Capital, state, grassroots movements and the reproduction of space in Turkey: A contribution to the critique of spatial political economy

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I certify that all material in this thesis which is not my own work has been identified and that no material has previously been submitted and approved for the award of a degree by this or any other University.

Signature: ……..

to the memory of my father, Tuncer

and

to my dear son, River Berkin

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ABSTRACT

Since the mid-1990s, the capitalist world-system has been characterised by a state of dramatic flux towards an uncertain and unpredictable future under the pressure of deepening economic, geopolitical and socio-ecological crises. While there are no final solutions to these deepening crises, there are clear signs of capitalism continuously aiming to reproduce itself through the restructuring of the relationships between capital, state and grassroots actors. Problematising this conundrum, this doctoral thesis scrutinises how spaces of recovery and further accumulation are produced. To understand and critique the way capitalism operates and recovers itself from recurrent crises, an interdisciplinary and explanatory framework is developed, offering a deeper theorising of the interplay between geography-making and crisis-displacement. To explain the top-down processes of space reproduction, this thesis deals with critical economic geography, sub-imperialism, international development and climate change literatures by focusing empirically on the case of Turkey's recent expansionist turn and dramatic leap forward in energy infrastructure development. To explore the bottom-up processes of space reproduction, the thesis engages with labour geography, uneven development, regional development and class politics literatures by focusing empirically on the case of hydroelectric power plant projects and anti-dam struggles in Dêrsim, located in Eastern Turkey. Adopting a critical realist case study approach and applying a mixed methods research by collecting both qualitative and quantitative data from multiple sources, the thesis provides a dialectical analysis of the underlying dynamics that have interactively paved the way for the interweaving spatial strategies of capital, the Turkish state and grassroots actors to fix the deepening problems they have faced. Drawing on its theoretical and empirical conclusions, this doctoral thesis expands our knowledge of the fabric of space and its re-production, addressing a number of under-researched areas in the literatures it has dealt with whilst uncovering and explaining the reality of contemporary Turkish political economy.

CONTENTS

TABLES AND FIGURES

– CHAPTER I –

INTRODUCTION

This doctoral thesis critically examines how space is reproduced in response to systemic crisis-tendencies. The word ‘systemic’ here signifies the system that has been called ‘capitalism’; a system that involves a very specific mode of production of space (Lefebvre, 1991; Harvey, 2006a; Smith, 2008). That is, by the means of occupying and producing space, capitalism attenuates (if not resolves) its internal contradictions and enables its historical expansion and growth (Lefebvre, 1976: 21). Accordingly, to examine the phenomena of space reproduction, this thesis problematises three systemic crisis-tendencies, which have been dramatically deepening since at least the 1970s when the post-World War II Keynesian politico-economic order started to fall apart (Harvey, 2005). This post-Keynesian system, which promotes privatisation, commodification, financialisation and all other possible ways of 'enclosing the commons' – what Harvey (2003) calls ‘accumulation by dispossession’ – has also been called ‘neoliberalism’ by some commentators (Harvey, 2003; Chomsky, 1999; Saad-Filho and Johnston, 2005).

Today, there has been a growing debate over the deepening crisis of neoliberalism. Although there is not yet a clear consensus about how capitalism will solve this crisis, many critical scholars hold an opinion that the neoliberal mode of capitalism is no longer working efficiently and increasingly requires a new set-up within or beyond the dominant neoliberal world order (Harvey, 2009; Kotz, 2009; Castree, 2010; Duménil and Lévy, 2011, 2018). The crisis of neoliberal capitalism can be seen as a three-dimensional crisis, represented by the deepening financial, geopolitical and socio-ecological crises, particularly since the mid-1990s.

The financial dimension of this crisis has risen to the surface as successive debt-crises in Turkey and Mexico 1994, the Asian Tigers 1997, Russia 1998, Brazil 1999, and Turkey and Argentina 2001-2002. In response to this first global wave of financial crises, the Washington consensus, which had been put into practice to transform so-called developing economies into open-markets (Williamson, 1990, 1993, 1997), was updated to the post-Washington consensus in the early-2000s in order to restore and reaccelerate the overheating global economy (Stiglitz, 2005; Williamson, 2003, 2004, 2005; Rodrik, 2006; Saad-Filho, 2010; Saad-Filho and Johnston, 2005). Although this phase of restoration was followed by a boom from 2002 to 2008, accompanied by growing international trade flows and rising commodity prices, the 2008-2009 global financial crisis, once again, dashed hopes for a usual recovery. As a matter of fact, despite the moderate recovery between 2010 and 2011, the system has still been suffering from significant fluctuations, characterising the last two decades in particular (WTO, 2015, 2016, 2017).

Drawing on Marx's (1894/1991) theory of the tendency for the profit rate to fall, Harvey (2003, 2006a) explains the financial crisis-tendencies inherent in the capitalist mode of production by the concept of overaccumulation, which signifies the lack of opportunities for profitable investment as the fundamental problem. For Harvey (2003), whilst overaccumulation is a condition where surpluses of capital and labour lie idle with no profitable outlets in sight, the neoliberal strategies of accumulation by dispossession together with geographical expansions, reorganisations and reconstructions capacitate the recovery from recurrent overaccumulation crisis tendencies inherent in the capitalist mode of production. In his words, "the production of space, the organization of wholly new territorial divisions of labour, the opening up of new and cheaper resource complexes, of new regions as dynamic spaces of capital accumulation, and the penetration of pre-existing social formations by capitalist social relations and institutional arrangements (such as rules of contract and private property arrangements) provide important ways to absorb capital and labour surpluses" (Harvey, 2003: 116).

In addition to the financial, there is a geopolitical dimension of this crisis, manifesting itself in at least two respects. To begin with, there has been a burgeoning unanimity in that the traditional core, represented by the US, has lost a considerable

degree of both its economic and political dominance in the neoliberal era (Chomsky, 2011, 2016; Duménil and Lévy, 2011; Harvey, 2009; Castree, 2010). Indeed, we are all witnessing that the US-led core countries are recalling the old-school imperialist strategies, ranging from country-specific trade wars to the military co-operation towards conquering strategic spaces in an attempt to put the brakes on the deepening decline of their global economic and geopolitical dominance (Duménil and Lévy, 2011; Harvey, 2003). Furthermore, from the perspective of the traditional core, the geopolitical dimension of the crisis is also characterised by a 'structural' need for the 'rebalancing' of emergent territorial powers (WTO, 2018). However, this is never such an easy task as it was before. Indeed, as is crystal clear in the case of BRICS, today's emerging territorial powers have been establishing new fronts, showing an 'antagonistic cooperation' with the hegemony of the US-led core and explicitly demanding a 'seat at the table' without 'overturning tables at the proverbial temple, but to collaborate in holding them up' (Bond and Garcia, 2015; Westra, 2017; Wallerstein et. al., 2016; Cafruny et. al. 2016; Bond, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c, 2013, 2016a; Luce, 2015).

With respect to this very pivotal point, Harvey draws attention to an important but often neglected peculiarity. He argues (2003: 185) that neoliberalism creates openings for 'sub-imperialisms' that insert themselves into the global economy, first as absorbers but then as producers of surplus capitals. According to Harvey, particular absorber economies with a certain level of industrialisation and financial capital are increasingly becoming rising territorial powers seeking out spatio-temporal fixes for their overaccumulating capitals. In other words, through geographical expansion and spatial restructuring, these sub-imperialisms not only ease the financial deepening crisis of neoliberalism, but also secure and deepen their presence and activity within their expanding territorial spheres of influence. Today, the word 'sub-imperialism' is commonly used to characterise 'emerging' sub-powers' economic and political expansion into other historical and geographical contexts (Luce, 2015). Marini, the founder of the theory of sub-imperialism, defines the notion of sub-imperialism as "the form which dependent capitalism assumes upon reaching the stage of monopolies and finance capital" (Marini, 1972: 15).

Finally, the third crisis dimension, which this doctoral thesis problematises, is more about the intersecting social and ecological crisis-tendencies significantly deepened during the neoliberal trajectories of the global economy. Originating from the environmental degradation intrinsic to the capitalist mode of production (O'Connor, 1988, 1998; Foster, 1992, 1999; Harvey, 2010, 2014), the ecological crisis, and climate change specifically, is arguably the latest of capitalism's crises (Pelling et al., 2012; Klein, 2015). Threatening the existence of biological life on Earth more than at any previous time (Parr, 2013; O'Connor, 2010; Moore, 2000), the ecological crisis has reached its climax, particularly after the late 1970s, and in turn, has led to two landmark intergovernmental accords: the 1997 Kyoto Protocol and the 2015 Paris Agreement, both of which favour a market-based solution to the crisis (Spash, 2016; Sapinski, 2016).

Many scholars have criticised the global climate regime's neoliberal environmental protection strategy, which prescribes 'the commodification of nature as a means to save it' (Lauren, 2016), in various respects. Nevertheless, turning a blind eye to growing public concerns, civic resistance and academic evidence underlining the need for a more realistic solution beyond capitalism-as-usual (Bakker, 2009, 2010; Matthews and Paterson, 2005; Buck 2007; Bumpus and Liverman, 2008, 2011; Büscher and Fletcher, 2015; Bachram, 2004), the market-based solution to ecological crisis has further enabled, secured and accelerated the flow of overaccumulated surpluses into socio-ecological space (Prudham, 2009; Böhm et al., 2012; Bryant et al., 2015; McCarthy, 2015; Castree, 2008a, 2008b; While at al. 2004; Ekers and Prudham, 2015a, 2015b, 2017; Cohen and Bakker, 2014; Ekers, 2015; Nugent, 2015; Zalik, 2015; Johnson, 2015; Guthman, 2015; Dempsey, 2015).

Although capable of easing the deepening financial crisis of neoliberalism by providing spaces for the absorption of capital and labour surpluses, the stimulated fixed capital investments into socio-ecological space have also led to new contradictions and crises at those spaces where surpluses have been absorbed (Lohmann, 2006, 2009, 2010; Böhm and Dabhi, 2009; Ghosh and Sahu, 2011; Bachram, 2004; Bryant et al., 2015). Here, De Angelis (2007) argues that today's crisis of capitalism is also a crisis of social and ecological stability. His theoretical analysis discloses that capital increasingly loses its capability to receive the necessary social

and ecological support for its growth, which in turn calls into question the legitimacy of capitalism. What is more important is that De Angelis (2013) takes his argument further by revealing the new capitalist strategy to cope with the crisis of social and ecological stability. He argues that the usual fixes from above are no longer capable of staving off this socio-ecological dimension of crisis, and therefore, capital seeks out new fixes from below – what he calls a 'commons fix' – to recover itself by realigning class/power relations and establishing new systems of governance, thus re-boosting capitalist accumulation and growth.

From these interpenetrating financial, geopolitical and socio-ecological crisis-tendencies arise a conundrum that requires both top-down and bottom-up processes of space reproduction, which would capacitate recovery and further accumulation by spatio-temporally restructuring the relationships between capital, state and grassroots actors. Overall, problematising this conundrum, this doctoral thesis extends the notion of spatio-temporal fix to understand, explain and critique how spaces of recovery and further accumulation are produced and restructured from above and below in response to deepening financial, geopolitical and socio-ecological crisis-tendencies. I scrutinise the top-down processes of space reproduction by turning my empirical attention to Turkey's spatial praxis. More specifically, I explore Turkey's recent expansionist turn and dramatic leap forward in energy infrastructure development as a spatio-temporal fix from above. To investigate the bottom-up processes of space reproduction, I turn my empirical attention to the case of the anti-dam struggle surrounding Turkey's hydroelectric power plant projects in Dêrsim, located in Eastern Turkey. In this case, I explore the bottom-up processes of geography-making and crisis-displacement, which the system co-opts to obtain the necessary social and ecological support for its accumulation and growth.

1.1. Empirical context

Here, before diving into the realm of theoretical discussions, I would like to lay the historical groundwork by briefly outlining my empirical context. Overall, the empirical context I have chosen for this investigation is important in two main respects. First, supporting my research purpose, the processes of geography-making and crisis-displacement in Turkey are tightly interwoven with the deepening financial, geopolitical and socio-ecological crisis-tendencies introduced thus far. Second, an empirical focus

on space reproduction in Turkey is particularly important and necessary in order to address a number of under-researched areas in the literatures, which this doctoral thesis incorporates within an interdisciplinary and explanatory framework.

In this section, I would like to elaborate on the first point. Accordingly, I will begin by introducing my empirical context by following the above-discussed three-dimensional crisis-tendencies in Turkey. In other words, this section follows the logic of the above section and briefly depicts the status quo of space reproduction in Turkey in the context of the three-dimensional crisis of neoliberal capitalism.

The financial crisis and Turkey

Overall, Turkey, like any other dependent-capitalism, has always been a perpetual absorber, to which global producers of surplus capitals would export their overaccumulated capital surpluses. This absorber status has deepened further, particularly after the US-backed military coup on 12 September 1980, which has retuned the territorial logic of power along with the neoliberal lines. Paving the way for the Turkish economy's neoliberal transition in line with 'the January 24 decisions' (Official Gazette, 1980), the military dictatorship shifted the logic of accumulation and growth in Turkey from import substitution to export oriented industrialisation (Yalman, 2009).

The Turkish economy in its neoliberal era has arguably been characterised by an accelerating momentum as well as an enhanced capacity in opening up of new spaces, markets, industries, commodities, resources and networks for capital surpluses to flow in. However, whilst practising its vital role well in facilitating space reproduction to absorb surpluses produced globally, Turkey has also accumulated its very contradictions and crisis-tendencies specific to its indebted economy, and was faced with severe debt-crises in 1994-1995 and 2001-2002 (Balkan and Savran, 2002a, 2002b). In the wake of this first wave of crises, the Turkish economy has, by its very nature, reinserted itself into the global economy as a retuned neoliberal market with an extensive capacity to absorb surplus capital. Resembling its practice after the Turkish debt-crises of 1994-1995 and 2001-2002, Turkey has again further sped up its perpetual rhythm of absorption of surplus in the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2008-2009, keeping its neoliberal momentum not only in capacitating the

absorption of capital surpluses, but intensifying its own financial problems as well. As a result, breaking all previous records of trade deficit, financial debts, current account deficit (Central Bank of Turkey, 2018a; Undersecretariat of Treasury, 2018a, 2018b; Turkish Statistical Institute, 2018a), the Turkish economy has once again been brought to the brink of a rapidly approaching debt-crisis under the structural pressures of currency exchange rate valuation risks and liquidity risks (IMF, 2017).

The geopolitical crisis and Turkey

The same has also been true for the deepening geopolitical dimension of crisis, given that the country has – for a long while now – been experiencing the most highly-charged times in its longstanding relationships with the US and the EU on the one hand, and the most intriguing times in its recent flirting with the BRICS bloc on the other. The tension between Turkey and the traditional core has become more complex and multifaceted than ever in tandem with deepening geopolitical crisis-tendencies and uncertainty. Representing the country's backlash against the state of dramatic flux towards an uncertain post-US hegemonic architecture, Turkey has radically switched to an expansionist foreign policy, often called 'neo-Ottomanism' (Yavuz, 1998; Onar, 2009), which Katz (2015) argues persisted in Turkey as the historic ideology across a variety of periods, from the heights of the imperial state to the depths of semi-colonial status. Davutoğlu (2013), the former Minister of Foreign Affairs between 2009 and 2014 and the former Prime Minister of Turkey between 2014 and 2016, portrays Turkey's new expansionist turn as an attempt to adapt to the changing international climate. Fidan (2010), the head of Turkey's National Intelligence Organization (MIT), outlines Turkey's new foreign policy doctrine with the concept of 'The Wave (Four-Zone) Approach', which places Turkey at the centre of four waves (zones) consisting of neighbouring countries, regional, continental and global powers respectively. According to his account, through its renewed foreign policy concept, Turkey depicts itself as a territorial power with a geographic, cultural, economic and strategic agenda to rapidly engage all regions to which Turkey belongs. Similarly, along the lines of its expansionist leap forward, the country has also placed a great deal of importance to aid-giving, posturing itself as "the most generous donor country in the world" behind the US – in terms of its GNI/humanitarian aid ratio – (Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency, 2016a, 2016b).

In the process of production of peripheral spaces to export domestically produced surplus capital – never disconnected from monopoly capital in the core – the Turkish construction and contracting industry, the largest employer of the labour market in Turkey, has been one of the key industries making most of Turkey's new expansionist foreign policy. Promoting all types of fixed capital investments in natural and built-environments (Bora, 2017; Karatepe, 2016), the construction industry's value has increased dramatically since the aftermath of the 2001-2002 Turkish debt-crisis, and its share in GDP climbed sharply, far more than any other sector in the economy between 2002 and 2017 (Turkish Statistical Institute, 2018c). It has become the world's second largest, behind China, for ten consecutive years since 2007. In 2016, of the world's top 250 international contractors, 46 were Turkish (ENR, 2017). To date, Turkish contractors have completed almost 9,000 projects on five continents and in 115 countries, with a total business volume of £342bn. Almost 90% of the construction works were undertaken in North Africa, Eurasia and the Middle East (European Construction Industry Federation, 2017: 74).

The socio-ecological crisis and Turkey

Manifestly, the Turkish construction industry has played a key role in producing peripheral spaces not only beyond Turkey's 'national' boundaries, but within Turkey as well. Since the aftermath of the 2001-2002 debt-crisis in particular, Turkey has also massively and quite radically reorganised its space and nature through energy and transportation infrastructure projects as well as other construction projects, including urban renewal and mass housing, shopping malls, recreational areas, sports stadiums, and so on. Representing my empirical focus, Turkey has attached a great deal of importance to energy infrastructure development, facilitating record-breaking fixed capital investments in energy infrastructure of all kinds and scales (fossil, renewables and nuclear). Within only a 15-year period of time, its installed energy capacity increased by 146.5%, from 31.8GW to 78.4GW (The Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, 2017b, 2018). Furthermore, during this prolonged period of spatial restructuring of capital, Turkey has further deepened its eco-destructive praxis as well as its high-energy-intensive, high-energy-consumer, high-carbon economy. Positioning itself among those joining Washington as most resistant to payment of climate debt (Bond, 2015), Turkey agreed to its exemption from any binding emission

cuts by backing the malgovernance of the global climate regime, at the cost of being debarred from Kyoto's flexibility mechanisms of CDM, ET and JI as well as associated financial, capacity building and technology development support (United Nations Development Programme, 2009, Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, 2017a; UNFCCC, 2002; International Energy Agency, 2016).

Interweaving with the social dimension of the ecological crisis, Turkey's massive and quite radical space reproduction praxis has also generated new complications, leading to a range of economic, social and ecological crises challenged by growing grassroots movements (Özen and Özen 2009, 2011; Özen, 2014; Gürcan and Peker, 2014, 2015; Farro and Demirhisar, 2014; Kuymulu, 2013). Representing both ruling political elites' and the Turkish construction industry's steep decline in receiving the necessary social and ecological support for further accumulation and growth (De Angelis, 2007), in 2013, for example, Turkey witnessed a countrywide uprising against the destruction of the Gezi Park in Taksim, Istanbul. The government's new project of pedestrianisation of Taksim Square and construction of a shopping centre and artillery barracks has been challenged by the resistance of millions of people. According to reports provided by the Human Rights Foundation of Turkey (2014) and the International Federation for Human Rights (2014), within 112 days of the beginning of the resistance, a total of 5,532 protests emerged in all cities of Turkey (except one, Bayburt), 3,611,203 people attended these protests, 5,513 people were detained (of which 148 were jailed), 8,163 people were injured, and 9 protesters were killed.

In the eastern province of Dêrsim – my main empirical context to analyse the reproduction of space in response to the socio-ecological dimension of the crisis – a great number of hydro dams have been built over the past twenty years (Dissard, 2017; Ronayne, 2005), bringing about deprivations of nature-dependent production cycles, displacement of Alevi Kurds and their livelihoods, acceleration of emigration and migration waves, and radical changes to the cultural, economic and social makeup of landscapes. Moreover, these recent crises have been incorporated into a more deep-rooted crisis: the chronic socioeconomic under-development of the region, which has been historically produced by both uneven capitalist development and the Turkish state's assimilation policies targeted at Alevi Kurds. Therefore, for almost two

decades, Dêrsimites from all sorts of classes have been resisting these dam projects, which pose a threat to their survival and self-reproduction as well as reshaping the socio-spatial relations and further complicating the existing crises embedded in this underdeveloped geography. Through their anti-dam struggle, not only have Dêrsimites been attempting to put the brakes on the dam projects, they have also been engaging in space production to overcome the self-reproduction and survival problems they have faced. However, as I will show in Chapter 5, their praxis has also been aiding capital's spatial displacement of crisis (De Angelis, 2013), enabling it to reproduce its own neoliberal logic of accumulation by creating spaces and relations for capitalist exploitation of nature, culture and histories.

Thus far, I have briefly introduced my empirical context, pointing out how space reproduction is tightly interwoven with financial, geopolitical and socio-ecological crisis-tendencies surrounding the state, capital and the grassroots in Turkey. Now, I will disclose three main contributions that this doctoral thesis proposes to the existing scientific knowledge by pinpointing a number of under-researched areas in the literatures, which I merge together under an interdisciplinary and explanatory framework to investigate the top-down and bottom-up processes of space reproduction in Turkey.

1.2. Theoretical context

To expand our knowledge of the fabric of space and its reproduction, this doctoral thesis draws on a central theory within the critical geography literature, which has arguably been experiencing its golden era since Lefebvre's (1976, 1991) seminal works disclosing the interrelations between the production and reproduction of space and the production and reproduction of capitalism. That is, the theory of spatio-temporal fix by Harvey (2001, 2003, 2006a, 2006b, 2010), uncovering the vital role that space production and restructuration plays in capitalism's recovery and reproduction by enabling the absorption of capital and labour surpluses.

For this doctoral thesis, the main strength of the theory of spatio-temporal fix is twofold. Originally, it is a powerful Marxist theory, explaining the interplay between recurrent overaccumulation crisis-tendencies and the making of spaces for further capitalist accumulation. This allows me to understand and critique Turkey's recent

expansionist turn and dramatic leap forward in energy infrastructure development as a systemic response to crisis-tendencies surrounding the contemporary Turkish political economy. Moreover, reinforcing this doctoral thesis with a well-informed interdisciplinary footprint, Harvey's notion of spatio-temporal fix has also attracted a great deal of academic attention from critical literatures on sub-imperialism, climate change and labour geography and has been employed to understand and critique the way contemporary capitalism operates within territorial, social and natural spaces.

By taking advantage of its explanatory power and interdisciplinary footprint, I develop a framework to explore top-down and bottom-up processes of geography-making and crisis-displacement in Turkey. My empirical investigation of the phenonomenon of space reproduction tracks the interplay between four spatial fixes, grouped into two conceptual categories – what I call 'spatial fixes from above' and 'spatial fixes from below'. Guiding me through my investigation of the former, I focus on three top-down spatial fixes operating in the territorial spheres of Turkey. Derived from Harvey's original conceptualisation of the notion of spatio-temporal fix (2001, 2003, 2006a, 2006b, 2010), the first spatial fix signifies Turkey's absorber role in the displacement of recurrent overaccumulation tendencies deepening the financial crisis of global capitalism. My empirical investigation of the space reproduction in Turkey, accordingly, begins with analysis of the capital reproduction pattern (Marini, 1972, 1977, 2000; Valencia, 2017; Luce, 2015; Osorio, 2012; Ferreria at al., 2012) specific to Turkey's socio-economic formation defining the country's perpetual absorber status.

Nevertheless, the absorption of surplus capital never guarantees a permanent solution to financial crisis-tendencies of the system. Instead, it further complicates them over the course of time. In fact, once surplus capitals are fixed in the space, it produces snowballing costs, leading to new contradictions and crisis-tendencies at the domestic economy level. Promising a structural solution for the absorber economy suffering from the disjuncture between capitalist cycles (Valencia, 2017; Marini, 1972, 1977; Luce, 2015), the second spatial fix is produced by the absorber economy territorially – never disconnected from the first spatial fix produced globally. The theoretical rationale for the second top-down spatial fix has also been put forth by Harvey (2003) by extending his theory of spatio-temporal fix from politico-economic space to geopolitical and geo-economic space by arguing that neoliberalism gives

birth to ‘sub-imperialisms’ seeking out systematic spatial fixes for their own surplus capital by defining their territorial spheres of influence. My empirical investigation of the space reproduction in Turkey, accordingly, proceeds with the analysis of Turkey’s recent expansionist turn in foreign policy and dramatic leap forward in energy infrastructure development as a systematic spatial fix with external and internal pillars. Facilitating the geographical expansion and spatial restructuring of surplus capitals, this top-down spatial fix is orchestrated by the territorial power, namely the Turkish state apparatus to offset contradictions and crisis-tendencies arising from its perpetual absorber status.

Embedded in my theoretical framework, the third spatial fix is produced by an intergovernmental agency, namely the global climate regime, which enables, secures and deepens capital’s access to space and its reproduction. The theoretical rationale for this third spatial fix is also available in the critical climate change and environmental governance literature. Overall, this interdisciplinary literature has been defined by two broad perspectives. Many optimistic accounts, on the one hand, construe the global climate regime and its policy tools and accumulation mechanisms as a new paradigm offering a more sustainable and greener capitalism, banding individual states together under the collective and interdependent process of decarbonisation (Newell and Paterson, 2010; Michaelowa and Dutschke, 2000; Stowell, 2005; Yamin, 2005; Lachapelle et al., 2017). Contrary to this optimistic depiction, critical scholars argue that the global climate regime is a new class project for accumulation (Bakker, 2009, 2010; Matthews and Paterson, 2005; Buck 2007; Bumpus and Liverman, 2008; Büscher and Fletcher, 2015), colonisation (Bachram, 2004; Bumpus and Liverman, 2011) and spatial displacement of crisis-tendencies (Prudham, 2009; Böhm et al., 2012; Bryant et al., 2015; Castree, 2008a, 2008b; Ekers and Prudham, 2015a, 2015b, 2017; Ekers; 2015; Nugent, 2015; Zalik, 2015), leading to new confrontations and crises at spaces in which carbon-offsetting projects have taken place (Lohmann, 2006, 2009, 2010; Böhm and Dabhi, 2009; Ghosh and Sahu, 2011). Many authors within this critical strand extend Harvey’s notion of spatio-temporal fix to explain and critique the neoliberal solution to the deepening ecological crisis (Böhm et al., 2012; Prudham, 2009; Bryant et al., 2015; McCarthy, 2015; Castree, 2008a, 2008b; While at al. 2004; Ekers and Prudham, 2015a, 2017; Cohen and Bakker, 2014).

Finally, the rationale for the fourth fix, which is different than the other fixes due to its bottom-up origin, is derived from the recent trajectories of labour geography literature (Peck, 2018; Herod, 2012; Coe and Jordhus-Lier, 2011; Bergene et al., 2010; Tufts and Savage, 2009; Castree, 2007; Lier, 2007). Taking inspiration from De Angelis' (2007, 2013) argument that today's crisis of capitalism requires – to use his words – 'commons fixes' to cope with the crisis of social and ecological stability, I propound a concept of socio-spatial fix, substantiated by my in-depth case analysis of the anti-dam struggle surrounding the hydroelectric power plant projects in Dêrsim. Specifically, I analyse the interplay between Turkey's hydro energy projects, Dêrsim's socio-spatial structure and the agency and praxis of grassroots movements towards geography-making and crisis-displacement from below. Through this analysis, I shed light on the constraining role of socio-spatial structure in the key dynamics of grassroots agency such as confrontations, alliance formation and compositional pattern. Furthermore, I disclose Dêrsim's socio-spatial fix, which has been brought about by the agency of grassroots movements in response not only to emerging confrontations arising from Turkey's hydro energy projects, but also to the chronic socioeconomic under-development of the region, which has been historically produced by both uneven capitalist development and the Turkish state's assimilation policies targeted at Alevi Kurds. The socio-spatial fix in Dêrsim performs three functions. First, it facilitates the production of capitalist social relations and spaces; second, it strengthens and maintains the existing social order through temporally moderating the province's chronic problems; and third, it provides legitimacy for the capitalist exploitation of nature, culture and histories.

Thesis contributions

This doctoral thesis proposes three contributions to the existing literature. My empirical focus on the contemporary Turkish political economy from the perspective of critical economic geography allows me to propose the first contribution to the sub-imperialism literature, which has called attention to Turkey by underlining its regional power-centre status (Katz, 2015; Wallerstein, 2015; Bond, 2015; van der Merwe, 2016a), often conceived as a determinant of sub-imperialist socio-economic formation (Marini, 1972, 1977, 2000; Luce, 2015). By providing an in-depth political economy analysis of Turkey as a territorial agency with a spatial agenda to become what might

be called a sub-imperialist power, this doctoral thesis attempts to advance our knowledge about sub-imperialism. That is, in this doctoral thesis, I aim to develop a relational conceptualisation of sub-imperialism by explaining Turkey's sub-imperialist turn in relation to the deepening financial, geopolitical and socio-ecological crisis-tendencies at global, territorial and regional scales. I develop this relational approach by critically engaging with three underdeveloped areas in the contemporary literature on sub-imperialism.

To begin with, although the contemporary literature on sub-imperialism has arguably been experiencing its renaissance by dint of theoretical and empirical rejuvenations emerging in the last decade (Bond, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c, 2013, 2016a, 2013; Garcia and Bond, 2015; Westra, 2017; Wallerstein et al., 2016; Luce, 2013; Valencia, 2017), Harvey's (2003) argument of *systematic spatio-temporal fixes* produced by rising territorial powers has remained under-researched – apart from certain conceptual allusions (Bond, 2017, 2016a, 2016b, 2004b; van der Merwe, 2016a, 2016b). This doctoral thesis sheds light on this under-researched area by exploring Turkey's new expansionist turn and recent dramatic leap forward in energy infrastructure development as a systematic spatio-temporal fix, which has been pointed out by Harvey (2003). This is particularly important to reach a relational explanation of sub-imperialism, allowing us to grasp the emergence and development of the sub-imperialist development scheme with regards to the system's geographical needs. By focusing on this under-explored issue in the sub-imperialism literature, this doctoral thesis aims to show how *spatio-temporal fixes* produced sub-imperialist are interlocked with the financial, geopolitical and socio-ecological crisis-tendencies.

Besides, apart from Brazil's own trajectory (Marini, 1972, 1977; Valencia, 2017; Luce, 2015), very little is known about how today's sub-imperialisms are organised around the very contradictions and crisis-tendencies they have faced. To shed light on this under-researched area, I take inspiration from Marini's argument that sub-imperialism is organised around the market problem, and embed Harvey's theory of spatial fix in the notion of *capital reproduction pattern,* conceptualised within Marxist Dependency Theory (Marini, 1972, 1977, 2000; Valencia, 2017; Luce, 2015; Osorio, 2012; Ferreria at al., 2012) to capture characteristics of capital circuits at the level of socio-economic formations, dealing directly with theoretical elements of the

accumulation process of both capital and the state (Filho and Araújo, 2015). By doing so, this doctoral thesis seeks to shed some light on the contradictions and crisis-tendencies inherent in Turkey's capital-import dependent socio-economic formation, highlighting the crisis-driven nature of Turkey's spatial praxis towards building a sub-imperialism. The argument I am developing here is also relevant to my critique of the existing sub-imperialism literature because of its limited scope to grasp the phenomenon of sub-imperialism from a relational angle. Therefore, by turning my focus on contradictions and crisis-tendencies inherent in dependent-capitalist socio-economic formation, I further clarify the relations between the global and the territorial, which in turn, allows us to see the interplay between the geography-making and crisis-displacement from the perspective of the capital reproduction pattern.

Finally, the contemporary sub-imperialism literature has been characterised by an overemphasis on sub-imperialisms' expansionist practices beyond their 'national' boundaries (Garcia and Kato, 2015; Misoczky and Imasato, 2014; Amisi et al., 2015; Bond, 2016a; 2004; 2013; 2015; Flynn, 2007). The same focus on 'the external' is also true for the wider international development literature, given that this literature has arguably been defined by an empirical focus on international and geopolitical opportunities and challenges, pushing today's emerging territorial powers to position themselves as new international cooperation actors alternative to the traditional core's declining international development paradigm (Woods, 2008; Six, 2009; Zimmerman and Smith, 2011; Tan-Mullins et al., 2010; Power and Mohan, 2010; Mawdsley and McCann, 2011; Mawdsley, 2012; Mawdsley et al., 2014, Eyben, 2013; Eyben and Savage, 2013; Brautigam, 2009; Gore, 2013; Moyo, 2009; Sörensen, 2010). As a corollary of this over-focus on the external, the internal dimension has remained considerably under-researched (Lancaster, 2007). In other words, what is not yet clear is how emerging territorial powers manage their dependencies towards sub-imperialist development. Drawing on Marini's argument that a sub-imperialist development scheme is a structural solution for a dependent-capitalism suffering from the disjuncture between capitalist cycles (Valencia, 2017; Marini, 1972, 1977; Luce, 2015), this doctoral thesis offers an alternative reading of the Turkish state's recent expansionist turn by conceptualising it as a systemic response to historically accumulating contradictions and crisis-tendencies inherent in Turkey's capital reproduction pattern. Besides, by extending my investigation deeper into Turkey's

severe energy-import dependency, I argue that Turkey's spatial praxis towards energy infrastructure development must always be seen as a strategic pillar of its sub-imperialist development agenda. Again, my critique here further props up my aim of developing a relational conceptualisation of sub-imperialism, since it allows us to grasp the interactions between the internal and the external pillars of sub-imperialist development from a spatial perspective.

Thus far, I have introduced this doctoral research's contribution to the sub-imperialism literature. Additionally, this doctoral thesis proposes its second contribution to a well-developed sub-disciplinary strand within the critical economic geography literature, namely labour geography, which, per contra, focuses on the question of how the geography of capitalism is made from below.

Originally, the labour geography literature emerged in response to the capital-focused strand of critical geography due to its conceiving of society in a passive manner and neglecting its role in making the geographies of capitalism (Herod, 1997, 2001, 2003; Castree et al., 2004; Lier, 2007; McGrath-Champ et al., 2010). Although it took shape after the late 1990s, its origin dates back to the period between the 1970s and 1990s, when the industrialised economies had gone through phases of restructuring and social, institutional and regulatory transformations – what has become known as deindustrialisation (Peck, 2018). Following this foundational phase and Herod's (1997) influential study, labour geography has become a critical sub-discipline, focusing widely on workers' praxis of shaping the economic geography of capitalism. Appropriately, the capital-centric sentiment of spatial fix has also been redefined within a bottom-up perspective, developing the concept of 'labour's spatial fix' to explain how the economic geographies of capitalism are shaped by workers' agency and praxis to overcome their problems of survival and self-reproduction (Herod, 1997).

Without any doubt, labour geography has played an important role in the development of the critical geography literature, placing emphasis not on society, but on workers' agency. However, the labour geography project has – for a while now – reached a phase of reflection and re-evaluation (Peck, 2018). Many critical scholars, including the leading contributors of the field, have debated existing research gaps, underdeveloped/neglected issues and future directions for labour geography (Peck,

2018; Herod, 2012; Coe and Jordhus-Lier, 2011; Bergene et al., 2010; Tufts and Savage, 2009; Castree, 2007; Lier, 2007).

I conceive of labour geography's recent phase of reassessment as a transitional stage, forming an emerging school of thought with an integrative, intersectional and recombinant labour geography approach – what might be called 'pluralist labour geography' (Peck, 2018). Having said that, I argue that the labour geography literature remains underdeveloped, particularly in terms of the exploration of the notion of spatial fix from below with respect to the socio-ecological stability crisis of neoliberalism (De Angelis, 2007, 2013). To illuminate this underdeveloped area, this doctoral thesis engages with the following matters of debate within labour geography to expand our knowledge of space reproduction from below in three respects.

To begin with, I reprise the long-standing criticism of labour geography of confining agency to a worker/union-centrism (Coe and Jordhus-Lier, 2011; Castree, 2007). I argue that this centrism, which is still prevalent even in more flexible accounts of labour geography (Tufts, 1998; Johns and Vural, 2000; Walsh, 2000; Ellem, 2003, 2008; Lier, 2007; Wills, 2008; Oseland et al., 2012; McDonald et al., 2012; Jordhus-Lier, 2013; Brookes, 2013), can be transcended by a grassroots agency perspective. I define grassroots agency as a collective form of socio-spatially constrained class-struggle acting towards the materialisation of commonised inter-class interests. The perspective I am proposing turns analytical attention from the existing versions of union-centrism to the realm of grassroots agency, in which labouring classes and their class allies participate with variegated economic, political and ideological agendas and organisations. Furthermore, I adopt Wright's (2000) notion of 'positive class compromise' and Campling et al.'s (2016) argument on class dynamics of development to explore and explain the inter-class relations in bringing about the socio-spatial fix in the case of Dêrsim.

Additionally, the emerging school of thought in labour geography has been characterised by an increasing emphasis on the problem of theorisation of agency and structure (Herod, 2012; Coe and Jordhus-Lier, 2011; Tufts and Savage, 2009; Castree, 2007). In other words, labour geography remains under-developed in terms of "how and why workers and capitalists act the way they do" (Herod, 2012: 349). In this regard, drawing upon Harvey's (2006b) theory of uneven development and his

argument on the production of regionality, I adopt an expanded notion of socio-spatial structure to reframe the interplay between structure and agency. In a broad sense, by the concept of socio-spatial structure, I refer to a relatively coherent configuration of socio-spatial relations that defines and differentiates inter-class relations in an unevenly developed geographical context. I argue that such socio-spatial structures can be seen as modular analytical units not only reflecting the whole, but also significantly advancing our knowledge of the spatiality and constrained nature of agency.

Lastly, I problematise the traditional framing of the notion of spatial fix from below due to its drawing of a non-dialectical distinction between capital's and labour's spatial fixes, setting one against the other. I argue that such framing of the notion of spatial fix leaves no room to probe into interpenetrations between spatial fixes from above and below. Accordingly, I aim to support the labour geography literature by incorporating Herod's (2003) and Harvey's (2006b) interpretations of regional 'growth machine politics'. Taking inspiration from De Angelis' (2013) notion of commons fix, I propound a concept of socio-spatial fix to explain how grassroots' praxis conjoins with and assists capital in both staving off its recurrent crisis of socio-ecological stability and reproducing its own logic of accumulation. That is, despite all their oppositions, capital and labour come together in variegated ways to fix recurrent crises of capitalist accumulation and development, which in turn aids capital in alleviating its socio-ecological stability crises at regional levels. The notion of socio-spatial fix from below that I am propounding here has a dialectical nature. On the one hand, it is a bottom-up response to existing crises embedded in a socio-spatial structure and therefore mainly seeks to maintain and reform the reproductive potential and livelihoods of the grassroots. On the other hand, such a grassroots socio-spatial fix aids capital's spatial displacement of the socio-ecological stability crisis of contemporary capitalism, enabling it to reproduce its own logic of accumulation and circulation.

Heretofore, I have introduced the two contributions this doctoral research proposes to the existing literature on sub-imperialism and labour geography. Finally, this doctoral thesis proposes its third contribution to the wider critical literature on spatial fix. Drawing on its explanatory and interdisciplinary framework, this doctoral thesis proposes a deeper theorising of the notion of spatial fix, highlighting the

integrative, relational and multi-layered nature of the production of space. This new description expands our knowledge of the fabric of space and its production and restructuration in three respects. To begin with, it illuminates the integrative nature of space reproduction, investigating how the geography of capitalism is made by focusing on both top-down and bottom-up processes of spatial displacement of crisis. Besides, it sheds light on the relational nature of space reproduction by exploring the state, capital and the grassroots agencies in their essential interactions in the process of geography-making and crisis-displacement. Lastly, it offers a multi-layered reading of space reproduction, enabling us to see how multiple agencies at different scales interact with each other to enable the recovery and reproduction of capitalism.

In this section, I have introduced the literatures that I merge together under an interdisciplinary and explanatory framework to investigate the top-down and bottom-up processes of space reproduction in Turkey in the context of the deepening financial, geopolitical and socio-ecological crises of neoliberal capitalism. Besides, I have disclosed three main contributions that this doctoral thesis proposes to the existing literature. Now, I will introduce my methodological approach, briefly articulating the ontological and epistemological position and the research design on which this doctoral thesis is built.

1.3. Methodological context

To produce the knowledge of the mechanisms of the production of space, this doctoral thesis adopts the critical realist philosophy of science pioneered by Bhaskar's seminal works (Bhaskar, 2008a, 2005). Overall, critical realism is not associated with a specific research methodology, per contra, it legitimates both extensive and intensive methods, representing its essentially pluralist nature (Wynn and Williams, 2012; Fletcher, 2016, Mingers, 2000; Ackroyd, 2009). Several researchers argue that the case study method is particularly advantageous, given that the critical realist scrutiny seeks to provide more detailed causal explanations of a given set of phenomena in terms of both the actors' interpretations and the structures and mechanisms that interact to produce the outcomes in question (Wynn and Williams, 2012; Ackroyd 2010, Easton, 2010).

Following in this tradition, I adopt case study design in exploring the phenomenon of the space reproduction at two scales of analysis. At the scale of territory, my political economy analysis focuses on Turkey's expansionist turn and energy infrastructure agenda and explains the phenomenon of space reproduction with respect to contradictions and crisis-tendencies deepening in Turkey's capital-import dependent socio-economic structure, further complicating the country's already problematic capital reproduction pattern, characterised by the disjuncture between capitalist cycles. At the scale of region, my socio-spatial analysis focuses on Turkey's hydroelectric power plant projects in Dêrsim and explains the phenomenon of space reproduction with respect to contradictions and crisis-tendecies deepening in Dêrsim's socio-spatial structure, further complicating Dêrsimites' survival and self-reproduction problems, historically produced by both uneven capitalist development and the Turkish state's assimilation policies targeted at Alevi Kurds.

Employing a mixed-methods approach, which has arguably been considered one of the main strengths of critical realist inquiry (Zachariadis et al., 2013; Modell, 2009; McEvoy and Richards, 2006), both quantitative and qualitative data were collected in a longitudinal setting through documentary research, unstructured/semi-structured interviews and observations. I also prop up the methodological strength of this doctoral research with particular advantages associated with my researcher status, given that I critically investigate my hometown, Dêrsim and my country of citizenship, Turkey. Taking inspiration from a recent methodological strand problematising the classical insider/outsider dichotomy due to its simplistic nature (De Andrade, 2000; Labaree, 2002; Breen, 2007; Trowler, 2011; Savvides et al., 2014; Milligan, 2016), I develop my critical reflexive awareness of my multiple researcher statuses, evolving, interacting and interweaving as a continuum with respect to my location in time and social space (Bryman, 2016), which intrinsically and quite inherently allows me to maximise the advantages and minimise the disadvantages of my intersecting insider and outsider statuses.

1.4. Thesis structure

Allow me to conclude this chapter by outlining the structure of this doctoral thesis. This thesis is structured in seven chapters including the introduction. In the introduction chapter, I have provided a general overview of the three-dimensional

crisis of neoliberal capitalism, which I problematise in order to explore how spaces are reproduced from above and below in response to these interrelated systemic crisis-tendencies. Then, I have introduced my empirical context, underlining its importance for scientific investigation with respect to my theoretical context, pointing out a number of under-researched areas in the literature that I bring together under an interdisciplinary and explanatory framework. Lastly, I have articulated my methodological context, briefly sketching out the ontological and epistemological position and the research design, on which this doctoral thesis is built, to investigate the top-down and bottom-up processes of space reproduction in Turkey.

The next chapter critically reviews an extensive body of literature from the disciplines introduced thus far and develops an interdisciplinary and explanatory framework. The chapter is structured in five sections. The first four sections identify four spatial fixes, all of which are making and re-making the geography of capitalism in response to systemic crisis-tendencies. The final section, on the other hand, concludes this chapter by tying these top-down and bottom-up dimensions together into a broader framework, highlighting the integrative, relational and multi-layered nature of the production of space via spatial fixes from above and below.

Chapter 3 lays out the methodological design of this doctoral thesis. The chapter starts with an overview of the critical realist philosophy of science, focusing on its ontological and epistemological assumptions and methodological principles. Following this, I outline my research design, pointing out advantages of the case study method with respect to critical realism. Then, I critically reflect on my researcher status, discussing its impact on the research process as a whole. Then, I describe the data collection method employed. After I detail each of the data collection procedures, I conclude the chapter by discussing how I then began to analyse the data collected.

Chapter 4 consists of two sections. Overall, this chapter provides a territorial level analysis of the top-down processes of geography-making and crisis-displacement in Turkey. It examines the phenomenon of space reproduction with respect to Turkey's perpetual surplus capital absorber and emerging surplus capital producer statuses respectively. In the second section, I turn my focus to Turkey as a producer of surplus capital. Drawing on Harvey's argument on sub-imperialisms, I analyse Turkey's recent expansionist turn in foreign policy and energy infrastructure

development agenda as a spatio-temporal fix. Accordingly, I provide an overview of this strategy, highlighting the methods that Turkey has practised to fix surplus capitals into space along the lines of its sub-imperialist development agenda. This analysis also accentuates the antagonistic cooperation that Turkey has developed with the traditional core and the global climate regime. Building on my territorial level analysis, Chapter 4 ties all three top-down processes of geography-making and crisis-displacement in Turkey together. Accordingly, it analyses Turkey with respect to the first fix, in which Turkey perpetually acts as an absorber of surplus capitals produced globally. Then, it analyses Turkey as a territorial power seeking out systematic spatio-temporal fixes that address its own contradictions and crisis-tendencies on the one hand, and further facilitate the first fix on the other. Lastly, I focus on the third fix, which is produced by an intergovernmental agency in response to the deepening ecological crisis, represented by the global climate deal.

Chapter 5 provides regional level socio-spatial analysis of the bottom-up processes of geography-making and crisis-displacement, concentrating empirically on hydroelectric power plant projects and the anti-dam struggle in Dêrsim. I start this chapter by describing the completed, ongoing and planned built-environment projects in Dêrsim. Then, I explore the interplay between Dêrsim's socio-spatial characteristics and the key confrontations associated with the dam projects. I extend this analysis deeper into the compositional pattern and alliance formation of Dêrsim's anti-dam struggle, as grassroots agency. I continue my analysis by tracking this grassroots agency's crisis-displacement agenda and geography-making praxis. Then, I conclude this analysis by providing data showing how the people of Dêrsim – through their grassroots struggle against hydroelectric power plant projects – have brought about a socio-spatial fix that addresses some of their self-reproduction problems on the one hand, and assists capital in staving off its recurrent crises and reproducing its logic of accumulation on the other. By doing so, I integrate my analysis of Dêrsim into my framework by disclosing the fourth fix, resulting in the production of space from below.

Chapter 6 concludes this doctoral thesis by tying my theoretical framework and empirical analysis together. Accordingly, this chapter explains the phenomenon of space reproduction in Turkey through the theoretical framework developed, disclosing four mutually interpenetrating spatial fixes produced by different agencies (capital, the

state, intergovernmental institutions, grassroots) at different scales (global, territorial and regional) in response to interweaving crisis-dynamics (financial, geopolitical and socio-ecological). In this chapter, I present the key conclusions from my analysis and highlight my contributions to the wider literature. Then the chapter moves on to the limitations of this study, where I also suggest how this investigation could be furthered in the future.

– CHAPTER II –

LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter develops an interdisciplinary and explanatory framework by critically reviewing an extensive body of literature from various disciplines. The chapter is structured in five sections. The first four sections identify four spatial fixes, all of which are making and re-making the geography of capitalism in response to systemic crisis-tendencies. The first section starts with the description of the critical geography literature, focusing on Harvey's notion of spatial fix and its relation to the deepening financial crisis of neoliberal capitalism. This section highlights the absorber role that peripheral economies play in the spatial displacement of surplus capitals. The second section moves on to the geopolitical dimension of the crisis, reviewing the sub-imperialism and international development literatures. Developing a relational conceptualisation of sub-imperialism, this second section is concerned with the second spatial fix produced by today's sub-imperialisms as emerging producers of surplus capitals. The third section deals with the ecological dimension of the crisis. Accordingly, this section reviews the climate change and environmental governance literatures, disclosing the third spatial fix produced by the global climate deal. The fourth section, on the other hand, builds the 'spatial fixes from below' dimension of the framework. It starts with a brief overview of the labour geography literature, focusing on Herod's notion of labour's spatial fix and its relation to bottom-up processes of space reproduction. Then, it engages with three contemporary matters of debate emerging in the recent trajectories of labour geography. Overall, this section supports the labour geography literature with a concept of socio-spatial fix, developed by bringing conceptual insights from Harvey's theory of uneven geographical development. This section also reviews a number of far-reaching contributions from

the critical regional development and class politics literatures, which I utilise to better explain the bottom-up processes of geography-making and crisis-displacement. In the final section, I conclude this chapter by tying these top-down and bottom-up dimensions together into a broader framework, highlighting the integrative, relational and multi-layered nature of the production of space via spatial fixes from above and below.

2.1. The financial crisis and the first spatial fix

The relation between space and capital has long been the main subject of economic geography. Until the early 1980s, economic geography had arguably been dominated by the neoclassical approach, which confines the scientific scrutiny to firms' behaviours, locational decisions and practices with respect to economic space (Herod, 1997). Since then, thanks to Lefebvre's (1976, 1991) influential contributions disclosing the interrelations between the production of space and survival of capitalism, many Marxist geographers (Harvey, 2006a, 2006b; Smith, 2010; Massey, 1995; Storper and Walker, 1989) have paved the way for a critical school of economic geography, which broadly focuses on how the geography of capitalism is made.

David Harvey, who is acknowledged as the greatest living Marxist geographer (Castree, 2007; Castree and Gregory, 2006), has played a significant role in the emergence and development of this critical school. With his novel contribution to the Marxist theory of crisis, The Limits to Capital (2006a), Harvey has uncovered the fundamental role that space plays in capitalism's survival by enabling capital to displace its overaccumulated surpluses. Here, the concept of 'overaccumulation', which Harvey has developed by drawing on Marx's (1894/1991) theory of the tendency for the profit rate to fall, signifies the lack of opportunities for profitable investment as the fundamental problem. In other words, overaccumulation refers to a condition where surpluses of capital and labour lie idle with no profitable outlets in sight (Harvey, 2003).

The theory of spatio-temporal fix (2001, 2003, 2006a, 2006b, 2010), which Harvey propounded as integral to his spatial analysis of systemic crisis-tendencies inherent in capitalist accumulation, discusses that capital staves off its recurrent crises of overaccumulation in three interrelated ways. Paraphrasing Harvey (2001, 2003),

the first is called “temporal displacement”, which enables capital to absorb its overaccumulated surpluses by investing in either long-term fixed capital projects such as transportation, energy-generation, communication, sewage and water, or in all other physical infrastructure development or social expenditure on housing, health care, research, education and so on. Capital’s second strategy to absorb its overaccumulated surpluses is named *spatial displacement*, which manifests itself as the opening up of new markets and development of new production systems, commodities, resources and networks, and so on. The third strategy represents a combined application of spatial and temporal displacements. Overall, the production and restructuration of space in these ways serves capital as a spatio-temporal fix in a double sense. On the one hand, it is a fix allowing capital to stave off, if not to resolve, the tendency toward crisis formation under capitalism through geographical expansion and/or spatial restructuring. On the other hand, it is a fix that constructs a fixed space, in which capital’s presence and activity is secured and deepened and which has to be destroyed and rebuilt in future in order to re-enable the spatio-temporal displacement of recurrent crises of overaccumulation.

This concept is central to this doctoral thesis, given that it represents the first spatial fix in the framework this chapter develops. Overall, the first spatial fix is concerned with the displacement of recurrent overaccumulation crisis-tendencies inherent in the capitalist mode of production. Its scope is, therefore, always global, in which territorial economies are positioned as either producers or absorbers of surplus capitals. From the perspective of the first spatial fix, the relation between these two is vital, given that the recovery and reproduction of the system increasingly necessitates perpetual absorbers to which global producers of surplus capitals would export their recurrent overaccumulation crises (Harvey, 2001, 2003, 2006a, 2006b, 2010).

To develop the second central concept in my framework, the following section employs Harvey’s notion of spatial fix to so-called emerging economy contexts. That is the second spatial fix produced by the emerging producers of surplus capitals, what Harvey (2003) calls sub-imperialism’s spatio-temporal fix. Accordingly, the following section shifts its focus from the scale of global to the territorial and sheds light on crisis-tendencies specific to dependent-capitalisms. To do this, I conjoin the theory of spatial fix with the notion of the capital reproduction pattern derived from the literature on sub-

imperialism. Furthermore, this section critically engages with three underdeveloped areas in the contemporary sub-imperialism literature and offers a relational conceptualisation of sub-imperialism.

2.2. The geopolitical crisis and the second spatial fix

In 'The New Imperialism', Harvey (2003) extends the explanatory power of his theory of spatio-temporal fix to geopolitical space by arguing that neoliberalism gives birth to sub-imperialisms.

> "The opening up of global markets in both commodities and capital created openings for other states to insert themselves into the global economy, first as absorbers but then as producers of surplus capitals. They then became competitors on the world stage. What might be called 'sub-imperialisms' arose, not only in Europe but also in East and South-East Asia as each developing centre of capital accumulation sought out systematic spatio-temporal fixes for its own surplus capital by defining territorial spheres of influence. But these spheres of influence were overlapping and interpenetrating rather than exclusive, reflecting the ease and fluidity of capital mobility over space and the networks of spatial interdependency that increasingly ignored state borders."

This new description entails an in-between status for certain absorber economies as well as integrating the notion of spatio-temporal fix into the territorial logic of power. Here, to clarify the tradition I will follow in this doctoral thesis, it should be noted that what actually counts as 'territory' has long been a matter of debate in the field of critical geography (Arrighi, 1994; Arrighi and Silver, 1999; Brenner, 1999; Brenner and Elden, 2009; Elden, 2010a, 2010b; Jessop, 2006, 2016; Jessop et al., 2008). Nevertheless, the power attached to the term 'territory' in Harvey's description entails the capitalist state apparatus as an agency that commands human and natural resources within a geographically-bounded context and mobilises these resources by exercising political, diplomatic and military strategies in order to assert its interests and achieve its goals in the world at large (Harvey, 2003). Moreover, Harvey's new description highlights how sub-imperialisms' fixes interlock with the logic and praxis of the first spatial fix in the spatial displacement of overaccumulation crisis-tendencies, both at the domestic and global scale. In this chapter, I will go into the details of

Harvey's argument, representing the theoretical ground for the second spatial fix embedded in my framework. To do this, allow me first to bring some clarity to the notion of sub-imperialism.

Originally, the theory of sub-imperialism, which is a Marxist form of dependency theory, was developed by Marini (1965, 1972) to explain the changing economic, politic and social relations after the new development scheme constituted by the military dictatorship as a solution to the market crisis affecting Brazil between 1962 and 1967. According to Marini (1972), Brazil's sub-imperialist scheme was developed, through the adoption of three integrated strategies, in response to the problem of the impossibility of further expansion on the basis of an insufficient domestic market. First, the sub-imperialist scheme was adopted through a relatively expansionist foreign policy in order to open up new spaces out of the domestic market to enable the expansion of exports. The second leg on which Brazilian sub-imperialism rests was an active policy of developing the transportation, electrification and military infrastructure. For Marini, these two legs of the sub-imperialist scheme resemble those applied by Nazi Germany but with a difference arising from Brazil's technological dependence on the 'core' countries of the capitalist system, which in turn necessitates a mutually beneficial cooperation with foreign capital. The final supplementary component of Brazil's sub-imperialist scheme was the promotion of 'consumer society' to accelerate the realisation of surplus-value and ensure the continuous circulation of capital. Overall, Marini calls this new mode of development 'Brazilian sub-imperialism' and defines it as "the form which dependent capitalism assumes upon reaching the stage of monopolies and finance capital" (Marini, 1972: 15).

According to Marini (1965, 1972, 1977; Luce, 2015; Bond, 2013, 2015), sub-imperialism is not an essentially Brazilian phenomenon, nor does it correspond to an anomaly in the evolution of dependent capitalism, but is a corollary of historically evolved contextual conditions in the intersection between world-capitalism and certain dependent economies. On the one hand, it corresponds to the international division of labour built on a new hierarchic arrangement of capitalist countries that allows certain peripheral countries to exercise a relatively autonomous expansionist policy. On the other, it corresponds to the very conditions and laws specific to peripheral economies. For Marini, Brazil in the 1970s was 'the best current manifestation of sub-imperialism',

because of several rationales, such as regional economic extraction, export of capital, and internal corporate monopolisation and financialisation. Moreover, Marini argues that the arrival of Brazil's dependent economy at the monopoly and finance capital phase was also a result of the integration of Brazil's national capital with foreign capital, given that Brazil's integration in the imperialist production system had allowed the country to carry forward its industrialisation and also to create heavy industry relying upon the super-exploitation of labour in close cooperation with global and national capital actors. Lastly, Marini also stresses that Brazilian sub-imperialism was a response to the market problem arising from the disjuncture between capitalist cycles. For Marini, the sub-imperialist scheme promises a structural solution to this disjuncture by promoting the expansion of exports and securing access to markets and raw materials in other peripheral economies.

Despite its great potential, the theory of sub-imperialism has remained considerably under-researched and underdeveloped, particularly until the emergence of the BRICS in 2006. This is partly due to the limited number of translations of Marini's original works into other languages (Bond, 2015). However, particularly after Harvey's (2003) attention to the rise of sub-imperialisms, critical scholars from various disciplines have shown a great deal of interest in revisiting the notion of sub-imperialism. The recent contributors to the literature have extended the notion of sub-imperialism from a Brazilian context to the rising bloc of BRICS and called attention to the other regional power-centres such as Turkey[1], South Korea, Mexico, Taiwan and Indonesia (Katz, 2015; Wallerstein, 2015; Bond, 2015; van der Merwe, 2016a). This growing academic interest has promoted significant theoretical and empirical rejuvenations, leading to a renaissance in the literature on sub-imperialism.

To begin with, the contemporary literature has been characterised by remarkable theoretical contributions reframing and updating Marini's theory of sub-imperialism. Bond (2013, 2015), for example, argues that today's sub-imperialisms are in charge of ensuring regional geopolitical 'stability' in areas suffering severe tensions; advancing the broader agenda of globalised neoliberalism, so as to legitimate deepened market access; more systematically promoting super-exploitative practices

[1] Because my empirical focus is on Turkey, here, it is worth noting that far too little attention has been paid to this call, apart from Katz's (2015) brief overview of the Turkish state's neo-Ottoman expansionism, which, he argues, aims to insert the country into a globalised neoliberal order as a regional sub-imperial power.

against not only labour but also nature within their hinterlands. Luce (2013, 2015), on the other hand, provides a much-needed theoretical contribution to the literature, revisiting Marini's original contributions and developing a global theory of sub-imperialism. In this 'global' version of the theory, sub-imperialism is defined as "a hierarchical level of the world system and at the same time as a stage of dependent capitalism (its highest stage) out of which some socioeconomic formations are transformed into new links in the imperialist chain without ever leaving the condition of economic dependency" (Luce, 2015: 29). For Luce, sub-imperialism corresponds with a certain type of socio-economic formation with a number of determinants. According to this account, dependent countries with a certain domestic level of industrialisation and monopolisation are characterised by a sub-centre status that chains other peripheral economies to the global imperialist productive system. Furthermore, such socio-economic formations require relatively autonomous and expansionist state apparatus, adopting a 'national' sub-imperialist agenda in cooperation with the dominant imperialism without questioning the framework of dependency. Moreover, to back its sub-imperialist project, the state apparatus in such socio-economic formations acts as an intermediary agency, providing national capitalist trusts and ensuring the unity of capitalist classes. Lastly, sub-imperialist economies not only transfer domestically produced surplus values to imperialist centres, but also capitalise on the surplus value of weaker peripheral economies.

Besides, the contemporary literature on sub-imperialism has provided a growing number of studies exploring the rising bloc of BRICS in particular. It is possible to discern two distinct thematic strands within this literature, each of which sheds light on different underdeveloped areas of the BRICS sub-imperialisms. The first strand consists of contributions that expand our knowledge of BRICS by bringing clarity to its general and country-specific characteristics, differences, functions, dynamics and relations and future directions (Garcia and Bond, 2015; Bond, 2013, 2015, 2016c, 2017; Moyo and Yeros, 2011; 2015; Fontes, 2015; Panitch, 2015; Katz, 2015; Dzarasov, 2015; Pozo, 2015; Robinson, 2015; Wallerstein, 2015; Vanaik, 2015; Prashad, 2015). The second strand, on the other hand, includes contributions examining BRICS in practice, focusing on empirical cases revealing BRICS countries' strategies to maintain and strengthen their sub-imperialist position within the hierarchy of the capitalist world-system by developing mechanisms of financing, cooperation and

investment and promoting massive capital projects ranging from mining to agribusiness and mega-sport events (Cafruny et. al. 2016; Westra, 2017; Wallerstein et. al., 2016; Amisi et al., 2015; Garcia and Kato, 2015; Martinez, 2015; Campos, 2015; Marshall, 2015; Braathen et al., 2015; Altvater, 2015; Flynn, 2007; Bond, 2016a, 2004a, 2004b; Misoczky and Imasato, 2014; Böhm et al., 2012).

From all these contemporary contributions to the literature on sub-imperialism arise a general critique of BRICS (Bond and Garcia, 2015). The key signposts of this critique can be summarised as follows. The sub-imperialist bloc of BRICS represents a unity of dependent-capitalist states with a certain level of industrialisation and monopolisation, which corresponds to a subordinate status within the hierarchy of the capitalist world-system. Although there are different views about whether Russia and China are sub-imperialist, subaltern capital-imperialist, inter-imperialist or *sui generis* imperialism of a new kind (Bond, 2015; Luce, 2015, Fontes, 2015; Katz, 2015), there seems to be a consensus that the BRICS countries adopt a policy of antagonistic cooperation with the dominant imperialism. “That means, in practice, that in areas ranging from world finance to climate change to super-exploitative relations with the periphery and even to soccer, the bloc aims not to overturn tables at the proverbial temple, but to collaborate in holding them up” (Garcia and Bond, 2015: 1). This sub-imperialist form of relation manifests itself, on the one hand, as an active policy for a relatively autonomous, expansionist and enhanced position in international politics. On the other hand, it is characterised by an integrated cooperation with the dominant imperialism in promoting a global corporate agenda of neoliberalism, ensuring regional ‘stability’ and deepening super-exploitation of labour, nature and weaker peripheral nations within and beyond BRICS hinterlands. Lastly, the sub-imperialist bloc of BRICS represents a coalition of high-carbon economies promoting remarkably carbon-intensive projects within and beyond their territorial spheres of accumulation, regardless of their catastrophic consequences at socio-ecological, socio-spatial and global levels (Bond, 2013, 2015).

Although it has been experiencing its renaissance since the last decade, the contemporary literature on sub-imperialism has remained extraneous to the three-dimensional crisis of neoliberal capitalism, to its relation to the need for a sub-imperialist restructuring of particular dependent capitalisms with a certain level of

industrialisation and financial capital, and to the interplay between the internal and the external pillars of the sub-imperialist development. Building on my critique above, in this doctoral thesis, I aim to develop a relational conceptualisation of sub-imperialism by dealing with three under-developed areas.

The first is related to Harvey's (2003) argument on sub-imperialisms' systematic spatio-temporal fixes, representing the second fix in my framework. In fact, although very few studies have alluded to Harvey's argument, arguably from a conceptual point of view (Bond, 2017, 2016a, 2016b, 2004b; van der Merwe, 2016a, 2016b), no previous studies have investigated what these systematic spatio-temporal fixes really are. To bring some clarity to this under-researched area, I argue that Harvey's notion of spatial fix (2001, 2003, 2006a, 2006b, 2010) overlaps with Marini's (1972) argument in many respects. Both theories, for example, affirm that the expansion of capital is a solution to crisis-tendencies specific to the capitalist mode of production. Besides, by arguing that the sub-imperialist development scheme is built on an active policy for physical infrastructure development, Marini (1972) also recognises the effectiveness of spatial restructuring of capital in furthering capitalist accumulation, reproduction and historical development processes. Furthermore, both theories have distinctive individual strengths supporting my research agenda. Marini's notion of sub-imperialism, for example, provides contextual leverage to understand the role of structural problems associated with foreign dependency relations in shaping dependent-capitalisms' spatial strategies. Harvey's notion of spatial fix, on the other hand, goes into more detail than Marini's theory of sub-imperialism in terms of explaining the role of space production in the survival of capitalism.

To integrate Marini's theory of sub-imperialism into my investigation of sub-imperialisms' systematic spatio-temporal fixes, I employ a fundamental and oft-neglected concept. Here, I refer to the concept of the capital reproduction pattern, which was propounded by Marini (2000) and further developed and applied within the scholarship on the Marxist Theory of Dependency (Osorio, 2012; Ferreria at al., 2012; Filho and Araújo, 2015; Luce, 2015). This concept extends Marx's (1867/2011) analyses on circular movement of capital to the level of domestic economy. In other words, originating from Marx's M-C-M' formula – which he developed to explain capital's movement within the sphere of circulation – the notion of capital reproduction

pattern focuses on two key sequencing circuits at the level of domestic economy. In the first phase (M – C), money-capital (M) is transformed into commodity-capital (C) in the form of wage labour and means of production such as instruments of labour (capital goods) and subjects of labour (intermediate goods). In the second stage of capitalist reproduction (C–M'), produced commodities are transformed back into money-capital and surplus values are realised. This notion also attaches a great deal of importance to the state apparatus, highlighting its active role in securing, orchestrating, recovering and advancing the reproduction of capital. As Filho and Araújo (2015) argue, the notion of capital reproduction pattern captures characteristics of capital circuits in level of socio-economic formations, dealing directly with theoretical elements of both the accumulation process of capital and the state.

This concept is particularly central to the second spatial fix in my framework, given that the theory of sub-imperialism suggests that the sub-imperialist development scheme must always be assessed as a crisis-displacement strategy developed in response to the disjuncture between the cycles in an attempt to alleviate crisis-tendencies inherent in dependent-capitalisms (Marini, 1965, 1972; Luce, 2015; Valencia, 2017). As Luce (2015) underlines, the capital reproduction pattern integral to sub-imperialist socio-economic formation is relatively effective in staving off crisis-tendencies originating from the contradictions specific to dependent-capitalism. In his words (2015: 37), "from the perspective of the capital reproduction pattern, the sub-imperialist country succeeds in reuniting the conditions to displace, through expansion, that which engenders realisation problems for the dependent economy in the second phase of circulation (C–M'). It also signifies succeeding to reunite conditions that mitigate some of dependency's structural effects in the first phase of circulation (M–C) and in the accumulation process on a broader scale."

Nevertheless, although the contemporary sub-imperialism literature highlights Marini's argument that Brazilian sub-imperialism is organised around the market problem as a solution to the disjuncture between the capitalist cycles, very little is known – outside of a Latin American perspective (Marini, 1972, 1977; Valencia, 2017; Luce, 2015) – about how today's sub-imperialist practices are interwoven with systemic crisis-tendencies inherent in emerging territorial powers. My argument here represents the second under-researched area in the contemporary sub-imperialism

literature. To recall, shedding some much-needed light on this often-neglected area in this contemporary literature is crucial to go beyond its simplified conception of sub-imperialisms as authorised territorial powers playing a subordinator role within the hierarchy of the capitalist world-system as well as to develop a relational conceptualisation of sub-imperialism as a territorial fix to the interlocking crisis-tendencies historically cultivated by the capitalist mode of production.

However, a relational conceptualisation of sub-imperialism also requires a critical engagement with the third under-researched area within the contemporary literature. That is, despite the extensive research carried out during the last decade, what we know about how today's sub-imperialisms produce space is based largely upon empirical studies mostly investigating how BRICS countries systematically reinforce their sub-imperialist agendas through performing various expansionist practices beyond their 'national' boundaries. In fact, the contemporary sub-imperialism literature is characterised by a large body of contributions that have chiefly focused on how sub-imperialisms materialise their expansionist strategies in weaker peripheral economies. By focusing on the BRICS-led capital projects in other absorber economies, this growing literature has expanded our knowledge of BRICS sub-imperialism's expansionist strategies, such as creating or participating in international trade, development and finance mechanisms in order to secure and deepen their access to other peripheral markets and appropriate surplus value from weaker dependent-capitalisms (Garcia and Kato, 2015; Misoczky and Imasato, 2014; Amisi et al., 2015; Bond 2004, 2013, 2015, 2016a; Flynn, 2007).

The similar overemphasis on the expansionist strategies of today's sub-imperialisms has also been true for the wider international development literature. This is particularly visible in the context of global development aid governance, in which today's sub-imperialisms are often called 'new donors'. Many scholars from this literature have investigated the international and geopolitical impetuses, opportunities and challenges pushing these new territorial powers to reposition themselves as alternative international development actors (Brautigam, 2009; Power and Mohan, 2010; Tan-Mullins et al., 2010; Mawdsley and McCann, 2011; Kragelund, 2011). Keeping the same focus on external impetuses and expansionist practices, this literature has also highlighted how emerging economies' development cooperation

strategies challenge traditional donors represented by the western international development paradigm (Woods, 2008; Six, 2009; Zimmerman and Smith, 2011; Mawdsley, 2012; Mawdsley et al., 2014, Eyben, 2013; Eyben and Savage, 2013; Gore, 2013; Moyo, 2009; Sörensen, 2010; Hausmann, 2014).

In this doctoral thesis, I problematise this overemphasis on what might be called 'the external', which reduces the notion of sub-imperialism to an expansionist foreign policy developed in response to international impetuses, opportunities and challenges associated with the state of dramatic flux towards an uncertain post-US hegemonic architecture. As a corollary of this over-focus on the external, domestic impetuses behind emerging territorial powers' expansionist praxis have remained considerably under-researched (Lancaster, 2007). This is also true for the domestic literature on Turkey's expansionist foreign policy. Chiefly produced by policy-makers, this domestic literature also portrays Turkey's expansionist turn in foreign policy as a 'success story' written by certain Turkish political elites in response to the changing international climate (Davutoğlu, 2008, 2013; Fidan, 2010, 2013; Fidan and Nurdun, 2008; Aras and Fidan, 2009; Kulaklıkaya and Nurdun, 2010; Ozkan, 2008, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013; Ozkan and Akgun, 2010).

Similar to the other two under-developed areas reviewed in this section, the contemporary literature's overt focus on 'the external' also leaves less room to grasp the relational fabric of sub-imperialism by reducing the concept to expansionist foreign policies followed by certain dependent capitalism. However, as Marini (1965, 1972), as well as recent theoretical contributions drawn upon Marini's original works have clearly indicated (Luce, 2015; Valencia, 2017), sub-imperialism is more than just an expansionist foreign policy to appropriate surplus values from weaker nations. Furthermore, it is not a spontaneously and accidentally evolved anomaly specific to dependent capitalism, but a systematically and strategically organised socio-economic formation corresponding to the highest stage of dependent-capitalism. Thus, what is not yet clear in this recently growing literature is how sub-imperialism is organised, maintained and further developed internally with its relation to 'the external'. Indeed, far too little empirical attention has been paid to exploring what spatial strategies are systematically practised within such dependent-capitalisms themselves. In this respect, Braathen et al.'s (2015) analysis of the BRICS countries' growing enthusiasm

to organise international mega-sport events within their national boundaries is a welcome intervention bringing some light to this oft-neglected area. By focusing on successive mega-events – the 2007 Pan-American Games, the 2014 FIFA World Cup, and the 2016 Olympics – organised in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, the authors disclose the role of such mega-events in not only aiding BRICS' ambition to strengthen their image as an emerging power worldwide, but also serving their interests in promoting neoliberal city governance practices such as branding Rio de Janeiro as a 'global city' to promote tourism, foreign investments and urban entrepreneurialism and suppressing the demands and rights of the grassroots. This study clearly indicates that there is a need to understand and critique the internal strategies integral to today's sub-imperialisms.

Before I expand my literature review further, I would like to provide a summary of the above-discussed three problematic areas that characterise the contemporary sub-imperialism literature, on which I built a relational conceptualisation of sub-imperialism. As I have disclosed thus far, Harvey's argument on systematic spatio-temporal fixes produced by sub-imperialisms has remained theoretically under-developed and empirically under-researched in the contemporary sub-imperialism literature. The same negligence has also been true for Marini's argument that sub-imperialism is a structural solution to systemic crisis-tendencies specific to dependent-capitalism. Lastly, this contemporary literature on sub-imperialism is characterised by a unilateral perspective that focuses solely on 'the external', neglecting how sub-imperialism is organised, maintained and further developed internally. Overall, my engagement with these three underdeveloped areas from spatial perspective offers a relational conceptualisation of sub-imperialism by shedding light on how spatial expansion and spatial restructuring practices performed by today's sub-imperialisms are interwoven with the first spatial fix at the global level and the structural crisis-tendencies at the territorial level. This suggests, the emergence and development of the sub-imperialist development scheme must be seen as a corollary of the system's geographical needs. Besides, my focus on contradictions and crisis-tendencies inherent in dependent-capitalist socio-economic formation suggest a relational reading of the global and territorial processes of geography-making and crisis-displacement. Finally, the relational perspective I am developing here underlines that the internal and the external pillars of sub-imperialist development must always be seen and assessed

together not only to produce a true knowledge of the phenomenon but also to develop a rational anti-capitalist critique of sub-imperialism.

In the final section of this chapter, I will integrate this argument into the broader framework this chapter develops. Before this, however, I would like to recall an important point relevant to the following section. That is, the high-carbon, super-exploitative and eco-destructive praxis characterising today's sub-imperialisms and its relation to the phenomenon of spatial reproduction. This point is particularly important for this doctoral thesis, given that it is closely connected with the deepening ecological crisis-tendencies in the prolonged trajectories of neoliberal capitalism. In the following section, I will further develop my relational conceptualisation of sub-imperialism by focusing on the ecological crisis in particular and reviewing the climate change and environmental governance literature. What makes this literature fundamental for this doctoral thesis is its relation to the third spatial fix, which is produced by an intergovernmental agency, namely the global climate regime, enabling, securing and deepening capital's access to space and its reproduction in the context of the ecological crisis.

2.3. The ecological crisis and the third spatial fix

Overall, climate change is arguably the latest of capitalism's crises (Pelling et al., 2012; Klein, 2015), arising from the environmental degradation intrinsic to the capitalist mode of production (O'Connor, 1988, 1998; Foster, 1992, 1999; Harvey, 2010, 2014; Moore, 2000). In response to this crisis, there have been more than twenty years of political attempts to curb the emission of greenhouse gases (GHG), chiefly resulting in two landmark international accords: the 1997 Kyoto Protocol and the 2015 Paris Agreement, both favouring a market-based solution to the crisis (Spash, 2016; Sapinski, 2016).

To provide a brief overview, the global climate regime's basic modus operandi is simple and sufficiently problematic. It all started with the creation of a new commodity by attaching an exchange-value to greenhouse gases (GHG). Following the commodification of GHG, the regime, on the one hand, has bound certain developed economies with quantified emission reduction targets and on the other, provided market-based mechanisms to stimulate capital actors of the countries with

binding targets to generate carbon credits by investing in GHG reductive projects globally. Finally, the regime has constituted global carbon-markets to enable the exchange of the right to pollute between global buyers and sellers of carbon credits generated. Whilst the 1997 Kyoto Protocol had not allowed the countries without binding targets to fully capitalise on their market-based mechanisms, the 2015 Paris Agreement – which will enter into force only after 2020 – offers relatively more inclusive policy instruments and financial mechanisms. Unlike the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, for example, the 2015 Paris Agreement seems to be relatively wider in scope with its new SDM (Sustainable Development Mechanism) that will be available for all parties that submit their 'intended nationally determined contributions'.

The system's market-based solution to the ecological crisis has significantly accelerated capital flows into space and nature, bringing about a global climate industry. Between 2004 and 2016, new global investments in renewable energy increased by 564.2% from $47bn to $312.2bn, and the total amount invested in renewable energy has reached $2.6 trillion (Frankfurt School, 2017). Today, the global financial flows associated with climate change mitigation and adaptation amount to around $343bn to $385bn per year (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2014). Similarly, the global value of the regional, national, and subnational carbon pricing instruments reached almost $50bn in 2015 (World Bank, 2015).

Newell and Paterson (2010: 1), offering an optimistic perspective on the new climate regime and its policy tools and accumulation mechanisms, labelled the new climate governance system 'climate capitalism', "a model, which squares capitalism's need for continual economic growth with substantial shifts away from carbon-based industrial development". Büscher and Fletcher (2015: 1) conceptualised the 'greening' trend in capitalism, propounding the notion of 'accumulation by conservation', which refers to "a mode of accumulation that takes the negative environmental contradictions of contemporary capitalism as its departure for a newfound 'sustainable' model of accumulation for the future". Others have called this new paradigm a more sustainable and greener capitalism (Michaelowa and Dutschke, 2000; Stowell, 2005; Yamin, 2005). Lachapelle et al. (2017) have argued that the global climate regime has resulted in a 'green' global division of labour, banding individual states together under the collective and interdependent process of decarbonisation.

However, while climate markets have become important cornerstones in capitalist discourses and practices, considerable doubts have also arisen as to whether or not the market-based solution is capable of mitigating the climate change crisis (Bailey and Wilson, 2009). In this regard, the market-based solution to the climate crisis has been subjected to criticism by many authors, theorising capital's interest in 'green' investment as a new wave of profit seeking (Bakker, 2009, 2010) and accumulation through decarbonisation (Matthews and Paterson, 2005; Buck 2007; Bumpus and Liverman, 2008). From a geopolitical perspective, Bachram (2004) and Bumpus and Liverman (2011) approach the geopolitics of climate economy, putting forward the notion of carbon colonialism, which discusses the greening of capital as a new colonising force equipped with the market-based accumulation mechanisms that assist the Global North in dominating the Global South. Besides, the various negative social, economic and environmental impacts as well as the ineffective and corrupt nature of the market-based solution to the climate crisis are also evidenced in a number of well-documented empirical studies (Lohmann, 2006, 2009, 2010; Böhm and Dabhi, 2009; Ghosh and Sahu, 2011; Bachram, 2004; Bryant et al., 2015).

In explaining the global political economy of the greening of capital, Harvey's theory of spatio-temporal fix has also been widely employed by critical scholarship on carbon offsetting. This literature argues that the global climate economy plays a 'fixing' role in absorbing overaccumulated surpluses of capital and labour, providing new opportunities for creating new 'green' markets, commodities, and mechanisms of capitalist legitimation (Prudham, 2009; Böhm et al., 2012). According to this account, the new climate markets assist capital to spatio-temporally fix its chronic overaccumulation problem, providing flexibility for capital by restructuring the geographical management of GHG emissions and carbon sinks (Bryant et al., 2015). Similarly, McCarthy (2015) discusses this global shift toward renewable energy as a global-scale socioecological fix addressing various crisis-tendencies originating from the contradictions of the fossil-fuel era.

Other critical scholars have extended the notion of spatial fix to more local settings, exploring the relation between neoliberal governance and policies and 'greening' of capitalism. Drawing on Harvey's notion of spatial fix, this literature has

identified a range of institutional/environmental 'fixes'. Castree (2008a, 2008b), for example, develops a notion of environmental fix to explain greening of capitalism as a strategy of neoliberalisation of nature. Again, While et al. (2004) suggest a notion of sustainability fix to explain local governments' restructuring strategy to balance the rising economic, social and environmental demands for ecological modernisation in accordance with the interests of capital actors. To shed light on the scalar dimension of crisis displacement, another environmentally attuned version of the spatial fix has been proposed by Cohen and Bakker (2014), propounding the eco-scalar fix as a rescaling instrument of environmental governance. Besides, Ekers and Prudham (2015a) develop a notion of socio-ecological fix to explain how social, ecological and legitimacy crises of capital are offset through conjoined production of space and nature. Ekers (2015) addresses the practices of reforestation and sustained-yield production as a form of the socioecological fix, assisting the Canadian state in tackling the problems of accumulation, unemployment and legitimacy of the state and forestry industry. Similarly, Nugent (2015) demonstrates how politico-economic contradictions in Ontario arising from air pollution, traffic congestion and economic stagnation were fixed through advancing the neoliberal governance of public infrastructure investments. Another piece by Zalik (2015) explores the fixing role of the reserve replacement, environmental review and tribunal processes in the case of the Canadian oil industry (See also Johnson, 2015; Guthman, 2015; Dempsey, 2015; Ekers and Prudham, 2015b, 2017).

The overall role that today's sub-imperial regimes play in this intergovernmental challenge has been the subject of criticism within the contemporary sub-imperialism literature. Garcia and Bond (2015: 3) describe this role as follows:

> "The BRICS countries promote an extractive, high-carbon economic model which threatens to amplify the catastrophic environmental and social destruction of advanced capitalism. The role of the BRICS in the *de facto* derailing of the Kyoto Protocol to limit climate change is revealing: Russia endorsed the Treaty in 2005 but withdrew in 2012, while in 2009 the other BRICS leaders joined Barack Obama to promote the Copenhagen Accord in behind-the-scenes negotiations. That 2009 deal rejected a mandatory limit on emissions, and at subsequent UN Framework Convention on Climate Change

> Conferences of the Parties, BRICS countries (including host South Africa in 2011) were among those joining Washington as most resistant to binding emissions cuts and payment of climate debt. By 2011 in South Africa, they had agreed to whittle away the critical notion of 'common but differentiated responsibility' for the crisis, to the detriment of the world's poorest and lowest-emitting countries."

According to Bond (2015: 23), "this role of propping up global economic and environmental malgovernance often benefits home-based corporations in the sub-imperial countries, but it is also a marker of cooperation and collaboration with the imperialist projects of core countries' multinational corporations and states: extension of the neoliberal conception that everything can and should be commodified, even the air through carbon markets."

Nevertheless, today's sub-imperialisms are not only promoting an extractive and high-carbon economic model by turning a blind eye to the ecological crisis and further undermining the global climate regime by refusing emission cuts and payment of climate debt (Bond and Garcia, 2015; Bond, 2015; Amisi et al., 2015; Reddy, 2015). Paradoxically, they prop up the global climate regime by opening up their spaces for 'green' projects and in pushing for further extension of carbon markets as well (Böhm et al., 2012; Bond, 2012). Allow me to give some statistics to better highlight the said ambivalent stances of today's sub-imperialisms towards climate change mitigation. In 2016, for example, BRICS emitted 43.4% of global GHG (Oliver at al., 2017), representing their disastrous share in the total global emissions. Nevertheless, China, Brazil, India and South Africa are also the preeminent actors of today's rapidly growing renewable energy markets (Frankfurt School, 2017; REN21, 2017). The UNFCCC database (2018a) shows that the BRICS countries (without Russia) have hosted 74.7% of the total 7800 CDM projects that have been registered since the emergence of the global climate regime. These statistics clearly indicate the BRICS (apart from Russia) sub-imperialism's eagerness to make the most of the global climate regime.

Accordingly, there has been a recently growing interdisciplinary literature examining the country-specific rationales that would explain how emerging economies have become the preeminent driving forces of the growing climate economy. Mathews (2015), for example, brings an insight into China's outstanding position in renewable

energy investments. This account explains China's dramatic transition from the black to the green development model as a corollary of the country's advantages arising from its latecomer industrialisation characteristics. Schmitz's (2017) analysis of China, South Africa, Brazil and India reveals that these countries' support for climate-relevant policies arises from their concerns with securing energy, building competitive green industries and creating jobs or providing a basis for future public revenue. Similarly, Chen and Lees (2016) argue that the expansion of renewable energy in China is a corollary of the country's adoption of a developmental state strategy that differentiates China's renewable energy policy from Western modes of environmental governance. Baker et al. (2014), while exploring the energy transition in South Africa, address the role of the uneconomical and unsustainable characteristic of the country's historical dependence on fossil fuel in bringing about the transition to renewable energy in South Africa. This recently growing literature provides much needed country-level analyses, expanding our knowledge of the contextual rationales behind the emerging territorial powers' climate/energy strategies. I support this literature by taking Böhm et al.'s (2012: 12) argument on board. According to this account, the theory of sub-imperialism can help us explain "the rationale behind recent embrace of carbon markets by particular nations and fractions of capital, and more specifically, to locate the central role of 'emerging economies' in promoting the global expansion of these policy tools".

Overall, my review of the literature in this section reveals today's sub-imperialisms relation to the ecological crisis-tendencies, and in turn, the third spatial fix. That is, today's sub-imperialisms actively facilitate the third spatial fix by co-opting carbon market mechanisms and promoting expansion and restructuring of capital along the lines of the market-based solution to the ecological crisis, whilst at the same time promoting extractive, high-carbon fixed capital projects, further amplifying the catastrophic ecological crisis-tendencies. The integration of the third spatial fix into my framework represents a further step in my relational conceptualisation of sub-imperialism. This integration not only allows me to grasp how financial, geopolitical and ecological crisis-tendencies are hanged together with sub-imperialisms' expansionist spatial strategies, but also, it paves the way for a more closer look at today's sub-imperialisms with respect to their internal strategies for spatial restructuring of capital along the lines of the three-dimensional crisis of capitalism.

Thus far, my literature review has focused on the financial, geopolitical and ecological dimensions of the crisis. However, there is also a social dimension of the crisis, closely connected with the high-carbon, super-exploitative and eco-destructive praxis characterising today's sub-imperialisms. De Angelis (2007, 2013) calls this dimension 'social stability crisis' and argues that the system increasingly loses its capability to receive the necessary social and ecological support for further accumulation and growth. Furthermore, he argues that the usual fixes from above – i.e. all three top-down spatial fixes identified thus far – are no longer sufficiently capable of staving off this socio-ecological dimension of crisis, and therefore, the system seeks out new fixes from below to recover itself by realigning class/power relations and establishing new systems of governance, thus re-boosting capitalist accumulation and growth.

By taking inspiration from De Angelis' argument (2007, 2013) as well as critically engaging with recent debates in labour geography, the section develops a concept of socio-spatial fix which is different than the other three spatial fixes due to its bottom-up origin. Here, before I review the labour geography literature, I would like to clarify the rationale for my preference of labour geography over the long-standing social movement literature whilst analysing the case of the anti-dam struggle in Dêrsim.

The rationale behind this choice is twofold. The first is related to the very nature of the mainstream social movement literature. Indeed, a closer look at mainstream 'social' movement theories like collective behaviour (Smelser, 1962), relative deprivation (Morrison, 1971), resource mobilisation (McCarthy and Zald, 1977), political process (McAdam, 1982) and new social movements (Cohen, 1985; Melucci, 1985; Touraine 1985) reveals that all these theories have been characterised by an overt negligence in the very relations between capitalism and social movements (Hetland and Goodwin, 2013). Here, I agree with Barker et al.'s (2013a) criticism of the mainstream social movements literature due to its consistent avoidance of approaching movements with Marxist and particularly class perspectives. Similarly, beside the dominant movement literature in political sociology, the same negligence is also valid in mainstream organisation studies despite a great number of researches on 'social' movements have been conducted by organisation studies scholars (Davis

et al., 2005, 2008; Campbell, 2005; Snow, 2008; Soule, 2012; Adler et al., 2014). Furthermore, the mainstream social movement literature has long been subjected to criticism due to its apathy toward movements' concerns and its scholastic and one-sided approach to the knowledge generation (Barker and Cox, 2002, Bevington and Dixon, 2005; Cox and Nilsen, 2007; Cox and Fominaya, 2009; Krinsky, 2013). By paraphrasing Marx (1845), mainstream movement literature interprets 'social' movements under the value-neutrality and scientificism clichés, but remains limited in producing knowledge to serve to social movement practice (Barker and Cox, 2002).

On the other hand, my second rationale is related to the current status of the critical social movement literature, which has been characterised by a growing academic interest since the late of the 20th century towards developing a Marxist theory of and for 'social' movements. To clarify, substantially benefiting from Western Marxist theory, particularly from Gramscian interpretation of 'Marxism' (Gramsci, 1999; Laclau and Mouffe, 2001), as an intellectual resource, academics from non-mainstream movement literature in political sociology (Cox, 1999a, 1999b; Cox and Nilsen 2005a, 2005b, 2006; Nilsen, 2007, 2009; Barker, 2013; Barker et al. 2013b) and organisation studies (Mumby, 1997; Cloud, 2001; Levy and Egan, 2001; Levy and Scully, 2007; Levy, 2008; van Bommel and Spicer, 2011; Spicer and Böhm, 2007; Böhm et al., 2008; Sutherland et al. 2013) have for a while now been developing the critical perspectives against the dominant movement theories, and cultivating a new theory of movements. The main motives behind this interest emanate from two interrelated problématiques in the field of movement scholarship. On the one hand, the question of to what extent existing 'social' movement theories have been grasping movement's reality and helping practices of movements inevitably provide a necessity for developing a new movement theory (Krinsky, 2013). On the other hand, a striking paradox also triggers this interest: A Marxist theory of and for movements has not been developed yet despite Marxism in itself is a result of the class struggle in the capitalist era of the history (Cox, 1999a). Nevertheless, this emerging strand of critical social movement literature has yet failed to integrate the much-needed socio-spatial analysis into the scrutiny of social movements. Besides, this strand's overt emphasis on Gramscian interpretation of Marxism leaves more room for an analytical focus on 'discourse' in the creation of hegemony and consensus but less for the application of

dialectical materialism to the spatial analysis of the material embedding of social movements in the process of space reproduction.

Following this clarification, now, I would like to continue with my review of the labour geography literature, which supports my investigation by providing the much-needed spatial focus on how the geography of capitalism is produced and reproduced from below.

2.4. The social crisis and the fourth spatial fix

To begin with, it is important to recall the close affinity between critical economic geography and its sub-discipline of labour geography. As I have introduced in Chapter 1, the origin of the critical school of geography dates back to the period between the 1970s and 1990s, when the industrialised economies had gone through phases of restructuring and social, institutional and regulatory transformations – what has become known as deindustrialisation (Peck, 2018). With a number of outstanding contributions, critical economic geography has significantly expanded our knowledge of how the geography of capitalism is made (Lefebvre, 1976, 1991; Storper and Walker, 1989; Massey, 1995; Harvey, 2001, 2003, 2006a, 2006b, 2010; Smith, 2010). However, the capital-focused approach of this well-established critical literature has been criticised by another group of Marxist geographers due to its conceiving of society in a passive manner, neglecting its role in making the geographies of capitalism (Herod, 1997, 2001, 2003; Castree et al., 2004; Lier, 2007; McGrath-Champ et al., 2010). Consequently, in the late 1990s, the debate gave birth to a sub-discipline, namely labour geography, which focuses on workers' praxis of shaping the economic geography of capitalism. In this labour-focused account of the critical economic geography literature, Harvey's notion of spatial fix has been re-conceptualised from a bottom-up perspective, developing the concept of 'labour's spatial fix' to explain how the landscapes of capitalism are shaped by workers' praxis to overcome their problems of survival and self-reproduction (Herod, 1997).

Without any doubt, the labour geography project represents an important step towards going beyond capital-focused frames in critical economic geography, which has generally failed to shed light on the role labour plays in the processes of geography-making and crisis-displacement. Paraphrasing Herod (1997:3), it paves

the way for seeing the making of the economic geography of capitalism through the eyes of labour by focusing on how workers shape the landscape in their own image whilst facilitating their goals. However, after reaching a certain level of maturity in the course of its evolution since the late 1990s, the labour geography project has – for a while now – arrived at a phase of reassessment, debating underdeveloped issues and future directions (Peck, 2018; Herod, 2012; Coe and Jordhus-Lier, 2011; Bergene et al., 2010; Tufts and Savage, 2009; Castree, 2007; Lier, 2007).

In these debates, the theorisation of agency has emerged as one of the most problematised matters. Castree's (2007:858) argument that "agency is both under-theorised and under-specified in most labour geographers' analyses of it" continues to be relevant. Although there seems to be a consensus among labour geographers on this matter, the debate also involves apparent differences of opinion. Tufts and Savage (2009), for example, assert that the agency of labour is not as important in constructing theoretical and analytical boundaries as it is in defining labour geography as a political project. Coe and Jordhus-Lier (2011), on the other hand, argue that the issue of theorisation of labour's agency is also an analytical problem, given the massiveness and complexity of the material and immaterial realms encircling labour. According to Das (2012), not only the notion of labour's agency but also labour geography's view of class is problematic and inadequate to grasp the spatiality, relational totality and multi-dimensionality of class struggle.

Nevertheless, the problem of under-theorised agency has still been generating limits for the further development of labour geography. This is mainly due to the fact that the issue of under-theorised agency is also linked to the issue of under-theorised structure. In other words, the labour geography project remains under-developed in terms of "how and why workers and capitalists act the way they do" (Herod, 2012: 349). In this regard, Coe and Jordhus-Lier (2011) argue that labour geography needs an analytical framework – if not a complete theory – to explore the socio-spatial dynamics that cause variations in workers' actions. They suggest a constrained and variegated notion of labour agency, arguing that space and social relations are fundamental to understanding agency's praxis of geography-making, due to the fact that both the conditions and the strategies of agency are spatial. In this regard, they examine the notion of agency in relation to four main socio-spatial constraints: capital,

the state, the community and the labour market.

Although Coe and Jordhus-Lier's (2011) argument can be seen as important progress in relation to the theorisation of the dialectic between agency and structure, this account nevertheless falls short by not addressing the role and embeddedness of uneven geographical development in the production and configuration of geographical spaces, socio-spatially differentiated inter-class relations and the agency and praxis of grassroots movements. With this doctoral thesis, I aim to take Coe and Jordhus-Lier's (2011) contribution further by arguing that grassroots agency should always be seen in relation to not only capital, state, community and labour markets, but also unevenly developed geographical space in which the class forces, relations, struggles and praxis are variably embedded.

In this respect, I argue that rather than identifying individual structural constraints or categories, an expanded notion of socio-spatial structure can be adopted into the scrutiny as a modularised image of the whole that allows us to explore the agency's praxis with respect to uneven geographical development. In a broad sense, by the concept of socio-spatial structure, I refer to a relatively coherent configuration of socio-spatial relations that defines and differentiates inter-class relations in an unevenly developed geographical context. Here, I address Harvey's (2006b:102) argument of 'production of regionality'. For Harvey, capitalism's uneven geographical development perpetually produces 'regional spaces', where "production, distribution, exchange and consumption, supply and demand, class struggle, culture and lifestyles hang together within an open system that nevertheless exhibits some kind of 'structured coherence'". According to Harvey, such regional structures can evolve into territorial units that operate as defined spaces of agency's collective action. In this respect, I argue that an analytical focus on preeminent axes of such socio-spatial structures can serve labour geography as considerable contextual leverage to explore the constrained nature of agency with respect to uneven geographical development.

Now, I must turn my critical attention to a different but related debate within labour geography. Since its emergence in the late 1990s, the labour geography literature has been characterised by a long-standing debate over its traditional worker/union-centrism in relation to agency (Das, 2012; Coe and Jordhus-Lier, 2011;

Castree, 2007). A historical look at labour geography enables the identification of an evolving strand of contributions attempting to overcome this centrism through community-unionism. Preliminary studies within this strand have mainly addressed cases showing how labour unions improve their organisational and struggling capacities through adopting community-unionism practices whilst dealing with emerging threats of industrial regulations and restructurings (Tufts, 1998; Johns and Vural, 2000; Walsh, 2000; Ellem, 2003). These contributions have paved the way for the second wave of contributions, which is identified by an increasing interest in theorising and framing community-unionism in relation to spatiality of labour as well as national and international scales of coalition-building in global production networks (Lier, 2007; Ellem; 2008; Wills, 2008; Oseland et al., 2012; McDonald et al., 2012; Jordhus-Lier, 2013; Brookes, 2013).

Overall, this evolving and strengthening strand suggests an important shift from the dominant worker/union-centrism to a more flexible and broader understanding of labour's agency in relation to the wider community. However, despite these progressive contributions, this strand is still greatly under the influence of the dominant perspective in several respects. To begin with, whilst linking labour to the wider community, this strand still tends to confine the class-struggle and labour's agency to unions, and thereby, pre-requires and prioritises empirical cases with workplace/industry-based confrontations to explore class agency. Besides, this strand still conceives of other social classes and strata outside of the proletariat simply as 'reinforcements' on which to capitalise, ignoring grassroots' collective and interdependent potential of shaping the geography of capitalism and bringing about fixes from below. Furthermore, a vast majority of cases explored in this strand are from developed country contexts. Thus, I reiterate Tufts and Savage's (2009) argument that labour geography needs a new perspective for cases in different spatial contexts, i.e. in the Global South, where the exercise of 'agency' takes on different form and meaning.

I argue that this strand's contributions need to be complemented by a grassroots agency perspective in order to go beyond the worker/union-centric narrowness of previous labour geography. I define grassroots agency as a collective form of socio-spatially constrained class-struggle acting towards the materialisation of

commonised inter-class interests. My conceptualisation of grassroots agency differs significantly from both worker/union-centrism and reciprocal forms of unionism. In my perspective, the notion of labour's agency is not confined to a privileged minority of unionised workers. Rather, our perspective allows us to comprehend collective agency of labour and its class allies with their realities constrained by various axes of socio-spatial structure such as ethnicity, race, gender, religion, culture, history, ecology, politics, economy, and so on. Analogous to my argument here, but originating from the Marxist-feminist literature, Ferguson (2016), while discussing the limitations of intersectionality feminism and suggesting an integrative ontology for social-reproduction feminism, underlines that labour and its collective agency must be seen as a complex, diverse unity both within and beyond the capitalist social totality. By taking inspiration from this account as well as Das' (2012) call for an alternative view of class and agency, I argue that a more comprehensive and dialectical ontology of the social can assist the pluralist school of labour geography in two respects. On the one hand, it enables us to grasp how the capitalist socio-economic formation is produced and reproduced by collective, interdependent and practical human activity taking place within organised and unevenly developed capitalist spaces. And, on the other, without de-emphasising the agency of labour but integrating it into a broader, multi-dimensional and relational conception of class, the premised ontological perspective provides a dynamic and complex understanding of class unity and struggle, which traditional labour geography often fails to address. In other words, the perspective I am proposing turns analytical attention from the existing versions of the union-worker centrism to the realm of grassroots agency, in which labouring classes and their class allies participate with variegated and interpenetrating economic, political and ideological agendas and organisations.

Lastly, this doctoral thesis problematises traditional labour geography's unilateral approach to the issue of spatial displacement of crisis. In the labour geography literature, the concept of labour's spatial fix has been developed as an alternative metaphor to capital-centric rendering of the spatial fix (Peck, 2003) in an attempt to understand how workers overcome the problems of their self-reproduction and survival whilst shaping economic landscapes through their praxis. Here, Coe and Jordhus-Lier's (2011) and Das' (2012) critiques of traditional labour geography's bias towards isolated success stories of workers are welcome interventions, allowing us to

recognise the ongoing bias as an inevitable corollary of the unilateral and non-dialectical distinction made between labour's and capital's spatial fixes.

However, the argument I develop here is particularly important in terms of problematising the way space is reproduced in an era where the viability and/or legitimacy of socio-ecological transformations necessary for further accumulation is increasingly disputed (De Angelis, 2007). Posing a direct threat to the basic assumptions upon which the system is built, the capitalist crisis of social stability refers to the system's declining capability of ensuring "the stability of social arrangements and interaction in forms compatible with the accumulation process, the extensive commodification of life, particular forms of disciplinary processes of market interaction and extraction of work." (ibid, 87-88). For De Angelis (2013: 603-604), this crisis of social stability signifies that "vital support for the growth of the social system is no longer forthcoming in sufficient degree, especially from the environment in which the capitalist system operates". He argues that fixes available for capital – corresponding to the top-down dimension of my theoretical framework – intensify the crisis of social and ecological reproduction, amplifying and widening the range of resistance. To deal with this deepening crisis of socio-ecological stability, thus, the capitalist system increasingly requires realignment of class/power relations and new systems of governance in order to re-establish growth and accumulation.

Taking inspiration from De Angelis' (2007, 2013) argument, I argue that making such a clear-cut distinction between capital's and labour's spatial fixes and setting one against the other is not sufficiently dialectical. Paraphrasing Engels' words (1892/2008: 47), both capital's and labour's fixes are as inseparable as they are opposed and despite all their opposition, they mutually interpenetrate. A similar argument to my critique of the labour geography's unilateral understanding of spatial displacement of crisis has been put forth by Campling et al. (2016) in relation to development literature, arguing that capitalism is constituted through and by class struggles at and beyond the point of production, and therefore struggles both from above and below must be seen as constitutive elements of the historical expansion, intensification and transformation of capitalism. Furthermore, through employing a class-relational approach, this account also brings an important insight into the constraining or facilitating role of a variety of socio-spatial axes of social difference

such as ethnicity, race, caste, location, sector, gender, and so on, in shaping the agency of capitalist and labouring classes toward a collaborative or antagonistic praxis.

Thus, through this doctoral thesis, I turn my focus to the potential coalescences between capital's and labour's needs, interests and their conjoined praxis of making geographies and displacement of crisis, which remains considerably under-researched in the labour geography literature. Here, I borrow Herod's (2003) and Harvey's (2006b) interpretations of regional 'growth machine politics' in order to explore the dialectic nature of capital's and labour's praxis towards displacement of crisis. Harvey (2006b: 103), in his theory of uneven development, addresses a typical form of regional class alliances and struggles, which seeks to establish a pattern of governance in which the stakes are fundamentally the economic health and well-being of the region rather than class. According to Harvey, such regional struggles and class alliances are characterised by "regional growth coalitions" to improve the competitive strength of the territory vis-à-vis other territories, and in such forms of struggle, the local bourgeoisie may support territorial struggles and join a local class alliance on the grounds of improving the welfare of the region. Analogous to Harvey (2006b), Herod (2003) also points out that workers participate in what he calls local boosterist campaigns to defend or improve their economic spaces because they have no other choice.

To explore the inter-class politics of development in the form of regional growth coalitions, I adopt Wright's (2000) notion of positive class compromise. Wright, while exploring the relationship between the associational power of workers – the various forms of power that result from the formation of collective organisations of workers – and the interests of capitalists, points out a 'positive' form of 'class compromise' that allows both opposing classes to improve their position through active and mutual cooperation. According to Wright, the labouring class' associational power has two distinctive effects on capital's interests. On the one hand, it puts the brakes on the capitalists' capacity to make unilateral decisions, and on the other, it is potentially beneficial to capitalists' interests by helping the bourgeoisie solve its collective action and coordination problems. Important empirical evidence for Wright's argument on positive class compromise is provided by Selwyn's (2011) overarching work examining

the evolution of labour's militant struggles towards a class compromise in the Brazilian horticultural export sector. Through his case study, Selwyn clearly demonstrates that leading employers in São Francisco's fruticulture sector have capitalised on workers' associational power to solve their collective action problems.

Building on these critical accounts, I propound a concept of socio-spatial fix to explain how the grassroots' praxis of geography-making and crisis-resolution conjoin with and assist capital both in staving off its recurrent crises embedded in socio-spatial structures and in recovering itself via the reproduction of new capitalist spaces and capitalist social relations. In this regard, I argue that socio-spatial fixes from below have a dialectical nature. On the one hand, it is a bottom-up response to existing crises embedded in a socio-spatial structure and therefore mainly seeks to maintain and reform the reproductive potential and livelihoods of the grassroots. On the other hand, such a grassroots socio-spatial fix aids capital's spatial displacement of crisis, enabling it to reproduce its own logic of accumulation and circulation.

2.5. Towards an integrative, relational and multi-layered perspective

To conclude this chapter, I would like to tie these four spatial fixes together under an interdisciplinary and explanatory framework, highlighting the integrative, relational and multi-layered nature of space reproduction, in which the geographies of capitalism are made and re-made in an attempt to displace financial, geopolitical, and socio-ecological crisis-tendencies. Through this framework, I propose a deeper theorising of the notion of spatial fix by extending its explanatory power in three respects. First, I highlight the integrative nature of space reproduction, investigating how the geography of capitalism is made by focusing on both top-down and bottom-up processes of spatial displacement of crisis. Second, I shed light on the relational nature of space reproduction by exploring multiple agencies in their essential interactions in the process of geography-making and crisis-displacement. Lastly, I investigate the phenomenon of space reproduction at regional, territorial and global scales, representing the multi-layered nature of space reproduction.

Table 1 below provides a summary of the four spatial fixes and their essential interactions, that will guide me through my investigation of the phenomenon of space reproduction.

Table 1: A summary of the four spatial fixes

<table>
<tr><th colspan="2">Fixes</th><th>Literature</th><th>Primary focus</th><th colspan="2">Key conceptual categories regarding space reproduction</th></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="4">Spatial fix from above</td><td rowspan="2">The first spatial fix</td><td rowspan="2">Harvey’s notion of spatio-temporal fix (2001, 2003, 2006a, 2006b, 2010).</td><td rowspan="3">Global overaccumulation crisis</td><td rowspan="2">To stave off, if not to resolve, the tendency toward crisis formation under capitalism through the spatial and/or temporal displacement of overaccumulated surplus capitals.</td><td>Spatial displacement
Absorption of overaccumulated surpluses by opening up new markets and development of new production systems, commodities, resources and networks, and so on.</td></tr>
<tr><td>Temporal displacement
Absorption of overaccumulated surpluses by investing in either long-term fixed capital projects such as transportation, energy-generation, communication, sewage and water, or in all other physical infrastructure development or social expenditure on housing, health care, research, education and so on.</td></tr>
<tr><td>The second spatial fix</td><td>Systematic spatio-temporal fixes by sub-imperialisms (Harvey, 2003)</td><td colspan="2">By providing new spaces, markets, industries, commodities, resources and networks for overaccumulated capital surpluses to flow in, sub-imperialisms facilitate this first spatial fix and in turn, capacitate the spatial and/or temporal displacement of the financial crisis of global capitalism.</td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td>Capitalist reproduction pattern (Marini, 1965, 1972; Osorio, 2012; Ferreria at al., 2012; Filho and Araújo, 2015; Luce, 2015; Marx, 1867/2011)</td><td>Structural disjuncture between the cycles (MC – CM`)</td><td rowspan="2">To capacitate the capital reproduction pattern and to alleviate some of dependency’s structural effects in the first (M-C) and second phases (C-M’) of circulation through geographical expansion and spatial restructuring.</td><td>Geographical expansion
To stave off the problem of realisation of surplus value embedded in the second phase of circulation (C-M’) surplus capitals were redirected to weaker peripheral spaces through enabling, securing and fostering the sub-imperial access to weaker peripheral economies and the surplus value extracted was transferred back into the domestic and global surplus-capital producers.</td></tr>
<tr><td>Spatial restructuring
To mitigate some of the dependency’s structural effects in the first phase of circulation (M-C) surplus capitals are mobilised into strategic built-environments and fixed into territorial spaces that would prop up the sub-imperialist development and growth, notwithstanding contradictions and crisis-tendencies structurally inherent in its capital-import dependent socio-economic formation</td></tr>
</table>

<table>
<tr><td rowspan="3"></td><td rowspan="2">The third spatial fix</td><td>Capital's market-based solution to the ecological crisis (Böhm et al., 2012; Prudham, 2009; Bryant et al., 2015; McCarthy, 2015; Castree, 2008a, 2008b; While at al. 2004; Ekers and Prudham, 2015a, 2017; Cohen and Bakker, 2014).</td><td rowspan="2">Climate change crisis</td><td rowspan="2">Global climate regime's finance and offsetting mechanisms as a fix enabling, securing and deepening capital's access to nature and space in attempt to absorb overaccumulated surpluses by providing new opportunities for creating new 'green' markets, commodities, and mechanisms of capitalist legitimation.</td><td rowspan="2">The third spatial fix interlocks with the first and second spatial fixes within the system's geographical needs.</td><td>To further promote the first spatial fix, sub-imperialisms actively facilitate the third spatial fix by opening up new spaces for 'green' projects within and beyond their hinterlands and pushing for further financialisation of climate change mitigation, promoting expansion and restructuring of capital along the lines of the market-based solution to the ecological crisis</td></tr>
<tr><td>Sub-imperialisms' antagonist cooperation with the global climate regime (Bond and Garcia, 2015; Bond, 2015; Amisi et al., 2015; Reddy, 2015; Böhm et al., 2012; Bond, 2012; Mathews, 2015).</td><td rowspan="2">To further promote the second spatial fix, sub-imperialisms develops antagonist cooperation with the third spatial fix in a way to co-opt carbon market mechanisms and promote extractive, high-carbon fixed capital projects, further amplifying the socio-ecological crisis-tendencies at the regional scale.</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="3">Spatial fix from below</td><td rowspan="3">The fourth spatial fix</td><td>De Angelis (2007, 2013)</td><td rowspan="3">Social stability crisis</td><td colspan="2" rowspan="2">Commons fix
To deal with this deepening crisis of socio-ecological stability, the capitalist system increasingly requires commons fixes to realign class/power relations and new systems of governance in order to re-establish growth and accumulation.</td></tr>
<tr><td>Uneven development and regional class politics literature (Herod, 2003; Harvey, 2006b; Wright; 2000; Campling et al., 2016; Das, 2012; Ferguson, 2016).</td></tr>
<tr><td>Recent debates within the labour geography literature (Peck, 2018; Herod, 2012; Coe and Jordhus-Lier, 2011; Bergene et al., 2010; Tufts and Savage, 2009; Castree, 2007; Lier, 2007).</td><td colspan="2">Labour's spatial fix
Whilst facilitating their goals, workers shape the landscapes of capitalism in their own image to overcome their problems of survival and self-reproduction</td><td>Socio-spatial fix
The notion of socio-spatial fix I am propounding here has a dialectical nature. On the one hand, it is a bottom-up response to existing crises embedded in a socio-spatial structure and therefore mainly seeks to maintain and reform the reproductive potential and livelihoods of the grassroots. On the other hand, it is a fix that aids capital's spatial displacement of the socio-ecological stability crisis of contemporary capitalism, enabling it to reproduce its own logic of accumulation and circulation.</td></tr>
</table>

Overall, in this framework, the phenomenon of space production is explained through the interplay between top-down and bottom-up processes of spatial displacement of crisis. There are three top-down spatial fixes embedded in the literature reviewed. Derived from Harvey's original conceptualisation of the notion of spatio-temporal fix (2001, 2003, 2006a, 2006b, 2010), the first spatial fix deals with the reccurent overaccumulation crisis-tendencies of global capitalism, in which today's sub-imperialisms play an absorber role like any other dependent-capitalisms. By providing new spaces, markets, industries, commodities, resources and networks for overaccumulated capital surpluses to flow in, today's sub-imperialisms facilitate this first spatial fix and in turn, capacitate the spatial displacement of the financial crisis of global capitalism.

Unlike other dependent-capitalisms, on the other hand, sub-imperialisms are also characterised by their emerging statuses of surplus-capital producer. That is, the geography of contemporary capitalism is also made by sub-imperialisms producing systematic spatio-temporal fixes for their own surplus capitals by defining territorial spheres of influence (Harvey, 2003). Produced by sub-imperialisms, this second spatial fix is never disconnected from the logic and praxis of the first spatial fix, as both interlock with each other in the spatial displacement of overaccumulation crisis-tendencies, both at the domestic and global scale. However, the second spatial fix seeks not only to further facilitate the first spatial fix, but also to provide a structural solution to the chronic disjuncture between the M–C and C–M' phases of circulation, which represents the main structural problem on which the sub-imperialist development scheme is built (Marini, 1972, 1977). Here is where I integrate the notion of the capitalist reproduction pattern conceptualised within the Marxist dependency theory (Marini, 1972, 1977, 2000; Valencia, 2017; Luce, 2015; Osorio, 2012; Ferreria at al., 2012; Filho and Araújo, 2015) into my framework in order to better explain the role of structural problems associated with foreign dependency relations in shaping dependent-capitalisms' spatial strategies. Unlike the common practice in the contemporary sub-imperialism and international development literatures, these 'spatial strategies' in my framework are never confined to the geographical expansion of capital. Rather, my framework includes an oft-neglected dimension of the sub-imperialist development scheme. That is, the spatial restructuring of capital, where

surplus capitals are fixed into the territorial space through an active policy for physical infrastructure development.

Embedded in my theoretical framework, the third spatial fix is derived from the critical climate change and environmental governance literature, which extends the notion of spatio-temporal fix to the global climate regime, problematising its market-based solution, enabling, securing and deepening capital's access to nature and space (Böhm et al., 2012; Prudham, 2009; Bryant et al., 2015; McCarthy, 2015; Castree, 2008a, 2008b; While at al. 2004; Ekers and Prudham, 2015a, 2017; Cohen and Bakker, 2014). Produced by an intergovernmental agency as a solution to the climate change crisis, this top-down spatial fix also interlocks with the other two within the system's geographical needs. As my literature review has pointed out, today's sub-imperialisms, as the driving forces of the growing climate economy (Mathews, 2015), co-opt the third spatial fix by opening up new spaces for 'green' projects within and beyond their hinterlands and pushing for further financialisation of climate change mitigation (Böhm et al., 2012; Bond, 2012). Nevertheless, as the contemporary sub-imperialism literature has clearly pointed out (Bond and Garcia, 2015; Bond, 2015; Amisi et al., 2015; Reddy, 2015; Böhm et al., 2012; Bond, 2012), there is an antagonistic dimension of this cooperation as well, given that the full exploitation of the third spatial fix entails a binding commitment to stop investing in carbon-intensive infrastructure, adopting a low-carbon model for accumulation and growth. By taking Böhm et al.'s (2012) argument on board, I argue that the theory of sub-imperialism can help us in understanding and critiquing the way today's sub-imperialisms integrate themselves into the global climate regime.

Lastly, the fourth spatial fix in my framework, which is different than the other fixes due to its bottom-up origin, is developed by critically engaging with the recent trajectories of the labour geography literature (Peck, 2018; Herod, 2012; Coe and Jordhus-Lier, 2011; Bergene et al., 2010; Tufts and Savage, 2009; Castree, 2007; Lier, 2007). Taking inspiration from De Angelis' (2007, 2013) argument that today's crisis of capitalism is also a social stability crisis, I propounded a concept of socio-spatial fix, shedding light on the bottom-up processes of geography-making and crisis-displacement in which the system's very logic of accumulation and growth is reproduced. This concept has allowed me to go beyond the traditional labour

geography's unilateral and non-dialectical distinction between labour's and capital's spatial fixes. I have propped up this bottom-up framework by integrating Harvey's (2006b) theory of uneven development, reinforcing the labour geography literature with a more relational understanding of the structure-agency dialectic (Herod, 2012; Coe and Jordhus-Lier, 2011; Das, 2012; Tufts and Savage, 2009; Castree, 2007). Finally, I embed a number of relevant critical scholarship from the regional development and class politics literatures (Harvey, 2006b; Wright, 2000; Campling et al., 2016; Das, 2012; Ferguson, 2016; Herod, 2003) into this framework to shed extra light on regional class dynamics of socio-spatial fixes from below.

– CHAPTER III –

METHODOLOGY

"All science would be superfluous if the outward appearance and the essence of things directly coincided."

Marx, Capital vol 3

Representing the ontological and epistemological foundation of this doctoral thesis, I perceive myself as a life-long student of historical and dialectical materialism (Engels, 1878, 1886, 1883, 1892; Marx, 1844, 1867, 1885, 1894; Marx and Engels, 1867; Lenin, 1908). To produce "the knowledge of the mechanisms of the production of phenomena in nature", I adopt the critical realist philosophy of science (Bhaskar, 2005: 13). Pioneered by Bhaskar's seminal works (2008a, 2005), critical realism acknowledges its close affinity with historical and dialectical materialism (Bhaskar and Callinicos, 2003; Bhaskar, 2008b) and offers a metatheory alternative to naturalist and anti-naturalist positions[2] dominating the scene in the philosophy of social science (Bhaskar, 2005).

According to Bhaskar (2005: 18-23), the former is concerned with the investigation of empirical invariances between discrete events, states of affairs and the like. Criticising the naturalist tradition due to the absence of explanations in social science conforming to the former's prescriptions, the latter, on the other hand, depicts a social science that concerned with the elucidation of meaning and the tracing of conceptual connections. For Bhaskar, "neither party doubts for a moment that empirical invariances are necessary for laws, or that the conceptual and the empirical

[2] Throughout this chapter, traditional paradigms, such as empiricism, positivism versus interpretivism and hermeneutics, are used synonymously with reference to the naturalist versus anti-naturalist philosophical position.

jointly exhaust the real". Contrary to these philosophical positions, critical realism proposes a new conception of science, having both similarities and differences with the naturalist and anti-naturalist traditions. On the one hand, the critical realist conception of science resembles that of the positivist tradition, which posits an essential unity of scientific method, and that of the hermeneutical tradition, which sees science as essentially differentiated in its objects. On the other, the critical realist account of scientific method is opposed to that of positivism; and also departs from that of the interpretivist tradition (Bhaskar, 2005).

3.1. Ontological and epistemological assumptions of the study

To clarify critical realism's relation to these two broad positions, let me first introduce the critical realist ontological and epistemological assumptions. For Sayer (2003: 5-6), there are eight signposts characterising critical realism.

1. The world exists independently of our knowledge of it.
2. Our knowledge of that world is fallible and theory-laden. Concepts of truth and falsity fail to provide a coherent view of the relationship between knowledge and its object. Nevertheless, knowledge is not immune to empirical check, and its effectiveness in informing and explaining successful material practice is not mere accident.
3. Knowledge develops neither wholly continuously, as the steady accumulation of facts within a stable conceptual framework, nor wholly discontinuously, through simultaneous and universal changes in concepts.
4. There is necessity in the world; objects – whether natural or social – necessarily have particular causal powers or ways of acting and particular susceptibilities.
5. The world is differentiated and stratified, consisting not only of events, but objects, including structures, which have powers and liabilities capable of generating events. These structures may be present even where, as in the social world and much of the natural world, they do not generate regular patterns of events.
6. Social phenomena such as actions, texts and institutions are concept-dependent. We therefore have not only to explain their production and material effects but to understand, read or interpret what they mean.

Although they have to be interpreted by starting from the researcher's own frames of meaning, by and large they exist regardless of researchers' interpretations of them. A qualified version of 1 therefore still applies to the social world. In view of 4–6, the methods of social science and natural science have both differences and similarities.

7. Science or the production of any other kind of knowledge is a social practice. For better or worse (not just worse) the conditions and social relations of the production of knowledge influence its content. Knowledge is also largely – though not exclusively – linguistic, and the nature of language and the way we communicate are not incidental to what is known and communicated. Awareness of these relationships is vital in evaluating knowledge.
8. Social science must be critical of its object. In order to be able to explain and understand social phenomena we have to evaluate them critically (Sayer, 2003: 5-6).

According to Easton (2010), points 1, 4 and 5 represent the key critical realist assumptions about ontology; and points, 2, 3, 6 and 7 illustrate critical realism's proposition that reality is socially constructed. Critical realism's response to the fundamental question of whether there exists a world independently of human consciousness is unique and distinctive. Unlike the naturalist and anti-naturalist traditions, critical realism argues that there exists both an external world independently of human consciousness, and at the same time a dimension that includes our socially determined knowledge about reality (Danermark et al., 2005). In response to the overt tension between these apparently contradictory views, critical realism argues that "the world is socially constructed but not entirely so. The 'real' world breaks through and sometime destroys the complex stories that we create in order to understand and explain the situations we research" (Easton, 2010: 120).

The philosophical grounds for this dialectical understanding rely on the distinction between intransitive and transitive dimensions of science, which Bhaskar developed to propose a transcendental realist theory of science, refuting empiricism and transcendental idealism[3]. For Bhaskar (2008a), there are two kinds of object in

[3] As Mingers (2004) argues, the term 'transcendental' is based on but distinct from its Kantian formulation. "Kant proposed universal conditions for the possibility of knowledge at all, namely that our minds structure our experience of reality in terms of space time and causality. This position can be called transcendental idealism. In

scientific knowledge. The first is called the intransitive object, consisting of the real things, enduring structures, mechanisms and processes, events and possibilities of the world. Although they are independent of us and invariant to our knowledge of them, they are not unknowable and therefore, they are objects of scientific discovery and investigation. The second one is called the transitive object, such as existing theories, technologies, social practices and so on, all of which are processed by the researcher to produce scientific knowledge. As Bhaskar argues, (2008a: 11) they are the raw materials of science – the artificial objects fashioned into items of knowledge by the science of the day. They include the established facts and theories, paradigms and models, methods and techniques of inquiry available to a particular scientific school. Sayer (2000: 11) provides a clear example, describing a critical realist understanding of the relation between the transitive and intransitive objects: "When theories change (transitive dimension) it does not mean that what they are about (intransitive dimension) necessarily changes too: there is no reason to believe that the shift from a flat earth theory to a round earth theory was accompanied by a change in the shape of the earth itself." Drawing on this distinction, critical realism holds that it is the transitive objects of science such as our beliefs, theories, and concepts about the entities that constitute reality to be ontologically real, yet distinct from the intransitive objects of science (Wynn and Williams, 2012).

Another key ontological distinction that needs to be underlined with respect to the critical realism is the multi-layered stratification of reality (Bhaskar, 2005), representing its structured, differentiated and changing nature (Danermark et al., 2005). Contrary to empirical realism's reduction of the real to the actual and the actual to the empirical (Bhaskar, 2008a), critical realism extends its categorial distinction between the transitive and intransitive dimensions of science into three overlapping domains of reality, in which experiences, events and causal mechanisms are embedded, respectively. In Bhaskar's own words (2008a: 46), "structures and mechanisms are real and distinct from the patterns of events that they generate; just as events are real and distinct from the experiences in which they are apprehended. Mechanisms, events and experiences thus constitute three overlapping domains of reality, viz. the domains of the real, the actual and the empirical."

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contrast to this critical realism asserts that the conditions for knowledge do not arise in our minds but in the structure of reality, and that such knowledge will not be universal and ahistorical."

Clearly visible from the paragraph above, in a critical realist philosophy of science, the reality is stratified into three overlapping but distinct domains: the empirical, the actual and the real. The empirical world is anthropocentric and it is the world that men can experience (Bhaskar, 2008a, Sayer, 2000). Containing our 'data' about what we experience, the empirical domain is always theory-impregnated or theory-laden, hence, always mediated by our theoretical conceptions (Danermark et al., 2005). Because it consists of those observable events that we are able to experience via perception or measurement, the domain of the empirical is a subset of the actual (Wynn and Williams, 2012), where events happen whether we experience them or not (Danermark et al., 2005). In other words, whilst the empirical is the domain where observations are made and experienced by observers, the actual domain includes both the empirical and events that may not be observed at all or may be understood quite differently by observers (Mingers, 2004; Easton, 2010). Wynn and Williams (2012) describes events as specific happenings or actions resulting from the enactment of one or more mechanisms, regardless of whether or not these are observed by humans. Comprising of observed and non-observed events, the actual domain is also distinct from the domain of the real.

For Bhaskar (2008a), the real essences of things are their intrinsic structures, which constitute the real basis of their tendencies and causal powers. Hence, independently existing outside of our knowledge of them, the domain of the real consists of structures and generative mechanisms having inherent tendencies, powers or liabilities that form the real basis for causal laws generating events in the domain of the actual. For example, if we take the Marxist distinction between labour power and labour into consideration, the former (the capacity to work) and the physical and mental structures from which it derives, is equivalent to the level of the real, while labour (working), as the exercise of this power, and its effects, belong to the domain of the actual (Sayer, 2000: 12).

Sayer (2003: 92) defines structures as "sets of internally related objects or practices" – i.e. "the landlord-tenant relation itself presupposes the existence of private property, rent, the production of an economic surplus and so on; together they form a structure". Structures constitute the real entities critical realists seek to investigate in a specific contextual situation (Wynn and Williams, 2012). Generative mechanisms,

on the other hand, are “nothing other than the ways of acting of things” (Bhaskar, 2008a: 3); and similar to the structures they are also the intransitive objects of scientific enquiry, existing and acting independently of the conditions, normally produced by men. Finally, in the critical realist philosophy of science, ‘the ways of acting of things’ are termed as ‘causal laws’, which must be analysed as tendencies with regard to powers and liabilities inherent in the structures and mechanisms. To ascribe a power means that there is something about the thing, which may be unknown, by virtue of which it behaves the way it does (Bhaskar, 2008a: 168), but this never means to identify tendencies as actions that are expected to occur in some law-like regular pattern. Rather, tendencies only indicate a possible course of action, and other mechanisms may also be enacted within the given structure in such a way as to prevent or alter the realisation of a particular causal effect (Wynn and Williams, 2012: 791). According to Mingers (2004: 93), “the heart of this argument is that of a causal criterion for existence rather than a perceptual one. In other words, for an empiricist only that which can be perceived can exist, whereas for a (critical) realist having a causal effect on the world implies existence, regardless of perceptibility”. It is also worth noting that this is not to say that critical realism conceptualises individual agent as a passive actor. On the contrary, for critical realism, individual actors also bear causal tendencies as they are components of the structures (Wynn and Williams, 2012).

Furthermore, the critical realist ontology assumes a distinction between open and closed systems, which most existing philosophy of science ignores (Bhaskar, 2008a). Indeed, in the natural and physical sciences, it is possible to design controlled experiments as more or less closed systems in order to make the phenomenon visible by reducing confounding effects and isolating the specific causes of a given outcome event or state change, which in turn ensures a common environment for replicated investigations (Wynn and Williams, 2012). However, this is not the case for the social world. From the perspective of critical realism, “the world is an open system consisting of things possessing causal powers or potentialities and liabilities in virtue of their intrinsic structures (essential natures), which may or may not be exercised, and when exercised may or may not be manifest in a particular outcome, hence may be exercised unactualised and/or unmanifest to people. (…) In an open world, the universality of causal laws can be sustained only if they are analysed transfactually,

that is, non-empirically, as operating in open and closed systems alike, ‘designating the activity of generative mechanisms and structures independently of any particular sequence or pattern of events’” (Bhaskar, 2008a: xvii).

Lastly, the critical realist ontology places emphasis on the dialectical nature of ‘emergence’ (Bhaskar, 2008a, 2005). Danermark et al. (2005: 60) provides a clear and simple illustration for the critical realist ontology of emergence: “Imagine that we start from ‘the bottom’, finding physical mechanisms in one stratum, chemical mechanisms in another, biological in a third, and ‘at the top’ are the psychological and social strata. When moving ‘upwards’ through these strata, we find that each new stratum is formed by powers and mechanisms of the underlying strata. At the same time, this new stratum represents something entirely new, unique and qualitatively different, which cannot be reduced to underlying strata. When the properties of underlying strata have been combined, qualitatively new objects have come into existence, each with its own specific structures, forces, powers and mechanisms. The start of this new and unique occurrence is called emergence, and it is thus possible to say that an object has ‘emergent powers’”. As this useful illustration reveals, emergent properties are independent from, and irreducible to the components of their constituents (Archer, 1995; Sayer, 2003; Wynn and Williams, 2012). For example, “the powers of water exist at a different stratum from those of hydrogen or oxygen. Emergence can be explained in terms of the distinction between internal and external relations” (Sayer, 2003: 119). Besides, critical realism argues that ‘emergence’ must always involve some element of ‘connectedness’ (Easton, 2010). That is, emergent properties are not only irreducible, but also relational. As Archer (1995: 9) clearly exemplifies: “Arising out of combination (e.g. the division of labour from which high productivity emerges), where the latter is capable of reacting back on the former (e.g. producing monotonous work), has its own causal powers (e.g. the differential wealth of nations), which are causally irreducible to the powers of its components (individual workers).”

Shedding light on a crucial analytical point, from which this doctoral thesis will benefit whilst exploring the interplay between the capitalist reproduction pattern and the Turkish state apparatus, Harvey (2003) provides a compelling example regarding the irreducible and relational nature of emergent properties, analysing the dialectic between territorial and capitalistic logics of power. According to Harvey (2003: 183),

“the two logics are distinctive and in no way reducible to each other, but they are tightly interwoven. They may be construed as internal relations of each other. But outcomes can vary substantially over space and time. Each logic throws up contradictions that have to be contained by the other. The endless accumulation of capital, for example, produces periodic crises within the territorial logic because of the need to create a parallel accumulation of political/military power. When political control shifts within the territorial logic, flows of capital must likewise shift to accommodate. States regulate their affairs according to their own distinctive rules and traditions and so produce distinctive styles of governance.” “The fundamental point is to see the territorial and the capitalist logics of power as distinct from each other. Yet it is also undeniable that the two logics intertwine in complex and sometimes contradictory ways. (…) In practice the two logics frequently tug against each other, sometimes to the point of outright antagonism. It would be hard to make sense of the Vietnam War or the invasion of Iraq, for example, solely in terms of the immediate requirements of capital accumulation. Indeed, a plausible case can be made that such ventures inhibit rather than enhance the fortunes of capital. But, by the same token, it is hard to make sense of the general territorial strategy of containment of Soviet Power by the United States after the Second World War—the strategy that set the stage for US intervention in Vietnam—without recognizing the compelling need felt on the part of business interests in the United States to keep as much of the world as possible open to capital accumulation through the expansion of trade, commerce, and opportunities for foreign investment. The relation between these two logics should be seen, therefore, as problematic and often contradictory (that is, dialectical) rather than as functional or one-sided. (…) The difficulty for concrete analyses of actual situations is to keep the two sides of this dialectic simultaneously in motion and not to lapse into either a solely political or a predominantly economic mode of argumentation” (Harvey, 2003: 29-30).

Intertwined with the ontological assumptions delineated thus far, critical realism proposes a set of epistemological assumptions helping us determine how to produce knowledge, how to evaluate the truth of the knowledge that we produced, and how this knowledge that we produced is to be measured against existing knowledge (Wynn and Williams, 2012; Danermark et al., 2005). The first of these originates from the categorial distinction made between intransitive and transitive dimensions of knowledge. That is, critical realism assumes that our knowledge of the intransitive

objects of science is formed in the transitive dimension of science, mediated by available theories about facts, existing social interactions and beliefs along with our own sensory and conceptual interpretations and the social structures to which we belong (Wynn and Williams, 2012). The second epistemological assumption relies on the critical realist distinction between closed and open systems. For critical realism, different from the natural systems, social systems are inherently interactive and open, where predicted effects may or may not occur depending on a multitude of factors; and therefore, critical realist epistemology is concerned with the explanatory power of the transitive objects, rather than their predictive power (Mingers, 2004). The third epistemological assumption is based on its stratified conception of the reality, where critical realism argues that the objects of knowledge and the focus of scientific inquiry are not constant conjunctions of events, in which the three domains of reality are collapsed into one, but intransitive structures and mechanisms operating in the unobservable domain of the real (Bhaskar, 2008a). Thus, critical realist epistemology assumes that "the resultant causal explanation will account for a set of existing and enacted mechanisms, along with the impact of any structural factors and relevant conditions that generated the outcome being studied" (Wynn and Williams, 2012: 794). Finally, contrary to the judgemental relativism, which asserts that all beliefs are equally valid, in the sense that there can be no grounds for preferring one to another (Bhaskar, 2005: 63), the critical realist epistemology defends the existence of 'multiple possible explanations' (Wynn and Williams, 2012) from the perspective of judgemental rationalism, which acknowledges the fallibility of scientific claims. In Bhaskar's (2008a: 33) words "to be a fallibilist about knowledge, it is necessary to be a realist about things. Conversely, to be a sceptic about things is to be a dogmatist about knowledge."

Thus far, to clarify my methodological approach, I have outlined the key ontological and epistemological assumptions the critical realist philosophy of science proposes alternative to naturalist and anti-naturalist traditions. Nevertheless, it should be noted that my methodological approach is also informed by an influential debate over the merits and demerits of critical realism. In fact, there has been an explicit criticism of critical realism in the literature, highlighting either its differences from Marxism or methodological demerits or specific disadvantages (Roberts, 1999, 2014; Brown et al., 2002; Gunn, 1989; Kemp, 2005; Kemp and Holmwood, 2003; Hammersley, 1995, 2009; Sayer, 2000). For instance, Roberts (2014) rejects the idea

that critical realism is compatible with Marxism. According to this account, critical realist epistemological insights are incapable of nourishing a critical theory of ideology in any objective sense and therefore, cannot contribute to the development of an adequate theory of knowledge. Besides, it is argued that the critical realist way of abstraction undermines the unity between theory and practice because it relies on a misinterpretation of Marx's methodological approach. Lastly, the author asserts that critical realism is not 'objective' enough to discover 'causal powers'. Building on this critique, Roberts (2014) highlights the differences between Marxist materialism and critical realism as follows (see Table 2) and argues that it must be doubted whether critical realism can act as a philosophical foundation for Marxism since critical realist concepts and categories are incompatible with historical materialism (Brown et al., 2002).

Table 2: Marxist materialism versus critical realism (Roberts, 2014)

Marxist materialism	Critical realism
monism	dualism
internal analysis	external analysis
labouring activity	human praxis
exploration of historical structuring	exploration of real structures
epistemologically sure reflection theory (for certain)	epistemologically vague correspondence theory (if lucky)
critical theory of ideology abstraction	neutral theory of ideology abstraction
investigation of social forms	investigation of causal mechanisms
determinate capacity retroaction	causal powers retroduction
methodology situated within theory and practice	methodology severed from theory and practice
concerned with real appearances	concerned with reality and appearances
critique of the one-sided nature of empiricism	critique of the impotent nature of empiricism
objective world exists	objective world exists through human praxis
consciousness is material	consciousness is real

Another criticism of critical realism is developed by Gunn (1989) arguing that Marx's writings provide a richer understanding of society and of the interplay between practice, theory and metatheory that the structured, causal relations offered by the critical realist philosophy. Thus, the author concludes that Marxism does not need for a 'philosophy' since Marxism regulates itself through not 'philosophy' but a process of practically reflexive theorising. Similar to Roberts' (2014) and Gunn"s (1989) critiques outlined-above, some authors also stress several disadvantages associated with critical realism. For instance, Kemp (2005) critiques the idea that social scientific research should be conducted with philosophical legislation. Again, for Hammersley (1995), critical realism imposes pre-existing frameworks and values to research contexts to make sense of it. Rejecting the critical realist suggestion of value-laden explanatory models, this account argues that a better way forward is to see social

science as simply trying to report about factual knowledge. In addition, Kemp and Holmwood (2003) find the critical realism's understanding of causal powers and structures problematic due to the fact that critical realists rely on *a priori* information about how structures operate in an open system, which in turn, leaves less room to adequately investigate social structures.

In response to the above-summarised 'disadvantages' of using a critical realist methodology to produce knowledge, I side with scholars having a positive attitude towards critical realism. With respect to the critical accounts that problematise the dialectic between philosophy and science, I agree with Joseph's (1998) argument that philosophy cannot be reduced to Marxism because it stands in relation to other sciences like physics, biology, mathematics or psycho-analysis. Similarly, on the contrary to the accounts seeking to detach Marxism from critical realism, I follow in the critical realist tradition that acknowledges their philosophical and methodological relations (Bhaskar & Callinicos, 2003; Bhaskar, 2008b; Joseph, 1998; Brown et al., 2002). For example, Joseph (1998) states that the critical realist arguments on ontological primacy, the distinction between the transitive and intransitive, the critique of actualism, critical naturalism and the transformational model of social activity could bring further clarification and improvement to the Marxist methodology of knowledge production. Similarly, in Brown et al., (2002), Brown states that Marxism can recognise within the critical realist concepts of structural causality, the distinction between thought and mind-independent object, the notion of tendencies, a conception of social structure and agency, the notion of emergence, the practical side of knowledge, and so on. Again, *Fleetwood (ibid) argues that* critical realism, in particular at the level philosophy of science, could support Marxism in providing a useful set of theoretical tools with which to assist in formulating the kinds of theories deemed appropriate by Marxists. This strand of contributions provides support to my methodological choice of application of Marxist concepts and theories within a critical realist study setting. Furthermore, in response to the accounts that seek to promote the objectivist cliché of 'value-neutral science', I defend the critical realism's fundamental ontological assumption of our knowledge of that world is theory-laden and therefore acknowledge the fallible nature of the knowledge produced in this doctoral thesis. Finally, with regards to the contention that critical realism is inadequate to investigate social structures, I call attention to this doctoral thesis, since my research here, as a whole,

demonstrates the advantage and capability of critical realism in capturing a very complex phenomenon, namely space reproduction, by exploring the interacting social structures at global, territorial and regional levels.

3.2. Research design and data collection methods

As a metatheory (Danermark et al., 2005) built on the above-summarised underpinning ontological and epistemological assumptions, the critical realist philosophy of science also functions as a general methodological framework for research (Fletcher, 2016). By its ontological and epistemological assumptions, the critical realist philosophy of science rejects cookbook prescriptions of method that allow one to imagine one can do research by simply applying them without having a scholarly knowledge of the object of study (Sayer, 2000). In Bhaskar's words (2005: 20), "its essence consists in the movement, at any one level of inquiry, from manifest phenomena to the structures that generate them. It shows that experimental and practical activity entails an analysis of causal laws as expressing the tendencies of things, not conjunctions of events ('epistemology'); that scientific discovery and development entails that scientific inferences must be analogical and retroductive, not simply inductive and/or deductive ('logic'); and that the process of knowledge-production necessitates a conceptual system based on the notion of powers ('metaphysics'). From this perspective, then, things are viewed as individuals possessing powers (and as agents as well as patients). And actions are the realization of their potentialities. Historical things are structured and differentiated (more or less unique) ensembles of tendencies, liabilities and powers; and historical events are their transformations."

Overall, critical realism is not associated with a specific research methodology (Wynn and Williams, 2012; Fletcher, 2016). Rather, it is essentially pluralist, given that it legitimates both extensive and intensive methods (Mingers, 2000). Research designs recurrently used by realist-inclined organisational researchers include case studies, generative institutional analysis, studies involving large scale data sets, action research and comparative and general policy evaluation – specifically excluding experimental research designs and attempted approximations to them using statistical techniques (Ackroyd, 2009). Nevertheless, there has been little guidance available on

which precise data collection, coding and analysis methods are best suited to applied critical realist research (Fletcher, 2016).

Several researchers have argued that the case study method is the best approach to explore the interaction between three overlapping domains of reality (Wynn and Williams, 2012; Ackroyd 2010, Easton, 2010). Representing the most commonly used definition, “a case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (Yin, 1984: 13). From a critical realist perspective, Easton (2010: 119) defines case study research as “a research method that involves investigating one or a small number of social entities or situations about which data are collected using multiple sources of data and developing a holistic description through an iterative research process.”

Following in the informed tradition hitherto outlined, this doctoral thesis adopts critical realist case study design. As Wynn and Williams (2012: 788) argue, “theorists and researchers applying methodological approaches consistent with the critical realist paradigm are positioned to provide more detailed causal explanations of a given set of phenomena or events in terms of both the actors’ interpretations and the structures and mechanisms that interact to produce the outcomes in question.” Accordingly, my case study investigates how spaces are produced in response to systemic crisis-tendencies, dealing with two units of analysis. First, it provides a territorial-level political economy case analysis, focusing empirically on Turkey’s recent expansionist turn in foreign policy and dramatic leap forward in energy infrastructure development. My territorial-level case study analyses the Turkish state’s external and internal spatial praxis with respect to systemic crisis-tendencies and contradictions surrounding the capital reproduction pattern specific to Turkey’s capital-import dependent socio-economic structure. Secondly, my regional-level case study research is concerned with the exploration of the bottom-up method of space reproduction, and therefore applies a regional level socio-spatial analysis, concentrating empirically on hydroelectric power plant projects and the anti-dam struggle against these projects in Dêrsim. Hence, my in-depth case study examines Turkey’s internal spatial strategy in practice and analyses the grassroots’ bottom-up

spatial praxis with respect to crisis-tendencies and confrontations inherent in Dêrsim's socio-spatial structure.

The dataset of this doctoral thesis was formed by employing a mixed-methods approach, which has arguably been considered one of the main strengths of critical realist inquiry (Zachariadis et al., 2013; Modell, 2009; McEvoy and Richards, 2006). Appropriately, both quantitative and qualitative data were collected in a longitudinal setting from accessible sources by conducting documentary research, unstructured and semi-structured interviews and observations.

Documentary research

For this doctoral research, both qualitative and quantitative documentary data were collected mostly via web-based data search and partly from my interviewees. The term 'document' refers to "an artefact which has as its central feature an inscribed text" (Scott, 1990: 5). It covers a very wide range of different kinds of sources, varying from personal documents such as diaries, letters, blogs and autobiographies to official documents deriving from the state and other private sources including any written materials available on mass-media outputs, websites, social media outlets and so on (Bryman, 2016). The use of documents as a data source in critical scholarship is common. It is worth noting that in each volume of *Capital*, Marx made extensive use of qualitative and quantitative documentary data such as various parliamentary and official reports and statistics, legislative codes, acts and statutes, and published histories (Harvey, L., 2011). However, over the past twenty years, social scientists have largely neglected and ignored the use of documents in favour of methods in which they are actively involved in producing data for their own purposes, which has, in turn, promoted interviews, questionnaires and direct observation as the basic tools of social research, while documents are seen as being of only marginal utility (McCulloch, 2004).

My documentary dataset for case analysis consists of a great number of qualitative and quantitative data collected from state and private sources. Most of the documents were available in the English and Turkish languages. With the exception of a small number of private reports and statistics and a few confidential documents provided by my interviewees, the great majority of my documentary database were

free to access. Table 3 below provides some descriptive information about my documentary dataset, listing data sources cited both in-text and in the references. Nevertheless, to protect the identities of some of my data sources such as interviewees providing confidential documents, columns in local newspapers, personal bloggers and social media groups, authors' names have not been disclosed.

To ensure the quality of evidence, I paid a great deal of attention to the selection of my data sources. Accordingly, I preferred to collect data from so-called 'reliable' official and private data sources such as governmental institutions, sectoral and sub-sectoral agencies, globally recognised databases such as the World Bank, OECD, the International Energy Agency, and so on. This procedural preference has helped me secure the authenticity, credibility and meaning criterion offered by Scott (1990) for assessing the quality of documents in terms of genuineness, clarity, comprehensiveness and accuracy. Besides, my critical realist standpoint, which requires the researcher to be critical of its object (Sayer, 2003), has also enabled me to acknowledge and eliminate the inherent bias arguably found in any official and private documentary sources.

Table 3: An overview of the documentary dataset (cited only)

Level of analysis	Descriptive examples	Documentary data sources		
		The state sources	***Private sources***	***Mass-media outputs***
Territorial	**Quantitative:** i.e. foreign trade, GDP, balance of payment, taxation and revenue stats, financial debts, FDIs, performance rankings on democracy, freedom and social peace, climate and ecology, energy generation, energy demand, energy balance tables, installed capacity, carbon emissions, statistical information about development assistance, Turkish energy market and Turkish construction and contracting industry, etc. **Qualitative:** Development and action plans, strategy documents, legislations, statutory decrees, regulations, policy papers, annual reports, sectoral activity reports and policy recommendation documents, consultation reports, official meeting records, international agreements and treaties, press releases and statements, reportages and	● Central Bank of Turkey ● Development Bank of Turkey ● Energy Market Regulatory Authority ● European Commission ● European Council ● General Directorate of Energy Affairs ● Investment Support and Promotion Agency ● Justice and Development Party ● Ministry of Commerce ● Ministry of Development ● Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources ● Ministry of Environment and Urbanisation ● Ministry of Finance ● Ministry of Foreign Affairs ● Official Gazette of Turkey ● Privatization Board of Turkey ● Revenue Administration	● IMF ● World Bank ● OECD ● United Nations ● UNFCCC ● United Nations Conference on Trade and Development ● United Nations Development Programme ● United Nations Refugee Agency ● International Labour Organization ● International Energy Agency ● European Environment Agency ● European Construction Industry Federation ● Turkish Industry and Business Association ● Association of Turkish Construction Material Producers ● Banks Association of Turkey ● Interbank Card Centre of Turkey ● Freedom House ● Human Rights Foundation of Turkey ● International Federation for Human Rights ● Institute for Economics & Peace ● The Economist Intelligence Unit ● Deloitte ● Boston Consulting Group ● Engineering News-Record	Online accessible newspapers, journals and magazines, journals of every political opinion. This includes global, national and local media outputs, containing useful qualitative information, such as reportages, analyses and comments given by the state, capital and the grassroots actors.

	comments published by national and international media, and so on.	● Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency ● Turkish Electricity Transmission Corporation ● Turkish Grand National Assembly ● Turkish Statistical Institute ● Undersecretariat of Treasury	● Frankfurt School ● REN21 ● Global Carbon Atlas ● Global Cement Directory ● Climate Action Tracker ● ECOSTAR & Forest Trends' Ecosystem Marketplace
Regional	**Quantitative:** Descriptive statistics on major dam and construction projects, energy generation capacities; demographic data on the province's population, migration, ecological biodiversity, political and socio-economic characteristics. **Qualitative:** Acts of parliament, parliamentary questions, development and environmental status reports, official press statements and releases by the state, business and the grassroots organisations, government decisions and reports about the province, documentary and introductory films, reportages, columns and comments published by national and local media, and so on.	● Provincial Governorship of Tunceli ● Municipality of Tunceli ● Provincial Directorate of Environment and Urbanization ● General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works ● Ministry of Development ● Ministry of Environment and Forestry ● Ministry of Forestry and Water Affairs ● Ministry of Interior ● Ministry of Justice ● Development Bank of Turkey ● Supreme Electoral Council ● Official Gazette ● Turkish Statistical Institute ● Documents provided by our Interviewees	● CounterCurrent ● Fırat Development Agency ● İşbank ● IHS Markit ● Munzur Su AŞ ● Tunceli Chamber of Commerce and Industry ● Tunceli Industrialists and Entrepreneurs Association ● Turkish Enterprise and Business Confederation ● Kahraman, M., Kahraman, K., & Karataş, Ş. (2010). ● Pir News Agency. (2018). ● Munzur, O. (2010).

Unstructured and semi-structured interviews

In addition to the documentary research, I conducted numerous unstructured and informal interviews as well as 29 semi-structured and formal interviews, commonly argued as the two main types of interview in qualitative research (Bryman, 2016). For the interviews, the researcher sought when feasible and practicable to verbally gain consent from interviewees. Information about the research was provided to interviewees before gaining their consent. Participants were as informed as possible about what was involved in taking part in the research and what the purposes of the project were. During the interviewing phase, the researcher did not collect data of a highly sensitive nature. Nevertheless, due to the highly sensitive nature of my empitical context – anti-dam movement in Dêrsim – there were various risks associated with the interviewees; i.e. they might be faced with state oppression, social and political pressure/criticism. To eliminate potential risks surrounding my interviewees as well as to ensure security, the collected data were securely stored on a password protected cloud account, which could only be accessed by the researcher. Interviews were

recorded by the researcher's mobile phone, which automatically uploaded recorded data to the cloud account. After the completion of each interview, records in the mobile phone were deleted. Furthermore, throughout this thesis, I ensured anonymity and confidentiality by not using participants' real names when presenting the data.

The unstructured interviews usually started by casual conversations with those people I already knew from the case location as well as many others I met during my several fieldwork trips. These informal interviews helped me improve the quality of interview dataset in several respects. First, drawing on these preliminary interviews, I formed a semi-structured interview draft in order to bring more clarity to underemphasised, controversial or conflicting matters embedded in the preliminary phase of informal interviewing. Second, this preliminary phase functioned as a natural snowballing process (Bryman, 2016), allowing me to identify and access the most knowledgeable agents in the field and to prevent inherent bias and partiality. Third, the informal interviews I preliminarily conducted also significantly reduced the problem of building trust between interviewees and the interviewer, laying a foundation for the formal interviewing phase. Above all, however, the preliminary interviewing phase enabled me keep the regional-level database fresh longitudinally.

Following this informal interview phase, a semi-structured interview draft was formed and 29 in-depth interviews were conducted (see Table 4). Interviewees consisted of organising committee members, representatives and members of activist groups, labour unions, occupational and local associations, local communities, local journalists and an academic from the local university. With the exception of four people, all of the interviewees were originally from Dêrsim. Eight of the interviewees were female; the age of the interviewees ranged from 22 to 58 years old, and the level of education varied from high school to university. Overall, the interviewees held a positive stance towards Dêrsim's anti-dam struggle. However, there were significant disagreements among interviewees about certain issues, such as the power struggle between activist groups, accumulation practices by locals, and political partiality in the organisation of activities related to the anti-dam struggle.

Table 4: An overview of interviewees (semi-structured only)

Name	Gender	Age	Place of birth	Education	Role
Interviewee 1	Male	50+	Dêrsim	University	President of an environmentalist association
Interviewee 2	Female	20+	Dêrsim	High school	Activist
Interviewee 3	Male	30+	Other	High school	Representative of the Democratic Rights Federation
Interviewee 4	Male	30+	Dêrsim	High school	Representative of Federation of Dêrsim Associations
Interviewee 5	Male	55+	Dêrsim	High school	Festival Organising Committee Member
Interviewee 6	Male	30+	Dêrsim	University	Representative of an occupational association
Interviewee 7	Male	40+	Dêrsim	High school	Activist
Interviewee 8	Male	30+	Dêrsim	University	Activist
Interviewee 9	Male	30+	Dêrsim	University	Academic
Interviewee 10	Female	40+	Dêrsim	University	Local
Interviewee 11	Female	25+	Dêrsim	University	Local
Interviewee 12	Male	30+	Dêrsim	University	Journalist
Interviewee 13	Male	45+	Dêrsim	University	Journalist
Interviewee 14	Male	30+	Other	University	Activist
Interviewee 15	Female	30+	Dêrsim	University	Representative of a local association
Interviewee 16	Male	45+	Dêrsim	University	Representative of an occupational association
Interviewee 17	Female	35+	Dêrsim	University	Representative of a labour union
Interviewee 18	Male	50+	Dêrsim	High school	Local
Interviewee 19	Male	30+	Dêrsim	High school	Activist
Interviewee 20	Female	30+	Other	University	Representative of an activist group
Interviewee 21	Female	25+	Dêrsim	University	Activist
Interviewee 22	Male	45+	Dêrsim	University	Journalist
Interviewee 23	Male	45+	Dêrsim	University	Activist
Interviewee 24	Male	35+	Dêrsim	High school	Local
Interviewee 25	Male	50+	Dêrsim	High school	Local
Interviewee 26	Male	55+	Dêrsim	High school	Local
Interviewee 27	Male	20+	Dêrsim	High school	Activist
Interviewee 28	Male	30+	Other	High school	Local
Interviewee 29	Female	20+	Dêrsim	High school	Activist

The interviews, each lasting approximately an hour, were tape-recorded. As Bryman (2016) underlines, qualitative interview research is arguably concerned with the reconstruction of events by asking interviewees to think back over how a certain series of experiences unfolded in relation to a current situation. Hence, through conversational dialogues rather than directive questioning, the interviewees were encouraged to generate the logical reasoning behind the key confrontations and characteristics of the struggle and emerging changes in socioeconomic and sociocultural discourses and practices in Dêrsim. The audio recordings were also added to the existing interview dataset and the new dataset was completely reanalysed to develop a more comprehensive investigation of the status quo in Dêrsim. Throughout this thesis, to ensure confidentiality, the interviewees' identities and occupations will not be revealed.

Overall, these two qualitative interviewing phases allowed me to go beyond text-based limitations inherent in the documentary method, bringing Dêrsimites' voices and perceptions to the research. Furthermore, conducting the interviewing processes within a longitudinal setting has also significantly eliminated the time-based limitations

inherent in the observation method, given that interviews are easier to organise than repeat visits to the research setting (Bryman, 2016).

Nevertheless, although my interview dataset is very rich and substantial with respect to the voices and perceptions of Dêrsimites and grassroots actors, it should be noted that it lacks some much-needed angles from the state and capital actors in particular, which, in turn, manifests itself as a methodological limitation of this doctoral thesis in providing a more comprehensive and inclusive knowledge of space reproduction. This limitation inevitably reflected on not only the data collection process but also to the entire writing and data presentation process of my doctoral thesis. Hence, in the absence of the government and private sector interviewees, I avoided mentioning a number of key government authorities and private sector organisations for ethical reasons unless they are publicly-known. Instead, I preferred to call these actors as broad categories such as 'the Turkish state' and 'capital', which in turn, led to the appearance of these actors as abstract forces.

The above-mentioned limitation is mainly due to three reasons. First, despite my endeavour to conduct interviews with the government and private sector representatives, my attempts failed since a great majority of my interview invitations were either declined or not responded. Second, in other cases, my access to key districts and villages to meet local governmental bodies in Dêrsim was precluded by the Turkish military forces for security reasons. Third, being obstinate in the conduct interviews with the state and private sector representatives was also risky since my researcher status could easily be mistakenly interpreted or deliberately depicted as an intelligence service activity by Dêrsimites and the grassroots organisations, which in turn, further complicate the entire data collection process.

Observations

In conformity with the nature of critical realist qualitative observation (Neergaard and Ulhøi, 2007), my case study is also informed by my personal observations and experiences both prior to and during my PhD research project, all of which allowed me to obtain a more in-depth understanding of the reproduction of space in Dêrsim and Turkey. Here, I would like to elaborate on my observational research by providing a brief critical reflexive analysis of my researcher status.

Defined as “a process of critical reflection both on the kind of knowledge produced from research and how that knowledge is generated” (Guillemin and Gillam, 2004), reflexivity is concerned with the effect of the researcher on the research, and vice versa (Attia and Edge, 2017). Reflexivity entails a sensitivity to the researcher’s cultural, political and social context and as such, ‘knowledge’ from a reflexive position is always a reflection of a researcher’s location in time and social space (Bryman, 2016). This concept is also closely linked to philosophical and methodological debates over objectivity/subjectivity and insider/outsider. As such, the outsider status is affiliated with the logic of objectivity, which has a strong kinship with the naturalist philosophy of science. Again, the insider status corresponds to the logic of subjectivity backed by the anti-naturalist philosophy of science.

From the perspective of critical realism, however, “the entire insider/outsider debate is clouded by the fact that subjectivity and objectivity are the factors by which insiders and outsiders define one another. Outsiders consider themselves to be objective relative to insiders, but insiders do not consider themselves to be merely subjective. Hence, objectivity is present in the self-understanding of both insiders and outsiders” (Ferber, 2006: 176). For critical realism, observations, as a scientific activity and social practice, is neither theory-neutral nor theory-determined, but theory-laden (Sayer, 2003). This simply means that if all knowledge is conceptually mediated because our knowledge of facts is theory-dependent, then it is impossible to make neutral observations of ‘facts’ about a social reality. Besides, all knowledge is never theory-determined, but theory-dependent, given that all knowledge is fallible and open to adjustment. From the critical realist perspective, therefore, the researcher, as the agent of knowledge production, must employ theories and perform scientific activity as a social practice to investigate and identify relationships and non-relationships, respectively, between what is observed, what actually happens, and the underlying mechanisms that produce the events in the world (Danermark et al., 2005). In other words, in the research process, the scientific knowledge of transitive objects, such as existing theories and social practices, are treated as means to produce the scientific knowledge of intransitive objects embedded in the domains of the real and the actual (Bhaskar, 2008a).

Overall, critical realism's understanding of the objectivity/subjectivity matter is more inclusive by its very dialectical nature, leaving more room to make the most of both insider and outsider statuses. By arguing that all knowledge is conceptually mediated and consequently concept-dependent, critical realism stands against the naturalist philosophy of science and defends the logic of subjectivity often associated with relativism. "Unlike relativism/idealism, however, critical realism contends, first, that there is a real world independent of our knowledge about it, and second, that it is possible to gain knowledge about this real world: facts are certainly theory-laden, but they are not theory-determined. However, knowledge is always fallible and more or less truthlike, and its usability varies in various social situations, since there are many different levels and forms of social practice" (Danermark et al., 2005: 202-203).

From a categorial point of view, it is commonly argued that each status has its own value and significance. According to Savvides et al. (2014), for instance, the familiarity of insider status is advantageous when developing research questions, designing interview schedules, accessing and recruiting participants, and during data collection, analysis and dissemination. This account underlines that the insiders are more aware of the lives of their participants than outsiders, and therefore, they hold a privileged research position to conduct ethical research that keeps (often marginalised) participants at the top of the research agenda and represents their voices. The outsiders, on the other hand, find themselves studying a group of which they are not a member (Dwyer and Buckle, 2009). It is often assumed that this status of being 'new' to the research context secures objectivity and detachment (Savvides et al., 2014). It is also argued that "outsiders may be able to make observations and draw conclusions that insiders could not, for example, by asking 'naive questions' to explore topics in depth, gaining valuable insight precisely because of their outsider perspective, and noticing features of the data that an insider may overlook" (Hayfield and Huxley, 2015: 92).

Although shedding some light on the importance of both positions in the production of knowledge, there have been longstanding methodological debates over the traditional insider/outsider dichotomy. It is possible to identify two strands within this debate with respect to their approach to the problem. The first strand consists of contributors offering a joint insider and outsider investigation in attempt to maximise

the advantages and minimise the disadvantages associated with each status (Evered & Louis, 1981; Bartunek et al., 1996; Louis & Bartunek, 1996; Gioia et al., 2010). According to Evered & Louis (1981), for example, researchers can employ both approaches simultaneously since each mode offers distinctive advantages. Similarly, Bartunek et al. (1996) suggeststhe joint insider/outsider research approach over other research approaches due to its advantages in describing the conceptual model, the group studied and its positive outcomes with respect to the research process as a whole. Again, Louis & Bartunek (1996) argues that the insider/outsider team approach would yield superior outcomes due to its particular advantages such as lessening stressful effects associated with participation to research, responsibility and acceptance, enhancing consciousness-raising regarding researchers' underlying assumptions and concerns, and in turn, contributes to the theorisation process by providing a more distinct picture of the phenomenon under study. Gioia et al. (2010) also suggest a joint insider-outsider approach, highlighting its effectiveness in capitalising on the insider's knowledge to articulate rationales for conceptions and actions on the one hand and minimising the insider bias on the other.

Informing my researcher status in this doctoral thesis, the second strand, however, consists of scholars with a more radical stance against the traditional insider/outsider dichotomy due to its portraying of the social world, in turn, researcher and research practice, as a mechanistically operated closed-system. Principally, many critical scholars problematise the classical insider/outsider dichotomy due to its simplistic nature, and encourage researchers' critical reflexive awareness of their evolving and continually interacting and interweaving researcher statuses (De Andrade, 2000; Labaree, 2002; Breen, 2007; Trowler, 2011; Savvides et al., 2014; Milligan, 2016). Deutsch (1981: 174), for example, criticises the classical dichotomy by arguing that "we are all multiple insiders and outsiders". For this account, one may be an "insider" among a group of "significant other" social scientists, and an outsider in application groups; or, one might be an outsider within one's scientific circle, by proposing variant theories, or not accepting the dogmas or "truths" that are current at a given time, or at the institution of affiliation. Similarly, Griffith (1998: 367) rejects the traditional insider/outsider dichotomy by arguing that "insider/outsider knowledge claims are embedded in social difference and social inequality". According to her account, research is constructed in a relationship with many others and the

researchers are, in fact, rarely insiders or outsiders, but are located in the social relations that construct both their inside and outside social boundaries.

Alternative to the traditional insider/outsider dichotomy, Breen (2007) proposes that the role of the researcher is better conceptualised on a continuum, so as to maximise the inherent advantages and minimise the potential for disadvantages of each. Analogously, arguing insider and outsider statuses as an interacting continuum rather than as binary opposites, Trowler (2011) points out that 'insiderness' is not a fixed value, and what counts as 'inside' also depends on one's own identity positioning. Highlighting the dynamic, multiple and negotiated nature of the insider status in relation to the group membership, De Andrade (2000) argues that the researcher's status as an insider was always evaluated and negotiated during fieldwork. Savvides et al. (2014: 423), on the other hand, underlines the methodological benefits of critical reflexivity, pointing out that "researchers' manipulation of their positionalities in relation to contextual factors also impacts on their sense of identity, their relationship with the Cultural Other, the entire research process, and the production of knowledge."

From the perspective of the traditional dichotomy, my researcher status during my fieldwork corresponds to the so-called 'insider' position, as I explore my hometown (Dêrsim) and my country of citizenship (Turkey). Contrary to this mechanistic depiction, my researcher status was never static and one-dimensional. Rather, it was an evolving, interacting and interweaving continuum, supporting my research process with numerous observations and experiences accumulated historically.

Allow me to bring some clarity to my own researcher status, reflecting on my observational research as a social practice. I was born and privileged to be brought up in Dêrsim (officially Tunceli), Turkey. In the first 16-year period of my life, I lived in Dêrsim, where my thought- and practice-world was shaped under the influence of uncountable everyday experiences, contradictions and confrontations linked with the Turkish state's systematic oppression of Alevi Kurds from all sorts of classes and the world turning a blind eye and a deaf ear to the right of the Kurdish nation to self-determination (Lenin, 1914). Then, my family moved to Izmir, the third most populous city in Turkey, where contradictions and confrontations were interwoven not only with the national question, but also the interplay between capital, the state and oppressed classes and strata.

Since then, I have become a visitor to my own motherland and my own motherland has become a host to my memorial, holiday, business and research trips. In the second 16-year period of my post-Dêrsim life in Turkey, I mostly lived in the largest provinces such as Izmir, Istanbul, Ankara, Antalya and Konya. My experiences in these new living spaces have also shaped my thought- and practice-world, forcing me to expand my existing knowledge deeper into the processes of capital accumulation, class struggle and socio-ecological transformations in Turkey. In late 2014, I moved to the UK, where I decided to research this empirical story that links the dam projects and anti-dam struggles in Dêrsim to the economic, geopolitical and socio-ecological crisis-tendencies inherent in the capitalist accumulation processes at regional, territorial and global levels. My developing knowledge during my PhD study in the UK led me to re-construct this empirical story so as to understand, explain and critique the space reproduction under the capitalist mode of production.

Whilst these locational shifts have quite naturally increased my experiences and considerably expanded my knowledge, at the same time, my multiple insider-outsider statuses in these emerging social spaces have always been evaluated and negotiated. For example, in the everyday life of Turkey, just answering a simple ‘where are you from?’ question by using the word ‘Dêrsim’ quite simultaneously initiates an intense stereotypification process in which you are categorised either as an ‘insider’ or ‘outsider’ in terms of economic, political, ideological, ethnic, linguistic, cultural, moral, religious, legal and spatial axes of social difference. Depending on the place, situation and person, your simple answer of your place of birth may easily pose a serious security risk for your own safety. Furthermore, this risk is naturally higher if you are critically investigating the Turkish state, capital and grassroots from the perspective of Marxism.

Nevertheless, these multiple insider-outsider statuses have also facilitated my research agenda in several respects. For example, my locational move from Dêrsim has allowed me to better observe and identify emergent changes in Dêrsim in the periods between my successive trips. Similarly, my move from Turkey to the UK has also relatively freed me to investigate Turkey’s spatial praxis critically, reinforcing my theoretical deepening and critical analysis skills. Furthermore, my preliminary observations and experiences both in Dêrsim and Turkey have also significantly

capacitated my research in terms of the development theoretical framework, the identification of empirical corroboration of structures, mechanisms and tendencies, the assessment of quality of data sources, the codification, analysis and interpretation of data, and so on. Besides, my familiarity with the case locations and connections with a great number of locals have also supported me in overcoming issues integral to qualitative data collection processes, i.e. identifying and accessing key informants in the case, building trust with interviewees, and so on. Lastly, by employing a fundamental critical realist principle, which suggests that the researcher must be critical of their object in order to be able to explain and understand social phenomena (Sayer, 2003), my researcher status has also allowed me to critically investigate my hometown and my country of citizenship with their contradictions.

During my PhD study in the UK, I have visited Dêrsim several times specifically for research purposes, and on each of my research trips I have attended a wide range of events varying from festivals to protests. Feeding into my existing observations, I took field notes and photographs, and communicated with locals and activists in the province. In the observation process, hand-written notes were transferred to Microsoft Word documents on a password-protected computer. These documents were then encrypted and uploaded to the cloud account. Once the data had been uploaded to the cloud account securely, both the hand-written notes and Word documents were deleted.

I also visited several other provinces and districts in Turkey, characterised by observable disputes between the state, capital and grassroots over energy infrastructure projects, such as wind and solar energy projects in Karaburun and Dereköy, Izmir. Although I visited these locations for another research project, these research trips have also expanded both my regional and territorial-level observational database, given that my observations in these different locations have helped me better understand the socio-spatial processes of geography-making and crisis-displacement from below. Besides, these research trips have also enabled me to identify the role of socio-spatial differences in constraining the grassroots movements' praxis, which has significantly improved my analysis of Dêrsim's socio-spatial dynamics and their relation to the anti-dam movement in Dêrsim.

I also took advantage of my research trips to Dêrsim and other case locations to expand my existing territorial-level observational knowledge. Different from my regional-level observational research, however, I have directed my focus towards country-level observable experiences varying from electoral campaigns to climate talks, to bilateral/multilateral trade agreements and even to the Syrian refugee crisis, all of which were important for grasping the reproduction of space with respect to geopolitical, economic and socio-ecological challenges faced by the state, capital and grassroots. Accordingly, I followed countless public talks, press meetings and commentaries given by governmental authorities, business associations and grassroots organisations. Conducted in an everyday research setting, this territorial-level observational research has enabled me to keep my research informed of the latest developments in Turkey, allowing me to obtain a more in-depth understanding of the top-down spatial processes of geography-making and crisis-displacement.

3.3. Data analysis and triangulation

To conclude this chapter, I would now like to describe the data analysis procedure adopted. Drawing from data analysis techniques from critical realism, my data analysis is influenced by the methodological works of Bygstad and Munkvold (2011a, 2011b) and Wynn and Williams (2012), who suggest key principles for conducting a critical realist case analysis. Informed by this literature, in the first step of my data analysis, I examined my dataset to identify and explicate events and patterns of these events that entail the phenomenon of production of space in the context of Turkey. The identified events were then categorised under two broad themes; the top-down and bottom-up processes of geography-making. This preliminary and all-inclusive analysis has also allowed me to provide a thick description and abstracted sequencing of events, paying attention to contextual conditions and structural entities, agencies, processes and outcomes that result in the phenomenon of space reproduction in Turkey. Accordingly, in the second step of my data analysis, I re-analysed my dataset by focusing on the events identified in the first step in order to identify and map active components integral to their emergence and realisation, such as political, economic, social, ecological systems, organisations and actors, policies, strategies, confrontations, and so on.

In the third step of my analysis, what Bygstad and Munkvold call (2011a) 'theoretical re-description', I examined my dataset to develop conceptual abstractions, engaging with the existing literature. Accordingly, in this third step of my data analysis, I abstracted my hitherto findings through concepts generated either from the data itself (i.e. grassroots agency, socio-spatial structure) or deriving from the literature reviewed (i.e. capital reproduction pattern, geographical expansion, spatial restructuring, production of regionality). This conceptual and theoretical deepening also allowed me to identify systemic structures and generative mechanisms having inherent tendencies, powers or liabilities at global, territorial and regional scales – i.e. global overaccumulation crisis-tendencies inherent in the capitalist mode of production, territorial contradictions and crisis-tendencies inherent in capital-import dependent socio-economic formation, confrontations and socio-ecological crisis-tendencies inherent in regional structures, and so on. The identified structures and mechanisms are redescribed taking contextual dynamics into account – i.e. Turkey's energy-import dependency, regional power-centre status, systematic oppression of Alevi Kurds in Dêrsim, and so on – and following on from this, a broad list of active and candidate structures and mechanisms is outlined.

In the fourth step, I focused my analysis on the identification of causal interactions between the identified events, structural entities and mechanisms interacting in the top-down and bottom-up processes of space reproduction. In this fourth-step analysis, I employed the principle of retroduction, which signifies the process in which the researcher ascribes powers, tendencies and liabilities to the identified structures and mechanisms in order to explain their relationship to events studied. In other words, it is the process of the application of previously identified and/or newly discovered mechanisms to the explanation of an outcome in a contextual setting (Wynn and Williams, 2012). Accordingly, I re-analysed my dataset to identify the key contradictions and crisis-tendencies originating from the identified and emergent structures and mechanisms and entailing the emergence of the phenomenon of space reproduction in the contextual case studied. On the one hand, this analysis allowed me to conceptualise the interplay of objects of scrutiny by ascribing powers, tendencies and liabilities to the identified and emergent structures and mechanisms. On the other hand, by ascribing causal powers to the objects of

scrutiny, it paved the way for reframing the global, the territorial and the regional together as interweaving levels of investigation (DeLanda, 2006).

In the fifth step, I iterated further by retroductions so as to chain all identified components with each other under an explanatory framework with sufficient causal depth. Through this analysis, all actual events of geography-making were analytically and logically chained to the identified and emergent structures and mechanisms surrounded by systemic contradictions and crisis-tendencies.

By very nature of research, the knowledge produced in this is social practice is always incomplete, since there will always be some components of the reality that the researcher may fail to access, notice, identify or relate due to numerous of reasons varying from the absence of data to lack of knowledge, and so on. This is particularly important for a critical realist investigation because of its ontological and epistemological assumptions. For instance, in critical realist ontology, the reality is stratified into the empirical, the actual and the real, in which the researcher attempts to identify not only observable but also non-observable components of the reality. Again, from the critical realist epistemological point of view, the phenomenon under study always occurs within an interactive and open system setting, which in turn, necessitates the investigation of a multitude of factors. The exemplified ontological and epistemological assumptions of critical realism, by their very nature, leaves more room for the above-stressed condition of incompleteness.

Although this is an inevitable characteristic of research as a social practice, still there are practical ways to deal with this problem. Accordingly, in this doctoral thesis, the explanatory power of the chained causal relations was refined and validated through three common techniques suggested in the literature. First, following Wynn and Williams' (2012) suggestion, to corroborate the identified structures and mechanisms and the retroduced relationships among them, I included multiple approaches to support my causal analysis based on the triangulation of a variety of data types and sources, analytical methods, and theoretical perspectives. Second, taking inspiration from Bygstad and Munkvold's (2011a, 2011b) suggestion, first, I acknowledged the fallibility of my causal explanations and therefore maintained data collection and data analysis in a longitudinal setting, which has allowed me to evaluate and refine my causal explanation repeatedly and progressively. Lastly, whilst

conducting my data analysis, I repeatedly and iteratively discussed my data analysis with my supervisor, taking advantage of his invaluable feedback. This invaluable collaboration process of co-evaluation and co-negotiation of data further improved the quality and validity of my findings.

– CHAPTER IV –

SPACE REPRODUCTION FROM ABOVE: Geographical expansion and spatial restructuring of capital in Turkey

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This chapter provides a territorial level analysis of the top-down processes of geography-making and crisis-displacement in Turkey. It examines the phenomenon of space reproduction with respect to Turkey's perpetual surplus capital absorber and emerging surplus capital producer statuses respectively, representing the two sections in this chapter. The first section starts with the investigation of the former, focusing on systemic contradictions and crisis-tendencies associated with Turkey's perpetual absorber status. By adopting the perspective of the capital reproduction pattern, this analysis tracks the historical intensification of systemic complications inherent in Turkey's capital-import dependent socio-economic formation. Then, I focus my analysis on the Turkish state as a political and military agency capacitating the reproduction of space and capital, and highlight its declining capability to stave off these systemic complications.

In the second section, I turn my focus on Turkey as a producer of surplus capital. Drawing on Harvey's argument on sub-imperialisms, I analyse Turkey's recent expansionist turn in foreign policy and energy infrastructure development agenda as a systematic spatio-temporal fix. I start this section with an overview of Turkey's geographical expansion strategy, seeking to manage some of Turkey's capital-import dependency's structural effects in the second phase of circulation. Disclosing the methods practised by Turkey to produce spaces in other peripherial economies, this chapter highlights the antagonistic cooperation Turkey has developed with the traditional core. This analysis also accentuates the strategic and pivotal role the

Turkish construction industry plays in propping up the Turkish state's expansionist agenda.

I continue this section by extending my analysis into Turkey's costly, heavy and ever-growing energy-import dependency. Overall, this analysis tracks the deepening of Turkey's severe energy-import dependency by highlighting its quasi-determinant weight in the capital reproduction pattern, and in turn, systemic contradictions and crisis-tendencies inherent in the country's socio-economic formation. Building on this analysis, I conceptualise Turkey's energy infrastructure development agenda as a spatial restructuring strategy to mitigate some of Turkey's capital-import dependency's structural effects in the first phase of circulation. Accordingly, I provide an overview of this strategy, highlighting the methods practised by Turkey to canalise surplus capitals into energy infrastructure. This analysis also accentuates the antagonistic cooperation Turkey has developed with the global climate regime in order to facilitate its spatial restructuring strategy.

4.1. Turkey as a perpetual absorber of surplus capitals

The reality of Turkish political economy is defined by a capital-import dependent socio-economic formation, featuring Turkey's perpetual absorber position in the hierarchy of the capitalist world-system. Here, by the concept of 'capital-import dependent socio-economic formation', I refer to a structural entity operating through a problematic pattern of capital reproduction and suffering from various structural contradictions and crisis-tendencies. Allow me to better describe this structure and its generative mechanism by starting with very basic macro-economic data: foreign trade statistics.

Figure 1 shows Turkey's imports and exports in the 22-year period between 1996 and 2017. Evidently, intermediate goods, which comprise semi-finished productive-commodities needed by industrial producers to manufacture capital or consumption goods, hold the lion's share in the country's ever-growing capital-import bill, with an average of 71.4%. They are followed by capital goods with an average of 16.1%, which implies other imported for-industry commodities such as machinery, equipment, vehicles, and so on. Consumption goods and other not-for-industry commodities have a share of 12.5% in the country's total import bill. Importantly, when

total exports and imports between 1996 and 2017 are compared, it is evident that the country's total exports covered only 64.1% of its total imports, leading to a perpetual trend of trade deficit.

Figure 1: Turkey's foreign trade between 1996 and 2017 (see Appendix A)



The statistics above are particularly important because they give away some characteristics of Turkey's capital reproduction pattern. This 22-year trend, for example, signifies that the first phase of circulation (M-C) relies heavily on an ever-growing and high-volume productive-commodity import. This entails the first structural contradiction: domestic production's severe dependence on productive-commodity import. When this contradiction is sequenced forward, it combines with another structural contradiction in the second phase of circulation (C-M'), namely the domestic exports' dependence on commodity-capital import. This simply means, to whatever extent Turkey increases its exports, it also boosts its commodity-capital import bill to a similar extent. Thus, export revenues perpetually fall short of compensating for the ever-growing and costly commodity-capital import bill.

However, commodity-capital import is but one of many components of Turkey's capital-import dependency. In fact, the Turkish economy's operation, reproduction and growth relies heavily on financial-capital and fixed-capital inflows as well – i.e. financial credits and FDIs. I will elaborate on these two components later in this section, focusing on the traditional strategies employed by the Turkish state apparatus to capacitate capitalist reproduction. Before this, however, allow me to provide a brief historical insight into the trajectories of Turkey's capital-import dependency.

The Turkish economy's capital-import dependency is not a given, but a constructed phenomenon. After two idyllic decades following the War of Independence between 1919 and 1923, Turkey has reinserted itself into the hierarchy of the capitalist world-system, siding with US imperialism (Avcıoğlu, 1973). The country's neo-colonisation process was arguably commenced in the aftermath of World War II. This can be symbolically dated back to 1948, when the Turkish economy gladly received its first US development aid given in accordance with the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan (Çayan, 2008). Over the course of time, this economic penetration process was further deepened through the Bretton Woods System and international partnership agreements at business level, and resulted in a typical import-dependent peripheral architecture shaped along the lines of the needs of the core (Boratav, 2010). A closer look at three politico-economic indicators (see Figure 2) allows us to track the historical development of Turkey's capital-import dependency.

Figure 2 provides some insight into the historical trajectories of Turkey's commodity-capital import-dependency, drawing upon the annual shares of Turkey's trade deficit, imports and foreign trade in GDP. As can be clearly seen, the period between 1923 and 1929 is characterised by a relatively high trade deficit fed by capital-imports to enable the capitalist restoration of the Turkish economy after the independence war (Avcıoğlu, 1973). The recovery phase is followed by a nonrecurring era of trade surpluses accompanied by successive declines in the share of capital-imports in GDP between 1930 and 1946. The period between 1947 and 1979 represents the Keynesian import substitution industrialisation era of Turkey, in which the domestic economy extensively internalised the monopoly-capitalist production relations. Within this period, the very integration of domestic bourgeoisie with foreign monopoly-capital was set up and significantly deepened, bringing about the capital-

import dependent socio-economic formation developed in compliance with the needs and priorities of monopoly-capitalist production relations (Çayan, 2008; Boratav, 2010). Since then, the Turkish economy has been characterised by an ever-growing trade deficit. Lastly, the period from 1980 to today corresponds to the neoliberal era of Turkey, in which the territorial logic of capitalist development has been shifted from import-substitution to export-oriented industrialisation (Yalman, 2009).

Figure 2: Trajectories of Turkey's commodity-capital import dependency (see Appendix B)



Turkey's neoliberal turn in 1980 is an important climacteric shedding light on the current status quo, and therefore, I would like to provide more details. As is evident in Figure 2, in this prolonged neoliberal period, the shares of trade deficit, international trade and imports in GDP increased dramatically. On the one hand, this means that Turkey absorbed more and more commodity-capital as a corollary of the first contradiction; recall domestic production's severe dependence on productive-commodity import. On the other hand, this also shows that the growth in exports remained structurally insufficient to balance the growth in imports as a corollary of the

second structural contradiction; recall domestic exports' dependence on foreign-capital import. The neoliberal period of the Turkish economy has thus been defined by a dramatic rise in its chronic trade deficit. Another important point to note is the momentum gained by the Turkish economy in the aftermath of the 2001-2002 debt-crisis. Statistically, within the 16-year period between 2002 and 2017, the volume of Turkey's exports, imports and trade deficit increased respectively 5, 4.7 and 4.2 times in comparison with its total exports, imports and trade deficit in the 79 years between 1923 and 2001 (see Appendix B).

As underlined earlier, Turkey's severe dependence on capital-import is not limited to productive-commodities. Rather, it is linked to financial capital at the core, of which the domestic economy is structurally compelled to import in order to finance its operation, i.e. trade-credits, investment-finance, interest-payment, debt-repayment, and so on. To clarify, it is useful to present some statistical information highlighting an inevitable contradiction of this structural liability. According to official statistics (Central Bank of Turkey, 2018b, 2018c; see Appendix C), the Turkish private sector's outstanding long-term loans received from abroad climbed sharply from $29.2bn to $221.7bn between 2002 and 2017. Analogously, the private sector's short-term loans and trade credits from nonfinancial corporations jumped from $22.8bn to $63.4bn between 2004 and 2017. This data[4] exemplifies the third contradiction, which is the domestic production's money-capital import-dependency. Furthermore, this accelerated rhythm of financial-capital absorption also gives some insights about the financial fragility structurally surrounding the domestic economy under the pressure of currency exchange rate valuation risks and liquidity risks. This represents the fourth contradiction, which signifies that the conditions of debt-repayment in the second phase of circulation (C–M') are structurally insecure.

Here, we see a typical debt-based economy, in which the imported capital (money-capital and commodity-capital) was processed and the produced surplus value was transferred back to their space of origin, but the debts, costs and

[4] The provided statistics on private sector loans and trade credits are but a few of many other indicators, representing Turkey's financial-capital import dependency. In fact, this dependency is also linked to the state and society through current account deficit, external and internal debt-stocks, cash loan instruments, ranging from credit cards, to personal, mortgage, vehicle and consumer loans, and so on. I will elaborate more on these other dimensions later in this section. But overall, the same trend is also true for the other indicators (see Appendix C).

contradictions associated with this capital-import dependent production process remained in the absorber economy. In the domain of the empirical, this manifests itself as a chronic current account deficit, from which Turkey has suffered structurally . To exemplify the trend and the current status quo, between 2002 and 2017, Turkey's current account deficit increased sharply from $626m to $47.5bn (Central Bank of Turkey, 2018a; see Appendix C), reproducing the structural debt-crisis tendency, as severely experienced in the cases of the Turkish debt-crises of 1994-1995 and 2001-2002 (Balkan and Savran, 2002a, 2002b).

My analysis thus far has deciphered certain structural contradictions and crisis-tendencies embedded in the capital reproduction pattern of Turkey's capital-import dependent socio-economic formation. To summarise, in the first stage of capitalist reproduction, which encompasses the process of transformation of money-capital (M) into commodity-capital (C) in the form of wage labour and means of production such as instruments of labour (capital goods) and subjects of labour (intermediate goods), the domestic economy is liable to purchase a significant part of the needed money-capital and means of production from abroad, which, in turn, brings about systemic dependencies, contradictions and debt-crisis tendencies for the absorber economy. In the second stage of capitalist reproduction (C–M'), which represents the phase of transformation of the produced commodities back into money-capital, these industrial and financial costs of capital-import dependent domestic production require to be offset in order to capacitate the realisation of surplus value and finance the continuity of the capital reproduction pattern in Turkey, and on a broader scale.

Here is where historically the political and military state apparatus, namely the Turkish state, comes into play to orchestrate the disjuncture by actively facilitating pro-corporate and oppressive policies, leading to new confrontations. The role that the state apparatus plays here is vital and therefore cannot be simply reduced to nepotism, cronyism, corruption or social capital networks between individual capitalists and political elites in Turkey. It is more than a reciprocal relation built on for-profit interests. Rather, it is a systemic amalgamation deeply rooted in the circular processes of capitalist production and reproduction in which capital and the state's survival interests are tightly interwoven.

To stave off systemic contradictions and crisis-tendencies inherent in its capital-import dependent socio-economic formation, the Turkish state exercises a great number of pro-corporate strategies. Allow me to identify some of the key elements of this traditional strategy. The first of these is, precisely, a super-exploitative labour policy. Statistically, the proletariat in Turkey is one of the cheapest labour forces in the world, ranking 10th among 44 economies in terms of cheap industrial labour costs (Schröder, 2016). According to the International Labour Organization's report (2016), which compares G20 countries in terms of average real wage, Turkey ranks as the 3rd cheapest labour market after China and India. In addition to its low-paid status, the Turkish labour market is also characterised by long working hours. The average number of working hours in Turkey is 47.9 per week, which corresponds to the longest among 41 countries listed in the OECD database (2018a). A report by the Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association (TÜSİAD, 2016) points out the role of Turkey's super-exploitative labour policy in providing a competitive position for Turkey by lowering manufacturing costs. Adopting the Global Manufacturing Cost-Competitiveness Index (BCG, 2014), the report calculates Turkey's manufacturing cost score as 98. When this score is compared to the other 24 economies in the official BCG (2014) report, Turkey ranks 7th in terms of production cost competitiveness by dint of its advantage of lower labour costs.

Furthermore, Turkey exercises a pro-corporate taxation system. A closer look at Turkey's total tax revenues (OECD, 2018b; Ministry of Finance, 2016; see Appendix D) reveals that the revenue acquired from taxes on income, profits and capital gains has gradually declined from 51.8% in 1980 to a considerably low share of 21.2% in 2016. In the same period of time, the share of tax revenues from social security contributions has climbed from 14% to 28.8%. Today, social security contributions (employers 16.4%, employees 11% and other 1.6%) hold the second largest portion of Turkey's total tax revenue. The lion's share, however, is held by goods and services tax, which imposes the tax burden not on the main drivers of the debt-driven economy, but on the already poor masses. Whilst the share of taxes on goods and services in Turkey's total tax revenues was 25.6% in 1980, this had reached 43.6% in 2016. Furthermore, the Turkish state also backs such a pro-corporate taxation system by virtue of a large variety of tax incentives (Revenue Administration, 2018a) and investment incentives (Investment Support and Promotion Agency, 2018a).

Moreover, to secure and accelerate the reproduction of capital, the Turkish state extensively boosts the financialisation of daily life through its banking system renewed in the aftermath of the 2001-2002 debt-crisis (Gültekin-Karakaş, 2009a; 2009b). This has been materialised by all sorts of cash loan instruments, ranging from credit cards, to personal, mortgage, vehicle and consumer loans, and so on. The Interbank Card Centre of Turkey reports (2002; 2017) show that between 2002 and 2017, the number of credit cards issued in Turkey climbed from 13.9m to 62.4m, of which 58.6m are individual cards and 3.8m are corporate cards. The domestic trading volume of domestic and foreign credit cards reached a total of ₺682bn and provided a net foreign currency inflow amounting to $4.7bn for Turkey in 2017. However, by provoking the masses to exchange their already limited future incomes with today's goods and services, the Turkish state has also extended the contradictions and footprint of the debt-driven economy deeply into the very roots of society. According to official statistics (Banks Association of Turkey, 2018), today, more than 30 million people are in a total of ₺566.7bn of debt to global finance oligarchy and its domestic partners due to cash loans, and around 10% of these people are subjected to legislative decisions for prohibited checks due to their ongoing unpaid loans and credit card debts.

By its very nature, such systematic impoverishing of society, super-exploitative labour policies, pro-corporate taxation and incentive mechanisms inevitably exacerbate the already problematic income inequalities and poverty, which in turn necessitates a super-oppressive state apparatus to restrain, repress and control the socio-political unrest of impoverished labouring classes. As an indicator of ever-growing income inequalities and poverty, Turkey holds one of the highest scores (41.9) in the World Bank Gini index (2018a), which measures the extent to which income distribution deviates from an equal distribution. The Turkish state's political oppression of labouring classes, on the other hand, is a globally known fact evidenced by many reports that measure the level of national democracy, freedom and social peace (i.e. Institute for Economics & Peace, 2018; The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2017; Freedom House, 2018).

However, neither of these state strategies suffice to generate a long-term solution to the chronic disjuncture in Turkey's capital reproduction pattern. This, in turn,

feeds back into two more structural contradictions, further complicating capitalist reproduction in Turkey. That is, to capacitate the reproduction and secure debt-repayments, the domestic economy demands more capital-import – in the form of fixed-capital (i.e. FDIs) and money-capital (new debts). As a result, to finance the current account deficit, the country craves FDI inflows, representing the fixed-capital dimension of Turkey's capital-import dependency. Otherwise, all roads lead to the same address, the global financial oligarchy, reproducing the vicious circle of Turkey's debt-driven economy (see Figure 3).

Figure 3: FDI inflows and Turkey's external debt-stock between 1980 and 2016 (see Appendix C)



Figure 3 above shows FDI inflows and external debt-stocks between 1980 and 2017. As can be seen from the figure above, there has been a sharp upward trend in FDI inflows to Turkey, particularly since the aftermath of the 2001-2002 debt crisis. This has been achieved mainly through massive and accelerated dispossession of public assets by the Turkish state in an attempt to finance the growing debt-based economy by providing new accumulation spaces for foreign capital. Accordingly, the Turkish state's privatisation revenue, which was a total of $8bn until 2002, reached a total of $68.9bn between 2002 and 2017, of which $47.1bn was transferred to the

Undersecretariat of the Treasury for interest and debt-repayment (Privatization Board of Turkey, 2018; see Appendix C). Nevertheless, privatisation-backed FDI inflows have also fallen short of financing Turkey's noticeably indebted economy. As an inevitable corollary, the financing of the chronic current account deficit by increasing the debt-stocks, in other words 'paying debts by taking on more debts', becomes a recurrent remedy for Turkey. Evidently, Turkey's external debt-stocks have gradually increased to keep the Turkish economy running and reached $454.8bn, while the share of the external debt-stocks in GDP climbed alarmingly to 53.4% in 2017 (Undersecretariat of Treasury, 2018a; see Appendix C). This synopsises not only the Turkish economy's deepening dependence on the global finance oligarchy, but also the range and scope of the approaching debt-crisis.

A recent IMF report (2018) calls attention to deepening financial crisis-tendencies in the Turkish economy after the prolonged period of growth and recovery in the wake of the 2008-2009 global crisis. What is more important is that the report notes the emerging conditions of an overaccumulation crisis in one of the most pivotal and strategic sectors in the Turkish economy, to which I will turn my empirical focus in the following sub-section.

> *"Following a slowdown in activity in 2016, growth recovered strongly last year. Large fiscal stimulus (including increased PPP activity) and policy-driven credit impulse boosted consumption and investment in 2017. Exports also increased sharply, but a pick-up in imports in the second half of the year tempered the growth contribution of net exports. Such has been the strength of the recovery that the economy now faces clear signs of overheating: a positive output gap, inflation well above target, and a wider current account deficit. Signs of possible oversupply in the building and construction sector are also emerging."*

Thus far, I have provided some empirical insight into Turkey by tracking the historical emergence and development of its capital-import dependent economic formation. My analysis has pointed out the Turkish state's active role and traditional strategies of capacitating the realisation of surplus value and securing the continual cycles of capital reproduction. My analysis has also highlighted some structural contradictions and crisis-tendencies integral to Turkey's capital reproduction pattern.

Now, allow me to tie this empirical insight with the first spatial-fix integral to my theoretical framework to explain the phenomenon of space reproduction in relation to Turkey's perpetual absorber role in the displacement of globally produced surplus capitals.

To recall, the first spatial fix in my theoretical framework was concerned with the displacement of recurrent overaccumulation crisis-tendencies inherent in the capitalist mode of production. The scope of the first fix is always global, where Turkey perpetually plays an absorber role. As my empirical analysis thus far clearly shows, Turkey's role in the first fix can be expressed in a motto: '*surplus capitals are welcome here, as always….*' Evidently, this has also been true for the prolonged financial crisis of neoliberalism, which has been deepening since the mid-1990s and demanding a new set-up either within or beyond the dominant neoliberal architecture (Harvey, 2009; Kotz, 2009; Castree, 2010; Duménil and Lévy, 2011, 2018). As underlined earlier, the role that Turkey plays in the prolonged financial crisis of neoliberalism is vital, given that the recovery and reproduction of the system increasingly necessitates perpetual absorbers – like Turkey – to which global producers of surplus capitals would export their recurrent overaccumulation crises (Harvey, 2001, 2003, 2006a, 2006b, 2010). However, the crisis never ends when surplus capitals are absorbed in the form of money-capital, commodity-capital and fixed-capital. On the contrary, the absorption of surplus capital has various snowballing costs for the absorber – in my empirical case, the Turkish economy.

My empirical analysis thus far, therefore, has delved into the emergence and development of Turkey's perpetual surplus-capital absorber position in the hierarchy of the capitalist world-system by focusing on a key structure, the capital-import dependent socio-economic formation. Accordingly, my analysis has traced the preliminary foundations of this formation to the post-Second World War period (Boratav, 2010; Çayan, 2008; Avcıoğlu, 1973). In this analysis, the operation of this capital-import dependent socio-economic formation is investigated through the perspective of the capital reproduction pattern conceptualised within the Marxist Dependency Theory (Marini, 1972, 1977, 2000; Valencia, 2017; Luce, 2015; Osorio, 2012; Ferreria at al., 2012; Filho and Araújo, 2015). Drawing on this analysis, I identified a number of key structural contradictions, or liabilities in the terminology of

critical realism, conditioning the chronic disjuncture between cycles of capitalist circulation in Turkey.

My analysis here has identified two key contradictions defining the first stage of the capitalist circulation (M-C) in Turkey: the domestic production's structural dependence on productive-commodity and on financial-capital import. In other words, in the first stage, which encompasses the process of transformation of money-capital (M) into commodity-capital (C) in the form of wage labour and means of production such as instruments of labour (capital goods) and subjects of labour (intermediate goods), the domestic economy is structurally liable to absorb ever-growing and high-volume money-capital and means of production to capacitate surplus value generation and growth. When this analysis is extended into the second stage of the capitalist circulation (C-M') in Turkey, I have identified four key contradictions: the domestic export's structural dependence on import, the domestic reproduction's structural dependence on financial-capital import, fixed-capital import and debt-repayment. In other words, in the second stage, which represents the phase of transformation of the produced commodities back into money-capital, the domestic economy's export revenues fall structurally short of compensating for the ever-growing and costly commodity-capital import bill due to the two inherent contradictions in the first stage. To capacitate the reproduction and secure debt-repayments, therefore, necessitates more capital-import – in the form of fixed-capital (i.e. FDIs) and money-capital (new debts).

This analysis has pointed out a structural debt-crisis tendency perpetually reproduced by these structural contradictions conditioning the chronic disjuncture between cycles of capitalist circulation in Turkey. That is, in this capital reproduction pattern, the imported capital is processed and then the generated surplus value is transferred back abroad, leaving the created financial debts and associated industrial costs and structural contradictions behind in the absorber economy. As severely experienced in the cases of the Turkish debt-crises of 1994-1995 and 2001-2002, this debt-based economic formation is also structurally fragile, as it is surrounded by unavoidable systemic risks – i.e. currency exchange risks and liquidity risks (Balkan and Savran, 2002a, 2002b).

From the perspective of the capital reproduction pattern, the problem here is how to capacitate further accumulation and growth notwithstanding the structural disjuncture on the one hand, and in the context of the deepening financial crisis of global capitalism on the other, given that the latter manifests itself as a systemic demand for more and more absorption of surplus capitals. As my analysis thus far indicates, the surplus capital absorption trajectories of Turkey since the mid-1990s have been characterised by an accelerating momentum in opening up of new spaces, markets, industries, commodities, resources and networks in which to flow. Accordingly, to understand key mechanisms that prop up the continuity and development of the problematic capital reproduction pattern in Turkey and in a broader scale, I have turned my focus to the political and military state apparatus of the territory, namely the Turkish state, and its traditional and spatial strategies to alleviate the chronic disjuncture, never leaving but rather further enhancing its perpetual absorber status.

Through this analysis, I have highlighted a variety of pro-corporate strategies that the Turkish state traditionally exercises along the lines of the neoliberal corporate agenda of capitalism. The reason these strategies are called 'traditional' is that these strategies are inherent in the state apparatus independent of whether it is an absorber or producer of surplus capitals. In Turkey, key traditional strategies include a super-exploitative labour policy that lowers domestic manufacturing costs, attracts FDIs, increases global competitiveness, etc.; a pro-corporate taxation system that imposes the tax burden on the masses; generous incentive instruments for investors to rhythmise the circulation of capital; extensive financialisation of daily life at the cost of social impoverishment; massive privatisation of public assets to boost FDI inflows; systematic oppression of the impoverished labouring classes to restrain, repress and control socio-political unrest.

Here, it should be also noted that my analysis on Turkey's traditional strategies speak to Moyo and Yeros (2011; 2015), Luce (2015) and Bond (2015) by establishing the very links between the structural problems in the capital reproduction pattern and the super-exploitative and super-oppressive state apparatus characterising today's sub-imperialisms. However, and more importantly, my empirical analysis thus far paves the way for the investigation of an often-neglected matter within the

contemporary sub-imperialism literature. That is, as my review in Chapter 2 has indicated, apart from Latin America (Valencia, 2017; Luce, 2015), very little is known about how today's sub-imperialist practices are interwoven with structural contradictions and crisis-tendencies inherent in dependent-capitalisms. By exploring Turkey's perpetual surplus-capital absorber position with respect to contradictions and crisis-tendencies intrinsic to its capital-import dependent formation, my analysis in the following section will seek to bring some clarity to Marini's (1972, 1977) under-researched argument: sub-imperialism is organised around the market problem arising from the disjuncture between capitalist cycles and therefore, must always be assessed as a crisis-displacement strategy alleviating contradictions and crisis-tendencies inherent in dependent-capitalisms.

From a theoretical point of view, the spatial strategies entailing Turkey's emerging status of surplus capital producer are particularly important in terms of Harvey's (2003) argument on the emergence of sub-imperialisms as well. To recall, for Harvey, today's sub-imperialisms insert themselves into the global economy first as absorbers but then as producers of surplus capitals, and in turn, seek out systematic spatio-temporal fixes for their own crisis-tendencies. In my theoretical framework, Turkey's spatial strategies are, therefore, conceptualised as the second spatial fix, which further capacitate the continuity and development of the capital reproduction pattern through geographical expansion and spatial restructuring. Clearly, my conceptualisation here is not only informed by Harvey (2003), but also Marini's argument that a sub-imperialist development scheme is a structural solution for the absorber economy suffering from the disjuncture between capitalist cycles (Valencia, 2017; Marini, 1972, 1977; Luce, 2015). Nevertheless, as reviewed earlier, although very few studies in the contemporary sub-imperialism literature have alluded to Harvey's argument arguably from a conceptual point of view (Bond, 2017, 2016a, 2016b, 2004b; van der Merwe, 2016a, 2016b), no previous studies have systematically analysed the notion of spatio-temporal fix from the perspective of a capital reproduction pattern specific to territorial powers. Thus, the following section will target this under-researched area within the contemporary sub-imperialism literature.

Allow me to conclude this section by briefly introducing the following section. Overall, the next section will delve into Turkey's surplus-capital producer status and spatial strategies by focusing on the Turkish state's new expansionist foreign policy and dramatic leap forward in energy infrastructure development respectively. By extending my analysis into Turkey's spatial strategies, the following section will demonstrate how the Turkish state has been canalising both domestically and globally produced surplus capitals into strategic built-environments that would prop up the continuity and development of its capital reproduction pattern notwithstanding structural contradictions and crisis-tendencies inherent in its capital-import dependent socio-economic formation.

4.2. Turkey as an emerging producer of surplus capital

To begin with, I would like to recall a theoretical formulation that will henceforth guide my analysis in this chapter. As reviewed in Chapter 2, the sub-imperialist socio-economic formation's main strength originates from its capital reproduction pattern, which is relatively effective in displacing crisis-tendencies through geographical expansion. This is mainly due to the fact that capital's geographical expansion activates and secures the absorber's access to markets and raw materials in other peripheral economies, which in turn provides the much-needed trade surplus for the domestic economy to alleviate the chronic disjuncture. In Luce's words, "the sub-imperialist country succeeds in reuniting the conditions to displace, through expansion, that which engenders realisation problems for the dependent economy in the second phase of circulation (C–M'). It also signifies succeeding to reunite conditions that mitigate some of dependency's structural effects in the first phase of circulation (M–C) and in the accumulation process on a broader scale" (Luce, 2015: 37).

Particularly since the severe debt-crisis of 2001-2002, the Turkish state has been practising two spatial strategies. By drawing on Harvey's notion of spatio-temporal fix, I call them 'geographical expansion' and 'spatial restructuring'. By the phrase 'spatial strategy', I allude to the Turkish state's agenda seeking to mobilise surplus capitals into strategic built-environments that would prop up its historical development and growth, notwithstanding contradictions and crisis-tendencies structurally inherent in its capital-import dependent socio-economic formation.

The first spatial strategy is expansionist in nature and concerned with the securing and improving of Turkey's – never disconnected from the interest of the core – access to new export and raw material markets as well the as maintenance and strengthening of the Turkish state's regional power status by taking advantage of the post-US hegemonic era, represented by growing inter-capitalist competitions as well as geopolitical tensions and uncertainty. Nonetheless, although the Turkish state dramatically and quite radically switched to an expansionist foreign policy in the mid-2000s, as my analysis has thus far revealed, the geographical expansion also means the intensification of Turkey's contradictions originating from the country's capital-import dependent industrialisation. This means, although geographical expansion is capable of relieving the second phase of circulation by extracting surplus value from peripheral economies, it is structurally incapable of mitigating the structural effects in the first phase of circulation, given structural contradiction of the domestic export's dependence on capital-import.

The sub-imperialist restructuring of Turkey's capital reproduction pattern therefore necessitates equally important internal spatial strategies aiming to manage dependencies embedded in the first phase of circulation. In the words of Berat Albayrak[5], current Minister of Finance and Treasury and the former Minister of Energy and Natural Resources, *"if you manage the dependency strategy in the right direction, a window opens to a strong foreign policy"* (Daily Sabah, 2018a). The second spatial strategy is, therefore, concerned with the management of key dependencies through restructuring of capital so as to prop up the sub-imperialist agenda of geographical expansion. Accordingly, my analysis focuses on one of the most severe dependencies surrounding the reality of Turkish political economy: the energy-import dependency, which holds the lion's share in Turkey's costly commodity-capital import bill. In line with its expansionist turn as well as by taking advantage of global financial capital's growing need and interest in space, nature and energy, the Turkish state has attached a strategical importance to manage – not solve – its severe energy-import dependency in such a way as to alleviate the chronic disjuncture between the capitalist cycles.

[5] To give more sense of the interwoven relations between capital, the state and government in Turkey, please note that Berat Albayrak is the son-in-law of the President Tayyip Erdoğan, and he was appointed as Minister of Energy and Natural Resources after his CEO career in Çalik Holding, which operates in the energy, construction, mining, textile, finance, and telecom sectors as a preeminent conglomerate in the Turkish bourgeois oligarchy.

In the following two sub-sections, I will elaborate more on these two spatial strategies, focusing on Turkey's practising of expansionist foreign policy and dramatic leap forward in energy infrastructure development. By analysing this interplay, I will explore the pivotal role that fixed-capital investments into built-environment at both national and geopolitical levels play in enabling Turkey's sub-imperialist development agenda. The analysis will start with the external component of Turkey's systematic spatio-temporal fix capacitating the accumulation and growth through space production. Accordingly, I will expand my empirical analysis on the geopolitical dimension of the crisis of global capitalism, which has further deepened in parallel with the rise of sub-imperialisms on the one hand, and the overt tendency towards a post-US hegemonic and more multipolar global order on the other.

Turkey's expansionist turn in foreign policy

A close look at Turkey's foreign policy reveals the historical emergence of three strategic shifts since the foundation of the republic in 1923. The Turkish foreign policy until the end of Second World War was characterised by the principle of "peace at home, peace in the world", representing a reasonable moderate position between emerging capitalist and socialist blocs at the time. In parallel with the deepening infiltration of US imperialism into Turkey after the Second World War, the Turkish state strategically shifted its foreign policy and historically sided with the capitalist-imperialist bloc. After becoming a NATO member in 1952, the Turkish state was responsible for defending one-third of the Alliance's land frontiers against the Warsaw Pact (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018). The preliminary foundations for the third strategic shift in Turkey's foreign policy, which represents the Turkish state's very first move towards a relatively expansionist foreign policy approach, were laid with the dissolution of the socialist bloc in 1991 in an attempt to secure and strengthen the Turkish state's regional power status in the emerging conjectural structure of the post-Cold War era. In the mid-2000s, whilst the post-Cold War era evolved into the post-US hegemonic era, the Turkish state further developed its expansionist doctrine, leading to a new and transformed regional and global foreign policy approach (Davutoğlu, 2008, 2013; Fidan, 2010, 2013; Fidan and Nurdun, 2008; Aras and Fidan, 2009; Kulaklıkaya and Nurdun, 2010; Ozkan, 2008, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013; Ozkan and Akgun, 2010; Hausmann, 2014).

The undersecretary of Turkey's National Intelligence Organization, Hakan Fidan (2010), who is one of the authors cited above, formulates the Turkish state's new expansionist foreign policy through what he calls the Wave (Four-Zone) Approach, which places the Turkish state in the centre surrounded by four waves (zones).

> *"Located within the band of the first wave (zone) are close neighbouring countries, in the second wave (zone) the surrounding region, in the third wave (zone) the continent and in the fourth wave (zone) the geography in which all continents interact. In this approach, wavelengths can be circular as well as elliptical in shape depending on the capacity of the country at the centre. Similar to the wavelengths expanding from the centre towards the periphery, zones also expand from the centre to the periphery. Every zone contains differences within itself, with the country at the centre inevitably producing separate policies for each zone. Countries located in separate zones have varying levels of influence on the centre. For instance, a country located in the first zone has an influence that is 4 times greater on the country at the centre than that of a country located in the fourth zone" (Fidan, 2010: 110).*

In his 'academic' article, Davutoğlu (2013), who was also one of the key policymakers and practitioners of Turkey's new expansionist foreign policy approach when he was the Minister of Foreign Affairs between 2009–2014 and when he was then promoted and became Turkish Prime Minister between 2014 and 2016, postulates Turkey's turn to – in his words – new multidimensional and proactive foreign policy, as follows.

> *"There are three positions that can be taken vis-à-vis the accelerating pace of the flow of history. The first position is to resist the change, withdraw into domestic confines and remain stuck in the status quo, due to the fear of change. Generally, the pace of this fast-moving stream overtakes those who take this first position. The second position is to float in this flux as far as possible, believing that one lacks the power, and hence the will, to initiate change. The third position is to take an active stance, based on a sound awareness that one is a subject that affects the dynamic flow of history, rather than an ordinary and passive component of it. This implies that one can exert*

one's authority in this stream as an actor who can change the course of history. In the last decade, Turkey's preference has been for this third position" (Davutoğlu, 2013: 865).

According to Davutoğlu (2013), emerging from the Turkish state's determination to become an active actor during this period of rapid historical change, probably the most significant principle of Turkey's new foreign policy approach is its three-dimensional 'humanitarian' diplomacy. When so-called three-dimensions are taken into critical consideration, the first is concerned with enabling, securing and developing domestic capital's access to new export and raw material export and raw material markets. To achieve this, the Turkish state has been attaching increasing importance to concluding Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) along the lines of the global corporate agenda of neoliberalism. Although the Turkish state has concluded a total of 35 FTAs thus far, 11 FTAs were repealed due to the accession of these countries to the EU (Ministry of Commerce, 2018a), where Turkey has been linked by the Customs Union Agreement (1995) since 1995. As a result, the number of FTAs currently in force is 21, of which 18 were concluded after the 2001-2002 debt-crisis. Furthermore, there are also a total of 31 ongoing and recently launched FTA negotiations (Ministry of Commerce, 2018a; 2018b).

In addition to FTAs, the Turkish state fosters its geographical expansion by promoting Bilateral Investment Treaties[6] (BITs) and Treaties with Investment Provisions[7] (TIPs). According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development database (2018), Turkey is a signatory to 116 BITs, of which 76 are currently in force and 40 are yet to come into force. Furthermore, Turkey has concluded a total of 21 TIPs and 84 bilateral agreements on Avoidance of Double Taxation (DTAAs) thus far (Revenue Administration, 2018b). Overall, a total of 57 BITs, 14 TIPs and 37 DTAAs were signed after the 2001-2002 Turkish debt-crisis,

[6] A bilateral investment treaty (BIT) is an agreement between two countries regarding promotion and protection of investments made by investors from respective countries in each other's territory (UNCTAD, 2018).

[7] The category of treaties with investment provisions (TIPs) brings together various types of investment treaties that are not BITs. Three main types of TIPs can be distinguished: (1) broad economic treaties that include obligations commonly found in BITs (e.g. a free trade agreement with an investment chapter); (2) treaties with limited investment-related provisions (e.g. only those concerning establishment of investments or free transfer of investment-related funds); and (3) treaties that only contain "framework" clauses such as those on cooperation in the area of investment and/or for a mandate for future negotiations on investment issues (UNCTAD, 2018).

representing the Turkish state's growing enthusiasm towards enabling capital's spatial expansion. Besides bilateral agreements, the Turkish state also builds up intergovernmental cooperation organisations at regional level such as BSEC (Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization), Developing-8 (D-8 Organization for Economic Cooperation), ECO (Economic Cooperation Organization) and OIC (Organization of Islamic Cooperation) (Ministry of Commerce, 2018c).

The Turkish state's new expansionist foreign policy has also been characterised by a generous development aid and emergency assistance approach, representing the emergence of Turkey as a new donor country on the world stage. In parallel with Turkey's growing enthusiasm for aid-giving, particularly after the mid-2000s, which has promoted the country to second place after the U.S. among humanitarian aid donors, the Turkish state, for a while now, presents itself as the most generous country in the world in terms of its ratio of GNI to humanitarian aid (Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency, 2015a, 2015b, 2016a, 2016b). Figure 4 below shows the historical trajectory of Turkey's emergence as an aid-giving country in the aftermath of the 2001-2002 debt-crisis.

Figure 4: Turkey's total official[8] and private[9] development assistance flows (see Appendix E)



As can clearly be seen from Figure 4 above, there has been a rapid upward trend in total aid outflows from Turkey, particularly since 2004. Commencing from 2005, we also see that private flows have increasingly become an integrated component of Turkey's foreign aid policy. Hence, between 2005 and 2016, the share of private flows in Turkey's total aid flows increased from zero-level to an average of 32%. Statistically, there have been more than $15bn of emergency aid outflows from Turkey between 2005 and 2016. In 2016, the Turkish state provided a total amount of $7.9bn for more than 170 countries by dint of its 150 public institutions as well as NGOs and thew private sector (Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency, 2016a, 2016b).

[8] Official flows comprises Official Development Assistance (ODA), Other Official Flows (OOF) and Officially Supported Export Credits. These include grants and concessional loans from the government sector of a donor country to a recipient country or multilateral agency active in development.

[9] Private flows comprises Private Flows at Market Terms and Net Private Grants. These include aid flows for commercial reasons from the private sector of a donor country and funds from non-governmental organisations for development or welfare purposes.

Although Turkey's official and private aid policy targets a great variety of peripheral economies, there are some large recipients, which are chiefly characterised by imperial or civil wars (i.e. Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, Myanmar), ethnic and linguistic commonalities (i.e. Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan) and religious and/or historical affinities (i.e. Pakistan, Palestine, Tunisia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Albania, Sudan). Figure 5 shows the top 15 aid-recipients in the period between 2002 and 2016.

Figure 5: Turkey's total aid flows by the top 10 recipients (See Appendix F)



While materialising its foreign aid policy, the Turkish state collaborates with the core economies on the re-establishment of global governance in crisis-zones as in the cases of Syria, Somalia, Iraq, Afghanistan, and so on. As a living example, of a total of $6bn emergency aid given by Turkey in 2016, $5.8bn was targeted at the world's arguably most problematic crisis-zone, the imperialist invasion of Syria. Besides, the Turkish state has the world's largest number of refugees today with 3.4 million Syrians and 346,800 refugees and asylum-seekers of various other nationalities (United Nations Refugee Agency, 2018). Nevertheless, Turkey also capitalises on its

‘humanitarian’ diplomacy to secure and strengthen its intermediary position, and in turn, regional power status in the word capitalist hierarchy. This is crystal clear from the case of the Syrian refugee crisis in particular, where the Turkish state has taken advantage of the crisis to speed up the visa liberalisation and accession talks between Turkey and EU as well as to acquire a total of £6bn funding from the EU (European Council, 2016; European Commission, 2018), whilst closely cooperating with occupying powers at the same time. Yet another apparent exemplar regarding this dimension is Turkey’s challenge to the voting system in the UN, on which the Turkish state’s ‘humanitarian’ diplomacy focuses specifically. Problematising the decisive power status held by the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (the US, the UK, France, Russia and China), the Turkish state advocates the reform of the UN under the motto ‘the world is bigger than the five’, as frequently stipulated by Erdoğan (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018). In Erdoğan's own words (Cumhuriyet, 2018), the Permanent Five status corresponds to the World War II period and the world is no longer experiencing the same conditions; thus, it is time for a change towards a new status, in which Turkey and other parties would be able to hold permanent member status alternately. In his press interview, Erdoğan clarifies the Turkish state’s geopolitical perspective, reprising the same ‘Talk Left, Walk Right’ rhetoric frequently used by the BRICS’ heads of state, corporates and elite allies (Bond, 2004c, 2015): “Turkey tries to take a step by rallying global powers against those, who operates with a colonial mentality” (Cumhuriyet, 2018). Please note Davutoğlu’s (2013: 868) experience in the voting of the UN on Syria (United Nations, 2012):

> *“The voting of the UN on Syria reflects the distortion in the existing order. In 2012, 132 countries voted in favour of the joint draft resolution on Syria proposed by Turkey and the Arab League, while a smaller number of countries voted against it and the rest abstained. The resolution, despite such major support in the General Assembly, was not adopted, due to the veto of two countries. The fundamental question here is: who represents the international community; the UN Security Council or the General Assembly? The General Assembly is composed of all of the countries, but the Security Council has only five permanent seats, and ultimately these five countries’ decisions determine resolutions.”*

In the words of Davutoğlu (2013: 867), *"Turkey's understanding of humanitarian diplomacy is multifaceted and multi-channelled; there have been contributions from several of Turkey's public institutions and NGOs, ranging from Turkish Airlines to TİKA [Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency], Kızılay [Turkish Red Crescent], TOKİ [Housing Development Administration of Turkey] and AFAD [Emergency Disaster Management Presidency]"*. Among these organisations, TİKA represents the main governmental institution responsible for coordination and implementation of Turkey's foreign aid policy in practice. TİKA was established in accordance with Statutory Decree Law no. 480 in the aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union (Official Gazette, 1992). In parallel with Turkey's progress in its expansionist foreign policy approach, the role and footprint of TİKA have increased significantly. As a matter of fact, the number of projects and activities, which were 2,240 between 1992 and 2002, reached 20,000 between 2003 and 2017, with an average of 2,000 projects and activities per year. Today, TİKA operates in over 160 countries with its 60 Programme Coordination Offices established in 58 countries (Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency, 2017).

Along the lines of the Turkish state's expansionist foreign policy approach, TİKA canalises Turkey's official and private flows towards 17 performance objectives categorised under five main aims, the so-called development of (1) social infrastructures (education, water, health, administrative/civic, social and cultural infrastructure and services); (2) economic infrastructures and services (transportation, communication, energy, finance, business); (3) production sectors (agriculture, forestry and fisheries; industry, mining, construction, trade and tourism); (4) infrastructures in crosscutting sectors; and (5) institutional capacity (human resources, information technologies, legislation infrastructure, and harmonisation with the policy documents). A closer look at projects and activities coordinated by the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency historically (2004a, 2004b, 2005a, 2005b, 2006a, 2006b, 2007a, 2007b, 2008a, 2008b, 2009a, 2009b, 2010a, 2010b, 2011a, 2011b, 2012a, 2012b, 2013a, 2013b, 2014a, 2014b, 2015a, 2015b, 2016a, 2016b; 2017, 2018a, 2018b) indicates the critical contribution of a pivotal sector, namely the building and construction industry, to which the recent IMF (2018) report calls attention due to its alarming tendency to oversupply. In other words, the lion's share goes to fixed-capital investment projects and activities – as usual – such as construction,

repair and restoration of schools, hospitals, water systems, housing, transportation, agricultural and industrial infrastructures, administrative and civic buildings, cultural built-environment, and facilities for crosscutting sectors. When the most recent budget (Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency, 2018a) is taken into consideration, statistically, the construction and building industry, as the largest shareholder with 34%, is responsible for 56.4% of the educational infrastructure budget, 30.8% of the health infrastructure budget, 97.5% of the water infrastructure budget, 13.5% of the administrative and civic infrastructure budget, 38.1% of the housing and cultural infrastructure budget, 48.2% of the transportation infrastructure budget, 8.8% of the agriculture infrastructure budget, 80.7% of the industrial infrastructure budget and 16.7% of the crosscutting sectors' infrastructure development projects and activities. Furthermore, the share of the construction and building industry in TİKA's future projects and activities is likely to grow more given that TİKA's strategic plan (Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency, 2018b) aims to double the number of projects and activities hitherto performed in the five-year period of time between 2018 and 2022.

The pivotal role played by the Turkish construction and building industry in Turkey's foreign aid strategy is also true for the country's neoliberal trajectories, particularly since the Turkish debt-crisis of 2001-2002. Here, by the phrase 'pivotal role', I refer not only to the construction industry's critical contribution to Turkey's new expansionist foreign policy, but also the industry's inherent capability to recover and catalyse the Turkish economy in general. This capability originates from the construction industry's relative effectiveness in staving off recurrent overaccumulation crises by absorbing capital and labour surpluses into the built-environment (Harvey, 2001, 2003, 2006a, 2006b, 2010) as well as its extensive and intensive interaction with a large variety of industries and sub-industries. Hence, despite its 8.6% share in GDP, the overall contribution of the Turkish construction industry to the Turkish economy reaches 30% when its direct and indirect impacts on almost 200 industries are taken into account (European Construction Industry Federation, 2017; Association of Turkish Construction Material Producers, 2017).

Since the aftermath of the 2001-2002 debt-crisis, the Turkish state has capitalised extensively on the construction industry's pivotal role in reorganising space

and nature (Bora, 2015). This has been achieved through promoting and incentivising massive fixed-capital investments on infrastructural development, urban transformation and the wholesale restructuring of urban landscapes. As a corollary, between 2002 and 2017, the value of the Turkish construction industry to GDP increased significantly by 1,530%, rising from $16.3bn to around $266bn and its share in GDP climbed sharply from 4.5% to 8.6%; far more than any other sector in the economy (Turkish Statistical Institute, 2018c; see Appendix G). During such a period of rapid and quite radical reorganisation of the space and nature, the Turkish economy grew by an average of 5.9% between 2002 and 2017 (World Bank, 2018c).

Arguably, behind such a dramatic leap forward of the Turkish construction industry lies a cost-effective and competitive structure originating from a wide range of exporter sub-industries. For example, the Turkish building material industry, as the major supplier of the Turkish construction industry, has become one of the world's top-10 producers and exporters. The sub-industry reached the export leader position in the Turkish economy in 2013 with more than $21bn export income. Today, with $91.4bn of domestic market volume and $15.2bn export revenue, the Turkish building material industry is one of the largest exporters not only in Turkey, but also in the world (Association of Turkish Construction Material Producers, 2017). Similarly, the Turkish cement industry is one of the leading producers and exporters in the global cement market (Global Cement Directory, 2018). The same is also true for a large number of other sub-industries exporting iron and steel bars and building components, insulated cables, dressed stones, aluminium and plastic building materials, ceramic covers and so on (Association of Turkish Construction Material Producers, 2018).

By taking advantage of the cost-effective and competitive structure arising from the domestic manufacturability of a considerable amount of capital and intermediate goods produced by a variety of exporter sub-industries as well as propping up such an already cost-effective structure with the Turkish state's generous political support, financial, technical incentives and super-exploitative labour policy, the Turkish construction industry, as the largest employer of the labour market in Turkey, has turned into one of the leaders in the global market. It has ranked as the world's second largest, behind China, for ten consecutive years since 2007. In 2016, of the world's top 250 international contractors, 46 were Turkish (ENR, 2017). To date, Turkish

contractors have completed almost 9,000 projects on five continents and in 115 countries, with a total business volume of £342bn. Almost 90% of the construction works were undertaken in North Africa, Eurasia and the Middle East (European Construction Industry Federation, 2017: 74).

It is worth re-emphasising that it is to this industry that the recent IMF report (2018) calls attention due to alarming tendency to fall if the Turkish state fails to open up new profitable spaces capable of easing its emerging oversupply. In other words, the Turkish building and construction sector, which has been pivotal to absorbing the global and domestic capital and labour surpluses, is now faced with its own overaccumulation crisis, further demanding new and profitable spaces in which to invest. Hence, nowadays, whilst Turkey goes to the 2018 Turkish general elections, Tayyip Erdoğan, President of Turkey and leader of the ruling AKP (Justice and Development Party), again reprises what he calls 'my crazy project' as an electoral pledge and post-election priority. Briefly, his crazy *Kanal İstanbul* project promises to build a 45km-long and 400m-wide artificial strait connecting the Black Sea with the Sea of Marmara, leading to new natural, ecological, social, economic and geopolitical catastrophes. Although his other crazy project of building a 4,500-square metre city in Syria is still hanging in the air, his main crazy project offers an alarming $15.6bn space for the construction industry. The same is also true for the opposition side. Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, leader of the main opposition CHP (Republican People's Party), for example, pledges to establish a Middle East Peace and Cooperation Organisation with Iran, Iraq and Syria with a promise to rebuild the Middle East through housings, bridges, roads and hospitals (Jensen, 2018; Anadolu Agency, 2016; Aydogan and Ercan, 2018; Hürriyet, 2018a; 2018b; Reuters, 2018; Daily Mail, 2018).

Regardless of whether or not the Turkish political elites would create conditions for a temporary survival of the industry, here, what is clearly visible is the emergence and development of a rapidly internationalising industry backing the geographical expansion, particularly since the debt-crisis of 2001-2002, as well as playing a pivotal role in both absorption of capital/labour surpluses and catalysis of industries it has hard-wired extensively. Above all, however, what also makes the Turkish construction and building industry important is its very connection with Turkey's second spatial strategy towards energy infrastructure development, which facilitates fixed-capital

investments into a strategic built-environment in an attempt to alleviate contradictions in the first phase of circulation (M-C) so as to prop up the country's sub-imperialist development agenda. The following sub-section will shed light on the internal dimension of this spatial restructuring strategy, focusing on Turkey's costly, heavy and ever-growing energy-import dependency. Now, before moving on the next sub-section, allow me to tie my empirical analysis of Turkey's geographical expansionist turn with the theoretical framework developed.

As argued earlier, the geopolitical dimension of the deepening crisis of neoliberalism is twofold. On the one hand, it is defined by an overt tendency towards a post-US hegemonic, more multipolar global order, on which the dominant imperialist core built its old-school imperialist counterstrategies – ranging from country-specific trade wars to the military co-operation towards conquering the world capitals of energy – in an attempt to turn the tide (Duménil and Lévy, 2011; Harvey, 2003). On the other hand, it is also characterised by an intensifying inter-capitalist competition between the dominant imperialisms and emerging subordinate territorial powers – what Harvey (2003) calls sub-imperialisms – such as the rising bloc of BRICS (Bond and Garcia, 2015) and other regional power-centres such as Turkey, South Korea, Mexico, Taiwan and Indonesia (Katz, 2015; Wallerstein, 2015; Bond, 2015; van der Merwe, 2016a).

My analysis in this sub-section has demonstrated that the Turkish state's response to the deepening geopolitical crisis of neoliberalism has been characterised by a quite radical shift to an expansionist foreign policy approach to enable, secure and develop the country's access to new export and raw material markets. My analysis has shown that the preliminary foundations for the strategic shift in Turkey's foreign policy occurred with the dissolution of the Socialist Bloc in 1991 an in attempt to secure and strengthen the Turkish state's regional power status in the emerging conjectural structure of the post-Cold War era. In the mid-2000s, however, whilst the post-Cold War era evolved into the post-US hegemonic era, the Turkish state further developed its expansionist doctrine towards a new multidimensional and proactive foreign policy, leading to a new and transformed regional and global approach.

As reviewed in Chapter 2, this third strategic shift has arguably been portrayed by policy-makers as a success story of the Turkish state written by certain Turkish political elites in response to the dramatic flux towards an uncertain post-US

hegemonic architecture (Davutoğlu, 2008, 2013; Fidan, 2010, 2013; Fidan and Nurdun, 2008; Aras and Fidan, 2009; Kulaklıkaya and Nurdun, 2010; Ozkan, 2008, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013; Ozkan and Akgun, 2010). Nevertheless, my analysis of Turkey's capital reproduction pattern has demonstrated that the emergence of Turkey's new expansionist foreign policy cannot simply be reduced to the impetuses, opportunities, challenges or pressures associated with the geopolitical crisis of neoliberalism as widely portrayed in this domestic literature and also in the wider international development literature (Brautigam, 2009; Power and Mohan, 2010; Tan-Mullins et al., 2010; Kragelund, 2011; Woods, 2008; Six, 2009; Zimmerman and Smith, 2011; Mawdsley and McCann, 2011; Mawdsley, 2012; Mawdsley et al., 2014, Eyben, 2013; Eyben and Savage, 2013; Gore, 2013; Moyo, 2009; Sörensen, 2010). In fact, my analysis makes it clear that this shift is also a corollary of structural contradictions and crisis-tendencies specific to Turkey, which increasingly force the Turkish state to stimulate the expansion of capital to extract surplus-value from peripheral economies that would ease debt-crisis tendencies triggered by the chronic disjuncture between cycles. This conclusion speaks to Lancaster's (2007) welcome intervention that the international development literature overemphasises international dynamics shaping expansionist state policies. Overall, by adopting the perspective of a capital reproduction pattern, my analysis has pointed out Turkey's chronic problem of the disjuncture between capitalist cycles acting as a structural impetus lying behind the Turkish state's expansionist turn. Evidently, my analysis of Turkey has shown that the expansion of capital appears as a sine qua non of offsetting the problems of realisation of surplus value and reproduction in the second phase of circulation (C-M') – remember that the convenience of the expansion originates from its capability of enabling dependent-capitalism's access to markets and raw materials in other peripheral economies, which in turn provides the much-needed trade surplus for the domestic economy to mitigate some of dependency's structural effects in the first phase of circulation (M-C) (Luce, 2015).

As my analysis thus far demonstrates, Turkey's spatial strategy of geographical expansion strategy seeks to provide the much-needed trade surplus for the domestic economy to alleviate the chronic disjuncture between cycles. Accordingly, this spatial strategy is concerned with the securing and improving of Turkey's access to new export and raw material markets as well as maintaining and strengthening the Turkish

state's regional power status by taking advantage of the post-US hegemonic international climate. My analysis has shown that the Turkish state strategically facilitates its access to new export and raw material markets along the lines of the Wave (Four-Zone) Approach, which classifies other capitalist economies into four separate zones with respect to their varying levels of influence on Turkey (Fidan, 2010). Developed opportunistically in response to external opportunities and threats surrounding the Turkish state in the post-US hegemonic era as well as internal pressures of historically deepening contradictions and crisis-dynamics embedded in Turkey's capital reproduction pattern, the Turkish state's new foreign policy entails a boom of Free Trade Agreements, Bilateral Investment Treaties and Treaties with Investment Provisions, and Bilateral Agreements on Avoidance of Double Taxation, particularly since the 2001-2002 debt-crisis. Besides, corresponding to its regional power-centre status, the Turkish state props up its expansionist agenda by partaking in intergovernmental cooperation organisations at the regional level, such as the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization, Developing-8 Organization for Economic Cooperation, Economic Cooperation Organization and Organization of Islamic Cooperation. Moreover, to further promote the expansion, the Turkish state quite enthusiastically positions itself as a new donor on the world stage, presenting itself as the most generous country in the world in terms of its ratio of GNI to humanitarian aid (Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency, 2015; 2016). Overall, my analysis here indicates that the way Turkey practises its expansionist foreign policy resembles the method applied by today's BRICS sub-imperialisms, such as creating or participating in international trade, development and finance mechanisms in order to secure and deepen their access to other peripheral markets and appropriate surplus value from weaker dependent capitalisms (Garcia and Kato, 2015; Misoczky and Imasato, 2014; Amisi et al., 2015; Bond, 2016a; 2004; 2013; 2015; Flynn, 2007). My findings in this chapter also align with Bond's (2013, 2015) argument that today's sub-imperialisms play an intermediary role in advancing the broader agenda of globalised neoliberalism, so as to legitimate deepened market access.

It is also clear from my analysis thus far that the Turkish state's expansionist foreign policy is both antagonistic and cooperative in nature – as an idiosyncrasy specific to sub-imperialisms (Garcia and Bond, 2015; Luce, 2015; Moyo and Yeros, 2015). On the one hand, it seeks to enable the geographical expansion of capital,

closely cooperating with the core economies in not only extending the global corporate agenda of neoliberalism deeper into peripheral spaces, but also establishing global governance by ensuring regional geopolitical 'stability' in areas suffering severe tensions (Bond, 2013; 2015). On the other, this close cooperation includes an antagonistic dimension, represented by growing demand from the dominant core for relatively autonomous conditions to facilitate its sub-imperialist development (Luce, 2015). As evident in my analysis thus far, for example, the Turkish state collaborates with the core economies on the re-establishment of global governance in crisis-zones as in the cases of Syria, Somalia, Iraq, Afghanistan, and so on. Nevertheless, my analysis has also shown that Turkey also even capitalises on humanitarian crises to secure and strengthen its intermediary position, and in turn, regional power-centre status in the word capitalist hierarchy. As the example of the Syrian refugee crisis has shown, the Turkish state takes advantage of the crisis to create pressure on the EU (European Council, 2016; European Commission, 2018) as well as to reprise its demand for a seat at the table of the UN Security Council (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018; Davutoğlu, 2013; United Nations, 2012).

Importantly, my analysis in this chapter has pointed out a rapidly internationalising industry consisting of a variety of exporter sub-industries, namely the Turkish construction and building sector, which both backs the Turkish state's expansionist agenda and prospers from it pre-eminently. My analysis has shown that, since the Turkish state's turn to sub-imperialist development agenda, the Turkish construction and building industry, as the largest employer of the labour market in Turkey, has become the world's second-largest behind China (ENR, 2017) and made the largest contribution to the Turkish state's expansionist aid-giving strategy by performing fixed-capital investment projects abroad such as construction, repairing and restoration of schools, hospitals, water systems, housing, transportation, agricultural and industrial infrastructures, administrative and civic buildings, cultural built-environment, and infrastructural facilities for crosscutting sectors (Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency, 2004a, 2004b, 2005a, 2005b, 2006a, 2006b, 2007a, 2007b, 2008a, 2008b, 2009a, 2009b, 2010a, 2010b, 2011a, 2011b, 2012a, 2012b, 2013a, 2013b, 2014a, 2014b, 2015a, 2015b, 2016a, 2016b; 2017, 2018a, 2018b).

As highlighted earlier, interacting with more than 200 sectors (European Construction Industry Federation, 2017; Association of Turkish Construction Material Producers, 2017), the Turkish construction and building industry has played a pivotal role not only in Turkey's expansionist praxis, but also in recovering and catalysing the Turkish economy in the aftermath of the 2001-2002 debt-crisis by fostering surplus-capital flows into the domestic and global built-environment projects, such as energy, transportation, communication, military, water and all other physical infrastructure investments as well as various construction projects mostly targeted at urban spaces, such as urban renewal and mass housing, shopping malls, education buildings, sport stadiums, recreational areas, and so on. This finding corroborates Marini's (1972) argument that the sub-imperialist development scheme is built on an active policy for physical infrastructure development. As can be clearly seen here, Marini's argument overlaps with Harvey (2001, 2003, 2006a, 2006b, 2010) by underlining the effectiveness of fixed-capital investments in staving off crisis-tendencies inherent in capitalist accumulation, reproduction and historical development processes.

The above paragraph is also important because it gives away the Turkish construction industry's very connection with the Turkish state's spatial restructuring strategy. To better clarify this, allow me to highlight a structural contradiction limiting the effectiveness of Turkey's expansionist strategy. As my analysis of Turkey's capital reproduction pattern in this chapter revealed, although relatively effective in facilitating the realisation of surplus value in the second phase of circulation (C-M'), the trade surplus provided by the expansion is structurally incapable of promising long-term relief for the chronic disjuncture between cycles. This is mainly due to the fact that Turkey's spatial expansion also means the intensification of contradictions originating from the country's capital-import dependent industrialisation as an inevitable corollary of the capital-export's severe dependence on the capital-import. To overcome this structural limit, the Turkish state reinforces its expansionist strategy with a spatial restructuring agenda that seeks to facilitate fixed-capital investments into strategic built-environments that would alleviate some of Turkey's capital-import dependency's structural effects in the first phase of circulation (M-C) and in the accumulation process on a broader scale (Luce, 2015). Paraphrasing Berat Albayrak's (Daily Sabah, 2018a) words, Turkey seeks to manage its dependency strategy in the right direction to strengthen its expansionist foreign policy. In the following sub-section, I will explore

the internal dimension of Turkey's systematic spatial fix that built on the Turkish construction sector's pivotal role in an attempt to develop a sub-imperialist structural solution to the chronic disjuncture it has increasingly faced.

Turkey's spatial agenda for energy infrastructure development

Energy has always been crucial for capitalism's historical expansion and growth. Nevertheless, perhaps the word 'crucial' needs to be specifically underlined when it comes to Turkey, which has been characterised by the lack of sufficient energy infrastructure needed to meet the already capital-import dependent domestic industry's ever-growing energy demand. As a result, energy-import usually holds a quasi-determinant weight in the political economy of Turkey, given the fact that it is the largest and ever-growing portion of the total commodity-capital import bill, and in turn, trade deficit. A historical look at energy-import statistics brings some statistical insight to the costly, heavy and ever-growing nature of Turkey's energy-import dependency. Indeed, the energy's share in total imports, which on an average was 14% between 1996 and 2001, increased to 20% in the period between 2002 and 2017. Analogously, its share in Turkey's total trade deficit climbed from 39% to 57% in the same period of time (Turkish Statistical Institute, 2018a, 2018b; see Appendix A).

Turkey's severe energy-import dependency has been further deepened since the country's turn to neoliberalism, reaching two decisive breaking points. Figure 6 allows us to identify the first breaking point emerging in the primary energy supply shortly after Turkey's neoliberal turn.

Figure 6: Neoliberal trajectories of Turkey's energy-import dependency (see Appendices H_1, H_2, and H_3)



Figure 6 compares the shares of imported and domestically produced energy resources in Turkey's total primary energy supply between 1980 and 2016. Overall, it provides a clear insight into how Turkey's energy-import dependency has been critically deepened since Turkey's turn to neoliberalism. As can be clearly seen, whilst Turkey's total primary energy supply has been increasing gradually, the share of imported energy resources in the energy supply reached its first breaking point shortly after Turkey's neoliberal turn, and climbed from 46% to 76% over the course of time. As a result, today, only 24% of Turkey's energy supply is met by domestic production, given that Turkey imports 97% of hard coal, 95% of petroleum products[10] and 99% of natural gas.

The second breaking point of Turkey's severe energy-import dependency emerged after the debt-crisis of 2001-2002. In this period, the footprint of Turkey's

[10] Petrol products include LPG, fuel oil, diesel fuel, naphtha, gasoline, petroleum coke, refinery gas, aviation fuel, gas oil, intermediates, base oil, white spirit, bitumen, marine fuel oil, marine diesel oil and others.

already severe energy-import dependency has deeply pervaded the sphere of electricity generation as well. Figure 7 provides further insight into Turkey's deepening energy-import dependency by focusing on the sphere of electricity generation.

Figure 7: Turkey's energy-import dependency in electricity generation (see Appendices I_1 and I_2)



Overall, Figure 7 compares the shares of imported and domestically produced energy resources in Turkey's electricity generation between 1996 and 2016. As can be clearly seen, whilst Turkey's abillity to generate electricity has been increasing gradually, the share of imported energy resources in the energy supply, which was 33% in 1996, reached the second breaking point with the debt-crisis of 2001-2002. Following this climacteric moment, imported resources' share in electricity generation continued to increase gradually and climbed up to 64% in 2014, proving that Turkey's energy-import dependency in the sphere of industrial production has also broadened over the sphere of electricity generation, worsening Turkey's perpetual lack of sufficient energy infrastructure to support its historical development and expansion.

Whilst Turkey's already severe energy-import dependency has further escalated particularly since the debt-crisis of 2001-2002, Turkey has also strengthened its perpetual energy-relevant contradictions arising from its capital reproduction pattern (see Appendix J). For example, the European Environment Agency (EEA) database (2018) shows that Turkey has enhanced its persistent position in the highest energy-intense economies not only in the EU, but also in the world during the accelerated neoliberal development period after the debt crisis of 2001-2002. The same is also true for Turkey's CO_2 emissions, which went up dramatically from 205.7MtCO_2 to 404MtCO_2 between 2002 and 2016, promoting the Turkish state to the world's 15th largest GHG emitter position (World Bank, 2018d; Global Carbon Atlas, 2018). Besides, the World Bank statistics (2018e) indicate that Turkey's energy use (oil equivalent per capita) sharply increased from 1.139kg to 1.657kg between 2002 and 2015. Moreover, such a high-energy-importer, high-energy-consumer, high-carbon-emitter and high-energy-intense socio-economic formation on which the Turkish economy is built is likely to grow and do so rapidly, given that Turkey is one of the fastest growing countries in energy-demand among the International Energy Agency (IEA) member countries (Tommila, 2010) and the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources (2017c) foresees that total electricity demand will be triple that of the predicted energy demand for 2017, reaching 814.47 TWh by 2037.

Overall, my analysis thus far demonstrates that in parallel with the country's turn to neoliberalism in 1980, Turkey's severe energy-import dependency has been further deepened, increasingly creating economically and ecologically unsustainable conditions to support the historical development and expansion. All these developments also indicate that such deepening contradictions of Turkey's high-carbon energy-import dependent socio-economic formation have more rapidly coalesced and accumulated particularly after the Turkish debt crisis of 2001-2002, spreading extensively to the sphere of electricity generation. Moreover, this historical trend shows that this rapidly growing energy-import dependency, as the costliest and heaviest component of Turkey's capital-import dependency, tends to further complicate Turkey's already chronic foreign trade deficit and current account deficit, exacerbate the chronic disjuncture and undermine the historical conditions of development and expansion (Lenin, 1917; Marini, 1972; Bond, 2013; Luce, 2015).

To manage its alarmingly-deepening energy-import dependency, the Turkish state has integrated a spatial strategy of energy infrastructure development into its central strategy of building a sub-imperialism – which the ruling political elites call Vision 2023. Vision 2023 (Ministry of Development, 2001, 2007, 2013a, 2018; Justice and Development Party, 2018) represents the current version of the historic ideology of the Turkish state (Katz, 2015), seeking to raise again its dependent-capitalism to its highest stage (Luce, 2015). Overall, it sets a great variety of strategic goals in an attempt to insert the neoliberal Turkey into the top-10 largest economies by 2023, the 100-year anniversary of the founding of the state.

Along the lines of its Vision 2023 strategy, the Turkish state aims to improve its installed capacity to 125GW by 2023, constructing 30GW fossil, 34GW hydro, 20GW wind, 5GW solar and a total of 2GW biomass and geothermal energy infrastructures (Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, 2014; Investment Support and Promotion Agency of Turkey, 2018b). The Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources (2017b, 2018) provides a wide range of statistics demonstrating Turkey's energy leap forward between 2002 and 2016. Turkey's installed capacity, for example, increased by 146.5%, from 31.8GW to 78.4GW within a 15-year period as a corollary of massive fixed capital flows into both fossil and renewable energy infrastructure. When the increase in installed capacity by fossil power plants is taken into consideration, the share of fossil energy increased by 126.5% from 19.6GW to 44.4GW. With regard to so-called 'renewable' energy resources, on the other hand, the share of the hydroelectric resources increased by 118% from 12.2GW to 26.6GW. Furthermore, the share of the solar and wind geothermal resources has increased from almost zero to 7.4GW. Moreover, the Turkish state is aiming to further its energy leap forward by building three nuclear power plants. Two of these, namely Akkuyu and Sinop nuclear projects, are currently under development and will commence electricity generation in 2023. These nuclear power plants will produce a total of 69bn kWh of energy by 2027. Although the third project's location has not yet been officially announced, the Turkish state has already commissioned two global companies to study the project's locational feasibility.

A recent report by the Turkish Industry and Business Association (2018) states that within a 15-year period, the Turkish state has mobilised a total of $67bn of capital

investments in energy generation. When Turkey's energy-generation leap forward between 2002 and 2016 is examined from a production-energy generation point of view, Turkey's total domestically produced energy supply[11], which was 24.5m toe (tonnes oil equivalent) in 2002, reached 35.4m toe in 2016 (see Appendix H_3). By taking the level in 2002 as a starting point and converting subsequent years' domestically produced energy supply increases into USD at crude oil import prices (OECD, 2018), the total positive contribution of these capacity increases to Turkey's trade deficit, and in turn current account deficit, is roughly equal to $34.4bn. This simply means that, in addition to the mobilising of a total of $67bn of capital investments in energy infrastructure development, Turkey imported a total of $34.4bn less energy by dint of the energy capacity increases between 2002 and 2016. Furthermore, the Turkish state aims to mobilise a total of $110bn worth of capital investment in energy in the next 10 years (Turkish Grand National Assembly, 2017).

In the materialisation process of this energy strategy integral to the sub-imperialist development agenda, the Turkish state has persistently laid a pro-corporate legislative foundation conforming to the global corporate agenda of neoliberalism. The accelerated neoliberalisation process of the Turkish energy market arguably commenced with the Electricity Market Law no. 4628 in 2001 (Turkish Grand National Assembly, 2001), which established an Energy Market Regulatory Authority and introduced a licensing and privatisation scheme to attract and canalise foreign and domestic capital investments into energy infrastructure. In 2004, the Turkish state prepared its strategy document (Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, 2004) to boost the privatisation of electricity generation and distribution assets. In addition to developing a neoliberal legislative framework to boost energy privatisations, to create a high-demand and easy to access energy market, and to open up new spaces for global and domestic capital actors to invest in energy, the Turkish state added a wide range of new laws into its legislative portfolio such as the 2005 and 2013 renewable energy laws no. 5346 and 6094 respectively (Official Gazette, 2011, 2005), laws no. 5686 and 5627 on geothermal energy (Official Gazette, 2017a) and energy efficiency

[11] The energy resources included into the calculation are hard coal, brown coal, coke coal, asphaltite, LPG, fuel oil, diesel fuel, naphtha, gasoline, petroleum coke, refinery gas, aviation fuel, gas oil, intermediates, base oil, white spirit, bitumen, marine fuel and diesel oil, hydro, geothermal, wind, sun, bioenergy (animal and vegetable waste and wood).

(Official Gazette, 2007), and the 2013 new Electricity Market Law no. 6446 (Official Gazette, 2013a).

Through successive laws constituted along neoliberal lines, the Turkish state has not only opened up a high-demand neoliberal energy market for surplus capitals to flow, but also extensively removed the already limited number of legislative barriers blocking capital's access to nature and public and private properties. For example, 'urgent expropriation' regulated under Article 27 of the Expropriation Law no. 2942, which paves the way for the immediate expropriation of private lands and premises in states of emergency such as war and disaster (Official Gazette, 1983), is frequently exercised by the Turkish state as the main method of enabling and securing capital's access to space (Göztepe, 2018). The same pro-corporate modus operandi is also true for the Environmental Impact Assessment Regulation (Official Gazette, 2013b), which is used by the Turkish state to enable and secure the commodification of natural space at the cost of capital projects' negative social and ecological impacts. According to environmental impact assessment (EIA) statistics between 1993 and 2017, whilst the Turkish state made a total of 57,658 'EIA is not necessary' decisions – of which 54% were on energy, mining and petroleum projects – the number of 'EIA is necessary' decisions remained at 930, of which only 49 resulted in 'EIA negative decisions' (Ministry of Environment and Urbanisation, 2018b).

In parallel with the variegated pro-corporate legislative support by the state, the Turkish energy market's opening ratio increased from a level of 23% in 2003 to 90% in 2017 (Energy Market Regulatory Authority, 2018; Deloitte, 2016). By dint of the legislative framework constituted for massive privatisation of publicly-owned enterprises in the Turkish energy market, statistically, the share of the private sector in Turkey's installed capacity, which was 39.7% in 2006, reached 74.4% in 2016 (Turkish Electricity Transmission Corporation, 2018). Overall, the Turkish state has gained $10.48bn in income by privatising 6.7GW of its installed energy generation capacity. This privatisation trend tends to develop more, given that Turkey already plans to privatise an additional 7-9GW energy capacity (Deloitte, 2016). In addition to the income gained from energy generation privatisations, Turkey has also generated a total of $13bn in privatisation revenue from the field of electricity distribution, into

which the Turkish state has thus far managed to mobilise a total of $28bn in capital flow (Turkish Industry and Business Association, 2018).

The Turkish state also backs its energy infrastructure development strategy by virtue of a generous set of financial and technical incentives to encourage fixed capital flows into energy infrastructure. For example, through its 'New Investment Incentives Program' (Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, 2014, Investment Support and Promotion Agency, 2018a), structured around 4 main pillars of "General", "Regional", "Large Scale" and "Strategic" investments, Turkey supports all kinds of local and foreign investors' energy projects (fossil, renewable and nuclear) with a great collection of financial support mechanisms such as VAT exception and refund, tax reduction, customs duty exemption, land allocation, interest support, employers' social security premium support, income tax withholding support, employees' social security premium support and so on. Similarly, with its Renewable Energy Resources Support Mechanism (YEKDEM), Turkey provides a feed-in tariff with a long-term power purchase guarantee for licensed and unlicensed investors aiming to generate energy from solar, biomass, geothermal, wind and hydro energy resources. There is also a 'Local Equipment Incentive' mechanism for those corporations using domestically produced equipment in the process of energy generation. Besides, the Renewable Energy Resource Area Mechanism (YEKA) finances capital actors investing in renewable energy and local manufacturing of renewable generation assets (International Energy Agency, 2016; Deloitte, 2016).

Given such a generous legislative, financial and technical support targeted strategically not only at domestic, but also foreign bourgeoisie, the Turkish state has managed to attract a record-high of FDIs into its high-demand and free-to-access neoliberal energy market. Statistically, between 2002 and 2017[12], Turkey received $17.4bn of FDIs in electricity, gas, steam and air-conditioning supply, which corresponds to the 2nd highest after the FDIs in financial services activities by banks. Moreover, the Turkish state has received a total of $4.3bn of FDIs in the manufacturing of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel and $3.2bn of FDIs in the mining and quarrying sectors (Central Bank of Turkey, 2018a; see Appendix K).

[12] 2017 statistics are provisional.

Besides, the Turkish state has been taking advantage of its progress in energy infrastructure development to position itself as a cheap industrial energy market (see Figure 8), which the country perpetually lacks as an inevitable corollary of its severe energy-import dependency. The International Energy Agency (2017a, 2017b, 2018) dataset provides a set of dramatic statistics on the evolution of the industrial electricity prices in Turkey.

Figure 8: Electricity price for industry in USD/MWh (see Appendix J)



As can be seen from Figure 8, industrial electricity prices in Turkey, which were considerably higher than both the OECD average of 60.6 USD/MWh and the OECD-Europe[13] average of 59 USD/MWh with a figure of 94.1 USD/MWh in 2002, dropped below both the OECD average of 104.1 USD/MWh and the OECD-Europe average of 115.3 USD/MWh with a figure of 87.5 USD/MWh in 2017. Furthermore, in the second quarter of 2018, electricity prices for industry in Turkey were 79.4 USD/MWh,

[13] "OECD-Europe comprises all European members of the OECD (not necessarily EU members). In 2012 these were Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and United Kingdom" (OECD, 2018c).

continuing their downward momentum. The direct and indirect benefits of providing cheap energy for domestic and foreign capital actors are diverse. For example, cheap industrial energy means a decrease in both electricity bills at business level and manufacturing costs at domestic industry level. Moreover, becoming a cheap energy market also functions as an incentive to attract more foreign capital inflows, which the Turkish state increasingly requires in order to finance its ever-growing current account deficit. Furthermore, its combination with the cheap labour policy naturally enhances the global competitiveness of the Turkish economy in general, all of which assist the Turkish state in capacitating the realisation of surplus value and financing the continuity of this capital reproduction pattern.

As already evident from my analysis thus far, in financing its energy infrastructure agenda, the Turkish state closely cooperates with the core to further promote the absorption of surplus capital into energy infrastructure. For instance, energy investors in Turkey take advantage of the Clean Technology Fund (CTF), jointly set up by the Turkish state, the World Bank's International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) (International Energy Agency, 2016). Thus far, TurSEFF (Turkey Sustainable Energy Financing Facility), a programme developed in 2010 in collaboration with the EBRD and the EU to finance capital's energy infrastructure and resource efficiency investment projects, has provided €577m of finance for 1,043 projects within an 8-year period (Turkey Sustainable Energy Financing Facility, 2018). Evidently, Turkey has become the largest recipient of EU climate finance, with a €667m annual average between 2013 and 2016 (Dejgaard and Appelt, 2018). Moreover, Global Environment Facility (GEF) grants and United States Trade and Development Agency (USTDA) grants are other international financing mechanisms on which the Turkish state capitalises to further facilitate energy infrastructure investments (Deloitte, 2016).

The same cooperation has also been true in the global climate regime's market-based solution to the climate change crisis. Whilst closely cooperating with the global finance oligarchy – to use Bond's (2013, 2015) expression – in further lubricating, legitimising and extending the global corporate agenda of neoliberalism deeper into the Turkish energy market, Turkey also opportunistically makes use of an

intergovernmental incentive, namely carbon credits, in propping up its strategic agenda for energy infrastructure development. Evidently, despite its growing high-carbon economy, Turkey has appeared as a key player in the global Voluntary Carbon Markets (VCMs). In 2014, there were a total 308 carbon offsetting projects registered to VCMs (Ministry of Environment and Urbanisation, 2018a). In 2015, a total of 2.6MtCO_2e equivalent carbon credits were sold by Turkey, which promoted Turkey to the top VCM position globally with Indonesia (Hamrick and Brotto, 2017). Again, in 2016, with a total of 1.9MtCO_2e, which corresponds to $2M worth of carbon credits, Turkey was ranked 6th after India, the US, South Korea, China and Brazil (Hamrick and Gallant, 2017).

Nevertheless, there is also an antagonistic dimension inherent in Turkey's dependent and opportunist cooperation with the global climate regime, which manifests itself as the Turkish state's denial of any binding GHG emissions target that would inevitably set a limit to its strategic agenda to energise sub-imperialism. As a matter of fact, whilst Turkey shows a keen interest in the opening up of new spaces for all kinds of capital investments in renewables in conformity with the global climate regime's market-based solution to the climate change crisis, the country's severe energy-import dependent and high-carbon industrial formation also compels the Turkish state to react against any restrictions imposed on its fossil energy infrastructure development.

Correspondingly, Turkey's attempts at the COP-7 Marrakech accord in 2001 resulted in an agreement that excluded the country's name from Annex-II, but kept it in the Annex-I list. This amendment has entirely differentiated Turkey's position when compared to other Annex-I parties of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol (United Nations Development Programme, 2009, see also Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, 2017a and UNFCCC, 2002). Following this amendment, Turkey agreed to become a party to the UNFCCC in 2004 and to the Kyoto Protocol in 2009. The outcome of this amendment is twofold. On the one hand, it exempted Turkey from any binding emission cuts, which in turn enabled Turkey to maintain its high-carbon capitalist development and growth along the lines of its sub-imperialist agenda. On the other hand, it debarred Turkey from capitalising on Kyoto's flexibility mechanisms of CDM,

ET and JI as well as associated financial, capacity building and technology development support (International Energy Agency, 2016).

However, the 2015 Paris Agreement, which aims to keep the global temperature increase this century well below 2°C (UNFCCC, 2015a, 2015b) and offers $100bn funding per year to finance carbon offsetting projects (Green Climate Fund, 2018), has created new opportunities for the Turkish state. Overall, by providing a new financial mechanism known as SDM (Sustainable Development Mechanism), which allows all parties to host and promote carbon offsetting projects as well as securing their access to 'Green Climate Fund', the post-Kyoto period offers a relatively wider framework and more inclusive policy instruments for the countries to submit their INDCs (intended nationally determined contributions). The benefits of this new system for Turkey are obvious, given that the new system shifts the logic from 'binding' to 'intended' emission cuts. Besides, it removes the restrictions on Turkey's access to financial mechanisms of the global climate regime such as the Green Climate Fund and other international sustainability funds. Furthermore, it allows Turkey to host and perform SDM projects, of which the Turkish state would take advantage in both improving its energy capacity and attracting more FDIs to finance its current account deficit, which is growing at an alarming rate.

Hence, in 2015, Turkey eagerly submitted its INDC, which intends to reduce its GHG emissions by up to 21% from the BAU level between 2021 and 2030. This simply means that Turkey commits itself to emitting up to 929MtCO_2e in 2030 by reducing a total of 246MtCO_2e from its 2030 BAU emission level of 1,175MtCO_2e (UNFCCC, 2018b). To reach this goal, the Turkish state promises to implement a number of plans and policies targeted at seven areas: energy, industry, transportation, building and urban transformation, agriculture, waste and forestry. With regard to Turkey's energy generation plans for 2030, the Turkish state aims to make the most of Turkey's full hydroelectric potential as well as increase its solar power capacity to 10GW and wind power capacity to 16GW. Turkey also aims to commission a nuclear power plant by 2030. Besides, the plan consists of rehabilitation of existing electricity generation infrastructure, establishment of micro-generation and co-generation systems and electricity production on site. In relation to energy efficiency, Turkey also pledges to reduce electricity transmission and distribution losses to 15 percent.

Nonetheless, the opportunistic nature of Turkey's INDCs has been critically analysed by the Climate Action Tracker (CAT), an independent scientific analysis produced by three research organisations tracking climate action since 2009, and rated it as "critically insufficient". According to the CAT report, Turkey's INDC target is not in line with interpretations of a "fair" approach and if most other countries follow Turkey's approach, global warming would exceed 3-4°C (CAT, 2018).

My empirical analysis in this sub-section has focused on the internal dimension of Turkey's systematic spatio-temporal fix, namely spatial restructuring. Now, allow me to tie this empirical analysis with my theoretical framework. As defined earlier, by the phrase 'spatial restructuring', I refer to a strategic type of fixed-capital investments that assist the Turkish state in the management of key dependencies so as to prop up the continuity and development of Turkey's capital reproduction pattern along the lines of its sub-imperialist development agenda. My analysis in this sub-section has identified a key component of this spatial strategy by delving into a quasi-determinant dependency in the Turkish political economy: the costly, heavy and ever-growing energy-import dependency. This has been achieved by extending the analysis of Turkey's spatio-temporal fix into the country's dramatic leap forward in energy infrastructure development, representing one of the key internal components of Turkey's sub-imperialist development agenda. This focus was particularly important because, as I have addressed in Chapter 2, despite the extensive research carried out during the last decade investigating sub-imperialisms' expansionist practices beyond their 'national' boundaries (Garcia and Kato, 2015; Misoczky and Imasato, 2014; Amisi et al., 2015; Bond, 2016a; 2004; 2013; 2015; Flynn, 2007), what is not yet clear is how sub-imperialism is organised internally. Now, I would like to bring some clarity to this by drawing conclusions from my empirical analysis on Turkey's spatial restructuring agenda in the context of the ecological crisis of neoliberalism.

As I have underlined in Chapters 1 and 2, originating from the environmental degradation intrinsic to the capitalist mode of production (O'Connor, 1988, 1998; Foster, 1992, 1999; Harvey, 2010, 2014), the ecological crisis of capitalism, or climate change in specific, is arguably the latest of capitalism's crises (Pelling et al., 2012; Klein, 2015). Posing more of a threat to the Earth than ever before (Parr, 2013; O'Connor, 2010; Moore, 2000), the ecological crisis has arguably reached a climax in

the neoliberal trajectories of capitalism since the late 1970s, and in turn, led to two landmark intergovernmental accords: the 1997 Kyoto Protocol and the 2015 Paris Agreement, with both favouring a market-based solution to the crisis (Spash, 2016; Sapinski, 2016).

As reviewed in Chapter 2, the overall role that today's sub-imperial regimes play in what Bond (2015) calls the single most important long-term global governance challenge, climate management has been the subject of criticism due to its ambivalent climate strategies. To bring some clarity, whilst emitting 43.5% of global GHG (Oliver at al., 2017) by rejecting any binding emission reduction target and propping up the global climate regime's malgovernance (Bond and Garcia, 2015; Bond, 2015; Amisi et al., 2015; Reddy, 2015), at the same time, BRICS sub-imperialisms (without Russia) have appeared as the preeminent investors of renewables by hosting 74.7% of the total 7,800 CDM projects that have been registered since the emergence of the global climate regime (UNFCCC, 2018a). To explore this dilemmatic position, I have taken Böhm et al.'s (2012: 12) far-reaching argument on board. That is, the theory of sub-imperialism can help us in understanding and critiquing "the rationale behind recent embrace of carbon markets by particular nations and fractions of capital, and more specifically, to locate the central role of 'emerging economies' in promoting the global expansion of these policy tools".

The benefit of this focus was twofold. First, as I have reviewed in Chapter 2, whilst there have been quite a few contributions analysing dependent-capitalisms' expansionist praxis (Garcia and Kato, 2015; Misoczky and Imasato, 2014; Amisi et al., 2015; Bond, 2016a; 2004; 2013; 2015; Flynn, 2007), the contemporary literature on sub-imperialism still lacks contributions analysing how these emerging territorial powers manage their key dependencies so as to support their sub-imperialist statuses. Second, this focus was also necessary to support a recently growing literature uncovering intrinsic impetuses behind the emerging economies' climate/energy strategies (Schmitz, 2017; Chen and Lees; 2016; Baker et al., 2014; Mathews, 2015).

Overall, my analysis in this sub-section has shown that Turkey's eco-destructive praxis resembles that of BRICS sub-imperialisms', represented by high-carbon economies promoting remarkably eco-destructive fixed capital projects within and beyond their territorial spheres of accumulation, regardless of their catastrophic

ecological consequences (Bond, 2013, 2015). Evidently, similar to BRICS sub-imperialism's common praxis, during its prolonged neoliberal period of capitalist accumulation, Turkey has noticeably intensified its eco-destructive praxis and contradictions, turning a blind eye to the ecological crisis of neoliberalism. By maintaining as well as accelerating its rhythm of high-energy-intense, high-energy-consumer, high-carbon development (World Bank, 2018d; Global Carbon Atlas, 2018). Furthermore, as my analysis has underlined, such an eco-destructive leap forward by Turkey is likely to grow and do so rapidly, given the fact that it is one of the fastest growing countries in terms of energy-demand (Tommila, 2010, Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, 2017c).

When this overt tendency is analysed from the perspective of the capital reproduction pattern, it is clear that the reproduction of the catastrophic dynamics of the ecological destruction is interwoven with the structural contradictions and crisis-tendencies inherent in Turkey as an inevitable corollary of the quasi-determinant weight of chronic fossil-based energy-import dependency (General Directorate of Energy Affairs, 2018a.16). Accordingly, my analysis of the prolonged neoliberal trajectories of this relation has revealed two breaking points that Turkey faced. The first entails a dramatic increase in the share of imported energy resources in Turkey's primary energy supply; and the second manifests itself as a broadening out of Turkey's energy-import dependency in the sphere of industrial production over the sphere of energy generation –further worsening Turkey's severe energy-import dependency represented by the lack of sufficient energy infrastructure to support its historical development and expansion.

This suggests, Turkey's severe energy-import dependency is liable to feed back into the unsustainable reproduction of Turkey's debt-based economy, as it holds the largest and ever-growing share in Turkey's total capital-import bill, trade deficit and current account deficit. The management of such a key structural dependency that reproduces structural contradictions and crisis-tendencies in Turkey, however, necessitates a spatial solution that promises a high-demand energy market in which global surplus capitals can flow. Moreover, Turkey further props up this spatial restructuring strategy by co-opting the market-based solution to the climate regime, representing the third spatial fix in my framework. Furthermore, this spatial solution

also props up Turkey's sub-imperialist development agenda, developed in response to the chronic disjuncture between cycles. In the following paragraphs, I will highlight my findings shedding light on this conclusion.

As my analysis in this sub-section has shown, the Turkish state has attached more strategic importance than ever to energy infrastructure development of all kinds – fossil, renewable and nuclear – particularly in the aftermath of the debt-crisis of 2001-2002. I have construed the Turkish state's growing interest in 'management of energy-import dependency' as an internal component of its sub-imperialist agenda (Ministry of Development, 2001, 2007, 2013a, 2018; Justice and Development Party, 2018). My analysis has shown that the Turkish state has closely cooperated with the global surplus capital producers in practising its spatial restructuring strategy. To mobilise fixed-capital investments into energy infrastructure, the Turkish state has further extended the neoliberal agenda of global capitalism deeper into the Turkish energy market in various ways. These include the privatisation of public-owned energy enterprises, the creation of a high-demand energy market, the opening up of new spaces for global and domestic capital actors to invest in energy, the dispossession of the already poor masses, the commodification of nature and so on.

As is evident in this sub-section, to put its already high-demand energy market at foreign and domestic capital's disposal, the Turkish energy market's opening ratio was dramatically increased to a level of 90% (Energy Market Regulatory Authority, 2018; Deloitte, 2016) by means of a pro-corporate legislative framework boosting the privatisation of electricity generation and distribution assets (Turkish Grand National Assembly, 2001; Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, 2004) as well as removing the already limited number of legislative barriers blocking capital's access to nature and public and private spaces (Official Gazette, 2011, 2005; 2017a, 2007; 2013a; 2013b). My analysis has also underlined that by propping up its pro-corporate legislative framework with quite generous financial and technical incentives to encourage both foreign and domestic fixed capital flows into energy infrastructure (MENR, 2014, Investment Support and Promotion Agency, 2018a, International Energy Agency, 2016; Deloitte, 2016), the Turkish state has mobilised a total of $67bn surplus capital in energy projects (Turkish Industry and Business Association, 2018). In this accelerated period of energy infrastructure development, Turkey has absorbed

a total of $25.4bn in FDIs[14], easing the finances of the chronic current account deficit. Through its enhanced free-to-access energy market, the Turkish state has extensively privatised public-owned energy enterprises (Deloitte, 2016; Turkish Industry and Business Association, 2018), which has brought a total of $23.48bn worth of privatisation 'income' chiefly used in paying off Turkey's ever-growing debts. By strategically canalising more and more capital surpluses into energy, the Turkish state has rapidly increased its installed capacity by 146.5% by dint of massive fixed capital flows into energy infrastructure projects (Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, 2017b, Turkish Statistical Institute, 2018f), which in turn has enabled Turkey to import approximately $34.4bn worth less energy within the 15-year period between 2002 and 2016. Furthermore, my analysis has pointed out that the Turkish state has also taken advantage of its progress in energy infrastructure development to reduce industrial electricity prices (International Energy Agency, 2017a; 2017b), further capacitating the realisation of surplus value and financing the continuity of this capital reproduction pattern by reducing manufacturing costs at domestic industry level, absorbing more foreign surplus capitals in the form of FDIs as well as enhancing the global competitiveness of the Turkish economy in general. This massive and quite radical trend of spatial restructuring is likely to grow more, as Turkey aims to mobilise a total of $110bn worth of capital investment additionally in the next 10 years (Turkish Grand National Assembly, 2017).

My analysis in this sub-section has also pointed out that the Turkish state's spatial strategy for energy infrastructure development has been facilitated along the lines of the neoliberal corporate agenda of global capitalism as well as through co-opting the financial, technical and legislative mechanisms associated with the market-based solution to the ecological crisis. This finding sheds lights on the interplay between the second and third spatial fixes embedded in my framework. In other words, whilst mobilising surplus capitals towards renewable energy infrastructure development, the Turkish state's internal spatial strategy has further interlocked with the global climate regime's finance and offsetting mechanisms, which conceptualised as the third spatial fix to enable absorption of surplus capitals and stave off crisis-

[14] Of this $25.4bn in FDIs, $17.9bn were invested in electricity, gas, steam and air-conditioning supply; $4.3bn were invested in the manufacturing of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel and $3.2bn were invested in the mining and quarrying sectors (Central Bank of Turkey, 2018a).

tendencies inherent in capitalist accumulation, reproduction and development processes (Prudham, 2009; Böhm et al., 2012, Bryant et al., 2015; McCarthy, 2015). Evidently, energy investors in Turkey capitalise on aid given by the World Bank's Clean Technology Fund jointly set up by the IBRD, IFC, EBRD as well as the US Trade and Development Agency grants and Global Environment Facility grants in financing renewable energy projects (International Energy Agency, 2016; Deloitte, 2016; Turkey Sustainable Energy Financing Facility, 2018). In addition to being the largest recipient of EU climate finance with a €667m annual average (Dejgaard and Appelt, 2018), Turkey has also become a top player in global VCMs, opportunistically taking advantage of carbon credits (Hamrick and Brotto, 2017; Hamrick and Gallant, 2017; Ministry of Environment and Urbanisation, 2018a) whilst simultaneously turning a blind eye to the ecological crisis of neoliberalism.

My analysis has also highlighted that there is always an additional antagonistic dimension of this interplay between the second and third spatial fixes. Indeed, Turkey undermines the global governance of the climate change crisis by refusing any binding GHG emissions target that would set a limit on the Turkish state's strategic agenda of energising a Turkish sub-imperialism. In other words, although the Turkish state shows a keen interest in the opening up of new spaces for all kinds of capital investments in renewables in conformity with the global climate regime's market-based solution to the climate change crisis, the country's severe energy-import dependent and high-carbon industrial formation also compels the Turkish state to react against any restrictions imposed on its fossil energy infrastructure development. As examined earlier, Turkey agreed to its exemption from any binding emission cuts by backing the malgovernance of global climate regime, at the cost of being debarred from the Kyoto's flexibility mechanisms of CDM, ET and JI as well as associated financial, capacity building and technology development support (United Nations Development Programme, 2009, Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, 2017a; UNFCCC, 2002; International Energy Agency, 2016). My analysis has indicated that the same oppositional attitude has also been true for the post-Kyoto period, which provides overt opportunities for the countries submitting their INDCs (intended nationally determined contributions), such as both hosting and performing SDM projects taking advantage of the $100bn Green Climate Fund as well as other financial mechanisms (UNFCCC, 2015a, 2015b; Green Climate Fund, 2018). Notwithstanding that Turkey has submitted its INDC

target (UNFCCC, 2018b) in an attempt to take advantage of the 2015 Paris Agreement by increasing its renewable energy capacity and stimulating more FDIs and funding to finance its alarmingly-growing current account deficit, such an opportunistic move is considered as 'critically insufficient', falling outside interpretations of a "fair" approach. This means if most other countries follow Turkey's approach, global warming would exceed 3-4°C (CAT, 2018).

To conclude, I would like to provide a summary of my analysis of so far. Overall, thus far, I have analysed the interplay between the three top-down spatial fixes. I started my analysis by investigating Turkey's perpetual surplus capital absorber role with respect to the first spatial fix. My analysis in the first section investigated the trajectories and outcomes of the first spatial fix in relation to structural contradictions and crisis-tendencies associated with Turkey's capital-import dependent socio-economic formation. By adopting the perspective of the capital reproduction pattern, this analysis has examined the state's active role in capacitating the reproduction of space and capital and highlighted Turkey's declining capability to stave off these structural complications through traditional strategies.

In the second section, I furthered this analysis by investigating Turkey's spatial practice as a producer of surplus capital. Drawing on Harvey's notion of spatio-temporal fix, I have analysed Turkey's recent expansionist turn in foreign policy and energy infrastructure development agenda as the second spatial fix, propping up Turkey's sub-imperialist development agenda. Accordingly, in the first sub-section, I have focused on the geographical expansion dimension of the second spatial fix and disclosed the methods that Turkey has practised in an attempt to produce spaces in other peripheral economies.

After providing a thick description of the external dimension of this spatial strategy, I have extended my analysis into Turkey's costly, heavy and ever-growing energy-import dependency, highlighting how alarmingly growing contradictions and dependencies have acted as structural forces that push the Turkish state to develop and adopt a spatial restructuring strategy for energy infrastructure development to prop up the historical development and expansion of capital. My analysis in this section has highlighted some key components of this spatial restructuring strategy, such as the privatisation of public-owned energy enterprises, the creation of a high-demand

and open energy market, the opening up of new spaces for global and domestic capital actors to invest in energy infrastructure, the dispossession of the already poor masses, the commodification of nature and so on. Furthermore, my analysis in this sub-section has also highlighted how Turkey's internal strategy of spatial restructuring has been powered by the third spatial fix, representing the global climate regime's finance and offsetting mechanisms.

Thus far, I have tied my findings to three top-down spatial fixes. In the following chapter, I will disclose the fourth spatial fix, which I call the 'socio-spatial fix'. As explained earlier, the fourth spatial fix in my framework is different from the other fixes due to its bottom-up origin and it helps us to grasp how crisis-tendencies at the regional scale are alleviated through the bottom-up processes of geography-making and crisis-displacement whereby the system's very logic of accumulation and growth is reproduced. Accordingly, the following chapter turns our analytical focus to the production and reproduction of regional space in response to systemic crisis-tendencies surrounding not only capital and the state, but also Dêrsimites. I will further my empirical analysis in this chapter by exploring the impact of Turkey's spatial restructuring praxis on Dêrsim's socio-spatial structure. Nevertheless, particularly different from my objective in this chapter, my analysis in the following chapter will also seek to disclose the bottom-up processes of geography-making and crisis-displacement through the concept of the socio-spatial fix.

– CHAPTER V –

SPACE REPRODUCTION FROM BELOW: The case of Dêrsim's anti-dam struggle

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This chapter provides regional level socio-spatial analysis of the bottom-up processes of geography-making and crisis-displacement, concentrating empirically on hydroelectric power plant projects and the anti-dam struggle in Dêrsim. The chapter starts with a brief description of the completed, ongoing and planned built-environment projects in Dêrsim. Following this, it explores the interplay between Dêrsim's socio-spatial characteristics and the key confrontations associated with the dam projects. Then, this analysis is extended deeper into the compositional pattern and alliance formation of Dêrsim's anti-dam struggle, as grassroots agency. I continue my analysis by tracking this grassroots agency's crisis-displacement agenda and geography-making praxis. Finally, this chapter concludes with an analysis of how the people of Dêrsim – through their grassroots struggle against hydroelectric power plant projects – have brought about a socio-spatial fix that addresses some of their self-reproduction problems on the one hand, and assists capital in staving off its recurrent crises and reproducing its logic of accumulation on the other.

5.1. A contextual background of the dam projects in Dêrsim

Uneven geographical development lies at the heart of the entire capitalist economy. In seeking areas of accumulation, certain geographies appear as investable spaces, providing plausible conditions in which to fix capital. In the spatial restructuration of capital in Turkey, the construction projects of dams in Dêrsim have emerged with the target of putting the province's rich water resource potential at capital's disposal. In line with this target, many preeminent capital actors of the Turkish oligarchy such as Boydak, Limak, Soyak, Ata, Zorlu, Saran, Aksa, Bilgin and Ağaoğlu

holdings as well as leading foreign energy and mining corporations from the USA, Austria, the UK, and Australia, such as Stone & Webster, Strabag, VA Tech Voest, VA Tech Elin, VA Tech Hydro and Rio Tinto, have turned their attention to Dêrsim's natural riches.

According to data derived from various official sources (DSİ, 2009; Governorship of Tunceli, 2015b, 2016a; Ministry of Environment and Forestry, 2009; Ministry of Forestry and Water Affairs 2012; Ministry of Justice, 2013), in total, there are 92 projects on Dêrsim's water potential. Of these 92 projects, 30 focus on the construction of hydroelectric dams and regulators, of which eight have been completed and are currently in operation with an installed energy capacity of 433.35 MW (Energy Market Regulatory Authority, 2017). According to the IHS Markit database (2018a, 2018b, 2018c), three of these completed dam projects, namely Tatar, Pembelik and Uzunçayır hydro power plants are registered for carbon credit certificates. On the completion of the remaining 22 dam projects that are still in progress, the total installed energy capacity of the hydro dams linked to Dêrsim will reach 1,000 MW (Energy Market Regulatory Authority, 2017; Fırat Development Agency, 2015). Of the other 62 projects, 10 are projects involving construction of irrigation dams and ponds and the remaining 52 are projects involving the construction of flood protection and stabilisation facilities. Moreover, 22 new mining projects and many quarrying projects have recently been planned and approved along with the dam projects (Governorship of Tunceli, 2015b, 2016a). Figure 9 illustrates the key construction projects in Dêrsim.

Underlining two crucial points relevant to my argument in this doctoral thesis, Dissard (2017) brings some critical insight into Turkey's dam projects in Dêrsim. First, he argues that dams, which were once the symbols of modernity in Turkey, have increasingly become questioned, challenged, and disputed, turning from shining icons of progress into contested infrastructures wreaking havoc and destruction. Although the theoretical and analytical framework he employed in his study is different from that of the current study, his empirical observation here speaks to De Angelis' argument (2007, 2013) on the socio-ecological stability crisis of neoliberalism, thereby allowing us to shed light on this underdeveloped area of scrutiny. Second, Dissard argues that the Turkish state and capital are targeting every potential river in Turkey to build dams, regardless of the ethnic or religious axes of social difference. Having agreed with his

overall argument here, nevertheless, this doctoral thesis is aiming to take his argument further, suggesting that such axes of socio-spatial difference are vital to understanding how and why Dêrsimites have acted in the way they have. The following subsection will focus on this matter, exploring how the interplay between the dam projects and Dêrsim's socio-spatial structure has defined the main confrontations on which Dêrsimites' anti-dam struggle is built.

Figure 9: Major construction projects in Dêrsim



Source: Interviewee 1, 2016; Governorship of Tunceli, 2016a, 2015b

5.2. Dêrsim's socio-spatialities and emerging confrontations

Dêrsim, as the least populated province of Turkey with a population of 82,193 (Turkish Statistical Institute, 2016a), has been suffering from a lack of socioeconomic growth as the corollary of uneven geographical development. According to various research reports on regional disparities in socioeconomic development (Ministry of Development, 2013b; İşbank, 2015, 2014; Development Bank of Turkey, 2012), the province is one of the least economically developed in Turkey. The local economy is strongly dependent on nature. Agriculture, sheep and goat farming, cattle farming,

beekeeping, dairy production, and fishing are the main dynamics of Dêrsim's economy. Production processes rely heavily on traditional methods using traditional equipment and machinery (Turkish Statistical Institute, 2014). The level of industrial development in Dêrsim is noticeably limited, given that there are only four manufacturing industry companies employing 10 or more workers (Provincial Directorate of Environment and Urbanization, 2017). Thus, the local economy is mainly built on small-scale economic activities relying heavily on small peasantry, petty bourgeoisie, and a relatively limited number of labouring class members employed by the province's underdeveloped bourgeoisie operating in the small-sized service and industry sectors.

Moreover, Dêrsim has also been experiencing sociocultural growth problems as a result of the systematic assimilation policies pursued since the Ottoman period. This is strongly linked to a relatively distinctive socio-spatiality, represented by the religious and ethnic minority identities of Dêrsimites. Dêrsim stands out from all other provinces in Turkey by virtue of its majority population of Alevi Kurds. As Dissard (2017) clearly underlines, this distinctive mix of ethnic origin and religious belief differentiates Dêrsim from both Turkish- and Kurdish-majority provinces in Turkey, making the province the only one where the Alevi Kurd minority group holds the majority position. However, the Turkification and Sunnification policies that have been performed since the Ottoman period have been strangling the sociocultural development of Dêrsim. Çem (2009) provides a historical overview of the military dimension of this systematic oppression, arguing that the Alevi Kurds in Dêrsim were successively subjected to eight military operations in the period between 1860 and the end of the First World War. Following the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923, nothing has positively changed in the logic and praxis of the territorial power against Dêrsimites. Rather, further brutalised as in 1925-1926 and 1930 military operations, and subject to a genocide attempt in 1937-1938 (Boztas, 2015), where an official report signed by the Minister of the Interior at the time indicates that a total of 13,806 Dêrsimites were massacred and 11,818 Dêrsimites from 2,258 families were expelled (Radikal, 2018). Moreover, the Turkish state's systematic assimilation and oppression of Dêrsimites has been institutionalised over the course of time. In line with the Turkish state's agenda of Turkification and Sunnification, Dêrsim's name was changed to Tunceli with a specific law put into force in 1935, and over the course of time, the use

of the Alevi Kurds' language, folklore, rituals, ceremonies, names, and even the word "Kurd" were officially banned (Beşikçi, 1990; Official Gazette, 1935). These policies are still prevalent in the Turkish Republic to this day (Ronayne, 2005) and shedding light on today's grassroots struggle in Dêrsim.

Where there is oppression, there is resistance. This simple dialectic has also been true for the geography of Dêrsim. Accordingly, in response to the chronic socioeconomic underdevelopment and historical assimilation policies targeted at Alevi Kurds, the province has long been characterised by a deep-rooted struggle-tradition since Ottoman times (Çem, 2009; van Bruinessen, 2000). Dêrsimites' historical uprisings, which had initially been led by local Kurdish Alevi chieftains, have, over the course of time, evolved into an integral part of labour's armed political parties since the mid-1970s. Not only due to its geographical advantages, but also due to the intensity of contradictions surrounding Dêrsimites historically, the province of Dêrsim has been strategic to the very first emergence and development of the guerrilla movement in Turkey, in which many Dêrsimites, – i.e. Mazlum Doğan, Hüseyin Cevahir, Ali Haydar Yıldız and many others – have played founder leader roles. In this respect, chiefly TKP/ML (The Communist Party of Turkey/Marxist-Leninist), MKP (The Maoist Communist Party), PKK (The Kurdistan Worker's Party) and DHKP-C (The Revolutionary People's Liberation Party-Front) have designated Dêrsim as a strategic space to flame the fire of rebellion against the system, and over the course of time, have become the key influential actors in Dêrsim's political, ideological, and democratic spheres of governance as a corollary of their wide-ranging public support.

Today's dam projects in Dêrsim were erected over such socio-spatially differentiated geography. In this context, the key confrontations in this case have emerged in accordance with the socio-spatialities of Dêrsim. One of the main confrontations frequently emphasised during the interviews is the (e)migration of Alevi Kurds away from the region, which has been further accelerated by these projects. As a consequence of the socioeconomic backwardness of the province and the systematic oppression of Alevi Kurds, Dêrsimites have been continually moving either abroad or to more developed provinces in Turkey. The official statistics show that a total of 139,196 people (e)migrated from Dêrsim between 1980 and 2015, which is over 1.7 times the province's current population (Turkish Statistical Institute, 2016b).

According to a parallel report submitted to UN (CounterCurrent, 2011), the Uzunçayır reservoir, one of the completed dam projects in Dêrsim, flooded several villages. The report also states that if all of the planned dams are constructed, 84 of the 365 villages in Dêrsim (Turkish Statistical Institute, 2014) will be displaced and the inhabitants subject to loss of their houses, fields, and pasture for their livestock to the reservoirs.

The footprint of this threat posed by the dam projects is significantly larger than expected when their cumulative impacts are taken into account. McCully (2001) underlines that the globally increasing capital investments in dams have resulted in poor economic return, but massive environmental and social destruction for so-called "developing" economies. Similarly, the World Commission's report (2000), considering the magnitude of impacts of dams, states that 40-80 million people were displaced globally, and 60% of the world's rivers have been negatively affected by dams. In this regard, the dam projects inevitably have a cumulative impact on the wider socio-spatial relations such as agricultural production, livestock, and fishing processes; these being the main economic activities in Dêrsim. This is likely to cause changes in a great number of socio-spatialities such as water quality, irrigation and farming methods, soil structure, cultivable crops, pasture areas and pathways for the livestock, fish fauna, biodiversity losses, climatic systems, and so on (Ronayne, 2005).

Moreover, with the completion of the ongoing projects, the physical connections between provincial capital and districts will be hindered due to the flooding of some of the main roads, further accelerating the (e)migration of people. In 2015, I observed a paradigmatic example in the Qisle district of Dêrsim. Two people from the Arduç family, who live in Yeresk village, went on hunger strike to protest against the village's loss of access to Qisle district for over a year, as a result of the completed Pembelik dam project that submerged the roads and bridges connecting the village to the rest of the district (see the interview by the Pir News Agency, 2018). The family's struggle resulted in the promise of a rope bridge made by capital and state actors (Governorship of Tunceli, 2015a). Many interviewees asserted that there was also a political and military agenda behind this physical disconnection caused by dam projects, so as to prevent the people of Dêrsim supporting the guerrilla warfare of labour's armed-political parties, through isolating guerrillas from locals, and incarcerating the guerrilla war to certain rural fields. In response to this militarist

agenda, the dams in Mercan and Dinar have been the subject of bombing attacks by the TKP/ML (Dissard, 2017).

Figure 10: The Arduç family and the rope bridge (2018)

Another confrontation repeatedly stressed during interviews is the projects' potentially devastating effects on Dêrsim's ecological socio-spatialities. Dêrsim's flora and fauna consist of 1,806 taxa of animals and plants, of which 261 are endemic. Of these 1,806 observed taxa, two are in the IUCN extinct category, 12 are in the critically endangered category, 22 are in the endangered category, 38 are in the vulnerable category and 65 are in the near-threatened category (Ministry of Forestry and Water Affairs, 2016). The dam projects pose a threat to the main sources of such rich biodiversity, bringing Dêrsim to the brink of losing almost all its main water sources giving life to the province's flora and fauna. Moreover, Dêrsim's key natural parks and valleys (Munzur, Peri, Pilemorı, Mercan, Tagar and Hagacur valleys), as the main natural habitats of animals and plants living in the province, are also under threat of being submerged in water or being impacted at significant levels (Ronayne, 2005).

Figure 11: Ibexes climbing a dam wall in Dêrsim (2016)



This ecological confrontation is linked to another socio-spatiality of Dêrsim. In the Alevi Kurds' faith, nature means more than simple physical materiality. Dêrsimites believe in the sanctity of nature and attribute a metaphysical immateriality to certain mountains, waters and rivers, animals, and plants (Çem, 2009). The location of such natural beings is known as "ziyaret," which Dêrsimites frequently visit to express their gratitude to their wise ancestors, murshids, rehbers, pirs, and dervishes. In addition to their spiritual functions, ziyarets are also identity, solidarity and cooperation centres that bring Dêrsimites together under shared sociocultural commonalities. The dam projects have caused submersion of many ziyarets (see short documentaries by Kahraman et al., 2010 and by Munzur, 2010) as well as a great number of historic-cultural socio-spatialities including monasteries, churches, bridges, and temples from medieval times (Dissard, 2017; Ronayne, 2005).

5.3. Compositional pattern and alliance formation of the anti-dam struggle

In conformity with Dêrsim's socio-spatialities and the main confrontations arising from the dam projects, the anti-dam struggle in Dêrsim has gone beyond the typical ecological mobilisation against dams, incorporating other ethnic, religious, and

economic confrontations historically embedded in Dêrsim's socio-spatial structure. Therefore, through their struggle, Dêrsimites have not only aimed to stop the dam projects by means of an ecological movement, they have also targeted Turkey's suppression of Dêrsim's Alevi Kurds, as well as the chronic underdevelopment of the province that characterises the survival and self-reproduction problems of all classes in Dêrsim.

Here, I dissent from Dissard's (2017) interpretation of Dêrsimites' anti-dam struggle. According to Dissard, the anti-dam struggle represents a shift from "Red" to "Green" political activism, in such a way that the traditional Leftist discourses and practices against capitalism, imperialism, and the state have been replaced by the preservation of the environment against the same foes. However, my interpretation of the case is different. I argue that this "green" dimension represents a deepening of class struggle that not only forces all sorts of classes in Dêrsim to attune their class interests to the deepening socio-ecological crisis-tendencies, but also provides a political ground for class alliances vis-à-vis their historically ongoing problems of survival and self-reproduction. Thus, a closer look at the anti-dam struggle reveals that its compositional pattern is a mixture of economics, minority rights and ecological movements, politically and ideologically linked to labour's armed-political parties.

As I have addressed previously, the noticeable influence of labour's armed political parties in Dêrsim is not new, but a historically produced socio-spatial relation embedded in Dêrsim shedding light on today's anti-dam struggle. This influence became apparent when the armed conflict between the Turkish state and the PKK gave birth to a peace process in the 2000s. The peace process inevitably provided a relatively democratic atmosphere in terms of freedom of speech, expression, association, and participation in local governance. Thus, labour's armed political parties increasingly leaned towards entering local and general elections and organising all Dêrsim's classes into democratic spheres of governance. Along the lines of this new political direction, candidates and organisations associated with labour's armed political parties successively increased their votes in local and general elections as well as their legitimate power in local municipal governments, particularly during the peace process (Supreme Electoral Council, 2017).

In Dêrsim, hence, a great majority of ecological, democratic, and minority rights

organisations that have brought the anti-dam struggle into existence are widely known for their political and ideological affiliations to one or another political party of labour. As a result, the leading organisations of the anti-dam struggle have been frequently targeted by the Turkish state under suspicion of being controlled and directed by the armed political parties of labour. For example, an interviewee from DHF (Demokratik Haklar Federasyonu—Democratic Rights Federation), one of the leading grassroots organisations behind the anti-dam struggle, noted that their organisations were raided by the police in 2010 and five of their comrades who had been organising the anti-dam struggle were sentenced to a total of 125 years' imprisonment due to the accusation of being linked to MKP (Interviewee 2, 2016). Similarly, following the collapse of the peace process, a number of my interviewees, many leading actors behind the anti-dam struggle such as elected provincial and district municipality mayors and authorities, activists of Dêrsim's grassroots organisations, labour unions and environmentalist groups were either detained, jailed, or dismissed. A number of Dêrsimites' democratic institutions were also closed down and local municipalities transferred to the appointed trustees by the Turkish state (Governorship of Tunceli, 2016b; Ministry of Interior, 2016; Official Gazette, 2017b).

However, through organising the anti-dam struggle with this multiple compositional pattern, labour's influential parties in Dêrsim have enabled the banding of all classes under a class coalition against the Turkish state and capital actors' historical and actual policies and practices targeted at Dêrsimites. In this respect, the alliance formation of Dêrsim's anti-dam struggle emerged as a coalition of the oppressed classes and strata of Alevi Kurds and Dêrsim's underdeveloped local bourgeoisie, which served as an inter-class platform for the agency and praxis of grassroots movements and their geography-making and crisis resolution. Representing a relatively indigenous system of governance in which class/power relations realigned with the aim of maintaining and reforming the reproductive potential and livelihoods of the grassroots, the class coalition in Dêrsim has been built on a number of dynamics historically embedded in Dêrsim's socio-spatial structure.

To begin with, by bringing about new confrontations such as deprivations of nature-dependent production cycles, displacement of Alevi Kurds and their livelihoods, acceleration of (e)migration waves, radical changes to the cultural, economic and

social makeup of landscapes, and so on, the dam projects have emerged as an increasing threat not only for the labouring classes, but also for Dêrsim's underdeveloped local bourgeoisie in terms of their common problems of self-reproduction and survival. Thus, in response to the broadening scope of the threat, Dêrsim's local bourgeoisie, for the first time in history, became organised and took part in the struggle chiefly led by grassroots organisations linked to labour politics. They frequently and explicitly stressed the negative outcomes of the dam projects for the local economy (Turkish Enterprise and Business Confederation, 2014), and manifested their negative stances against the Turkish state's policies targeting Dêrsim's ethnic, religious, and cultural values as well as their financial support for the grassroots (Tunceli Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 2017; Tunceli Industrialists and Entrepreneurs Association, 2017).

Furthermore, ethnicity and religion, as two main distinctive axes of the socio-spatial relations in Dêrsim, have also laid the foundations for this class coalition. Here, it should be noted that this foundation has been established despite a great variety of sub-cultural identities in Dêrsim. For example, there have been long-standing conflicts among Dêrsimites due to their kinship with different tribal groups having fierce controversies over various historical, cultural, religious angles of Alevi Kurdish identity (Çem, 2009; Bulut, 2012). The same has also been true for the ethnic and linguistic aspects of the Dêrsim identity, since the province mainly comprises of a population speaking Zazaki and Kurmancî dialects, leading to a historical debate over the ethnic identity of Dêrsim's Alevi Kurds (van Bruinessen, 2018). Nevertheless, such sub-cultural identities and conflicts among Dêrsimites have remained subtle in the struggle due to the fact that dam projects have been generating a common problem of survival and self-reproduction for all sub-cultural identities in Dêrsim. In addition, Dêrsimites have well-established consciousness built over numerous learned-experiences with respect to the need for solidarity against the Turkish state's historical oppression of their identities. Thus, the representatives of DHF and DEDEF (Dersim Dernekleri Fedarasyonu—Federation of Dêrsim Associations), pro-MKP, and pro-TKP/ML organisations leading the struggle, described the dam projects as the Turkish state's new mode of the historical and systematic oppression of Dêrsim's Alevi Kurds. In line with their interpretation, they identified Dêrsim's struggle not only as a reaction against the dam projects but also a defence against the Turkish state's never-ending attacks

on the labouring classes of Dêrsim (Interviewees 3 and 4, 2016). The following comment should be noted:

> *"The dam constructions in Dêrsim are another step of the never-ending ethnic cleansing project by the Turkish state. The ethnic cleansing of Dêrsim is nothing new for us* [Dêrsimites]*. We all know that Dêrsim has been subjected to many ethnic cleansing attempts, including genocides, massacres and exiles since the Ottoman Empire. After the Ottomans, in the period of the Turkish Republic, we experienced the Dêrsim Massacre in 1938. Again, in the 1990s,* Dêrsimites *were made to leave their lands through forced evacuations, burning down of villages and numerous 'unidentified' murders. The scope of the threat was our lives in 1938; then it was enlarged in 1990s by targeting our lives in our common living spaces; and today, it is aimed at our lives in our common living spaces as well as our nature"* (Interviewee 4, 2016).

Lastly, the relatively democratic atmosphere provided by the peace process between the Turkish state and the PKK had also enabled the emergence of this class coalition. The number of associations established by Dêrsimites has almost doubled from 67 to 132 (Ministry of Interior, 2017) in the most shining period of the peace process, when for the first time the then Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan used the term "Kurdish question" in his Amed speech in 2005, and when the Turkish state killed 34 unarmed Kurdish civilians in the 2011 Roboski Massacre (Grand National Assembly of Turkey, 2013). Similarly, for the first time in Dêrsim's history, candidates nominated by labour's political parties were elected to parliament in the 2007 and 2015 general elections and came to power in provinces and a number of district municipalities successively in the 2009 and 2014 local elections (Supreme Electoral Council, 2017).

Under such a compositional pattern and alliance formation, the preliminary foundations of Dêrsim's struggle were laid in 1998 by the "Spend your holiday in Dêrsim" campaign to encourage remigration and to bring Dêrsimites together against the approaching threat of the dam projects. The campaign idea evolved into the "Munzur Culture and Nature Festival" in 1999. However, the Governorship of Tunceli banned the festival. In 2000, the struggle broke the governorship's ban policy on the festival. After 2000, despite the ban policy, Dêrsimites have continued to organise the festival. To put the brakes on Turkey's suppression of Alevi Kurds' sociocultural

identity, Dêrsimites revived their language, folklore, rituals, and histories, particularly during the festival periods.

> *"The first festival in 2000 was very effective in many respects. However, the state used cartel media to downplay it by means of a psychological war mentality. The second festival witnessed a huge protest against the governments' fascist approach to the festival. In the third festival, the provincial governor, gendarme commander and commissioner of police approached the festival differently and told the organising committee that they were allowing the festival on condition that the committee would guarantee social tranquility. The 4th festival was organised under a similar list of conditions. However the 5th and 6th festivals were banned by the government. From the 7th to the 14th festivals, the new initiative strategy* [the peace process between the Turkish state and the PKK] *made itself more apparent and the government started to be involved in the festival explicitly, even at the level of direct participation. Today the festival is being organised through the collaborative efforts of the municipality and other actors."* (Interviewee 5, 2016).

Eventually, the festival became one of the most popular in the country and achieved some of its main goals. When official statistics (Turkish Statistical Institute, 2016b) are taken into account, Dêrsim's (e)migration rates have gradually declined since the early 2000s. Particularly after 2008, for the first time in Dêrsim's history, the province began to receive more inward than outward migration. Besides, *"in recent years, the festival made its presence felt and the touristic attraction of the province has increased like Bodrum, the Aegean Sea coast and so on"* (Interviewee 6, 2016). By dint of the festival, Dêrsim has increasingly become an attraction for dissidents from other geographies of Turkey, and consequently, Dêrsim's seasonal population has increased considerably during the festival periods. Moreover, the festival has significantly broken the bans on Alevi Kurds' identity and increased the social awareness of the local people. In 2010, Dêrsim held an anti-dam protest march with over 20,000 protestors; the highest level of participation ever recorded in an environmental protest in Turkey (CounterCurrent, 2011).

Figure 12: We don't want a dam in Dêrsim (2017)

5.4. Reproduction of capitalist social relations and spaces in Dêrsim

In parallel with the successive festivals, the economic dimension of the struggle has become more apparent and given birth to new socio-spatial relations, triggering the production of the capitalistically organised social relations and spaces for further accumulation, growth and development. This has been achieved by a local boosterist campaign – to use Herod's (2003) expression – developed by the grassroots organisations in Dêrsim, integrating locals into capitalist accumulation processes and facilitating the commodification of Dêrsim's various socio-spatialities such as nature, cultural, historical customs and political histories.

In the following paragraphs, I will elaborate in more detail on how this has been achieved in practice. Before that, I would like to signify the conjoining of this economic dimension of Dêrsim's socio-spatial strategy with the neoliberal agenda of capitalism. As can be seen my central description above, Dêrsim's socio-spatial strategy for economic infrastructure development is capitalistic in nature and practice, tightly interweaving with capital's logic of accumulation, growth and development. Moreover, their socio-spatial strategy coalesces the neoliberal logic and praxis of 'everything can and should be commodified' (Bond, 2015), and in turn extends it deeper into Dêrsim, one of the most rebellious geographies in Turkey, where capital has historically been lacking the necessary socio-political support for further accumulation (De Angelis,

2007, 2013). Furthermore, their socio-spatial strategy overlaps with the neoliberal environmental protection strategy of global capitalism, which prescribes 'the commodification of nature as a means to save it' (Lauren, 2016).

One of the paradigmatic examples of the struggle-originating capital accumulation practices is Munzur A.Ş., which is a joint-stock bottled water factory that commenced production in 2005, with an initial capital investment from 240 local inhabitants. The Munzur A.Ş. was established in line with the local boosterist campaign as a local bottom-up development project.

An activist from DEDEF, as one of the leading actors behind the Munzur A.Ş. project, clarified the 'social' rationale for this project: "*to solve the economic and sociological problems in Dêrsim through sharing 10% of the company profits in order to set up new local businesses that can contribute to Dêrsim's development*" (Interviewee 7, 2016). Another activist from DHF explained the 'protective' logic behind the project as follows: *"In any case, the state would sell the water in the Munzur Valley to capital. In response to this threat, the idea was to establish a large cooperative, to which both rich and poor people could contribute, so as to prevent other companies taking possession of it as a gift by the state. Because our people [Dêrsimites] know that if other companies come before we establish our own company, they will force us to leave our lands. So, the plan was to prevent this from happening."* (Interviewee 8, 2016).

Over the course of time, Munzur A.Ş. has become the sole exporting company in Dêrsim, employing over 40 locals and distributing six types of bottled water product, not only throughout Turkey but also to Germany and Iraq via its 42 national and international authorised dealers (Munzur Su, 2018). As a marketing strategy, the company has also widely capitalised on material and immaterial sociocultural patterns identifying with Dêrsimites' ethnic, religious, and cultural socio-spatialities. However, in favour of the social rationale behind the project, Dêrsimites have condoned the commodification of their sociocultural artefacts as well as the Munzur River, which is a paramount "ziyaret" in the Alevi Kurd faith.

> *"The Munzur A.Ş. has been established as a private enterprise with a social purpose in reaction to the past and ongoing state policies toward this*

province. This can be considered as one of the serious mistakes of the ecological movement because it commercialised nature by taking water from Ovacık and distributed it everywhere. In this sense, I think that the political groups made a big mistake. Indeed, Munzur A.Ş. deviated from its social purposes and transformed into a typical capitalist enterprise over the course of time." (Interviewee 9, 2016).

Figure 13: Workers' strike at Munzur A.Ş. (2014)

The Munzur A.Ş. experience played a frontier role in the legitimisation of nature's commodification in Dêrsim. More paradoxically, in accordance with the legitimate grounds provided by Munzur A.Ş., a small dam project in Dinar was completed by Elda-HGG Construction Inc., which is a local company having publicly known connections with the grassroots organisations. Although the company attempted to build another small dam in Dêrsim after the completion of the Dinar dam, this second attempt failed due to the widespread discontent among Dêrsimites and the growing political tensions between the grassroots organisations over such a paradoxical compromise. Nevertheless, whilst explaining the 'compromise' story behind this paradoxical praxis, many interviewees have stressed that the company

owners have agreed on opting out of the second project at the cost of investment, showing an accommodationist approach to Dêrsimites' growing concerns and demands.

Furthermore, new entrepreneurial projects such as a bottled sparkling water plant, fish farms, red meat packing plant, poultry farming facilities, and so on, were put into practice by Dêrsimites. The trend of accumulation through commodification of nature has also stimulated the service sector, particularly tourism. Whilst successive festivals has been mitigating the province's (e)migration problem and attracting more and more visitors, Dêrsim's mountains, lands, paths, rivers, riverbanks, and underground waters have also been transformed into spaces for capital accumulation. This includes places of entertainment, beaches, picnic and camping sites, thermal spa facilities, restaurants, areas for nature sports such as rafting, hunting, trekking, mountain climbing, cycling and so on. One interviewee states, *"They [the grassroots organisations] rented even our sacred space in Halbori Springs"* and she adds, *"When it comes to commercial activity, regardless of religion, identity or ideology, they all use every means available to fill their pockets." (Interviewee 10, 2016).* In other words, the neoliberal logic of 'resistance' in Dêrsim has increasingly turned into a socio-spatial mechanism, re-boosting capitalist accumulation through commodification of nature as well as locals' entrepreneurial creativity. One interviewee describes the status quo in Dêrsim by sharing her experience:

> *"I think an example can give you an idea about the new Dêrsim. For the sake of introducing Dêrsim, I took my friends, who came from outside the city in order to support the struggle, to Kutudere [a natural place transformed into restaurants, a beach, and a picnic and camping site, frequently propagandised by the Turkish mainstream media as the new face of Dêrsim representing peace, comfort, security, development, etc.]. We spent plenty of time touring the natural habitat and decided to take a rest under a tree. Then, a man came and told us that the place we sit belongs to a commercial property, pointing to one of the restaurants. Can you believe it, they are trying to gain money from the shadow of a tree of God! Today in Dêrsim, natural habitats no longer belong to nature itself. Somehow or other, they have been privatised" (Interviewee 11, 2016).*

Figure 14: A local restaurant in Dêrsim (2018)

The subjects of commodification are not limited to Dêrsim's nature. The historic-cultural and sociopolitical values have also been transformed into commodities by locals in accordance with the local boosterist campaign. One of my interviewes, a local journalist, explains this trend as follows: *"The festival has resulted in a huge turnout for the region, bringing about a new economic cycle. At the beginning, people sold Munzur trout, mountain honey, wild garlic, crops they produced. Then, the municipality earmarked a long street and rented market stalls for locals' use" (Interviewee 12, 2016).* Another local journalist I interviewed underlines the widening spatial footprint of this new economic cycle. *"In festival periods, market stalls cover the entire road between Seyit Rıza Square and Demir Bridge. This commercialisation trend was expanded to natural habitats in Pülümür Valley, Harçik, Sinan, Marçik, Kududere and so on." (Interviewee 13, 2016).* The following comment exemplifies the main commodification processes taking place in this street market economy:

> *"One month before and after the festival period you can find a wide array of products on the market stalls. The municipality* [pro-PKK] *rents the market*

places for the sake of the local economy's development. The stallholders sell products containing political, historical, cultural and religious symbols or figures that have an important place in Dêrsim people's lives. For example, Ali ibn Abi Talib, the Twelve Imams, Zulfiqar, Seyid Rıza, İbrahim, Deniz, Mahir, the Kurdish flag, Abdullah Öcalan, Mazlum Doğan, and so on... People have no idea what they are buying or selling! They actually exchange our beliefs, values, culture, history and even religion in the form of commodities. Dêrsimites weren't used to this kind of exchange relations before" (Interviewee 14, 2016).

Overall, there has been an atmosphere of tolerance for the accumulation practices performed by Dêrsimites, further interlocking with the Turkish state's agenda to open up Dêrsim for capital investments. This agenda has been explicitly announced at the speech of the provincial governor of Tunceli at the opening ceremony of the 8th festival, which customarily starts with the lighting of the festival flame that would symbolically commence the traditional anti-dam protest march led by grassroots organisations: *"We will all pull together in unity to open beautiful Tunceli to tourism and turn it into a tourism paradise"* (Demir, 2008). A great majority of people we interviewed explicitly stated their positive stances towards these economic activities. *"I believe our history, nature and beliefs can contribute to the development of the city. In fact, I think maybe it is the only beneficial result of these dam projects."* (Interviewee 15, 2016). The established consensus on regional growth politics is also extensively reflected in the interviewees' comments. The locals explained their tolerance of the accumulation through appropriation of Dêrsim's nature, culture and histories by putting forward the argument of their economic wellbeing. The following comment can be noted: *"The capitalist system is established on the commodity and therefore we should connive the commercialisation in Dêrsim. Why should it only be other people in Turkey who make money? Let Dêrsimites make some money!"* (Interviewee 16, 2016). A labour union representative [pro-PKK] clearly explains their support for the commodification practices in Dêrsim as follows:

"The main contradiction of the labour movement up until now in Turkey is the understanding of labour movement merely as a field of opposition. The majority of labour organisations in Dêrsim think that such understanding doesn't improve, but marginalises our struggle. (...) If you tell people that they must be

against commodification, they will reply that they are starving; they are landless; they have no alternative except moving away. By doing so, you lose public trust, and when you lose public trust, people come closer to the capitalist system. To avoid this, labour organisations in Dêrsim have been adopting a new perspective, offering alternative methods of development and creating new job opportunities and work areas. Thus, we see these commodification practices as a corollary of having no alternative ways of living, and support these economic activities unless they harm the environment" (Interviewee 17, 2016).

Nevertheless, besides the atmosphere of tolerance, there has still been an emerging atmosphere of disapproval, calling into question the indigenous system of governance established and its socio-spatial solution to Dêrsimites' self-reproduction and survival problems. As already evident thus far, a number of interviewees have expressed their concerns and critiques regarding the capitalistic logic and praxis inherent in this socio-spatial solution. *"The municipality's economic approach to festivals calls into question whether or not our struggle is really against the dam-projects" (Interviewee 18, 2016). "The commercialisation trend in Dêrsim is one of the most dangerous risks for us [Dêrsimites]. I think, Dêrsim has taken ill due to the capitalist system. By 'illness', I mean the illness of taking advantage of the situation" (Interviewee 19, 2016).*

Besides, many interviewees levelled the criticism at certain grassroots organisations playing a dominant role in Dêrsimites' anti-dam struggle. One representative of an activist group, for example, objects to the pro-PKK organisations' pragmatic political agenda. *"If you want to govern a society, then govern their governors. This is the situation that has emerged in Dêrsim. The Kurdish national movement [pro-PKK organisations], as the dominant power in our struggle, steers the people towards its own axis. Corresponding to the existing political conjuncture sometimes they say 'Dêrsim is the centre of peace!', but sometimes they say 'Dêrsim is the centre of resistance!' Especially in recent years, they direct the struggle in line with peace and fraternity, and this mentality provides grounds of legitimation for government policies" (Interviewee 20, 2016).* Another activist shares his opposition to populism inherent in the current manner of struggling. *"They [the municipality and grassroots organisations] don't use our struggle effectively. I believe they think if they*

organise Dêrsimites in a more realistic and efficient protest line, current popularisation will decrease. I mean, they are afraid of becoming isolated" (Interviewee 21, 2016).

One local journalist, on the other hand, expresses his observations and critical judgements about political favouritism and inner power struggles as follows. "*I think the problem of the organising committee [the committee in charge of organising the festival and other events] is not related to individuals' choices, but there are ulterior motives behind these choices. Because our struggle is led by individuals assigned to act towards the purpose of the bodies [grassroots organisations] to which they belong, they try to prioritise the interests of their factions rather than those of Dêrsimites. Hence, they only promote their political agendas, but push Dêrsimites' needs and demands into the background. Reactions of locals and alternative struggle groups are somehow suppressed. For instance, they keep their audience [supporters] out of the activity when they believe it is not useful for their political agenda. Another example is that there are a few small local environmentalist groups. When these groups organise events, such as collecting garbage from riverbanks, these power elites don't support them or they approach the event as an advertisement opportunity and impose upon them ridiculous conditions such as 'do these activities under our name'" (Interviewee 22, 2016).*

In addition to such critiques, there is also a growing local criticism of festivals due to their various negative impacts on nature and everyday life in Dêrsim. "*The pollution that people cause within only 4 days of the festival is unbelievable, perhaps more than in the remaining 361 days in a year. How can you be persuasive in your struggle, while you harm the environment?" (Interviewee 23, 2016). "I don't believe in the sincerity of the struggle any longer. Thus, I withdrew from attending any environmental protests or other activities after the Uzunçayır Dam protest." (Interviewee 24, 2016). "People [Dêrsimites] are annoyed because of the festivals. I believe the municipality does not care about this issue. I believe they perceive any criticism as the opponents' view, and therefore close their ears to complaints" (Interviewee 25, 2016). "Many of my friends and I wish to escape from the city in festival periods, because it's getting too crowded and noisy. Actually, we feel anger towards the idea of the festival. You know, visitors usually say that they are coming to Dêrsim to support the struggle, but I don't believe in this anymore unfortunately. For*

me, the festival just creates an illusion of struggle and under the impact of this illusion we are all becoming more unconcerned about our real problems" (Interviewee 26, 2016).

Before I conclude this chapter, I would like to briefly describe how the Turkish state has adopted and furthered the local boosterist campaign in recent years. As I have mentioned earlier, following the collapse of the peace process, many activists as well as the grassroots organisations and municipalities in Dêrsim have again been targeted by the Turkish state. After the closing down of many democratic organisations and transferring of local municipalities to trustees, the festival has not been organised for two years on the pretext of the risk of an ISIS attack. After this two-year break, instead of banning the festival, the Turkish state has attempted to organise a new one; and the grassroots organisations in Dêrsim have rejected taking part in the "trustee's festival", declaring that they would organise their own (Çamur, 2017).

Nevertheless, following in the legitimate grounds provided by the 15 years of neoliberal 'resistance' praxis by the grassroots, the Turkish state has further accelerated the commodification of Dêrsim's nature, culture and history and opened up more spaces for capital to invest. According to the provincial governor of Tunceli, "projects that were being spoken about for years but never realised were carried out within only a year" (Cumhuriyet, 2018). During his press interview given with respect to the new introductory film advertising Dêrsim as a tourist city (*Provincial Governorship of Tunceli, 2018)*, the mayor and governor of Tunceli notes that they have completed 62 projects within 14 months. Here is another inaugural commentary given by the provincial governor of Tunceli on the transformation 36 of 80km of the Munzur River into an 'international rafting track'. *"I've been holding the office of both provincial governor and municipality mayor for almost 11 months. Dear President of the Republic and Ministers are very supportive to the works and projects we have been carrying out. For example, we have now brought in one of the highest quality drinking waters to Tunceli. We built recreational areas, beaches, landscapes, marinas like in Bodrum, piers, recreational crafts and gondolas, even blossom trees, so that our citizens would enjoy them"* (Municipality of Tunceli, 2018). Similarly, in another press interview, he brings tidings of new projects completed and the dream of the new social climate as follows: "*Environmental planning of a 200,000 square metre area was*

carried out in order to be used by city dwellers. Walking and cycling routes, outdoor swimming pools, piers, cafés, leisure areas and miniature bridges were built. (…) Tunceli is now a city of peace. Our citizens, tradesmen, and locals are very satisfied. We are trying to reflect the affection and warmth of our government to locals" (Daily Sabah, 2018b).

Figure 15: A recreational area in Dêrsim (2018)

Thus far, Chapter 5 has explored the bottom-up processes of geography-making and crisis-displacement, focusing on hydroelectric power plant projects and the anti-dam struggle in Dêrsim. Accordingly, I started my regional-level case analysis with a description and identifications of a great variety of actors and fixed-capital projects shaping the geography of Dêrsim. I have then taken this analysis further by exploring the impact of this top-down process of space reproduction on Dêrsim's regional structure as well as identifying confrontations associated with Dêrsim's socio-spatialities. Following this, my empirical analysis has focused on grassroots agency's crisis-displacement agenda and geography-making praxis, examining the compositional pattern and alliance formation of Dêrsim's anti-dam struggle.

In the following section, I merge my empirical analysis and findings in this chapter with my framework, focusing on the phenomenon of space reproduction from below and exploring how Dêrsimites produced a socio-spatial fix that addresses some of their self-reproduction and survival problems on the one hand, and assists capital in staving off its recurrent crises and reproducing its logic of accumulation on the other.

5.5. Dêrsim's socio-spatial fix to socio-ecological stability crisis

Today's sub-imperialisms amplify not only environmental degradation, but also social instability more than ever by promoting capital's high-carbon, extractive, super-exploitative and eco-destructive praxis against the very basic interests of labour, grassroots, nature and weaker nations (Bond and Garcia, 2015). As reviewed in Chapter 1, in connection with world-capitalism's rapidly accelerating eco-destructive praxis during its prolonged neoliberal era (O'Connor, 1988, 1998; Foster, 1992, 1999; Harvey, 2010, 2014; Moore, 2000), there have also been deepening conditions of what De Angelis (2007) calls socio-ecological stability crisis. That is, capital increasingly loses its capability to receive the necessary social and ecological support for its recovery and growth, which in turn calls into question the legitimacy of capitalism. In other words, whilst attempting to stave off its economic, geopolitical and ecological crises through boosting capital's geographical expansion and/or spatial restructuring, such top-down spatio-temporal fixes produced by traditional and emerging surplus capital producers have also increasingly undermined socio-ecological conditions of the spatial displacement of crisis, leading to new crises at regional spaces, into which overaccumulated capital has increasingly flowed in the form of fixed capital projects such as transportation, energy-generation, communication, sewage and water and all other physical infrastructure development (Harvey, 2001, 2003). Here is where the capitalist system requires new bottom-up strategies to enable the displacement and recovery of the crisis of social and ecological stability through realigning class/power relations and establishing new systems of governance, re-boosting capitalist accumulation and growth (De Angelis, 2013).

My analysis in Chapter 5 has explored this fourth fix by tracking the Turkish state's internal spatial strategy for energy infrastructure development in practice. By analysing the interplay between capital, socio-spatial structure and grassroots agency in the context of the recent trajectories of labour geography, I have provided an in-

depth case analysis of how the people of Dêrsim – through their grassroots struggle against hydroelectric power plant projects – have produced what I call a socio-spatial fix from below that both addresses their province's chronic underdevelopment and assists capital in staving off its recurrent crises and reproducing its logic of accumulation.

The Dêrsim case provides an empirical example showing the capacity of socio-spatial structure to constrain grassroots' collective action. In Dêrsim, the socio-spatial structure has acted as a structural constraint shaping grassroots agency in a variety of ways. For example, the emerging confrontations associated with the dam projects, which brought about grassroots agency in Dêrsim, have strongly connected with the socio-spatial characteristics of the province. These confrontations include the displacement of Alevi Kurds, deprivations of agricultural production, livestock and fishing processes, acceleration of emigration and migration waves, destruction of ecological habitats, annihilation of Alevi Kurds' identity, solidarity and cooperation centres, and so on. My analysis has uncovered that, whilst organising their struggle, Dêrsimites frequently and repeatedly link these emerging confrontations to ethnic, religious, cultural, historical, political, ecological and economic components of Dêrsim's socio-spatial structure.

Moreover, Dêrsim's socio-spatial structure also plays a constraining role in framing the compositional pattern of grassroots agency, which, in this case, has gone beyond a typical mobilisation against dam projects, evolving into a mixture of economic, minority rights and ecological movements. This is mainly due to the fact that these dam projects are closely connected to other deep-rooted problems embedded in Dêrsim's socio-spatial structure. For example, the problem of the destruction of ecological habitats also implies the undermining of Alevi Kurds' identity, solidarity and cooperation centres as well as deprivations of nature-dependent production cycles, which negatively affect the chronic socioeconomic problems of the province.

Lastly, my case analysis reveals that the formation of class alliances between grassroots movements is also constrained by the province's socio-spatial structure. In response to the broadening scope of the threat posed by dam projects, the class alliance of the anti-dam struggle has emerged between the labouring classes of Alevi

Kurds and Dêrsim's underdeveloped local bourgeoisie. In conformity with this class alliance formation, the anti-dam struggle has given birth to a local boosterist campaign with the aim not only of resisting the dam projects, which would worsen the province's chronic socio-economic backwardness, but also reviving and developing the province's ethnic, cultural, historical, political, economic and ecological relations.

All these findings discussed above indicate that an analytical focus on socio-spatial structures can provide considerable contextual leverage to understand the agency's spatiality and constrained praxis in relation to unevenly developed geographical configurations. Here, my empirical analysis brings a new insight into the growing debate on the theorisation of agency (Castree, 2007; Tufts and Savage, 2009; Coe and Jordhus-Lier, 2011; Herod, 2012). My case study demonstrates that despite the complexity of the material and immaterial realms conditioning the agency (Coe and Jordhus-Lier, 2011), socio-spatial structures can be scrutinised as modular analytical units not only reflecting the whole, but also significantly advancing our knowledge of the spatiality and constrained nature of agency.

Moreover, by providing an empirical example of how socio-spatially differentiated structural constraints shape agency's praxis, my case study responds to Tufts and Savage's (2009) and Herod's (2012) calls for deeper spatial analysis of cases to explore the variations in agency's praxis and strategies. Here, I also take Dissard's (2017) contribution further. As Dissard (2017: 18) argues, dams are being built on every river in Turkey "unbiased to the fact that these might 'belong' to Turks, Kurds, Sunnis, Alevis, or others". However, my case analysis of the most longstanding anti-dam struggle in Turkey reveals that the agency and praxis of grassroots movements in Dêrsim are closely linked not only to ethnic and religious, but also political, cultural, historical and economic axes of socio-spatial difference perpetually produced by the Turkish state and capital actors.

Thus far, I have discussed how and why Dêrsim's socio-spatial structure acts as a constraint that shapes grassroots agency. Yet, the reverse of this dialectic is also true. That is, grassroots also shapes the socio-spatial structure by producing fixes to their problems of self-reproduction and survival. However, different from Herod's (1997) notion of labour's spatial fix, I address the conjoined nature of capital's and grassroots' praxis of geography-making and displacement of crisis. In this respect, the

Dêrsim case has allowed us to develop and adopt a notion of socio-spatial fix to explore how grassroots' praxis towards the displacement of crisis conjoins with and assists capital in staving off its recurrent crises embedded in socio-spatial structures and the reproduction of spaces and social relations for further accumulation.

The case of Dêrsim can be seen as a socio-spatial fix in a variety of ways. To begin with, my case illustrates that the grassroots struggle has given birth to new socio-spatial relations through reproducing capitalist social relations and capitalist spaces. This has been materialised along the lines of the local boosterist campaign, allowing local people to integrate into capital accumulation for the sake of the province's socio-economic development. In this respect, Dêrsim's socio-spatial fix has conjoined with and assisted capital in facilitating the production of capitalist social relations and spaces, creating a pattern of governance that reproduces and rescales socio-spatial structure under the motto of the economic health and well-being of the province.

Besides, it functions as a socio-spatial fix to Dêrsim's socioeconomic and sociocultural growth problems, which have been historically blocked by uneven capitalist development and the Turkish state's assimilation policies. In this regard, Dêrsim's socio-spatial fix also conjoins with and assists capital in strengthening and maintaining the social order through temporally moderating the province's chronic problems, such as perpetually increasing (e)migration, lack of local capital accumulation and capitalist development, permanent social unrest over economic underdevelopment as well as political bans on, and repression of, Dêrsimites' ethnic and religious identities.

Lastly, by attaching local people and dissident groups to the processes of capital accumulation through commodification, Dêrsim's socio-spatial fix conjoins with and assists capital in providing legitimacy for the capitalist exploitation of nature, culture and histories. My case analysis has uncovered that the struggle-led accumulation practices have played a frontier role in expanding the wave of appropriation of natural, cultural and historical socio-spatialities for the sake of local development and created an atmosphere of tolerance for the accumulation practices performed by the locals. Moreover, the Dêrsim case also shows that such struggle-led accumulation practices, in accordance with the spirit of capitalism, have inevitably

resulted in a wave of accumulation through the commodification of Dêrsim's nature, cultural customs and political histories.

The notion of socio-spatial fix I propounded goes beyond 'success stories of workers' dominating the previous labour geography literature (Das, 2012; Coe and Jordhus-Lier, 2011) as well as Herod's (1997) conceptualisation of labour's spatial fix. As the case of Dêrsim shows, the socio-spatial fix has a dialectical characteristic. On the one hand, it improves the reproductive potential and livelihoods of the grassroots, and on the other, assists capital's spatial displacement of crisis, enabling it to reproduce its own logic of accumulation. In this respect, the notion of socio-spatial fix that I developed through the case of Dêrsim provides empirical support to Campling et al.'s (2016) central argument of how capitalism's historical expansion, intensification and transformation is mutually constituted through class struggles from above and below.

Furthermore, my analysis reveals that the socio-spatial fix in Dêrsim has been produced by grassroots agency built upon the class compromise between the labouring classes and the underdeveloped bourgeoisie of Alevi Kurds. Here, I agree with both Herod's (2003) and Harvey's (2006b) arguments that labour's and other oppressed classes' involvement in such regional growth coalitions is a result of the fact that "they have no other choice". In Harvey's words (2006b: 93), "whole social formations that had suffered mightily from the depredations of capital could conclude that if they could not beat capitalism they may as well join it". However, the local boosterist campaign in the case of Dêrsim can also be interpreted in relation to Wright's (2000) notion of 'positive class compromise', which appears in the form of active and mutual cooperation between opposing classes to improve their position. According to Wright, this is the case when the labouring class' associational power is strong enough, on the one hand, to block the unilateral materialisation of capitalist-class interests, and on the other, to positively contribute to solving the collective action and coordination problems faced by capitalists. In this regard, the class compromise in Dêrsim could be seen as a corollary of the significant associational power of labour's armed political parties having considerable influence in the province's political, ideological, social and democratic spheres.

Throughout my analysis, I adopted a grassroots agency perspective instead of

traditional labour geography's worker/union-centrism. This perspective shift has allowed us to go beyond the previous worker/union-centrism, which fails to fully explain the case of Dêrsim. My analysis of the case clearly demonstrates that such a collective form of agency cannot be explored entirely by focusing solely on workers' agency, praxis and isolated class interests. Rather, the complexity of realms encircling Dêrsimites' anti-dam struggle necessitates a broader and integrative class agency perspective that enables a grasping of the multi-dimensional, relational, spatial nature of the reality (Das, 2012) by directing my analytical focus to the mutual cooperation, collective praxis and commonised class interests between labour and its class allies. The grassroots agency perspective has also significantly expanded our understanding of the dynamics that unite Dêrsimites from all sorts of classes. Undoubtedly, the first of these is the hydropower projects, which have provoked a massive outcry from all sorts of classes in the province by posing new threats to Dêrsimites. Moreover, however, the ethnicity, religion and political directions of Dêrsimites have also played an important role in compromising inter-class interests. Here, I make an analogy with my findings and Campling et al.'s (2016) argument that the agency of social classes in the process of development is not only shaped by intra- and inter-class relations, but also interwoven with other socio-spatial axes of race, ethnicity, gender, caste, citizenship, and so on. Finally, as I addressed whilst discussing Wright's (2000) notion of positive class compromise, the significant influence and associational power of labour's armed political parties in Dêrsim's political, social, ideological and democratic spheres have also enabled the emergence and development of grassroots agency.

Above all, however, my findings bridge three important gaps within a particular strand of contributions in labour geography, which calls for a more flexible and broader understanding of labour's agency (Tufts, 1998; Johns and Vural, 2000; Walsh, 2000; Ellem, 2003, 2008; Lier, 2007; Castree, 2007; Wills, 2008; Coe and Jordhus-Lier, 2011; Oseland et al., 2012; McDonald et al., 2012; Jordhus-Lier, 2013; Brookes, 2013). My research aids this strand of contributions by providing an empirically substantiated framework to explore the cases in the Global South context, which remains considerably under-developed in the labour geography literature (Tufts and Savage, 2009). Additionally, my case analysis goes beyond this strengthening strand of contributions, which often conceives of other social classes and strata outside the proletariat as simple reinforcements of labour's agency. By adopting a grassroots

agency perspective, my analysis of the Dêrsim case has shown that grassroots struggles, as platforms of inter-class solidarity and action, can act as collective agencies with a capacity to make geographies of capitalism and produce socio-spatial fixes to their shared problems of survival and self-reproduction.

Finally, as I have addressed previously, the worker/union-centrism in traditional labour geography still reflects this emerging strand, confining agency to unionised workers and workplace/industry-based confrontations. However, the grassroots agency perspective has allowed us to transcend this tendency by exploring how confrontations without a direct link to the workplace gravitate labour and its class allies towards more collective forms of class struggle. For example, in Dêrsim the confrontations associated with the dam projects have interpenetrated more deep-rooted confrontations to do with chronic underdevelopment, perpetually producing survival and self-reproduction problems for all classes in Dêrsim. This corroborates Ferguson's (2016) argument that all social relations of production and oppression are internally related and integral to a more complexly-organised capitalist totality, and therefore, there is no compelling reason to prioritise workplace/industry-based confrontations but, instead, there is a necessity for a broader and more dynamic and integrative understanding of class struggle as a complex and diverse unity that, on the one hand, produces and reproduces the capitalist whole and, on the other, seeks to revolutionise it.

In the final chapter, I will conclude this doctoral thesis by tying arguments together and presenting the key conclusions from my analysis. The conclusion chapter will also highlight my contributions to the wider literature as well as the limitations of this study, where I also suggest how this investigation could be furthered in the future.

– CHAPTER VI –

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

This doctoral thesis has been built on the problem of the rise and intensification of financial, geopolitical and socio-ecological crises in the prolonged neoliberal era of capitalism. The financial dimension of this crisis has risen to the surface primarily in the mid-1990s represented by successive debt-crises as in Turkey, Mexico, Russia, Argentina, Brazil and the Asian Tigers. Despite the restoration of the global neoliberalisation project in the aftermath of this first wave (Williamson, 1990, 1993, 1997; Stiglitz, 1998; Williamson, 2003, 2004, 2005; Rodrik, 2006; Saad-Filho, 2010; Saad-Filho and Johnston, 2005), the crisis has further deepened during the new millennium and hit the capitalist economies harshly in the global financial crisis of 2008-2009, feeding back into recent debates over whether or not neoliberal capitalism has reached its end (Harvey, 2009; Duménil and Lévy, 2011, 2018; Castree, 2010; Kotz, 2009).

Since the mid-1990s, the capitalist world-system has also been characterised by a state of dramatic flux in the context of geopolitical space as a corollary of the deepening decline in US hegemony (Harvey, 2003; Duménil and Lévy, 2011; Chomsky, 2011, 2016). Whilst the US-led core has attempted to put the brakes on their deepening decline in global dominance by recalling the old-school imperialist strategies ranging from country-specific trade wars to the military and political co-operation towards conquering the world capitals of energy, the geopolitical dimension of the crisis has further deepened in parallel with the rise of new sub-imperial fronts, broadening their sub-imperialist praxis by developing an antagonistic cooperation with the core (Harvey, 2003; Bond and Garcia, 2015; Westra, 2017, Wallerstein et al., 2016; Bond, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c, 2013, 2016a, 2016b; Luce, 2015). Having a certain

level of industrialisation and monopolisation defining their subordinate statuses within the hierarchy of the capitalist world-system, certain dependent-capitalisms have adopted an active policy for a relatively autonomous, expansionist and enhanced position in international geopolitics and geo-economics, whilst at the same time promoting the global corporate agenda of neoliberalism, ensuring regional 'stability' and deepening super-exploitation of labour, nature and weaker peripheral nations within and beyond their hinterlands (Bond, 2013, 2015).

Moreover, as is evident in the climate change crisis, the system has catastrophically undermined conditions of socio-ecological reproduction more than ever in history (De Angelis, 2007; Moore, 2000; Parr, 2013; O'Connor, 2010; Pelling et al., 2012; Klein, 2015). An extensive body of research has evidenced that the system has only offered a market-based fix (Spash, 2016; Sapinski, 2016) that enables, secures and deepens capital's access to socio-ecological space (Prudham, 2009; Böhm et al., 2012; Bryant et al., 2015; McCarthy, 2015; Castree, 2008a, 2008b; While et al. 2004; Ekers and Prudham, 2015a, 2015b, 2017; Cohen and Bakker, 2014; Ekers, 2015; Nugent, 2015; Zalik, 2015; Johnson, 2015; Guthman, 2015; Dempsey, 2015), leading to a new contradictions and crises (Lohmann, 2006, 2009, 2010; Böhm and Dabhi, 2009; Ghosh and Sahu, 2011; Bachram, 2004; Bryant et al., 2015). In other words, the capitalist mode of production in its neoliberal era has not only intensified its eco-desctructive nature (O'Connor, 1988, 1998; Foster, 1992, 1999; Harvey, 2010, 2014), but also exploited the growing threat of climate catastrophe in an attempt to recover and engage in further capitalist accumulation, turning a blind eye to public concerns, civic resistance, and academic evidence underlining the need for a more realistic solution beyond capitalism-as-usual (Bakker, 2009, 2010; Matthews and Paterson, 2005; Buck 2007; Bumpus and Liverman, 2008, 2011; Büscher and Fletcher, 2015; Bachram, 2004). De Angelis (2007) theorises this third dimension of the crisis as the crisis of socio-ecological stability by pointing out a critical decline in capital's capability of receiving the necessary social and ecological support for its growth.

Problematising the above outlined conundrum of financial, geopolitical and socio-ecological crises, I have scrutinised how spaces of recovery and further accumulation are produced and restructured from above and below in response to this

three-dimensional crisis. This explicit focus on space was drawn upon a central theory within the critical geography literature, which has arguably been experiencing its golden era since Lefebvre's (1976, 1991) influential contribution disclosing the interrelations between the production and reproduction of space and the production and reproduction of capitalism. That is, the theory of spatio-temporal fix by Harvey (2001, 2003, 2006a, 2006b, 2010), uncovering the vital role that space production and restructuration plays in capitalism's recovery and reproduction by enabling the absorption of overaccumulated capital and labour surpluses. This notion was important also because of its wide interdisciplinary footprint, as it has attracted a great deal of academic attention from critical literatures on sub-imperialism, climate change and labour geography and has been employed to understand and critique the way contemporary capitalism operates within territorial, social and natural spaces.

In accordance with this main theoretical research question and relying on the very strengths of Harvey's notion of spatio-temporal fix, this doctoral thesis has explored four interlocking fixes making the geography of capitalism. Theoretical rationales for these four fixes were derived from the existing literature itself. The rationale for *the first fix* was drawn on Harvey's (2001, 2003, 2006a, 2006b, 2010) original conceptualisation of the notion of spatio-temporal fix concerned with the displacement of overaccumulation crisis-tendencies increasingly faced by the global surplus capital producers in the prolonged financial crisis of neoliberalism since the mid-1990s. The rationale for *the second fix* has also been derived from Harvey (2003), who has extended his theory of spatio-temporal fix from politico-economic space to geopolitical and geo-economic space by arguing that neoliberalism gives birth to 'sub-imperialisms' seeking out systematic spatio-temporal fixes for their own surplus capital by defining their territorial spheres of influence. *The third fix* has been addressed within the critical climate change and environmental governance literature by integrating Harvey's notion into the analysis of issues around the ecological crisis of neoliberalism (Böhm et al., 2012; Prudham, 2009; Bryant et al., 2015; McCarthy, 2015; Castree, 2008a, 2008b; While et al. 2004; Ekers and Prudham, 2015a, 2017; Cohen and Bakker, 2014). Finally, the rationale for *the fourth fix,* which is different than the other fixes due to its bottom-up origin, was derived from De Angelis' (2007, 2013) argument that today's crisis of capitalism requires – to use his words – commons fixes to cope with the crisis of social and ecological stability.

To explore the interplay between these top-down and bottom-up spatial solutions to financial, geopolitical and socio-ecological crisis-tendencies, I have developed an interdisciplinary and explanatory framework and investigated the making of capitalist spaces in response to systemic crisis-tendencies via spatial fixes produced by different agencies at different scales. As explained in Chapter 2, to understand and critique this conundrum, I have employed an integrative, relational and multi-layered theoretical framework, which offers a deeper theorising of the notion of spatial fix by reframing it as interlocking crisis-displacement processes. Drawing upon this conceptualisation, I have investigated the phenomenon of space reproduction by focusing on the four spatial fixes.

Here, before I highlight the contributions arising from this framework, allow me to operationalise this framework to explain how capitalist spaces and relations for accumulation and growth are produced and reproduced both from above and below in response to the financial, geopolitical and socio-ecological crisis-tendencies. My analysis has started with the first spatial fix, in which Turkey plays a perpetual absorber role. This analysis has revealed a number of contradictions structurally triggering debt-crisis tendencies conditioned by the chronic disjuncture between the M-C and C-M' circuits of capitalist reproduction. Following this analysis, I have integrated the second spatial fix into my discussion, disclosing Turkey's spatial strategies as a systematic spatio-temporal fix that further facilitates the first fix on the one hand, and eases the chronic disjuncture between cycles on the other. My analysis has shed light on two interrelated dimensions of Turkey's systematic spatio-temporal fix. I called the first one geographical expansion, where surplus capitals were redirected to weaker peripheral spaces and the surplus value extracted was transferred back into the domestic and global surplus-capital producers. My analysis has shown that Turkey has orchestrated the expansion of capital through an active policy for a relatively autonomous, expansionist and enhanced position in international politics, feeding back into the geopolitical crisis-tendencies. I called the second spatial strategy spatial restructuring, where capital surpluses were fixed into territorial spaces so as to manage the structural disjuncture between cycles. My analysis has demonstrated that Turkey has orchestrated the spatial restructuring of capital through a high-carbon, extractive, super-exploitative and eco-destructive praxis of geography-making, turning a blind eye to the very basic interests of labour, grassroots, nature and weaker nations. My

analysis of Turkey's spatial restructuring strategy has also shown that the global climate regime's market-based solution to the ecological crisis, the third spatial-fix embedded in my framework, was also co-opted by the Turkish state to further facilitate its sub-imperialist agenda.

My analysis in Chapter 5 has demonstrated that the Turkish state's spatial restructuring strategy, which manifests itself as a boom in fixed capital flows into the built-environment, has also had devastating impacts on the reproductive potential of space, nature and grassroots. My in-depth case analysis has disclosed a bottom-up form of spatial fix, which I call the socio-spatial fix, produced from below in response to the existing and emerging crisis-tendencies embedded in regional structures of capitalist accumulation. Socio-spatial fixes from below have a dialectical nature, as my case analysis clearly demonstrates. On the one hand, they are a bottom-up response to the crisis-tendencies deepening in regional structures as a corollary of massive and quite radical reorganisation of space and nature by strategically boosted fixed-capital flows into energy infrastructure and therefore, mainly seek to maintain and reform the reproductive potential and livelihoods of the grassroots. On the other hand, it is a socio-spatial fix that aids capital's spatial displacement of crisis, enabling it to reproduce its own logic of accumulation and circulation despite the overt lack of social support for the Turkish state's eco-destructive energy projects.

Through this empirically substantiated framework, I have provided a deeper theorising of the notion of spatial fix, bringing dialectical insights into the fabric of space and its production and restructuration. To understand and critique how the geography of capitalism is made from the perspective of spatio-temporal fix, this doctoral research has highlighted the integrative nature of space reproduction by focusing on both top-down and bottom-up processes of spatial displacement of crisis. Besides, this theoretical deepening has enabled us to see the essential interactions between and within spatial fixes from above and below, which corresponds to the relational nature of space reproduction. Lastly, it has provided a multi-layered reading of the notion of spatio-temporal fix by focusing on the interplay between global, territorial and regional political economies. Overall, building on this reinforced explanatory power of the notion of spatial fix, this doctoral thesis has proposed its first contribution to the critical

geography literature by highlighting the integrative, relational and multi-layered nature of space reproduction.

Through my doctoral research, I proposed the second contribution to the sub-imperialism literature, which has arguably been experiencing its renaissance by dint of theoretical and empirical rejuvenations that have emerged in the last decade (Bond, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c, 2013, 2016a 2013; Garcia and Bond, 2015; Westra, 2017; Wallerstein et al., 2016; Luce, 2013; Valencia, 2017). Overall, my empirical focus on Turkey was timely, given that the contemporary accounts within the sub-imperialism literature have called attention to Turkey's regional power-centre status (Katz, 2015; Wallerstein, 2015; Bond, 2015; van der Merwe, 2016a), often conceived as a determinant of sub-imperialist socio-economic formation (Marini, 1972, 1977, 2000; Luce, 2015).

My investigation of the phenomenon of space reproduction in Turkey from the perspective of sub-imperialism theory has allowed me to propose a relational conceptualisation of sub-imperialism by unveiling the interplay between Turkey's spatial strategies towards sub-imperialist development and the deepening financial, geopolitical and socio-ecological crisis-tendencies at global, territorial and regional scales. Besides, this relational perspective has allowed us to see the system's geographical need for a sub-imperialist restructuring of certain peripheries. Finally, my relational approach to the notion of sub-imperialism has provided a spatial lens to see how the internal and the external pillars of the sub-imperialist development are interwoven with each other. The contribution I am proposing to the literature here has advanced our knowledge of sub-imperialisms in three respects.

To recall, as my review of the contemporary sub-imperialism literature in Chapter 2 has revealed, Harvey's argument on systematic spatio-temporal fixes produced by sub-imperialisms has remained theoretically under-developed and empirically under-researched in the contemporary sub-imperialism literature. Additionally, Marini's argument that sub-imperialism is a structural solution to systemic crisis-tendencies specific to dependent-capitalism has been another oft-neglected area in this literature. Furthermore, this literature has been characterised by a unilateral perspective that solely focus on 'the external', neglecting how sub-imperialism is organised, maintained and further developed internally. Now, I would

like to better clarify my contribution to this literature by drawing conclusions from my political economy analysis of Turkey as a territorial agency with a systematic agenda to become a sub-imperialist power.

As I have emphasised above, apart from Brazil's own trajectory (Marini, 1972, 1977; Valencia, 2017; Luce, 2015), still very little was known about how today's sub-imperialisms were organised around structural contradictions and crisis-tendencies specific to their dependent-capitalist formations. By taking Marini's argument on board, this doctoral thesis has explored Turkey's sub-imperialist praxis as a spatial crisis-displacement strategy to alleviate contradictions and crisis-tendencies inherent in its capital-import dependent socio-economic formation. This has been achieved by integrating the notion of capitalist reproduction pattern conceptualised within the Marxist Dependency Theory (Marini, 1972, 1977, 2000; Valencia, 2017; Luce, 2015; Osorio, 2012; Ferreria at al., 2012; Filho and Araújo, 2015) into Harvey's (2003) argument on the emergence of certain dependent-capitalisms first as an absorber, then as a producer of surplus capital. This theoretical, analytical and empirical focus has allowed me to track the historical trajectories of the perpetual absorber status and their role in fixing the recurrent overaccumulation crisis-tendencies inherent in the global surplus capital producers (Harvey, 2001, 2003, 2006a, 2006b, 2010). My analysis has pointed out a number of structural contradictions inherent in Turkey's capital reproduction pattern, all leading to a typical debt-driven economy deeply dependent on the global finance oligarchy and surrounded by a high level of financial fragility under the pressure of currency exchange rate valuation risks and liquidity risks. By analysing the neoliberal trajectories of the Turkish dependent-capitalism since 1980, I have also demonstrated that these contradictions and crisis-tendencies have unsustainably and alarmingly accumulated and coalesced with the accelerated rhythm of absorption of surplus capitals, particularly after the severe debt-crises of 1994-1995 and 2001-2002 – in parallel with the deepening financial crisis of neoliberalism. My analysis of Turkey from the perspective of the capital reproduction pattern has expanded our knowledge by shedding some light on Marini's under-studied argument. That is, sub-imperialism is organised around the market problem arising from the disjuncture between capitalist cycles.

This analysis has enabled me to focus on Turkey's traditional and spatial strategies to capacitate and finance the continuity and development of this problematic capital reproduction pattern. I have identified a number of traditional strategies, including super-exploitative labour policy to lower domestic manufacturing costs; pro-corporate taxation system to impose the tax burden on the already poor masses; generous incentives to rhythmise the circulation of capital; provoking the masses to exchange their already limited future incomes with today's goods and services through the financialisation of daily life; systematic oppression of the impoverished labouring classes to restrain, repress and control socio-political unrest; privatisation of public assets to boost FDI inflows. My analysis of traditional strategies has expounded on the structural links between the Turkish state apparatus and the capital reproduction pattern specific to Turkey, and thereby provided some extra insight into Moyo and Yeros (2011; 2015), Luce (2015) and Bond (2015) by demonstrating the very systemic roots of super-exploitative and super-oppressive state apparatus characterising today's sub-imperialisms.

Following my analysis of the above-summarised traditional strategies, I have identified two key spatial strategies that Turkey has adopted, particularly since the aftermath of the 2001-2002 debt-crisis. Taking inspiration from Harvey's notion of spatio-temporal fix (2001, 2003, 2006a, 2006b, 2010), I called these spatial strategies 'geographical expansion' and 'spatial restructuring', both seeking to alleviate some of Turkey's capital-import dependency's structural effects in the first (M-C) and second phases (C-M') of circulation. Drawing on this formulation, I have analysed the Turkish state's recent expansionist turn in foreign policy and the energy infrastructure development agenda as two key components of Turkey's spatio-temporal fix. This conceptualisation was important and necessary to support this literature with Harvey's notion of spatio-temporal fix. Indeed, as I have underlined earlier, although the contemporary literature on sub-imperialism has been revived after Harvey (2003) called attention to the rise of sub-imperialisms, his argument's remaining part, which points out sub-imperialisms' seeking out their own spatio-temporal fixes, has not been the subject of a systematic analysis going beyond the existing conceptual allusions (Bond, 2017, 2016a, 2016b, 2004b; van der Merwe, 2016a, 2016b). By taking Harvey's (2003) argument on board, this doctoral thesis has provided an in-depth political economy analysis of the Turkish state's new expansionist foreign policy and

recent dramatic leap forward in energy infrastructure development as spatial strategies for geographical expansion and spatial restructuring.

In this doctoral thesis, the external dimension of Turkey's spatio-temporal fix was conceptualised as an expansionist spatial strategy to stave off the problem of realisation of surplus value embedded in the second phase of circulation (C-M') through enabling, securing and fostering the sub-imperial access to weaker peripheral economies. My analysis has shown that the Turkish state has switched to this expansionist strategy particularly since the aftermath of the 2001-2002 debt-crisis, and facilitated it by concluding growing numbers of bilateral, multilateral trade, cooperation and tax avoidance agreements with peripheral economies; increasingly partaking in intergovernmental development cooperation organisations at regional levels; positioning itself as a new donor on the world stage; exporting its super-exploitative, high-carbon, eco-destructive, extractivist praxis to peripheries; and taking political, economic and military roles in the re-establishment of global governance in crisis-zones as in the cases of Syria, Somalia, Iraq and Afghanistan.

My findings on Turkey's spatial strategy for the expansion of capital corroborate Bond's (2015) argument that today's sub-imperialisms play intermediary roles in lubricating, legitimising and extending the neoliberal political economy deeper into their regional hinterlands; advancing the broader agenda of globalised neoliberalism, so as to legitimate deepened market access; ensuring regional geopolitical 'stability' in areas suffering severe tensions; and more systematically promoting super-exploitative practices against not only labour but also nature within and beyond their hinterlands. My findings have also overlapped with those of expansionist practices by today's sub-imperialisms as already extensively disclosed by many critical scholars from the Marxist dependency theory (Garcia and Kato, 2015; Misoczky and Imasato, 2014; Amisi et al., 2015; Bond, 2016a; 2004; 2013; 2015; Flynn, 2007). The same overlap has also been true for the antagonistic side of this close cooperation, representing an idiosyncrasy specific to sub-imperialisms (Garcia and Bond, 2015; Luce, 2015; Moyo and Yeros, 2015). As can be clearly seen in the well-known case of the Syrian refugee crisis, the Turkish state has even been capitalising on humanitarian crises to secure and strengthen its intermediary position, and in turn, regional power-centre status in the word capitalist hierarchy by advocating the reform of the UN and

the Security Council under the motto ‘the world is larger than five’. In other words, whilst closely cooperating with the dominant core in the production and restructuration of space to fix the deepening financial crisis of neoliberalism, the Turkish state also increasingly demands a seat at the table for relatively autonomous conditions to further its sub-imperialist development, which in turn feeds back into the geopolitical crisis of neoliberalism.

My analysis of the Turkish state’s expansionist turn from the perspective of the capital reproduction pattern has enabled us to shed light on another under-researched area within the sub-imperialism literature (Garcia and Kato, 2015; Misoczky and Imasato, 2014; Amisi et al., 2015; Bond, 2016a; 2004; 2013; 2015; Flynn, 2007), as well as in the wider international development literature (Woods, 2008; Six, 2009; Zimmerman and Smith, 2011; Tan-Mullins et al., 2010; Power and Mohan, 2010; Mawdsley and McCann, 2011; Mawdsley, 2012; Mawdsley et al., 2014, Eyben, 2013; Eyben and Savage, 2013; Brautigam, 2009; Gore, 2013; Moyo, 2009; Sörensen, 2010). As reviewed in Chapter 2, both literatures have been defined by an overemphasis on ‘the external’, such as international and geopolitical impetuses, opportunities and challenges pushing today’s emerging territorial powers to develop expansionist foreign policies. The same overfocus on ‘the external’ has also been true for the domestic literature on Turkey’s expansionist foreign policy, which portrays Turkey’s new expansionist turn as a ‘success’ story of the Turkish state, written by certain Turkish political elites in response to the changing international climate (Davutoğlu, 2008, 2013; Fidan, 2010, 2013; Fidan and Nurdun, 2008; Aras and Fidan, 2009; Kulaklıkaya and Nurdun, 2010; Ozkan, 2008, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013; Ozkan and Akgun, 2010; Hausmann, 2014).

Contrary to such a depiction, the relational conceptualisation of sub-imperialism developed in this doctoral thesis has offered an alternative reading of the Turkish state’s recent expansionist turn by conceptualising it as an inevitable corollary of structural contradictions and crisis-tendencies inherent in Turkey’s capital reproduction pattern. My analysis has demonstrated that although the Turkish state has taken advantage of the dramatic flux towards an uncertain post-US hegemonic architecture to develop its sub-imperialist agenda, Turkey’s expansionist turn was also a structural response to the chronic disjuncture blocking the historical development

and expansion. Through this alternative reading, this doctoral thesis has brought some light into the oft-neglected domestic impetus behind Turkey's expansionist turn in the context of the deepening financial and geopolitical crises of neoliberalism. Besides, my analysis has indicated that the perspective of the capital reproduction pattern can be adopted into the scrutiny within the international development literature to understand and critique the internal politico-economic dynamics lying behind so-called emerging powers' expansionist practices.

Following my analysis of Turkey's spatial strategy for the expansion of capital, I have turned my focus to Turkey's spatial restructuring strategy from the perspective of the capital reproduction pattern. This analysis has also expanded our knowledge about an oft-neglected matter in the contemporary sub-imperialism literature. That is, the sub-imperialist development scheme is built on an active policy of physical infrastructure development (Marini, 1972). As Chapter 2 has indicated, despite the extensive research carried out during the last decade, what is not yet clear in this recently growing literature is how emerging territorial powers manage their dependencies towards sub-imperialist development. Through this doctoral thesis, I have brought some clarity to this under-researched area by extending my analysis of the capital reproduction pattern deeper into Turkey's severe energy-import dependency characterised by the lack of sufficient energy infrastructure to meet the already capital-import dependent domestic industry's ever-growing energy demand.

My analysis has pointed out that energy-import, as the largest and ever-growing portion in Turkey's total capital-import bill, and in turn trade deficit, arguably holds a quasi-determinant weight in structural contradictions surrounding the first phase of circulation (M-C). As underlined earlier, from the perspective of the capital reproduction pattern, such alarmingly growing energy-import dependency under the pressures of insufficient energy infrastructure and growing energy-demand can be seen as a systemic force in two respects. First, being the costliest, heaviest and ever-growing portion of Turkey's total capital-import bill and trade deficit, it acts as a systemic catalyst that perpetually enhances contradictions surrounding the first phase of circulation (M-C), and increasingly triggers the disjuncture between the capitalist cycles. Second, it also acts as a growing systemic impetus pushing the Turkish state

to develop an internal spatial strategy for energy infrastructure development to enable, secure and improve the historical development and expansion.

Drawing on these overt characteristics of the Turkish economy, I have analysed the neoliberal trajectories of Turkey's costly, heavy and ever-growing energy-import dependency. Overall, my analysis has demonstrated that Turkey's severe energy-import dependency has been further deepened in parallel with the country's turn to neoliberalism in 1980, increasingly creating financially and ecologically unsustainable conditions to energise the historical development and expansion. My analysis has uncovered that the share of energy-import in Turkey's total imports, and in turn, in total trade deficit, has climbed sharply since the country's turn to neoliberalism, further intensifying the structural contradictions and crisis-tendencies in Turkey. Moreover, my analysis has disclosed two breaking points worsening Turkey's already severe energy-import dependency. The first was a perpetual decline in the share of domestically produced energy resources in total energy supply, which was turned upside down shortly after Turkey's integration into the neoliberal world-order and has further deepened particularly since the mid-1990s. The second breaking point rose to the surface in the aftermath of the debt-crisis of 2001-2002 and since this very climacteric moment, the share of domestically produced energy resources in electricity generation has also been turned upside down, extending the footprint of Turkey's already severe energy-import dependency deeper into the sphere of electricity generation. In other words, Turkey's energy-import dependency in the sphere of industrial production has also broadened out over the sphere of electricity generation, worsening Turkey's perpetual lack of sufficient energy infrastructure to support its historical development and expansion.

These findings have allowed us to better understand the underlying systemic rationale behind why the internal dimension of Turkey's spatio-temporal fix was built on energy infrastructure, which was conceptualised in this doctoral thesis as a spatial restructuring strategy to mitigate some of Turkey's capital-import dependency's structural effects in the first phase of circulation (M-C) through mobilising surplus capital flows into energy infrastructure. My analysis has demonstrated that the Turkish state has made a dramatic leap forward in energy infrastructure development of all kinds – fossil, renewable and nuclear – particularly in the aftermath of the debt-crisis

of 2001-2002. Dedicated to close cooperation with the neoliberal agenda of monopoly-capitalism, the Turkish state has facilitated the spatial restructuring of capital by creating a high-demand and easy to access energy market; removing the already limited number of legislative barriers blocking the commodification of nature and capital's access to public and private properties; opening up new spaces for global and domestic capital actors to invest in energy infrastructure and well-incentivising their investments with the political and military state support as well as financial instruments; massively privatising public-owned energy enterprises; further dispossessing the already poor masses through urgent expropriations.

My analysis has illustrated that this internal strategy for capital's spatial restructuring has assisted the Turkish state in offsetting industrial and financial costs of capital-import dependent domestic production as well as capacitating the realisation of surplus value and financing the continuity of this capital reproduction pattern. Through its internal spatial strategy, the Turkish state has dramatically increased its installed energy infrastructure, which in turn has reduced its energy-import bill at the rate of the capacity increase. Besides, massive privatisation incomes as well as record-high absorption of surplus capitals in the form of FDIs into the Turkish energy market have further assisted the Turkish state in financing its current account deficit. Furthermore, my analysis pointed out that the Turkish state has reduced the industrial electricity prices in comparison to its competitors by taking advantage of its progress in internal spatial strategy for energy infrastructure development. As argued earlier, the benefit of cheap industrial energy is not only a simple reduction in electricity bills of individual capitalists. In fact, it promises a reduction in manufacturing costs at domestic industry scale. Besides, it functions as an incentive to attract more FDI inflows, which the Turkish state increasingly requires in order to finance its ever-growing current account deficit. Moreover, its combination with the cheap labour policy promises an increase in the global competitiveness of the Turkish economy in general, propping up the Turkish state's sub-imperialist development agenda.

My analysis of Turkey's energy-import dependency from the perspective of capital reproduction pattern was also important to better understand the relation between the top-down spatial fixes by focusing on Turkey's antagonistic cooperation with the global climate regime's market-based solution to the ecological crisis of

neoliberalism. Accordingly, this doctoral thesis has taken Böhm et al.'s (2012: 12) call that the theory of sub-imperialism can help us in understanding and critiquing "the rationale behind the recent embrace of carbon markets by particular nations and fractions of capital, and more specifically, to locate the central role of 'emerging economies' in promoting the global expansion of these policy tools".

As elaborated earlier, the antagonistic dimension of Turkey's relation has 'officially' manifested itself as an agreement between Turkey and the global climate regime, allowing Turkey's exemption from any binding emission cuts at the cost of being debarred from the 1997 Kyoto Protocol's flexibility mechanisms of CDM, ET and JI as well as associated financial, capacity building and technology development support (United Nations Development Programme, 2009, Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, 2017a; UNFCCC, 2002; International Energy Agency, 2016). My analysis of Turkey's capital reproduction pattern has provided some evidence to suggest that this antagonistic dimension of backing the malgovernance of the global climate regime is due to the interplay between three underlying dynamics: Turkey's already high-carbon industrial formation; its rapidly growing energy-demand; and the Turkish state's enthusiasm towards constructing more and more fossil energy infrastructure to mitigate the industrial and financial costs of severe energy-import dependency in the first stage of circulation; all of which has expanded our knowledge of systemic dynamics shaping the Turkish state's antagonistic relation to the global climate regime. As my analysis has demonstrated, whilst there have been more than twenty years of intergovernmental attempts to curb the emission of GHGs, the Turkish state has noticeably intensified its eco-destructive praxis and contradictions during its prolonged neoliberal period of capitalist accumulation, turning a blind eye to the ecological crisis of neoliberalism and backing the malgovernance of the global climate regime. By not only maintaining, but also accelerating its rhythm of high-energy-intense, high-energy-consumer, high-carbon capitalist development, Turkey has become the 15th largest GHG emitter in the capitalist world-system (World Bank, 2018d; Global Carbon Atlas, 2018). Furthermore, as underlined earlier, Turkey's eco-destructive leap forward is likely to grow more and to do so rapidly, given the facts that it is one of the fastest growing high-carbon economies in terms of energy-demand (Tommila, 2010, Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, 2017c) and the Turkish state strategically aims to increase its installed capacity by constructing more and

more fossil power plants (Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, 2014; Investment Support and Promotion Agency, 2018b). Turkey's praxis here resembles that of the BRICS sub-imperialism, representing high-carbon economies promoting remarkably eco-destructive projects in cooperation with the core, emitting almost half of global GHG (Oliver at al., 2017), refusing any binding emission reduction targets and propping up the global climate regime's malgovernance regardless of the approaching ecological catastrophe (Bond and Garcia, 2015; Bond, 2013, 2015; Amisi et al., 2015; Reddy, 2015).

On the other hand, my analysis has also shown that the Turkish state has also closely cooperated with the global climate regime's market-based solution to the ecological crisis of neoliberalism. The said cooperative praxis by Turkey also represents an idiosyncrasy specific to today's sub-imperialisms, which have hitherto hosted a great majority of CDM projects, taking advantage of financial and carbon-trading opportunities granted by the global climate regime (UNFCCC, 2018a; Frankfurt School, 2017; REN21, 2017). As my analysis has pointed out, whilst facilitating its internal spatial strategy through mobilising fixed capital investments into renewables such as hydro, wind, solar, biomass and geothermal energy infrastructures, the Turkish state has effectively co-opted the global climate regime's financial instruments such as the World Bank's Clean Technology Fund, the US Trade and Development Agency grants and Global Environment Facility grants to further its agenda of energising a Turkish sub-imperialism. The same has also been true for the carbon offsetting mechanisms, often presented as the world's only solution to mitigate the ecological crisis of neoliberalism. As underlined earlier, Turkey, being the largest recipient of EU climate finance, has also become one of the top investors in renewables (Frankfurt School, 2017; REN21, 2017), and in turn global VCMs by opportunistically taking advantage of carbon trading (Hamrick and Brotto, 2017; Hamrick and Gallant, 2017; Ministry of Environment and Urbanisation, 2018a). Furthermore, despite its resistance to the 1997 Kyoto Protocol's legally binding emission cuts, my analysis has indicated that the Turkish state has shown a keen interest in developing its antagonistic cooperation with the global climate regime in the post-Kyoto era, characterised by a lack of binding enforcement mechanism but more comprehensive and inclusive financial and carbon-offsetting opportunities for the parties submitting their 'intended' emission reduction targets. As my analysis has

pointed out, the Turkish state has submitted its 'critically insufficient' INDC (CAT, 2018) for the 2015 Paris Agreement (UNFCCC, 2018b) in an attempt to take advantage of the global climate regime's financial and carbon-trading mechanisms to increase its renewable energy capacity, stimulate more FDIs as well as funding to finance its alarmingly-growing current account deficit. My findings have corroborated the argument that today's sub-imperialisms are very eager to serve the global climate regime as perpetual absorbers of surplus capitals by opening up their spaces for 'green' projects and in pushing for further financialisation of climate change mitigation (Böhm et al., 2012; Bond, 2012). My findings have also indicated that the Turkish state has provided a high-demand, free-to-access, strategically incentivised energy market ever-ready to sink surplus capitals produced globally, propping up the neoliberal agenda of capitalism that everything can and should be commodified – even the air through carbon markets (Bond, 2015). By doing so, the Turkish state's internal spatial strategy has interlocked with the global climate regime's market-based solution to the ecological crisis, which has been argued as a spatio-temporal fix to the deepening financial crisis of neoliberalism increasingly requiring new profitable 'green energy' markets to enable absorption of surplus capitals and crisis-tendencies inherent in the capitalist accumulation, reproduction and development processes (Prudham, 2009; Böhm et al., 2012, Bryant et al., 2015; McCarthy, 2015).

Thus far, my conclusion has consolidated the three spatio-temporal fixes from above and outlined my two main contributions to the critical economic geography and sub-imperialism literatures. Now, I turn my critical focus to the production and restructuration of space from below, taking inspiration from De Angelis' (2007, 2013) argument that capitalism has entered a phase of socio-ecological stability crisis, represented by the lack of social and ecological support for its recovery and growth, thereby requiring 'commons fixes' from below realigning class/power relations and establishing new systems of governance to re-boost capitalist accumulation and growth. The following paragraphs clarify the third contribution this doctoral thesis has made to the labour geography literature by drawing conclusions from my analysis of how spaces for recovery and further accumulation are produced and restructured from below in response to the socio-ecological stability crisis of neoliberalism.

In this doctoral thesis, I have provided an in-depth case analysis of how the people of Dêrsim – through their grassroots struggle against hydroelectric power plant projects – have produced a socio-spatial fix that both addresses their province's chronic underdevelopment and assists capital in staving off its recurrent crises and reproducing its logic of accumulation. My empirical case analysis has substantiated my theoretical arguments in relation to the recent trajectory of labour geography, which I perceive as a transitional stage, forming a new school of thought – what might be called "pluralist labour geography" (Peck, 2018). In this context, my research has responded to Peck's call for a pluralist labour geography, expanding our knowledge in three respects.

To begin with, my research has brought new insights into the debate on the theorisation of agency within its spatiality and constrained nature (Castree, 2007; Coe and Jordhus-Lier, 2011; Das, 2012; Herod, 2012; Tufts and Savage, 2009). As reviewed earlier, the problem of the under-theorised nature of labour agency has long been called into focus (Castree, 2007) within the literature. Many labour geographers have pointed out difficulties and problems associated with constructing a theoretical and analytical framework (Tufts and Savage, 2009) capable of dealing with the massiveness and complexity of the material and immaterial realms encircling labour (Coe and Jordhus-Lier, 2011) as well as grasping the spatiality, relational totality and multi-dimensionality of class struggle (Das, 2012). Nevertheless, the labour geography project has remained under-developed in terms of "how and why workers and capitalists act the way they do" (Herod, 2012: 349). This call has been addressed by Coe and Jordhus-Lier (2011), who developed an analytical framework to explore the constrained and variegated notion of labour agency and its geography-making and crisis-displacement praxis with respect to capital, the state, the community and the labour market. This doctoral thesis has taken Coe and Jordhus-Lier's (2011) contribution further by arguing that class agency should always be seen in relation to the unevenly developed geographical space in which the class forces, relations, struggles and praxis are variably embedded. By revisiting Harvey's (2006b) argument of regional spaces, my research has developed an expanded notion of socio-spatial structure as a modular analytical unit to explore the dialectic relation between structure and agency in relation to uneven geographical development. My analysis of the Dêrsim case has provided an empirical example showing the capacity of socio-spatial

structure to constrain confrontations, compositional pattern and class alliances on which grassroots' collective action is built. My findings here have demonstrated that an analytical focus on socio-spatial structures embedded in differentiated space-time contexts of capitalism can significantly advance our knowledge of the spatiality and constrained nature of agency.

In addition to this point, this doctoral thesis has expanded our knowledge by going beyond labour geography's tendency to confine class and its agency to unionised workers and mostly focus on workplace/industry-based confrontations in a Global North context. As reviewed earlier, since its emergence in the late 1990s, the labour geography literature has been characterised by a long-standing debate over its traditional worker/union-centrism in relation to agency (Das, 2012; Coe and Jordhus-Lier, 2011; Castree, 2007). Over the course of time, an evolving strand of contributions has attempted to overcome this centrism through evidencing how labour unions in the Global North context improve their organisational and struggling capacities through adopting community-unionism practices whilst dealing with emerging threats of industrial regulations and neoliberal restructurings (Tufts, 1998; Johns and Vural, 2000; Walsh, 2000; Ellem, 2003). Engaging with these preliminary studies, this strand has also paved the way for the second wave of contributions theorising and framing community-unionism in relation to spatiality of labour as well as national and international scales of coalition-building in global production networks (Lier, 2007; Ellem; 2008; Wills, 2008; Oseland et al., 2012; McDonald et al., 2012; Jordhus-Lier, 2013; Brookes, 2013).

However, despite these progressive contributions suggesting a more flexible and broader understanding of labour's agency in relation to the wider community, this strand has remained under the influence of the dominant perspective in several respects. To begin with, whilst linking labour to the wider community, this strand has again confined class-struggle and labour's agency to unions, and thereby, pre-required and prioritised empirical cases with workplace/industry-based confrontations to explore class agency. Besides, this strand has also portrayed other social classes and strata outside of the proletariat as simply 'reinforcements' on which to capitalise, ignoring grassroots' collective and interdependent potential of shaping the geography of capitalism and bringing about fixes from below. Furthermore, a vast majority of

empirical cases explored by this strand were from developed country contexts, corroborating Tufts and Savage's (2009) argument that labour geography needs a new perspective for cases in different spatial contexts, i.e. in the Global South, where the exercise of 'agency' takes on different form and meaning. This doctoral thesis has expanded our knowledge by going beyond labour geography's tendency to confine class and its agency to unionised workers and mostly focus on workplace/industry-based confrontations in a Global North context.

This has been achieved by conceptualising class from a grassroots agency perspective, instead of the community-unionism version of worker/union-centrism arguably dominating the labour geography literature. As my analysis of the Dêrsim case has clearly demonstrated, class agency cannot simply be reduced to solely workers' agency, praxis and isolated class interests. Rather, the complexity of realms encircling Dêrsimites' anti-dam struggle such as systematic state oppression, chronic underdevelopment and its further deepening due to fixed capital investments in energy infrastructure as well as ethnicity, religion, and political minority statuses of classes in Dêrsim, have necessitated a broader and integrative class agency perspective grasping the multi-dimensional, relational and spatial nature of the reality (Das, 2012). The argument I have made here aligns with Campling et al.'s (2016) argument that the agency of social classes in the process of capitalist development is not only shaped by intra- and inter-class relations, but also interwoven with other socio-spatial axes of race, ethnicity, gender, caste, citizenship, and so on.

Overall, this comprehensive and dialectical ontology of class (Das, 2012) and social-reproduction (Ferguson, 2016), has allowed us to comprehend the geography-making and crisis-resolution praxis from below with respect to the multilayered, complex and dynamic nature of class-struggle endeavouring to materialise commonised inter-class interests in a socio-spatially defined context. On the one hand, the grassroots agency perspective has enabled us to understand the production and restructuration of space as a collective, interdependent and practical human process taking place within capitalistically organised and unevenly developed socio-spatial settings. On the other, it has provided a dynamic and complex understanding of class unity and struggle without de-emphasising the agency of labour but integrating it into a broader, multi-dimensional and relational conception of class, which traditional

labour geography has hitherto failed to address. In other words, the grassroots perspective developed by this doctoral thesis has turned the analytical attention from the existing versions of the union-worker centrism to the realm of grassroots agency, in which labouring classes and their class allies participate with variegated and interpenetrating economic, political and ideological agendas and organisations.

Lastly, this doctoral thesis has expanded our knowledge of labour geography by problematising traditional labour geography's unilateral approach to the issue of spatial displacement of crisis. As reviewed earlier, the concept of labour's spatial fix (Herod, 1997) has been developed as an alternative metaphor to capital-centric rendering of the spatial fix (Peck, 2003) in an attempt to understand how workers overcome the problems of their self-reproduction and survival whilst shaping economic landscapes through their praxis. As an inevitable corollary of such a clear-cut and unilateral distinction made between capital's and labour's spatial fixes setting one against the other, the labour geography literature has arguably been characterised by an overt bias towards isolated success stories of workers, as clearly pointed out by Coe and Jordhus-Lier (2011) and Das (2012). This doctoral thesis has problematised the non-dialectical nature of this conceptualisation, arguing that although the notion of labour's spatial fix is very capable of shedding a clear light on the opposition between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat's geography-making and crisis-displacement praxis, it is still incapable of grasping the interpenetrations between opposing class agencies and their conjoined praxis in enabling the recovery and reproduction of capitalism.

My critique here was particularly important and necessary in several respects. For example, this critique has allowed us to bring some empirical evidence from the Dêrsim case to Campling et al.'s (2016) far-reaching argument that capitalism is constituted through and by class struggles at and beyond the point of production, and therefore struggles both from above and below, and these must be seen as constitutive elements of the historical expansion, intensification and transformation of capitalism. Besides, it has enabled us to provide some empirical evidence to De Angelis' (2007, 2013) argument that capital requires bottom-up fixes to overcome its socio-ecological stability crisis, deepening in the neoliberal era. Above all, however, this critique has also been crucial to understanding the production and restructuration

of space from above and below. In Engels' words (1892/2008: 47), the two poles of an antithesis, positive and negative, are as inseparable as they are opposed, and that despite all their opposition, they mutually interpenetrate.

To explore the coalescences between capital's and labour's needs, interests and both their opposing and interpenetrating praxis of making geographies and displacement of crisis, on the one hand, this doctoral thesis has taken inspiration from Herod's (2003) and Harvey's (2006b) interpretations of regional "growth machine politics". Both argue that capital and labour come together to fix crises of capitalist development through organising 'local boosterist campaigns' and establishing 'regional growth coalitions' to defend or improve the competitive strength of their economic spaces because they have no other choice. To explore the inter-class politics of development in the form of regional growth coalitions, on the other hand, I have adopted Wright's (2000) notion of positive class compromise. Building on Herod's (2003) and Harvey's (2006b) interpretations of regional "growth machine politics" as well as Wright's (2000) notion of "positive class compromise" and Campling et al.'s (2016) argument on class dynamics of development, this doctoral thesis has developed a concept of socio-spatial fix, as a form of commons fix, which was called into focus by De Angelis (2007, 2013). Our notion of socio-spatial fix has allowed us to go beyond Herod's concept of labour's spatial fix (Herod, 1997) by shifting the analytical focus to interconnections, interpenetrations, and concatenations between capital's and grassroots' agencies. That is, despite all their differences, capital and grassroots movements have a lot in common in the making of geographies of capitalism and spatial displacement of crisis-tendencies they have increasingly faced. The idea of socio-spatial fix shows how the grassroots' praxis of geography-making and crisis-resolution conjoin with and assist capital both in staving off its recurrent crises embedded in socio-spatial structures and in recovering itself via the reproduction of new capitalist spaces and capitalist social relations. Overall, the Dêrsim case has demonstrated that socio-spatial fixes from below have a dialectical nature. On the one hand, they are a bottom-up response to existing crises embedded in a socio-spatial structure and therefore mainly seek to maintain and reform the reproductive potential and livelihoods of the grassroots. On the other hand, such grassroots socio-spatial fixes aid capital's spatial displacement of crisis, enabling it to reproduce its own logic of accumulation and circulation.

Thus far, I have tied key arguments together, outlining three main contributions, all of which shed light on a different neglected and under-researched area in the existing literature. Yet, the reverse of this dialectic is also true. That is, there are a number of areas in need of further investigation, on which this doctoral thesis has not been able to elaborate adequately in order not to digress from my research foci as well as due to the time available to finish a PhD project. Accordingly, I would like to outline my recommendations for future research, drawing on both limitations and contributions of this study.

Limitations of the study and recommendations for future research

As I have underlined in Chapter 3, whilst examining the interplay between the capital reproduction pattern and the Turkish state apparatus, this doctoral thesis has analytically benefited from Harvey's (2003) theoretical argument on the dialectic between the territorial logic of power and the capitalistic logic of power. Nonetheless, due to the fact that the current study was not specifically designed to explore this phenomenon, I have avoided drawing any half-baked conclusions on such a crucial mystery, which has increasingly become a problematic in the neoliberal trajectories of world-capitalism. In Harvey's (2003: 86) words, *"the territorial logics of power are in the course of mutation, but the outcomes are by no means certain. It is now also evident that the territorial and the capitalistic logics exist in a state of high tension"*. What is now needed is more systematic studies pushing my analysis of the dialectic between geography-making and crisis-displacement forward, reinforcing Harvey's invaluable attempt to unveil the mystery of the dialectic between the two logics of power.

This is particularly important for another limitation surrounding this doctoral thesis. Allow me to briefly detail this matter. As Harvey (2003: 29) argues, *"in practice the two logics frequently tug against each other, sometimes to the point of outright antagonism."* Accordingly, the Turkish state's sub-imperialist agenda might also turn into a backward step depending on the dialectic between the two logics of power, namely the logic of the long-lived agent operating in a territorialised space and the logic of capital operating in a continuous space-time setting. The very conditions for this antagonism have – for a while now – been emerging. As my analysis has underlined in Chapter 4, the recurrent debt-crisis tendencies have been deepening in

the Turkish economy, interweaving with the conditions of an overaccumulation crisis in the construction and building industry, which has been playing a pivotal and strategic role in Turkey's both external and internal spatial praxis as well as in absorbing surplus capitals produced globally, particularly since the aftermath of the debt-crisis of 2001-2002. Although this doctoral thesis has successfully demonstrated the interplay between the Turkish state's sub-imperialist agenda and the capital reproduction pattern in Turkey, the approaching debt-crisis and its uncertain impacts on the logic of capital have constrained us in drawing conclusions for the post-crisis trajectories of Turkey. Nevertheless, this limitation provides an opportunity for us to call for further works. A systematic investigation of the Turkish state's post-crisis trajectories, for example, would also be interesting to shed light on the intertwining and contrasting dialectic of the capitalistic and territorial logics.

Another limitation inherent in this doctoral research is due to its analysis of the Turkish state's internal spatial strategy by focusing solely on energy infrastructure development. This limitation has, on the one hand, enabled us to contribute to the sub-imperialism literature by shedding light on today's sub-imperialisms being organised through orchestrating the strategic spatial restructuring of capital within their territorial sphere of influence. On the other, it has constrained us in extending our analysis into other built-environments massively and quite radically restructured through various fixed capital investments in transportation, communication, sewage, water and all other physical infrastructure developments, as well as social expenditure on housing, health care, research, education and so on. Accordingly, this doctoral thesis calls for further investigation into other strategic dimensions of the Turkish state's spatial restructuring strategy in particular, and broadly of today's sub-imperialisms. This need is also particularly relevant, and another possible area of future research would be to investigate how today's sub-imperialisms have constructed its hegemonic infrastructure, given that fixed capital flows into a space also enable, secure and deepen capital's presence, activity, and domination. In other words, future research in the sub-imperialism literature could take my analysis further by examining more closely the role of fixed capital flows into physical and social infrastructure in enabling the consent of the governed classes, thereby constituting a social basis for sub-imperialism as a hegemonic project of the territorial logic of power.

Very similar to the above limitation, there is one more, regarding my relatively narrow and passive aspect to nature and ecological crisis. Indeed, whilst examining the ecological dimension of crisis, this doctoral thesis has mainly focused on particular ecological issues, such as Turkey's eco-destructive praxis, high-energy-intensive, high-energy-consumer, high-carbon economy and its engagement with the global climate regime. The same limitation is also true for my case study, where I was mainly concerned with the loss of fauna and flora in Dêrsim. This particular limit of the scope in relation to nature and ecological crisis has emerged as an inevitable corollary of the research question this doctoral thesis attempted to address. Although this passive aspect to nature and ecological crisis has supported my research significantly by eliminating the risk of digression from the topic, this should also be noted as a limitation of this doctoral thesis. Thus, future research in this field is needed to understand the interplay of the ecological crisis and spatial fixes at multiple scale by adopting a more active and extensive focus on nature.

The same limitation is also true for my focus on Turkey's antagonist cooperation with the core. Again, whilst examining the antagonist dimension of this relation, this doctoral thesis has only exemplified the Turkish state advocating the reform of the UN and the Security Council and propping up the malgovernance of the global climate regime. Nonetheless, the tension between the Turkish state and the traditional core is more complex and multifaceted than the two specific examples on which I have focused. Today, visual and written media of every stripe in Turkey are full of news pointing out that the country has been experiencing the most difficult times in its strategic relationships with the US and the EU, and at the same time, the most intriguing times in its recent flirting with BRICS sub-imperialism. Further research in this field would be of great help in understanding the neglected dimensions of this antagonistic cooperation.

In relation to my case analysis of Dêrsim, there is one more limitation arising from my preference of the labour geography literature over the social movements literature. In fact, my engagement with the labour geography has significantly supported my research focus on the phenomenon of space reproduction, which remains an under-theorised both in the mainstream social movements approaches (Smelser, 1962; Morrison, 1971; McCarthy and Zald, 1977; McAdam, 1982; Cohen,

1985; Melucci, 1985; Touraine 1985) and the critical social movements scholarship (Cox, 1999a, 1999b; Cox and Nilsen 2005a, 2005b, 2006; Nilsen, 2007, 2009; Barker, 2013; Barker et al. 2013b). Despite this advantage, it should be noted that the social movements literature as a whole offers much-sophisticated aspects to investigate the role of the ethnic, cultural, linguistic, gender and citizenship axes of social difference in the formation of the social movements from below. In my case analysis of Dêrsim, although I have drawn upon a number of perspectives offering a more comprehensive and dialectical ontology of class (Campling et al., 2016; Das, 2012; Ferguson, 2016), yet my analysis has remained considerably limited with respect to the heterogeneous nature of sub-cultural identities in Dêrsim. Thus, future research in the social movement literature could take my analysis further by examining more closely the role sub-cultural identities play in the formation of class relations making the geographies of capitalism.

To conclude, I would like to put into words not a limitation but a possibility that the case of Dêrsim has pointed toward. What made the grassroots struggle in Dêrsim both unique and problematic was its attempt to establish a capitalistically organised economic infrastructure to defend and remake their space, which has in turn enabled the conditions for further capitalist accumulation, growth and development. Throughout my critical investigation of space reproduction in my hometown, however, I have wondered what would Dêrsim be like if Dêrsimites' spatial strategy was not organised in the way it was, or similarly, what would Dêrsim be like if Dêrsimites' spatial strategy was re-engineered so as to make a geography beyond capitalism. That is, a geography of utopia, established and defended through militant nonviolence, in which social, economic, political, ecological, cultural and all other processes of everyday life are reorganised so as to transcend private property, commodity system, bourgeois dictatorship and all sorts of diseases of class society inherent in the each and every capitalistically-organised body space.

I still have no answer to this question, but a possibility to offer. A possibility of a new kind of utopian thought and practice, which is now again being discussed (Harvey, 2000; De Angelis, 2007) but yet not revolutionarised enough to pave the way for a complete detachment of the oppressed-body from the oppressor. A possibility, whose socio-spatial, ecological and political conditions have been continuously and

increasingly reproduced by the capitalist modernity itself. A possibility that could be built on one of the most precious yet most neglected of our human rights. It is the right to the city. It is far more than the individual liberty to access urban resources. It is the freedom to make and remake ourselves and our cities (Harvey, 2008).

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APPENDICES

Appendix A: Turkey's foreign trade between 1996 and 2017

Year	Imports			Exports	Energy-import
	Capital goods	Intermediate goods	Consumption goods & others		
1996	10,253,553,040	29,114,095,805	4,258,993,651	23,224,464,973	5,913,984,671
1997	11,107,859,116	32,119,882,544	5,330,979,013	26,261,071,548	6,063,002,448
1998	10,660,620,929	29,906,826,618	5,353,944,355	26,973,951,738	4,506,150,980
1999	8,727,005,886	26,854,200,471	5,090,065,674	26,587,224,962	5,375,272,472
2000	11,365,338,165	36,009,555,328	7,127,927,010	27,774,906,045	9,529,252,010
2001	6,940,425,180	30,300,839,997	4,157,817,776	31,334,216,356	8,339,220,917
2002	8,399,564,903	37,655,830,493	5,498,401,932	36,059,089,029	9,203,593,683
2003	11,325,906,779	49,734,760,233	8,279,025,046	47,252,836,302	11,574,885,978
2004	17,397,440,482	67,549,436,061	12,592,889,425	63,167,152,820	14,407,061,166
2005	20,363,221,590	81,868,283,580	14,542,645,737	73,476,408,143	21,254,830,917
2006	23,347,555,798	99,604,659,525	16,623,958,825	85,534,675,518	28,858,773,761
2007	27,054,432,821	123,639,630,703	19,368,650,977	107,271,749,904	33,882,781,705
2008	28,020,665,407	151,747,101,303	22,195,807,399	132,027,195,626	48,280,963,294
2009	21,462,823,387	99,509,820,926	19,955,776,898	102,142,612,603	29,905,147,906
2010	28,818,241,904	131,445,426,338	25,280,663,610	113,883,219,184	38,496,979,949
2011	37,270,610,670	173,140,242,682	30,430,822,922	134,906,868,830	54,116,787,675
2012	33,925,388,972	174,930,330,755	27,689,421,182	152,461,736,556	60,115,790,279
2013	36,771,126,999	183,811,325,436	31,078,797,675	151,802,637,087	55,916,326,571
2014	35,995,906,918	176,721,668,830	29,459,541,325	157,610,157,690	54,889,014,063
2015	34,904,939,732	143,316,884,780	29,012,534,104	143,838,871,428	37,842,404,830
2016	35,918,942,468	134,315,400,510	28,383,892,069	142,529,583,808	27,167,478,963
2017	33,116,138,969	171,461,764,783	29,221,747,482	156,992,940,414	37,203,604,839

Data sources: Turkish Statistical Institute, 2018a, 2018b, 2018d

Appendix B: Foreign trade and GDP statistics between 1923 and 2017					
	Trade deficit	**Foreign Trade**	**GDP**	**Imports**	**Exports**
1923	-36,082,000	137,662,000	577,365,269	86,872,000	50,790,000
1924	-18,027,000	182,897,000	727,784,431	100,462,000	82,435,000
1925	-26,253,000	231,653,000	920,479,042	128,953,000	102,700,000
1926	-24,974,000	217,848,000	995,269,461	121,411,000	96,437,000
1927	-27,003,000	188,501,000	887,245,509	107,752,000	80,749,000
1928	-25,432,000	201,988,000	832,639,594	113,710,000	88,278,000
1929	-48,731,000	198,385,000	1,056,802,030	123,558,000	74,827,000
1930	1,840,000	140,920,000	807,664,975	69,540,000	71,380,000
1931	291,000	120,161,000	707,868,020	59,935,000	60,226,000
1932	7,254,000	88,690,000	596,243,655	40,718,000	47,972,000
1933	12,974,000	103,156,000	691,878,788	45,091,000	58,065,000
1934	4,246,000	141,768,000	738,909,091	68,761,000	73,007,000
1935	5,597,000	146,867,000	796,121,212	70,635,000	76,232,000
1936	20,051,000	167,289,000	1,029,333,333	73,619,000	93,670,000
1937	18,685,000	199,765,000	1,096,666,667	90,540,000	109,225,000
1938	-3,880,000	233,918,000	1,506,666,667	118,899,000	115,019,000
1939	7,149,000	192,145,000	1,589,076,923	92,498,000	99,647,000
1940	30,869,000	130,939,000	1,853,769,231	50,035,000	80,904,000
1941	35,707,000	146,405,000	2,307,538,462	55,349,000	91,056,000
1942	13,236,000	238,994,000	4,772,230,769	112,879,000	126,115,000
1943	41,394,000	352,074,000	7,107,769,231	155,340,000	196,734,000
1944	51,722,000	304,182,000	5,147,923,077	126,230,000	177,952,000
1945	71,295,000	265,233,000	4,213,384,615	96,969,000	168,264,000
1946	95,691,000	333,469,000	3,676,737,968	118,889,000	214,580,000
1947	-21,343,000	467,945,000	2,700,750,000	244,644,000	223,301,000

1948	-78,254,000	471,852,000	3,397,464,286	275,053,000	196,799,000
1949	-42,395,000	538,045,000	3,240,142,857	290,220,000	247,825,000
1950	-22,240,000	549,088,000	3,469,464,286	285,664,000	263,424,000
1951	-88,004,000	716,168,000	4,167,178,571	402,086,000	314,082,000
1952	-193,006,000	918,834,000	4,793,178,571	555,920,000	362,914,000
1953	-136,472,000	928,594,000	5,584,928,571	532,533,000	396,061,000
1954	-143,435,000	813,283,000	5,699,571,429	478,359,000	334,924,000
1955	-184,291,000	810,983,000	6,853,892,857	497,637,000	313,346,000
1956	-102,350,000	712,330,000	7,908,571,429	407,340,000	304,990,000
1957	-51,908,000	742,342,000	10,517,571,429	397,125,000	345,217,000
1958	-67,827,000	562,369,000	12,552,071,429	315,098,000	247,271,000
1959	-116,183,000	823,781,000	15,686,821,429	469,982,000	353,799,000
1960	-147,455,000	788,917,000	9,931,691,332	468,186,000	320,731,000
1961	-160,465,000	853,945,000	5,511,803,097	507,205,000	346,740,000
1962	-238,250,000	1,000,644,000	6,402,201,327	619,447,000	381,197,000
1963	-319,529,000	1,055,703,000	7,401,581,858	687,616,000	368,087,000
1964	-126,458,000	948,000,000	7,871,872,247	537,229,000	410,771,000
1965	-108,215,000	1,035,691,000	8,418,513,216	571,953,000	463,738,000
1966	-227,761,000	1,208,777,000	9,997,301,762	718,269,000	490,508,000
1967	-162,335,000	1,207,003,000	11,143,766,520	684,669,000	522,334,000
1968	-267,240,000	1,260,078,000	18,008,000,000	763,659,000	496,419,000
1969	-264,402,761	1,338,069,895	20,128,000,000	801,236,328	536,833,567
1970	-359,128,162	1,536,080,674	18,825,000,000	947,604,418	588,476,256
1971	-494,238,886	1,847,442,064	16,847,000,000	1,170,840,475	676,601,589
1972	-677,580,721	2,447,518,921	21,319,000,000	1,562,549,821	884,969,100
1973	-769,132,518	3,403,299,324	26,854,000,000	2,086,215,921	1,317,083,403
1974	-2,245,319,493	5,309,683,025	36,985,000,000	3,777,501,259	1,532,181,766
1975	-3,337,482,901	6,139,633,271	46,300,000,000	4,738,558,086	1,401,075,185
1976	-3,168,432,557	7,088,861,549	52,996,000,000	5,128,647,053	1,960,214,496

1977	-4,043,251,786	7,549,303,840	60,613,000,000	5,796,277,813	1,753,026,027
1978	-2,310,861,876	6,887,187,254	66,277,000,000	4,599,024,565	2,288,162,689
1979	-2,808,236,309	7,330,626,913	80,960,000,000	5,069,431,611	2,261,195,302
1980	-4,999,242,486	10,819,485,724	67,457,000,000	7,909,364,105	2,910,121,619
1981	-4,230,439,458	13,636,308,270	70,419,000,000	8,933,373,864	4,702,934,406
1982	-3,096,692,118	14,588,638,857	63,485,000,000	8,842,665,488	5,745,973,370
1983	-3,507,168,416	14,962,835,761	60,373,000,000	9,235,002,089	5,727,833,673
1984	-3,623,428,759	17,890,635,947	58,643,000,000	10,757,032,353	7,133,603,594
1985	-3,385,366,646	19,301,386,044	66,408,000,000	11,343,376,345	7,958,009,699
1986	-3,648,045,687	18,561,496,888	75,018,000,000	11,104,771,288	7,456,725,601
1987	-3,967,757,492	24,347,856,325	85,638,000,000	14,157,806,908	10,190,049,416
1988	-2,673,373,689	25,997,421,922	90,495,000,000	14,335,397,805	11,662,024,117
1989	-4,167,451,194	27,416,834,635	106,123,000,000	15,792,142,914	11,624,691,720
1990	-9,342,837,977	35,261,413,202	149,195,000,000	22,302,125,589	12,959,287,612
1991	-7,453,551,852	34,640,475,894	149,156,000,000	21,047,013,873	13,593,462,021
1992	-8,156,426,289	37,585,683,940	156,656,000,000	22,871,055,114	14,714,628,825
1993	-14,083,302,637	44,773,436,423	177,332,000,000	29,428,369,530	15,345,066,893
1994	-5,164,146,952	41,375,891,102	131,639,000,000	23,270,019,027	18,105,872,075
1995	-14,071,969,892	57,346,051,655	168,080,000,000	35,709,010,773	21,637,040,881
1996	-20,402,177,523	66,851,107,469	181,077,000,000	43,626,642,496	23,224,464,973
1997	-22,297,648,887	74,819,792,221	188,735,000,000	48,558,720,673	26,261,071,548
1998	-18,947,440,164	72,895,343,640	270,946,851,959	45,921,391,902	26,973,951,738
1999	-14,084,047,069	67,258,496,993	247,543,704,782	40,671,272,031	26,587,224,962
2000	-26,727,914,458	82,277,726,548	265,384,360,328	54,502,820,503	27,774,906,045
2001	-10,064,866,597	72,733,299,309	196,736,197,787	41,399,082,953	31,334,216,356
2002	-15,494,708,299	87,612,886,357	230,494,219,971	51,553,797,328	36,059,089,029
2003	-22,086,855,756	116,592,528,360	304,901,341,485	69,339,692,058	47,252,836,302
2004	-34,372,613,148	160,706,918,788	390,386,833,065	97,539,765,968	63,167,152,820
2005	-43,297,742,764	190,250,559,050	481,496,930,643	116,774,150,907	73,476,408,143

2006	-54,041,498,630	225,110,849,666	526,429,394,293	139,576,174,148	85,534,675,518
2007	-62,790,964,597	277,334,464,405	648,753,606,282	170,062,714,501	107,271,749,904
2008	-69,936,378,483	333,990,769,735	742,094,394,984	201,963,574,109	132,027,195,626
2009	-38,785,808,608	243,071,033,814	616,703,324,770	140,928,421,211	102,142,612,603
2010	-71,661,112,668	299,427,551,036	731,608,367,458	185,544,331,852	113,883,219,184
2011	-105,934,807,444	375,748,545,104	773,979,672,027	240,841,676,274	134,906,868,830
2012	-84,083,404,353	389,006,877,465	786,282,516,717	236,545,140,909	152,461,736,556
2013	-99,858,613,023	403,463,887,197	823,044,427,528	251,661,250,110	151,802,637,087
2014	-84,566,959,383	399,787,274,763	799,369,750,354	242,177,117,073	157,610,157,690
2015	-63,395,487,188	351,073,230,044	719,620,440,108	207,234,358,616	143,838,871,428
2016	-56,088,651,239	341,147,818,855		198,618,235,047	142,529,583,808
2017	-76,806,710,820	390,792,591,648		233,799,651,234	156,992,940,414

Data sources: Turkish Statistical Institute, 2018a, 2018e

Appendix C: Statistics on current account deficit, FDIs, external debt-stocks, private sector loans and credits, privatisation revenues							
Year	**Current Account Deficit**	**Total FDI inflows**	**External Debt Stock**	**Outstanding Long Term Loans Received from Abroad by Private Sector**	**Outstanding Short Term Loans Received from Abroad by Private Sector**	**Nonfinancial Corporations - Trade Credits**	**Privatisation Revenues**
1980	-3,408,000,000	18,000,000	19,131,091,000				
1981	-1,936,000,000	95,000,000	19,235,547,000				
1982	-952,000,000	55,000,000	19,715,952,000				
1983	-1,923,000,000	46,000,000	20,324,057,000				
1984	-1,439,000,000	113,000,000	21,607,733,000				
1985	-1,013,000,000	99,000,000	26,012,629,000				
1986	-1,465,000,000	125,000,000	32,933,707,000				
1987	-806,000,000	115,000,000	40,943,571,000				
1988	1,596,000,000	354,000,000	40,992,856,000				
1989	938,000,000	663,000,000	41,577,123,000				
1990	-2,625,000,000	684,000,000	49,424,156,000				Total privatisation revenue until 2003 is 8,240,000,000
1991	250,000,000	810,000,000	50,873,480,000				
1992	-974,000,000	844,000,000	56,553,854,000				
1993	-6,433,000,000	636,000,000	68,604,754,000				
1994	2,631,000,000	608,000,000	66,249,182,000				
1995	-2,339,000,000	885,000,000	73,781,102,000				
1996	-2,437,000,000	722,000,000	80,624,827,000				
1997	-2,638,000,000	805,000,000	84,719,907,000				
1998	2,000,000,000	940,000,000	96,953,866,000				
1999	-925,000,000	783,000,000	101,784,253,000				
2000	-9,920,000,000	982,000,000	116,799,282,000				
2001	3,760,000,000	3,352,000,000	112,946,286,000				
2002	-626,000,000	1,082,000,000	129,501,121,000	29,211,544,305			

2003	-7,554,000,000	1,702,000,000	144,076,069,000	30,143,736,655			
2004	-14,198,000,000	2,785,000,000	159,621,567,000	36,999,723,621	10,182,925,181	12,593,000,000	1,283,000,000
2005	-20,980,000,000	10,031,000,000	173,601,952,000	50,919,987,886	13,301,136,965	15,011,000,000	8,222,000,000
2006	-31,168,000,000	20,185,000,000	211,039,511,000	82,196,960,158	10,754,419,666	16,383,000,000	8,096,000,000
2007	-36,949,000,000	22,047,000,000	260,028,248,000	121,901,419,990	8,576,478,858	21,084,000,000	4,259,000,000
2008	-39,425,000,000	19,851,000,000	290,571,653,000	141,050,738,391	10,630,869,184	22,032,000,000	6,259,000,000
2009	-11,358,000,000	8,585,000,000	278,829,980,000	128,511,191,233	6,585,816,145	21,101,000,000	2,275,000,000
2010	-44,616,000,000	9,099,000,000	300,869,524,000	119,669,018,060	19,009,641,516	22,765,000,000	3,082,000,000
2011	-74,402,000,000	16,182,000,000	305,569,781,000	126,869,726,734	24,863,438,212	25,373,000,000	1,358,000,000
2012	-47,963,000,000	13,744,000,000	338,827,811,000	140,652,104,366	30,597,267,768	26,390,000,000	3,021,000,000
2013	-63,642,000,000	13,563,000,000	390,353,934,000	156,624,366,151	41,310,348,769	32,325,000,000	12,486,000,000
2014	-43,644,000,000	13,119,000,000	402,558,688,000	168,589,800,369	44,093,045,065	31,855,000,000	6,279,000,000
2015	-32,109,000,000	18,002,000,000	396,664,940,000	195,171,525,001	20,386,688,547	33,145,000,000	1,996,000,000
2016	-33,137,000,000	13,343,000,000	405,656,066,000	203,453,789,450	14,232,826,653	36,440,000,000	1,314,000,000
2017	-47,478,000,000	11,025,000,000		221,701,453,444	18,587,492,920	44,827,000,000	224,000,000

Data sources: Central Bank of Turkey, 2018a, 2018b, 2018c; Undersecretariat of Treasury, 2018a, 2018b; Privatization Board of Turkey, 2018; World Bank, 2018b, 2018f

Appendix D: % of Turkey's total tax revenues							
Year	**Taxes on income, profits and capital gains**	**Social security contributions (SSC)**	**Employers' SSC**	**Employees' SSC**	**Taxes on property**	**Taxes on goods and services**	**Other taxes**
1980	51.8	14.0	8.1	5.1	5.4	25.6	3.1
1981	52.8	13.1	7.6	4.7	5.5	24.9	3.6
1982	53.2	13.7	7.8	5.0	5.2	26.8	1.1
1983	49.4	15.1	8.7	5.4	4.9	29.0	1.5
1984	45.9	17.4	10.1	6.2	4.7	27.9	4.1
1985	37.0	14.3	8.3	4.7	4.6	36.0	8.1
1986	38.6	13.6	7.8	4.9	3.3	31.2	13.3
1987	35.6	15.9	9.2	5.9	3.2	32.0	13.3
1988	34.2	15.1	8.7	5.5	2.8	31.7	16.2
1989	36.0	17.6	10.0	6.4	2.5	28.2	15.7
1990	33.5	19.7	11.0	7.4	2.3	27.9	16.7
1991	34.8	19.6	11.0	7.6	2.2	29.3	14.1
1992	32.5	20.4	10.7	8.1	2.0	29.8	15.3
1993	32.0	19.7	11.3	7.3	2.1	31.8	14.4
1994	29.7	15.8	8.6	6.1	8.1	37.1	9.3
1995	28.3	12.1	6.3	4.7	3.0	37.6	19.0
1996	26.2	15.8	9.0	5.7	1.8	38.3	18.0
1997	27.4	14.5	7.2	5.7	2.7	37.1	18.2
1998	33.2	14.5	7.4	5.7	3.5	36.1	12.8
1999	31.4	18.5	8.8	6.9	2.8	35.9	11.4

2000	29.5	18.7	9.0	6.7	3.2	42.0	6.6
2001	28.9	21.5	12.0	6.4	2.4	40.1	7.1
2002	24.8	19.8	9.1	6.8	2.9	46.9	5.6
2003	23.7	20.8	9.5	7.3	3.2	49.4	2.8
2004	22.1	23.9	10.7	8.4	3.1	47.7	3.2
2005	21.8	22.4	10.2	7.7	3.3	49.3	3.1
2006	21.6	22.4	9.6	8.4	3.6	48.7	3.8
2007	23.7	21.7	10.1	8.8	3.8	47.7	3.2
2008	23.9	25.0	12.5	8.4	3.6	45.5	2.0
2009	24.1	24.5	13.4	9.0	3.6	45.7	2.1
2010	21.3	24.9	13.7	9.4	4.1	47.7	2.1
2011	21.0	27.9	14.7	10.0	4.1	45.2	1.8
2012	21.8	27.2	14.9	10.4	4.2	45.0	1.7
2013	20.2	27.4	15.5	10.9	4.6	46.1	1.6
2014	21.1	28.5	15.9	10.8	4.9	44.1	1.4
2015	20.3	29.0	16.2	10.9	4.9	44.3	1.5
2016	21.2	28.8	16.4	11.0	4.8	43.6	1.6
Data source: OECD, 2018b							

Appendix E: Turkey's total official and private development assistance flows			
Year	**Total official and private flows**	**Official flows (ODA + OOF + export credits)**	**Private flows (At market terms + net private grants)**
1990		3,000,000	
1991		118,400,000	
1992		87,020,000	
1993		62,350,000	
1994		57,540,000	
1995		106,760,000	
1996		87,600,000	
1997	349,600,000	76,720,000	
1998	167,300,000	68,780,000	
1999	331,030,000	120,270,000	
2000	141,150,000	81,880,000	
2001	64,130,000	64,110,000	
2002	72,970,000	72,960,000	
2003	107,520,000	66,630,000	
2004	1,128,230,000	339,160,000	
2005	1,051,940,000	601,040,000	56,700,000
2006	1,663,140,000	714,340,000	1,072,720,000
2007	1,336,640,000	602,330,000	775,990,000
2008	1,576,750,000	780,360,000	798,940,000
2009	1,519,650,000	707,170,000	823,490,000
2010	1,718,180,000	967,420,000	775,990,000
2011	2,363,450,000	1,273,010,000	1,078,720,000
2012	3,436,480,000	2,533,300,000	846,650,000
2013	4,347,140,000	3,307,670,000	1,052,530,000

2014	6,403,130,000	3,591,080,000	2,739,560,000
2015	5,104,700,000	3,919,140,000	1,072,780,000
2016	7,943,280,000	6,487,680,000	1,247,800,000
2017		8,142,890,000	

Data source: OECD, 2018d, 2018e

Appendix F: Turkey's total aid flows by the top 10 recipients

Year	Syria	Azerbaijan	Afghanistan	Kazakhstan	Kyrgyzstan	Pakistan	Somalia	Iraq	Egypt	Bosnia and Herzegovina
2002	60,000	4,140,000	380,000	1,510,000	2,480,000	100,000	-	80,000	10,000	6,420,000
2003	100,000	3,650,000	700,000	2,870,000	3,160,000	60,000	-	1,250,000	30,000	660,000
2004	1,930,000	22,900,000	8,740,000	27,170,000	34,740,000	330,000	640,000	24,570,000	260,000	5,790,000
2005	4,560,000	69,480,000	28,560,000	142,950,000	112,120,000	153,760,000	-	12,920,000	1,200,000	18,620,000
2006	3,620,000	468,160,000	57,650,000	60,530,000	66,890,000	30,690,000	3,270,000	18,850,000	5,980,000	58,590,000
2007	6,310,000	418,360,000	71,610,000	119,350,000	69,720,000	34,660,000	3,550,000	55,080,000	30,560,000	22,510,000
2008	4,920,000	298,300,000	141,960,000	76,590,000	52,960,000	85,650,000	7,510,000	47,680,000	16,210,000	26,240,000
2009	5,840,000	323,330,000	96,880,000	83,970,000	76,810,000	46,490,000	5,690,000	88,240,000	35,590,000	53,540,000
2010	18,750,000	231,680,000	107,320,000	53,450,000	86,760,000	136,310,000	5,810,000	50,700,000	17,370,000	87,390,000
2011	162,030,000	322,480,000	160,190,000	118,940,000	74,090,000	234,950,000	93,390,000	56,830,000	26,510,000	39,940,000
2012	1,019,930,000	392,360,000	151,750,000	104,770,000	105,510,000	29,640,000	86,610,000	39,390,000	523,920,000	28,300,000
2013	1,638,500,000	477,680,000	89,730,000	46,300,000	131,550,000	85,980,000	115,740,000	44,740,000	576,830,000	25,280,000
2014	2,291,510,000	1,962,960,000	65,230,000	128,540,000	84,770,000	24,820,000	74,350,000	220,020,000	12,320,000	43,460,000
2015	2,694,020,000	284,760,000	56,780,000	34,440,000	98,360,000	38,930,000	314,820,000	32,690,000	- 192,920,000	60,960,000
2016	5,851,230,000	240,470,000	33,430,000	49,490,000	35,030,000	6,210,000	59,630,000	47,290,000	- 376,620,000	57,010,000

Data source: OECD, 2018d, 2018e

Appendix G: Turkish construction industry's increasing role in the domestic economy			
Year	**Value to GDP**	**% share in GDP**	**Annual GDP Growth %**
1998	4,362,082,899	6.07	2.31
1999	5,969,304,771	5.57	-3.39
2000	9,071,100,200	5.32	6.64
2001	11,404,098,992	4.65	-5.96
2002	16,286,205,220	4.53	6.43
2003	21,654,506,468	4.63	5.61
2004	30,819,874,151	5.34	9.64
2005	37,582,564,095	5.58	9.01
2006	49,816,623,374	6.31	7.11
2007	59,796,605,402	6.79	5.03
2008	67,981,092,889	6.83	0.85
2009	56,156,968,933	5.62	-4.70
2010	70,701,311,318	6.09	8.49
2011	100,016,363,157	7.17	11.11
2012	117,433,141,951	7.48	4.79
2013	145,908,412,529	8.06	8.49
2014	165,654,620,291	8.10	5.17
2015	190,619,215,139	8.15	6.09
2016	223,362,830,977	8.56	3.18
2017	265,977,448,657	8.56	7.42
Data source: Turkish Statistical Institute, 2018c; World Bank, 2018c			

Appendix H_1: Statistical data on Turkey's total primary energy supply between 1980 and 2016								
Year	Hard Coal (TOE)		Petrol Products (TOE)		Natural Gas (TOE)		Other Fossil Energy Sources (TOE)	
	Domestic	Imported	Domestic	Imported	Domestic	Imported	Domestic	Imported
1980	2,195,000	576,000	2,447,000	14,339,000	21,000	-	11,660,000	-
1981	2,422,000	397,000	2,481,000	14,533,000	15,000	-	12,236,000	-
1982	2,445,000	675,000	2,450,000	15,950,000	41,000	-	12,950,000	-
1983	2,159,000	1,019,000	2,313,000	16,517,000	7,000	-	13,758,000	-
1984	2,216,000	1,209,000	2,191,000	17,515,000	36,000	-	14,526,000	78,000
1985	2,199,000	1,624,000	2,216,000	17,574,000	62,000	-	16,186,000	28,000
1986	2,151,000	1,829,000	2,514,000	19,101,000	416,000	-	17,089,000	6,000
1987	2,111,000	2,389,000	2,762,000	22,625,000	270,000	399,000	17,950,000	-
1988	2,212,000	3,152,000	2,692,000	24,265,000	90,000	1,038,000	16,711,000	-
1989	2,027,000	2,531,000	3,020,000	21,701,000	158,000	2,728,000	18,591,000	8,000
1990	2,080,000	4,204,000	3,902,000	23,399,000	193,000	2,964,000	16,851,000	355,000
1991	1,827,000	4,664,000	4,674,000	20,862,000	185,000	3,672,000	16,389,000	334,000
1992	1,727,000	4,131,000	4,495,000	22,733,000	180,000	4,038,000	17,599,000	569,000
1993	1,722,000	4,046,000	4,087,000	26,817,000	182,000	4,508,000	16,975,000	790,000
1994	1,636,000	3,951,000	3,871,000	25,689,000	182,000	4,891,000	17,579,000	811,000
1995	1,319,000	4,347,000	3,692,000	28,345,000	166,000	6,242,000	17,832,000	845,000
1996	1,290,000	5,922,670	3,674,617	30,759,571	169,613	6,633,825	10,799,808	293,750
1997	1,331,000	6,987,000	3,629,814	30,797,625	208,903	8,155,125	11,488,323	489,140
1998	1,143,000	7,362,000	3,384,803	31,176,600	465,747	8,442,225	12,304,811	424,406
1999	1,070,000	6,328,000	3,086,891	31,267,311	603,156	10,195,245	11,886,359	313,157
2000	1,196,000	8,803,049	2,886,560	33,216,758	527,359	12,227,325	11,755,577	507,650
2001	1,321,000	5,452,337	2,679,040	31,669,168	257,039	13,503,600	11,096,957	368,078
2002	1,229,000	7,856,530	2,563,611	34,211,618	312,182	14,293,950	10,311,582	485,800
2003	1,131,770	10,546,352	2,493,796	35,288,236	462,523	17,178,975	10,439,480	356,355
2004	1,080,680	10,928,902	2,389,307	36,808,629	583,966	17,982,525	9,430,412	272,767
2005	1,183,525	11,432,152	2,395,188	37,181,634	740,025	21,854,877	9,791,712	289,853

2006	1,348,126	13,256,376	2,284,451	38,810,390	747,935	24,933,068	11,597,526	326,391
2007	1,305,000	14,333,639	2,240,884	39,729,420	736,771	29,562,261	13,763,109	309,166
2008	1,379,000	12,708,018	2,268,070	38,540,852	838,654	30,651,049	14,996,600	146,829
2009	1,517,000	13,119,068	2,349,082	35,924,950	564,813	29,581,592	15,226,985	183,000
2010	1,577,232	14,309,784	2,620,800	38,702,650	562,650	31,381,350	15,205,071	113,488
2011	1,597,590	15,392,000	2,485,350	38,160,144	627,000	36,196,421	14,956,362	203,156
2012	1,398,279	18,830,775	2,454,900	40,929,786	521,706	37,885,806	14,158,584	251,248
2013	1,136,800	17,205,134	2,518,950	40,608,759	443,025	37,346,925	12,416,803	345,018
2014	1,110,200	19,201,504	2,578,800	41,875,344	395,175	40,641,150	12,702,764	237,213
2015	875,350	21,916,455	2,641,443	49,946,289	314,325	39,952,275	11,750,575	369,200
2016	721,914	23,178,086	2,701,650	50,773,476	302,775	38,240,400	14,737,885	380,689

Data source: General Directorate of Energy Affairs, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016

Appendix H_2: Statistical data on Turkey's total primary energy supply between 1980 and 2016							
Year	**Hydro (TOE)**	**Geothermal (TOE)**	**Wind (TOE)**	**Bioenergy (TOE)**	**Sun (TOE)**	**Imported electricity (TOE)**	**Total primary energy supply (TOE)**
1980	976,000	60,000	-	-	-	115,000	32,389,000
1981	1,085,000	60,000	-	-	-	139,000	33,368,000
1982	1,218,000	82,000	-	-	-	152,000	35,963,000
1983	975,000	100,000	-	-	-	191,000	37,039,000
1984	1,155,000	197,000	-	-	-	228,000	39,351,000
1985	1,036,000	237,000	-	-	-	184,000	41,346,000
1986	1,021,000	338,000	-	-	5,000	67,000	44,537,000
1987	1,601,000	374,000	-	-	10,000	49,000	50,540,000
1988	2,490,000	398,000	-	-	13,000	33,000	53,094,000
1989	1,543,000	396,000	-	-	19,000	48,000	52,770,000
1990	1,991,000	433,000	-	-	28,000	15,000	56,415,000
1991	1,951,000	435,000	-	-	41,000	65,000	55,099,000
1992	2,285,000	448,000	-	-	60,000	16,000	58,281,000
1993	2,920,000	467,000	-	-	88,000	18,000	62,620,000
1994	2,630,000	483,000	-	-	129,000	3,000	61,855,000
1995	3,057,000	511,000	-	-	143,000	-	66,499,000
1996	3,480,867	542,982	-	6,978,720	159,000	23,229	70,728,652
1997	3,424,185	602,208	-	7,024,450	179,000	214,338	74,531,110
1998	3,631,694	655,100	-	6,919,320	210,000	283,671	76,403,377
1999	2,982,265	687,574	1,763	6,714,920	236,000	200,406	75,573,048
2000	2,655,551	712,930	2,872	6,457,030	262,000	326,052	81,536,713
2001	2,064,851	764,056	5,366	6,210,600	287,000	393,828	76,072,923
2002	2,896,807	819,956	4,128	5,974,270	318,000	308,585	81,586,018
2003	3,038,337	860,196	5,280	5,748,270	350,000	99,588	87,999,157
2004	3,963,198	890,980	4,962	5,531,840	375,000	39,861	90,283,029
2005	3,402,203	1,007,184	5,074	5,324,910	385,000	54,687	95,048,025

2006	3,813,085	898,000	10,879	5,171,530	402,500	49,295	103,649,552
2007	3,096,576	914,000	30,539	5,007,606	420,000	74,332	111,523,302
2008	2,861,203	1,150,694	72,800	4,771,170	420,000	67,890	110,872,830
2009	3,092,431	1,624,526	128,596	4,674,054	428,750	69,828	108,484,676
2010	4,454,370	1,965,480	250,776	4,489,195	432,000	98,384	116,163,230
2011	4,501,154	2,059,840	406,264	3,507,800	630,000	391,799	121,114,881
2012	4,976,386	2,236,459	504,028	3,426,504	768,000	501,096	128,843,556
2013	5,110,160	2,635,658	649,946	3,399,815	795,000	638,894	125,250,886
2014	3,495,470	3,523,939	732,720	3,249,408	803,000	671,230	131,217,916
2015	5,774,556	4,805,000	1,002,158	2,944,680	827,700	613,653	143,733,659
2016	5,781,857	6,034,000	1,334,462	2,842,540	916,612	544,406	148,490,751

Data source: General Directorate of Energy Affairs, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016

Appendix H_3: Statistical data on Turkey's total primary energy supply between 1980 and 2016								
Year	**Total primary energy supply**				**% of imported fossil energy resources**			**Crude oil import prices (US Dollar)**
	Domestic	**Imported**	**% of domestic**	**% of imported**	**Hard Coal**	**Petrol Products**	**Natural Gas**	
1980	17,359,000	15,030,000	54%	46%	21%	85%	0%	
1981	18,299,000	15,069,000	55%	45%	14%	85%	0%	
1982	19,186,000	16,777,000	53%	47%	22%	87%	0%	
1983	19,312,000	17,727,000	52%	48%	32%	88%	0%	
1984	20,321,000	19,030,000	52%	48%	35%	89%	0%	
1985	21,936,000	19,410,000	53%	47%	42%	89%	0%	
1986	23,534,000	21,003,000	53%	47%	46%	88%	0%	
1987	25,078,000	25,462,000	50%	50%	53%	89%	60%	
1988	24,606,000	28,488,000	46%	54%	59%	90%	92%	
1989	25,754,000	27,016,000	49%	51%	56%	88%	95%	
1990	25,478,000	30,937,000	45%	55%	67%	86%	94%	
1991	25,502,000	29,597,000	46%	54%	72%	82%	95%	
1992	26,794,000	31,487,000	46%	54%	71%	83%	96%	
1993	26,441,000	36,179,000	42%	58%	70%	87%	96%	
1994	26,510,000	35,345,000	43%	57%	71%	87%	96%	
1995	26,720,000	39,779,000	40%	60%	77%	88%	97%	
1996	27,095,607	43,633,045	38%	62%	82%	89%	98%	
1997	27,887,883	46,643,228	37%	63%	84%	89%	98%	
1998	28,714,475	47,688,903	38%	62%	87%	90%	95%	
1999	27,268,928	48,304,119	36%	64%	86%	91%	94%	
2000	26,455,880	55,080,833	32%	68%	88%	92%	96%	26.61
2001	24,685,911	51,387,011	32%	68%	80%	92%	98%	22.98
2002	24,429,536	57,156,483	30%	70%	86%	93%	98%	23.57
2003	24,529,652	63,469,505	28%	72%	90%	93%	97%	27.05

2004	24,250,346	66,032,683	27%	73%	91%	94%	97%	34.9
2005	24,234,820	70,813,204	25%	75%	91%	94%	97%	50.65
2006	26,274,033	77,375,520	25%	75%	91%	94%	97%	61.48
2007	27,514,484	84,008,818	25%	75%	92%	95%	98%	68.59
2008	28,758,192	82,114,638	26%	74%	90%	94%	97%	98.07
2009	29,606,238	78,878,439	27%	73%	90%	94%	98%	61.27
2010	31,557,574	84,605,656	27%	73%	90%	94%	98%	78.26
2011	30,771,360	90,343,520	25%	75%	91%	94%	98%	109.81
2012	30,444,845	98,398,711	24%	76%	93%	94%	99%	111.7
2013	29,106,156	96,144,731	23%	77%	94%	94%	99%	108.37
2014	28,591,476	102,626,441	22%	78%	95%	94%	99%	99.71
2015	30,935,787	112,797,872	22%	78%	96%	95%	99%	51.42
2016	35,373,694	113,117,056	24%	76%	97%	95%	99%	41.28

Data source: General Directorate of Energy Affairs, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016; OECD, 2018f

Appendix I_1: Statistical data on the energy generation in Turkey between 1980 and 2016											
	Hard Coal (TOE)		Brown Coal (TOE)		Derived Gases (TOE)		Petrol (TOE)		Natural Gas (TOE)		Electricity (TOE)
Year	Domestic	Imported	Domestic	Imported	Domestic	Imported	Domestic	Imported	Domestic	Imported	Imported
1996	82,020	376,570	7,261,612	-	79,231	363,769	200,745	1,680,400	77,980	3,049,928	23,229
1997	89,214	468,326	7,774,246	16,646	72,327	379,673	216,330	1,835,481	94,152	3,675,482	214,338
1998	78,102	503,048	8,470,909	2,988	56,444	363,556	220,055	2,026,869	236,593	4,288,532	283,671
1999	85,374	504,906	8,635,834	1,195	67,110	396,890	206,961	2,096,318	349,074	5,900,455	200,406
2000	85,992	632,936	8,910,791	1,569	30,501	224,499	188,689	2,171,311	325,213	7,540,372	326,052
2001	165,738	684,072	8,931,659	1,594	39,396	162,604	188,920	2,233,244	161,297	8,473,740	393,828
2002	106,635	681,674	7,332,675	-	32,465	207,535	156,260	2,085,301	194,806	8,919,607	308,585
2003	174,002	1,621,433	6,901,146	-	28,396	264,604	127,165	1,799,439	268,499	9,972,557	99,588
2004	214,599	2,170,233	5,783,035	-	29,965	303,035	101,603	1,565,256	326,151	10,043,406	39,861
2005	243,186	2,349,036	6,515,494	-	30,396	293,604	73,955	1,148,046	415,057	12,257,722	54,687
2006	264,267	2,598,586	8,070,914	3,816	36,000	354,000	59,214	1,005,979	401,521	13,385,040	49,295
2007	261,914	2,876,767	9,769,874	-	33,880	372,120	76,935	1,364,010	401,320	16,102,613	74,332
2008	321,880	2,966,248	10,558,888	-	49,631	457,369	96,819	1,645,233	459,441	16,791,607	67,890
2009	349,168	3,019,618	9,488,843	-	56,488	488,512	74,985	1,146,755	316,607	16,582,017	69,828
2010	365,813	3,318,915	9,352,053	-	63,737	578,263	56,318	831,682	316,534	17,654,441	98,384
2011	555,676	5,353,664	10,113,433	-	60,558	583,442	16,143	247,857	320,352	18,493,773	391,799
2012	474,843	6,394,757	9,044,900	-	47,003	632,997	41,929	699,071	258,754	18,790,496	501,096
2013	413,362	6,256,116	7,842,965	-	44,252	669,748	43,163	695,837	221,578	18,678,963	638,894
2014	440,533	7,619,257	9,731,165	-	48,591	840,409	48,555	788,445	202,001	20,774,449	671,230
2015	356,449	8,924,553	8,341,251	-	36,524	914,476	23,319	440,931	126,270	16,049,505	613,653
2016	315,025	10,114,352	10,137,701	-	25,059	804,555	30,869	580,137	116,587	14,724,876	544,406

Data source: General Directorate of Energy Affairs, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016

Appendix I_2: Statistical data on the energy generation in Turkey between 1980 and 2016												
								Resources Input			Total energy supply used to generate electricity	
Year	Hydro	Geo	Wind	Wood	Waste	Asphaltite	Sun	Domestic	Imported	Total energy supply used to generate electricity	% of domestic	% of imported
1996	3,480,867	71,982	-	-	-	-	-	11,254,438	5,493,895	16,748,333	67%	33%
1997	3,424,185	71,208	-	-	-	-	-	11,741,661	6,589,946	18,331,607	64%	36%
1998	3,631,694	73,000	-	-	-	-	-	12,766,797	7,468,664	20,235,461	63%	37%
1999	2,982,265	69,574	1,763	-	-	-	-	12,397,956	9,100,170	21,498,125	58%	42%
2000	2,655,551	64,930	2,872	-	-	-	-	12,264,539	10,896,739	23,161,278	53%	47%
2001	2,064,851	77,056	5,366	-	-	-	-	11,634,284	11,949,083	23,583,367	49%	51%
2002	2,896,807	89,956	4,128	-	-	-	-	10,813,731	12,202,702	23,016,433	47%	53%
2003	3,038,337	76,196	5,280	-	-	-	-	10,619,021	13,757,621	24,376,642	44%	56%
2004	3,963,198	79,980	4,962	-	-	-	-	10,503,493	14,121,790	24,625,283	43%	57%
2005	3,402,203	81,184	5,074	-	-	-	-	10,766,550	16,103,095	26,869,645	40%	60%
2006	3,813,085	1,770	10,879	43,000	-	-	-	12,700,650	17,396,715	30,097,365	42%	58%
2007	3,096,576	-	30,539	58,000	-	-	-	13,729,038	20,789,843	34,518,880	40%	60%
2008	2,861,203	139,694	72,800	35,200	10,000	-	-	14,605,557	21,928,347	36,533,904	40%	60%
2009	3,092,431	374,702	128,596	77,000	7,000	104,000	-	14,069,820	21,306,729	35,376,549	40%	60%
2010	4,454,370	574,480	250,776	9,300	76,120	225,561	-	15,745,062	22,481,685	38,226,747	41%	59%
2011	4,501,154	596,840	406,264	3,900	79,420	192,638	-	16,846,377	25,070,536	41,916,913	40%	60%
2012	4,976,386	773,434	504,028	5,229	121,880	195,345	-	16,443,731	27,018,417	43,462,148	38%	62%
2013	5,110,160	1,172,633	649,946	4,422	178,020	158,670	-	15,839,170	26,939,557	42,778,728	37%	63%
2014	3,495,470	2,033,000	732,720	-	192,940	221,117	-	17,146,092	30,693,790	47,839,882	36%	64%
2015	5,774,556	2,945,000	1,002,158	-	230,560	237,636	16,700	19,090,424	26,943,118	46,033,542	41%	59%
2016	5,781,857	4,143,000	1,334,462	-	330,257	661,193	89,690	22,965,700	26,768,326	49,734,027	46%	54%

Data source: General Directorate of Energy Affairs, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016

Appendix J: Statistical data on Turkey's energy use, emissions, installed capacity, electricity prices for industry, and crude oil import prices							
Year	**Energy Use (kg of oil equivalent per capita)**	**CO_2 emissions**	**Installed capacity**	**Industrial electricity prices (US Dollar, USD/MWh)**			**Crude oil import prices (US Dollar)**
				Turkey	**OECD (Total)**	**OECD (Europe)**	
1980	715	75,764	5,119				
1981	705	79,875	5,538				
1982	732	86,989	6,639				
1983	758	90,542	6,935				
1984	771	95,797	8,462				
1985	800	106,717	9,122				
1986	845	116,882	10,115				
1987	919	129,907	12,495				
1988	908	126,310	14,521				
1989	927	139,317	15,808				
1990	978	145,859	16,318				
1991	948	148,620	17,209				
1992	962	153,108	18,716				
1993	1,004	159,137	20,338				
1994	976	156,849	20,860				
1995	1,053	171,975	20,954				
1996	1,126	188,205	21,249				
1997	1,166	198,535	21,892				
1998	1,170	200,614	23,354				
1999	1,131	196,771	26,119				
2000	1,201	216,151	27,264				26.61
2001	1,094	194,553	28,332				22.98
2002	1,139	205,686	31,846	94.15	60.56	59.05	23.57
2003	1,178	218,524	35,587	99.45	69.27	73.49	27.05

2004	1,205	225,421	36,824	100.12	74.64	81.92	34.9
2005	1,240	237,391	38,844	106.41	80.31	90.73	50.65
2006	1,355	261,615	40,565	99.81	87.66	105.97	61.48
2007	1,437	284,658	40,836	108.75	94.93	118.81	68.59
2008	1,401	283,980	41,817	138.8	110.63	142.96	98.07
2009	1,371	277,845	44,761	137.6	106.4	134.1	61.27
2010	1,475	298,002	49,524	150.92	107.2	131.7	78.26
2011	1,546	320,840	52,911	138.4	115.7	143.2	109.81
2012	1,585	329,561	57,059	148.2	116.6	139.7	111.7
2013	1,543	324,772	64,008	146.6	119.5	147.5	108.37
2014	1,578	345,981	69,520	130.8	120.7	147.1	99.71
2015	1,657		73,147	112	104.1	121.9	51.42
2016			78,497	105.6	102.2	116.3	41.28
2017				87.5	104.1	115.3	

Data source: World Bank, 2018d, 2018e; OECD, 2018f; International Energy Agency, 2017a, 2017b, 2018; Turkish Statistical Institute, 2018f

Appendix K: FDIs in energy-built environment			
Year	**FDIs in mining and quarrying**	**FDIs in manufacturing of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel**	**FDIs in electricity, gas, steam and air-conditioning supply**
2002	2,000,000	-	68,000,000
2003	13,000,000	2,000,000	87,000,000
2004	74,000,000	-	63,000,000
2005	41,000,000	-	2,000,000
2006	123,000,000	6,000,000	1,164,000,000
2007	336,000,000	471,000,000	567,000,000
2008	145,000,000	28,000,000	1,055,000,000
2009	89,000,000	61,000,000	2,153,000,000
2010	136,000,000	3,000,000	1,824,000,000
2011	146,000,000	1,255,000,000	4,293,000,000
2012	188,000,000	355,000,000	773,000,000
2013	717,000,000	236,000,000	1,794,000,000
2014	382,000,000	101,000,000	1,131,000,000
2015	207,000,000	1,809,000,000	1,338,000,000
2016	148,000,000	-	676,000,000
2017	447,000,000	-	367,000,000
Data source: Central Bank of Turkey, 2018a			