressing the questions may prove problematic since it determines the data collection and analytical methods of the study.

The most appropriate design for testing social constructivism in this thesis is the case study. For Peters (1998: 137) this approach 'remains by far the most common method of research in political science.' Multiple definitions of case studies exist in the academic literature. In its most basic sense a 'case' is a 'single instance of a phenomenon within a single setting' (Peters, 1998: 142) that allows researchers to abstract from political complexity in order to test their theoretical propositions. Berg (2007: 283) hence describes the case study as a research approach for obtaining information systematically regarding a person, social setting or event in order that researchers have a better understanding how the subject acts. The case study as a *class of events* can include different kinds of political systems or processes (George and Bennett, 2005: 17-18). Case studies can also be employed to follow events through time to give a temporal (diachronic) dimension to theory testing rather than focusing on a specific point in time (synchronic). In this respect, the case study technique which means 'the detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode to develop or test historical explanations that may be generalisable to other events', and are useful to elucidate causal mechanisms and framing scope conditions (George and Bennett, 2005: 5).

A case study design was therefore considered appropriate for the research for several reasons. Firstly, case studies allow the researcher to isolate and abstract complex social processes such as policy implementation from the

broader political reality, thereby allowing more focused testing of theory (Yin, 2015). In studying Europeanisation within stalled or partially reversing accession (see Chapters 1; 2), it clearly is not possible to examine this process across all Turkish policy sectors within the constraints of a PhD programme. Given that this phenomenon is both pronounced and relatively unexplained within the water policy sector (see Chapter 2), it is appropriate to utilise this as the case study (although see below). In addition, case studies allow pre-testing of theoretical assumptions in what Eckstein (1975) calls a 'plausibility probe'. Within the thesis, the plausibility of social constructivism for explaining Europeanisation under stalled accession could therefore be examined in what Peters (1998: 150) calls a 'crucial case'; in this case Turkey (see also Eckstein, 1975).

Secondly, a case study design also allows in-depth examination of such processes over time (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2003; George and Bennett, 2005), which is particularly important to understanding how EU WFD norms are shaping implementation in Turkey. A synchronic 'snap-shot' of current implementation would reveal little about the extent to which socialisation and social learning are occurring, since by its nature these processes can be more effectively assessed through time. Case studies are also particularly amenable to process tracing of 'causal mechanisms' between variables (George and Bennett, 2005: 147) discussed in more detail below, and provide a strong fit with pre-existing Europeanisation studies into socialisation and social learning (Checkel, 2001).

Thirdly, case studies allow the use of multiple qualitative data sources, including interviews, documentary evidence and participant observation (Yin, 1999; Gerring, 2007). As identified above, research into social constructivism relies on qualitative in-depth assessment of how international norms intersubjectively determine actors' interests and identities; features only readily accessible through qualitative data.

There are also significant analysis advantages to within-case methods (George and Bennett, 2005). Case studies help the investigator to obtain high levels of

conceptual validity and evaluate indicators. There are some variables such as 'democracy' and 'political culture' that are very difficult to measure, so when statistical methods are inappropriate, case studies are generally effective (George and Bennett, 2005). Secondly, case studies allow heuristic identification of new hypotheses and variables. Thirdly, they are effective for exploring causal mechanisms by allowing their assessment in individual cases. Researchers may discover a number of intervening factors in a single case, clarify specific causal mechanisms or pave the way to define the circumstances under which causal mechanisms can operate (George and Bennett, 2005). Fourthly, cases allow researchers to consider theories on causal mechanisms within social processes. Finally, the last advantage of case studies is that they can be employed for modelling causal relations. Such models can help simplify complex causal relations such as path dependency.

On the other side of the coin, there are some limitations to the use of case studies. The most obvious is case selection bias which 'is commonly understood as occurring when some form of selection process in either design of the study or the real-world phenomena under investigation results in inferences that suffer from systematic error' (Collier and Mahoney, 1996: 60). Case selection with regard to the dependent variable can be suitable for some single case research designs (George and Bennett, 2005), particularly when the case represents the universe or primary object of the research study. However, comparative cases should ideally be selected on the basis of difference in the independent (i.e. influencing) factors for the phenomenon being studied, otherwise theoretical testing is problematic (Peters, 1998). In this event, case studies can be selected on the basis of 'most different' examples to increase variability in the independent factors (Teune and Przeworski, 1970; Peters, 1998: 144; Burnham et al., 2008). As discussed above this feature was not an issue in the thesis case study design since the single case, Turkish water policy implementation, was selected to meet the study objectives.

The second main limitation of a case study is that it is not always possible to generalise the results statistically to the wider population (Thomas, 2011). In this respect, large N quantitative surveys, using multiple examples, for

statistical analysis can claim a measure of generalisability to the wider population, depending on sample size. However, theory-testing within “small N” case studies can only relate the findings to the case in question and draw inferences for the broader context. In this case, the implementation of the WFD can be used to make propositions on the wider process of Europeanisation under stalled accession in Turkey but still be mindful of the context-specificity of findings. It is more problematic to make claims on similar processes in other countries, given that there are only a small number of non-similar examples such as Ukraine, although such research can establish theoretical arguments for further testing, particularly regarding the de-Europeanisation debate now emerging (see Chapters 2, 7 and 8).

A third limitation is the extent of the case and defining boundaries (Thomas, 2011; Collier and Mahoney, 1996). Here the issue is where to draw the boundaries which refers to what to include and what to exclude and, thus, what is the claim to knowledge that is being made, what is it a case of? For instance, schooling consists of pupils, parents and other factors including local employers and institutions. Teachers do not just define how or what to teach government policies also affect teaching practice. Drawing boundaries around the phenomenon under research conditions is therefore challenging (Stark and Torrance, 2005: 34). Case studies consequently require consideration of social and historical structures of action (Ragin and Becker, 1992). Also, the more tightly defined the case is, the less possibility for limitation issues. Within the research study, the implementation of the WFD was to an extent relatively self-limiting as a case but, nonetheless, its multi-level, multi-actor nature still had to be accounted for in the case design.

Another limitation related to the study of political implementation in this thesis is therefore the level of analysis. In other words, what specific institutional level should the case study focus on? This problem remains an issue for researchers investigating multi-level political processes such as EU governance, where European, national and sub-national political arenas inter-link (for example, Bomberg and Peterson, 1998). Implementation of the WFD may be considered a process that involves political processes at the EU, national and regional

(river basin) levels, making case design potentially problematic. Indeed, as explained in Chapters 5 and 6, the transfer of EU water norms occurred via a higher level interaction between the EU and Turkish political actors, and a regional level process involving training and projects within river basins (see Demirbilek and Benson, 2018). Examining Europeanisation at national level may therefore provide only a partial view of implementation, thereby skewing any results.

4.5 The embedded case design

One means of overcoming any limitations, including the appropriate level of analysis when considering implementation in Turkish water policy, was to use an embedded multi-level design. Bache (2008), for example, adopts a multi-level governance approach to examining the Europeanisation impacts of cohesion policy at the UK and EU levels, while this approach is widespread in the EU studies literature generally (Peterson and Bomberg, 1998). According to Yin (2015: 50) there are four principal kinds of case study design: single-case (holistic) designs, single-case (embedded) designs, multiple-case (holistic) designs, and multiple-case (embedded) designs (see Figure 4.1). While a multiple-case design clearly was not appropriate for the research objectives, a single-case (embedded) was considered suitable for capturing the multi-level nature of WFD implementation in Turkey. In this respect, a single-case could not focus on the entirety of implementation across the whole country, requiring some selectivity of research focus. Here, the research 'context' (Yin, 2015: 50) is the broader national institutional policy implementation process, which initially translates WFD norms into implementation action at regional, river basin institutional levels. Embedded units of analysis within this case design are therefore river basin institutions. The sub-units were predicted to provide important contributions to the research in terms of how EU norms were impacting actors interests and identities 'on the ground' and were then mutually (re)constituting practice at national level as learning about management outcomes occurs. One potential problem with splitting such an analysis within embedded cases is that more emphasis may be given to the sub-units, with the

context neglected (Yin, 2015). However, to counteract any bias, extensive research was conducted at both levels (see Chapters 5, 6).

Two river basin sub-units were chosen as part of this case design. Chapter 2 recounted how as part of the WFD implementation in Turkey, 25 river basins were established along with specific implementing institutions. Clearly, it was not possible or desirable to investigate all these river basins within the constraints of the thesis research, necessitating some selectivity. While choosing river basins at random could have been a valid selection strategy, the two sub-units were deliberately chosen on the basis of several criteria. One important consideration was that they were not international transboundary river basins, since these units have different institutional arrangements, involving actors from neighbouring countries, to those encompassing rivers only flowing through Turkish territory. Another factor considered was that they were 'most different' (Teune and Przeworski, 1970; Peters, 1998: 144) in terms of their physical, demographic and socio-economic characteristics in order to more widely test the theoretical assumptions within the case. In view of these factors, the sub-units of the Büyük Menderes and Konya (closed) basins were selected to explore how EU process has an impact on local actors and changes at basin level.

Both examples are nationally significant for the WFD process and present contrasting examples of learning around EU water norms. Büyük Menderes was a pilot study of the first EU project, called MATRA (see Chapter 5) and are chosen to examine the effects of the WFD over a significant period of time at the basin level. Therefore, Buyuk Menderes basin is a useful case study to examine the adjustment process to the WFD at the local level from 2002 when the MATRA project started, which was the first project for the implementation of WFD (see Chapter 5). Governmental actors received assistance from the Dutch government and as a consequence of the projects, a draft river basin management plan for the Büyük Menderes basin, a legal and institutional analysis report, a handbook covering methodologies and guidance for implementing the WFD were prepared (European Commission, 2011: 9). The aim was to improve the cooperation between the stakeholders responsible for

water management and increase knowledge on the WFD and the integrated water management approach. In this respect, the BMB has been the 'blueprint' for the preparation of RBMPs for the other basins. Therefore, it could be considered a key case for study.

The second case study is the Konya basin. It also could be considered a 'critical' case for studying WFD implementation, primarily due to its national significance but also relevance to learning processes on the WFD. This basin is a closed basin (i.e. surrounded by other basins) and most problematic basin in terms of water management because the main economic activity is agriculture which because of climate change and illegal abstraction activities is experiencing serious droughts (Ribamap, 2018). The Konya basin, because of being one of the 200 most ecologically significant areas in the world by the WWF in 1998, was accepted as a pilot project 'Towards Wise Use of the Konya Closed Basin', which was initiated in 2003, with the collaboration of the EU, WWF, the Turkey-Netherlands Water Partnership and Turkish government. The aim was to facilitate integrated river basin management and develop communication between local and governmental actors (see Salmaner, 2008). During the project several capacity building activities were organised for local actors, encompassing NGOs, irrigation cooperatives, municipalities and farmers. Learning on EU water norms, as discussed in Chapter 7, became integral to how the WFD process was developed in the Konya basin. As with the BMB, Konya therefore represents a key case for study.

Finally, these two case studies are the pilot cases of the project on the 'Conversion of RPAPs to RBMPs (2014-2017)', therefore they were useful cases to understand the organisational and policy development and learning through capacity building activities. Furthermore, they have different environmental issues due to their geographical positions, the biggest issue at Konya basin is drought; at Buyuk Menderes basin it is water pollution. This is fundamentally because geographically, Konya is a closed basin, but Buyuk Menderes basin is the longest in the region, so it has many connections with the other basins, causing more pollution. Regarding this point, they represent two high profile but contrasting examples of learning in the WFD process, rather

than they were chosen because they are geographically different. Europeanisation of the Konya basin could, therefore, be more problematic due to serious drought than in the Büyük Menderes example. More details are provided below and in Chapters 6 and 7, where these case studies are compared in terms of institutional changes and learning in Chapter 8.




Figure 4.1: Basic types of designs for case studies, COSMOS Corporation (Yin, 2015: 50).

4.5.1 Sub-unit 1: Büyük Menderes river basin

The Büyük Menderes river basin is the longest river in west Anatolia with a length of 585 km. It is one of the most densely populated river basins in Turkey with a population of 2.5 million (Büke et al., 2013). This river, in the southwestern part of Turkey, is the longest river flowing into the Aegean Sea

(Hermans, 2005b). Several large urban centres are found in the basin: Izmir, Manisa, Uşak, Muğla, Afyon and Burdur.

The Büyük Menderes basin was a pilot region for the implementation of the WFD in Turkey (see Chapters 5, 6). The Netherlands government assisted the Turkish government with implementing the WFD under the IWFD Project (Implementation of Water Framework Directive). This project lasted 2 years (between January 2002 and December 2003) and it aimed to provide a better understanding of the WFD amongst Turkish institutions. It was also designed to assist Turkey in implementing the WFD in line with institutional and executive amendments at both national and regional level. The IWFD at national level required establishing river basin districts in Turkey and evaluating and determining the monitoring networks and preparation of the River Basin Management Plans for these districts. The members are required to publish their RBMPs within 9 years after the WFD came into force. Finally, the IWFD project aimed to prepare a River Basin Management Plan for the pilot basin, Büyük Menderes. This project was implemented in close coordination and cooperation between the Turkish Government, Dutch Government agencies and external experts under a 'two-way learning' process. The project was Dutch-Turkish led by a private contractor, Grontmij Consulting Engineers (Hermans, 2005b). The activities were undertaken at the Büyük Menderes basin via the EU projects mentioned in detail in Chapter 7.

4.5.2 Sub-unit 2: Konya (closed) basin

The second sub-unit differs significantly from the Büyük Menderes basin in several major aspects. Management of the Konya (closed) basin is complicated compared to other Turkish river basins because of its aridity. Located in southern Turkey, the river basin is mountainous and less densely populated. Due to the arid conditions and demand for water from intensive agricultural activities, primarily arable production of wheat, sugar beet and alfalfa, pressure on water resources is high. Within the Konya basin, significant environmental pressures have been exerted on water resources from other users, including animal farming, pollution from untreated domestic wastewaters, untreated

industrial wastewaters, plus the impacts from climate change and erosion (Ayaz, 2010).

As in the Büyük Menderes river basin, implementation of the WFD is ongoing. As described further in Chapter 6, central government has established a Watershed Protection Plan originally dating back to 2009 (Ayaz, 2010). This plan has been prepared in consultation with stakeholders through a number of meetings, with this collaborative process still continuing. During the preparation of action plans, some opening and stakeholders meetings took place at the Basin. The stakeholders included the Environmental Management General Directorate of the Ministry of Environment and Forestry, all Provincial Environment and Forestry Directorates in the basins, TUBITAK-MRC, project consultants, municipalities and service providing firms.

4.6 Process tracing

The next consideration in the research design was the specific data collection and analysis techniques. Given the theory-testing nature of the thesis and its requirements to examine implementation through time, a process tracing technique was considered appropriate. This approach also determines the type of data collection and analysis strategy adopted, which focused on qualitative interviews and documentary evidence.

George and Bennett (2005: 6-7) define process tracing as a within-case analysis in which 'researchers examine histories, archival documents, interview transcripts, and other sources to see whether the causal process a theory hypothesises or implies in a case is, in fact, evident in the sequence and values of the intervening variables in that case.' Checkel and Bennett (2015: 6) add to this definition by stating that 'the process tracing method attempts to identify the intervening causal process - the causal chain and causal mechanism - between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable.' Checkel (2008: 115) indicates that 'methodologically, process tracing provides the how-we-come-to-know nuts and bolts for mechanism-based accounts of social change.... [b]ut, it also directs one to trace the process in a very specific, theoretically informed way.' This mechanism can explain how a

social phenomenon is associated with interactions between individuals and other individuals or social aggregates (Checkel, 2008). Recurrent processes are related to specified conditions and specific outcomes (Checkel, 2008; Mayntz, 2003). Here, the researcher must consider the theoretical propositions on the impact of causal mechanisms in a specific sequence of events to gauge whether they can explain the outcome. Process tracing can also provide a heuristic function and reveal new variables and hypotheses that derive from the events that are discovered in case studies (George and Bennett, 2005).

A process tracing method was considered appropriate to the theory-testing aims of the research and the case study design chosen, for several reasons. Firstly, process tracing attempts to identify causal processes in complex political events (Bennett and George 2005), making it ideal for investigating WFD implementation in the Turkish case study. Secondly, it then allows the longitudinal testing of theoretical assumptions in terms of such causal processes (ibid.). Again, it was important for the thesis research because it aimed at testing the explanatory value of socialisation and social learning for the structuring effect of EU water norms – processes that by their nature have a temporal (diachronic) dimension. Thirdly, process tracing is most commonly employed within case study designs (see Checkel, 2001; Checkel, 1999; Schimmelfennig, 2005c; Schimmelfennig, 2017; Schimmelfennig, 2008; Schimmelfennig et al., 2003), again making it ideal for the thesis study.

Finally, process tracing can encompass multiple qualitative data sources such as interviews and documentary analysis; the primary data types used for testing the theories in the study. Besides this, process tracing integrates with other methods in the empiricist/positivist tradition including case studies and content analysis (Checkel, 2005). For example, Checkel (2001) employs several data collection techniques within process tracing, including interviews, meeting summaries and secondary data, and triangulates between them. In this respect, he argues that '[p]rocess tracing is part and parcel of the constructivist methodological tool kit' in order to analyse studies within European and International Politics (Checkel, 2005: 5;14). Accordingly, this method has been used by conventional constructivists (see Lewis, 2005) and

rational-choice scholars (see Schimmelfennig, 2005b), making it epistemologically consistent with the approach adopted in this thesis study.

According to Jungar (2002: 62) the main aim of process tracing is to 'model a path that covers the decision points, considered alternatives and the actual choices made.' In essence, process tracing allows the researcher to disaggregate a political process into several sequences of events or decision-points that are inter-linked. These events then allow the researcher to reconstruct the causal mechanisms influencing the political outcome through ordering the collection of relevant data and its theoretical explanation.

Using the literature on process tracing, a dedicated method of data collection and analysis was therefore developed to fit the thesis aims. Firstly, documentary material (see below) was initially employed to construct a timeline of key events in the implementation of the WFD at both national and sub-unit level. Here, this data focused on these specific data points to examine how WFD norms – causal mechanisms – were influencing the identities of implementing actors. As identified in Chapter 2, implementation can be traced back to the early 2000s but has continued after the decline in the accession process post-2005. Secondly, once this timeline was established, interviews with key policy-makers were conducted to cross-check these causal mechanisms through time. Of interest were the insights of individual actors into the degree of socialisation and social learning occurring within the case study institutions in response to the WFD. Finally, these data were analysed using the theoretical propositions identified in Chapter 3. Each theory provides predictions on what should be the structuring effects of WFD norms on individual actors: a process of socialisation and/or social learning will occur around EU water policy norms. In this way, the theories pointed towards the data required to test them, what Allison and Zelikow (1971: 4) call the 'ponds' in which the study could drag its theoretical 'nets'. Once collected, these data were analysed to assess the extent to which the theories explained implementation (Chapter 5, 6).

Some potential limitations apply to process tracing of theory within case studies, most notably the issue of congruence. In essence, by testing theory, a research

study 'aims to strengthen or reduce support for a theory, narrow or extend the scope conditions of a theory, or determine which of two or more theories best explains a case, type or general phenomenon' (George and Bennett, 2005: 109). This process starts with 'a theory and then attempts to assess its ability to explain and predict the outcome in a particular case' (George and Bennett, 2005: 181). Therefore, the degree of congruence between the theoretical propositions and the data provides an assessment of this ability. Overcoming this issue within the case study was addressed through 'triangulation' of multiple data in the process tracing analysis, discussed further below.

4.7 Data collection tools

In this study, to fit with the process tracing approach, data collection methods involved documents and interviews with high-level policy-making elites. This section therefore describes: (i) the types of documentary sources employed, both primary and secondary, (ii) the interviews conducted, and (iii) how participatory observation was carried out.

4.7.1 Documentary sources

Creswell (2003) states that documentary sources are highly effective for generating data in case studies. There are several forms of documentary data which are commonly classified as primary, secondary and tertiary (Burnham et al., 2008). Primary sources 'consist only of evidence that was actually part of or produced by the event in question' for example cabinet documents, treasury documents, Prime Minister's office documents, private papers etc. (Burnham et al., 2008: 165;167). Secondary sources are 'material circulated at the time or soon after and which was available to the public at the time of the event in question' including government publications, newspapers, periodicals and reports (ibid.). Tertiary sources include 'all later work in the public domain offering a reconstruction' such as published diaries, memories, biographies, unpublished theses, books and journal articles (Burnham et al., 2008: 165;167). Documents might therefore be publicly available such as official reports, policy statements, newspapers and meetings records, or they can be private such as letters, e-mails and diaries. Public documents are helpful resources for social

researchers, and they are expected to provide unbiased factual and reliable information because they are prepared by officials (although see biases below). Moreover, the accessibility of documentary sources is important for researchers because they can usually be obtained by visiting archives, libraries or, increasingly, by accessing government websites (Denscombe, 2010).

Primary documentary sources include data collection from systematic databases, official reports and legal documents, such as political agreements between Turkey and the EU, the Negotiation Framework for Turkey and the Accession Partnership with Turkey. Several documents, including EU-Turkey Progress Reports, Progress Reports 2012-2013 prepared by the Republic of Turkey Ministry for EU Affairs, National Programs 2001, 2003 and 2008. Accession Partnership Documents and National Reports were also selected to enhance interpretation of qualitative data in this research. These reports are significant as they provide qualitative, officially sanctioned records of how the WFD is being implemented and thereby can support the assessment on how its normative structures were influencing institutional development in Turkey. Beside the primary sources, in this study, secondary sources including newspapers and also tertiary sources, including books and journal articles are used.

As with all data sources there are strengths and weaknesses to using documents. Documents are generally easy to access, particularly now that governments and the EU make archives available online. They also provide documented evidence of what actors actually state (Creswell, 2003). However, documentary material should always be approached with a degree of caution due to potential biases, particularly 'authenticity' (Burnham et al., 2008: 185-188). In this respect, the authenticity of documents can be overcome by using official sources but this raises another potential concern over their credibility (ibid.). While government documents may not deliberately mislead, they can often only present a positive version of events or one biased towards a political viewpoint (Vickers, 1995). Consequently, the researcher must always aim to triangulate such sources with other data, such as interviews. Another issue is

that only parts of the documentary record may be available, either because it was never originally generated or is withheld from the public (Creswell, 2003). How representative of the reality of events documents present is therefore an important research consideration for all qualitative researchers.

4.7.2 Interviews

In this research semi structured interviews were also conducted as part of the theory-testing. Interviews were conducted with policy-makers at national and river basin levels, reflecting the embedded multi-level nature of the research. These interviews aimed to shed light on the experiences, knowledge, attitudes and perspectives of elites, in particular around whether they were becoming socialised and/or undergoing social learning around WFD norms. Additional interviews were conducted with officials in Brussels to provide context on the Europeanisation process, particularly the socialising strategies employed by the EU for WFD norm transference.

Interviews are a useful data collection tool in case studies especially when the researcher aims to understand a participant's experiences in depth (Denscombe, 2010). They form a key mechanism in qualitative research design through their ability, if undertaken correctly, to elicit detailed information about events and individuals in their natural settings (Weiss, 1994; Alshenqeeti, 2014; Kvale, 1996). They provide an opportunity for respondents to express their feelings and ideas in their own words (Berg, 2007). Interviews can also elucidate individuals' motivations for specific actions (Checkel, 2001: 565). For example, Checkel and Moravcsik (2001) conducted interviews in order to analyse changes in actors' preferences and the degree of socialisation/persuasion they were experiencing: research that could not easily be undertaken through other means such as quantitative surveys. Finally, interviews allow the researcher to examine causal mechanisms and triangulate documentary sources within process tracing, thereby allowing more robust theory testing (George and Bennett, 2005).

Interviews were undertaken in the thesis study using a standard approach developed from the methodological literature. Three main types of interviews

are utilised in academic studies: structured, semi-structured and unstructured (Denscombe, 2010). The structured interview mainly focuses on a strictly organised and predetermined series of questions that require yes or no responses, and is qualitatively analogous to a quantitative survey. In this type of interview, participants and researchers have less freedom of expression due to the predetermined direct questions (Berg, 2007). However, analysis is fairly straightforward since the researcher only needs to consider a limited number of responses to the questions. Unstructured interviews can refer to 'in-depth' interviews or 'guided conversations' do not involve predefined questions but do require elaborate preparation and wide knowledge of the research context in order to successfully guide the conversation (Davies, 2001: 76; Patton, 2002). Questions can be determined by the 'natural flow of conversation' (Guion et al., 2001: 1), although the researcher must respond reflexively to the answers and hence becomes situated within the interview. Such interviews are therefore more associated with inductive (post-positivist) studies, often within ethnography or social sciences where elicitation of knowledge of individual perceptions in theory-building is a central aim.

Rather than a structured or unstructured approach, the thesis study utilised semi-structured elite interviews, which strongly fitted the research design. Saunders and Lewis (2012) emphasise that in semi-structured interviews, the researcher prepares several subjects to be addressed and questions to be answered by participants but then reacts to the responses to pose further questions where more exploration or clarification is required. One of the advantages of semi-structured interviews is that they include pre-defined topics for discussion that are established by a researcher while allowing for flexible examination of newly emerging themes that can be interesting to the research (Denscombe, 2010). Berg (2007: 39) emphasises that researchers should use a basic checklist that encompasses the key themes that are of interest but allows 'for in-depth probing while permitting the interviewer to keep the interview within the parameters traced out by the aim of the study.' Although standardising this framework between interviews provides a measure of comparability, the order of questions can vary depending on the participants.

Some topics may not be applicable to a specific interviewee and can be excluded from the questioning. Moreover, the researcher is able to ask additional questions so as to cross-check whether the participant's responses are accurate.

A semi-structured interview programme was therefore devised to inform the data collection in Turkey. Of interest to the research aims (Chapter 1) is how WFD norms are influencing policy actors' identities through socialisation and social learning. Chapter 3 sets out the key normative assumptions made by the theory, which then informed the interview questions. A series of topics and questions were then devised to elicit information from interviewees on these theoretical assumptions (see Appendix 1). An ethical protocol was also developed for use in the fieldwork, discussed further below. Once the questions were completed, interviewees were contacted for participation in the research.

4.7.2.1 Elite interviews

This section focuses on elite interviews, in which political scientists examine the role of elites in the policy-making process (Burnham et al., 2008). In this study a semi-structured 'elite' interview methodology was selected in order to gain information about decision-makers and the decision-making process.

According to Tansey (2007: 767) the elite interview is the fundamental tool of data collection for process tracing:

'... [E]lite interviewing can have [an important role] in facilitating the process tracing method and in providing the kind of data that can be critical in uncovering the causal processes and mechanisms that are central to comprehensive causal explanations. Process tracing requires data collection on key political decision-making activity, often at the highest political level, and elite interviews will frequently be a critical strategy for obtaining this required information.'

The elite interview can enhance the precision of the information that is collected from other sources (Tansey, 2007; Bryman, 2001). For instance, archives and departmental political papers are prone to a 'self-justificatory element'; they

emphasise the 'administrative process' of policy-making, and they might be deceptive and incomplete (Booth and Glynn, 1979: 315; Davies, 2001: 74). This is because, in contrast to surveys, interviewing provides researchers with a means to ask open-ended questions, therefore it enables the acquisition of information about the elites' attitudes and beliefs (Aberbach and Rockman, 2002; Tansey, 2007). Accordingly, interviews are subsidiary sources to documentary records and they provide corroborative and additional information to documentary records to produce a 'combination of oral and archival evidence' (Davies, 2001: 75). Researchers also can potentially generalise the findings as they attempt to learn the general perceptions of elites such as politicians or civil servants, as well as process tracing the 'hidden elements' of decisions and actions which entail the events that cannot be analysed from other sources (Babbie, 1995; Tansey, 2007).

Davies (2001) emphasises 4 key criteria that are required for the elite interview: information needs to be from first-hand witnesses, the level of access of the participant to events needs to be known, and senior-level officers are seen as more reliable, and lastly the participant's track record of reliability should be disclosed. By conducting interviews with the elites, the study research sought to discover socialisation of the actors to new norms and beliefs that changed in parallel with government preferences and state behaviour.

There are some advantages and disadvantages to elite interviewing (Alshenqeeti, 2014: 43; Breen et al., 2001: 3). The advantages can be its capacity for a high return rate in terms of data generation, its relative flexibility, and the potential linking of theory to data in complex processes. Also, unlike documents, interviews provide an opportunity to directly communicate with 'witnesses' to the events in order to provide unique insight (Tansey, 2007: 767). A disadvantage of such interview is that they are time-consuming. Arranging interviews, travelling between interview sites, conducting interviews, transcribing recordings and analysing findings can take considerable effort, especially compared to structured techniques. Other problems relate to interviewee reliability; Seldon (1988: 6) argues that interviewees' evidence can be unreliable due to simple memory loss, their oversimplification of events or

biased perceptions, or even through deliberate attempts to mislead the researcher. Other problems may emanate from the asymmetry of power between the elite and the researcher, whereby this dissuades certain lines of questioning for fear of non-cooperation (see Seldon, 1988: 201). Issues can therefore arise around the validity and reliability of interview data (Alshenqeeti, 2014).

4.7.2.2 Identifying the elites

Interviewing focused on so-called elite actors in Turkish water policy. There is no clear-cut definition of an 'elite', so the notion is controversial. According to Checkel (1997: 476), 'elites are the gatekeepers who ultimately control the political agenda.' Accordingly, Richards (2001: 199) claims that an elite 'implies a group of individuals, who hold, or have held, a privileged position in society and... are likely to have had more influence on political outcomes.' The term also refers to people who are directly involved in the political process and have unique insight regarding the causal processes of specific political issues (Dexter, 2006). Another way of viewing such actors is that they can provide data which are not likely to be accessible from other sources. Within Turkey, the responsible ministries and their departments for water management were therefore initially targeted. The main responsible actors are the MoFWA and the MoEU and their related departments. These departments, based on the 'General Directorate of Water Management' are the 'Basin Management Planning Department', the 'Water Legislation and Policy Department', the 'Inventory and Allocation Department', the 'Monitoring Department', the 'Water Quality Management Department', and the 'Flood and Drought Management Department' (Kinaci, 2013). Therefore, elite actors interviewed in the thesis study included national level policy-makers, officials in river basin institutions, water policy experts and also non-state actors participating in river basin planning (see Appendix 2 for interview list).

4.7.2.3 Sampling

Non-probability sampling, in which researchers draw samples from the wider population by not using random selection, is suitable for the process tracing

method (Tansey, 2007). There are different kinds of non-probability sample, including convenience sampling, quota sampling, dimensional sampling, purposive sampling and snowball sampling (Cohen et al., 2007). One of the important forms of non-probability sampling for interviewing is the so-called snowball method (Babbie, 1995). The snowball or 'referral' sampling strategy (Burnham et al., 2008: 207), is predominantly used within qualitative research, especially for interviews (Snijders, 1992).

In this sampling, researchers attempt to identify a small number of participants, and they are used to suggest other interviewees who are difficult to access such as where there is a weak communication network or a delicate topic (Cohen et al., 2007). It is an efficient method to identify key actors who may otherwise be ignored, because elites are likely to suggest other important actors who researchers did not initially perceive as relevant to the research (Tansey, 2007). This is particularly relevant for process tracing as it seeks to gain information about the particular sequence of events or processes. Therefore, researchers attempt to select participants with regard to their positions within this sequence of events. To obtain all information for this purpose, researchers need to consider that the process may be affected by unexpected political players that are not initially seen as relevant or significant. By applying a snowball sample, the main actors and others who have important roles in unexpected positions can be identified (Tansey, 2007).

Interviewing was consequently undertaken using a set procedure. Initially the deputy general manager in the Ministry was contacted for an appointment. Prior to the interview, signing of the consent form was requested, along with another request for recording. Most interviewees were happy to comply, although on one occasion the interviewee declined to sign the consent form meaning that data collected could not be directly attributed and was excluded from the analysis. Interviews started with some informal discussion to develop what Burnham et al. (2008: 214) calls a 'rapport'. This provided a context to set out the study aims, use of data and establish any concerns of the interviewee regarding the research. Then questioning would start, typically by asking some simple questions around the role of the interviewees and how long they had

worked in the position. This provided an entry into more detailed questioning based on the themes in the interview schedule. Of interest here were the perceptions of the elite on the implementation of the WFD, with the questioning sometimes diverging into interesting avenues of enquiry. Questioning was focused on the aspects of socialisation and social learning around the WFD identified in Chapter 3, i.e. how learning was occurring and the extent to which norms were internalised during this process. Where clarification on specific points was required, more intensive 'probing' (Rubin and Rubin 1995: 150) was undertaken. Finally, at the end of the interview, the interviewees were thanked and asked whether they could recommend further contacts.

This approach fitted the interview sampling strategy. In one sense, the 'sampling' of interviewees within process tracing is self-evidential, since within any political process there are individuals who are significant to the decision-making, as identified in the documentary analysis. These individuals were contacted first for inclusion in the interviewing programme. However, not all participants were known to the researcher at the start of the interviewing, necessitating a snowball sampling method. Vogt and Johnson (2011: 368) describe snowball sampling as 'a technique for finding research subjects... [in which] [o]ne subject gives the researcher the name of another subject, who in turn provides the name of a third, and so on.' In this sampling, researchers identify a small number of initial participants that are used to suggest other interviewees, who may be more difficult to access (Cohen et al., 2007). Since it relies on personal recommendation via referral from the elite, other elites are often willing to comply. It can also be a valuable technique for identifying elites not initially known at the start of the study (Tansey, 2007). Snowball sampling is also amenable to process tracing since it allows researchers to follow networks of elites through a complex sequence of decision-making.

4.7.2.4 Getting access to elites

One of the biggest issues with such interviews is access to elites (Goldstein, 2002). Some actors are by their nature difficult to contact or interview, particularly ministers or high level bureaucrats. Others seek to deliberately

'insulate themselves from unwanted disturbance' (Thomas, 1995: 4). As a result 'negotiating access' (Stedward, 1997: 153-154) can be problematic. This problem was addressed in several ways. An initial contact was made with the elite by email in which the aims of the study were explained, along with a request for an interview. Follow-up emails and phone calls were made where no response was received. Sometimes this resulted in a refusal but in general most actors contacted were obliging. In this event, another email was sent to confirm dates and provide an ethical consent form for use of the interview data (see below and Appendix 3).

4.7.2.5 Conducting interviews

The semi-structured interview varies depending on the study. However, three general propositions may be followed so as to deliver the interview questions (Burnham et al., 2008: 212-213). Firstly, the respondent will have a number of questions which the researcher wants to encompass. Secondly, the questions require prioritising as 'essential', 'desirable' and 'necessary' for the research. Lastly, the researcher should not apply the framework of the interview too rigidly. The interviewer should allow the respondent to open new topics and ensure the discussion develops flexibly.

The interview questions were prepared according to the theoretical approach of the study in Chapter 3 (see Appendix 1). Interview questions related to the aspects of socialisation and social learning identified in the theoretical framework. For example, a key feature of socialisation determined in the framework is norm transference between the EU and Turkish actors. It was assumed that if such norm transference occurs under the EU socialising strategies then changes in actor preferences around the WFD would occur. In addition, social learning is interpreted as norm acquisition by these actors as a result of this socialising process. Interview questions therefore focused on how socialisation was occurring, whether changes in preferences had occurred, whether actors were acquiring WFD norms (learning) and whether their interests/identities had become more 'European' and less nationally oriented.

Interviewees were then asked questions regarding these processes within the WFD implementation.

In this study, semi-structured interviews were conducted with 48 participants in order to collect data necessary for answering the research question and increase the extent and reliability of the study (Table 4.1). The main aim of the interviews was to discover stakeholders' ideas and experiences with regard to the Europeanisation process of Turkish water policy. In total, 31 interviews were conducted with officials from Turkey (Ankara, Aydın and Konya), the EU Turkey Delegation, and officials in Brussels including DG NEAR and DG for Environment (see Table 4.1). The remainder of the interviews, 17 in total, were conducted in the two river basin case studies with local officials and stakeholders.

Table 4.1: Data collection methods

	Data Collection Methods	Participants	Number	Date
CENTRAL	Semi-structured Interview	Delegation of the European Union to Turkey	2	7 th of November 2017
		Ministry of Urbanisation and Environment	7	May-June 2017 31 st October 2017
		Ministry of Forestry and Water Affairs	19	May-June 2017
		DG NEAR and DG for Environment	3	17 th and 23 rd of October 2017
LOCAL	Observation (stakeholder meeting)	Konya (closed) basin	74	8 th of May 2017
		Büyük Menderes basin	62	9 th of May 2017
	Interview (by email)	Konya (closed) basin	11	May 2017
		Büyük Menderes basin	6	

4.7.2.6 Validity and reliability of interviewing

To ensure the validity and reliability of interviewing, researchers can follow some simple techniques (Alshenqeeti, 2014: 44). For example, they should not

ask leading questions; should take notes rather than just relying on audio recording; conduct a pilot interview and give the interviewee a chance to sum up and clarify the points they have made (ibid.). Also, after transcription is completed, copies can be sent to the participants to let them check for accuracy (Davies, 2001). Besides this, researchers can conduct a second or third interview with them to check the accuracy, or email regarding specific points, and they can compare the information with other participants' evidence. Also, they can utilise documentary and observational data in order to detect errors (Hammersley and Gomm, 2008: 100).

In ensuring the reliability of data collected, the thesis research therefore engaged in several techniques. Firstly, the interview schedule was carefully checked for any leading questions. Secondly, a pilot testing of the research questions was undertaken to road-test them for suitability and also to check the usefulness of data collected. This process enabled the researcher to reflect on the questions and make adjustments. Thirdly, hand written notes were taken in all the interviews. Fourthly, at the end of each interview the interviewee was asked whether they had any questions or would like to add any further comments. As described above, interviewees could then nominate other potential contacts. All participants were offered a chance to review the final transcript as part of the interview protocol. However, only a few requested this option. Some interviewees were contacted again at a later date, in order to clarify certain aspects of their evidence: this helped reduce any misunderstandings about the points made. Finally, as discussed further in the next section, interview data was cross-checked with documentary sources to triangulate findings in the data analysis stage. While this could not eradicate error, which would be difficult in any qualitative research of complex social processes, it nonetheless helped enhance the reliability of data collected.

4.8 Observation

Several main types of observation are identified in the literature: participant and non-participant observation, structured, semi-structured and unstructured observation. In non-participant observation, a researcher conducts observation

without interacting with the people observed. In participant observation, a researcher becomes a member of the group and this may require a researcher to live or work in the community during the observation. The structured observation method requires that the researcher has predetermined areas that are identified for investigation, along with specific target groups or events (Bentley et al., 1994). However, this study utilised participant observation.

4.8.1 Participatory observation

Participation observation as a qualitative research data collection method is becoming widespread in social science. This method is most commonly used in anthropology and sociology where it is successfully employed in group or community studies, particularly in marginal and criminal groups such as Okely (1983)'s study on Traveller-gypsies (Burnham et al., 2008).

There are four types of participant observation: complete participation, participant as observer, observer as participant and complete observer (Gold, 1958: 217). *Complete participation* lets a researcher conceal their identity when they join the group or community because of the fear of rejection from accessing the group. The advantage of this method is that the observer does not have any impact on the group, therefore the data will be more reliable and valid. However, covert participant observation research is not perceived as ethical and honest in social science. For example, a controversial case is Laud Humphreys's study observing homosexual encounters in men's toilets. It was contentious because some groups involved did not consent to involvement. In *participant as observer*, the researcher does not fully integrate into the group due to his research role but does not conceal his identity (Burnham et al., 2008). This is most commonly used in community studies where the observer has attempted to spend time with the group and develop relationships with them, thereby gaining their trust (Gold, 1958), but it can also be used in other circumstances:

'The observer as participant role is used in studies involving one-visit interviews. It calls for relatively more formal observation than either informal observation or participation of any kind. It also entails less risk of

going native than either the complete participant role or the participant as observer role' (Gold, 1958: 221).

In this type of observation, the researcher's interaction with the various informants is so brief and superficial that there can be mutual misunderstanding (Burnham et al., 2008). Lastly, the *complete observer* refers to an observer concealing his identity and rejecting interaction with the informants, so in this observation type the group or community is never aware of being observed.

For this study, the *participant as observer* method was practical and helpful, particularly at the stakeholder meetings for the Konya and Büyük Menderes basins. There were a number of local actors from different departments or agencies from different cities. By attending these meetings, it was possible to observe the interaction between the local and national actors, and the learning perspectives and concerns of local actors about the basin management approach. Of particular interest for the theoretical testing was how actors were acquiring WFD norms (i.e. learning) through interaction. During the coffee and lunch breaks, participants were questioned and notes made. Contact details for email the questions were also solicited. After a week, the questions were emailed to the participants and so the answers were cross checked.

4.8.2.1 Advantages of participatory observation

By using this participatory method, the researcher has opportunities to spend time with the groups and empathise with her/his subjects. Also, in-depth knowledge on understanding of people's behaviours and motivations can be gained by the observer (Burnham et al., 2008). It also enables insight into how participants interact and behave, which is particularly important for understanding normative influence.

In this respect, the participant observation approach was important for this research. Firstly, in the Konya and Büyük Menderes basins there are several cities and departments, so it would be difficult to determine the responsible local actors and reach them through other means. Secondly, it was helpful in examining the interaction between local and governmental actors, whether local

actors acquired knowledge on the basin management approach, and whether they learned from governmental actors and also from EU projects with which they engage. Therefore, the observation was important to explore whether local actors learned about EU water norms and policies.

4.8.2.2 Disadvantages of participatory observation

Burnham et al. (2008: 235) indicate that 'many researchers are... suspicious of evidence from participant observation, regarding it as unsystematic and unquantifiable, too impressionistic and subjective.' Another point is the conflict between the roles of participant and observer, is that the observer is always at risk of 'going native' or becoming fully engaged or 'captured' by the group, thereby biasing findings (Burnham et al., 2008: 235). Also, participatory observation can be very expensive and requires time to gain groups' trust and learn about their languages and cultures (Burnham et al., 2008). The disadvantages of participatory observation in this research were that the meetings lasted just one day, so limited time was available to interact with the local actors and create a rapport. Discussion was undertaken during the breaks and lunch time and notes of this were taken. It was also difficult to identify all of the participants at the meetings since attendance lists were not provided.

4.9 Data analysis and interpretation

Another approach to analysing bias in qualitative research is triangulation of data. Davies (2001: 78) emphasises the triangulation process which refers to the corroboration of multiple sources which are primary (interviews or first-hand accounts) and secondary (archival). Accordingly, even if interviewees seem reliable, researchers should consider multiple sources for the reliability and validity of data. Denzin and Lincoln (2018: 779) categorise triangulation into two types which are 'within methods' triangulation and 'between methods' triangulation. Triangulation within methods refers to the replication of research in order to verify reliability and theory confirmation. Triangulation between methods includes the use of multiple methods which is appropriate if there are disputable aspects in the study (Adelman et al., 1976). For example, Lewis (2005) utilised triangulation to explain socialisation in his study, by combining

qualitative and quantitative research methods including interviews, archival documentation and secondary sources.

In order to measure learning participants' processes; interviews, observation, reports or documents can be used. Process tracing is also a good method to measure how phases/levels/types of learning unfold and how the causal mechanisms or factors associated with learning can be identified (see Heikkila and Gerlak, 2013: 502). Participants can be asked how they shift their strategies (behavioural outcomes) and their beliefs. Also, what kind of information caused belief changes and how this information is interpreted and diffused, which are aspects of norm internalisation (see Flockhart, 2004; Peshkopia and Imami, 2008). The questions were therefore prepared deliberately to understand how actors learn information by interaction with EU experts and how the information is disseminated within the organisation.

Accordingly, the focus of the thesis is how Turkish actors adopt EU norms and rules and how learning and socialisation processes take place. In order to give a better understanding of these questions, the learning processes (acquisition, transition and dissemination) were analysed to measure which modes of social learning occur from 1999 until the present (see Heikkila and Gerlak, 2013). Social learning has been perceived as a mechanism of the socialisation process (see Schimmelfennig, 2005a) and for this process successful norm internalisation can be an expected outcome. For norm internalisation, the key point is that actors should practice what they learn from the EU experts (see Flockhart, 2004; Schimmelfennig, 2000). Accordingly, this thesis also aimed to examine how actors practice what they learn, including policy changes and behavioural changes (see Chapter 3).

4.10 Summary

This chapter has focused on the research design of the thesis. In order to assess the theoretical framework, which is the constructivist perspective as outlined in Chapter 3, a specific theory was developed. This study applies a qualitative mixed method. In this study, embedded case study design was used; Turkey with two subcases. Besides, a process tracing technique was developed

to assess the theoretical framework to find causal relations between the Europeanisation process and domestic changes through a series of events (Chapter 5-8). As a requirement of process tracing, documentary analysis and interview were used for data collection. Interview data was mainly collected in different Turkish cities and also in Brussels. In order to collect more viable data at local level, participant observation was also applied through conversing with local actors from different cities as well as observing the learning and interaction between governmental actors and local actors. Data problems were overcome through triangulation. Therefore, Chapters 5 to 8 focus on empirical findings and how these methods were applied to explain case studies by using a theoretical perspective.

Chapter 5. The Europeanisation of Turkish water policy: Implementing the Water Framework Directive at national level

5.1 Introduction

After Turkey received EU candidate status in 1999 at the Helsinki Council meeting, the Europeanisation process for Turkey was initiated. This became a driving force for the domestic reforms and shifts in water management policies (Chapter 1). However, a critical issue identified in the thesis Introduction (Chapter 1) and Literature Review (Chapter 2) is that while conditionality attached to accession candidacy may have strongly influenced Europeanisation of the Turkish water policy sector between 1999 and 2005, it may be less coherent as an explanatory framework in the period afterwards: a point supported by recent analysis of other policy sectors. In this respect, Chapter 2 developed the case for examining the potential of alternative theoretical perspectives, namely sociological institutionalism. Key theoretical assumptions were developed in Chapter 3. However, it would be empirically problematic to test these arguments across the entire water policy sector, as discussed in Chapter 4, therefore it was argued that they can be examined in depth using the specific case study of the Water Framework Directive, which provides a significant indicator of this wider process.

In this respect, this Chapter has two primary objectives. Firstly, to empirically map the multi-level implementation of the WFD, in order to show patterns of Europeanisation within the Turkish water policy sector. Given the challenges of adopting and implementing the WFD, Turkey has had to make significant financial, technical and institutional investments. As explained below, a critical role has been played by successive EU-supported projects in transferring policy. Secondly, the Chapter seeks to analyse these patterns of Europeanisation using the theoretical framework developed above. Of interest here, is the extent to which theoretical assumptions around institutional socialisation and social learning have explanatory value.

In meeting these two objectives, this Chapter is structured in the following way. The first section focuses on describing the legal and institutional changes

supporting the transfer and implementation of the WFD in Turkey. As explained in Chapter 4, the WFD requires multi-level governance, at both the national and regional scales, necessitating an embedded case design. After initially explaining the main features of the WFD, this Chapter then examines these changes more broadly at national level, across three semi-distinct periods of Europeanisation: (i) 1999-2006 (ii) 2007-2013 and (iii) 2014-present. Documentary and interview data are employed to construct a timeline of evolving policy development. The second section then analyses Europeanisation across these distinct periods, using sociological institutionalism theory. Indicators of social learning are applied to the account within these three phases. Interview results, in particular, are utilised to uncover political actors' identities and interests within the implementation process to see how, and indeed if, they are being shaped by EU normative structures, i.e. WFD requirements. Evidence of social learning in response to these norms is then evaluated.

5.2 Implementing the Water Framework Directive: Context

The Water Framework Directive 2000 is the EU's flagship environmental policy, comprising a significant component of the water acquis. It is therefore unsurprising that implementing the WFD became an important element of Turkey's accession strategy, detailed below. However, it is timely to reflect back on the Directive origins, main principles and objectives.

The WFD originated in earlier water pollution policy (Benson and Jordan, 2008). Faced with chronic fresh and marine water pollution across Europe, the EEC prioritised it in its First Environmental Action Programme in 1973 (CEC 1973). Thereafter, several 'first generation' water policies were adopted based on setting environmental quality standards, including directives for bathing water, surface water for drinking, shellfisheries and freshwater fisheries (Benson and Jordan, 2014). Member States were given considerable flexibility in setting standards by these directives. Further directives for controlling dangerous substances in water, based on emission limit values and environmental quality objectives, and establishing drinking water product standards then followed. But

this flexibility largely failed to counter pollution problems, particularly eutrophication of freshwater sources (ibid.). Two so-called 'second generation' measures were then adopted to tackle pollution at source, namely the Nitrates Directive and the Urban Waste Water Directive, although these imposed significant implementation costs (European Commission, 2010). Attempts by the EU to introduce further measures led to demands from national governments and the European Parliament for a more holistic water policy. As a result, the European Commission proposed the Water Framework Directive in 1996 (COM (96)59).

Adopted in 2000, the Water Framework Directive (2000/60/EC) marked a significant departure from earlier water policies. Based upon the principles of integrated water resources management, the Directive repealed pre-existing measures replacing them with an overarching framework based upon river basin management planning for surface and ground waters (European Commission, 2016a; Sumer, 2016). Directive articles include the requirement on governments to establish river basin districts within their territory (Article 3), maintain 'good' ecological and chemical water status and prevent deterioration in water quality (Article 4), analyse the characteristics of river basins (Article 5), establish monitoring programmes for water quality (Article 8), introduce full cost recovery from water provision (Article 9), and adopt a programme of measures (POM) for river basin to inform planning (Articles 11, 13) (European Commission, 2010; Kallis and Butler, 2001). Significantly, the WFD also requires provision of information to the public on planning, along with stakeholder consultation in plan production (Article 13). River basin planning has therefore necessitated significant institutional change in EU states, leading to implementation challenges (Sumer and Muluk, 2011; Voulvoulis et al., 2017; Sten Hansen and Mäenpää, 2008; Berbel and Expósito, 2018).

As the next sections describe, Turkey has experienced many challenges in implementing the WFD. The Directive has required fundamental changes to national water policies and institutional arrangements. After Turkey was accepted as an EU candidate in 1999, Turkey initially received pre-accession assistance from 2001 under the Turkish Financial Instrument. To support this

process, Turkey has both incrementally adjusted national legal-policy frameworks in parallel with receiving technical and economic assistance via EU-led projects under the European Commission's Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA), which came into force in 2007. Moreover, new institutional settings have been required at national level, including the establishment of the Ministry of Forestry and Water Affairs, plus local level river basin committees discussed further in Chapter 6-7. Of interest, from a theoretical perspective, is whether such changes are resulting in social learning amongst institutional actors around EU water policy norms and whether they have been internalised. In this respect, the analysis below will focus on the claims of Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005b) and others, who maintain that actors learn lessons from the EU, internalising its norms, thereby driving forward Europeanisation through a socialisation process.

5.3 Phase 1: Implementation of the WFD in Turkey 1999-2006

5.3.1 Introduction

Prior to 1999, Turkish water policies reflected domestic priorities, with little EU influence (Demirbilek and Benson 2018). Turkey then embarked on transferring elements of the *acquis* (Kibaroglu et al., 2012). The national 'Eighth 5 Year Development Plan 2000' emphasised that legislation should be adopted to improve usage, protect water resources and ensure EU standards (State Planning Organisation, 2000). A 'National Programme for Adoption of the Acquis' was then adopted in 2001 (then 2003 and 2008) to support this transfer, as required under the Copenhagen accession criteria and Turkey's EU Accession Partnership document (Republic of Turkey Ministry for EU Affairs, 2017). Regarding the water *acquis*, transfer initially focused on the Urban Waste Water Treatment Directive (UWWTD) (91/271/EEC), the Dangerous Substances in Water Directive (76/464/EEC) and the WFD. Cooperation then started between Turkish government ministries and the EU Commission on transferring EU water policy.

Transfer has occurred through the transposition of EU water laws into Turkish national policy and policy implementation via several mechanisms, most

significantly EU funded projects (see Table 5.1). This section therefore explains how Turkish alignment with EU water policy initially developed, specifically focusing on the WFD. In the period of 2002-2006 this took the form of three projects: The ‘Implementation of the WFD in Turkey (2002-2004)’ (MATRA); the ‘Environmental Heavy-Cost Investment Planning in Turkey (2002-2005)’ (EHCIP) (see Figure 5.1; Table 5.1); and finally the ‘Restructuring of the Turkish Water Sector for the Implementation of EU Water Directives (2005-2006)’ (Sumer, 2016: 204,211). Throughout this period, Europeanisation progressed through increasing legal adoption and institutional development.




Figure 5.1: Important activities in Turkish Water Policy 2000-2015.

5.3.2 Project development 2002-2006

5.3.2.1 The MATRA Project 2002-2004

Turkey initiated adoption of the WFD through the MATRA Project 2002, receiving assistance from the Dutch government. Key institutional actors involved were the Turkish General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works (DSI), Ministry of Health (MoH), Ministry of Environment and Forestry (MoEF), Dutch government officials, Grontmij Consultancy, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs (MARA), the Ministry of Tourism and the Secretariat General for EU Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Sumer, 2016: 203). This pre-

accession programme was designed to support Turkey in adopting the water *acquis*, including the WFD (Alparslan et al., 2007; Şorman, 2006).

Table 5.1: Twinning projects (Sumer, 2016; Ribamap, 2017; Ministry of EU, 2017; Water Ambassadors, 2018)

	Project Name	Actors	Year
1	The implementation of WFD in Turkey (MATRA) (MATO1/TR/9/3)	DSI, MARA, MoEF, SPO, Grontmij Consultancy, Dutch government	2002-2004
2	Environmental Heavy-Cost Investment Planning in Turkey (Tr/0203.03/001)	MoEF, Consortium of Envest	2002-2005
3	Restructuring of the Turkish Water Sector for the implementation of EU water Directives	Defra/UK, MoEF	2005
4	Capacity Building Support to Turkey for the Water Sector (TR06-IB-EN-01)	DSI, MoEF	2007-2010
5	Capacity Strengthening and Support of Implementation of Nitrate Directive (TR2007-IB-EN-01)	MoFAL	2007-2010
6	Mitigating Flood Risk in Flooded Areas in the GAP Region (GAPSEL) (TR0602.18)	GAP Regional Development Administration	2007-2010
7	Capacity Improvement for Flood Forecasting and Flood Control in the TR-BG CBC Region (TR0602.15)	DSI	2007-2011
8	Alignment in Bathing Water Monitoring (TR10-IB-EN-02) (TR2010/0327.01)	MoF	2010-2014
9	Capacity Building to implement the Flood Directive (TR2010/0327.05) (TR-10-IB-EN-01)	DSI	2010-2014
10	Capacity Building on Water Quality Monitoring (TR09-IB-EN-03) (TR2009/0327.02)	MoFWA	2011-2015
11	Capacity Building Support to Turkey on Groundwater Management (TR2012.0740.14)	MoFWA	2013-ongoing
12	Technical Assistance for Conversion of River Basin Protection Action Plans into River Basin Management Plans (TR2011/0327.21.05)	MoFWA	2015-2018
13	Technical Assistance on Economic Analyses within RBMPs and Water Efficiency Aspects in 3 Pilot Basins in Turkey (TR2012.0740.14)	MoFWA	2017-2019
14	Emergency Case Management and Risk Analysis in Drinking Water for the Protection of Public Health (TR08-EN-05-TWL)	MoH	2012-2013
15	Capacity Building on Marine Strategy Framework Directive in Turkey (TR2011/0327.21.06)	MoEU	2016-2018
16	Technical Assistance for Water Ambassadors Education and Awareness Raising Project	DSI, the MoNE, the General Directorate of Radio and Television Corporation	2017-2018

This project, assisted by Netherlands, was the first step in harmonising the WFD with Turkish water policy (Moroglu and Yazgan, 2008: 277). A key objective was development of cooperation amongst decision-making actors and also encouraging public participation to support knowledge transfer in implementing the WFD at regional and national levels (Alparslan et al., 2007; Sumer, 2016). River basin districts in Turkey were initially defined, as required by WFD Article 3, with 25 identified (see Figure 5.2; Table 5.2). Two coordinating bodies were established at national and regional (river basin) levels. The first group, the National Platform, encompassed stakeholders including ministerial staff and was responsible for decision-making on water-related issues. The second group, the River Basin Working Group, became responsible for preparing draft RBMPs in each basin.



Figure 5.2: River basin districts in Turkey (Cicek and Sahtiyanci, 2012: 6).

One early initiative included a draft River Basin Management Plan for the Büyük Menderes river basin as a pilot to inform roll-out nationally. Regional actors involved included the Provincial Directorate of Environment and Forestry, 21st Regional Directorate of the DSI (State Hydraulic Works), the Provincial Directorate of Rural Services, the Provincial Directorate of Agriculture, the Provincial Directorate of Health, the Provincial Directorate of Forestry, the Provincial Directorate of Tourism and Adnan Menderes University in Aydin (Alparslan et al., 2007). Drawing lessons from the pilot project, policy-makers

divided Turkey into several river basin districts (see Figure 5.2) for the purposes of planning (Cinar and Ozdinc, 2006)⁵.

Table 5.2: Actions taken in Turkey in line with EU water policy (Kinaci, 2013).

	Action	Year	Remarks
1	Transposition into Turkish legislation	2011	Full transposition will be ensured by the date of accession
2	Designation of River Basin District	2012	25 basins have already been defined.
3	Start of preparation of the Article 5, Reports for River Basins	After 2013	River Basin Protection Action Plans (RBPAP) which are being prepared by the DGWM under the MOFWA will have been finalized by 2013 and will set the basis for Article 5 reports
4	Start of preparation of the RBMPs	After 2014	Preparation of RBMPs are directly linked with the finalization of Article 5 reports and RBPAPs.
5	Start of implementation of RBMPs	After 2015	2015 is in line with the start of the second of the RBMPs of the present EU member states
6	Achievement of “good water status” unless derogation is required due to technical reasons and disproportionate costs	2027	Year of achievement of good water status depends on the actual challenges in the basins.

In addition to the Dutch government, consultants from the Netherlands also proved important within the MATRA process. The Grontmij Consulting Engineers published a report in 2003 (Sumer, 2016), recommending the DSI and the Ministry of Environment and Forestry to prepare a National Water Quality Plan and National Water Quantity Plan in order to support a National Integrated Water Management Plan (Cinar and Ozdinc, 2006). A draft river basin management plan for the Büyük Menderes basin, a legal and institutional analysis report, a handbook, including guidance and methodologies, for implementation of WFD and so on were prepared. However, due to limited resources, the transfer process was constrained despite increasing the

⁵ River Basins of the Marmara Sea: The Marmara and Susurluk basins; River basins of the Black Sea: The West Karadeniz, Kizilirmak, Yesilirmak, East Karadeniz basins; River basins of the Mediterranean Sea: The Ceyhan, Seyhan, East Akdeniz, West Akdeniz, Antalya Basins; International River basins: The Asi, Firat, Dicle, Aras, Coruh, Meric-Ergene basins; River basins of the Aegean Sea; The Büyük Menderes, Kucuk Menderes, Gediz, Kuzey Ege; Enclosed Basins: The Burdur Lakes, Konya and Van closed basins (Moroglu and Yazgan, 2008).

awareness of related stakeholders regarding the WFD (European Commission, 2011: 9). Therefore, the MATRA project was a good introductory activity to understand the implementation of the WFD within the EU accession (DG NEAR, 2009: 22).

5.3.2.2 Environmental Heavy Cost Investment Planning (EHCIP) (2002-2005)

Turkey also received EU technical assistance through the 'Technical Assistance for the Preparation of the Integrated Environment Approximation Strategy for Turkey Project financed under EU MEDA Program (2003–2004)' and the 'Technical Assistance for Environmental Heavy Cost Investment Planning' (EHCIP) Project. The latter occurred within the framework of the 'Capacity Building in the Field of Environment for Turkey' programme, financed under the 2002 EU Pre-Accession Financial Assistance (2003–2005) (Moroglu and Yazgan, 2008: 277). It aimed to develop administrative and engineering capacity in order to meet Turkey's environmental infrastructure conditions within the EU accession, primarily by supporting environmental projects for wastewater, industrial pollution control, air pollution control and also determine how the existing financial instruments could be used for environmental investment (European Commission, 2011: 10). The EHCIP project covered the investment costs required to adopt 15 water-related directives including the UWWTD, the Drinking Water Directive, the Nitrates Directive and the Bathing Directive and so on (Sumer, 2016: 208). Accordingly, the investment costs were identified as €33.969 billion (Ministry of Environment and Forestry, 2006: 18). The project also aimed to estimate the required investments to fully implement EU water-related directives in Turkey as well as ascertain financial tools to implement requirements regarding water quality, including those for pollution control and waste management (Sumer and Muluk, 2011).

5.3.2.3 Restructuring of the Turkish water sector for the implementation of EU water directives (2005-2006)

A report, called *Restructuring of the Turkish Water Sector for the Implementation of EU Water Directives*, was then prepared by the UK Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) in 2005 for the

MoEF to enable implementation of the WFD (Sumer, 2016: 208-209). This report recommended transferring some responsibilities of the DSI to a new environmental agency and also establishing a council similar to the UK Ofwat for controlling water tariffs and investments (Sumer and Muluk, 2011).

5.4 Phase 2: Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA I) 2007-2013

5.4.1 Introduction

The European Commission then supported adoption and implementation of the *acquis* through the Instrument for Pre-Accession Instrument, introduced in 2007 (Duyulmus, 2014: 2). Such funding for the environment includes transition assistance and institution building, cross border cooperation, regional development, human resources development and rural development (Torcu, 2013). After the completion of MATRA and EHCIP, WFD transfer was then supported through an initial IPA programme (IPA I).

Funding supplied under the IPA I programme for the environment was €90M between 2007 and 2013. Although primarily supportive of the WFD adoption, funds were also made available for climate change mitigation, nature protection, air quality improvements and waste management (Torcu, 2013). Twinning projects were then developed in which EU member states agreed to provide assistance to Turkey to improve its administrative capacity for adopting the *acquis*. Several national laws plus by-laws on Urban Waste Water Treatment, the Usage of Domestic and Urban Sewage Sludge in Soil, Waters Intended for Human Consumption and the Protection of Waters Against Nitrate Pollution from Agriculture (see Table 5.3; Figure 3), were enacted within the scope of the EU Twinning projects (Kinaci, 2013).

Table 5.3: Legal amendments in line with EU water acquis.

By-Laws	Status/Date-No	Related EU Legislation
By-law on the Protection of Water Basins Used for Drinking and Utility Water	28/10/2017 No 30224 (MoFWA)	WFD (2000/60/EC)
By-law on the Control of Water Use and Reduction of Losses in Agricultural Irrigation Activities	16/02/2017 No 29981	WFD (2000/60/EC)
By-law on the Determination of Sensitive Water Bodies and the Areas affecting these Bodies and the Improvement of Water Quality	23/12/2016 No 29927 (MoEU and MoFWA)	WFD (2000/60/EC), UWWTD (91/271/EEC), ND (91/676/EEC)
By-law on the Preparation, Implementation and Monitoring of Flood Management Plans	12/05/2016 No 29710 MoFWA (GDWM)	Flood Risks Assessment and Management Directive (2007/60/EC)
By-law on Environmental Permits and Licenses	10/09/2014 No 29115 (MoEU and MoFWA)	UWWTD (91/271/EEC)
By-law on the Control of Water Losses in the Drinking Water Supply and Distribution Systems	08/05/2014 No 28994 (MoH)	WFD (2000/60/EC)
By-law on the Monitoring of Surface Waters and Groundwaters	11/02/2014 No 28910 (MoFWA-DSI, MoEU)	WFD (2000/60/EC), Environmental Quality Standards Directive (2008/105/EC)
By law on the Protection and Improvement of Salmonid Waters and Cyprinid Waters	12/01/2014 No 28880 (MoFAL and MoFWA)	Water for Freshwater Fish Directive (78/659/EEC)
By-law on the Prevention of Major Industrial Accidents and Reducing Their Effects	30/12/2013 No 28867	WFD (2000/60/EC) and the control of major-accident hazards involving dangerous substances (96/82/EC)
By-law on Surface Water Quality	30.11.2012- No 28483 Revised. 15/04/2015 No 29327; 10/09/2016, No 29797) (MoFWA and MoEU)	WFD (2000/60/EC), UWWTD (91/271/EEC), Environmental Quality Standards Directive (2008/105/EC)
By-law on the Protection of Water Basins and Preparation of Basin Management Plans	17/10 2012, No 28444 (MoFWA). Revised as the 'By-law on the Preparation, Implementation and Follow-up of Basin Management Plans', 28.10. 2017, 30224)	WFD (2000/60/EC),
By-law on the Quality of Surface Waters Used or Intended to be Used for Drinking Water Supply	29/06/2012 No 28338 20/11/2005 No 25999 (abolished) (MoFWA)	WFD (2000/60/EC) and (75/440/EEC) and (79/869/EEC)
By-law on the Protection of Groundwaters against Pollution and Deterioration	07.04.2012- No 28257 Revised 22/05/2015 No 29363 MoFWA (GDWM, DSI)	WFD (2000/60/EC), Daughter Directive on Groundwater (2006/118/EC)
By-law on the Usage of Domestic and Urban Sewage Sludge in Soil	03/08/2010 No 27661 (MoEU and MoFWA)	UWWTD (91/271/EEC)

By-law on the Control of Soil Pollution and the Point Source Polluted Sites	08/06/2010 No 27605 (MoEF and MoFWA)	UWWTD (91/271/EEC),
By-law on the Quality of Bathing Water	09/01/2006 No 26048 (MoFWA-GDWM, MoH, MoEU and Municipalities)	Bathing Waters Directive 2006/7/EC, (revised Bathing Water Quality Directive (76/160/EEC)
By-law on Urban Waste Water Treatment	08/01/2006 No 26047 (MoFWA and MoEU)	WFD (2000/60/EC), UWWTD (91/271/EEC)
By-law on the Control of Pollution caused by dangerous substances in and around water bodies	26/11/2005 No 26005 Revised 31/12/2005 No 26040; 30/03/2010 No 27537 (MoEF and MARA)	Directive Concerning Water Pollution by Discharges of Certain Dangerous Substances and Auxiliary Directives (76/464/EEC) and 87/217/EC
By-law on the Protection of Wetlands	17/05/2005 No 25818 Revised 30/01/2010 No 24656; 04/04/2014 No 28962; 01/08/2017 No 30141 (MoFWA and SHW)	WFD (2000/60/EC), the Habitats Directive (92/43/EEC), the Birds Directive (2009/147/EC), Ramsar Convention (17/05/1994-No 21937)
By-law on Waters Intended for Human Consumption	17/02/2005 No 25730 Revised 07/03/2013 No 28580 (MoH)	WFD (2000/60/EC), and Directive on the Quality of Water Intended for Human Consumption (98/83/EC)
By-law on Waste Collection from Ships and Wastes Control	26/12/2004 No 25682 Revised.18/03/2010 No 27525 (MoEU)	Port reception facilities for ship-generated waste and cargo residues directive (2000/59/EC) and MARPOL
By-law on Mineral Waters	01/12/2004 No 25657 Revised. 07/03/2013 No 28580 (MoH)	(2009/54/EC) (2003/40/EC)
By-law on the Protection of Waters against Nitrate Pollution from Agriculture	18/02/2004 No 25377 (abolished) 23/07/2016 No 29779 (MoFAL and MoFWA)	WFD (2000/60/EC), ND (91/676/EC)
By-law on Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA)	16.12.2003, No 25318 Revised 16.12.2004 No 25672; 2008; 2013 No 28784) (MoEF)	Environmental Impact Assessment (85/337/EEC)
By-law on Water Pollution Control	1988 No 19919 Revised, 31/12/2004 No 25687; 2008 No 26786; 25/03/2012 No 28244 (MoEF and DSI)	WFD (2000/60/EC), UWWTD (91/271/EEC)

5.4.2 Twinning projects

Several bi- or tri- lateral Twinning projects then assisted the adoption of non-WFD water directives. Firstly, projects were introduced to provide technical assistance under the UWWTD implementation. For example, the ‘Nevşehir Wastewater Treatment Plant Project (WWTPP) (2007-2010)’ aimed at

environmental protection and reducing pollution from water emissions in line with EU standards (Ministry of EU, 2017) (see Appendix 6). It also targeted water quality improvements in the local Kizilirmak River by reducing pollution from the Municipality of Nevşehir (European Commission, 2006a). To do this, a wastewater treatment plant was established, with Nevşehir municipality staff trained and institutional capacity increased via technical assistance for Waste Water Treatment Plant (WWTP) construction. This was achieved through the ISPA assistance to Central and Eastern Europe (European Commission, 2006a). Another related project is the 'Tokat Wastewater Treatment Plant Project (2007-2010)'. The main beneficiary actor was the Municipality of Tokat (Ministry of EU, 2017). It aimed to provide technical assistance for the construction of WWTP in Tokat province to improve the water quality of the Yesilirmak River by decreasing the pollution stemming from the Tokat Municipality. The institutional capacity of the municipality was increased via training events and also EU technical assistance for the WWTP (European Commission, 2006a).

In addition to these measures, other projects adopted related to flood protection. One of them was the Project on 'Capacity Improvement for Flood Forecasting and Flood Control in the TR-BG CBC Region (2007-2011)'. The target of this project was a decrease in accidents, deaths, injuries and economic losses through improving flood protection measures at the Turkish-Bulgarian border, particularly within the Edirne region. This project was implemented by the DSI. Flood forecasting and an early warning system was established, plus regulation of the river bed in the Maritza River and opening of a connection channel between the Maritza and Tundja rivers. This project did not aim the transposition of the Floods Directive or implementation, but to increase the capacity building for flood forecasting for Actions taken in Turkey in line with EU Water Policy the Maritza River. So, there was coordination between the stakeholders to minimise the damage caused by floods (DG NEAR, 2010: 11).

Secondly, projects were undertaken in support of the EU Floods Directive 2008 adoption. For example, the project, 'Mitigating Flood Risk in Flooded Areas in the GAP Region (GAPSEL)', was operational between 2007 and 2010. This

project was implemented by the GAP Regional Development Administration (Ministry of EU, 2017). The aims of the project were to improve the capacities of local governments and NGOs to establish long-term solutions to reduce negative impacts of flood events in the South Eastern Anatolian Region (DG NEAR, 2010:11). The DSI observed that local governments did not have adequate technical capacity, so their capacities needed to be increased to minimise the flood risks (DG NEAR, 2010:11). Also, DSI regional directorates participated and contributed to the project that aimed to improve the capacities of local governments and NGOs to reduce negative impacts of flood events in 6 provinces in the South Eastern Anatolian Region: Batman, Mardin, Siirt, Sanliurfa, Sirnak and Diyarbakir (Sumer, 2016-2011).

Thirdly, technical assistance was provided to support alignment of national measures with the Bathing Water Directive (2010-2014). The beneficiary institution was the MoH, with several other partners involved: France as lead partner and Italy as junior partner (Ministry of EU, 2016; General Directorate of Water Management, 2014a: 9). The aim of the project was to decrease public health risks, establish bathing water profiles, develop the quality monitoring system for bathing waters in the MoH, develop coordination amongst national and local actors and enable data sharing amongst them regarding bathing waters in order to transpose the Directive into Turkish legislation (Dikmen and Irmak, 2016; European Commission, 2010). Turkey transposed the EU Bathing Water Directive (2006/7/EC) into national legislation through the regulation on Bathing Water Quality in 2006. It includes a ten-year period to fulfil the Directive requirements, including monitoring activities and inspection of bathing waters and prevention of pollution. This project encompassed identification of the roles of the MoH, preparation for the alignment to the directive plus organising in-service training of technical staff at the MoH and 33 provincial Public Health Directorates. Other activities included evaluation of bathing waters, organising workshops to discuss the results, undertaking study visits to member states to observe laboratories, developing monitoring systems and classifications, quality assessment of bathing waters, local visits to pilot laboratories to observe practice, preparing the national and local reports, presenting results to the EU

and generating bathing water quality data. Guidance documents also were published by Italian and French experts for this process (Dikmen and Irmak, 2016).

Fourthly, the 'Emergency Case Management and Risk Analysis in Drinking Water for the Protection of Public Health (2012-2013)' project supported implementation of the Drinking Water Directive (98/83/EC). The MoH cooperated with Italian partners to improve the risk assessment capacity of its Public Health Institution through developing methodologies for identifying contamination in drinking water, improving early warning systems and emergency case management capacity. Under this project, several workshops were organised by the national Public Health Institution and Public Health Directorates. Four trainings were provided to 200 technical personnel from 81 Public Health Directorates and presentations made by Italian experts. Therefore, the technical and administrative capacities of the MoH at the central level and Directorates at the provincial level were increased (Dikmen and Irmak, 2016: 275-276).

Finally, another Twinning project, 'Strengthening the Capacity of Sustainable Groundwater Management in Turkey (2006-2008)', a Turkish-Dutch venture, assisted Turkey with transposition and implementation of the EU Groundwater Directive (80/68/EEC) and WFD. There were 3 working groups that were organised: *A Juridical Working Group*, for supporting the transposition of EU directives; *an Institutional Working Group*, for establishing the institutional structure of groundwater management; and lastly *a Technical Working Group*, working on the pilot groundwater management plan. The first two groups included staff from national level, including the State Planning Organisation and related ministries; the third one included personnel from both national and regional level. The projects encompassed gap analysis between Turkish legislation and EU directives, and making recommendations to support new requirements regarding EU directives (Vliegthart et al., 2007: 64). The Kucuk Menderes basin was a pilot basin for which a Groundwater Management Plan (GMP) was prepared to carry out and test the new directives (Vliegthart et al., 2007: 64). This helped to improve knowledge and capacity at a technical and

institutional level. Transposition of EU groundwater legislation was completed in 2008. Recommendations, made for future scenarios to meet water, demand were the construction of several dams and options for restructuring of the responsibilities amongst the actors to reach 'good' water quality status (Sumer, 2016: 209).

The Twinning projects also aimed at supporting WFD implementation. On this point, several national by-laws (regulations) were adopted to implement EU water quality directives (see Table 5.3). The 'Capacity Building Support to Turkey for the Water Sector' project (TR06-IB-EN-01) was initiated in 2007 to improve national institutional capacity for water management at the river basin level regarding the WFD, the UWWTD and the Dangerous Substances Directive, plus daughter directives. The project, coordinated by the DSI in the MoEF, partnered with Netherlands and UK actors. Legal and administrative structures of the directives were then revised for transposition and implementation of the directives. A pilot project then trialled these new legal-administrative arrangements in the Büyük Menderes basin (European Commission, 2006a). This project helped the Turkish monitoring system to meet the EU requirements and a data gap was recognised for an efficient river basin management, as well as the importance of cooperation for a successful monitoring system (European Commission, 2011).

A second national level project was undertaken between 2007 and 2010: 'Technical Assistance for Capacity Strengthening and Support of Implementation of Nitrate Directive'. This project, funded by the EU and implemented by Vakakis International and a Greek consultancy, aimed to strengthen the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs' institutional capacity to implement the Nitrates Directive by decreasing pollution from agricultural activities. Other partners included Austria as Lead with the Netherlands and UK as Junior Partners (The Ministry of EU, 2016). In order to implement the 2004 by-law on the Waters Nitrate Pollution Caused by Agricultural Resources, Turkish officials needed to identify nitrate vulnerable zones and 'at risk' water bodies, plus develop action plans and establish monitoring and reporting systems (EC, N/D:8-9). Implementing the by-law had proved difficult due to

excess nitrates resulting from intensive farming practices and the lack of secondary legislation or guidelines. This project provided hands-on training to 150 MARA staff (central, local and laboratories) on sampling, analysing and evaluating procedures, in addition to developing legislation and guidance documents during the 24 months of the project. Agricultural action plans, pollution reports for 81 provinces and 20 mobile laboratories were then introduced to sample and test pollution in provinces (EC, N/D:8-9).

Another Twinning project regarding flood protection was the 'Capacity Building to implement the Flood Directive (2010-2014)'. The beneficiary institution was the DSI under the MoFWA. Partnered in this project were France (Lead) and Romania (Junior) (Ministry of EU, 2016; Directorate of Strategy Development, 2012). The purpose of the project was to decrease the negative impacts of floods on human health, environment and cultural heritage by creating a framework for flood management. This involved increasing the awareness of the other invested actors, including local governments, public, tourism sector and farmers. In addition, it aimed at improving the institutional and technical capacity of the DSI to practice and transpose the EU Flood Risks Assessment and Management Directive (2007/60/EC) into national legislation. In order to improve institutional capacity, existing legislation and the technical and administrative capacities of national institutions were reviewed and a legal gap analysis report was prepared. Also, training activities were organised with at least 100 technical staff at national and local levels; study visits to member states as well as workshops and seminars were held. Preliminary flood hazard maps, flood risk assessment, flood risk maps in the pilot basin (Bati Karadeniz River Basin) and draft flood risk management plans were prepared. Meetings were held to discuss the active involvement of stakeholders. Also, a National implementation plan for the Floods Directive was prepared.

Lastly, after the completion of these projects a new initiative the 'Capacity Building on Water Quality Monitoring' was implemented between 2011 and 2013. This project involved a partnership between the MoFWA, the Directorate General for Water Management, the DSI, the Netherlands as Lead Partner and Spain and France as Junior Partners (Ministry of EU, 2016). Other Ministries

and institutions involved were the MoEU, the MoFAL and the MoH (Directorate of Strategy Development 2012). Under the WFD, Turkey is required to complete river basin management planning. To do this, data on the chemical, biological and hydro-morphological status of surface and ground water bodies are necessary (Article 8, WFD). Monitoring of water bodies needs to be repeated regularly in every 6-year planning cycle and this encompasses classifying water bodies into five ecological quality classes (high, good, moderate, poor, bad) and two chemical quality classes (good and less than good) (General Directorate of Water Management, 2014a). Project aims were therefore based upon providing detailed analysis of legal and institutional gaps between Turkish and WFD monitoring provisions and the capacity of administrative structures to undertake monitoring. Project cooperation and coordination were ascertained with stakeholders through regular meetings (General Directorate of Water Management, 2014a; Ministry of Forestry and Water Affairs, 2018). Recommendations were provided for capacity building and trainings, implementation of surface water body monitoring and preparation of monitoring plans for pilot basins including the Meric-Ergene, Susurluk, Sakarya, Konya and Büyük Menderes river basins. A handbook and practical 'how to' guide for water quality monitoring were developed, while training sessions were held for Turkish officials on sampling, monitoring and classifying water bodies. Study visits were also made to France and Spain (General Directorate of Water Management, 2014a; Ministry of Forestry and Water Affairs, 2018). A pilot project was undertaken to further develop WFD implementation. A surface water monitoring programme was created in the Büyük Menderes river basin where surface water was evaluated for its chemical, physicochemical, biological and hydro-morphological characteristics. To support long-term capacity building, over 20 MoFWA and DSI personnel were trained in different WFD monitoring procedures and techniques, with both theoretical and field based training undertaken (General Directorate of Water Management, 2014a: 3).

5.5 Phase 3: Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA II) 2014-present

5.5.1 Introduction

Pre-Accession assistance has continued in the period since 2014. A new phase (IPA II) has meant different priorities but primarily still aims at supporting WFD implementation through national level initiatives. A key focus is on reducing pollution thereby improving water quality as well as the institutional capacity-building started within IPA I. Total EU grant funding in IPA II is €682M to date: a significant increase on IPA I. The focus for IPA II regarding the environment is investments in infrastructure, primarily waste and wastewater sectors (Torcu, 2013). Interviewee 26 (2017) emphasised that they have a number of projects prepared by the MoFWA and the MoEU related to improving drinking waters and capacity building including technical support to adjust acquis. For these projects the EU's contribution is 85%, the rest (15%) is provided by the ministry (9%) and the municipalities (6%). Municipalities can receive loans from the General Directorate of Bank of Provinces to help implementation (Iller Bank).

However, while the IPA 2 period covers 2014-2020, the implementation actually started in 2018 (Interviewee 26, 2017). Before this start point, there are programming, budgeting and preparation of the projects for tendering. Before tendering, these projects need to be confirmed by the EU Delegation. Afterwards, the projects need to be announced for the proposals from the companies and these proposals require very detailed evaluation. And finally, agreement between the company and the ministry is signed, so it is a quite long process. In the IPA 1 period, there were not enough capacity building projects, however in the IPA 2, there have been more capacity building projects and the MoEU manages these projects including programming, tendering etc. Interviewee 25 (2017) stated that "we have 2 meetings in every 6 months with the experts from the EU commission to observe how IPA funds have been used and at which stage we are."

Therefore, since 2014, Turkey has undertaken 23 wastewater projects (see Appendix 6; Appendix 8), including those at Erzincan, Adiyaman, Mardin, Ordu,

Ankara and Konya (Department of European Union Investments, 2017a; Department of European Union Investments, 2017b). Both the MoEU and the Department of European Union have made investments in drinking water and wastewater projects under this programme.

5.5.2 Recent and ongoing IPA II projects

According to Articles 11 and 13 of the WFD, RBAPs and RBMPs must be prepared for each river basin district, in conjunction with stakeholders. Turkey completed its river basin action plans and started another project in 2014; the 'Conversion of River Basin Action Plans into River Basin Management Plans' in collaboration with the Spanish Ministry of Forestry and Water Affairs (Ministry of EU, 2017). The aim was to prepare RBMPs for the Susurluk, Konya, Büyük Menderes and Meric-Ergene basins (Ribamap, N/D). A gap analysis was undertaken between the Action Plans and the Master Plans of the DSI. Basin working groups and common working groups were then established with Bulgaria and Greece for the Meric-Ergene Basin, which is transboundary. Other activities included characterising river basins, identifying significant water issues, study visits to EU member states, transboundary cooperation in the Meric-Ergene river basin, analysing pressures on water bodies, monitoring the status of water bodies, developing programmes of measures and finally converting the RBAPs into RBMPs. The latter approach involved stakeholder consultation and public involvement in drafting RBMPs and capacity building. Turkey also developed water information systems, encompassing GIS mapping and introduced data management systems (Ribamap, 2017a).

Under the project 15 training workshops/seminars were organised: the workshop on surface water impress, groundwater impress (18/04/2016-22/04/2016), economic characterisation (02/05/2016-05/05/2016, Ankara), Modelling Working Session (20/09/2016-22/09/2016, Ankara), Water Bodies Status Classification Working Session (26/09/2016-30/09/2016, Ankara) environmental objectives programme of measures and cost-effectiveness (11/04/2016-15/04/2016, Ankara) and cost-benefit analysis of the PoM (31/10/2016-4/11/2016, Antalya). The aims of the workshops were to support

the capacity building and learning by doing of domestic actors (Ribamap, 2016a). Also, 4 study visits were organised to the EU member states (Ribamap, 2017a). Finally, RBMPs require preparing for 25 basins in the period to 2023 (see Table 5.2).

The final component of the project involves updating the national implementation plan for the WFD, while reviewing a by-law on Surface Water Quality Management in view of the EU Directive on Environmental Quality Standards. The final component updates the national implementation plan for the WFD; Legal Gap Analysis and training programmes, which cover updating of the national implementation plan for the WFD; reviewing of the by-law on Surface Water Quality Management in view of the Directive on Environmental Quality Standards; organising international conference on river basin management in Turkey; and training programmes for staff for the preparation of RBMPs for other 21 river basins in Turkey (Ribamap, 2017a).

The Turkish government also developed a new national water law, to better implement EU directives (Demirbilek and Benson, 2018). A new legal framework was originally produced in 2012 by the MoFWA but has still yet to be adopted by parliament. When it finally becomes law, it will help integrate national water management with the WFD, along with new by-laws for the protection of drinking water basins, water tariffs, wastewater recycling and water loss and leakage (see Table 5.4) that will supplement several existing WFD-related regulations (Kinaci, 2017). The MoFWA also prepared the by-law on Protection of Water Basins and Preparation of Management Plans and established committees at national and local level (see Figure 5.3), which include the Water Management Coordination Committee, Basin Management Central Committee, Basin Management Committees and Provincial Water Management Coordination Committees (Ribamap, 2017a).

Table 5.4: Draft water laws and regulations.

Drafts Laws/by-laws	Status/Date-No	Related EU Legislation
Draft Water Law	Under consideration by Prime Ministry	WFD (2000/60/EC)
Draft by-law on the Protection of Drinking Water Basins	Sent to Prime Ministry to be published	WFD (2000/60/EC)
Draft by-law on Water Tariffs	Preparation ongoing	WFD (2000/60/EC)
Draft by-law on the Re-use of Treated Wastewater	Preparation ongoing	WFD (2000/60/EC)
Draft by-law on Wastewater Recycling	Preparation ongoing	
Draft by-law on Water Loss and Leakage	Preparation ongoing	WFD (2000/60/EC)
Draft by-law on the Quality of Irrigation Water and Re-use of Water	Preparation ongoing	
Draft by-law on Fresh Water Quality for Protection of Fish Life and Sustainability	Preparation ongoing (MoFAL)	




Figure 5.3: Mechanism established with a view to ensuring coordination in water management (Ribamap, 2017a).

One of the projects was the 'Capacity Building on Marine Strategy Framework Directive in Turkey (2016-2018)' (Ministry of EU, 2017). The main beneficiary actor was the MoEU, others were MoFWA and MoFAL. The aim of this project was to achieve good environmental status for waters by considering related EU directives, particularly the MSFD (2008/56 EC) (Ministry of Environment and Urbanisation, 2017c). Other aims included understanding legal, institutional and technical requirements of the MSFD; administrative and technical capacity building to transpose and implement the MSFD; providing coordination amongst the related institutions and developing methodology to implement the MSFD (Ministry of Environment and Urbanisation, 2017b). 4 workshops were organised regarding the MSFD in 2017; along with 2 study visits to Portugal, Spain, Italy and Slovenia and 2 training meetings between 2016 and 2017 (Ministry of Environment and Urbanisation, 2017a). Besides these events, a 'Marine and Coastal Waters Quality Determination and Classification Project' (DEKOS) was completed and 73 sensitive marine areas which are significant for marine species and ecosystems were delineated (Ribamap, 2017a).

There are also other (ongoing) technical assistance projects, including 'Capacity Building Support to Turkey on Groundwater Management' managed by the MoFWA and the 'Technical Assistance on Economic Analyses within River Basin Management Plans and Water Efficiency Aspects in 3 Pilot River Basins in Turkey (2017-2019)' (Ministry of Forestry and Water Affairs, 2018; Ministry of EU, 2017). Also another project just completed is the 'Technical Assistance for Water Ambassadors Education and Awareness Raising' project. The responsible for oversight of this project was the DSI which is based in the MoFWA. Other involved actors were the Ministry of National Education and the General Directorate of Radio and Television Corporation. Western Mediterranean Basin, Konya (Closed) Basin and Eastern Black Sea Basin were the pilot basins. The aim of the project was to raise public awareness regarding sustainability of rational water use and environmental protection by using media and education channels. Target groups were primary and secondary school students, university students, teachers and mothers. The project also aimed to

train the personnel of institutions to train 40.000 individuals (Water Ambassadors, 2018).

Following on from the EU Twinning projects, several nationally funded projects have been planned by the MoEU and the MoFWA (see Appendix 10). During the IPA I-II periods, the ministerial personnel at national and local level were trained to strengthen their institutional and technical capacities for water quality monitoring and preparation of river basin action and management plans. These projects were important steps in learning how to implement the water-related EU directives. The GDWM, based in MoFWA, completed several EU and nationally funded projects to harmonise with the *acquis* (see Table 5.1). As a follow up, the GDWM has recently started several nationally-funded projects with regard to preparing flood risk management plans, in addition to improving water quality and monitoring (see Table 5.2).

National level implementation of the EU water *acquis*, particularly the WFD, is intensifying despite declining enthusiasm for accession in Turkey: a trend that has continued since 2005. As identified in Chapters 1 and 2, this raises questions over how Europeanisation may be explained, since the conditionality imposed by the Copenhagen Criteria is now much less significant as domestic support for EU membership has withered. In the next section, this chapter analyses these patterns of Europeanisation using the theoretical framework developed in Chapter 3.

5.6 A sociological institutionalism analysis of Europeanisation in Turkish water policy

As mentioned in Chapter 1, the Common Implementation Strategy (CIS) for the WFD aims at harmonious implementation of the WFD (Sumer, 2016). While Turkey did not widely participate in the CIS process, nonetheless its key outputs in terms of technical specifications and guidance documents were used in WFD transfer. The CIS involved several activities including information sharing; development of guidance on technical issues; information and data management; and application, testing and validation (European Commission, 2001b). Under the CIS, three working levels were established including the

Water Directors, the Strategic Co-ordination Group and the Working Groups (European Commission, 2003a). The Water Directors have responsibility for driving the process and they are supposed to meet twice a year (European Commission, 2001b). A Strategic Coordination Group, including participation of Member States, was established for providing coordination of different working groups and activities under the CIS as well as discussing the results of the WGs. Also, working groups were created for the different activities and projects. Leading countries on working groups are mainly the Member States or Commissions.

The Working Groups are responsible for preparing technical documents and coordination to avoid duplication of the work, as different working groups' activities may be related to each other (European Commission, 2003a). For example, an economic working group has linked with the working group on heavily modified water bodies (European Commission, 2001b). In addition WGs have organised several conferences and workshops for the exchange of information and experience, data management and developed guidance on technical issues (European Commission, 2003a). Several guidance documents were prepared by the Working Groups with regards to monitoring; economic analysis; identification of heavily modified and artificial water bodies; analysis of pressures and impacts; assessment, classification of groundwater; identification of river basin districts; public participation and implementation of Geographical Information Systems (European Commission, 2019a). Guidance documents were developed based on existing practices and available knowledge in the Member States at that time (European Commission, 2003a). Also, they were developed based on existing practice in the Member States and tested in pilot river basins, including 14 national and sub-river basins (European Commission, 2001b).

As outlined in Chapter 1, Turkey took a different approach to other accession states for transferring the WFD, which did not encompass the CIS but focused on project-led information exchange of its WFD practice at national and basin levels. Under the Twinning and IPA projects, working groups, including Turkish national and local actors and EU experts, were created. The EU-led projects

also aimed to receive technical and financial help from the EU in order to implement the WFD and related directives and improve dialogues and coordination between EU and Turkish experts, which is a similar aim to the CIS; information exchange, coordination between MS and the Commission and technical help from EU level to national and basin levels (European Commission, 2012b). Interactions between Turkish and European experts actively started through the Twinning process and then continued through the IPA projects. For example, Turkey took into consideration the Common Implementation Strategy for the WFD, Guidance Document No: 2 Identification of Water Bodies in order to identify water bodies in the basins and the methodology was considered as suitable for Turkey (Gokdereli, 2015). However, Turkish experts did not actively participate in activities under the CIS: they only attended the CIS meetings⁶ as observers. One Turkish official, based in the MoFWA, attended, as a participant, the meeting of the strategic coordination group for the WFD CIS, 17/05/2018, Brussels (European Commission, 2018b-a). Turkish experts were not actively involved in the Working Groups. Therefore, this chapter does not analyse social learning and socialisation in the CIS process, but returns to provide discussion of this in Chapter 8.

5.6.1 Introduction

As identified in Chapter 3, we could employ new institutionalism accounts to explain continued Europeanisation under conditions of declining conditionality. On the one hand, if we focus on individual learning, rationalist institutional approaches would suggest that this occurs in response to strategic interaction with EU rules. In this sense, the exogenous accession obligation to adopt EU water policy would still be a powerful driver of institutional change. On the other hand, social constructivists argue that Europeanisation occurs through the

⁶ For example, Turkish experts attended the meetings on Working Group E on Chemical Aspects, 14-15/03/2012, CCAB, Brussels; Working Group E on Chemical Aspects, 11/10/2012, CCAB, Brussels; Working Group A on Ecological Status (ECOSTAT), 20/03/2012, JRC, Ispra (IT); Working Group C on Groundwater, 21/03/2012, CCAB, Brussels; Workshop on Assessing the impacts of hydromorphological alterations, 12-13/06/2012, Bavarian Representation, Brussels; Groundwater Conference, 09/10/2013, Brussels; Working Group on Groundwater, 10-11/10/2013, CCAB, Brussels (Water Quality Department, 2014).

processes of socialisation and social learning (see Flockhart, 2004; Börzel and Risse, 2000). Institutional actors undergo identity change through acquiring EU norms, internalising them and thereby generating shared (intersubjective) understandings on Europeanised behaviour (Checkel, 1999). Social learning, in these arguments, is predicated on the 'logic of appropriateness' (March and Olsen 2011: 1), involving a focus on how human action can be interpreted through less rational rule-based perspectives. Rather than institutional actors rationally following EU rules per se, as they are '[e]mbedded in a social collectivity, they do what they see as appropriate for themselves' according to their situation when tasked with such obligations (ibid.). Institutional actors learn new (i.e. European) interests via social interaction with EU norms, which includes communication, negotiation, leadership, facilitating and framing, often adapting them to their specific context (European Commission, 2003). Social learning can therefore be gauged where domestic institutional actors acquire such norms and are then as a consequence socialised into a shared understanding of appropriateness around behaviour (Schusler et al., 2003).

However, Chapter 4 identified methodological challenges in assessing the degree of socialisation and social learning occurring under Europeanisation and hence the wider extent of the latter. As Radaelli and Dunlop (2013: 923) emphasise 'the European Union may well be a learning organisation, yet there is still confusion about the nature of learning, its causal structure and the normative implications' of such processes. It is consequently a challenge for social science to measure how learning occurs in this context, let alone non-EU states. Despite the widespread application of social learning in the EU literatures, it still presents a 'minefield' in terms of methodologies, with such processes arguably hard to measure, define, evaluate and apply empirically (Flockhart, 2004: 366).

Learning has a significant role in shaping whether actors reach an agreement on their understanding of policy problems, taking common solutions and how this knowledge is translated into policy (Heikkila and Gerlak, 2013). For this reason, Chapter 3 discussed a range of theoretical indicators for measuring social learning, although three main mechanisms were identified from the

Europeanisation and environmental management literatures to guide the analysis of Turkish water policy (Berger, 1999; Checkel, 2001; Reed et al., 2010; Benson et al., 2015). Firstly, a *superficial* change in learning where limited acquisition of norms occurs through interaction, with actors passively taking information from the EU. If there is a superficial cognitive understanding of EU norms via social interaction, which refers to communication enabling alteration to actors' motivations and attitudes, superficial social learning can be considered to have occurred. In the case of the thesis study, such learning would therefore be evident where EU water policy norms are communicated to actors, leading to change in their individual motivations and attitudes around Turkish water policy through socialisation. Such learning could be considered a superficial form of Europeanisation since it only assumes such changes occur in individual behaviour around EU water policy.

Secondly, learning is *partial*. Here, a deeper form of social learning is anticipated as EU water policy norms are assimilated by individual actors but more actively transferred horizontally toward others within a wider institutional community through group interaction, leading to more extensive change in normative practice at the institutional level. Mannin (2013: 12) emphasised that 'a Europeanisation cause/effect may also be between states - a horizontal process through bilateral policy learning. Horizontal learning experiences can emerge as Europeanisation if encouraged or adopted by the EU. A Europeanisation 'effect' and its outcome is subject to mediating factors at member state level that will influence the extent of transformation.'

Finally, a *transformative* level of learning may occur. Here, the notion of learning is much more extensive, operating at an intersubjective socio-cultural level. Actors proactively learn behavioural signals from EU water norms, develop shared beliefs and diffuse them to larger groups in the community, leading to widespread transformative system-wide Europeanisation of institutional behaviour, i.e. socialisation.

Besides, as explained in Chapter 3, social learning may cause changes in organisational structures (Tippett et al., 2005) and actors' behaviours.

Accordingly, social learning process may lead norm internalisation, as an outcome point of socialisation (Schimmelfennig, 2005a). Therefore, transformative learning may lead deep socialisation while partial and superficial levels of social learning may result partial and low norm internalisation respectively (see Table 3.3).

As described in Chapter 4, a specific methodology was developed to collect data on the degree of social learning occurring. In order to access participants to understand the processes and motivations of actors, and why they have a willingness to learn and adjust to new norms as well as how these norms are learned, a process tracing method (see Heikkila and Gerlak, 2013: 502; Checkel, 2001) and also interviews were used. Interviewees were asked questions regarding their learning activities during the WFD implementation process, with interviews conducted at European, national and local levels. This section therefore aims to analyse learning patterns of national level Turkish officials to determine what type of social learning has occurred as a measure of Europeanisation. This analysis is divided into three phases, using the time frames identified above, to examine both the depth (level) of learning occurring (*superficial, partial and transformative*) and its temporal-spatial extent. Of particular interest for the study hypothesis (Chapter 1) is whether social learning around EU water norms is increasing over time, as predicted, while the explanatory value of rational theory, with its emphasis on rule-based conditionality, is indeed declining. Supporting this hypothesis then allows an assessment on the claims of scholars on the wider value of social learning as an explanation for Europeanisation.

5.6.2 An analysis of social learning in three phases

On the one hand, in the rationalist approach learning is more individual through strategic interaction that refers to simple learning (Chapter 3). On the other hand, in sociological approaches learning is more collective: one of the diffusion pathways, identified by constructivists of European norms to national settings or agents is social learning. This means agents or elite decision makers are prone to adopt new norms and interests and internalise them in addition to generating

shared understanding which can have an impact on the actors behaviours (Checkel, 1999). Social learning is based on the logic of appropriateness, providing a perspective on human action that can be interpreted. In this approach, actors learn new interests via interaction.

As described above, Europeanisation of Turkish water policy via the WFD has occurred gradually over time since the early 2000s. Degrees of social learning can be assessed over this period to establish whether it is indeed leading to deeper norm acquisition over time, as our hypothesis (Chapter 3) would predict. Interviewees were consequently asked questions regarding their learning activities during the EU process, using the theoretical framework (Chapter 3) to guide the analysis.

5.6.2.1 Social learning 1999-2006

In this early phase, the documentary analysis and elite interviews present a picture of initially limited knowledge of WFD norms amongst Turkish national officials (i.e. no learning was occurring), followed by *superficial* form of learning as the process of policy norm transfer occurred, i.e. limited acquisition of EU norms through interactions. Up until 1999, Turkey had developed its own national water legislation, with little evident learning from abroad apart from some international level influences on basin management schemes (Hermans, 2011). Knowledge of the WFD appeared low. Adoption of the broader EU *acquis*, including water policy, then initiated a gradual learning process involving superficial cognitive change as national actors passively acquired norms. This process can be traced back to the 'National Programme for Adoption of the *Acquis*' in 2001, followed by transfer of the WFD through cooperation between the EU Commission and Turkish government ministries. As described above, the main 'learning' mechanisms chosen were the MATRA and ENVEST projects but throughout this period norm *acquisition* remained low.

In this respect, interview data suggests that some *superficial* level of learning was apparent amongst policy officials involved in these projects, with initial communication of EU norms leading to limited change in their individual motivations and attitudes around Turkish water policy. For example, Hermans

(2005a) indicates that the initial WFD stakeholder meeting took place on 12/12/2002, which aimed to start awareness building and creating support amongst the actors. It was recognised that the Turkish actors had a good level of technical expertise and knowledge on integrated basin management which acquired from previous implementation of IWRM norms (see Demirbilek and Benson, 2018), which water experts from the Netherlands were not expecting before the actor analysis. Generally, most interviewees indicated their learning process on the WFD started with the MATRA, with one official stating that:

“...through the MATRA, the [EU] experts came and taught us regarding the determination of water bodies and also we practised them in Büyük Menderes basin, so we had first theoretical knowledge and then a practical process. Finally, by MATRA we started learning WFD and also recognised that it would be hard to implement” (Interviewee 9, 2017).

Interviewee 20 (2017) said “there was some technical progress via MATRA, however legislative arrangements were mainly initiated after the environment chapter was opened in 2009.” However, another interviewee stated that the MATRA project finished in 2006 due to inefficient technical capacity, suggesting only superficial learning was occurring (Interviewee 19, 2017). Despite its lack of efficiency, other interviews suggest that MATRA nonetheless laid the cognitive basis for the later Twinning projects in 2008, with some EU individual norm acquisition apparent by officials, which was later instrumental in further learning. In this respect, another ministerial officer (Interviewee 19, 2017) argued that “the MATRA project was the first step to learning the directives, including the Nitrate and Ground waters directives.” They then added that:

“... This project was renamed as the IPA and we continued adopting the directives including the WFD, flood directives and so on with other projects by considering both water quality and quantity. During EU projects, we adopted some directives including the Urban Waste Water, Nitrate, Marine Strategy, along with monitoring, environmental quality standards, preparation of RBAPs and RPMPs as well as surface water quality monitoring regulations.”

Another important contributory mechanism for learning was the TAIEX trainings. These can be categorised under the Technical Assistance Information Exchange Office (TAIEX) events including seminars, workshops, study tours, peer reviews, Regional Training Programme (RTP) and translations (MWH Consortium, 2007). Their purpose was to give technical assistance to the candidates and to facilitate implementation of the WFD (European Commission, 2015e). Some initial TAIEX trainings were organised by the Ministry of Environment and Forestry on Water Quality Management and Assessment (2004, Expertise), Sewage Sludge (2005, Expertise), Urban Waste Water (2005, Expertise) and Natural Mineral Water and Spring (2005) (Ministry for EU Affairs, 2018) (see Appendix 5).

TAIEX trainings are important for information *acquisition* and *translation*, because Turkish experts apply to join the TAIEX programme to have better understanding of the water *acquis*. Accordingly, they demand for workshop or study visit to learn more on specific topic by interacting with EU experts. Interviewee 20 (2017) emphasised that “under TAIEX, we had some activities including workshops and study visits. We had a chance to visit European countries and experts from the EU countries visited Turkey to provide training. During workshops Turkish ministerial officials, academics and EU experts exchanged information and had a chance to discuss recent academic studies. The number of these activities was increased.”

Interviewees suggested that the training allowed some superficial norm acquisition (see Heikkila and Gerlak, 2013) with limited cognitive understanding of EU norms emerging. In this phase, social learning was initiated, however it remained at superficial level. The individuals acquired new information via interaction with EU experts through the IPA projects and TAIEX trainings but at this point they were trying to understand a completely new system, which was significantly different from the existing one, so a limited *translation* can be observed as well. As a result, in this later period, although learning remained at a very superficially individual level it did nonetheless provide the basis for a partial expansion of norm acquisition as a broader EU-influenced water policy ‘community’ developed at national level after 2007.

5.6.2.2 Social learning 2007-2013

There was an evident progression in social learning around WFD norms in the period after 2007, primarily driven by the IPA-I and the Twinning Projects (see Table 5.1). National level learning was supported by the EU experts through several study visits and training workshops organised to increase the awareness and knowledge of national officials in line with the river basin management approach and WFD. Therefore, officials not only learned further theoretical knowledge but also how to implement it at national and basin levels. A cognitive shift was therefore visible as individual policy actors not only learned from these EU initiatives but also started to share WFD norms within a wider horizontal policy 'community' at national level (see Medema et al., 2014). Accordingly, *dissemination* of information, even limited, in multiple network started. Therefore, while still rather superficial, more *partial* levels of learning began to emerge during this period as actors preferences changed through greater community interaction.

Interviews show how this *partial* level of learning evolved, initially through communication and interaction with twinned EU partner country officials in the projects. For example, one official said that she learned the main principles of WFD by participating in the Twinning project (2008-2010) and she also actively worked for the Büyük Menderes basin for three years (Interviewee 19, 2017). She added:

“.... after the GDWM was established, we had several trainings, given by the foreigner experts, and TAIEX trainings. Also, we had in service trainings, including EU policy, transboundary waters and water security by official staff or academics.”

Interviewee 22 (2017) stated “I had a chance to attend the training under an IPA project related to preparation of RBAPs, which was organised by the Ministry of Environment and Forestry (MoEF). In the training, there were officials from the DSI, the MoEF and the Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Livestock. We had training on WFD and other related directives by the experts from the Dutch

consortium and after training we had exams. I also attended some of the TAIEX trainings.”

Actors acquired information on various aspects of the EU water acquis. For example, under the Nevsehir and Tokat WWTP projects, technical staff in the municipality were trained and also institutional capacity was increased on WWTP. Under the project on the EU Bathing Directive (2006/7/EC), in-service trainings, workshops and study visits to member states were organised and staff from the MoH and the Provincial Public Health Directorates were trained. Besides, 150 staff (central and local) from the MARA were trained by external organisations in sampling and analysis procedures, and the Nitrates Directive. Lastly, under the GAPSEL project, there was information diffusion from governmental level (DSI) to local level (NGOs and local governments) regarding increasing capacity to decrease the impacts of flooding in the South Eastern Anatolian Region. Therefore, these IPA projects were helpful for the local and governmental staff to understand and evaluate the directives as well as learn how to implement them. Also, diffusing of information (horizontally) to a wider community of practice (see Medema et al., 2014) was still developing as knowledge started to be shared. Accordingly, *dissemination* of information across organisations and multiple levels was at a preliminary stage.

Regarding the level of learning occurring, Interviewee 20 (2017) said “The IPA projects and other trainings strengthen our capacity. Officials receive more experience regarding technical knowledge and their perspectives also change. If you have good staff, you can have good progress. They go abroad, represent Turkey and explain our technical works. Also, through these projects we better understood that we should consider not only quantity but also quality in this sense, I significantly internalise these projects because of their contribution.” Interviewee 20 (2017) also added that in the scope of IPA projects officials made lots of study visits. For example, they argued that they “had a chance to visit and observe how wastewater treatment plants work and what the critical points are, so it is very useful. There are information sharing and also we can transfer the latest technology into our country.”

Regarding this point, Interviewee 19 (2017) emphasised the establishment of the ministry became helpful for building trust and coordination, and many collaborative projects were then carried out via the IPA projects. Therefore, it is clear that, in the second period, learning by interacting with the EU experts, other national officials and other stakeholders was increased through the EU-funded projects. Turkish experts learned about the WFD and other directives but also how to implement them via practising in the pilot basins.

The projects were also instrumental in developing this community of learning. Another official, Interviewee 23 (2017) stated he attended the ‘Capacity Building Support to Turkey for the Water Sector (2007-2010)’ project, the ‘Technical Assistance for Capacity Strengthening and Support of Implementation of Nitrate Directive (2007-2010)’, and the ‘Capacity Building on Water Quality Monitoring (2011-2013).’ He also added that “under the Twinning projects, we worked with the EU experts and we strengthened our capacity and knowledge as well as there was a mutual information flow” (Interviewee 23, 2017). When asked whether these projects changed his and other participants and stakeholders’ perspectives he replied:

“Definitely! We learned a lot. We learned that we need to implement a basin management approach, consider both water quality and quantity, prepare allocation plans, monitor chemicals in the basins and implement ecosystem-based water quality management.”

Further, in terms of better understanding and interpreting their knowledge on the EU policy, (*acquisition and translation*), Turkish experts applied for TAIEX programmes including workshops, study visits and trainings. Under these programmes (see Appendix 5) individuals had more dialogues and communication within the organisation and with the EU experts. More TAIEX trainings then were staged in 2006, including workshops on the WFD; the UWWTD; discussion of groundwater issues; and ground water modelling (General Directorate of Water Management, 2013). During the workshop on Flood Risk Assessment and Management, 120 participants from the different related Ministries attended and five experts from different countries gave

presentations (Efeoglu, 2015). Another workshop was held in Ankara in 2009 on identification of basins and sub-basins in Turkey. In total, 75 participants attended from the MoEF and the DSI. The aim was to define the basins and sub basins by using categories and GIS (Efeoglu, 2015)⁷.

The workshop on Exchange of Experiences through the Mediterranean Countries in the context of water policy, took place in Ankara and 51 participants from the MoFWA attended. Experts from Spain, Italy and Portugal made presentations. Its aims were to create a common language, coalesce experiences and obtain a better understanding of water policy system in other Mediterranean countries (European Commission, 2018e). A workshop was organised for 02-03/07/2013, to collate understanding of hydromorphological monitoring system and evaluation system in the EU member states. Austria, Netherlands and Spain shared how they implemented such systems and discussed the development of a monitoring system for Turkey (European Commission, 2018f)⁸ (see Appendix 5). There were also study visits to other EU countries to learn about other monitoring systems. This included Monitoring of Marine and Coastal Pollution (Italy); Implementation of Sewage Sludge

⁷ Besides them, Multi country- Workshop on Waste Framework Directive's Implementation into national legislation, 10-11 December 2012, Bratislava-Slovak Republic. 31 participants from the Ministries of Environment and Environmental Agencies in Western Balkans, Moldova, Ukraine and Turkey attended to the workshop to improve their knowledge on the implementation of WFD and transition of WFD in to national legislation (European Commission, 2018g), lastly a Workshop on exchange of experiences through the Mediterranean Countries on water policy on 27-28 September 2012 in Ankara (Ministry for EU Affairs, 2018)., which hosted 47 participants from different departments from different universities including DSI, GDWM, MoEU, MoFAL, NGOs and Universities. The aim was understanding WFD, better understanding of water governance and transferring and sharing experiences between different Mediterranean countries (European Commission, 2018a).

⁸ Other TAIEX trainings; Training of Senior Managers for the EU Negotiations (20-22 September, 2011). The Clingendael/Netherlands Institute of International Relations trained over 3 days a group of senior diplomats from the GDWM about EU accession negotiations (General Directorate of Water Management, 2011); the Training of Trainers G2G Project (March 2010-September 2011). The GDWM completed the project by cooperating with the Holland AVD Agency that funded the project. Thirty-nine representatives from the universities, from the related Ministries and from the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TUBITAK) were trained on WFD with its priority and other water related directive to be enabled to carry out the RBMPs (General Directorate of Water Management, 2011b). Another training is that Training about Water Law and Transboundary Waters (20-24 February 2012). Lastly, took place in the MoFWA, was organised by coordinating with the Holland AVD Agency. The AVD Agency trained 100 participants, who were from the related ministries and the Centre for Middle Eastern Strategic Studies (ORSAM), about water policy, water law and trans-boundary waters during a week-long training session (General Directorate of Water Management, 2012b).

Directive in Turkey (Romania); and Protection and Management of Water Resources (Brussels) (European Commission, 2018a) (see Appendix 5).

As a result of these events, the individuals involved in this process, noted that changes in the organisational structure and establishment of the new departments related to a basin management approach facilitated the learning process. Besides the changes in organisational structure that occurred, Turkish experts had a tendency to apply for more IPA projects and TAIEX programmes, this led to more dialogue and communication from within and outside of their organisation and increased their knowledge. They learned from both internal sources, departmental training and presentations related to EU water directives and external sources. They learned details of the WFD and other related directives, so they strengthened their knowledge base in this phase and they interpreted this information, by which the processes of *acquisition* and *translation* are observed. Therefore, through the development of nascent 'communities' of practice during this period the beginnings of deeper norm acquisition occurred as WFD approaches spread horizontally between actors. However, they still did not have an evident shared/common understanding at this stage, as they were still acquiring, transmitting and diffusing information, so a partial level of SL can be observed in this phase.

5.6.2.3 Social learning 2014-present

More recent development of Turkish water policy shows further extension of social learning on the WFD. Accordingly, Turkish experts applied for more EU projects for the preparation of RBMPs and they also learned monitoring through the projects, which was new for Turkish experts. Regarding this, the diffusion of information to the local level was evident by the establishment of the basin management committees. Although it is problematic to state that a genuinely *transformative* level of learning has now been established, these features are becoming evident, albeit in a rather preliminary way i.e. proactive norm acquisition, transmission, development of shared beliefs, and diffusion of norms across wider communities. As described above, the IPA (II) projects, national legal changes and preparation of RBMPs has continued the process of WFD

norm adoption across larger communities of practice. Yet, significant challenges still evidently exist to *transformative* social learning.

Transformative learning is evident within the project implementation, with proactive acquisition and transmission on WFD norms now consistently occurring through transnational links to EU countries. For example, one official talked about how he attended meetings in Brussels and the Danube River Basin. He emphasised the importance of observing how basin management committees work for learning on Turkish practice (Interviewee 18, 2017).] Turkish experts were encouraged to learn more by interaction with each other and with the EU experts under the EU projects. For example, Interviewee 21 (2017) stated “our managers also support us to attend these activities, so we always keep updating our knowledge.” The new personnel recruited in the GDWM require a doctorate to be considered an expert. They also now predominantly focus on studying EU-water related directives, mainly the WFD showing that institutional awareness is high. Interviewee 20 (2017) suggested that deputy experts require writing their thesis in 3 years on specific WFD-related issues. They also actively work in EU projects at the basins. During the stage of writing their thesis, the personnel have supervisors from at the university and the institution (internal sources). So not only they do produce practical work at basin level but also improve themselves through an understanding of theoretical perspectives, which is a very good way to learn⁹.

⁹ For example, Muge Erkal, (2014) ‘Intercalibration in the Scope of the WFD: Studies Performed by European Union and Recommendations for Turkey’, Ozgur Gurhan, (2014), ‘Investigation of suitable methodology in terms of evaluation of quality of groundwater’, Ebru Doganay, (2014), “Evaluation of analysis methods for monitoring Turkish water resources in terms of physicochemical parameters according to WFD, Feyza Sancak (2014), ‘Determination of properties of groundwater sampling wells and sampling basis’, Caner Gok, (2014), ‘Determination of chemical and physico-chemical monitoring points for European Union candidate turkey’, Altunkaya Cavus, (2014), ‘Integration of subscale and upper scale plans to river basin management plans’ Sukra Uzunalioglu Deniz, (2014), ‘Real time monitoring systems: Meriç-Ergene case study’, Tolga Cetin, (2014), ‘Biological quality elements according to WFD: phytoplankton and phytobenthos’, Ozan Soy Turk, (2014) ‘Groundwater monitoring according to WFD and an assessment for Turkey’, Bihter Guney (2014), ‘Lace of wetlands in RBMPs, investigating of the relationship between WFD, Bird and Habitat Directive’, Nuray Ayten (2014), Principles of sectoral water allocation’, Tugba Canan Oguz, (2015), ‘Widely experiencing water quality problems in drinking water treatment and treatment solutions’ (General Directorate of Water Management, 2014b).

Turkish experts received several trainings, under the TAIEX program, in specific issues related to EU water *acquis*, which was helpful for norm *acquisition* and *translation* (see Appendix 5). For example, under the TAIEX programme, the study visits included how to implement their own system for the allocation of water resources. Turkish experts visited Rome and were given training in sectoral allocation system and administrative structure as well as the monitoring and supervision systems required for the allocation of water resources (European Commission, 2018b-b). Another study visit was to Italy, which was on Determination of the Wastewater Tariffs in EU Countries; 3 officials from the MoEU received training on the criteria used to set the wastewater and solid waste tariffs as well as an explanation of integrated water service tariffs application to users (European Commission, 2018d). Lastly, under the TAIEX training programme in 2014, experts from the Netherlands visited the GDWM and informed the staff about the modelling of water resources, the institutions undertaking this work and projects that are conducted in cooperation with other countries. As a result, the GDWM adopted modelling for water resources management (General Directorate of Water Management, 2014a). The TAIEX trainings helped to improve information flows and learning about how other EU countries practice the WFD and other directives.

Beside the study visits, there were many workshops organised under the TAIEX training programme (see Appendix 5); on the transposition and implementation of the Waste Framework Directive; 24 officials, from the Ministries of Environment attended the trainings to increase the knowledge about the implementation of the Waste Framework Directive (2008/98/EC), prevention of waste production, re-use and recycling (European Commission, 2018h). Also, a regional workshop on strategic planning in the water sector was organised, in which 31 officials from the MoE attended. The intention of the workshop was to examine and understand the requirements of implementing the water related policies including the WFD, the UWWTD, the Drinking Water Directive (DWD), the Floods Directive (FD), and the Nitrates Directive (ND) (European Commission, 2018j). Another workshop, on Chemical Monitoring of Sediment and Biota, was attended by 50 participants from ministries, universities and

NGOs. The experts from Slovenia, Romania and Italy made presentations. The aim of the workshop was to highlight the importance of chemical monitoring of sediment and biota under the WFD, which had yet to put this monitoring into practise in Turkey. However, the information transferred through this event allowed officials to be aware of its importance when it did start to implement such monitoring. It also aided Turkish officials the ability to learn from EU countries in how they implemented this section of the WFD (European Commission, 2018c)¹⁰.

Besides the TAIEX programs, there have been a number of IPA projects (see Table 5.1) organised, which enhanced information *dissemination* to local level. In this period, the EU projects on ‘Conversion of River Basin Action Plans into River Basin Management Plans’ in collaboration with the Spanish consortium Ministry of Forestry and Water Affairs (Ministry of EU, 2017) was completed in 2017 and four RBMPs were prepared for the Susurluk, Konya, Büyük Menderes and Meric-Ergene basins. Other training events and study visits were organised for the officials on various different topics, including surface water impress, groundwater impress and economic characterisation (Ribamap, N/D). During the project, for 3 years, active interaction was observed between the EU and Turkish experts. According to one official, who participated in this process, there was a good information flow from the EU experts because as they had not prepared these plans before and they requested the EU’s experience and

¹⁰ ECRAN- Workshop on WFD Program of Measures in Drina River Basin, 2015, Albania, is financed by TAIEX instrument. 25 officials from the MoE attended to be encouraged for the implementation of WFD to reach good water status in Drina River basin (European Commission, 2018m). TAIEX/ ECRAN Workshop on linkages between the WFD and Strategic Environmental Assessment Directive (SEAD) and Environmental Impact Assessment Directive (EIAD), 22 – 24 September, 2015, Prague, Czech Republic. 21 participants from the MoE attended this workshop to get knowledge about the application of SEA and EIA in Czech Republic. Also, the aims are to determine the differences and similarities between the WFD and SEA/EIA directives (European Commission, 2018k). TAIEX Workshop on Reconciling Hydropower Production and Flood Protection with Water Management and Nature Protection, 2016, Brussels. It was organised in co-operation with Directorate-General Environment. Turkish experts’ countries got knowledge about the importance of integrated water management, nature protection, strategic planning and green infrastructure in the EU members (European Commission, 2018u). Workshop on Program of Measure under the WFD. Tirana, 2016, which is aimed to improve understanding for the preparation of the RBMPs and discuss the draft RBMP and the Programme of Measures for the Drina RB and also related legal and technical issues to comply with the WFD (European Commission, 2018u).

knowledge (Interviewee 18, 2017). Another participant indicated that they had a chance to get training and regular interaction meetings with the foreign experts, who stayed during the project over three years (Interviewee 24, 2017). In the meetings, experts and staff had a chance to evaluate whether significant progression was being made under the project.

Accordingly, there were more regular contact events, via IPA projects, between Turkish and EU experts. Turkish experts were able to interpret the information, received from the EU experts, through the TAIEX trainings, thus evidencing a *translation* of information increasing (see Heikkila and Gerlak, 2013). For example, one official stated that “we learned many things during this process. For example we learn to evaluate things in their way and we learned what we do wrong, we learned to focus on the issue for example, in terms of monitoring” (Interviewee 23, 2017). Beside *acquisition* and *translation* of the norms in this stage, national officials further disseminated this knowledge downwards to the river basin level. For example, in the project process they learned new technical knowledge such as biological monitoring and hydro-morphology. One official said “during the EU projects on the ‘Conversion of RBAPs into RBMPs’, we were taught how to get samples from a basin and how to prepare and analyse them in the laboratories”, accordingly they learned from the EU experts by practicing new technical knowledge (Interviewee 11, 2017). Another claimed that:

”We used to look at water quality within a project in the past, but we have started to consider this at basin level now. The State Hydraulic Works used to focus on drinking water infrastructure and development of water resources, so water quantity was the priority in the past. In terms of water quality, there was Water Pollution Control Regulation (revised recently), but it was not efficient for the protection of water basins with regards to parameters and standards, stated in the regulation. The WFD indicates reaching good water status and considering both water quality and quantity is important for water management, so monitoring and preparation of RBMPs are significant. We, as a department (GDWM) applied for EU-funded projects, including the Capacity Building Support

to Turkey for the Water Sector, Capacity Building Support to Turkey on Groundwater Management, Capacity Strengthening and Support of Implementation of Nitrate Directive, which were helpful for us to learn the directives from EU experts and improve our capacity. Therefore, there is not a 100% change in terms of water quantity as was Turkey's priority before the EU process was initiated. However, the concept of a water body also came to us as new and we initially looked at water quality at the basin level. Also, stakeholder participation at basin level increased" (Interviewee 23, 2017).

In this phase, the interaction between Turkish actors at national and local levels was improved. In this process, *transformative* learning through vertical interaction of ideas and knowledge (see Medema et al., 2014) started to occur from national to river basin levels, primarily through national level WFD stakeholder trainings. In order to provide inter-sectorial coordination for efficient water management, the Ministry of Forestry and Water Affairs prepared the by-law on 'Protection of Water Basins and Preparation of Management Plans' and established committees at both national and local level, including the Water Management Coordination Committee, Basin Management Central Committee, Basin Management Committees and Provincial Water Management Coordination Committees (Ribamap, 2017a) which is explained in detail within the next chapter.

The MoFWA also organised the training of trainers programme for related ministries, NGOs and universities. Accordingly, there was a project that lasted eight months between 2014 and 2015, called 'Implementation of WFD and preparation of RBMPs'. 60 participants from related ministries, NGOs, universities attended and the participants certificated as 'trainer of the WFD and RBMPs'. The aim was to improve the capacity of the 25 basin management committees. Training related to the WFD and water directives, monitoring, water budgets, water bodies, public participation, negotiation skills, economic analysis and RBMPs (General Directorate of Water Management, N/D). According to Interviewee 20 (2017), participants also received information about practice in EU countries. He suggested that such training resulted in a mutually beneficial

flow of information amongst participants as this training network expanded. Such networks also supported further learning from abroad.

Despite learning increasingly occurring within and between institutions, significant challenges remain in embedding EU water norms on a system-wide basis, primarily the technical requirements of the WFD. Technicalities imposed by the implementation process limit the extent to which shared beliefs and understandings of the WFD can develop. Monitoring of water quality, a key feature of the WFD, illustrates this point. Accordingly, monitoring, particularly biological is quite new for Turkish experts, and they are aware that it is important to increase water quality. Regarding this, Interviewee 24 (2017) claimed that:

“Turkey used to do monitoring when it was necessary. While Turkey was monitoring quite a few parameters, now 250 parameters were defined to monitor regarding WFD. To carry out monitoring, technical infrastructure and human resources to identify contaminants should be adequate. We still need time for this.”

To support this point, another official stated:

“... in the past, the DSI made basin master plans and completed them for each basin... even if the administrative borders and hydrological borders were not compatible. When we read the WFD, we thought it would be remarkably hard to implement this because some river basins have not still completed development in terms of water quantity, so it is a very difficult directive to adopt” (Interviewee 4, 2017).

Related to changes in line with the WFD and monitoring one interviewee emphasised:

“Turkey was not practising monitoring for national waters, the DSI used to do at the points at river basin when they found it necessary. Turkey has been doing coastal monitoring via a requirement of Barcelona declaration and Bucharest Convention since 1987. Turkey has very good data for coastal monitoring but did not have data for monitoring at

national water except the monitoring took place regarding conventional parameters including PH, temperature etc. Now, we are monitoring many parameters including a number of organics, inorganic, metals, semimetals and so on. We put 45 parameters on our list which is a requirement in the WFD and we prepared monitoring programmes for each basin and according to results we prepare basin water quality reports and evaluate which parameters stem from which pressure. Besides, we started measuring biological parameters in line with the requirement of WFD, so biological monitoring also started in this period even if it requires expertise and the measurement of the parameters are difficult. I find them very important and necessary changes” (Interviewee 22, 2017).

These technical constraints, however, appeared to be reducing as Turkish actors became exposed to the WFD process and a ‘learning by doing approach’. An experiential learning approach appeared to be leading to more transformative norm acquisition and internalisation. Interviewee 20 (2017) emphasised that the

“Learning process still continues. As the MoFWA, our aim is the transposition of WFD into national legislation and adaptation to integrated basin management. During my working time under the Ministry, nearly 20 years, I and my colleagues recognised that it is normal to face water-related problems when you do not manage your water at the basin level. If you do not have integrated water management, you cannot solve the issues in the cities sharing the same basin. This is because you do not see the big frame and where problems are coming from. Regarding this, we used to discuss integrated basin management, but we did not have a driving force, because we did not have this administrative structure. After the EU process started, the institutions took water management more seriously. Now the driving force is the WFD, which helps us to transpose our thinking into the national legislation. I personally do not discuss being an EU member or not, the EU process gives us energy, so I focus on improving our technical capacity. Our chiefs always support us to improve ourselves and receive latest and correct technical applications from the Europe. We would like

to gain on Europe in terms of reaching highest technical level and capacity as soon as possible in order to make our system more durable to solve water related issues”

As a result, in this phase, it can be observed that actors began to change their beliefs and associated behaviours. They also developed a shared understanding of ideas and strategies: from the interviews, many actors thought that the WFD and EU water *acquis* were appropriate and legitimate, and accordingly their beliefs were manifestly changing. They also developed a shared language and discourse around the WFD (see Heikkila and Gerlak, 2013) and started commonly using the terms ‘basin’ and ‘basin management’ (Interviewee 16, 2017). Furthermore, in this stage actors generated more projects, provided national funding to complete RBMPs and also constructed more water treatment plants (see Appendix 6; 8; 12). They learned from EU experts and automatically continued practising their knowledge. In this phase, *dissemination* can be observed within the organisation at governmental level and also interaction and dialogue started with the local level as well as dissemination of information to the local level (vertical interaction) increased (see Medema et al., 2014; Heikkila and Gerlak, 2013). Therefore, in this phase a *transformative* level of social learning is evident but is still too early to talk of complete transformation in learning around the WFD.

5.6.2.4 Summary

It can be seen from the interviews that political actors had a willingness to learn from EU water-related directives in implementing a river basin management approach via successive projects. As they want to improve their capacity to decrease the water management issues including authority conflict and coordination. The learning process started with the MATRA project. In this first phase, at national level, learning remained more superficial, i.e. norm acquisition was limited and only superficial cognitive understanding of EU norms was evident. After the IPA (I-II) started, learning by interaction with the EU experts increased as EU and government funded projects continued, leading to both community interaction at national level as well as a

communication of water norms occurred. More active learning with regional actors at the river basin scale increased and their preferences changed, i.e. partial learning. Starting with the TAIEX trainings, policy actors received technical knowledge on specific WFD topics from EU experts and there was an information flow and guidance from the EU side which was essential in strengthening institutional capacity and coordination. By the time that the final phase started, there is definite evidence of deeper *acquisition* of knowledge of EU rules and dissemination, as horizontal and vertical norm transfer was occurring. However, it cannot yet be considered genuinely transformative as significant challenges still exist to WFD implementation. Therefore, it is clear that social learning progress has incrementally increased from 2002, though it has proved both slow and generally only partial in supporting implementation.

In this respect, we can argue that a social learning perspective does reveal much about Europeanisation of the water policy sector at national level, thereby partly supporting the central hypothesis of the study on the value of a sociological institutional perspective to explaining implementation under conditions of declining accession incentives (Chapter 1). Indeed, rational theory, with its emphasis on conditionality as the main explanatory variable cannot readily interpret these implementation patterns: EU material incentives are weak in the period after 2004, so have increasingly less bearing on why Turkish actors should continue to adopt WFD norms while there is de-Europeanisation initiated in 2011 in some policy areas including minority rights and human rights (Chapter 2). Accordingly, the motivation of actors is important to adopting the WFD when there is no credible EU membership perspective. According to interview records, actors find integrated basin management is an appropriate way of managing water and the EU process can help them to adopt this system. Some of them (Interviews 23, 20, 24, 11, 4 and 10) were already aware of the problems, stemming from lack of coordination and not managing water at the basin level. Therefore, they applied for EU-funded projects to increase their technical and institutional capacities and improve coordination. However, if we view this process through the lens of social learning, it could be argued that sociological institutionalism does give a credible account, especially after 2004,

through showing that, initially, superficial learning around WFD norms was supported by the projects. This is because Turkish experts continued applying for EU-funded projects and TAIEX programmes to learn WFD and other related directives from the EU experts in order to adopt integrated basin management. This then gave way to more active information sharing and the growth of communication, as learning expanded across EU, national and regional levels. The preferences and interests of Turkish actors also started to change during this period, as they started to prioritise water quality collectively in the MoFWA (Interview 20, 23, 11 and 22) and became more exposed to the implementation process. It could be argued that, once this learning was embedded, it has had a mildly transformative effect as institutional actors learn more about river basin planning and diffused their knowledge into the local actors. A desire to learn more developed, thereby deepening and widening Europeanisation in this sector. Significant constraints however still exist to implementation around inter-sectoral coordination (Chapter 8) and technical capacity, meaning learning is still occurring and deeper, transformative forms of cognition are only just emerging.

Therefore, as explained above, different levels of social learning are observable in the different phases. However, what does this mean for socialisation outcomes? Regarding this point, the next section discusses whether social learning lead to norm internalisation in Turkish political actors.

5.6.3 An analysis of socialisation in three phases: National level Europeanisation

5.6.3.1 Introduction

As discussed in Chapter 3, sociological institutionalism argues that Europeanisation can be measured in several ways, which include social learning and socialisation. In this respect, Schimmelfennig (2005a: 63) defines transnational socialisation in the EU 'as a process of inducting nationally constituted societal and governmental actors into adopting the constitutive schemata and rules of the EU community.' Unlike rationalist theory, which focuses on the Europeanisation impacts of rules such as conditionality,

socialisation therefore seeks to understand how such rules are adopted by actors. The unit of analysis is therefore domestic or transnational actors rather than governments (Schimmelfennig, 2005a). Socialisation, implies an unequal relationship between actors that can be understood as 'the induction of new members into the ways of behaviour that are preferred in a society' (Flockhart, 2004: 366). Applied to Europeanisation, this induction involves EU rule adoption by national actors.

As discussed in Chapter 3, social learning and socialisation are different within Europeanisation. The point which makes social learning and socialisation different is that while social learning refers to the acquisition of new knowledge by actors and not necessarily result in behavioural change, socialisation presupposes that 'what is to be learned is already practised by at least one other actor', which correspond with the standards set by the group an agent is being socialised into (Flockhart, 2004: 366). Schimmelfennig (2005a) emphasises that the socialisation process results in some degree of rule adoption and is expected to change political attitudes and habits. Besides, Quaglia et al. (2008: 158) claim that 'if [actors] are socialised to new norms and policy paradigms, one should be able to see some changes in domestic policies, unless socialisation is so thin that it does not go beyond the creation of communities of discourse'. Therefore, socialisation has not occurred if the appropriate behaviour cannot be observed. Under Europeanisation, political behaviours and habits would change if the actors involved are affected by the integration process (Schimmelfennig, 2005a; Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970).

Accordingly, it is difficult to observe socialisation occurring without resultant policy change; actors may just simply adopt the behaviour required by a norm set for strategic and rational reasons (Flockhart, 2004: 366; Checkel, 2001). Schimmelfennig (2000: 112) describes internalisation as 'the adoption of social beliefs and practices into actors' (see also Alderson, 2001) own repertoire of cognitions and behaviours. Clearly both will be shallower than internalisation of norms as a result of genuine belief change (Flockhart, 2004: 366). Moreover, Schimmelfennig (2005a: 69) indicates that there are methodological problems in explaining socialisation - under which conditions does socialisation occur or

how do we know the results (e.g. rule adoption) caused by socialisation process? The problem is that we cannot know whether genuine learning has taken place or whether actors have simply adopted the behaviour demanded by a specific norm set for purely strategic and rational reasons (see also Peshkopia and Imami, 2008). Also, how do actors adjust to constitutive schemata and EU community rules? In line with causal relevance, researchers should indicate whether actors' behaviours and beliefs would have been different in the absence of socialisation as well as whether the compliance with EU rules takes place as a consequence of adoption, namely by mechanisms internal to the actors not externally generated (Schimmelfennig, 2005a: 70).

Chapter 3 therefore showed how socialisation can be measured in the Europeanisation of water policy. Here, in order to match the hierarchical 'levels' of social learning developed in the analytical framework, Chapter 3 showed how different degrees of socialisation relating to EU water rule adoption could be conceptualised. Therefore, in line with the argument presented by Schimmelfennig (2005a: 69), two conceptions of normative effects to determine whether actors have adopted EU rules: *(i) formal (ii) behavioural*; firstly, *formal concept of socialisation* can be understood as the transference of community schemata or rules into the national laws, constitutions or establishment of formal domestic organisations as well as procedures to assist to force them (Schimmelfennig, 2005d: 69), accordingly state structures and policies affected by socially constructed norms (Finnemore, 1996). As outlined in Chapter 3, although easily measured *formal socialisation* represents a rather superficial form of this process, since Europeanisation could just result in actors transferring EU rules into national water policy or establishing specific organisations without limited actual change occurring. Secondly, *behavioural concept of socialisation* refers to the resultant behaviour change of domestic actors in order to comply with the community schemata or rules (Schimmelfennig, 2005a: 70) as well as plans, strategies and programmes in line with the EU norms and rules. Socialisation is supposed to change the political habits and attitudes of the political actors who directly affected by the

integration process (see Schimmelfennig, 2005a; Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970; Sasse, 2007; Kelley, 2004).

Finally, socialisation infers 'a change in identity or the adoption of pro-integration beliefs and practices' (see Schimmelfennig, 2005a: 70; Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970). Identity infers to self-identification of a state with shared collective awareness of the EU. For a successful identity factor, the target state should consider the EU as the main 'aspiration group' (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005a: 18). Flockhart (2004: 361) also emphasises that the complex nature of identity construction is highly related to 'positive self-esteem' desire to belong to a new group. Importantly, socialisation requires focusing on impacts of the beliefs and practices of societal and individual actors in line with the belief changes (Schimmelfennig, 2005a) which can infer norm internalisation (see also Flockhart, 2004; Peshkopia and Imami, 2008). A fully socialised actor regards these beliefs and practices as their own and follows them autonomously. Accordingly, 'the norm set and associated values and procedures become internalised to such a degree that following the norm set is no longer a source of dispute, but is performed on a habitual basis' (Flockhart, 2004: 362). Besides, belief and practices should be sufficiently institutionalised in decision-making processes and effectively protected by domestic sanctioning mechanisms (Schimmelfennig, 2000: 112). Accordingly in a long-term, the new norms are institutionalised and internalised.

In this respect, EU rule adoption results in actual and visible behavioural change around water policy or management, thereby representing a deeper form of socialisation (see Lewis, 2003), whereas socialisation levels can be also labelled as *low*, *partial* or *deep*. Therefore, Chapter 3 argued that Europeanisation in Turkish water policy could be measured via socialisation through these three levels.

5.6.3.2 Socialisation 1999-2006

In the first phase, as mentioned in the section on social learning, some EU-related legislative changes were made during this period, although the impacts of the WFD process were limited. The by-laws included on the protection of

water against Nitrate Pollution from Agriculture; on the waters intended for Human Consumption, the by-law on UWWT and on EIA and water pollution control were revised (see Table 5.3). Using the above criteria, even *formal* conception of socialisation could be considered low: policy actors became aware of EU water norms but little actual transference of community rules or domestic organisations was established. Even though some actors initiated learning on the WFD via EU projects, it is hard to discover any changes in actors' behaviours. In this phase, Turkish actors just prepared a draft RBMP for BM basin. Accordingly, because of the lack of normative behaviour of actors, norm internalisation was not generated for successful socialisation.

Therefore, in this phase, a low level of formal practice can be observed but, it is hard to observe actors' behaviours and beliefs in line with EU community norms meaning they had not changed yet. The important point, as Flockhart (2004) emphasises, is that actors should practice what they learn, accordingly it is hard to see any interest and preference change in this phase, as such socialisation can be coded as *low*.

5.6.3.3 Socialisation 2007-2013

During the period afterwards, a more *formal* type of socialisation became increasingly visible at national level (see Schimmelfennig, 2005d). Formal changes refer to adopting new norms by transferring community schemata into a national legislative structure (Schimmelfennig, 2005d). Regarding this point, legislative changes designed to implement EU water norms, were enacted including the by-law on the Control of Soil pollution and Point sources polluted sites in 2010, by-law on the Protection of Water Basins and preparation of RBMPs and so on (see Table 5.3). Also, supporting legislative notifications and a Prime Minister Circular were prepared (see Appendix 4). Here, it is evident that transference of the WFD into national law by policy actors was also facilitating formal organisational innovation.

Besides the increase in legal internalisation, formal domestic organisations were established (see Schimmelfennig, 2005d). Within the space of a few years, Turkey established a new ministry, the MoFWA on 04/07/2011 with a new

department, the GDWM. Under the GDWM, some departments were created, including: the Basin Management Department; the Water Quality Management Department; the Flood and Drought Management Department; the Monitoring and Water Information System Department; the Research and Assessment Department; the Water Law and Policy Department and Management Services Department (General Directorate of Water Management, 2014c).

Accordingly, Interviewee 21 (2017) expressed that Turkish officials actually began to shape their administrative and legislative structures according to EU water policy and added that the establishment of the new ministry was a positive step. Given the nature the WFD, he argued, the pre-existing departments were not well placed to implement it. Interviewee 20 (2017) also indicated that the establishment of new departments under the GDWM, accelerated the transference process. This is because the DSI had a heavy workload and it could not undertake these new implementation tasks, so the GDWM was established. Now, as a result, the institutions have better understanding of the importance of considering both water quality and quantity. Compatibility of Turkish water governance with EU water norms is proceeding quickly: the contribution of the EU process and the new departments have been helpful (Interviewee 20, 2017).

While *formal* socialisation is apparent in this period, the beginnings of a *behavioural* form are also evident. As described above and in Chapter 3, socialisation here moves beyond actors implementing EU water norms and creating new organisational structures to a situation where these actors shift their behaviours to comply with them. Reflecting on this point, Interviewee 17 (2017) emphasised “the GDWM aims to provide coordination amongst different institutions. There is an email network including the health ministry, agriculture, environment and urbanisation. When a decision needs to be taken, this has to be sent to the others and then a common decision can be taken. The GDWM is responsible for this.” In this phase, 25 RBAPs were prepared and also two WWTPs in Nevsehir and Tokat were constructed. Also, more water and wastewater projects started in this period (see Appendix 6). A Groundwater Management Plan was prepared for the Kucuk Menderes basin under the

project of Strengthening the Capacity of Sustainable Groundwater Management in Turkey in 2008. Preliminary flood hazard maps, flood risk assessment and flood risk management plans were prepared for the pilot, Bati Karadeniz River Basin. Therefore, compared to the first phase, it is evident that Turkish actors created plans, programmes, and strategies according to EU water directives through the EU-funded projects, so their behavioural changes are in line with the EU schemata and rules during this phase.

Furthermore, the Europeanisation process can be seen as an opportunity to introduce technical arguments and also consultation processes, plus encourage coordination and building trust amongst participants (Mazey and Richardson, 2001). Also there can be shift in ideas and attitudes at the domestic level (Gheciu, 2005). In this study, the IPA projects, had transformative effects on actors' behaviours and also socialisation and professionalising of the actors (Bürgin, 2016: 115). Interviewee 20 (2017) indicated that before the IPA projects, the institutions had a tendency to work independently. However, during this period they began to communicate to solve issues, as actors assimilated the requirements of the WFD. As a result, cooperation and the culture of working together became common. The contribution of the WFD process was therefore greater actor coordination, managing the projects together, communication and focusing on a common aim. He also added that as the process requires mutual interaction, they learned from each other about expectations but stressed that such learning is ongoing, a point to note for the above analysis:

“... of course it takes time because there are some opponents. However, we are not dictating anything, this is a necessary, we need to manage water at basin level, and this has been practised in the EU and USA. I used to discuss this with my friends, I always supporting this system because some provinces had discussion because of water pollution, and you can overcome this with EU water norms. r. We still need time but at least we understand that we needed to communicate and discuss because we need each other.”

Socialisation has an influence on actors' behaviours and political attitudes and habits (see Sasse, 2007; Kelley, 2004; Schimmelfennig, 2005a). As explained above, Turkish actors gained new political habits and attitudes from the EU process including coordination, interaction and collaboration as well as their beliefs changed, for example, they prioritised not only water quantity also water quality. Regarding this point, communicative or cognitive conception referring to changes in actors' communication and discourses also improved (Alderson, 2001; Schimmelfennig, 2005d). Accordingly, actors' language/discourse also changed. In fact, a new vocabulary started to enter into the implementation process that was overtly taken from the WFD. For example, the terms 'basin' and 'basin management' were not widely used prior to this period in relation to water management policy. One official discussed how it became internalised within the departmental language:

“... I started working [in the department] in 2011 [and] people already understood what 'basin' meant. However, it was not valid for all water related institutions, sometimes we had difficulties in explaining basin or basin management to other stakeholders/actors” (Interviewee 24, 2017).

Interviewee 16 (2017) then stated that “I can say after 2011, the term 'basin' was extensively used but before 2008 it was not commonly expressed.” They stated as a result of the preparation of the RBAPs, policy actors became used to this term (i.e. socialised by it), along with other stakeholders. They added that now everyone understands what is meant by this concept and there is no longer the need to explain it. The notion of public participation, a core component of the WFD, also entered institutional discourses (ibid.).

The beginnings of a *behavioural* concept of socialisation are then evident in this period and still ongoing, discussed further below, but were deeper forms of socialisation also occurring? Interviewee 24 (2017) stated: that “My perspective in terms of water changed (producing energy, irrigation); previously we did not pay attention to environmental concerns and whether all living things have rights to water. However, reaching these standards also took time for the EU countries - we are still living this process.” Another official indicated that their

perspectives have considerably changed regarding the efforts to achieve parity with the EU (Interviewee 18, 2017). During the EU process, Turkish actors changed their behaviours in terms of the way of doing things and they recognised their mistakes from the past. Regarding this point, EU policy had positive impacts on its introduction, for example in changing outmoded pre-existing policies and practices: for example, the DSI used to drain swamps and wetlands but then initiated conservation measures. Interviewee 18 stated that this transition also changed the way Turkish officials conducted impact analysis of water policy. Supporting this view, Interviewee 19 (2017) emphasised that:

“I understood particularly from the last 10 years [since implementing EU policy] that water has become the primary policy. Due to extreme climate events, the adverse impacts of climate change on water resources and water scarcity, the importance of water has globally increased. All global institutions started to take action and water architecture has been prioritised. So, we [the Turkish government] need to be more active for water management. I believe we have taken firm steps forward. But we have long way to go.”

As a result, during this period, beside the significant structural changes, actors' behavioural attitudes also started to change but it was not valid for all related actors and ministries, thus such attitude changes appear to be limited. In terms of beliefs change and internalising the EU norms, actors initiated an understanding of basin/basin management and started to use this terminology, however it was still at an initial stage. Their attitudes and behaviours started to change, they understood that communication and understanding each other's opinions are important (see Mazey and Richardson, 2001), however it is hard to observe any shared understanding of norms and automatically practising them for deeper socialisation (see Lewis, 2003). Socialisation, although preliminary compared to the first period, was nonetheless evident – although primarily in more formalised or behavioural variants, so *partial* socialisation can be observed here.

5.6.3.4 Socialisation 2014-present

Referring back to the thesis assumptions (Chapter 3), it was hypothesised that Europeanisation, if the theory was credible, would lead to deepening institutional socialisation through the process of learning. Social learning did cause norm internalisation and diffusion at the national level (see Alderson, 2001; Schimmelfennig et al., 2006; Checkel, 2001; Flockhart, 2004) and led to changes in the actors' behaviours and attitudes (see Risse-Kappen et al., 1999; Flockhart, 2010). The present period would tend to support this hypothesis, although more study beyond 2014 is required to make steadfast observations.

The *formal concept of socialisation* is detectable during this phase, as Turkey accelerated its adoption of WFD norms into national legislation. Several by-laws were enacted including the by-law on the 'Protection of Water Basins used for Drinking and Utility Water (28/10/2017, No. 30224)', by-law on the 'Control of Water Use and Reduction of Losses in Agricultural Irrigation Activities (16/02/2017, No. 29981)', by-law on the 'Preparation, Implementation and Monitoring of Flood Management Plans (12/05/2016, No. 29710)' and also other supportive legislations (see Table 5.3; Appendix 4). In the same vein, Interviewee 20 (2017) emphasised:

I honestly do not focus on political debates or being an EU member, which is a different discussion than our objective, which is adjusting to the EU water acquis. . I perceive the EU directives as consensus text. Because these directives had economic, social and environmental impact analysis which take maybe 3-5 years and also necessary amendments have been made. So we should know this is a consensus text, but of course we can do 'fine tuning'.

Regarding this point, Interviewee 23 (2017) stated they had adopted nearly 90% of the acquis but it will be 100 % after the water law draft is enacted. Accordingly, formal socialisation (Schimmelfennig, 2005d), transferring EU rules and schemata into the national laws, increased in this phase and Turkey mostly adapted the EU water acquis.

It is also important to elucidate how local actors are affected and socialise by EU norms and rules (see Peshkopia and Imami, 2008). Beside the legal amendments, formal domestic organisations to provide inter-sectoral coordination were established by the MoFWA, including the Water Management Coordination Committee, Basin Management Central Committee, Basin Management Committees and Provincial Water Management Coordination Committees (Ribamap, 2017a). Beside the establishment of the new committees, the transferring of the community rules into the national law has increasingly continued. Therefore, these committees have an important role for communication and more dialogue amongst the related ministries and also between local and governmental actors via regular meetings during the year.

One official stated:

“In the past, there was not any legal and practical base of RPMPs in Turkey. Even there were some plans for the basins before the EU process, the difficulty was to practise them with the lack of legal base. However, after the EU process initiated, this became more feasible and applicable. In the EU process, the RPMPs need to be prepared and legal base should be made as well to adopt the *acquis*. I find this is important and necessary. If you do not internalise integrated management approach, you cannot manage the basin, you cannot see the current situation and requirements of the basin. You cannot find out the water volume and control the basin when you aim to protect basin as a whole. Accordingly, basin management approach is the correct way to manage the basin and we do these activities as being aware of this reality” (Interviewee 25, 2017).

In a similar vein, as Schimmelfennig (2005a) indicates the changes in actors' behaviours and attitudes with regard to the community rules within the socialisation process are expected. If there is no change in the political attitudes and habits, socialisation remains very weak. Especially after the establishment of the committees at national and local levels, the national actors have enthusiasm to build communication and enhance the relations with local actors,

because they were aware of that for the basin management stakeholder involvement is the fundamental criteria. The management culture and actors' habits have changed, the actors tend to work together and understand the importance of collaborating and communication.

Accordingly, in this process political actors have better understanding of the necessity of interaction and coordination with other stakeholders and the importance of transparency. As Schimmelfennig, (2000) emphasises, changes in beliefs and practices should be institutionalised in the decision-making process. Regarding this point, Interviewee 13 (2017) argued that one of the important benefits that they have gained from the process is not only transparency but also institutions which have learned to work cooperatively, because stakeholders demanded collective decision-making on water issues. Turkey is a developing country and should make investments. To do this, institutions should make a decision collectively. He added 'I believe that the countries, had good progress for water management, have a co-decision culture and this is the main difference between Turkey and the EU member states.' In respect of this point, Interviewee 20 (2017) emphasised that:

"In order to do work, the stakeholders need to coordinate and communicate with each other in this process, this is the way of doing work. At the beginning of this process, it was difficult, however now this is working well. Under the EU-funded projects, the ministries work together. And also the ministries, responsible for water management (mainly the MoFWA and MoEU) know each other better and synchronised with each other. And they manage the projects effectively. We have better situations now in terms of communication and I am sure it will improve."

Furthermore, behavioural changes in Turkish experts increased in this phase. They produced more plans and projects for the pilot basins under the EU-led projects, so the appropriate behaviours related to EU norms can be observed in this phase. Regarding this observation, actors applied for more EU-funded projects and prepared plans in this phase; RBMPs were prepared for Büyük Menderes, Konya, Susurluk and Meric-Ergene basins under the IPA project of

Conversion of RBAPs into RBMPs. A Flood Management Plan of Antalya basin and Sectoral Allocation Plan for the Seyhan basin were also prepared. Also, actors prepared more projects with a national budget to complete RBMPs and flood management plans; preparation for flood management plans for Ceyhan, Susurluk, Kizilirmak, BM basins; preparation of drought management plans for Antalya, Burdur, Bati Karadeniz basins (see Appendix 7). Other projects are proposed by the GDWM including the preparation of drought management plans for the Sakarya and Kizilirmak basins' plus projects on drinking water basin protection plans (see Appendix 10).

As Schimmelfennig (2005a) states, socialisation alters the practices of individual actors with regard to their belief changes. Actors gained new technical knowledge and started to practice them through the EU-funded projects. The actors started to practice new techniques. Interviewee 22 (2017) stated:

“I find the process is very positive. We have started doing biological monitoring for the last 2 years. Biological parameters have been measured according to the requirement of the WFD as well as we do isomorphological monitoring. So the monitoring has been increased and the biological monitoring requires special expertise, so it is difficult but we started.”

She also added “when the river basin management approach was first explained, it was not familiar for people who were then indecisive about it”. She went on to explain that:

“during the last few years, the studies have been transformed into basin management approach. For instance, I attended a workshop last week, one industrialist told me that the basin management approach is very good and he added if the waters is not purified, the local people will be affected badly. Therefore, they have this awareness. Because there is no other option, I think it is generally accepted.”

According to another participant, special provision determination studies used to be carried out when it was necessary at local level in specific basins in line with the Water Pollution Control Regulation which defines protection zones for drinking water basins. Now officials are doing this at a macro level (Interviewee 4, 2017). Another official emphasised they did not have hydro-morphologic monitoring experience but learned them in this process. They have some methodological differences between actors but the target is the same (Interviewee 23, 2017).

In terms of practising the EU water acquis, some interviewees emphasised that there are some changes in terms of methodology. For example, “When we transform EU laws into national legislation, we do not copy and paste, we practice this in a suitable way to our organisational culture” (Interviewee 23, 2017). Interviewee 22 (2017) added that the EU has some methods and guidance documents, because the standards should be the same for the member states. However, geographical conditions, industrial situations, climate and agriculture in Turkey may be different from European countries.

The methods that Turkish experts use, can be different from the ones which EU countries use. They read the EU guidance documents and also look at the EPA. If they cannot find a suitable one, they create one. For example, when they determine the deepness of the lakes in Turkey could not be in parallel with the standards (Interviewee 20, 2017). In the same vein, Interviewee 23 (2017) emphasised that they choose the methods according to characteristic of the basin. For example, for water bodies, method A has been used in France, we use method B, and when I use method B I can reach the same target. So the WFD is not restrictive in terms of this perspective. Regarding this point, one of the officials said:

“We do not break the patterns, we have a base and we put the layers on it so we are building a new system on our base, so I think this is a structure at the end and brings positive things to us, accordingly there is not 100% change.”

Beside the adaptation of the EU legislation, for socialisation to have occurred actors are expected to internalise the norms and agree that this is the correct way of managing water in order to practice and implement the WFD (see Diez et al., 2005; Schimmelfennig, 2005a). From the interviews governmental experts referred to the EU basin management system and how this system could be effective and useful in Turkey. In addition, the actors' perspectives, as different from the past, changed in line with the WFD and they started to consider water from both quality and quantity perspectives. Therefore they had evidently changed their perspectives to water management. For example, Interviewee 20 (2017) emphasised this – the WFD – is the correct way of managing water. He emphasised that he has definitely agreed to use the technical aspect of this system, adjusting to basin management, working at basin level and establishment of the basin committees. The EU process has had a positive contribution in terms of capacity building and also personnel learned looking at the cases from broad and different perspectives. Moreover, another official stated “we definitely internalised basin and basin management, this is definitely in our system” (Interviewee 14, 2017). One of the participants indicated “the deepness of the lakes in Turkey could not be in parallel with the standards.” The most manageable and sustainable system is integrated river basin approach. And, she thought this this system has been accepted as better even if implementation is still weak (Interviewee 21, 2017). Another official stated “I believe the basin management is a good system: I attended nearly 70 meetings including at basin level during the process. We need an efficientbasin management system in Turkey” (Interviewee 12, 2017).

Norm internalisation refers to collective expectation about appropriate attitudes and behaviours held by community actors (Finnemore, 1996). In the last phase, it appears that Turkish actors agreed that a basin management approach is an appropriate way of managing water and this perspective diffused to the other stakeholders through the activities under the EU-funded projects. From the interviews, it is clear that some officials had knowledge on river basin management approach and they were aware of having lasting problems due to not considering the basin as a whole. One official expressed that they learned

to perceive the basin at a macro level in this process (Interviewee 10, 2017). Regarding, Interviewee 21 (2017) stated:

“I find it very positive to adjust to the basin management approach, which is fundamental change in this process. Because it is not true to just care about 5 or 10 kilometres of a basin. Some cities, based at the same river basin, may have different policies and approaches, however with this integrated approach, they follow the common policies to protect their basin. Because, they are aware of that if they pollute the river, other users in neighbourhood can have adverse impacts. However, it is not easy to practise, because it is a new system and takes time to adjust.”

He also added that “before the EU process, we were trying to bring integrated river basin management approach into the agenda for 15-20 years. The problems were incrementally growing.” However, he argued that until the WFD process they did not have a driving force to create a synergy. Also, the administrative structure was not suitable for this. Now the driving force is the WFD and this helped in transposing their views and opinions into the national legislation. The EU, he argued, helped strengthen the system.

Moreover, Interviewee 20 (2017) indicated that he understood the EU consider the events in great detail. For example, they had a fish directive but they adjusted this to integrate with the EU fish directive. When he read the EU directive, he understood how biological parameters can be used for water pollution prevention. Interviewee 20 (2017) also added that:

“We understood that we need to learn to look at the event in detail. We were familiar with the chemical monitoring, but we now do biological and hydromorphological monitoring. These are the positive contributions from the EU process... however the changes don't happen in one day, it is a process. There is an evaluation process, we read the EU directives and learn and evaluate them and have meetings to discuss whether we have enough personnel to do etc. I hope we will achieve the basin management system.”

As explained in Chapter 3 and above (section 5.6.2), social learning infers acquisition of new knowledge by actors through interaction with others, however it does not necessarily cause behavioural changes (Flockhart, 2004). In order for socialisation to occur, what is learned, should be practiced by the actors in parallel with their belief systems (Flockhart, 2004; 2010), accordingly socialisation process should lead to rule adoption and shifts in actors' habit and attitudes (Schimmelfennig, 2005a). As a result, Turkish actors' perspectives and behaviours generally changed and they are more engaged with the EU water *acquis*, they learned new technical knowledge (e.g. biological monitoring) and started to practice them without conceding cultural and geographical features. There are some efforts regarding how to manage the basins and how to improve both water quality and quantity (Interviewee 23, 2017). Interviewee 21 (2017) indicated that they established more departments related to basin management, flood and drought management.

Therefore, in this phase, partial/deep socialisation was observed. Turkish actors' efforts have been focused on this system and the next studies will be the same. For deep socialisation, there should be automatic compliance with the norms and rules (see Lewis, 2003). Accordingly, Appendix 6 and Appendix 7 show Turkish actors have created related projects, funded by national budget, including constructing more wastewater plants and completing flood and drought management plans. Furthermore, in terms of process, they follow the EU and internalise this system; however in term of implementation they still need time to adjust. After they totally adjust to this system, coordination and information sharing will be improved, however they are just at the beginning (Interviewee 20, 2017). Accordingly their beliefs are consistent with their behaviours and attitudes, including their long-term plans for example completing RBMPs until 2020. Also, they started automatically producing future plans and strategies with regard to their learning and experiences from the EU-funded projects. Therefore, the level of socialisation can be coded as *partial/deep*.

5.7 Conclusion

Consultation process, including seminars, workshops, conferences, is related to mutual learning and this shapes actors' perspectives and preferences (Mazey and Richardson, 2001: 83). Accordingly, in the second and third period, several workshops, capacity building activities and trainings related to IPA projects were organised. This chapter focuses on analysing water-related governmental actors' perspectives and behaviours and activities in terms of social learning and socialisation mechanisms. The EU-funded projects in water sector started in 2002, however in the first phase, the learning remained at individual level. In the second period, the IPA projects continued and under this program, governmental officials attended several trainings and study visits, resulting in their knowledge on EU water policy increasing. In the last period, beside the ongoing IPA projects, the RBMPs started to be prepared and the ministries have nationally-funded projects to carry on preparing the RPMPs for other basins and also constructing new wastewater treatment plans, so the governmental official started implement the WFD on their own.

In addition, in the first period in parallel with learning, socialisation was low. Few actual water norms or organisational innovations were evident meaning that formal socialisation was limited. The analysis shows that in the second phase, formal socialisation continued and also changes in actors' behaviours and perspectives initiated and was coded as *partial*. However, in the last period besides the increase in the formal socialisation, including basin management committees and also new by-laws, it can be seen from the interviews that governmental actors' discourses mainly changed in line with the WFD and basin management approach. In terms of behavioural socialisation, they started to practise new technical knowledge for example biological monitoring, therefore in the last phase socialisation can be coded as *partial/deep*. The next section aims to analyse the learning process and activities at the Konya and Büyük Menderes basins.

Chapter 6: Implementing the Water Framework Directive at river basin level: Konya (closed) basin

6.1. Introduction

Chapter 5 focused on analysing social learning and socialisation at national level across three phases covering the periods of 1999-2006, 2007-2013 and 2014-present. In order to test the veracity of the theories as explanatory frameworks for Europeanisation, this chapter aims to elucidate whether social learning and socialisation has occurred at river basin level, reflecting the multi-level nature of the Water Framework Directive (see Chapter 4). Following the pattern of analysis undertaken in Chapter 5, this chapter firstly focuses on a historical analysis of social learning and socialisation in the Konya (closed) basin before; analysing the same process for the Büyük Menderes basin in the following Chapter 7. In order to produce the analysis, stakeholder meetings in Aydin and Konya provinces were attended. Local actors (see Appendix 11; Appendix 12) involved in implementing the river basin management approach were also interviewed to understand their learning and awareness of the IPA projects in the basins. Therefore, the following sections provide an empirically-based assessment on whether local actors in Konya basin were subject to social learning and then became socialised as the WFD implementation occurred, as Europeanisation theory would predict (Chapter 3).

6.2 Konya (closed) basin

The Konya (Closed) Basin (see Figure 6.1), Turkey's third largest river basin covers 53.000km² area (Divrak and Demirayak, 2011: 166). This area covers the provinces of Konya, Karaman, Mersin, Nevsehir, Nigde, Aksaray, Ankara, Antalya and Isparta (Duygu et al., 2017: 56), and includes several volcanic mountains within its old river bed. It is bordered by the Sakarya and Kizilirmak river basins in the north, the Kizilirmak and Seyhan River Basins in the east, Eastern Mediterranean Basin in the south and the Antalya and Akarcay River Basins in the west (Duygu et al., 2017: 55). Konya is arguably the most vulnerable and problematic basin amongst those basins in Turkey, due to its aridity, water scarcity and dependency on agriculture for its economic

development (Ribamap, 2018). Annual precipitation averages only 407 mm in the basin around twice typical desert rainfall (Ribamap, 2016b: 2). Due to a decrease in wetlands and lakes, bird species also have declined (Salmaner, 2008). The Konya basin has a population of three million people, with several major urban centres including the cities of Konya, Isparta and Aksehir. Significantly, 45% of its area is covered by agriculture (Divrak and Demirayak, 2011: 167). There is substantial demand for water resources due to intense agricultural activities in Konya, where crops include corn, wheat, sugar beet and alfalfa/lucerne. Several factors cause environmental pressures including arable agriculture and animal farming, untreated domestic wastewaters, untreated industrial wastewaters, industrial development, low precipitation, the negative effect of climate change on water resources, erosion surrounding dam, lakes and rivers, and high consumption of water for agriculture (Ribamap, 2018). Given these critical pressures on water resources, it is unsurprising that Konya was chosen as a pilot for implementing the WFD.



Figure 6.1: The geographical location of the Konya (Closed) Basin (Ribamap, 2016b: 6).

6.2.1 Projects in the Konya basin – 1999-2006

The WFD pilot project, 'Towards Wise Use of the Konya Closed Basin', was initiated by the Turkish government in 2003 in order to facilitate the IRBM

process through capacity building activities and establishing communication between inter-sectoral stakeholders (Divrak and Demirayak, 2011: 170). The reason why Konya basin was chosen as a pilot study is that the Konya basin was accepted as one of the 200 most ecologically significant areas in the world by the WWF in 1998 (Salmaner, 2008), but is subject to the environmental pressures identified above. The project aim was to engage with local actors, including NGOs, irrigation cooperatives, municipalities and farmers to initiate a dialogue with them, and comprehend their concerns as a basis for future river basin planning. The key partners in the project were the Turkish government, the WWF, the Turkey-Netherlands Water Partnership and the EU (Salmaner, 2008). The central government actors encompass several bodies¹¹ (Salmaner, 2008: 143). There were also stakeholders at basin level, which were initially engaged to the project¹² (Salmaner, 2008: 144).

The main outputs were the preparation of the Tuz Lake Management Plan, the Beyşehir Lake Management Plan and the Eregli Marshes Management Plan. The Tuz Lake Management Plan was produced in 2008 (Salmaner, 2008). Salmaner (2008: 191), after interviewing policy-makers, emphasises that the management plans could be called 'wetland management plans' due to limitations in the related legislation even though the entire planning activities were performed at a larger scale. In addition, the Tuz Lake Management Plan is the first completed basin level project conducted with a participatory planning approach. Under the project, several capacity building activities were organised, including education programs to train stakeholders on Integrated Water Resources Management and enhance dialogue amongst stakeholders in the basin. Some of the education programs were on; Agriculture and Environment

¹¹ The State Planning Organisation, MoEF, Environmental Protection Agency for Special Areas, Ministry of Agriculture and Village Affairs, Ministry of Industry and Commerce, DSI, Ministry of Culture and Tourism, General Directorate of Mineral Research and Exploration, several professional chambers including the Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects, universities, national newspapers and televisions, WWF-Turkey, plus The Turkish Foundation for Combating Soil Erosion, Reforestation and Protection of Natural Habitats (TEMA).

¹² They included the Provincial Agricultural Directorship, Konya Province Culture and Tourism Directorship, Provincial Environment and Forestry Directorships (for Konya, Aksaray, Isparta), Konya Meteorology Regional Directorship, DSI 4th Region and 18th Region Directorships, the Konya Greater City Municipality, General Directorate of Konya Water and Wastewater Administration, Industrial Organization Zones, Konya Sugar Factory, Eregli Sugar Factory, Municipalities Association (Konya, Isparta, Aksaray, Nigde, Karaman, Ankara).

as a member of the EU, (26 April 2005); a short-term course on IWRM (22-29 January 2006); the Cihanbeyli Altınekin Irrigation Application Project, (29 March 2006); the project on Education and Application of Organic Agriculture, (March-April 2006); Education about EU policies in the Konya Closed Basin (23 July 2006); and pilot projects on drip irrigation and education of farmers in 2006-2007. As a result of these developments, incremental capacity building activities and public awareness on the issues in the basin increased, with over 2000 farmers trained in sustainable irrigation and production methods by 2008.

In order to increase communication, there were a number of stakeholder meetings and workshops¹³

Therefore, for the implementation of IRBM, the Konya basin can be considered one of the most successful cases in terms of engagement activities, having included the participation of 600 different stakeholders since 2003 (Göçmez et al., 2008: 166; Divrak and Demirayak, 2011: 170). Also, the project paved the way for increasing the awareness of stakeholders on restricted water resources and misuse of water in agriculture and the IWRM approach through capacity building activities and stakeholders meetings. Capacity building activities were effective even if local actors did not think they were able to affect governmental decisions (Divrak and Demirayak, 2011). Besides, farmers received training and they started to use sustainable technologies, including organic agriculture and drip irrigation systems (Salmaner, 2008).

During this early period, Salmaner (2008) indicates that the stakeholders, were primarily engaged with projects, prepared and implemented the plans including, management, land use and conservation plans in the Tuz Lake area, However, even though ideas on sustainable development were initially established,

¹³ the Konya Basin first stakeholder meeting (12-13/02/2004); EU Deliberations and Agriculture meeting (05/02/2005); Meeting on facilities for mitigating the effects of global warming (November, 2007) and workshops on the Watersheds Management Plan (25-28/05/2005); 'Through the Wise Use of Beyşehir Lake Sub-basin Project (11-12/02/2004, 17/04/2004, 05/11/2004, 21-25/03/2005); and a conference on Konya Basin underground water resources and drought (11-12/09/2008)(Salmaner, 2008). In this project, the MoEF, MARA, DSI, Municipalities, Regional and Provincial Directorates of the Ministries, Irrigation Cooperatives, local media, NGOs, academics and sugar beet cooperatives attended (Divrak and Demirayak, 2011).

spreading this concept to the entire basin and receiving efficient results takes time.

6.2.2 Projects in the Konya basin - 2007-2013

The RBAPs for 25 basins of Turkey were completed between 2009 and 2013. The RBAPs are necessary to identify short and long-term targets to control water resources and their sustainability. They also include a usage programme for each basin by evaluating physical and technical features of surface and groundwaters in order to prevent pollution and deterioration, stemming from activities in the basin (Ribamap, 2018). The RBAP for Konya basin was prepared in 2010 under the project 'Preparation of Watershed Protection Action Plans for 11 Watershed in Turkey' with the collaboration of the MoEF (General Directorate of Environmental Management, 2010: 57). There were three stakeholder meetings organised to prepare the Konya RBAP: the opening meeting (25/11/2010); the 2nd stakeholder meeting (25/10/2010); and the last stakeholder meeting (20/12/2010). There were several stakeholders from different departments¹⁴ (General Directorate of Environmental Management, 2010: 88). As a consequence of the feedback from the stakeholders at the meetings, the final report was prepared by the General Directorate of Environmental Management (General Directorate of Environmental Management, 2010: 88).

Beside the RBMP for Konya, irrigation projects were implemented by the DSI. However after 2011, these projects were unofficially renamed as KOP, and both Nigde and Aksaray provinces were included in the irrigation projects. After 2011, the State Planning Organisation and the Ministry of Development produced several studies on the deficiency of water and agricultural infrastructure. In line with these studies, a draft KOP Action Plan was prepared in 2011, encompassing agricultural water management, development of irrigation infrastructure, land consolidation, and increasing the environmental

¹⁴ Environmental Management General Directorate of MoEF, the Provincial Environment and Forestry Directorates in the Basin, TUBITAK-MRC project consultants, service providing firms, Municipalities in the Basin, the Regional State Water Works, the Provincial Bank, Special Provincial Administrations, Agriculture Provincial Directorates and related NGOs in the Basin area.

sustainability, efficiency and diversity of the agricultural products. The Konya Plain Regional Development Administration (KOP RDA) was then established on 08/06/2011 by a statutory decree in order to coordinate and implement the planning, programming, monitoring and evaluation of the KOP (Konya Ovasi Projesi Bolge Kalkinma Idaresi Baskanligi, 2016). During the preparation of the Action Plan, central and local organisations, ministries, provinces and development agencies were asked for their project proposals by the KOP RDA. After this process, the KOP Action Plan provinces working committees were established and a draft KOP Action plan was prepared in line with the proposals (Turkiye Cumhuriyeti Kalkinma Bakanligi, 2014). In addition, the KOP RDA started the preparation of the final KOP Action Plan in 2012, encompassing a holistic perspective and medium and long-term plans. The action plan was then presented to the Regional Development High Commission and confirmed in 2014. The plan is explained in detail in the following section.

6.2.3 Projects in the Konya basin - 2014-present

The last version of 'KOP Action Plan (2014-2018)' was prepared by the KOP RDA. The Plan was confirmed on 30/12/2014, encompassing land consolidation, use of water meters and transformation of water distribution infrastructure to a closed system. It was produced in collaboration with the DSI, the Agricultural Directorate and Directorate of Agricultural Reform (Divrak and Demirayak, 2011: 173). Also, the KOP RDA's assigned position was expanded by cabinet decrees on 06/06/2016 (No. 2016/8870) and 07/09/2016 (No. 2016/9140). Both Nevsehir and Yozgat provinces and Kırıkkale and Kırşehir provinces were then incorporated into the KOP region (Konya Ovasi Projesi Bolge Kalkinma Idaresi Baskanligi, 2017; Konya Ovasi Projesi Bolge Kalkinma Idaresi Baskanligi, 2018). This project aims at supporting development in terms of sustainable agriculture, sustainable use of water in agriculture, and enhancing the energy, trade and industry sectors (Konya Ovasi Projesi Bolge Kalkinma Idaresi Baskanligi, 2016). It also aims to increase irrigated fields from 924.000 ha to 1.100.000 ha, in line with the KOP Small Scale Irrigation Program (KÖSİP) (2016-present). Under the project, 61.500 ha at the mountainous area will use a pressurised irrigation system and rehabilitation of irrigation

infrastructure to resolve irrigation issues and increase the income level from agriculture (Turkiye Cumhuriyeti Kalkinma Bakanligi, 2014: 50). Moreover, its purposes are designed for providing coordination, capacity building, information and experience amongst the organisation and institutions as well as addressing the administrative, financial, and technological and informational deficiencies of NGOs, universities, local directorates, regional development administration and development agencies.

Under the KOP project, KOP Region Universities Union (UNIKOP) was established for academic and administrative cooperation to analyse the needs of training in the basin and to improve interplay between the universities and industry, and integration between universities and the city. The project also aimed to increase research and development as well as establish new laboratories (Turkiye Cumhuriyeti Kalkinma Bakanligi, 2014). Moreover, the KOP Action Plan adopted in 2015 detailed sectoral expenditures: 938.618.000 Turkish Lira was spent on transport; 241.031.000 TL for education; and 214.811.000 TL for 'sustainable use of water resources and basin management' (Konya Ovasi Projesi Bolge Kalkinma Idaresi Baskanligi, 2016). By 2017, the MoFWA had the second highest ministerial spending, of 311.878.725 TL, after the Ministry of Transport, Maritime Affairs and Communications (MoTMAC) (Konya Ovasi Projesi Bolge Kalkinma Idaresi Baskanligi, 2016; Ribamap, 2018) demonstrating the importance attached to water resources by the Government.

Several documents were prepared to deal with the adverse impacts of drought and water scarcity¹⁵ (Duygu et al., 2017). Also, the Project for 'Preparation of Drought Management Plan of the Konya Basin (2013-2015)' was prepared in line with the integrated basin management approach adopted by the flood and drought management department of the GDWM. The Plan aimed to mitigate drought risks in the Konya basin (Duygu, 2015), by enhancing stakeholder

¹⁵ For example, the "Strategy and Action Plan for Combating Agricultural Drought (2013-2017)" document was prepared under the coordination of the MoFAL. Furthermore, the policies, strategies and actions indicated in the "Tenth Development Plan (2014-2018)" and "Regional Development National Strategy (2014-2023)" were produced under the coordination of the Ministry of Development. Here, the "Strategic Plan of MoFAL (2013-2017)", the targets for 2023 determined by the Ministry of Forestry and Water Affairs, the "2013-2017 Strategic Plan" and the "DSİ Strategic Plan (2015-2019)" are taken into consideration (Duygu et al., 2017).

coordination, protecting water resources and water quality, increasing public awareness and knowledge and coordinating with local administrations and general directorates of ministries (Duygu et al., 2017: 66). The Drought Management Expert Committee was established under the GDWM, including officials from the GDWM, the DSI, the State Meteorological Service, the General Directorate of Combating Desertification and Erosion, the General Directorate of Natural Conservation and National Parks, and the General Directorate of Forestry (General Directorate of Water Management, N/Da: 33). The first drought management plan was prepared for the Konya basin by the GDWM in 2015, in coordination with the DSI, the KOSKI, the Konya Basin Irrigation Project (KOP) Administration, scientists in universities and non-government organisations (General Directorate of Water Management, 2016). After preparation of the plan the GDWM organised a meeting on 20/11/2015 with the participation of several stakeholders¹⁶ to present the draft (General Directorate of Water Management, 2016).

Other institutional innovations in the Konya Basin include the regional development programme, covering 13 cities, with 75% of the budget (€90.62 million) financed by the EU (Reeves, 2006: 37). The Mevlana Development Agency (MEVKA) established on 22/11/2008, which covers Konya and Karaman provinces, was also created with regards to the EU regional development strategy (Divrak and Demirayak, 2011). Additionally, the Ahiler Development Agency, covering Aksaray, Kirikkale, Kirsehir, Nevsehir and Nigde provinces, was established in order to improve research-development through university and industry collaboration. The members of the agency visit companies and inform them about the importance of research-development and

¹⁶ The GDWM, Republic of Turkey General Directorate of Forestry, Forest and Water Affairs Seventh Regional Directorate, DSI, Food Agriculture and Livestock Provincial Directorate of Karaman, Karamanoğlu Mehmetbey University, The Union of Turkish Agricultural Chambers, DSI Fourth Regional Directorate. Konya Sugar Industry and Trade inc, Necmettin Erbakan University, Governorship of Aksaray, Selcuk University, Karaman Municipality, MoFAL, Bahri Dagdas International Agricultural Research, Konya Regional Directorate of Forestry, Meteorology Eighth Regional Directorate, Konya Provincial Directorate of Culture and Tourism. MEVKA, Irrigation Unions, KOP RDA, Science, Industry and Technology Provincial Directorate, Environmental Organizations and Solidarity Association, Aksaray Municipality, General Directorate of Konya Water and Sewerage Administration, Grand National Assembly of Turkey and Contractor Company France, Germany and Austria, began to favour a 'privileged partnership' attended the meeting.

available governmental incentives (Konya Ovasi Projesi Bolge Kalkinma Idaresi Baskanligi, 2018: 57). The development agencies are also responsible for supporting capacity building, technical and financial requirements of the metropolitan municipalities. To facilitate effective information strategies, the agencies provide technical support to the municipalities to improve their internet website infrastructures to inform the public regarding their activities. The EU accession agreement Chapter 22, which covers 'Regional policy and coordination of structural instruments', is important for the determination of regional development policies and national programmes (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Development, 2014: 14).

Several EU projects were undertaken in the Konya (closed) basin. These include the 'Project on Preparation of Konya Closed Basin Sectoral Water Allocation Plan (2016-2018)', 'the Project for Preparation of Drought Management Plan of Konya Basin (2013-2015)' implemented by the MoFWA (GDWM), the Seydisehir Water and Wastewater (2015-2018), which was conducted by the consortium including one French, one Turkish and two British companies; and the 'Technical Assistance for the Conversion of RBAPs into RBMPs'. There is one infrastructure project has been undertaken since 2014, which is the Aksehir Water and Wastewater Plant (2014-ongoing) (see Appendix 8).

In addition, the 'Tenth Development Plan' (2014-2018) sets clear objectives for sustainable water resources management, encompassing prioritising water quality and quantity provision, basin level planning, coordination amongst multi-level authorities and also increasing the efficiency of water usage in the agricultural sector. This plan aims at increasing irrigation efficiency and using water saving modern irrigation systems, supporting drought resistance crops and decreasing the usage of groundwater. It also encompasses several municipal level projects: the water and sewerage infrastructure project (SUKAP); the municipal infrastructure project (BELDES); and a project for supporting rural infrastructure of villages (KÖYDES) (Özbek, 2016).

The KÖYDES project was prepared with the technical support of the Ministry of Development. This project aimed to eliminate the continuing issues with regards to drinking water provision and road construction in the rural areas within 51 provinces, excluding the metropolitan municipalities (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Development, N/D). Under the KÖYDES project, in order to develop water and sewerage infrastructure, 13.042.000 Turkish lira was spent in 2015 (Konya Ovasi Projesi Bolge Kalkinma Idaresi Baskanligi, 2016); 7.551.704 Turkish lira was spent in 2016 (Konya Ovasi Projesi Bolge Kalkinma Idaresi Baskanligi, 2017); and lastly 13.105.024 Turkish lira was spent in Aksaray, Konya and Niğde provinces in 2017 (Konya Ovasi Projesi Bolge Kalkinma Idaresi Baskanligi, 2018).

The Drinking Water and Sewerage Infrastructure Project (SUKAP), was initiated and coordinated by the Ministry of Development in 2010. It aimed to financially support municipalities for drinking water and sewerage infrastructure projects. Municipalities with a population of 25.000 or less used to get a grant of 50% for drinking water and infrastructure expenditures. For the remaining amount they were allowed to receive an affordable loan from the ILBANK. Municipalities with a population of 25.000 or more, incorporated into the SUKAP via the decision of the High Planning Council, were permitted to receive loans from the ILBANK and surpassed the borrowing limits to implement their drinking water and sewage projects (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Development, N/D). Under the SUKAP, several wastewater and drinking water network infrastructure projects were completed and some are still in progress in the provinces of Aksaray, Karaman, Konya, Kirikkale, Yozgat, Nevsehir, Kirsehir and Nigde (Konya Ovasi Projesi Bolge Kalkinma Idaresi Baskanligi, 2016; Konya Ovasi Projesi Bolge Kalkinma Idaresi Baskanligi, 2017; Konya Ovasi Projesi Bolge Kalkinma Idaresi Baskanligi, 2018) (see Appendix 8). Another project was the Konya Drinking Water Project (Blue Tunnel). Under the scope of this project, the Blue Tunnel Drinking Water Treatment Plants and the Blue Tunnel Drinking Water Distribution Pipeline projects were prepared. These investments will provide large-scale irrigation to arid lands of the Konya Plain by the construction of the

Afsat and Bozkir Dam, which feeds the Bagbasi dam and aims to transfer 414m³ water to Konya basin annually through a 17 km length tunnel.

Capacity building activities were also undertaken. The 'Drought Perception and its Social-Economic Impacts' project for the KOP Region was implemented in 2015-2017 in order to assess local actors' perceptions and take measures for drought. Participants included farmers, municipalities and universities (Konya Ovasi Projesi Bolge Kalkinma Idaresi Baskanligi, 2017: 95). A survey was undertaken of 790 managers and 603 farmers in Aksaray, Karaman, Konya and Nigde provinces. Another project was the KOP Agricultural Training Project, a collaboration of NGOs and the Ministry of Education, the MoFWA, universities and development agencies in 2015-2018 (see Table 6.1). In the scope of this project, 1206 technical staff were trained with 27 training programs along with 2760 farmers in 32 training programs. It aimed to train young and women farmers on efficient usage of soil and water, plus stock farming. Also, in the scope of the project on 'Determination of the Training Needs and Organising of Training Programs', the staff from the provincial special administrations and the municipalities in the KOP region (2015-2018) in Aksaray, Karaman and Nigde were trained on the preparation of EU projects, project management and protocol rules of EU projects. A project on 'Improving Infrastructure of the Research Institute in Konya (2015-2018)' was then initiated, with the cooperation of KOP RDA, universities and NGOs, primarily for addressing sustainability in irrigated and dry farming and overcoming the drought (Konya Ovasi Projesi Bolge Kalkinma Idaresi Baskanligi, 2014).

Table 6.1: The activities in the Konya (closed) basin.

	Project Name	Responsible Actor	Collaborators	Year
1	Project on drought perception and its social-economic impacts	KOP RDA		2015-2017
2	Project on improving technological capacity of the investment, monitoring and coordination directorates	Ministry of Interior	development agencies, KOP RDA	2015-2017
3	Project on determination of the training needs and organising of training programs for provincial special administrations	KOP RDA	development agencies, TODAIE, Ministry of Interior	2015-2017
4	Project on determination of the training needs and organising of training programs for municipalities	KOP RDA	development agencies, TODAIE, Ministry of Interior, Turkish association municipalities	2015-2018
5	Project on determination of the training needs and organising of training programs for the staff working in the KOP RDA and development agencies on EU funds and accreditations	Ministry of Development	KOP RDA and development agencies, TODAIE, Ministry of EU, Ministry of Economy	2015-2018
6	Project on capacity building of NGOs in the KOP region on organising, governance, providing funds, preparation of projects.	KOP RDA	development agencies, UNIKOP	2015-2018
7	Surveying on water transfer to Konya basin from other basins	MoFWA-DSI	KOP RDA, NGOs, MoEU, MoFAL	2014-2015
8	Project on improving infrastructure of laboratory and research institute in Konya	MoFAL	KOP RDA, universities, NGOs	2015-2018
9	Project on encouraging the usage of modern irrigation systems for water saving in KOP region	MoFAL, Chambers of Agriculture	KOP RDA, local authorities, Ziraat Bank	2015-2018
10	Project on supporting research-development on irrigation programs and increasing efficiency of water for agricultural use in the areas having water stress	MoFAL, Chambers of Agriculture	NGOs, universities and the KOP RDA	2015-2018

After Turkey completed its RBAPs, another EU project was undertaken on the 'Conversion of RBAPs into RBMPs started in collaboration with the Spanish consortium and Ministry of Forestry and Water Affairs (Ministry of EU, 2017). This project was completed in 2017 and the RBMPs were prepared for the Susurluk, Konya, Büyük Menderes and Meric-Ergene basins (Ribamap, N/D). Three stakeholder consultation meetings for the Konya basin took place on 01-02/06/2015, 08/05/2017 and 04/04/2018 (Ribamap, 2018; General Directorate of Water Management, 2015). For the second basin stakeholder meeting, 100 stakeholders from different institutions including universities and irrigation unions, were invited and 134 participants attended (see Table 6.1). Alongside different water-related stakeholders, participants were from the Ministry of Forestry and Water Affairs, the members of consortium and governmental officials. At the meetings, the consequences of technical assistance and general information about basin management were presented. The project team provided an overview of the project, which covered fundamental accomplished consequences, general information about the river basin management approach and the WFD as well as increasing the awareness of local authorities in the basin. During this project, in line with the requirement of the WFD, 110 water bodies were identified, along with 18 groundwaters, 58 rivers and 34 lakes. There were 14 heavily modified water bodies, which were changed due to human activities and no longer achieve good ecological status, and 12 artificial water bodies were created by human activities via physical alteration or realignment of the water body (Ribamap, 2017b: 4). Protected areas were identified in relation to Article 7 of the WFD, the Shellfish Waters Directive (2006/113/EC) and the Urban Wastewater Treatment (91/271/EEC) (Ribamap, 2016b: 7). Beside these assessments, an impact analysis was made to identify the adverse effects of human activities (pressures) on water bodies. For example, 6 groundwaters were classified as 'high risk', 7 of them 'medium risk' and 5 of them as 'low risk' (Ribamap, 2016b: 16). For rivers, 14 of them were judged 'high risk', 32 as 'medium' and 12 as 'low risk' (Ribamap, 2016b: 13). It was also identified that the Konya Organised Industrial Zones and sugar factories in Konya, Nigde and Aksaray provinces increased their wastewater

discharges and pollution in the basin (Ribamap, 2017b: 19). An economic analysis of the basin included examination of water use by sectors, water services and pricing (Ribamap, 2017b).

6.3 Analysis of social learning at Konya (closed) basin across three stages

Three main mechanisms for social learning were employed to determine the analysis of Europeanisation as described in Chapters 3 and 5, first at national level and in this chapter at river basin level. These mechanisms include *superficial, partial* and *transformative forms* of learning that can be assessed by using norm acquisition, translation and dissemination. These criteria can be assessed in the case of the Konya basin across the three stages outlined. Therefore, this chapter firstly conducts an analysis of social learning, encompassing the multi-level learning activities of actors, before examining how such learning leads to specific socialisation outcomes (see also Chapter 3).

6.3.1 First phase 1999-2006

Following the pattern of social learning at national level, this process could be considered limited during the first development phase in the river basin. As identified in Chapter 3, superficial learning occurs when EU water policy norms become communicated to specific actors, resulting in limited acquisition of norms with some provisional degree of norm translation occurring, and also limited forms of dissemination to other actors. Such a superficial form of learning is evident from the data collected on this period.

As explained in section 6.2, the main project innovation occurred through the 'Towards Wise Use of the Konya Closed Basin' initiative. It is clear that some progress was made enhancing dialogue and increasing actors' awareness and information on IRBM through the educational programs and stakeholder meetings at basin level. In total, 2000 farmers were trained on sustainable irrigation, organic farming so there was some information acquisition, but learning was at a *superficial* level. Actors passively acquired information about the WFD process but importantly it is hard to observe active translation and

dissemination of this information (see Heikkila and Gerlak, 2013). According to Divrak and Demirayak (2011), some obstacles to implementation were faced during the project, meaning that some stakeholders hesitated to express their concerns and issues at the onset. This is probably because they did not believe in the significance of participation due to centralised structure of the administrative system, reflecting the nature of pre-existing institutions (ibid.).

However, as the project progressed, local actors' dialogue with governmental actors and the EU experts improved via stakeholder workshops and meetings. Norm acquisition started to occur as actors gained confidence in the system, but this remained at a very early stage. For example, even though the Tuz Lake Management Plan was completed, other management plans were still on progress. Therefore, little evidence was found of these actors actively evaluating the new information and integrating them into management. Given the rather preliminary nature of the projects, dissemination of EU norms within a wider institutional community through group interaction was very limited and remained at superficial level, along with little multi-level network interaction. Therefore, social learning can be coded as *superficial* level during this phase.

6.3.2 Second phase 2007-2013

In this period, some collaborative activities between national and local actors, can be witnessed as norm acquisition, translation and dissemination, started to increase. For example, in order to prepare the Konya Basin Action Plan, three stakeholder meetings were organised by the MoEF. In accordance with the feedback from the stakeholders, the RBAP for Konya basin was prepared resulting in further norm acquisition but also the use of EU-derived information on the WFD in the plan preparation. Such information was also disseminated to the wider community involved. The KOP RDA, established in 2011, enhanced interaction and coordination with several local and governmental actors in order to prepare the action plan. Accordingly, it was an important initial step in terms of understanding the concerns, ideas and information flows from stakeholders. The Mevlana and Ahiler Development Agencies, established in 2008 and 2009 respectively, were efficient in providing interaction amongst local actors.

Therefore, just as in the previous phase, there was some interaction and information flows visible, showing information acquisition (see Heikkila and Gerlak, 2013). However, *translation* and *dissemination* of information were still limited. Therefore, social learning was still at a *superficial/partial* level.

6.3.3 Third phase 2014-present

It is clear that after 2014, within the scope of KOP Action Plan, there were a number of capacity building activities for farmers and local authorities in coordination with the related ministries, universities and development agencies leading to more extensive forms of learning. By the establishment of the UNICOP, the Drought Management Expert Committee and the Ahiler Development Agency, coordination amongst local and governmental actors increased and several capacity building activities were organised (see Table 6.1). Local technical staff, from directorates, municipalities and also farmers, were trained on irrigation and efficient farming. Research and development activities were internalised and coordinated by the KOP RDA (see Table 6.1). For example, under the scope of the KOP Agricultural Training Project, 1206 technical staff were trained with 27 training programs along with 2760 farmers in 32 training programs. It particularly aimed to train young and female farmers on efficient usage of soil and water, and stock farming. Therefore, acquisition, transition and dissemination of information across multiple networks were observable from the thesis research.

The more recent phase has resulted in the emergence of partial level learning with nascent forms of transformative learning, although the results are variable. On the one hand, some participants had a chance to learn what basin is and a basin management approach via the stakeholders meetings, i.e. active EU norm acquisition, translation and dissemination were occurring. Actors, were actively engaged in acquiring WFD norms and then interpreting them in terms of their own management experiences. When asked “do you have any idea about what is basin and basin management, when did you learn first and were these meeting were useful?”, one participant Interviewee 33 (2017) stated “I did not have knowledge on basins or basin management. After I attended the meetings,

I came to the conclusion that this system is useful. However, it could become more productive.” Interviewee 35 (2017) also said “yes I learned when I attended the first meeting, finding it useful.” Also, one of the participants from a public health directorate at the stakeholder meetings stated “I am generally invited to these kinds of meetings and thanks to these meetings I have knowledge about this system. I find this system useful.”

Some participants already had little knowledge on basin management which they developed via these meetings through acquisition of WFD norms. Interviewee 32 (2017); Interviewee 36 (2017) indicated that they knew of the basin management system before but this meeting was helpful in consolidating their knowledge. Similarly, another participant expressed that she already knew about basin management plans. She then had a chance to attend a stakeholder meeting to acquire more knowledge which supported this pre-existing understanding of planning (Interviewee 37, 2017). Again, Interviewee 40 (2017); Interviewee 41 (2017) expressed they learned what basin management approach is from degree studies but these meetings were helpful for understanding more through each interaction. Another local actor indicated that after the meetings he gained more information about irrigation systems and related studies, and the efficient use of water at basin level (Interviewee 36, 2017).

However, some actors did not find these meetings useful, suggesting that learning was not always occurring due to limited acquisition of WFD norms combined with a resistance from actors to add to their existing knowledge. For instance, one official from an irrigation union indicated that they knew the situation of the Konya basin very well before the EU process, so in 2016, they helped with the preparation of the sectoral water allocation plan. Accordingly, she stated that they have already used their water efficiently and these meetings do not provide any return (Interviewee 38, 2017). One academic expressed that he knew what the basin management approach is from his research. However, he added that separate research was being conducted by agriculturists, geologists, hydrologists, civil engineers and environmental engineers and there should have been better coordination. He then stated that

he was not sure whether these meetings were useful or not (Interviewee 39, 2017), suggesting that leaning was not universally widespread amongst the participants.

While a partial form of learning is then occurring, evidence for a transformative level of learning is somewhat lacking, i.e. active norm acquisition, use of new knowledge on the WFD, and its active dissemination to other actors. When asked whether they learned from other actors' perspectives, For example, Interviewee 32 (2017) stated he had a chance to learn other stakeholders' concerns and requests. One concern was the lack of implementation measures in the basin. Interviewee 34 (2017) indicated after the meeting it was clear that if the necessary measures had not been taken, there would be serious problems regarding lack of water. But the meetings were leading to active discussion of these issues. Interviewee 38 (2017), for example, emphasised "I learned the points that I agree with other stakeholder and the other points that I do not agree with." Similarly, Interviewee 41 (2017) expressed "Now, I have ideas about other stakeholders' perspectives and concerns after the meeting."

Other actors learned more technical details from the process. Interviewee 40 (2017) indicated he learned that the DSI permits for opening water-well and irrigation water have been distributed by the irrigation unions by charging. Therefore, there was a change in individual understanding and acquisition of information on basin management via these meetings and an increase of awareness regarding the issues at the Konya basin as well as actors initiated to learn to communicate with each other and their concerns. In addition, compared to the second phase there was some progress on learning and increasing awareness of actors through capacity building activities. However, the acquisition and translation of information varies depending on individuals' background, so *acquisition* and some level of *translation* were evident however *dissemination* was still weak. Therefore social learning can be coded as *partial* in the third phase, despite the emergence – albeit limited – of *transformative* forms, depending on the specific actor.

6.4 Analysis of socialisation at Konya (closed) basin across three stages

The previous section mentioned at which degree social learning occurred at Konya basin over time but the critical question is whether it actually then led to socialisation of these actors, as the Europeanisation theory in Chapter 3 would predict. The significant point to distinguish between socialisation and social learning mechanisms is implementation of EU rules and resultant behavioural changes. This is because, as explicitly mentioned in Chapter 3, social learning may or may not cause changes in actors' behaviours, which then equates to socialisation. This chapter therefore analyses socialisation and also seeks to elucidate whether it occurred amongst policy actors using the indicators of *formal and behavioural* concepts of socialisation (see Chapter 3). Accordingly, this section explains whether local actors were socialised through low, partial or deeper levels of socialisation (see Lewis, 2003) by practising community rules in coordination with governmental actors, as well as exploring whether norm internalisation occur at Konya basin.

6.4.1 First phase 1999-2006

In this phase management plans, including the Tuz Lake Management Plan, the Beyşehir Lake Management Plan and the Eregli Marshes Management Plan, were initiated, but only the Tuz Lake Management Plan was completed in 2008 (see Salmaner, 2008). Capacity building activities, stakeholder meetings and some education programmes for farmers and other local actors were started, and via these activities communication and dialogue were established. In this phase, formal and behavioural socialisation were in evidence as actors implemented EU rules to a very limited degree. Therefore, individual understanding for some farmers and local actors increased, because the activities occurred in a small part of the basin. However, behavioural changes and belief changes were at very early stage to occur and proved difficult to detect, so there is low norm internalisation occur at this stage.

6.4.2 Second phase 2007-2013

The KOP RDA was established to prepare and coordinate the KOP Action Plan in 2011 in this phase. In addition, two development agencies, the Ahiler and Mevlana Development Agencies, were established in line with the Accession Agreement Chapter 22, which is for 'Regional policy and coordination of structural instruments' (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Development, 2014: 14). The RBAP for Konya basin was also prepared in 2010 (General Directorate of Environmental Management, 2010: 57), precipitating further *formal* socialisation as EU rules were implemented on the ground. During the preparation stage, three stakeholder meetings were organised at basin level: an opening meeting (25/11/2010); a 2nd stakeholder meeting (25/10/2010); and the last stakeholder meeting (20/12/2010).

While *formal* socialisation is apparent in this period, the beginning of *behavioural* socialisation is also evident. As described above and in Chapter 3, socialisation here moves beyond actors implementing EU water norms and creating new organisational structures to a situation where these actors shift their behaviours to comply with the norms. Although difficult to measure, in this second phase it is possible to detect changes in actors' behaviours, as officials became actively engaged with the EU projects to prepare reports, which was mainly governmental actors' responsibility. For example, the project for 'Preparation of Drought Management Plan of Konya Basin (2013-2015)' was initiated in this process. The governmental officials also received feedback from local actors, so it can be seen that there was nascent communication and interaction between actors at national and basin levels. But while actors began to implement WFD requirements through projects, interviews suggested limited discursive shifts occurred around actors' use of WFD ideas in water management.

In terms of norm internalisation, there should be belief changes which should be observable in the actors' behaviours (see Flockhart, 2004). Even if there were some behavioural and legal/structural changes, it is hard to observe that actors' beliefs changed, so socialisation was *low/partial*.

6.4.3 Third phase 2014-present

In this phase, a *formal* form of socialisation has emerged as actors have continued to implement WFD rules. For example, the UNIKOP and the Drought Management Expert Committee were established. Also, the 'Project for Preparation of Drought Management Plan of the Konya Basin (2013-2015)' and the 'Project on Preparation of Konya Closed Basin Sectoral Water Allocation Plan (2016-2018)' were carried out. In addition, there were several wastewater network construction and drinking water network construction, wastewater treatment plants constructions were completed (see Table 5.4; Appendix 8). Therefore, unlike the previous two phases, a *behavioural* form of socialisation is more detectable. Coordination and dialogue were enhanced through these structural changes. This aspect was apparent from the interviews as local actors spoke about how their behaviours were changing.

During the observation, when asked one of the participants from the provincial directorates stated "After this, I look at the basin differently" (Interviewee 36 (2017)). He stated that the studies at basin level were very helpful to him in supporting work to address problems in the basin. Other interviews agreed with this statement. Interviewee 35 (2017) said that even if there are some deficiencies with the process, basin management approach is a good system. Another participant indicated that river basin management is effective but there should be better communication between the basins (Interviewee 37, 2017). Interviewee 39 (2017) also indicated that the basin management approach is definitely helpful in solving problems, however the projects firstly should have started in small basins and applied in larger ones after the lessons learned. Therefore, through the stakeholder meetings via EU-funded projects, actors started to refer more explicitly to community rules and accordingly their beliefs started to change.

Coordination between local and governmental actors has also increased as a result of the project process, resulting in behavioural change. The agencies and the KOP RDA are effective in establishing coordination between local and governmental actors and also amongst the local actors. For example, one of the

duties of development agencies is to organise research-development activities and construction of laboratories by providing coordination between industry and universities. In this process, there were more projects created at the local level, including the KOYDES and SUKAP. Under these projects, stakeholders improved dialogue while technical staff had training on research-development. As a result, their technical knowledge and awareness of river basin management increased. In terms of agricultural development and the drought issue, farmers also assimilated water saving techniques as a result of participation. Accordingly, the farmers' behaviours manifestly changed through this process as they now typically use modern irrigation systems. Also, because local municipalities and governors attended the meetings, their coordination gradually increased. The local institutions used to work independently in water management but started to cooperate under the IPA projects. Regarding this point, Interviewee 40 (2017) indicated there were some positive changes after the EU process, including enhanced cooperation in the preparation of action plans and stakeholder meetings. Behavioural forms of socialisation therefore became more evident during this phase.

In this process some positive, albeit limited changes took place in behaviours of actors but also communicating ideas around EU norms. As a result of the WFD project process, awareness of pre-existing problems and potential solutions linked to river basin management certainly increased through the discussions. After basin management committees were established, participants engaged in greater communication and they attended stakeholders meetings via the IPA projects. During the meetings, they discussed technical and methodological responses. National governments also received some feedback from local officials, therefore there was information flow and interactions between local and governmental actors via these meetings. In terms of providing communication and changing each other's ideas and perspectives, some participants found stakeholder meetings at local level effective. For example, Interviewee 38 (2017) emphasised the usefulness of meetings for generating trust and communication amongst the actors around river basin management. She also added that she managed to change others' ideas via these meetings.

Interviewee 40 (2017) stated “I am not sure about building trust, but these meetings are helpful in terms of communication.” Interviewee 42 (2017) claimed the system will be efficient if implementation integrates the ideas of local actors and stakeholders. Finally, some officials indicated that stakeholder meetings were definitely useful to communicate ideas on river basin management with other actors and to generate trust (Interviewee 42, 2017; Interviewee 32, 2017).

Consequently *partial* form of socialisation was detectable despite some officials indicating that stakeholders meetings were inadequate for communication and building trust around river basin management (Interviewee 33, 2017; Interviewee 34, 2017; Interviewee 36, 2017; Interviewee 39, 2017). Interviewee 39 (2017) stated “I could not learn from others because it was so crowded and participants were from different backgrounds, so there should have been small group meetings for better results.” He added that he tried to change others’ perspectives but he was not sure how much this actually happened. Interviewee 37 (2017) indicated that “these meetings can be helpful for communication, but they personally were not useful for me to learn others’ perspectives.”

So what was driving this constraint on socialisation? Resistance to the WFD resulted from the problematic structure of the basin itself, related technological/methodological issues and the perceptions of individual actors. Interview 35 (2017) from an organised industrial zone expressed:

“I grew up in Konya. Industry is [limited] so there is not too much pollution... geographical regions are different from Europe. I do not think this system will be carried on; it considers all sectors including drinking water, industry and agriculture. Turkey is different from other countries, why do we take the European system?”

He also supported the idea of water transfer in the Konya basin and added that the “Manavgat river flows through to the Mediterranean sea. We can export this water”. Interviewee 40 (2017) stated that the basin management approach is not a better system to solve water related problems. Regarding this point, Interviewee 38 (2017) indicated that river basin management is not going to solve the problems in every region. Interviewee 39 (2017) also emphasised the

lack of progress made regarding water management at basin level. Others questioned the relevance of the process to them personally. For example Interviewee 37 (2017) said “I am not an expert on water management, so I do not have lots of information regarding the changes in this process, I work on waste management.” Other interviewees commented on the scale of the basin, the lack of relevant data for planning and monitoring measures, and the specific water use issues in the basin around agricultural irrigation, making the assimilation of EU norms more difficult.

6.5 Conclusions

The analysis in Chapter 6 has focused on whether local actors in the Konya basin became socialised through the mechanism of social learning during the adoption process to the WFD. During the first stage, social learning was very limited (*superficial*) or almost non-existent, reflecting the preliminary nature of the WFD implementation process. Unlike the national level policy implementation (Chapter 5), this process had a longing lead time as the projects were established. In the second stage, more local actors learned about the WFD while formal form of socialisation occurred as implementation started. In the last stage, multi-level actor interaction increased in parallel with the EU and governmental projects, for example the preparation of the RBMPs and the KOP project. However, norm acquisition, translation and dissemination were still not widespread, suggesting that only partial level learning had developed. When considering socialisation outcomes, some partial/deeper forms of socialisation were evident through sharing and learning around WFD norms but resistance in terms of water transfer and some methodological issues to the EU process was also detected. At this point in time, norm internalisation is still weak and even though actors' behaviours have visibly changed, changes in their beliefs and interests are still in their very early stages.

Chapter 7: Implementing the Water Framework Directive at river basin level: Büyük Menderes river basin

7.1 Introduction

Both Chapter 5 and 6 examined how well social learning and socialisation theory could explain patterns of Europeanisation, the former at national level and the latter at river basin level in Konya. This chapter aims to follow both of these analyses, using the same approach. Although documentary sources and interviews were employed for data collection, as explained in Chapter 4, participant observation was also applied in this basin. During the stakeholder meetings, participants were asked various questions in line with EU projects and related activities at basin level and whether they learned from governmental and foreign experts as well as whether their interests, beliefs and behaviours were influenced as a result.

7.2 Büyük Menderes river basin

Büyük Menderes basin (BMB) is one of the most densely populated basins in Turkey, with a population of 2.5 million. It contains the longest river which drains into the Aegean Sea, at 585 km in length (Büke et al., 2013). The BMB basin covers the 10 provinces (see Figure 7.1) of Izmir, Manisa, Usak, Mugla, Afyonkarahisar, Aydin Denizli, Isparta, Kutahya and Burdur (Hermans, 2005b; Ministry of Forestry and Water Affairs, 2015: 8). In total, the BMB covers 3.3% of Turkey's landmass, which equates to 26.361 km² (Ribamap, 2016c: 1). The most common land use in the basin is agriculture, which covers 44% of the total basin area. In addition, 20% of the basin area is covered by forest, 1% is covered by surface water and 33% semi-natural areas (Ministry of Forestry and Water Affairs, 2015: 8). Also, around 65% of the population lives in urban areas such as Nazilli, Aydin and Söke (Özonat, 2013: 83).



Figure 7.1: The location of the Büyük Menderes basin district (Ribamap, 2016c: 1).

There have been some environmental issues at the basin due to land use and economic activities, including industrial, agricultural, mining, forestry and tourism activities. The level of groundwater has also decreased due to climate change, water abstraction and administrative issues, relating to the existence of several provincial and central organisations, and legal issues, which derive from several water-related regulations. The inconsistency of regulations causes conflicts amongst these institutions as well as a lack of coordination and authority issues (Özonat, 2013). In the same vein, within the BMB, the major environmental issue is pollution caused by agriculture, livestock, untreated industrial and urban discharges, plus leakages and discharges from solid waste storage areas of municipalities into surface and groundwater. Other major sources of pollution stem from domestic use (Ribamap, 2016c).

7.2.1 Projects in the Büyük Menderes basin – 1999-2006

Chapter 6 showed how various national-EU projects were used to develop the WFD implementation at the river basin scale. As in Konya, this process started soon after the Accession Agreement was signed with the EU. In this early phase, between 1999 and 2006, the BMB was a pilot region to practice WFD implementation within a project, called the MATRA - Implementation of the Water Framework Directive (MATO1/TR/9/3). This project focused on public

participation in decision-making regarding water management, river basin management, knowledge transfer and integrated water management (Hermans, 2005a). The project was primarily supported by Dutch Government agencies and targeted a better understanding of the WFD amongst Turkish actors with regards to necessary organisational and executive changes at local and national levels (Hermans, 2005b). Project implementation was conducted through the coordination of the Dutch and Turkish governments and external experts through a mutual learning process and informational flow (ibid.). Several actors comprised the Dutch side of the project, encompassing Grontmij Consulting Engineers, Ecorys-Netherlands Economic Institute, two Dutch governmental agencies, the Directorate-General of Public Works, and the Water Management and Waterboard Hunze. An academic institute, UNESCO-IHE Delft, assisted Turkish experts in developing the WFD process through providing short-term training. Turkish partners included Turkish governmental institutions from regional and central levels and the Turkish consultant Kentkur Consultancy (Özonat, 2013).

Within the scope of the MATRA project, two working groups, at national and local levels, were established. Firstly, the National Platform which included all major stakeholders at national level, aimed at enabling decision-making regarding WFD related issues (Alpaslan et al., 2007). Secondly, the River Basin Working Group (RBWG) including representatives of related public and local organisations, was initiated (see Table 7.1; Figure 7.2). The RBWG's aim was to prepare a draft RBMP for the BMB (Alpaslan et al., 2007). Accordingly, experts from the RBWG were trained by the Dutch team on the preparation of the RBMP and the establishment of the river basin districts via mutual learning, information exchange and letting Turkish experts practice implementation on their own (Wijk et al., 2004; DSI, 2014).

Initially, the Dutch project team lacked information on the BMB, requiring it to undertake an actor analysis to prepare the training programme for the representatives in the Netherlands. A Dynamic Actor Network Analysis (DANA) was used to select participants and evaluate their background information on integrated river basin management. Therefore, the actor analysis was mainly

based on interviews because of lack of the English documentary sources (Hermans, 2005a). In total, 19 representatives, from Irrigation Unions, provincial governors, Chambers of Agriculture and Commerce, Industries, and regional directorates of governmental agencies, were interviewed. They were asked questions regarding their perspectives on water resources management; the problems, possible solutions and role of the actors in solving the issues (Hermans, 2005a). According to the actor analysis, the Dutch team recognised that actors had a good knowledge and awareness of river basin management, therefore the MATRA project focused on development and implementation of the RBMPs rather than basic technical capacity building (Özonat, 2013).

Within the context of MATRA, stakeholder meetings were organised to start this process. A regional stakeholder workshop was held on 03/09/2002 in Aydin attended by participants from NGOs and related institutions. During this workshop, the project was introduced and the outcomes of the actor analysis presented. On the basis of the discussions, the RBWG was created¹⁷, which then had several meetings with the Dutch Consortium (see Table 7.2). The project team had a separate meeting on 05/09/2002 with the RWT to discuss the project (Hermans, 2005a). There was another meeting of the project team with the RBWG on 10/12/2002. The project team's members also had their first stakeholder workshop on 12/12/2002, followed by another one on 13.05.2003. As a result of the project team and RWT meetings, the outcomes of the analysis were validated in terms of the evaluation of water quality (Hermans, 2005a). Four teams were established to undertake the preparation of the draft RBMP. These were the 'Technical Expert Team for Characterisation', 'Technical Expert Team for Pressure and Impact', 'Technical Expert Team for Ecology', and 'Technical Expert Team for Measures' (Özonat, 2013). These teams supported the RBWG (see Figure 7.2).

¹⁷ The RBWG includes Provincial Directorate of Environment and Forestry, 21st Regional Directorate of DSI, Provincial Directorate of Agriculture, Provincial Directorate of Rural Services, Provincial Directorate of Health, Provincial Directorate of Forestry, Provincial Directorate of Tourism, Provincial Directorate of Industry and Trade and Adnan Menderes University in Aydin




Figure 7.2: Institutional structure of the Büyük Menderes river basin management (Özonat, 2013: 95).

In addition, the RBWG organised an information meeting on 09/01/2004 with the participation of 126 stakeholders in Aydın¹⁸ (DSI, 2014) (see Table 7.1). At this meeting, background information and ongoing activities were explained to the stakeholders and it was emphasised that the meetings were significant in providing coordination for an integrated river basin approach (Ministry of Forestry and Water Affairs, 2014).

As a result of the MATRA project, the river basin districts in Turkey were defined by the national platform. A draft RBMP for the BMB was completed in 2003, which was a significant step for Turkey in implementing the WFD. Also, regarding the issues surrounding water management in the basin, the team emphasised the institutional and administrative problems, including limited budget, lack of coordination amongst the organisations and limited staff, the influence of politicians regarding water management, and the overlapping activities of governmental institutions (Hermans, 2005a).

¹⁸ The participants at the information meeting of the Büyük Menderes basin included the 21st Regional Directorate of DSI, the head of the department of River Basin Plan, Governor of Province of Aydın, officials from GDWM, Deputy Manager of GDWM, represents from Aydın Water and Sewerage Administration, and Deputy Mayors of Provinces of Burdur, Denizli and Isparta.

Table 7.1: The participants of the Büyük Menderes River Basin Working Group (Alpaslan et al., 2007: 160).

Provincial Directorate of Environment and Forestry
21st Regional Directorate of DSI (State Hydraulic Works)
Provincial Directorate of Agriculture
Provincial Directorate of Rural Services
Provincial Directorate of Health
Provincial Directorate of Forestry
Provincial Directorate of Tourism
Provincial Directorate of Industry and Trade
Adnan Menderes University in Aydin

Table 7.2: Timeline of actor analysis for the IWFD Turkey project (Hermans, 2005: 124).

Date		Event
2002	Jan 1	Start of Implementation WFD Turkey project
	Feb 12	Meeting with project manager Ecorys-NEI
	Feb/Mar	Project team short mission to Turkey
	Apr 11	Meeting with project manager and director in Rotterdam
	Apr 12	Email introduction to Turkish project consultant
	Apr 19	First proposal and planning for actor analysis in Turkey
	Apr/May	Change of pilot project area to Buyuk Menderes basin
	Jun 4	Meeting with Turkish project consultants at IHE Delft
	Jun 14	Meeting with project consultants at Grontmij Houten
	Jul 11	Detailed planning emailed to project team NL and Turkey
	Aug 12	Start data collection in Turkey
	Aug 13-16	Interviews actors in Aydin
	Aug 19-22	Interviews actors in Denizli
	Aug 23-30	Constructing DANA models and analysis of results
	Sep 2-5	Preparing / conducting project workshops in Aydin
	Sep 13	Written report actor analysis results (emailed from Delft)
	Dec 10	Evaluation with Regional Working Group at IHE Delft
	12	Evaluation with project team at IHE Delft
2003	May 13	Evaluation with project manager at Ecorys-NEI

7.2.2 Projects in the Büyük Menderes basin – 2007-2013

After the initial process, a new phase in project development occurred. Firstly, the Twinning project, called the 'Capacity Building Support to the Water Sector in Turkey (2007-2009)' was conducted with cooperation of the UK, Netherlands and Slovak Republic. The aims of the project were to conduct a legal analysis of the WFD, UWWTD and Dangerous Substances Directive (DSD), implement these directives in the pilot basin, and also develop both internal and external communication strategies (Özonat, 2013). A steering Committee, including project leaders, Twinning advisors and representatives from governmental institutions, was established whose committee met four times a year. The first meeting of the project took place in February 2008, with the participation of governmental and non-governmental institutions. Accordingly, the Büyük Menderes Environmental Protection Union (BMEPU), including a number of stakeholders from the provinces of Usak, Aydin and Denizli, was established in order to provide stakeholder participation, guidance and direction from regional actors within the BMB (Özonat, 2013). Additionally, a working group, including foreigner experts and Turkish experts was set up to prepare the various parts of the RBMP for the BMB.

The RBMP for the BMB that was drafted during the MATRA project, was updated in this phase. A characterisation report, based on the draft was prepared and the working group drafted the final version of the BMB RBMP which proposed a new monitoring system and programme of measures, as required by the WFD. Besides the updating of the draft plan, a communication plan was created for stakeholder participation and to increase public awareness. Accordingly, several meetings were organised in 2008-2009 under the coordination of the BMEPU to engage with stakeholders at basin level. These meetings helped to increase dialogue and information flow amongst the main stakeholders, including farmers, industrialists, managers of treatment plants, NGOs, irrigation unions and governorates (Özonat, 2013).

The second significant EU-funded project was the 'Technical Assistance for Capacity Building on Water Quality Monitoring (2011-2013)'. Within the scope of

the project, regular monitoring activities were launched by the MoEF in 2011. Accordingly, the water quality parameters in the BMB were monitored. Environmental quality standards and ecological quality ratios were determined in line with the WFD and its daughter directives (DG NEAR, 2009: 22). During the project, as a requirement of Article 5 of the WFD Annex II, surface water monitoring programme and basin preparatory actions were completed between 2011 and 2014. Consequently, the surface water bodies within the basin district were identified according to surface water categories including coastal water, streams, lakes and rivers (WFD, Article 2). Hydromorphological characterisations of water bodies were also conducted, along with identification of different river water body types. Also, the BMB monitoring programme (hydromorphological, chemical, physicochemical, biological) was designed during this period (Ministry of Forestry and Water Affairs, 2015).

Additionally, the water use by different socio-economic sectors and water pricing was also analysed: another requirement of the WFD (Ribamap, 2016c). These activities within the BMB helped to increase the knowledge and experience of the actors. Finally, a Basin Measures Strategy Paper for the BMB, was prepared by the MoFWA. This document encompassed measures for reducing pollution; the establishment of wastewater treatment plants for industries; the establishment of hazardous waste handling; and recycling and disposal activities. Regarding the implementation of these activities, the Büyük Menderes Follow-up Commission was also created to assess progress.

7.2.3 Projects in the Büyük Menderes basin – 2014-present

In this phase, one of the most significant projects related to implementing Article 13 of the WFD is the ‘Technical Assistance for the Conversion of RBAPs into RBMPs’, which started in 2014. Article 13 of the WFD requires states to produce a river basin management plan for each river basin district. In order to undertake this requirement within the project, characterisations of resources in each river basin, according to Article 5 of the WFD, required completion. Accordingly, the characterisation encompassed initial identification of water bodies, environmental pressures and their environmental impacts on waters

(DG NEAR, 2012). Therefore, within the BMB, 172 water bodies were initially identified, including 38 groundwaters, 81 rivers, 48 lakes and 2 coastal water bodies (Ribamap, 2016c: 4).

Moreover, in line with Article 6 of the WFD and other related directives, including Bathing Water Quality (76/160/EEC), Shellfish Waters Directive (2006/113/EC) and Urban Waste Water Directive (91/271/EEC), the protected areas were identified (Ribamap, 2016c). Several stakeholder meetings were organised as part of the project, on 03-05/06/2015, 09/05/2017 and 06/04/2018, which included the participation of general directorates, the provincial bank, universities, water and sewerage administrations, and deputy governors. Project activities remain ongoing.

7.3 Analysis of social learning at the Büyük Menderes basin across three stages

As described in Chapters 3, 5 and 6 three main mechanisms for social learning were used to analyse Europeanisation, initially at national level and then at river basin level, based on norm acquisition, translation and dissemination. These criteria are assessed in this section for the BMB within the three phases of its development described above. Initially the analysis considers *superficial*, *partial* and *transformative levels* of learning with regards to actors' learning (see Chapter 3).

7.3.1 First phase 1999-2006

The aim of MATRA project was to improve knowledge of the WFD in related to organisations, policy-makers and the public (Hermans, 2005a). The majority of this interaction occurred within the RBWG and Dutch team helping local actors to acquire information on WFD. Accordingly, local actors learned from both internal and external sources through dialogue via meetings, trainings and workshops. Consequently, passive acquisition of information was evident at this stage, resulting in more superficial forms of learning. In addition, there is some evidence that these actors started to interpret this information and disseminate them to others via the stakeholder meetings in 2002 and 2003 mentioned

above. Also, 126 participants in BMB attended the information meetings which took place in Aydin in 2004 and they were informed on integrated river basin approach. This shows that the information flow and dissemination of information to the local level were evident.

The above overview shows that the local representatives of the RBWG therefore had a chance to interact and talk about the problems and potential solutions at the basin. They could learn from the process individually but also about each other's concerns and perspectives, which is evident from analysis of early meeting documents. This nascent learning process continued into the initial preparation of the draft RBMP. It seems that there is also some level of *translation* and *dissemination* occurring during this phase rather than just the passive acquiring of information. The RBWG members gained experience by preparing of characterisation of the river basin. For example, the water bodies were categorised based on their size, salinity and connection to the rivers; analysis of impacts and pressures; mapping of monitoring network according to the Article 8 of WFD; and identification and mapping of protected areas (Özonat, 2013). Additionally, some pilot studies were conducted in the upper part of the Curuksu Creek, Bafa Lake and BM Delta during this time (Alpaslan et al., 2007). However, this project only lasted 2 years due to limited budget and time, so it could not meet the expected outcomes. Therefore some actors acquired information and learned from the Dutch experts (external sources) through practicing how to prepare the RBMPs which infers to some level of *translation* and limited *dissemination*. Accordingly, social learning can be coded as being at a *superficial* level.

7.3.2 Second phase 2007-2013

Information acquisition and translation via EU projects continued into the second developmental phase, with a more *partial* form of learning increasingly apparent. Here, WFD norm acquisition was manifestly more active, with actors using this information in their decision-making and then disseminating it to others, not only in their immediate 'community', but also to actors in other groups. Within the context of the 'Technical Assistance for Capacity Building on

Water Quality Monitoring (2011-2013)' project, some training activities were organised to increase individual awareness of the WFD within the BMB and they were helpful for dissemination of the information across to organisations and to local level. Additionally, farmers were trained in good agricultural practice by aiming to reduce the over-use of agricultural activities and decreasing pollution, i.e. norm acquisition was apparent. Regarding this, two projects were organised, led by NGOs. The first project, 'Expanding the Rational Use of Agricultural Chemicals in Büyük Menderes River Basin', was implemented by the coordination of the Denizli Chamber of Agriculture and Nature and Environment Foundation; and funded by EU environmental fund. Under this project, was conducted in a pilot area (Saraykoy), farmers were trained in agricultural chemical use and reducing of soil and water pollution (Özonat, 2013: 104). Secondly, the project 'Water to Bafa, Crops to Aegean' was implemented with the support of WWF-Turkey and Coca-Cola Turkey in order to raise awareness of 3000 farmers. It also aimed to establish drip irrigations system across 12 villages around the Bafa Lake to save nearly 60 million tons of water (Özonat, 2013: 105).

Through the establishment of the BMEPU, several meetings were organised which increased dialogue and information flows between actors and so *dissemination* of information was enhanced during this period. Therefore, it can be seen that local actors' awareness and information increased regarding water quality and technical experience through trainings and activities, implemented in the pilot areas. Therefore, social learning was at a *partial* level at this phase.

7.3.3 Third phase 2014-present

Such *partial* learning is still evident in the current phase, although some more *transformative* forms of learning have emerged as a result of the WFD process. One factor has been an increase in the stakeholder meetings within the basin; the meetings helped to continue actor knowledge acquisition which started in the earlier stages. In the context of the project 'Technical Assistance for the Conversion of RBAPs into RBMPs', three stakeholder meetings were organised on 03-05/06/2015; 09/05/2017; and 06/04/2018. Stakeholders, from related

general directorates, the provincial bank, universities, water and sewerage administrations; and deputy governors attended these meetings (see Appendix 12). In the meetings, the stakeholder were informed of the situation of the basin and progress in completing the RBMP for the BMB. Concerns, perspectives and ideas of stakeholders were then received by the consortium and Turkish governmental experts during the meetings.

From the interview records, some interviewees improved their knowledge on basin management through these meetings, with active *translation* of WFD information occurring. Regarding this observation, Interviewee 43 (2017) said “I am an environmental engineer. I knew what a basin management approach is, however after these meetings I learned in detail and also gained new information.” In the same vein, Interviewee 44 (2017) indicated he learned new information via these meetings, adding that he found them helpful to gain new information (ibid.). Also, one participant indicated that he had a general knowledge on basin management and these meetings were helpful to developing his knowledge (Interviewee 45, 2017). Interviewee 46 (2017) stated she learnt basin management at in-service trainings and added “these meetings are useful to develop my knowledge and learn more.” Another participant said he learned the basin management approach in 2006 and it was helpful in terms of development of his environmental consciousness (Interviewee 47, 2017). Interviewee 48 (2017) also indicated that these meetings were helpful for him to learn more information, particularly about the WFD. Nevertheless, during the stakeholder meetings, some did not attend the previous stakeholder meetings and this was the first time they heard the term of ‘basin’. So, the learning and awareness varied depending on the participants’ backgrounds and the frequency of the meetings, they attended. But it is clear that there is evidence of *acquisition* and *transition* of information.

Dissemination also occurs via these meetings, as actors expressed their opinions and concerns. EU experts from the consortium and Turkish experts from the Ministries made presentations, and informed stakeholders about the WFD and related activities at the basin. The participants had a chance to meet and share their knowledge, and learn from each other’s ideas and concerns: a

feature that was evident from the interviews. Participant observation in the meetings showed that most listened to the presentation carefully and asked related questions, resulting in brainstorming about how the studies are conducted during the projects. Participants offered new ideas to the project team to consider and also they expressed their concerns about some studies and methods that were implemented in the project. It was useful for them to initiate communication and recognise any misunderstanding between them. These meetings were also efficient for social interaction amongst the participants who were not aware of each other's activities.

Some participants expressed that they learned new information about each other's activities, ideas and perspectives on water management when they met during the breaks and discuss their comments and questions on the meeting day (Interviewee 44, 2017; Interviewee 45, 2017; Interviewee 47, 2017). Interviewee 48 (2017) said "I learned the importance of water allocation, quality, distribution, the efficient use of water as well as the situation of wastewater." As a result, it was evident from the interviews and participant observation that although local actors learned, it was not widely visible for all stakeholders. Also, stakeholders had a willingness to engage more with each other in implementing the projects and the decision-making process, so social learning can be coded as *partial/transformational* in the last phase. The next section focuses on analysing whether this learning was actually resulting in socialisation around EU water norms in the BMB.

7.4 Analysis of socialisation at the Büyük Menderes basin across three stages

This section analyses socialisation mechanisms in order to understand whether socialisation is occurring and at which level: *low*, *partial*; or *deep* (see Chapter 3). More specifically, this section examines whether norm internalisation occurs during the norm transfer process. It also examines whether actors' interests and beliefs changed, and whether WFD rules are practiced over the three phases.

7.4.1 First phase 1999-2006

Formal socialisation is apparent in the first period, where actors started to adjust to WFD rules. A project team at national level and the RBWG was established (see Figure 7.2) and stakeholders had several meetings with the project team in order to ensure these rules were implemented in the BWB. *Behavioural* form of socialisation was also initiated in this process during the preparation of the draft RBMP for BMB, thereby meeting a key requirement of the WFD. The RBWG members practiced the categorising of water bodies in the upper part of the BMB, Curuksu Creek, Bafa Lake and BM Delta. All types of pressures were assessed for the impact analysis, with actors assimilating WFD practice as a result. The RBWG were given requirements to prepare the management plan regarding the WFD. Firstly, a monitoring network analysis (hydrological, chemical and ecological) was established, according to Article 8 of the WFD, for groundwater, surface waters and protected areas. Economic analysis of water use, analysis of pressures and impacts, definition of reference conditions, and mapping and identification of protected areas were also made by the RBWG (Alpaslan et al., 2007: 161; Özonat, 2013).

In the context of the MATRA project, several training, workshop and meetings were organised by the RBWG to increase their knowledge and encourage them to design the RBMPs (Özonat, 2013). The project aimed to increase the cooperation amongst the different level of decision-making bodies and public participation (Alpaslan et al., 2007). The local actors had a chance to communicate during the meetings and their awareness of each other's concerns and opinions increased. Additionally, a website and five newsletters were created to open the communication channels to public.

Therefore, in terms of norm internalisation, actors started to practice these norms via learning and produce plans and programs at basin level. However, as it was only the initial stage, actors practiced these norms under the guidance of governmental and foreign experts, but it was hard to observe that their beliefs and behaviours completely changed. Consequently, *low* socialisation occurred in this phase.

7.4.2 Second phase 2007-2013

Following the first phase, actors continued to implement WFD rules. Under the EU Twinning project, the 'Capacity Building Support to the Water Sector in Turkey' (2007-2009), a steering Committee at national level was established. The Büyük Menderes Environmental Protection Union, including a number of stakeholders from the provinces of Usak, Aydin and Denizli, was also created to provide guidance from the regional perspective within the BMB. A working group was created to prepare parts of the RBMP for the BMB and within the scope of the 'Technical Assistance for Capacity Building on Water Quality Monitoring' (2011-2013) project. The Büyük Menderes Follow-up Commission was created to control the progress of implementation of the targets, as specified in the Basin Measures Strategy Paper for Büyük Menderes. Therefore, besides the *formal* concept of socialisation, communication continued within this process amongst the actors.

Behavioural socialisation occurred as the monitoring programme, related to Article 5, Annex II of WFD, was completed. The activities, including updating the draft plan and planning the activities for the next phase, were helpful in increasing actors' individual knowledge of the WFD. There was *formal* socialisation and *behavioural* changes can be seen when actors were developing the RBMP, as well as increased communication via established groups at basin level. However, even though actors' behaviour changed, it was still hard to observe whether actors' beliefs changed over time, so socialisation was still at a *low/partial* level.

7.4.3 Third phase 2014-present

In this phase, there is a discernible shift from *formal* and *behavioural* socialisation towards greater communication and discursive interactions around WFD norms. Formal WFD rules continued to be implemented by individual actors. The basin management committees were established by a communique, so a number of actors had an opportunity to be involved in the committees, accordingly *formal* concept of socialisation was in evidence.

Actors also continued to change their behaviour in relation to WFD norms. A few participants stated they attended the IPA-I projects, changing their behaviours as a result. Interviewee 46 (2017) expressed she had a chance to attend two studies which were conducted by the GDWM. Firstly, she attended one study related to hydromorphological monitoring and the second one was for defining the situation of the wastewater treatment plants in Aydin and Denizli. However, one participant indicated that the participants should get involved in more projects. Therefore, *behavioural* forms of socialisation through EU projects via social learning can be observed but not widely diffused to all participants.

However, even if some local actors' changed their behaviour, their beliefs were not completely changed in line with the WFD. For example, Interviewee 19 (2017) said that local people do not want to implement the decisions, which had been dictated to them. Rather than telling them to implement a decision, it is logical to include them into the process and convince them to act together by explaining them the benefits of the activities. Interviewee 43 (2017) indicated that "I think the basin management approach is theoretically correct. The sanctions to implement this system should be improved and control mechanisms should be established for the institutions". Interviewee 44 (2017) said "we are at the beginning stage of the process, so we have some deficiencies. When the system has been developed over time, it will be better." One of the interviewees said this system will provide a basis for the next activities (Interviewee 45, 2017). Interviewee 46 (2017) also indicated that in terms of water quality and determination of pollution, causes and measures, the basin management system is good. Another said that the basin management system is a good system, because institutions have more tendency to take co-decision and cooperation with NGOs and universities (Interviewee 48, 2017).

Although local actors learn more via stakeholder meetings and even some actors find the system useful, it is clear that it is not widely accepted by all the participants at local level. The awareness of basin management is increasing but it will take time for local actors to internalise the new system. Also, there is still a resistance from some local actors. It is evident from the interviews and observation that actors have different knowledge and skills: some actors,

already have knowledge on the basin, gain more information via the meetings; others, who do not have knowledge, get confused during the meetings. While formal and behavioural socialisation is evident, actors' beliefs and ideas are not completely changed, so socialisation is still at a *partial* level.

7.5 Conclusions

This chapter focused on examining the basin management activities regarding the WFD and related directives from social learning and socialisation mechanisms at the BMB. The EU-funded projects were implemented at the BMB to support the WFD process and they helped actors acquiring information over time. Some working groups were created for effective partnership between national and local and also international level, however the stakeholder participation was narrow and although there were some pilot studies in the basin, these just covered small parts of the basin until the third phase. From the interview records and observation, even though EU-funded projects resulted positive outcomes in terms of improving public participation, coordination, capacity building and increasing knowledge on WFD, it is not widely circulated to the all stakeholders at local level. Stakeholders still require to learn and interact with the governmental actors as well as increase engagement with the projects more. Therefore, in terms of socialisation, although there has been formal socialisation and behavioural changes, it is still not clear that actors changed their beliefs and identities regarding EU water policy, i.e. socialisation is only partial.

Chapter 8: Assessing the value of sociological institutionalism for explaining the Europeanisation of Turkish water policy: A discussion

8.1 Introduction

The preceding chapters focused on the data collection and analysis of empirical material. This chapter aims to return to the research objectives to elucidate how well they have been met and also discuss the empirical findings. Accordingly, this chapter focuses on the following themes: firstly, it summarises the implementation of EU water policy at both levels, secondly, it examines how rational theories can explain these patterns and thirdly, it discusses how well sociological institutionalism is able to explain the patterns compared to rational theory. The fundamental objective of the thesis is to empirically examine how Turkey is adapting to EU water policy in the absence of credible EU membership and understand the motivations of policy-makers. More importantly, how can sociological institutionalism, in the form of social learning and socialisation analysis, give a better explanation for Europeanisation in Turkey's water governance? Finally, it considers the implications for policy recommendations and future policy predictions regarding the consequences of the study.

8.2 How has the EU Water Framework Directive been implemented in Turkey?

Chapters 5, 6 and 7 focused on multi-level implementation of WFD in the Turkish water policy sector. They identified that Turkey made important financial, technical and institutional investments through the process of transferring the policy within the EU-funded projects, increasing over time from 2002 until present (see Table 5.1). The implementation process can be examined at national level and within individual river basin case studies.

A similar process to the Common Implementation Strategy, in which member states interacted, and collaborated via working groups and workshops, was observed under the IPA I-II projects in Turkey. For example, under the MATRA,

2 working groups, national (including foreign and Turkish experts) and local levels, were established and a handbook including methodologies and guidance for the preparation of RBMP in Buyuk Menderes basin was prepared in collaboration with the Dutch consultants (Alparslan et al., 2007; Sumer, 2016). Also, under the project on 'Alignment in Bathing Water Monitoring' (2010-2014) guidance documents for Turkish experts to implement the EU Bathing Directive (2006/7/EC) were prepared by Italian and French experts (Dikmen and Irmak, 2016). Under the EU Twinning projects on the 'Capacity Building Support to the Water Sector in Turkey' (2007-2009) and Technical Assistance for Capacity Building on Water Quality Monitoring' (2011-2013) project working groups were created. The working groups were responsible for providing coordination amongst the related responsible directorates and local actors and also prepare the reports/ guidance/ handbook in coordination with the EU experts. Besides, the working groups in CIS aimed to create a common understanding of the requirement for the implementation of the related directives (European Commission, 2015f), this was also an aim for the EU-led projects.

Therefore, during the EU-funded projects, Turkish experts interacted with other stakeholders and EU experts, so there was information flow and discussion of the methods and guidance documents. They had a chance to interact with each other and with the EU experts via EU-led projects (Chapter 5). As Interviewee 20 stated the methods, which have been used in Europe, can be different from Turkey. Turkish experts read EU guidance documents and discuss with the EU experts under the EU-led projects. If they thought the methods were not suitable with geographical conditions, climate, and agriculture, they created a suitable version adapted to the characteristics of the basin. Interviewee 18 also stated that:

"I read the WFD and also related guidance documents related to my working area. I have not attended any activities/meetings under the CIS, but I personally would say the EU-led projects in Turkey are more comprehensive as the EU provides technical and financial support to the candidate states. However when we met the EU experts under the Twinning and TAIEX programmes, we saw

they had different approaches in terms of implementing the WFD, so we tried to find the suitable methods for Turkey, so the EU experts assisted us for better implementation of the WFD.”

Accordingly, this thesis mainly focuses on EU-funded Twinning and IPA projects and how Turkish actors, from different water-related ministries, receive technical support from the EU experts via workshops, training, and study visits. Therefore, under the EU-led projects, Turkish experts had a chance to discuss the methods in the guidance documents which were mainly created according to the European basins, and chose or created suitable ones for Turkish basins. Therefore, this thesis aims to explain the active interaction and social learning process between Turkish and foreign experts via this EU-led process.

8.2.1 National level patterns

During the accession process, Turkey received technical and financial support via EU-led projects. Chapter 5 mainly focused on EU-funded projects, legal amendments and institutional changes which support adaptation to the EU water acquis. The changes were examined in three periods (i) 1999-2006 (ii) 2007-2013; and (iii) 2014-present. To do this, national documents and interview data were analysed in detail.

In the first phase, as identified in Chapter 5, the EU funded projects started with the MATRA in 2002, which was an important step to implementing the WFD as well as encouraging public participation (Sumer, 2016). Through the support of the Dutch government, this project resulted in several positive outcomes: the establishment of 25 river basin districts, as a requirement of Article 3 of WFD (Moroglu and Yazgan, 2008) a draft river basin management plan for the BMB; a legal and institutional analysis report and a handbook, including guidance and methodologies, were prepared (European Commission, 2011: 9).

In the second phase, IPA I (2007-2013) initiated several projects in order to increase water quality, institutional and technical capacities and flood protection. In the scope of these projects, several workshops, trainings and study visits were organised to increase knowledge and capacities as well as

sampling and analysing data initiated. Beside the projects, several legislative amendments and institutional changes were completed including the establishment of the MoFWA and departments of GDWM¹⁹ under the Ministry as well as basin management committees: the Water Management Coordination Committee, Basin Management Central Committee, Basin Management Committees and Provincial Water Management Coordination Committees at local and national levels (Ribamap, 2017a).

In the third phase, IPA II (2014-2020) was initiated and the EU-led projects continued, including the 'Capacity Building Project on the Marine Strategy Framework Directive (2016-2018)', 'Technical Assistance on Economic Analyses within River Basin Management Plans and Water Efficiency Aspects in 3 Pilot River Basins in Turkey' (2017-2019)', and 'Technical Assistance for Water Ambassadors Education and Awareness Raising'. One of the most important projects was the 'Conversion of River Basin Action Plans into River Basin Management Plans' (2014-2017). The river basin management plans for the Susurluk, Konya, Büyük Menderes and Meric-Ergene basins were also prepared (Ribamap, N/D). Under this project, several workshops and trainings were organised at local level and basin management committees held 3 meetings in the scope of the project. Also, new by-laws were enacted and a draft national Water Law in line with WFD was prepared (see Table 5.4). Beside these innovations, Technical Assistance Information Exchange Office events encompassing seminars, workshops, study tours and peer reviews continued (MWH Consortium, 2007).

8.2.2 Local level patterns

In the first phase, the 'Towards Wise Use of the Konya Closed Basin' project was conducted in cooperation with the Netherlands and this helped governmental actors to start a dialogue with locals including NGOs, irrigation cooperatives, municipalities and farmers (Salmaner, 2008). Within the project,

¹⁹ Basin Management Department, Water Quality Management Department, Flood and Drought Management Department, Monitoring and Water Information System Department, Research and Assessment Department, Water Law and Policy Department and Management Services Department (General Directorate of Water Management, 2014c).

2000 farmers received training on drip irrigation, organic agriculture and EU policies at the Konya basin. Stakeholder meetings took place and therefore their collective awareness on limited water resources started to increase. However, implementation remained at a very early stage before spreading to the rest of the basin. In the second phase, in order to prepare the RBAP for the Konya basin, stakeholder meetings were organised. Also the KOP RDA and Mevlana and Ahiler Development Agencies were established in order to enhance stakeholder participation and coordination between local and national actors.

In the third phase, the projects continued to be implemented. These included the 'Preparation of the Konya Closed Basin Sectoral Water Allocation Plan (2016-2018)'; 'Preparation of Drought Management Plan of Konya Basin (2013-2015)'; and the 'Technical Assistance for the Conversion of RBAPs into RBMPs', which implemented by the MoFWA (GDWM). Several workshops and trainings were also organised. Under these events, 1206 technical staff were trained within 27 training programs and in addition 2760 farmers were trained within 32 training programs.

The Büyük Menderes basin was not as problematic as the Konya basin for implementation, however pollution due to industrial and agricultural activities was high. Also, in the BMB, resistance to the projects/activities was low compared with the Konya basin, where water transfer is controversial and the DSI is still working on this issue. Adoption of the River Basin Management Plan is still ongoing (Ribamap 2018).

8.3 To what extent can rational theory explain these implementation patterns?

As examined in Chapter 2, the studies of external Europeanisation in non-EU countries mainly focus on rationalist institutionalism and conditionality, as the main independent variable to explain rule adoption (Sedelmeier, 2011). However, in the Turkish Europeanisation literature, theoretical explanation, especially after 2005, varies depending on the policy sector, which was examined in Chapter 2. The conditionality feature is nonetheless evident in the thesis analysis (Chapters 5, 6, 7), leading to some question marks over the

ability of RI and conditionality as explanatory frameworks for WFD transfer in Turkey.

8.3.1 Pre-2005

As described in Chapter 2, the conditionality strategy uses conditions for ensuring successful transfer of EU norms, including rewards (EU membership, technical and economic support), the credibility of promises and rewards, and favourability of domestic conditions. According to Schimmelfennig (2005a), the credibility of threats (withdrawing aid or blocking the way for membership) and promises (membership or assistance) are important for successful democratic conditionality. For example, when Turkey received its accession candidacy, the offer of membership meant Turkey carried out many democratic and human rights reforms. However, if domestic adoption costs exceed the benefits of membership credibility and high asymmetry exists between the EU and CEECs, it is argued that conditionality does not lead to domestic change (Schimmelfennig et al., 2003).

These features were certainly evident in Turkish water policy prior to 2005, particularly regarding the WFD process. Aside from the wider membership incentive, which influenced domestic norm change across multiple sectors, a significant factor for WFD adoption was, as RI theorists would predict, rewards including technical and financial assistance. This conditionality factor was evident early in the transfer process with the commencement of the MATRA project (Chapter 5). As described, MATRA, entitled the 'Implementation of the WFD in Turkey', was adopted in 2002 as the first step to implement the WFD (Moroglu and Yazgan, 2008: 277). Turkey received both technical and financial support for its implementation. Further assistance was provided via the 'Technical Assistance for the Preparation of the Integrated Environment Approximation Strategy for Turkey Project', financed under the EU MEDA Program (2003–2004); and the 'Technical Assistance for Environmental Heavy Cost Investment Planning Project' within the framework of the 'Capacity Building in the Field of Environment for Turkey', financed under the EU Pre-Accession Financial Assistance (2003–2005) (ibid.). Indeed, such IPA financing

could well be interpreted from an RI perspective as a positive incentive to implement, thereby supporting the theory.

8.3.2 Post-2005

However, after 2005 RI becomes less helpful in explaining the patterns of WFD implementation, reflecting broader problems with using this theoretical approach to explain Turkish Europeanisation, as discussed in Chapter 2. Certainly, technical assistance plus financing was continually provided under the IPA projects but the wider context of accession had by this point changed. A succession of further projects, as described in Chapter 5, continued, including the National Programme for Adoption of the Acquis, the 'Strengthening the Capacity of Sustainable Groundwater Management in Turkey' (2006-2008), the 'Capacity Building Support to the Water Sector in Turkey' (2008-2009), and the 'Capacity Building on Water Quality Monitoring' (2010-2014). Given the degree of technical and financial assistance provided by the EU and national governments to Turkey, the conditionality argument has some credibility even post-2005, since when the accession process has increasingly stalled.

But on closer analysis, conditionality could – as predicted in Chapter 2 – be more difficult to apply in this period. Boşnak (2016: 86) claims 'de-Europeanisation manifests itself as a weakening of the EU's normative context in environmental debate'. She also emphasises that the declining relations with the EU have weakened the EU as a normative aspect. However, this observation also depends on policy actors and their preferences, for example air quality is also in the EU agenda but Turkey does not implement the EU projects. Turkey was criticised in the progress reports regarding air quality. The 2012 progress report stated that preparation of National Emissions Ceilings Directive continued (European Commission, 2012a: 82), however generally the state national legislation needs to be adapted to EU directives on ambient air quality (European Commission, 2011a; European Commission, 2014a; European Commission, 2016d; European Commission, 2018).

The important point is the overlapping of EU and Turkish political actors' agendas in relation to water management. As opposed to other sectors, there

was an incremental progress in water policy, especially when the de-Europeanisation period started after 2011, Turkey received positive feedback from the EU progress reports. Also, Turkey applied for more IPA-II projects for rule adoption. As Saatçioğlu (2014) emphasises in her article, the relationship between conditionality and domestic reforms is controversial and she found a negative relationship between them; this feature is also observable in water management (see also Saatçioğlu, 2016). The important question is then what is the motivation of the actors? It can be seen from the interviews that institutional actors had a willingness to learn from EU water-related directives in implementing a river basin management approach via the successive projects, but they did not necessarily act in response to 'rational' conditionality factors.

Following 2005, in some areas domestic reforms have been stalled or reversed, however, when asked the interviewees suggested that water policy and related EU-funded projects have not been negatively affected by the tension between the EU and Turkey. Interviewees said that even we have problems with the EU from time to time. "I think the tension between the EU and Turkey is mainly political. I think we will not change our policy in terms of environment and water, which is more technical process, namely IPA projects continued and will continue" (Interviewee 23, 2017; Interviewee 24, 2017; Interviewee 1, 2017; Interviewee 13, 2017; Interviewee 16, 2017). Interviews suggested that Turkish actors' priority for WFD adoption was not becoming an EU member but improving the water environment. For example, they found the activities during the EU accession process useful even knowing that Turkey is not going to be an EU member (Interviewee 17, 2017). Regarding this point, Interviewee 13 (2017) indicated that even if the EU accession process should seem impossible, they perceived them "as capacity building, learning directives and guidance documents are comprehensive. It is important to work, learn and analyse them in terms of discovering the current situation in Turkey." This point was supported by another, who reiterated that "even though Turkey may not become an EU member, gaining legislative change, caring about water, coordination etc. were more important" (Interviewee 18, 2017). Interviewee 19 (2017) also said "yes being an EU member is ambiguous for Turkey, however we took the EU

criteria in terms of environment and water as a target rather than the EU membership.” Therefore, Turkish political actors’ motivation is predominantly reaching the EU standards rather than prioritising EU membership.

The argument presented by many interviewees was that Turkey’s wider development was predicated on having a modern water policy; even if there was another process rather than the EU one, Turkey would need to make investments in line with water and environment (Interviewee 19, 2017; Interviewee 21, 2017). Another official indicated that their motivation was not EU incentives but “to create a more sustainable country in terms of water resources and economic development.... the basin management approach is the most sustainable model in terms of water management” (Interviewee 20, 2017). In the same vein, Interviewee 23 (2017) stated that the basin management approach is the most efficient one for Turkey. They argued that because when making policy or strategy the need is to determine the conditions of water resources in terms of both quality and quantity: “We were aware of the basin management system before, but the EU was a trigger for us.” Again, in this context a RI theoretical explanation, with its emphasis on incentives and the credibility of incentives, is problematic to apply and rather superficial. As discussed in Chapter 2, examining alternative theoretical explanations for the Europeanisation of water policy after 2005 would appear justifiable.

In addition, Turkish actors also indicated that they will continue domestic reforms even when the EU accession process stops (Interviewee 4, 2017). Interviewee 1 (2017) stated “we do not work just to adapt to the EU or become an EU member, we work to catch up with the EU standards. So, nothing is going to change when the EU process stops. What could happen is that although we have EU funds, they can be cut in this situation making the process longer. However, our wastewater policy is not going to change.” For example, IPA projects are also very costly especially for candidate countries. Interviewee 22 (2017) also indicated they must use the national budget for the implementation of the WFD in addition to EU funds. Besides, Interviewee 24 (2017) indicates that:

“According to the EU Integrated Environmental Approximation Strategy, we needed to spend nearly 13 million Euros, however we spent nearly 39 million Euros for water sector between 2007 and 2013. However, we still cannot solve the water issues, because the timeline of the targets in the WFD is not realistic. Even if you have money, you also need to change the management perspective and mentalities. Also, the environment needs a renewal and cleaning process, which takes time. For example, when you establish a wastewater treatment plant, it takes years to be built and open. Even if the EU financially supports Turkey, it is not enough, so we spent more time and money planned. This is because Turkey has 25 river basins and we need more money to prepare RBMPs and establish more wastewater treatment plants. Turkey is not a geographically small country like Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina or Albania: even with a small amount money you can solve the issues there.”

8.4 Even if there is a decreasing credibility of Turkey’s EU accession, how can a sociological institutionalism perspective explain Europeanisation in Turkey’s water governance?

Flockhart (2004: 362) emphasises that rationalist theory does not seem adequate for elucidating costly norm change, which seems to have more to do with ‘less tangible’ factors related to positive self-esteem, having their roots in desire rather than in cost–benefit calculations based on rationality. Also, it is argued that SI theory is helpful for understanding why and how agents have a willingness to adopt and learn new norms, which shape their behaviours (Flockhart, 2004: 378). As Bürgin (2016: 108) emphasises:

‘reforms corresponding to EU standards are considered to be part of Turkey’s more general modernisation strategy independent of EU membership prospects. In this respect, reforms can be read as Europeanisation in a wider socio-political and normative context, rather than ‘EU-isation’ as a formal process of alignment with the EU acquis.’

The question then remains, if rationalist theory is inadequate for explaining this process, what are the alternatives?

As identified in Chapter 2, in the Turkish Europeanisation literature, studies focus on alternative approaches to explain changes in domestic politics. For example, historical perspectives (see Icoz, 2011); discursive approaches (see Yilmaz and Soyaltin, 2014; Fisher Onar, 2012; Yanik, 2011; Aydin-Düzgit, 2011); the merger of conditionality and lesson-drawing (see Yilmaz, 2014; Celenk, 2016); macro-sociological approaches (see Buhari-Gulmez, 2011) and domestic preferences (Müftüler-Baç, 2011). However, a sociological perspective (see Tocci, 2005; Göksel and Güneş, 2005) has recently become more popular in Turkish Europeanisation studies, with social learning identified as potentially important (see Rumelili and Boşnak, 2015; Boşnak, 2016). Therefore, this section examines the explanatory value of SI in Turkey's water governance, focusing on socialisation and social learning.

8.4.1 Socialisation and social learning

As discussed in Chapter 3, in socialisation explanations of Europeanisation, one of the key diffusion mechanisms is social learning (Börzel and Risse, 2003). As identified, SL infers elites adopt new norms and rules as well as internalise them via learning interaction (Checkel, 1999; Börzel, 2012). Accordingly, if there is a change in actors understanding via social interaction as well as changes in actors' motivations and attitudes, SL can be considered to be occurring. Socialisation then results as actors internalise such norms through the learning process. For understanding the degree of social learning occurring in Turkish water management and the resultant socialisation that has occurred, Chapter 3 established an analytical framework based on the three levels of learning forwarded by Heikkila and Gerlak (2013) and others, namely: *superficial learning*; *partial learning*; and *transformative learning*. Socialisation was measured as *low*, *partial* or *deep*.

In summary, an analysis of social learning and resultant socialisation effects were undertaken at both national and river basin level across three periods. In the first period (1999-2006), superficial learning regarding water acquis was

supported by a few EU projects at national level. At the Konya and Büyük Menderes basins, there is very limited norm acquisition, translation and dissemination.

In the second phase (2007-2013), *partial* learning became much more evident. Turkish experts engaged with more EU projects and the knowledge was horizontally shared in the institutions. At the Konya basin, the interaction and communication increased via development agencies and information acquisition increased. However, *translation* and *dissemination* of information were still limited and at a provisional stage, accordingly SL is still determined to be at a *superficial/partial* level. For the BMB, local actors acquired information and limited translation was also evident, meaning SL was very much at a *partial* level.

In the last period (2014-present) although some *transformative* learning began to occur, at both national and basin levels, learning appeared more partial. Multi-level networks and information flows to the regional level were initiated. Interviews indicate that institutional actors have an increasing willingness to learn about implementing the river basin management approach from the EU experts via the EU-funded projects. At the Konya basin, more capacity building activities were observed compared to the second period. It is therefore visible that *acquisition* and some level of *translation* was evident, however *dissemination* is still weak. Therefore SL, can be determined as *partial*. For the BMB, stakeholders have a willingness to engage more with each other in implementing the projects and also the decision-making process, accordingly SL is coded as being at a *partial/transformative* level.

There was a consensus amongst the water related experts that IPA projects are important to reach EU standards and learn the basin management approach, so social learning processes helped to exchange views and encourage actors to understand and follow water-related EU rules and norms. Moreover, EU experts learned the importance of coordination and interaction with other stakeholders/ministries/departments by conducting EU projects, so an interaction and coordination culture have been accepted by actors while their

administrative capacity has been improved. This observation reflects Bürgin (2016: 106) who indicates that “while applications for IPA projects may initially be driven by financial, organisational or personal career-related incentives unrelated to the accession process. The projects’ long-term effects may result in new institutional constraints or stipulate social learning processes leading to deeper change than initially envisaged by the Turkish side.

As mentioned in Chapter 3, socialisation, as a process of norm transfer/diffusion can be observed by practising of what is already learned, which can finally result in norm internalisation. For norm internalisation, the *formal* concept of socialisation, including policy and structural changes, and *behavioural* forms of socialisation, encompassing plans, projects, strategies and actors’ attitudes, are supposed to take place. Also, socialisation can be observed through different levels: *low*, *partial* and *deep*. The question then remains as to whether the learning patterns detected led to socialisation through norm internalisation.

In the first phase (2002-2006), a low level of formal practice is evident at national level; actors’ behaviours with regards to EU norms also did not change and accordingly socialisation is coded as *low*. Norm internalisation is difficult to detect during this period. In the Konya Basin, capacity building and education programmes for local actors started, so limited formal and behavioural socialisation was evident, therefore norm internalisation was also *low*. Even though formal socialisation is observable, local actors’ behaviours and beliefs did not change, so *low* levels of socialisation were also evident in the BMB.

In the second phase (2007-2013), beside the structural changes described above, actors’ behaviours changed. However, this stage was preliminary, so socialisation only occurred at a *partial* level. In the Konya basin, legal/structural changes can be observed during this period, however actors’ beliefs and behaviours regarding the WFD were very limited, and therefore socialisation also occurred at a *low/partial* level. In the BMB, behavioural socialisation was evident, however only limited belief changes were observed, so socialisation can also be coded as *low/partial* level.

In the third phase (2014-present), at national level, *partial/deep* socialisation is observed as actors' behaviours have changed with regards to EU norms, which they increasingly accept as legitimate. In this phase, a *partial* level of socialisation was evident at Konya basin. Finally, formal and behavioural forms of changes were detectable in the BMB. However, as the research shows actors' beliefs and behaviours were not completely changed, so socialisation is coded as *partial*.

8.4.1.1 Comparison of local and national levels

At the national level, the learning process was initiated by the MATRA project. The governmental actors subsequently applied for more Twinning and IPA projects and under these projects, they had opportunities to undertake seminars and workshops regarding the WFD and other directives and also visits to EU countries. Since 1999, Turkish experts have applied for various projects and have also interacted and learned from the EU. Over time, the level of learning of Turkish experts increased and this helped them to change their preferences in parallel with integrated river basin management. Also, in terms of organisational structure, governmental actors became more organised aided by the establishment of the Ministry of Forestry and Water Affairs in 2011 and GDWM and its departments, which increased coordination and learning regarding the WFD. For example, the Basin Management Department, Monitoring and Water Information System and Water Quality Management Department were established, indicating that Turkish political actors show their interest in water quality, monitoring, and the basin management system.

However, at the local level organisational structure was, and still is, lacking. There are directorates of state hydraulic works, but limited structures in terms of implementing the basin borders. Therefore, the directorates had difficulties in RBMP coordination and associated issues around the basins. After basin management committees were established in 2012, they included multiple participants, including NGOs, irrigation cooperatives and universities. Local actors had more chance to attend the activities in the basins and became aware of the EU projects. Accordingly, local actors started interacting and learning

from governmental actors, EU experts and each other with regards to the issues around the basins and EU projects. Some actors from the local ministerial departments had been involved in the EU-led projects before, but this was the minority of participants because the basins are quite big and cover many cities and stakeholders. Some actors attended the EU projects and learned information which could not be diffused to the other stakeholders in the whole basin because of a lack of structures for coordination - especially before 2012. Therefore, the establishment of the basin management committees helped local actors for acquisition, translation, and dissemination of information regarding the basin. However, this process is still at an early stage and SL mainly remains at a partial level.

When we look at the learning process, the diffusion of information to a multi-level network is necessary (Heikkila and Gerlak, 2013). Also, the participation of local actors in the decision-making process for water management is important for adopting the WFD (Benson et al. 2014). Therefore, using SI through social learning was important to understand how actors learn and change their roles perceptions and organisational practices by interaction with the EU level (Jenson and Merand, 2010), as well as how these norms and practices are diffused to the local level.

8.4.1.2 Comparison of Buyuk Menderes and Konya (closed) basins

In terms of learning, these two basins have their differences. From the interviews and participant observation, during the stakeholder meetings at Konya basin, academics and people from irrigation cooperatives were critical of the governmental actors. The local actors, especially from irrigation cooperatives state that they already do drip irrigation and are aware of the problems they have in the basin, so they do not need extra training. The most important issue at the basin is water transfer principally because it is a closed basin which is susceptible to serious drought. This feature has an important impact on agricultural production. The local actors thought that there should be water transfer from other basins to Konya but the WFD and the Turkish draft

water law do not allow this. Therefore, in terms of water transfer, there was a debate between local actors and governmental and EU experts.

In the Buyuk Menderes basin, local actors asked more questions during the stakeholder meetings regarding water pollution, treatment, and the measures, as well as about the methods that governmental actors use in the project. They had more enthusiasm to learn about the technical side of the projects, including methodologies and findings. Local actors offered different methods which they thought were more suitable to the basin. According to interviews, the participants found that integrated basin management is a good approach and may help to solve the problems in the basin. Their comments and questions were more constructive and positive compared with the local actors at the Konya basin. Local actors in the BMB seemed less suspicious of the WFD and integrated basin management, and were more open to learning about the problems collectively in comparison to others in the Konya basin. Therefore, it seems that the basins, because of geographical differences have different water-related issues and this affects actors' perspectives, attitudes and learning capacities.

8.4.2 What is the value of SI compared to RI?

8.4.2.1 The advantages and disadvantages of RI

Rational choice institutionalism has been widely used in political science (see Scully, 2006; Ward, 2002), especially in EU studies to explain the influence of the EU especially in the candidate states. A rationalist approach provides a 'rational link', explaining people's behaviours which can be understood by means of achieving the particular targets (Scully, 2006: 20). RI argues that accession process provides actors with new 'European' political opportunities and constraints (Börzel and Risse, 2000: 7). As Börzel and Risse (2000) discuss Europeanisation causes differential empowerment and redistribution of resources, however actors should have the capacities to utilise them.

In the rationalist approach, actors' goals (winning elections or achieving particular political aims) and the assumptions are explicit and actors are aware

of the options (Weyland, 2002; Scully, 2006). Also, an RI approach emphasises the importance of the role of strategic interaction amongst the actors for the assessment of the political outcomes, including educational or economic development and material advantage, have direct influence on actors' behaviours (Hall, 1996: 951). Governments can increase their capacities against other actors and the European integration process is controlled by national governments whose preferences are derived from the matters of national economic benefits rather than the *logic* of international system (Scully, 2006: 25). Accordingly, their individual interests may be pursued for political stability (Weyland, 2002). For example, in Turkey, the AKP have increased their power against the Kemalist and military's electoral appeal.

RI theory has tended to explain actors' behaviours by referencing to their self-interests (for example electoral concerns, re-elections and political career interests) from incentives and constraints (Weyland, 2002). Accordingly, it focuses on the influence of sets of rules on individual actors, namely interest calculation and strategic interaction. However, Levi et al. (1990: 1) emphasise that 'the interdependence of choices means that individual actions may have unintended consequences.' Also, it disregards 'external causes', causal influence of rules and institutions as well as political beliefs, which can be affected by ideas and ideologies (Weyland, 2002: 58). As a result, RI neglects identifying actors' interests, because politicians may focus on their own political career interests and short-term aims, which can be complex and misleading. Moreover, RI does not provide explanations for how political changes occur and the consequences of the changes.

In the rationalist approach, where and why institutions emerge is not well explained, has more focus on desired results. Institutions and individuals have mutual interaction. Regarding this, institutions shape individuals' behaviour and individuals are also supposed to shape the behaviour of institutions, therefore individuals should cause institutional activities. Accordingly, as a paradox, individuals produce the institutions and then are constraint by them (Peters, 2012). Another argument on the RI is that this approach focuses on explaining

stability, however may not focus on how institutions change, function internally and make a decision.

Hall (1996) emphasises that rationalist institutionalists are inclined to explain the preferences or aims of the actors exogenously. However, particularly in empirical cases, the preferences of actors are often ambiguous and difficult to identify. Because, on the one hand the notion of rationality infers 'plausible as a normative account of human behaviour', on the other hand infers 'yield prescriptions about particular cases'; however what is rational is 'elastic' and may vary depending on the contexts, therefore there is indeterminacy (Elster, 1990: 20). Regarding this point, dimensions influencing the relationship between the institutions and actors might not be 'instrumental' or 'well-modelled'. This is because, the institutions may affect the actors' identities and preferences, actors are highly instrumental and their strategies can be chosen from 'culturally-specific repertoires' and institutional environments also can influence the actors' strategies (Hall, 1996: 951). Accordingly, SI may be a better approach to clarify these dimensions, as explained in the next section.

In addition, the rational-choice approach is good at elucidating why change occurs with regard to actors' preferences within the institution (Peters, 2012). However, this approach may not disregard institutional change, which is important to assess the effects of structure on actors' behaviour and policy. Change, in this approach and as a similar to the HI, is not continuing process of adaptation and learning, accordingly change take places when the existing institution cannot meet the requirement (Peters, 2012)

In addition, social interaction on compliance has been disregarded as an explanation for Europeanisation by the rationalist approach (Ladrech, 2011; Checkel and Moravcsik, 2001). In this respect, after the credibility of EU membership decreased after 2005, conditionality has become weaker in Turkey. The EU cannot then use conditionality threats on Turkey in terms of blocking the way for membership or withdrawing assistance, especially in the water policy area. Europeanisation, therefore, has varied depending on sectors and domestic actors' motivations and preferences. However, it seems that

domestic reforms are – to an extent – driven by EU norms and values in the realm of water policy suggesting that SI may have some explanatory advantages over rational theory.

In the same vein, Bürgin (2016: 112) indicates ‘an engagement with EU projects is unlikely without personal career-advancement motives or departmental motivations’. Officials in the candidate countries sometimes regard their counterparts with suspicion, implying the absence of one of the preconditions for social learning: ‘an open-minded discursive setting’ (ibid.). Bürgin (2016: 112) also indicates that ‘twinning projects have sometimes been able to promote socialisation processes leading to policy and politics changes deeper than envisaged by the actor’s initial calculations.’

8.4.2.2 The advantages and disadvantages of SI

SI defines institutions broadly, which not only covers formal rules procedures and norms but also cognitive scripts, moral templates including ‘frames of meaning, guiding human action’ (Hall, 1996: 947). This approach also takes a distinctive approach for understanding the relationship between the institutions and individual action as well as how institutional practices shift or originate. ‘Rational action’ in SI emphasises socially constituted institutions and organisations that seek to define their identity in socially appropriate ways as opposed to RI, in which individuals and organisations focus on maximising their material gain (Hall, 1996: 949). SI also draws important attention to the processes when new institutions are being developed. It also focuses on why particular institutions should be chosen and the role and importance of collective processes of interpretation and concerns for social legitimacy (ibid: 949).

This thesis presents an argument that SI, inferring the impacts of EU normative and ideational structures on actor identities, norms and attitudes rather than rule-based conditionality focusing on actors’ self-interests (Weyland, 2002), could therefore give a credible explanation for Europeanisation in water management in the declining accession process. Regarding this point, it is clear that a sociological perspective provides some explanatory value for ongoing

Europeanisation in Turkish water management despite the limited membership perspective and high costs. SI focuses on changes in actors' preferences through more endogenous explanations (Katznelson and Weingast, 2005) which in contrast to HI and RI, tend to privilege exogenous dynamics to explain institutional changes more than internal dynamics. As Jenson and Merand (2010) emphasise in rationalist approaches actors create institutions when they think they will get a benefit, namely they do a cost-benefit calculation. However, they think social factors underpin social actions and even strategic choices can be influential rather than the calculation of optimality.

As a critique of the sociological perspective would no doubt argue, financial and technical material incentives are significant and, in this case, require explanation. Another obvious 'reward' for countries is access to financial aid and technical assistance, i.e. 'capacity building' (Börzel and Risse, 2012: 7). From the interview data, Turkish actors expressed that they do not prioritise EU membership or (re)opening negotiations (Interviewee 20; 24; 23; 19; 9), their priority is to adjust to the integrated basin management and so they have an expressed willingness to get support from the EU (Interviewee 21, 11; 12; 20; 24), as the EU is the driving force for them (Interviewee 20). Turkish experts applied to Twinning and IPA I-II project to learn how to practice the WFD, as they generally agreed that basin management is the correct way of managing water (Interviewee 20; 24; 20; 19; 9; 12). Twinning projects are highly effective in providing coordination between public administrations of EU member states and accession countries in the latter's implementation of EU policies (European Commission, 2015b). Even after 2005, Turkey never experienced problems receiving EU funds as long as they fulfilled accession requirements. However, even if the EU provides financial support, according to interviews, Turkey still spends more money on water than financially predicted, therefore the costs are still high. As explained in Chapter 5, from the scope of water management, the actors' motivation to apply for EU-led projects is to learn and implement the river basin approach because of it being perceived as more compatible with contemporary Turkish water management and the most appropriate way of overcoming water issues. Regarding this point, actors' motivations to apply for

EU funds and, as a consequence of the projects, any policy changes and also changes in actors' perspectives and behaviours are important. In the CEECs, even if there is policy change its implementation is weak. Besides, for the CEECs, when there are high costs, exceeding the benefits of membership, governments are not keen on undertaking domestic reforms even if there is credibility and asymmetry in interdependency and power between CEECs and the EU. However, in Turkey, costs for water management are still high and it seems likely that Turkey will continue spending more money on preparing RBMPs and constructing wastewater treatments plants, while there is de-Europeanisation in other sectors, e.g. human rights. Additionally, political actors in water management seem, according to the interviews, eager to carry on the implementation of the WFD and basin management system, even if the relationship between the EU and Turkey remains uncertain.

Besides, as Peters (2012) states sociological institutionalism, is related to institutional behaviour, which may create confusion in distinguishing organisations and institutions, because organisations and the organisational literature are rich in sociological literature. Accordingly, Scott (1995) identified three types of institutions in sociology: normative, cognitive and regulative. They infer the role of institutions is to regulate/control social behaviour. On the one hand March and Olsen focuses on the normative basis of institutions, which refers to the appropriate behaviour in any situation. On the other hand, others (see Jepperson, 1991) place more emphasis on the cognitive basis of organisational theory, which infers institutions are socially constructed and how member of institutions perceive situations within the environment (Peters, 2012). Accordingly, the former one focuses on explaining the decision-making process, the latter on members of the organisations, who take the decisions, so these approaches require more explanation (Peters, 2012), and therefore the meaning of an institution is not very clear. Moreover, SI approach may neglect the process of developing institution or reforms may collide with the power between actors regarding their interests, accordingly meanings, symbols and scripts may come from processes of interpretation and also processes of competition. Also, SI is more concentrated on processes at the macro-level. As

a result, actors involved in the process can be neglected and results may be perceived to have occurred without agents.

In conclusion, this thesis argues that SI has evident value to analysing Europeanisation in the water sector, although there are some caveats. Even though SI provides a better explanation for WFD implementation post-2005 through its emphasis on social learning and resultant socialisation, as explained above, it has limitations. For example, SI does not really explain the political processes around EU water norm adoption, which is a fault in other institutional theories, as well as the evident importance of social interaction, as Checkel (2001) has argued. Institutions do not evolve outside of political processes and so cannot be readily detached from them. Moreover, it is hard to analytically distinguish strategy and norms, because on the one hand strategy can be socially embedded. On the other hand, norm creation may cover strategic calculation (Jenson and Merand, 2010). Therefore, rational and normative behaviour have a close relationship: norms should be strategically diffused and rational is socially constructed (Jenson and Merand, 2010). In this respect, perhaps alternative approaches to SI can be examined, for example a discursive institutionalism approach (see Schmidt, 2011) would allow a focus on the role of ideas, namely the WFD, in shaping actor preferences in the Europeanisation process.

8.5 What are the implications for policy recommendations and future policy predictions with regards to the consequences of this study?

From the chapters 5, 6 and 7, it was evident that there were some obstacles for social learning and socialisation at both levels. This section focuses on the challenges to adopting the EU water acquis at local and national levels. Understanding these challenges can then potentially help to provide normative recommendations for future water policy in overcoming them, discussed below.

8.5.1 Obstacles to social learning

Heikkila and Gerlak (2013: 496-497) emphasise exogenous and endogenous factors that hinder or support the policy learning process. Endogenous factors

encompass *social dynamics*, or actors' interaction and communication patterns; covering trust and conflict amongst the actors and shared understanding of actors' communication, including tolerance for openness to dialogue, having a common language and sharing values, all of which can pave the way for acquisition and dissemination of the information. Secondly *structure*, refers to how actors' roles, responsibilities and functions are organised and structured. The responsibilities can be integrated/centralised or decentralised/fragmented, which can assist dissemination of information across the group. With a more integrated structure, on the one hand, learning can be limited if actors are insulated from opportunities; on the other hand, it may create opportunity for actors within the group to ease acquisition of information and facilitate dissemination of new information quickly. Also if there is a small group of actors responsible for decision-making this will facilitate transition of information. Besides, the actors in positions of power can facilitate availability and transition of information and information sharing because they are able to access information that others cannot. Accordingly, powerful leaders or individuals, who are *boundary spanners* can overcome the challenges to disseminate information in centralised/decentralised structures (Heikkila and Gerlak, 2013: 496).

For Heikkila and Gerlak (2013: 499) exogenous factors can be political pressure, external perturbations, political turnovers and economic crisis, which may cause a lack of resources and change the domains in technological and functional activities, including services, products and necessary technological tools and resources as well as changes in social dynamics and reductions in social interactions as challenges to the learning process.

When governmental officials were asked about the difficulties for learning and adopting to EU water policy, they generally stated they did not have any difficulty in understanding the process while they were provided with several chances to learn or attend workshops and conferences in other countries. However, they mentioned some social dynamic and structural challenges in this process that have evident implications for future implementation.

Firstly, multi-level structural constraints to learning are evident regarding the IPA projects that then impacted social interaction. Primarily, officials were not entirely supportive of the process due to its temporal nature. They found the process too long for meaningful engagement; 2 years, which was often argued to be challenging. Although officials found the IPA projects useful for working with foreign experts, the preliminary preparation period was considered exhaustive; 2.5-3 years to start the projects from the original agreement. As a result, there were often changes to the programmes before their inception and they then did not respond to changing contexts as new issues emerged, i.e. they lacked responsiveness. One official emphasised that they started projects 3 years after the original application and they mostly learned how to implement the directive during this process (Interviewee 5, 2017). Interviewee 22 (2017) indicated that “the process of IPA is very long, we applied for an IPA project in 2013 and could not get any result by 2017”. Moreover, the application process is very challenging. For the tender, a project application is sent to the related department in the Ministry of Environment and Urbanisation and they evaluate it, ask for amendments and then send it to the EU Delegation for further scrutiny. After the project is agreed the minimum start time is then 2 years.

Secondly, another structural challenge, regarding coordination, is authority conflict, which in turn impacts social dynamics, hindering diffusion of ideas and information across groups, and demotivating actors in sharing their opinions and respecting other actors. One of the officials said that:

“... some institutions have nearly the same duties regarding water management, it takes time to manage them because we have an institutional culture which is hard to break. We started having meetings and planning to create a national water information system and hope it will solve this issue. Accordingly, the duties of the institutions will be clear and there will not be recurrence in the works” (Interviewee 13, 2017).

Another emphasised that “the biggest issue regarding water is that there are many responsible actors including ministries, special provincial administrations, and ministries. Accordingly, there is a management issue. Also, communication

and cooperation still needs to be improved” (Interviewee 24, 2017). Consequently, inter-organisational communication and cooperation is poor. Interviewees 13 and 14 (2017) both argued that after the draft Water Law is enacted, the government will be better able to deal with authority conflict, i.e. through structural change. The water field is related to many sectors. For instance, regarding wastewater, the MoFWA and DSI have dedicated departments and the MoEU also has responsibilities. However, Interviewee 20 (2017) said that communication and coordination are better than before and it is improving, adding that “responsibilities require gathering together [in a single entity] to be able to implement policy efficiently.” He also added that after the Water Law is enacted, the legal framework and system will be stronger. Another official supported this view:

“The GDWM is responsible for providing coordination. As long as the water law is enacted it will gain supervision rights and will be more effective. At the moment, it has the right to inform the responsible ministries. For example, if we determine pesticide use at a place or a plant pollutes water resources, we inform responsible ministries about these situations so that they take appropriate measures. However, with this law we will have responsibility for supervising these plants and imposing a penalty” (Interviewee 22, 2017).

As at national level, cooperation and communication was a problem between different institutions in river basins. In the BMB, the major issues were cooperation (being actively part of the projects), communication and also practising their learning. Some interviewees agreed that the stakeholders just met at the stakeholder meetings, which this is not adequate for effective implementation. For example, Interviewee 43 (2017) stated that the communication amongst the institutions takes place just via stakeholder meetings. Interviewee 43 (2017) was unhappy about not being a part of any project and its decision-making, and executive processes even though her institution is responsible for wastewater treatment. Regarding the WFD implementation, Interviewee 45 (2017) indicated that there is no deficiency in the legislation, however there are some problems with the implementation

around coordination. Communication with foreign experts was also considered significant by some participants. For example, a DSI regional directorate member expressed that “why have these experts been brought from abroad while there are already many academics who know the region better”.

Thirdly, Interviewee 13 (2017) expressed “from my perspective the major issue is that the private sector and public require to be informed about EU water policy, although we reached certain points (have progressed) in terms of capacity building.” There is therefore clearly a communication issue that affects social dynamics in terms of openness to dialogue and acquisition and dissemination of information. This communication deficit is occurring within the wider policy community and beyond.

Communication problems were also visible at river basin level; one of the complaints from the participants related to the lack of information available and preparation time for meetings. Participants stated that they were not informed about the agenda/projects when they were invited and also they were not given enough time to search for background information (Interviewee 41, 2017; Interviewee 33, 2017; Interviewee 34, 2017; Interviewee 36, 2017; Interviewee 32, 2017; Interviewee 35, 2017). Therefore, they tried to learn about the project during the presentation, meaning that there was not enough time for them to gain information, process it and comment during the meeting day (Interviewee 38, 2017). Interviewee 39 (2017) also indicated that “the participants should be informed [in advance] about the topics that will be discussed during the day, so that the participant is able to evaluate them. However, the participants learn the topic during the meeting and struggle to understand the issues and evaluate them.”

Fourthly, both institutional and individual capacity requires strengthening, i.e. structural and social dynamic constraints. Administrative structures are only partly developed in the river basins. Regarding this point, Interviewee 11 (2017) indicated that they still need to improve their administrative capacities because the development levels of the basins vary significantly. Individual technical capacity is also an issue. For example, biological monitoring is quite new for the

officials so they need more biologists and improved collaboration with epistemic communities (Interviewee 9, 2017). One interviewee stated that institutional capacity could be enhanced through working with universities since they needed to increase the technical base for monitoring.

Fifthly, despite the social learning described in Chapters 5 and 6, changes in political behaviours, cultures and attitudes that influence social dynamics are only slowly emerging, i.e. socialisation is incomplete. Actors' behaviours changed and they started to practice new knowledge, for example biological monitoring is mentioned in Chapter 5, but there have been some obstacles. There were difficulties in internalising new water management approaches. Regarding this issue, Interviewee 24 (2017) emphasised that "Einstein says it is harder to crack prejudice than an atom." They added that it took 5-10 years to establish the idea of a basin system across government. Another 5-10 years may then be required for basin management to be fully implemented. In other words, breaking pre-existing patterns of water management, derived from an accumulation of historical 'policy layering' (Thelen, 2004), and taking responsibilities/duties from institutions and giving them to others is difficult. As discussed above, it is important to deal with authority conflict and make common decisions together (Interviewee 24). Regarding this point, Interviewee 20 (2017) emphasised that there is a conventional management model in Turkey and you cannot change this in one day. People generally understood this in the EU projects and also in basin committees. Cultural change is more problematic to engineer. For example, with biological monitoring, no one had encountered this requirement before, so it could only be incrementally introduced. Adjusting to the technocratic requirements of the WFD has not been easy. For example, Interviewee 11 (2017) expressed:

"When experts from Holland came, we had several different viewpoints, because they mainly used to deal with floods, however our main problems are drought and water allocation. They did a characterisation on our waters, we learned their system and they learned ours. For example, they have a regular flow regime but it is not regular in Turkey. They firstly did not understand why we built dams, but we explained why

and they eventually understood us. Their concept of a water body was different and was not compatible [to Turkish practice], however we managed to adjust (by approximation). The WFD needs to be flexible according to conditions in countries, for example on dams.”

Sixthly, Interviewee 23 (2017) stated that “in order to adopt the EU laws, further legal changes were required.” This constraint is both endogenous (i.e. structural within the Turkish institutional system) but also exogenous (i.e. related to the EU process and its impacts on wider Turkish politics). Some changes are highly related to EU directives, for instance the groundwater directive is 95% compatible with the related EU directive. In terms of legal adoption, Turkey has been successful (Demirbilek and Benson, 2018), however in terms of implementation it is still a work in progress. In the same vein, Interviewee 16 (2017) also emphasised that it is hard to express at the moment that Turkey has legally accepted river basin management. The new Water Law will provide a legal basis when it is enacted. However, in terms of implementation, Turkey is still in an early developmental stage. After implementation improves, mutual information flow and coordination will be consolidated.

Seventhly, issues with social dynamics in the river basins concerned the level and type of participation. In the Konya basin, there was criticism with regard to stakeholder participation and integration with the projects. On the one hand, some participants thought that the attendance lacked a diversity of stakeholders (Interviewee 41, 2017; Interviewee 42, 2017; Interviewee 35, 2017; Interviewee 36, 2017; Interviewee 37, 2017). At the stakeholder meeting, one participant expressed that a number of institutions or stakeholders were not aware of the project (Interviewee 38, 2017). One participant expressed the attendance was not enough as not all the water related departments were invited (Interviewee 42, 2017). On the other hand, others criticised that too many participants had been invited. Also, Interviewee 39 (2017) indicated that there should be a separate meeting on the issues around implementation and decision-making; some are experts on policy while others are expert on technical concepts. Therefore there is no benefit because both groups possess different knowledge and works. Interviewee 40 (2017) also indicated that while the attendance is

adequate, he stated that the academics and governmental officials mostly talk but local officials abstain from expressing their ideas and feelings, so a comfortable environment should be created for them to discuss issues.

Finally, one of the most important issues in river basins is water transfer, although this stems more from exogenous factors related to the WFD process. This is because Konya is the region that has the lowest precipitation in Turkey and the highest agricultural land use. According to local people, water transfer is an obligation for this basin even if the RBAPs and draft water law do not promote it. Local actors therefore complained that water transfer was not actively considered in the projects. One member of the agricultural engineer's chamber questioned whether the new Water Law actually aims to hinder water transfer. Another participant, an EU expert, challenged this view, stating that they had worked for similar issues in Spain. They undertook water transfers in two basins, which the EU accepted. One of the senior officials from the Ministry of Forestry and Water Affairs provided answers to the water transfer issue in the draft water law; this is a high level/ministerial decision and discussion, however the regional directorate of DSI has some experience on water transfers.

8.5.2 Recommendations

Several normative policy recommendations for overcoming these obstacles to learning can therefore be made as a direct output of the research. Given that previous studies of Turkish water policy are now dated (e.g. Sumer, 2016), the thesis research can make recommendations in order to support future WFD development not only in Turkey but also IWRM globally. The latter is of particular significance as the EU seeks to promote its WFD norms to other non-EU states through mechanisms such as the EU Water Initiative (EU-WI) (Adelle et al., 2017). We can examine these recommendations at both national and local level.

At national level procedural, technical and institutional changes are required to increase the level of learning occurring and overcome structural and social dynamic constraints. Procedural changes may be difficult to enact around the project review process but speeding up the time between application and

decision would increase responsiveness. Authority conflict still remains a significant challenge to WFD implementation at national level. The institutions do not want to share their authority, with responsibilities having accumulated through time to become 'locked in' (see Pierson, 2004). Although the new Water Law should provide greater clarity in responsibilities, this aspect is still concerning. Greater inter-ministerial coordination could be achieved through a committee of relevant ministers which may be an option for consideration. Technical capacity is also a limiting factor. For example, biological monitoring is quite new for officials, so there is a need for more trained biologists and improved collaboration with universities. In the USA, each state has established a water research centre at a university to support the Clean Water Act implementation. Turkey could consider a similar option for each RBD. Information provision to stakeholders, a key feature of the WFD process, could also be enhanced through wider inclusion of the public and private enterprises in decision-making.

At regional level, in river basins, other priorities are apparent. For example, incremental adjustments to the meeting processes are manifestly required to support learning. One approach to expand the range of participants could be including more citizen representation. It is important to inform stakeholders at an early stage of the projects to make them feel more engaged. Decision-making could be more inclusive; local people will engage if they are able to affect the decisions of the policy-makers. Also making the process less technocratic and improving the communication of information is an important prerequisite revealed by the thesis research. In addition, the research shows that limited inter-institutional communication and authority conflict exist in the river basins. While greater cooperation between agencies is therefore the normative ideal, some form of formalised coordinating mechanism or channel for communication should be established. Finally, the thorny issue of water transfer requires tackling in order to avoid future conflict. In this respect, the WFD process should recognise the need for transfers, although in practice it may do little to resolve conflicts between basins. One means of countering it is

the formulation of bi-lateral agreements between RBDs, as exist in other countries, although enforcement could still be an issue.

8.6 Summary

Chapter 8 discussed the research questions, outlined in the introduction chapter. Firstly, it focused on how Turkey has adopted the WFD and other daughter directives (Chapter 5) at national and local levels in three phases. Afterwards, it discussed whether a rationalist approach can provide an explanation for the domestic changes in line with *water acquis* as well the literature. As an alternative explanation, this chapter discussed the value of a sociological institutionalism perspective for Europeanisation in Turkey's water governance, through social learning and socialisation. Lastly, it focused on obstacles to learning and norm internalisation at both national and local (basin) level and, on this basis, also made recommendations for future policy predictions if WFD implementation is to develop in the future.

Chapter 9: Conclusions to the thesis

9.1 Aims, objectives, research questions

As identified in Chapter 1, 5 and 8, the influence of the EU's Common Implementation Strategy was negligible meaning that these mechanisms became the main conduits for transfer as Turkey passively attends the CIS's meetings and conferences which contributed to their learning explained in Chapter 8. Turkish experts received more detailed information about the implementation of the WFD via TAIEX programmes and IPA I-II projects, in which several national and local actors had a chance to participate (see Chapter 5). Turkey has had more benefits from EU-led projects comparing with the CIS meetings in terms of receiving technical and financial support and improving working together and coordination with other responsible colleagues and EU experts. Therefore, this thesis excluded the CIS for WFD and comprehensively focused on EU-led projects and the interaction between the EU members and Turkey and explaining Turkey's WFD implementation by social learning.

This thesis sought to address a specific aim and answer one main research question, plus four sub questions (Chapter 1). As discussed in Chapters 1, 2 and 3, the fundamental premise forwarded by the thesis is that, on the basis of arguments presented in the EU studies literature, rational choice theories largely fail to explain the continuing adoption of EU water norms under conditions of declining accession conditionality, thereby requiring the consideration of alternative explanations. As also discussed, scholars have argued that sociological institutionalism could offer another perspective but that applications to the Turkish context are to date limited in the Europeanisation literature. In response, Chapter 1 posed a main research question to guide the analysis: *what is the explanatory value of sociological institutionalism for the Europeanisation of Turkish water policy?* In answering this question, four sub-questions were also established to structure the research, namely:

- How has the EU Water Framework Directive been implemented in Turkey?
- To what extent can rational theory explain these implementation patterns?
- Even if there is a decreasing credibility of Turkey's EU accession, how can a sociological institutionalism perspective, with its social learning and socialisation mechanisms explain Europeanisation in Turkey's water governance?
- What are the implications for policy recommendations and future policy predictions with regards to the consequences of this study?

Results of the research in relation to the above questions were discussed in Chapter 8. Firstly, the WFD has been implemented in Turkey since 2002, although its history is complex. The pattern of implementation was examined both temporally (i.e. diachronically) in the intervening period but also across multiple levels of governance. The thesis research shows that implementation has occurred via a higher-level national policy process, through legal and institutional changes initiated through EU projects and training exercises. Although implementation was slow in the period up to 2005, it started to develop faster in the period thereafter with significant changes to policy now occurring, including a new draft Water Law that prioritises river basin management planning. In parallel, WFD implementation has also occurred through the ongoing development of river basin planning in 25 river basin districts across Turkey. A series of EU-supported projects and training exercises have helped initiate a nascent planning process that has led to the creation of river basin action plans that are currently being incorporated into river basin management plans. The two basin case studies illustrate how this process is occurring, although show that it is far from geo-politically or spatially homogenous, with the Konya basin implementation proving more protracted than in Büyük Menderes.

Secondly, as predicted by scholars' more general observations on Turkish EU accession, this pattern of implementation becomes more difficult to interpret with rational institutionalism theory over time. As discussed in Chapter 2,

rational theorists' views on Europeanisation of accession states tend to revolve around the causal influence of EU material incentives in incentivising domestic political actors to implement EU rules through changing domestic opportunity structures. A key factor in this process, it is argued, is conditionality and the incentives, including membership incentives, financial assistance and technical support, along with the credibility of threats and promises. To an extent, the thesis analysis shows that rational theorists do have a valid point. Certainly, during the early period of WFD implementation at national level prior to 2005, the key membership incentive was a factor. But thereafter, as domestic enthusiasm for the accession declined, it becomes much less credible to explain ongoing WFD implementation through this argument. While rational theorists would point to the financial and technical assistance offered by the EU to Turkey for implementation through the various projects and training events, this still does not explain why Turkey has continued to restructure its entire system of water policy and governance in line with EU policy norms. Given the significant expense involved for governance restructuring, rational arguments appear to increasingly lack credibility.

Thirdly, the thesis showed that, to an extent, a sociological institutionalism perspective could offer some insight into these patterns of WFD implementation. An ongoing process of socialisation has occurred around WFD norms through social learning driven by the EU as a 'norm entrepreneur' in transferring the water acquis to Turkish actors. Learning has occurred through interaction at both national level and, increasingly, at river basin scale. Moreover, social learning around WFD norms has increased over time, leading to greater socialisation. At national and basin levels, degrees of learning were initially quite superficial during the period up to 2005; the transference of norms was more passive with little cognitive understanding evident amongst Turkish policy actors. Over time, in response to repeated 'teaching' interventions by the EU (e.g. IPA projects and training exercises), national level policy actors have more actively exchanged information through communication and interaction, leading to changes in their preferences. Socialisation of actors has to an extent resulted from this learning process. The theory can therefore provide some

explanation as to why Europeanisation has continued well after accession imperatives have declined, in ways not apparent in RI theorising. However, it was noted that SI itself does not explain other aspects of Europeanisation; its focus on institutional development rather downplays more overtly 'political' influences in the implementation of the WFD in Turkey. In this respect, the theory may need to be combined with other theories of the policy process such as pluralism or power-based theories.

Fourthly, a more normative question was forwarded on the basis of the analysis in terms of what it tells us about the future implementation of the WFD in Turkey and how any obstacles to socialisation could be overcome. Several evident learning barriers to implementation were revealed by the study that could form the basis of future policy recommendations for the Turkish government

Finally, the thesis research does allow us to reach conclusions on the explanatory value of sociological institutionalism for Europeanisation in Turkish water policy. On the one hand, it could be argued that such theory does help to understand ongoing Europeanisation in the absence of any substantial material incentives, primarily the membership incentive under conditionality. Actors learn from the EU about its water norms, leading to their internalisation as they become socialised, thereby driving forward the Europeanisation process. Material incentives, in this respect, are of limited influence. On the other hand, conditionality was certainly a factor in initiating the learning process pre-2005, while the continued 'teaching' assistance offered by the EU as norm entrepreneur has been a factor. In addition, SI does not overtly engage with the political aspects of post-accession Europeanisation in the ways other Turkish scholars are now promoting. Sociological institutionalism therefore has value to the debate but its explanatory power could be enhanced through combination with more political or power-based theorising.

9.2 The added value of the study to the literature

This thesis adds to the knowledge within the EU studies, Turkish domestic politics and environmental governance literatures. As discussed in the next section, both theoretical and empirical insights are added to these literatures

through new research into: theoretical interpretations and empirical examples of external Europeanisation; theoretical analysis of the Turkish accession process; new empirical material on Turkish water policy; theoretical development of sociological institutionalism in analysing environmental governance; and finally, adding new empirical examples of IWRM for comparative analysis.

9.2.1 Contribution to the EU literature

The impacts of the EU on the transformation of policies, politics and polities of member states and candidate countries have increasingly become an important area of discussion in the academic literature (Börzel and Panke, 2016). Yet, while Europeanisation has informed a burgeoning literature, there is only limited discussion on instances of reversing or 'stalled' accession and how it can be theorised. Here, the thesis examines this Europeanisation process in the example of Turkey by using a sociological institutionalism perspective, thereby adding to our existing knowledge. In addition, Europeanisation studies have a tendency to focus on policy changes rather than institutional shifts (True et al., 2007). This study consequently elaborates the transformation of institutional behaviours and changes at elite level and multi-stakeholder learning processes by undertaking semi-structured elite interviews and case studies. Accordingly, the research provides an enhanced understanding of learning processes, collaboration and technology transfer. The central contribution of the thesis is therefore to explain the implementation of a river basin management approach in Turkey by evaluating the relative importance of external or internal factors in driving the process and in so doing it sheds new light upon the validity of the claims made by sections of the Europeanisation literature. In this respect, a Europeanisation approach helps to interpret how the EU-induced and domestically driven variables can support or block domestic reforms.

The study also provides a valuable addition to the wider literature on WFD transfer and IWRM. On a global scale, IWRM has become the main implementing 'paradigm' for national water governance (Benson et al., 2015). Multiple comparative studies have been undertaken to examine IWRM implementation in national contexts (e.g. Fritsch and Benson, 2013; Mehta et

al., 2014; Gallego-Ayala and Juárez, 2011; Rouillard et al., 2014) but research on Turkey is lacking, presenting a significant gap in this literature. In addition, emergent studies on the WFD have examined how the EU has exported its norms on a global scale through, for example, knowledge transfer networks such as the EU Water Initiative (EU-WI) (e.g. Fritsch et al., 2017). This study consequently has a potential to add to such debates and also other areas including EU 'external governance' (Lavenex and Uçarar, 2004; Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2009), EU environmental policy entrepreneurship (Bretherton and Vogler, 2005), water policy transfer (e.g. Swainson and de Loe, 2011; Benson et al., 2013), and water policy translation and 'travel' (Mukhtarov and Cherp, 2014; Gerlak and Mukhtarov, 2015) in relation to the WFD.

9.2.2 Contribution to Turkish studies

On the basis of its observations, the thesis also makes an important contribution to knowledge on Turkish domestic politics. As discussed in Chapter 2, rational theoretical arguments have tended to historically dominate broader discussions around Turkish accession, yet they have become increasingly subject to criticism (see Macmillan, 2012; Buhari Gulmez, 2017; Müftüler-Baç, 2011; Börzel and Soyaltin, 2012). Indeed, the literature on this subject shows that domestic changes can be explained by mediating domestic (endogenous) and European (exogenous) factors (Acikmese, 2010). Beside adaptational pressure, mediating factors are important for enabling domestic changes, which are political culture and change agents who mobilise at domestic level from the sociological institutionalist perspective, the existence of multiple veto points, the capacity of domestic institutions to exploit opportunities (Börzel and Risse, 2000; Cowles et al., 2001), social learning (Checkel, 2001), and discourse (Schmidt and Radaelli, 2004). The adaptational pressure on domestic impacts of the EU on policies and institutions varies in Turkey; in some areas, for example during the resolution of the Cyprus conflict, domestic changes were stalled while other areas such as minority rights and ombudsmanship, reforms continued after 2005 (Börzel and Soyaltin, 2012; Rumford, 2011).

However, to date, no study has examined the explanatory power of RI theory in relation to alternative theories in the Turkish environmental sector. Research into this subject therefore has the capacity to add significantly to this debate through an analysis of Turkish water policy; a key developmental sector that continues to undergo Europeanisation despite declining accession incentives. Therefore, while EU influence differs from case to case, the mechanisms explaining the changes as well as what domestic factors influence them become important questions, which are explored in this study. Nevertheless, despite the deceleration of domestic reforms recently, the Turkish government is likely to continue reforms even under the Erdogan tenure. There is consequently an important gap in the literature in explaining under what conditions and to what extent Turkey adapts to EU policy regarding water.

The Turkish Europeanisation literature mainly focuses on political Europeanisation, which examines the impacts of EU integration on domestic administrative structure and national executives, and also interest groups and political actors (Diez et al., 2005; Ugur, 2010). Some studies concentrate on examining policy changes through a collective understanding of both state and societal actors engaged in the process and their awareness of the impacts of Europeanisation (Meyer and Poncharal, 2012; Cowles et al., 2001). This process of societal Europeanisation evolves 'as a product of growing transnational exchange and cooperation – either independent of or in conjunction with European-level politics' (Meyer and Poncharal, 2012: 5). Nas and Özer (2012) also indicate that increasing administrative and technical capacities and social learning, referring to the internalisation of norms and rule adoption of individuals and institutional actors through socialisation, are significant. However, in the Turkish Europeanisation literature even where a sociological perspective and social learning have been utilised, authors do not tend to provide in-depth explanation on how and what kind of learning occurs (see Celik and Rumelili, 2006; Rumelili and Boşnak, 2015; Macmillan, 2012; Ustun, 2010). Sociological institutionalism therefore requires better and deeper analysis, which is an aim of this study.

The research will add to pre-existing studies on Turkish water policy, particularly IWRM development, providing new empirical analysis. Studies on Turkish water management mostly stem from disciplines such as environmental engineering, sociology, international relations and geography. Others have taken a more historical perspective or focused on specific projects (see Berktaş et al., 2006; Oğuz, 2010; Yıldız and Özbay, 2009; Tigrek and Kibaroglu, 2011; Kibaroglu et al., 2012; Moroglu and Yazgan, 2008). Yet, these studies are largely descriptive and lack theoretical interpretation: a gap that is addressed by the thesis. They also do not pay attention to the learning of political actors at national and local levels, and how EU norms and rules have influenced political actors and their perspectives on water management.

9.2.3 Contribution to the environmental governance literature

This thesis has contributed to the theoretical development of social learning within environmental governance studies. It develops an SL argument within the Europeanisation literature on Turkish water policy. In the environmental governance literature, the authors focus on SL without providing a detailed theoretical explanation that is drawn from SI (see Reed et al., 2010; Keen et al., 2005; Pahl-Wostl and Hare, 2004; Steyaert and Ollivier, 2007). However, this thesis focuses on the meaning of SL within the EU literature and develops different levels of SL, including superficial, partial and transformative.

This thesis not only significantly contributes to the literature on Turkish environmental management policy but also national comparative data on WFD implementation. As discussed in Chapter 2, there is a burgeoning literature on the WFD within the EU, from various theoretical perspectives: conditionality (see Öniş, 2003; Aydın and Acikmese, 2007; Tocci, 2007a; Özbudun, 2015), lesson-drawing (see Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004; Celenk, 2016), and social learning and socialisation (for example, Dabrowski and Maliszewska, 2011; Soyaltin, 2013b; Nas and Özer, 2012; Gürkan, 2018). In addition, some studies have been conducted into the transfer of WFD norms to non-EU states (see Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004; Whitman, 2011; Börzel and Soyaltin, 2012; Öniş and Yilmaz, 2009). However, there is little discussion in

this literature on its impacts in Turkey. The study therefore extends forward our understanding of external Europeanisation and the downloading of WFD norms under conditions of (de)Europeanisation.

9.3 Future directions of the research

The thesis sets the stage for a broader research agenda that, due to its cross-cutting nature, interacts with debates in several academic areas, most notably external Europeanisation and de-Europeanisation particularly under conditions of declining accession incentives in Turkey (see Saatçioğlu, 2016; Kaliber, 2016; Boşnak, 2016; Aydın-Düzgüt, 2016; Cebeci, 2016). As discussed above, this area is still emerging in the Europeanisation studies on Turkey with scholars grappling with this novel phenomenon, utilising a variety of theoretical perspectives. There is a significant scope to utilise the theoretical approach undertaken in this thesis in examining ‘stalled’ accession or de-Europeanisation in sectors such as human rights, the judiciary and economic policy, where patterns of implementation of EU norms are arguably more complex, in addition to other environmental policy sectors, e.g. climate policy or air quality policy. Of particular interest is how Turkish policy actors are either being socialised or de-socialised by EU norms through actor learning dynamics – which could constitute a unique research agenda (see Gürkan, 2018; Bürgin, 2014). For example, where policy reforms have been reversed in the period since 2005 such as human rights (for example, Öniş, 2008; Öniş, 2009; Arıkan, 2017), critical questions emerge from a sociological perspective as to how Turkish policy actors are now ‘unlearning’ EU policy norms and the motivations therein.

The thesis research also has applications to novel Europeanisation patterns in other countries. After the CEE accession expansion in the early to mid-2000s, the enlargement process slowed with only Croatia joining the EU, in 2013. The geo-political landscape of accession states is currently highly variable: some candidate states are slated for future accession (Serbia, Macedonia, Montenegro), others are future candidates (Bosnia, Kosovo, Albania) while Turkey and Iceland appear to have reversed their accession process. Eastern European Neighbourhood Policy states (Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia,

Armenia and Azerbaijan) meanwhile may one day move towards accession candidacy. In the case of Ukraine, this process appeared relatively well advanced after the signing of the 2016 Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area in 2016 – but, as the 2014 Euromaidan protests show, accession appears a much less linear process than during the CEE enlargement. Accordingly, theoretical explanations of external Europeanisation may require revising to account for these new accession strategies. The thesis is ideally positioned to contribute to future comparative study and theory-building into the dynamics of external Europeanisation, de-Europeanisation and re-Europeanisation occurring.

Of additional interest for future research is how the thesis can contribute to developing debates over the EU's global transfer of WFD norms. This phenomenon has been charted in relation to the EU's Water Initiative (EUWI), a European Commission supported transnational policy network platform that aims to transfer the WFD to South American, Mediterranean, East European and Central Asian states (Fritsch et al., 2017). The EU also is employing the WFD as a transfer object of its global 'Water Diplomacy' approach, which has led to bi-lateral water policy partnerships with China and India. As noted above, theoretical arguments on policy transfer and policy learning have already been integrated into the Europeanisation debate (for example, Dunlop and Radaelli, 2016a; Dunlop and Radaelli, 2016b; Dunlop, 2017; Radaelli, 2000a; Lavenex, 2002a) but not as yet to initiatives such as the EUWI. The experience of Turkey may be instructive to this area of research, since the EUWI operates as a similar form of high-level 'peer-to-peer' network transfer (see Benson and Jordan, 2011) for WFD norms to the Commission projects discussed above (Landig, 2011). Theoretical developments in the transnational network (Stone 2012; 2014) or diffusion literature could support such work. Project-led EU transfer, through specific training or implementation programmes, is another potential area for future research investigations (see Bürgin, 2016; Akgul and Gurer, 2014; Bürgin, 2014; Landig, 2011).

The thesis could also inform future research into how IWRM is reshaping national water policy on a global scale. The concept of IWRM has expanded

from its initial inception as the Dublin Principles for sustainable water management (WMO, 1992) to inform water policy and governance on a global scale (Benson et al., 2015). Promoted by international organisations such as the UN and EU; transnational NGOs such as Global Water Partnership (GWP); and international funding agencies such as the World Bank, IWRM is now the organising 'paradigm' for water governance worldwide (ibid.). Comparative research into how IWRM is reshaping national water management is now emerging (Fritsch and Benson, 2013; Benson et al., 2015) with several areas of interest for future research programmes, for example: the institutional rescaling of water management to the river basin scale through mechanisms such as RBMP (see Moss and Newig, 2010; Frederiksen et al., 2013; Huesker and Moss, 2015; Newig et al., 2016), the integration of environmental with other water use objectives (see Fritsch and Benson, 2013) and public participation in decision-making (see Jager et al., 2016; Boeuf and Fritsch, 2016). While the WFD is often cited as a key example of IWRM, the evolution of multiple national examples provides significant scope for comparative lesson-drawing (Rose, 2005) and potential policy transfer (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2012; Benson et al., 2012) on best practice. This thesis is well placed to contribute to this emerging debate by furnishing evidence on the effectiveness of IWRM implementation in Turkey (see Demirbilek and Benson, 2018). Comparison could be undertaken with European and non-European states, particularly those in Eastern Europe, Central Asia and Southern Asia where IWRM is fast becoming the principal model for national policy-makers to follow.

9.4 Summary

Therefore, this thesis aimed to provide better explanation of the domestic reforms in water policy in the absence of credible membership perspective. Turkey still continues adopting the EU *acquis* via IPA projects, which pave the way for Turkish actors to learn and implement the *acquis*. This thesis aimed to elucidate how this learning and implementation process can be explained through a sociological institutionalism perspective and via social learning and socialisation. Finally, this thesis has contributed to: the theoretical development of social learning within the environmental management literature, theory on

Europeanisation and sociological institutionalism, sociological perspectives in the Turkish Europeanisation literature, Turkish water policy and IWRM research more generally.

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Appendices

Appendix 1: Interview questions

General questions

How long have you been working in the department?

What is your role in making and implementing national water policy?

SOCIALISATION

What were the main characteristics of Turkish water policy before the country gained EU candidate status in 1999?

How has Turkish water policy changed in the period after 1999? What are the main institutional and organisational changes that have occurred?

To what extent has adoption of the EU Water Framework Directive influenced these changes?

Have there been any negative or positive effects on Turkish water policy of adopting the WFD?

To what extent has international opinion of Turkey, particularly in the EU, affected adoption of the WFD?

What is your current target regarding adoption of the WFD?

What are your existing projects regarding EU water policy? What are the challenges (economic, social, and political) in the implementation of EU policy?

What are the possible advantages and disadvantages of following EU water policy in Turkey in the future?

What are the drivers/motivations behind Turkey's continued attempts to adopt EU rules? How can you explain this process?

Do you think that following EU water policy is the correct approach in Turkey or was the traditional system better?

To what extent have your views on managing water resources changed in response to implementing the WFD approach?

Is there a mismatch between traditional Turkish water policy and the WFD approach?

In your opinion, is there a significant difference in how Turkish and EU policy actors view approaches to water management?

Do you think that the EU Water Framework Directive is a good model for addressing water quality issues?

Do you think this model (or WFD) is suitable for Turkey?

Which WFD principles do you find practical in Turkey and which ones have you decided to follow? Why?

Which features of the WFD do you find impractical in Turkey and have decided to disregard? Why?

Which features of the traditional Turkish approach to water management did you decide to keep?

How did the establishment of new institutions (ministry, departments, and water boards) affect adoption of WFD principles?

Were non-governmental actors, such as regional managers, NGOs, universities and the public included in the decision-making and implementation process? If so, how were their ideas and concerns taken into consideration?

SOCIAL LEARNING

How did you first learn about EU water policy? Did you receive any specialised training about the WFD? What kind of assistance regarding learning and implementing of EU policy did you get from the EU?

Did you give training or presentations to your staff about the WFD?

Have you talked to other groups (other departments, local boards, industry, citizens) about the WFD?

How did you evaluate implementation of the WFD approach in Turkey? Did this evaluation lead to further modification of Turkish water policy?

Have your views on water management in Turkey changed after the EU process?

Has this process led to changes in how the department views water management in Turkey? If so, what changes?

Has this process led to changes in how other groups (departments, local boards, industry, and citizens) view water management in Turkey? Is the WFD approach now widely accepted?

LOCAL

When was this water board established? What is your role on this board?

What were the problems regarding water management before the EU process?

What water management changes occurred after the EU process? Did these changes address water management issues?

How did you learn about the WFD? Did you receive any official training?

How do you implement the national policy? Do you get help from the national level?

Do you think that the voice of other stakeholders is heard during the process of policy making and implementation?

Were you given a chance to join the decision-making and implementation process? If yes, what was your role in the process?

Appendix 2: List of interviews

Levels	Organisations	Number
EU	DG NEAR AND DG ENVIRONMENT	2+1
TURKEY	MoFWA	19
	MoEU	7
	Delegation of EU to Turkey	2
LOCAL	Büyük Menderes Basin	6
	Konya (Closed) Basin	11
TOTAL		48

Appendix 3: Information sheet and consent form for research

Title of Research Project

The impacts of Europeanisation on Turkish Water policy in the absence of credible EU membership perspective with regard to shifts in the actors' behaviours and ideas.

Details of Project

I am a PhD student at the University of Exeter's Environment and Sustainability Institute (ESI), based on Penryn Campus in Cornwall. My project is on examining the shifts in the legislative and institutional manner in the EU process as well as actors' learning, behaviour, ideas and domestic norms in the scope of Turkish Water policy. This research is funded by the Turkish Republic Ministry of National Education.

The information, collected from the participants through interviews, will be used in my PhD thesis and it may be used for academic publication as well.

Contact Details

For further information about the research /interview data (amend as appropriate), please contact:

Name: Burcin Demirbilek

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University of Exeter, Penryn Campus
Penryn, Cornwall
TR10 9FE

Telephone: (+44)(0)7407094981

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If you have concerns/questions about the research you would like to discuss with someone else at the University, please contact:

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Confidentiality

Interview tapes and transcripts will be held in confidence. They will not be used other than for the purposes described above and third parties will not be allowed access to them (except as may be required by the law). However, if you request it, you will be supplied with a copy of your interview transcript so that you can comment on and edit it as you see fit (please give your email below so that I am able to contact you at a later date).

Your interview data will be held in accordance with the Data Protection Act.

Data Protection Notice

The information you provide will be used for research purposes and your personal data will be processed in accordance with current data protection legislation and the University's notification lodged at the Information Commissioner's Office. Your personal data will be treated in the strictest confidence and will not be disclosed to any unauthorised third parties. The results of the research will be published in anonymised form."

a. Interview recordings

The digital recording of your interview will be deleted as soon as there is an authoritative written transcripts and contact details.

b. Interview transcripts and contact details

Your personal and contact details will be stored separately from your interview transcript that will be stored on U drive and may be retained for up to 5 years. If you request it, you will be supplied with a copy of your interview transcript so that you can comment on and edit it as you see fit (please provide your email below)

Third parties will not be allowed access to interview tapes and transcripts except as required by law or in the event that something disclosed during the interview causes concerns about possible harm to you or to someone else.

Anonymity

Interview data will be held and used on an anonymous basis, with no mention of your name, but we will refer to the group of which you are a member. If this is not the case you need to adapt the text.

Consent

I have been fully informed about the aims and purposes of the project.

I understand that:

- there is no compulsion for me to participate in this research project and, if I do choose to participate, I may withdraw at any stage;
- I have the right to refuse permission for the publication of any information about me;
- any information which I give will be used solely for the purposes of this research project, which may include publications or academic conference or seminar presentations;
- If applicable, the information, which I give, may be shared between any of the other researcher(s) participating in this project in an anonymised form;
- all information I give will be treated as confidential;
- the researcher(s) will make every effort to preserve my anonymity.

.....

.....

(Signature of participant)

(Date)

.....
.....

(Printed name of participant)

(Email address of participant if they have requested to view a copy of the interview transcript.)

.....
.....

(Signature of researcher)

(Printed name of researcher)

One copy of this form will be kept by the participant; a second copy will be kept by the researcher(s).

Your contact details are kept separately from your interview data.

Appendix 4: Supporting water legislation

Notifications/Circulars/Documents/Decrees	Status/Date-No	Related EU Legislation
Notification on the Technical Procedures for the by-law on the Control of Water Losses in Drinking Water Supply and Distribution Systems	16/02/2017 No 29981	
Notification on Good Agricultural Practices Regarding the Prevention of Nitrate Pollution in Waters from Agricultural Activities	No: 2016/46 (MoFAL and MoFWA)	Nitrates Directive (91/676/EEC)
Notification on the Control of Water Losses in Potable Water Supply and Distribution Systems	21/02/2015 No 29274	Sampling and Analysis of surface water intended for the abstraction of drinking water directive (79/859/EEC)
National Basin Management Strategy Document (2014-2023)	04/07/2014 No 29050	
Notification on the Protection of Sensitive Inland Surface Waters against Eutrophication	26/02/2014 No 28925	
Circular on Groundwater Management Action Plan	11/07/2013 No 2013/5	
Notification on the Establishment, Tasks, Working Principles and Procedures of Basin Management Committees	18/06/2013 No 28681 Revised 20/05/2015 No 29361 MoFWA (GDWM)	WFD and Flood Risks Assessment and Management Directive (2007/60/EC)
Prime Ministry Circular on Ergene River Basin Protection Action Plan	13/06/2013 No 28676	WFD
Prime Ministry Circular on the Water Management Coordination Committee	20/03/2012 No 28239	WFD
Notification on the technical procedures of wastewater treatment plants	20/03/2010 No 27527	91/271/EC
Prime Ministry Circular on the Rehabilitation of River Beds and Creek Beds	20/02/2010, No 2010/27 MoFWA (GDWM)	EU Floods Directive (2007/60/EC)
Notification on the sampling and analysing methods of Water Pollution Control Regulation	10/10/2009 No 27372	
Notification on the Administrative Procedures of Water Pollution Control Regulation	30/07/2009 No 27372	
Notification on the procedures and principles of specific provision determination studies for Water Pollution Control Regulation	30/06/2009 no. 27274	
Notification on sensitive and less sensitive water areas under Urban Waste Water Treatment Regulation	27/06/2009 No 27271	Urban Wastewater Treatment Directive (UWWTD) (91/271/EEC)
Notification on the quality of shellfish waters	02/06.2008 No 26894	2006/113/EC Directive on the environmental quality of shellfish waters

Prime Ministry Circular on River Beds and Floods	09/09/2006, No 2006/27 MoFWA (GDWM)	EU Floods Directive (2007/60/EC)
Notification on the Technical Principles of Water Pollution Control Regulation (In Turkish, Teknik Usuller Tebliği)	07/01/1991 No 20748	
Government Decree on the Establishment and Duties of the Ministry of Environment and Forestry (abolished)	1991 No 443	
Government Decree on the Establishment and Responsibilities of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs	1991 No 441	
Government Decree on the by-law on Environmental Permits and Licenses the Organisation and duties of the Ministry of Health	1983 No 181	
Notification on Wetlands	28/05/1994 No 21943 05/04/1995 No 22249 15/04/1998 No 23314 09/02/2005 No 25722 20/06/2009 No 27264 31/01/2013 No 28545	The Habitat Directive (92/43/EEC) The Birds Directive (2009/147/EC) Ramsar Convention (17/05/1994-No 21937)
Notification on Administrative Procedures of the by-law on Water Pollution Control	12/03/1989 No 20106	
Notification on Technical Procedures of Waste Water Treatment Plants		

Appendix 5: TAIEX programmes

Task No	Name		Date	
3546	Environmental Impact Assessment	Workshop	24-26/07/2002	MoE
9238	Water Quality management and assessment	Expertise	28/07/2004	MoEF
20898	Natural Mineral Water and Spring	Seminar (Slovenia)	27/09/2005	MoFAL
9795	Urban Waste Water	Expertise	14-15/11/2005	MoEF
9795	Sewage Sludge	Expertise	14-15/11/2005	MoEF
24008	Bathing Water 2006/7 EC	Expertise	2006	MoEF
10498	Quality of Shellfish Waters Additional Participants	Expertise	2006	MARA, MoEF
	WFD and Urban Wastewater Treatment Directives	Workshop	13-14/09/ 2007	MoEF
	Discussion of Groundwater Issues	Expertise	2007	MoEF
7488	Residue Monitoring in Fishery and Aquaculture	Study visit	2007	MARA
6831	European Fisheries Fund (1198/2006)	Workshop	September 2007	MARA
9885	Ground water modelling	Workshop	23/07/2008	MoEF
11082	Flood Risk Assessment and Management Directive	Workshop	8-9/12/2009	MoEF
9883	Identification of basins and sub-basins in Turkey by using GIS and rivers coding	Workshop	28-29/05/2009	MoEF
13486	GIS Application for Groundwater	Study Visit	2009	MoEF
9882	Monitoring of Marine and Coastal Pollution.	Study Visit (Italy)	06-08.04.2009	MoEF
2008.01. TRST.13 7	Implementation of Sewage Sludge Directive in Turkey	Study visit (Romania)	5-7/05/2009	MoEF
48648	Workshop on exchange of experiences through the Mediterranean Countries on water policy	Workshop (Ankara)	27-28/09/2012	MoFWA
50850	Multi country- Workshop on Waste Framework Directive's Implementation into national legislation.	Workshop (Bratislava, Slovak Republic)	10-11/12/2012	MoEF
51437	Exchange of Experiences through the Mediterranean Countries in the Context of Water Policy	Workshop (Ankara)	4-5/04/2013	MoFWA
52415	Protection and management of water resources	Study Tour (Brussels)	24-26/04/2013	Turkey and Western Balkans
51985	Hydromorphology & Hydromorphological Monitoring According to Water Framework Directive	Workshop (Ankara)	01- 02/07/2013	MoFWA
51983	Online Surface Water Monitoring Systems	Workshop	08/07/2013	MoFWA
47876	Expert mission on Determination of Sensitive Areas of Inland Waters	Expertise (Ankara)	24-25/10/2013	MoFWA

56281	Local Administration Facility workshop on water protection and management	Workshop (Brussels)	14-16/05/2014	
52847	Determination of the Wastewater Tariffs in EU Countries	Study Visit (Italy)	26 – 28/05/2014	MoEU
TAIEX/ ECRAN- 57736	Introductory Workshop on Economic Analysis in Accordance with the Water Framework Directive (WFD): “Recovery of the costs through water pricing & Institutional/policy framework of the water utility sector for cost recovery and efficiency	Workshop (Skopje)	21-22/10/2014	MoEU
57735	ECRAN Multi-Country Workshop on the transposition and implementation of the Waste Framework Directive	Workshop (Podgorica, Montenegro)	21-22/10/2014	MoEU
TAIEX/ ECRAN- 59649	ECRAN Regional Workshop on Strategic Planning in the Water Sector	Workshop (Montenegro)	03-04/06/2015	MoEU
TAIEX/ ECRAN – 60279	Workshop on Water Framework Directive Program of Measures in Drina River Basin	Workshop (Albania)	15 – 17/09/2015	MoEU
TAIEX/ ECRAN 60280	Workshop on linkages between the Water Framework Directive (WFD) and Strategic Environmental Assessment Directive (SEAD) and Environmental Impact Assessment Directive (EIAD)	Workshop (Prague, Czech Republic)	22 – 24/09/2015	MoEU
TAIEX/ ECRAN – 60516	5 th Screening Workshop on WFD Program of Measures in Drina River Basin.	Workshop (Montenegro)	07 – 09/10/2015	MoEU
TAIEX/ ECRAN –60743	6 th Screening Workshop Water Framework Directive Program of Measures –Environmental Objectives and Exemptions	Workshop (Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina)	17 – 19/11/2015	MoEU
TAIEX/ ECRAN – 61384	Regional Workshop on WFD: Program of Measures Basic and Supplementary measures and their anticipated effects	Workshop (Podgorica, Montenegro)	15 – 17/02/2016	MoEU
TAIEX/ ECRAN 61725	TAIEX/ ECRAN Regional Workshop “Tools and guidance for assessing resource and environmental cost in the WFD” and 3 rd Annual Meeting	Workshop (Skopje)	29 – 31/03/2016.	MoEU
TAIEX 61285	Workshop on Irrigation Scheme Management for Effective Water Usage in Agriculture	Workshop (Ankara)	27 – 28/04/2016	DSI
TAIEX/E CRAN 62260	Multi-beneficiary Workshop on Eutrophication Reduction Measures under EU Directives in the Domain of Water	Workshop (Sarajevo, Bosnia & Herzegovina)	16 –18/05/ 2016	MoEU
TAIEX ECRAN	Multi-beneficiary Workshop on Program of Measure under the Water Framework Directive	Workshop (Tirana)	20 – 22/06/2016	MoEU
TAIEX ECRAN- 62669	Multi-beneficiary Workshop on Actions Toward Good Status of the Water Framework Directive	Workshop (Sarajevo, Bosnia & Herzegovina)	11 – 13/07/2016	MoEU
TAIEX 58445	Expert Mission on Determining the Discharge Standards for Waste Water	Expertise (Ankara)	5-7/10/2016	MoEU
	Workshop on Reconciling Hydropower	Workshop	10-11/10/2016	Directorate-

TAIEX 62825	Production and Flood Protection with Water Management and Nature Protection	Brussels		General Environment MoEU
TAIEX 58764	Expert Mission on Water and Basin Management	Expertise (Antalya)	10-11/04/2017	MoFWA
TAIEX 64334	Expert Mission on Water Conservation under Agri-Environment Measure in IPARD program	Expertise (Ankara)	19-23/06/2017	Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Livestock
TAIEX	Workshop on Chemical Monitoring of Sediment and Biota.	Workshop (Ankara)	25 – 26/09/2017	MoFWA
TAIEX	Multi-beneficiary Workshop on Funding Opportunities for the Water Sector	Workshop (Brussels)	07/10/2017	MoEU
TAIEX 62719	Chemical Monitoring of Sediment and Biota	Workshop (Ankara)	25-26/09/2017	MoFWA
TAIEX 65061	Study Visit on Allocation of Water Resources	Study visit (Rome, Italy)	28 February – 2 March 2018	MoFWA

Appendix 6: List of infrastructure projects of the Ministry of Environment and Urbanisation (IPA I 2007-2013)

	Project Name	
TR0602.02	Tokat Wastewater Treatment Plant Project (Tokat)	2007-2010
TR0602.01	Nevşehir Wastewater Treatment Plant Project (Nevşehir)	2007-2010
2008TR16IPR002	Ordu Wastewater Treatment Plant Project	ongoing
2009TR16IPR008	Ceyhan Wastewater and Stormwater Project (Adana)	2012-2015
2009TR16IPR019	Bulancak Water and Wastewater (Giresun)	
2009TR16IPR003	Amasya Water and Wastewater Projects (Amasya)	2013-2015
2009TR16IPR019	Bulancak Water and Wastewater (Giresun)	2013-ongoing
2009TR16IPR014	Adiyaman Wastewater (Adiyaman)	2013-2016
2009TR16IPR012	Diyarbakir Water and Wastewater (Diyarbakir)	2012-ongoing
2009TR16IPR010	Dogubayazit Drinking Water Supply (Agri)	2012-ongoing
2009TR16IPR011	Ercis Drinking Water Supply (Van)	2012-ongoing
2009TR16IPR007	Erzincan Water and Wastewater (Erzincan)	2012-ongoing
2009TR16IPR013	Erzurum Wastewater (Erzurum)	2012-2015
2009TR16IPR005	Luleburgaz Wastewater (Kirkclareli)	2012-ongoing
2009TR16IPR009	Manavgat Water and Wastewater (Antalya)	2012-ongoing
2009TR16IPRM002	Merzifon Wastewater Project (Amasya)	2015-ongoing
2009TR16IPR017	Nizip Water and Wastewater (Gaziantep)	2013-ongoing
2009TR16IPR016	Polatli Water and Wastewater (Ankara)	2015-ongoing
2009TR16IPRM001	Seydisehir Water and Wastewater (Konya)	2015-ongoing
2007TR16IP001	Soma Wastewater (Manisa)	2015-ongoing
2009TR16IPR015	Siverek Wastewater (Sanliurfa)	2012-ongoing
2010TR16IPR002	Bartın Water and Wastewater (Bartın)	2015-ongoing
2009TR16IPR006	Akşehir Water and Wastewater (Konya)	2014-ongoing
2010TR16IPR005	Akcaabat Water and Wastewater Project	2014-ongoing
2012TR16IPR002	Kahramanmaraş Water and Wastewater Project	2015-ongoing
2012TR16IPR004	Kutahya Wastewater	2016-ongoing
2012TR16IPR001	Sanliurfa Wastewater Treatment Plan and Collector Lines Project	2016-ongoing
2010TR16IPR004	Silvan Drinking Water Supply	2015-ongoing
	Erdemli Water and Wastewater (Mersin) ongoing	

Appendix 7: Ongoing projects of the General Directorate of Water Management

	Project Name	Year
1	Project for Preparation of Drought Management Plan of Doğu Akdeniz Basin	2016-2018
2	Project for Preparation of Drought Management Plan of Küçük Menderes Basin	2016-2018
3	Project for Preparation of Drought Management Plan of Kuzey Ege Basin	2016-2018
4	Project for Preparation of Drought Management Plan of Van Gölü Basin	2016-2018
5	Project for Preparation of Drought Management Plan of Antalya and Burdur Basins	2016-2018
6	Project for Preparation of Drought Management Plan of Batı Akdeniz Basin	2016-2018
7	Project for Preparation of Drought Management Plan of Fırat Dicle Basin	2017-2019
8	Project for Preparation of Drought Management Plan of Seyhan, Ceyhan and Asi Basins	2017-2019
9	Project for Preparation of Flood Management Plan of Ceyhan Basin	2015-2018
10	Project for Preparation of Flood Management Plan of Susurluk Basin	2015-2018
11	Project for Preparation of Flood Management Plan of Sakarya Basin	2015-2018
12	Project for Preparation of Flood Management Plan of Kızılırmak Basin	2016-2019
13	Project for Preparation of Flood Management Plans of Büyük Menderes and Akarçay Basins	2016-2019
14	Project for Preparation of Flood Management Plans of Burdur and Batı Akdeniz Basins	2016-2019
15	Project for Preparation of Flood Management Plan of Aras Basin	2016-2019
16	Project for Preparation of Flood Management Plan of Batı Karadeniz Basin	2017-2019
17	Project for Preparation of Flood Management Plan of Fırat-Dicle Basin	2017-2020
18	Project for Preparation of Flood Management Plans of Kuzey Ege, Gediz and Küçük Menderes Basins	2017-2019
19	Project for Preparation of Flood Management Plan of Doğu Akdeniz Basin	2017-2019
20	Determination The Effects Of Climate Change On Snow Melting And Flows Project	2017-2019
21	Assessment of Alternatives for Reuse of Treated Wastewater	2017-2019
22	Technical Assistance on Economic Analysis within River Basin Management Plans and Water Efficiency Aspects in 3 Pilot River Basins in Turkey	2017-2019
23	Development of hydrological, water quality and ecological modelling Tool for Sustainable Management of water resources	2016-2019

24	Project for National Water Information System	2012-2018
25	Project for mainstreaming and ensuring sustainability for Turkish National Water Information System	2012-2018
26	The Project on the Establishment of Reference Area Monitoring Network in Turkey	2016-2020
27	Project on Determination of Assimilation Capacity of Lakes and Improvement of Water Quality	2016-2018
28	Project on Endocrine Disrupting Substances and Investigation of Treatment Technologies	2016-2018
29	National Water Plan	2017-2018
30	Technical Assistance for Conversion of River Basin Protection Action Plans into River Basin Management Plans	2015-2018
31	Project on Preparation of Gediz River Basin Management Plan	2016-2018
32	Project on Preparation of Küçük Menderes River Basin Management Plan	2017-2019
33	Project on Preparation of Kuzey Ege River Basin Management Plan	2017-2019
34	Project on Preparation of Burdur River Basin Management Plan	2017-2019
35	Project on Preparation of Akarçay Basin Sectoral Water Allocation Plan	2016-2018
36	Project on Preparation of Konya Closed Basin Sectoral Water Allocation Plan	2016-2018
37	Project on Preparation of Kucuk Menderes and Gediz Basins Sectoral Water Allocation Plans	2017-2019
38	Project on Basin Protection Plan and Special Provision Determination of Yuvacik Dam Reservoir and Sapanca Lake	2014-2018
39	Project on Water Quality Monitoring, Reference Point Determination and Modelling of Gönen Dam Reservoir	2016-2018
40	Capacity Building Support to Turkey on Groundwater Management	2016-2018
41	Project on Development of the Methodology for the Determination of Environmental Objectives for Surface, Coastal and Transitional Waters: Büyük Menderes River Basin Pilot Study	2013-2018
42	Establishment of a Methodology for the Determination and Assessment of Groundwater Quality and of Groundwater Quality Characteristics and Implementation of This Methodology in Burdur and Batı Akdeniz River Basins	2017-2019
43	Establishment of a Methodology for the Determination and Assessment of Groundwater Quality and of Groundwater Quality Characteristics and Implementation of This Methodology in Yeşilirmak River Basin	2017-2019
44	Project on Digitising of Water Resources: Preparation of Monitoring Programmes by Performing Typology, Water Body and Risk Assessment Studies	2017-2021

Appendix 8: Wastewater and drinking water infrastructure projects (within KOP Action Plan)

Wastewater and drinking water infrastructure projects (within KOP Action Plan) (Konya Ovasi Projesi Bolge Kalkinma Idaresi Baskanligi, 2016; Konya Ovasi Projesi Bolge Kalkinma Idaresi Baskanligi, 2017; Konya Ovasi Projesi Bolge Kalkinma Idaresi Baskanligi, 2018).

	Project Name	Responsible Actor	Year
	AKSARAY		
1	Aksaray Wastewater Treatment Plant and Collector Network Project (under IPA-II)	MoEU	2016-
2	Demirci Wastewater Network Construction	General Directorate of Bank of Provinces (GDBP)	2015
3	Eskil Wastewater Network Construction	GDBP	2017
4	Gülağaç Drinking Water Network Construction	GDBP	2015-2017
5	Gülpınar Wastewater Network Construction	GDBP	2015-
6	Helvadere Drinking Water Network Construction	GDBP	2015-2018
7	Ortaköy Wastewater Treatment Plant Construction	GDBP	2015-2017
8	Saglik Drinking Water Network Construction	GDBP	2017
9	Sultanhanı Wastewater Treatment Plant Construction	GDBP	2015-2017
10	Mamasin Dam Lake Basin Special Provision Determination and Basin Protection Plan	WMGD	2015-2017
11	Aksaray Wastewater Network Construction	GDBP	2016-
	KARAMAN		
1	Ayrancı Wastewater Network Construction	GDBP	2015-2018
2	Kazımkarabekir Wastewater Network Construction	GDBP	2015
3	Kazımkarabekir Wastewater Treatment Plant Construction	GDBP	2016-)
4	Güneyyurt Wastewater Treatment Plant Construction	GDBP	2017-
5	Sarıveliler Drinking Water Network Construction	GDBP	2015-2017
6	Sudurağı Wastewater Treatment Plant Construction	GDBP	2015-
7	Sudurağı Wastewater Network Construction	GDBP	2015-2017
8	Ibrala Dam Drinking Water Treatment Plant	MoFWA	2015-2017
9	Ibrala Dam Drinking Water Distribution Pipeline	MoFWA	2015-2018
	KONYA		
1	Aksehir Drinking Water and Sewage Project	MoEU	2015-2018
2	Seydisehir Water and Wastewater Project	MoEU	2015-2018
3	Çeşmelisebil Wastewater Network Construction	GDBP	2015-2018
4	Derbent Wastewater Network Construction	GDBP	2015-2017
5	Derebucak Wastewater Network Construction	GDBP	2015-2017

6	Gökpınar Wastewater Treatment Plant Construction	GDBP	2015-2017
7	Hamzalar Wastewater Network Construction	GDBP	2015-2017
8	Huyuk Wastewater Treatment Plant	GDBP	2017-
9	İsmil Wastewater Network Construction	GDBP	2015-2018
10	Okçu Wastewater Network Construction	GDBP	2015
11	Sadikhacı Wastewater Network Construction	GDBP	2015-2017
12	Sarioğlan Wastewater Network Construction	GDBP	2015-2017
13	Taşpınar Wastewater Network Construction	GDBP	2015-2017
14	Tavşançalı Wastewater Network Construction	GDBP	2015-2018
15	Yunak Wastewater Network Construction	GDBP	2015-2018
16	Blue Tunnel Drinking Water Treatment Plants	MoFWA	2015-2018
17	Blue Tunnel Drinking Water Distribution Pipeline projects	MoFWA	2017-
NIGDE			
1	Alay-Bağlama-Kiledere Wastewater Network Construction	GDBP	2015
2	Altunhisar Drinking Water Network Construction	GDBP	2015-2018
3	Azatlı Drinking Water Network Construction	GDBP	2016-
4	Bahçeli Drinking Water Network Construction	GDBP	2015-2017
5	Baglama Drinking Water Network Construction	GDBP	2017-
6	Çavdarlı Wastewater Network Construction	GDBP	2015
7	Çamardı Wastewater Network Construction	GDBP	2016-
8	Çamardı Drinking Water Network Construction	GDBP	2017-
9	Degirmenli Wastewater and Drinking Water Network Construction	GDBP	2017-
10	Dündarlı Wastewater Network Construction	GDBP	2015-2017
11	Dündarlı Drinking Water Network Construction	GDBP	2017-
12	Edikli Wastewater Treatment Plant Construction	GDBP	2015-2017
13	Edikli Drinking Water Network Construction	GDBP	2017-
14	Hacıabdullah Wastewater Network Construction	GDBP	2015
15	Karaatlı Wastewater Network Construction	GDBP	2015
16	Karakapı Drinking Water Network Construction	GDBP	2015-2017
17	Keçikalesi Drinking Water Network Construction	GDBP	2015-2017
18	Keçikalesi Wastewater Network Construction	GDBP	2017-
19	Kemerhisar Wastewater Network Construction	GDBP	2016-
20	Kiledere Drinking Water Network Construction	GDBP	2015-2017
21	Konaklı Drinking Water Network Construction	GDBP	2015-2017
22	Konaklı Wastewater Treatment Construction	GDBP	2017-
23	Ulukışla Wastewater Network Construction	GDBP	2016-
24	Ulukışla Drinking Water Network Construction	GDBP	2017-
25	Yeşilgölcük Drinking Water Network Construction	GDBP	2016

Appendix 9: Wastewater and drinking water infrastructure projects (non-KOP Action Plan)

Wastewater and drinking water infrastructure projects (non-KOP Action Plan) (Konya Ovasi Projesi Bolge Kalkinma Idaresi Baskanligi, 2016); (Konya Ovasi Projesi Bolge Kalkinma Idaresi Baskanligi, 2017); (Konya Ovasi Projesi Bolge Kalkinma Idaresi Baskanligi, 2018)

	Project Name	Responsible Actor	Year
	AKSARAY		
1	Eskil Drinking Water Supply Project	MoEU	2015-2017
2	Selime Drinking Water Treatment Plant Project	MoEU	2015-2017
3	Sultanhani Drinking Water Supply Project	MoEU	2015-2017
	KIRIKKALE		
1	Bahşılı Drinking Water Network Construction	GDBP	2016-2018
2	Balıseyh Drinking Water Network Construction	GDBP	2017-
3	Çelebi Drinking Water Network Construction	GDBP	2016-
4	Delice Drinking Water Network Construction	GDBP	2017-
5	Karakeçili Wastewater Network Construction	GDBP	2016-2018
6	Karakeçili Drinking Water Network Construction	GDBP	2016-2018
7	Keskin Drinking Water Network Construction	GDBP	2016-2018
	YOZGAT		
1	Akdağmadeni Drinking Water Network Construction	GDBP	2016-2018
2	Aydincik Drinking Water Network Construction	GDBP	2017-
3	Boğazlıyan Drinking Water Network Construction	GDBP	2016-
4	Karayakup Wastewater Network Construction	GDBP	2017-
5	Oluklu Drinking Water Network Construction	GDBP	2017-
6	Sırçalı Drinking Water Network Construction	GDBP	2016-2018
7	Uzunlu Drinking Water Network Construction	GDBP	2017
8	Yozgat Drinking Water Treatment Plants	DSI	2012-2016
	KIRSEHIR		
1	Kırşehir Drinking Water Distribution Pipeline Project	DSI	2016-2017
2	Kırşehir Drinking Water Treatment Plants	DSI	2016-2018
3	Kurancılı Wastewater Treatment Plant Construction	GDBP	2017-
	NEVSEHIR		
1	Avanos Drinking Water Network Construction	GDBP	2016-2018
2	Nevşehir Drinking Water Distribution Pipeline Project	DSI	2016-
3	Nevşehir Drinking Water Treatment Plant	DSI	2015-
4	Gulsehir Wastewater and Drinking Water Network Construction	GDBP	2017-
5	Hacibektas Wastewater Network Construction	GDBP	2017-
6	Hacibektas Drinking Water Network Construction	GDBP	2017-
7	Kozakli Drinking Water Network Construction	GDBP	2017-
8	Ürgüp Wastewater Network Construction	GDBP	2016-2018
9	Yazihüyük Drinking Water Network Construction	GDBP	2016-2018

Appendix 10: Projects proposed in 2018

Projects proposed in 2018 (General Directorate of Water Management, 2018)

	Project Name
1	Project for Preparation of Drought Management Plan of Sakarya Basin
2	Project for Preparation of Drought Management Plan of Kızılırmak Basin
3	Preparation of Flood Management Plans of Doğu Karadeniz and Çoruh Basins
4	Preparation of Flood Management Plans of Seyhan and Asi Basins
5	Preparation of Flood Management Plan of Van Gölü Basin
6	Establishment of Groundwater Monitoring System/Network by Using Conceptual Model
7	Ulusal Su Bilgi Sistem Yaygınlaştırma Ve Sürdürülebilirliğinin Sağlanması Projesi
8	Project on Interaction of Groundwater and Surface Water in view of Quality and Quantity
9	Establishment of a Methodology for the Determination and Assessment of Groundwater Quality and of Groundwater Quality Characteristics and Implementation of This Methodology in Fırat-Dicle River Basin
10	Project on the Ecotoxicological Data Requirement for Hazardous Substances
11	Project on the Sectorial Cost Analysis for the Implementation of Environmental Quality Standards of the Hazardous Substances
12	Project on Preparation of Asi River Basin Management Plan
13	Project on Preparation of Fırat-Dicle River Basin Management Plan
14	Project on Preparation of Burdur and B.Menderes Basins Sectoral Water Allocation Plans
15	Project on Preparation of Fırat-Dicle Basin Sectoral Water Allocation Plan
16	Project on Drinking Water Basin Protection Plan of Kozlu (Ulutun) Dam Reservoir
17	Project on Drinking Water Basin Protection Plan of Kapulukaya Dam Reservoir
18	Project on Drinking Water Basin Protection Plan of İbrala Dam Reservoir
19	Project on Drinking Water Basin Protection Plan of Akdeğirmen Dam Reservoir
20	Burdur Basin Water Efficiency Plan Preparation Project

Appendix 11: List of institutions at stakeholder meetings at Konya (closed) basin

Institutions
General Directorate of Water Management
General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works
Konya Province
Isparta Province
Karaman Province
Ankara Province
Nigde Province
Aksaray Province
Nevsehir Province
Konya Provincial Directorate of Science, Industry and Technology
Konya Provincial Directorate of Environment and Urbanisation
Konya Provincial Directorate of Food, Agriculture and Livestock
Konya Public Health Directorate
Aksaray Provincial Directorate of Science, Industry and Technology
Aksaray Provincial Directorate of Environment and Urbanisation
Aksaray Provincial Directorate of Food, Agriculture and Livestock
Aksaray Public Health Directorate
Karaman Provincial Directorate of Science, Industry and Technology
Karaman Provincial Directorate of Environment and Urbanisation
Karaman Provincial Directorate of Food, Agriculture and Livestock
Karaman Public Health Directorate
Nigde Provincial Directorate of Science, Industry and Technology
Nigde Provincial Directorate of Environment and Urbanisation
Nigde Provincial Directorate of Food, Agriculture and Livestock
Nigde Public Health Directorate
Ankara Provincial Directorate of Science, Industry and Technology
Ankara Provincial Directorate of Environment and Urbanisation
Ankara Provincial Directorate of Food, Agriculture and Livestock
Ankara Public Health Directorate
Isparta Provincial Directorate of Science, Industry and Technology
Isparta Provincial Directorate of Environment and Urbanisation
Isparta Provincial Directorate of Food, Agriculture and Livestock
Isparta Public Health Directorate
Nevsehir Provincial Directorate of Science, Industry and Technology
Nevsehir Provincial Directorate of Environment and Urbanisation
Nevsehir Provincial Directorate of Food, Agriculture and Livestock
Nevsehir Public Health Directorate
Isparta Special Provincial Administration

Nevsehir Special Provincial Administration
Nigde Special Provincial Administration
Karaman Special Provincial Administration
Aksaray Special Provincial Administration
Aksaray Municipality
Nigde Municipality
Karaman Municipality
Isparta Municipality
Nevsehir Municipality
Konya Water and Sewerage Administration (KOSKI)
Ankara Water and Sewerage Administration (ASKI)
Konya Metropolitan Municipality General Directorate of Environmental Protection and Control
Ankara Metropolitan Municipality General Directorate of Environmental Protection and Control
Aksaray Chamber of Commerce and Industry
Karaman Chamber of Commerce and Industry
Isparta Chamber of Commerce and Industry
Nevsehir Chamber of Commerce and Industry
Nigde Chamber of Commerce and Industry
Ankara Chamber of Commerce
Ankara Chamber of Industry
Konya Chamber of Industry
Konya Chamber of Commerce
Mevlana Development Agency
Ahiler Development Agency
Bati Akdeniz Development Agency
Selcuk University
Necmettin Erbakan University
Middle East Technical University
Ankara University
Hacettepe University
Suleyman Demirel University
Nevsehir Haci Bektasi Veli University
Aksaray University
Omer Halisdemir University
Karamanoglu Mehmetbey University
Kayseri Regional Directorate of Provincial Bank
Antalya Regional Directorate of Provincial Bank
Konya Regional Directorate of Provincial Bank
Ankara Regional Directorate of Provincial Bank
Karaman Organized Industrial Zone
Eregli Organized Industrial Zone
Aksaray Organized Industrial Zone

Nigde Boron Organized Industrial Zone
Central Anatolian II. Regional Directorate of Mineral Research and Exploration (MTA)
Central Anatolian III. Regional Directorate of Mineral Research and Exploration (MTA)
Ayranci Irrigation Union
Cumra Irrigation Union
Gevrekli Irrigation Union
Gebere Irrigation Union
Ilgin Atlanti Irrigation Union
Ivriz Right Coast Irrigation Union
Ulurmak Right Coast Irrigation Union
Konya Regional Irrigation Cooperatives Union
Konya Plain Project (KOP) Regional Development Administration
Konya Provincial Representative of Turkish Foundation for Combating Soil Erosion (TEMA)

Appendix 12: List of institutions at stakeholder meetings at Büyük Menderes basin

Institutions
Ministry of Forestry and Water Affairs
Aftonkarahisar Province
Denizli Province
Mugla Province
Usak Province
Aydin Province
Usak Province
Aftyonkarahisar Municipality
Usak Municipality
Denizli Metropolitan Municipality
Mugla Metropolitan Municipality
Aydin Metropolitan Municipality
Aftyonkarahisar Chamber of Commerce and Industry
Mugla Chamber of Commerce and Industry
Usak Chamber of Commerce and Industry
Denizli Chamber of Commerce
Denizli Chamber of Industry
Aydin Chamber of Commerce
Aydin Chamber of Industry
Guney Ege Development Agency
Zafer Development Agency
Aydin Astim Organized Industrial Zone
Aydin Umurlu Organized Industrial Zone
Aydin Ortaklar Organized Industrial Zone
Aydin Soke Organized Industrial Zone
Aydin Nazilli Organized Industrial Zone
Aydin Buharkent Organized Industrial Zone
Aydin Cine Organized Industrial Zone
Denizli Deri Ihtisas Organized Industrial Zone
Denizli Organized Industrial Zone
Denizli Deri (Karma) Organized Industrial Zone
Usak Organized Industrial Zone
Usak Karahalli Organized Industrial Zone
Dinar Organized Industrial Zone
Sandikli Organized Industrial Zone
Izmir Regional Directorate of Provincial Bank
Eskisehir Regional Directorate of Provincial Bank
Aydin Provincial Representative of Turkish Foundation for Combating Soil Erosion (TEMA)

Central Anatolian II. Regional Directorate of Mineral Research and Exploration (MTA)
Eagean Regional Directorate of Mineral Research and Exploration (MTA)
Cal Plain Irrigation Union
Soke Plain Irrigation Union
Akcat Right Coast Irrigation Union
Nazilli Right Coast Irrigation Union
Baklan Left Coast Irrigation Union
Bozdogan Akcay Left Coast Irrigation Union
Büyük Menderes Irrigation Union
Bereket Irrigation Union
Denizli Tavas Kizilcaboluk Irrigation Cooperatives
Denizli Civril Kocak Irrigation Cooperatives
Denizli Civril Kizilcasogut Irrigation Cooperatives
Aydin Kuyucak Horsunlu Irrigation Cooperatives
Aydin Karacasu Ataeymir Irrigation Cooperatives
Aydin Sultanhisar Central Irrigation Cooperatives
Mugla Yatagan Bozarmut Irrigation Cooperatives
Usak University
Adnan Menderes University
Pamukkale University
Afyon Kocatepe University
Mugla Sitki Kocman University

Appendix 13: Interviewees' institutions at local level

KONYA (CLOSED) BASIN	
Konya Public Health Directorate	2
Nigde Chamber of Commerce and Industry	1
Nevsehir Special Provincial Administration	1
Nigde Public Health Directorate	1
Nevsehir Public Health Directorate	1
Konya Regional Irrigation Cooperatives Union	1
Konya Metropolitan Municipality General Directorate of Environmental Protection and Control	1
Selcuk University	1
Eregli Organised Industry Zone	1
Regional Directorate of Forestry	1
BÜYÜK MENDERES BASIN	
Afyonkarahisar Provincial Directorate of Food, Agriculture and Livestock	1
DESKI (Denizli Metropolitan University Water and Sewerage Administration)	1
DSI 21. Regional Directorate	2
Mugla Municipality General Directorate of Environmental Protection and Control	1
Mugla Regional Directorate of Forestry	1