

SELF-DETERMINATION,
SOVEREIGNTY, AND HISTORY:
SITUATING ZIONISM IN THE
SETTLER COLONIAL ARCHIVE

SELF-DETERMINATION, SOVEREIGNTY, AND HISTORY: SITUATING ZIONISM IN THE SETTLER COLONIAL ARCHIVE

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This work is humbly dedicated to those who lived and still live under colonialism, settler or otherwise, may they one day be free.

Abstract

Pre-existing models of Zionism as a Central European organic nationalist movement have sought to locate its rise to historic prominence primarily in the context of British imperial instrumentality which Zionist national histories themselves that have sought to emphasize. This thesis finds this specific connection unsatisfying, and therefore takes a broader historic and thematic view. Using the settler colonial research paradigm as a starting point, and its inherently comparative, trans-national and trans-historical perspective, it will attempt to trace several genealogies. The first, of the post-Enlightenment construction of the reasoning subject and the theory of self-determination, would be constituted against, and in front of, or prior to, the extended world, and the Others of a similarly constructed “mankind” that were seen to inhabit it. Through the philosophies of these self-determining subjects in common, in relation to private property and to the state that would secure it for them, it will come to an as yet unresolved problem of the sovereign subject and the universalization of that subject’s freedom in the sovereignty of the modern democratic state, a problem that many European thinkers would seek the resolution of in the potentiality of the settler colonial frontier.

A second genealogy will trace the self-determining subjects of post-Enlightenment philosophy as they made their transits on the stage of history in and between what James Belich termed the “Settler Empire.” This imperium, encompassing the Second British Empire and the United States of America, contained and produced imagined communities, myths of racialized identity, technologies of racial government and settlement and attitudes to history and the future of the planet, that prefigured Zionism and practices of the state of Israel, which have proven to be one of its lasting legacies. A final genealogy will trace the sacred and secular messianic of Protestantism in Britain and America, which I argue after Gabriel Piterberg and Amnon Raz-Krakotzkin shows that Zionism is largely a continuance of Christian historicism and restorationist traditions rather than of the Jewish tradition and that the history of Protestantism in the settler colonial world had profound import on this development historically. This argument is reinforced by a close reading of key Christian and Jewish Zionist texts, analysed from the perspective of comparative settler colonial studies. This reveals that key ideological tropes of Zionism were pre-figured in the Christian Zionist tradition, that Jewish Zionism re-articulated Christian restorationist traditions, and importantly, that the legacies of settler colonial histories played an important role in shaping the development of Zionist ideology and the work of some of its key thinkers. The genealogy ultimately concludes that British elites and Zionist lobbyists in 1917 in many ways shared the same teleology of history and notion of history itself and their adoption of the Balfour Declaration was in large part consequence of this. The thesis closes by returning to the question of the unresolved problem of the universalization of self-determination in the modern democratic state and the question of sovereign violence in said state. This was a problem that European thought arguably has never fully resolved, but has found a heuristic outlet for the playing out of these issues in the open frontier of the settler colonies. We will show how profoundly dangerous a heuristic scheme this is by closely examining the play of sovereignties on the settler colonial frontier in America, Australia and then in contemporary Palestine, to indicate that such heuristic outlets are not to be seen as “practices of freedom” but rather mechanisms of structural invasion, elimination, and necropolitical violence.

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Overview

This thesis seeks to trace several parallel genealogies in the history of settler colonialism in three chapters with a view to situating and contextualizing Zionism within the wider settler colonial research paradigm. Having done this, the thesis will engage in a close reading of key Christian and Jewish Zionist texts that have as yet received little scrutiny from the perspective of settler colonial studies. These readings will identify a number of ideological structures identified in the genealogies, to reveal the degree to which Zionism in its Christian and Jewish variants is indebted to the history of settler colonialism and substantially foreshadowed in it. The thesis will then close by looking comparatively at the specificities of settler technologies of native dispossession on the open frontier, foregrounding the case study with the historic examples of America and Australia and then focusing on the contemporary example of the Occupied Territories.

Aims and Methodology

Much study of Zionism up to this point has focused on it as an example of Central European romantic or organic nationalism, from the perspective of British Imperial history, and its instrumentalization of the Zionist movement to secure its ends in the Middle East, or of the movement's prodigious success at lobbying European and American governments to its cause. Whilst I would not dispute the importance of these histories, I would argue they omit a rich history beyond Europe, and to my mind have never been really satisfying on their own terms. In response to the "New Israeli Historians" of the 1980s and 1990s, Palestinian national histories, and anti-Zionist and Palestinian activism more generally, a defence of the conventional narrative of the history of the Zionist movement and the history of the state of Israel has contended variously that critical narratives ignore Zionism's unique circumstances, - its lack of a mother country, its non-exploitation of the native population (as opposed to the example for instance of African slaves in America), its uniquely democratic nature in a region marked by authoritarian rule- that critics single Israel out for criticism unfairly, that vis-à-vis the native question, critics of the state might better focus on the histories of "really" settler colonial states, such as the United States, or Australia for example and that Israel was populated not by "settlers" but exclusively by refugees and migrants. All of these objections I believe are *precisely the point* of critiques of Zionism and the state of Israel in the first place, if we apply a comparative and historic settler colonial approach, as the thesis will hope to show. By deepening our understanding of the thematic, technological, discursive, and historical links that bind the settler colonial world together, or of the collective repository of the settler colonial archive, I hope to provide a wider and more deeply contextualized space for Palestine in settler colonial studies, where I believe it has received somewhat superficial attention with regards to its importance historically, and to provide activism with a more nuanced picture of precisely what Zionism really "is". Beyond this, the thesis aims to act as a reminder,

that we pause and consider that whenever we embark on a politics of emancipation and freedom, we first consider if in our effervescence of utopian potentiality, we are not in fact, closing off the avenues of the freedom of others, or outright obliterating other ways of being in the world.

The thesis is historically comparative and theoretically minded. Its main contribution is to the history of ideas pertaining to Zionism as a settler colonial movement in particular, and to settler colonial theory more generally. As a work of history, by its nature it implies an attempt to mediate between the historical record, the archive, primary, secondary, and tertiary sources, that is, competing historical accounts, and an implied audience (White 1975, 5). Thus, I am constructing a historical narrative, and in this case, in part, a historical narrative about historical narrative itself, and in doing so, I am engaging in an act of production. I am erecting signs, I am implying a direction, selecting, marking off elements in my narrative to make what would otherwise prove unintelligible, hopefully, a convincing argument.

This is I believe the work of the historian. I do not believe that truly “objective” history is possible. The utterer of the historic narrative cannot excise herself from the discourse of history, there is no “invisible empty subject”, no Archimedean point from which the abstract object “history” may speak through some transparent medium. Facts do not speak for themselves, people speak facts, and define in their speech the very definition of what are accepted as facts.

As Nietzsche described the process:

devotion to truth and the precision of scientific methods arose from the passion of scholars, their reciprocal hatred, their fanatical and unending discussions and their spirit for competition [...] personal conflicts [...] slowly forged the weapons of reason (Nietzsche in Foucault 1984, 78).

Even more so in the ideologically charged realm of history, the truth of things, the objective, was and still is a dynamic of power and the knowledge attendant to it. The historical record is not a passive resource, and the historian is not its objective interpreter; both condition what counts as knowledge and have therefore been active producers, informing what has counted as historical knowledge and mediating the production of further historical knowledge into the future.

Beyond the realm of Foucauldian discursives, Strauss and Löwith remind us that our modernist temporalization of history is both very recent, and arguably at odds with the vast majority of the peoples of the world. Indeed, in the light of the practical impossibility of extracting a singular, dialectic or synthesized, historical “fact” from the complex multiplicity of any grounded existence in the “here and now” the historian has to resort to the construction of “history” as an abstraction by the selection of facts from a multiplicity of “inexhaustible [...] physical and psychical detail” (Levi-Strauss 1966, 257). Therefore, if history, even history -such as historical materialism, which makes claims to universalism- can only be partial in the extreme, then history *must* be history *for*. History must be *for* a purpose, otherwise the selection of an arbitrary fragment against an arbitrary background of continuity which contextualizes it in the present cannot be but

meaningless. History is not meaningless, but neither is it objective; truth comes, I believe, from what history is *for*.

In the light of these limitations on the production of historical knowledge, I follow the insight of Walter Benjamin, that history might be a process in which we let the victors have their histories, and instead, we produce histories *for an 'Other'*, we “awaken the dead and [...] piece together what has been smashed” (Benjamin 2003, 392) against the wind of progress. This is the project of settler colonialism more generally, a history excavated against the grain of Whiggish imperial history, Post-Colonial Studies, whose focus has been classical colonies and the currents of Historical Materialism, which despite Marx’s own relatively nuanced discussion of the settler colonies with regards to his theories of primitive accumulation, has largely ignored the accumulation of the “primitive” that the theory at least implicitly relies on.

I follow Said in applying a contrapuntalism to my genealogies of the self-determining settler subject and its modernist prostheses throughout the thesis. The histories, theories and philosophies of imperialism and settler colonialism are sedimentary, hybrid, palimpsestic, and nomadic; not unitary homogenous and sedentary (Said 1994, xxv). The history of the settler is by its nature also a history of the native (and a spectrum of marked others) through which, in spite of, and *because* of whom the settler came into being. This mirror image carries over from the construction of the self, of society, of the state, of political ideologies and technologies, and into the present, of left-wing politics of emancipation. All rely on, “pass through” and appropriate nativity, and native ways of being as the settler did native land. Israel today, and scholarly debate surrounding it continues the process. This took place transnationally, across the settler empire, and so my approach to the subject takes a comparative perspective and does not dwell in any one epoch, moving back and forth, to try and make sense of a scene still very much in motion.

The study is inherently comparative in nature, after Anderson, comparison as a method effects the work as something of a haunting, a “double consciousness” (Anderson 2002, 229). I find it difficult to think through the colonization and settlement of Ireland, North America, Australia, and South Africa, without also thinking the colonization of Palestine. The settler world, much as Said noted of the Orient, constitutes an archive. Examining this archive involves analysing primary sources, those secondary to it, hermeneutic productions of the European philosophical and historic imagination and even the discourses of the settler colonial paradigm itself. All of these artefacts draw forth comparisons in their positionality within the archive as such; therefore, I do not believe the conventional distinction between primary, secondary, tertiary and other sources applies or should apply to the thesis. Because of this, the conventional structuring and positioning of the literature review will not apply, and the literature relevant to the subjects under discussion will follow the thesis as it progresses. To place a

review of relevant literature at the outset and outside the body of the text would separate what is arguably as much a part of the subject under discussion as the other materials, and would render the flow of the argument unnecessarily confusing.

Methodologically speaking, the thesis aims, in three chapters to provide genealogies of a theory of subjectivity, a secular and a sacred identity respectively; these combine to reveal what is argued to form a teleology of history, which the thesis will present working through Zionism via a close reading of some of its key texts. These texts will then be analysed through the lens of comparative settler colonial studies to reveal their settler colonial technological underpinnings. Finally, the theoretical insights of the preceding chapters will be brought to bear on a close comparative analysis of the open frontier in the American, Australian and Israeli cases, with a specific focus on the contemporary West Bank.

Research Question: How was Zionism pre-figured in the Settler Empire? How is the State of Israel a lasting legacy of it?

The main research question is followed by a number of supplementary questions corresponding to each thesis chapter:

- 1.) How did Post-Enlightenment European philosophy produce a particular type of human subject that stood differentially against the “Others” of “Mankind”?
- 2.) How did the subjects of the “Settler Empire” shape a self-referential transnational “imagined community”? What were its institutions, technologies and legacies?
- 3.) What are the intersections between Protestantism, Messianism, Historicism, and the Restorationist Tradition in England and America?
- 4.) How was Zionist settler colonialism pre-figured in Christian Zionism? How were the technologies, traditions, and ideas of settler colonialism (and Christian Zionism) re-articulated by Jewish Zionists?
- 5.) In what ways did the post-Enlightenment notion of universal freedom inform the radical decentralization of sovereign violence in settler colonial structural invasion? How has this been institutionalized in the West Bank?

Settler Colonialism

Briefly, the settler colonial paradigm seeks to explore what has been occluded in the understandable focus of anti-colonial struggle on classical exploitation colonialism. As Patrick Wolfe explains, we have become familiar with the guerrilla theory of Fanon, Cabral et al, who speak to the oppressed majority upon whose labour the coloniser is precariously dependent. The settler colonial paradigm asks us the question, what happens “if the colonizer is not dependent or aspires to independence from the labour

of the colonized?” Where in the classical exploitation colonial formation the determinate articulation is between the colonizer and the colonized, in the settler colonial formation the encounter (or non-encounter) is between the settler and the land (Wolfe 1999, 1-2); the native is excised, and indeed, was never supposed to be there in the first place. As settler colonizers come to stay, Wolfe terms their invasion “a structure, not an event” (Wolfe 1999, 2). The paradigm asserts that settler colonialism can exist alongside and within classical colonial situations, as was the case in the American colonies. The inverse of this is also true. There is no settler colonialism without imperialism; settler colonialism is by definition a transnational formation.

Chapter Descriptions

Chapter One is a genealogical account of the construction of post-Enlightenment European subjectivity as set against its ‘Others’ in both the colonies and the metropole. This project of producing an inner determined subject, whose reason, whose ability to know, was set prior to the world of external “things” or extended matter, established an epistemic rather than ontological relationship with the lifeworld and the land. This founding of a particular subjectivity in the context of the colonial encounter in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries would have profound implications for other ways of knowing the world. From the figure of the individual subject, this project went on to encompass humans in company, in society and in states. Within all of these modes of organization the key component in the discourse of self-determination was a self-subjection, the self-election to choose subjection to an external authority for the good of the individual or the collective. This decision, as set against those who were seen to have not “done the work” of electing to choose, would have lasting consequences for indigenous peoples to this day. This “New World” of being would be termed by Denise Ferreira da-Silva “divine Poiesis” (da-Silva 2007), marking the subject as someone who is not part of the lifeworld, not someone who might “learn from the land” (Meyer 2008, 219), but someone whose ultimate being in a real way existed prior to it and made place, space, and themselves in it. The last, and ultimately unresolved step in this process is that from a collective of self-determining subjects to the universalization of their subjectivity in the form of the state, where an unassailable tension between the violence of state sovereignty and the potential destabilizing power of its constituting other, the self-determining citizen, would become a norm, at least in the metropole.

Chapter Two charts a history of the transnational constitution of the settler subject in the two wings of the “Settler Empire” (Belich 2009) -the United States and the Second British Empire- against an equally transnational body of peoples of colour. In this “Anglo-World” a secular teleology of history of Anglo-Saxons will be excavated (to be counterposed against a sacred teleology of history of Anglos as latter-day Hebrews in **Chapter 3**). This history, stretching back to the Reformation, was a process of

constitution by negation, whereby settler identity would ultimately turn upon what it was not, that is, indigeneity, and a spectrum of marked others in the metropole and the colonies, the figure of the Jew among them (This “passing through indigeneity” to secure settler identity will be more fully explored in the concrete examples of **Chapter 5**). As settlers made transits of this “Empire” there emerged a planetary ontology, in which the settler colonization of the globe seemed to be a realistic prospect for some, including two figures enamoured of British imperialism, Theodor Herzl and Israel Zangwill who will be looked at more closely in **Chapter 4**. This ability to move with historically unprecedented ease and speed across the great spaces of the planet informed the structural logic of settler colonialism on the ground, the ability, and willingness of settlers to move into space, and to *displace* the native would shape state and subject, producing, in turn, new myths of both. All were mutually constituted in negation of the native. The history of the settler empire is also a history of the technologies of settlement, primarily the technologies of structural invasion, the means through which the elasticity of metropolitan capitalism is mobilized against the fixity of native social reproduction. **Chapter 2** concludes by looking at how two modes of this developed within the settler empire. Through a discussion of “Pre-accumulation” and “Isopolitics”, we see how the transnational constitution of state and subject materially bore down on the native and their lifeworld, how settler technologies of dispossession made their way through the settler world and through history, and how they came to be formalized in Zionism.

Chapter 3 charts a history of messianism and the apocalyptic in parallel to the secular history of race and more secular identification in **Chapter 2**; its primary focus is the *longue durée* messianic in the Protestant faith and in European historicism and the place of Jewish restorationism in that faith and its English and American offshoots in particular. The chapter aims to show firstly how the sacred and the secular in Protestant messianism cannot be so easily disentangled and that political eschatology is hardly solely located in the Totalitarian movements of the twentieth century. Secondly, we will see that the identification with Jewish restoration in the English tradition has deep ties to the founding of both the English and American nation states and their relationships to the production of history. Lastly, we aim to show that several tropes of Zionist nationalist ideology identified by Gabriel Piterberg, can be identified in key restorationist and English and American republican texts referencing the ancient Hebrews, and Jewish restoration as a settler colonial project. This argument reinforces Amnon Raz-Krakotzkin’s insight that Zionism is less a continuation of Jewish tradition than it is of the Protestant tradition, and, I would argue, of Protestant traditions whose attachment to the ancient Hebrews can be usefully contextualized via the paradigm of settler colonial studies. The Chapter ends with a discussion of how such an understanding might inform our consideration of the Balfour declaration and British support for a Jewish National Home in Palestine, by reference to Protestantism, Zionism, and History as a sacred/secular eschatology.

Chapter 4 is a close reading of several key texts in Christian and Jewish Zionism which I believe have not been subjected to a settler colonial reading. The first of these, Anthony Ashley Cooper, the 7th Earl of Shaftsbury's *State and Prospects of the Jews*, straddles the line between the sacred and secular in the thesis and the line between settler and exploitation colonialism. Cooper both worked with a number of publicly activist and politically organized evangelicals towards, and courted publicity in the service of, welfare reform at home and at ameliorating the condition of various persecuted peoples in the British Empire and beyond. His primary, most famous and consequential interventions were regarding the Jews. In examining his most well-known intervention on restoration we establish his articulation of a number of tropes that would become central to Zionist ideology, and, one, especially, concerning the *place* of the Jews in Europe and their better positioning out into *space*, that frames the classic settler move vis-à-vis social contradiction.

From Cooper, we move to two Christian Zionist “planners” who proposed their own practical designs for Jewish restoration in Palestine itself. In Laurence Oliphant, we have a consummate British Imperialist, an esoteric evangelical, and an individual who had made numerous transits within the settler empire, one of which being a foray into settler religious socialism in America. Oliphant’s esoteric approach to his faith provides us with a thematic link back to the Puritans of Cromwell’s New Model Army, the Congregationalists in New England, and forwards, to the Zionist BILU group in Romania and the ideological peculiarities of Arthur Ruppin’s training Farms and the Yishuv founding generation. Oliphant would propose something halfway between classical and settler colonialism for the restoration of the Jews to Palestine and marks the distinction between what makes successful settlement and what does not in his *Land of Gilead*.

George Gawler, unsuccessful governor of South Australia as far as the Crown was concerned, but father of settlement there, founder of Adelaide, and victim of imperial revisionism as local settler histories tell the tale (Borrow 1955), would pen what is, as far as I am aware the only truly Christian Zionist *and* settler colonial blueprint for the restoration of the Jews to Palestine. In plain terms, Gawler outlines in *Tranquilization of Syria and the East: Observations and Practical Suggestions in Furtherance of the Establishment of Jewish Colonies in Palestine the Most Sober and Sensible Remedy for the Miseries of Asiatic Turkey* a subsidy-based plan for settlement in which both settlers who could afford to relocate and those who could not would be accommodated in the endeavour and supported in their social reproduction on the ground when they arrived. Gawler foreshadows Zionism, he embodies the British attitude regarding support for Zionism as both common sense from the perspective of secular progress and messianic apocalypticism, but most crucially, he brings Christian Zionism fully into the “settler revolution” by using the analogous examples of Canadian, New Zealand, and Australian settler colonization, much as Zionists would later seek to do.

From here we move to Jewish Zionist thinkers proper in the form of two journalists and playwrights, Theodor Herzl and Israel Zangwill, who function as Zionists of the British side of the “Settler Empire”. Both sought out and attempted to embody the role of imperialists, though Zangwill as British since he truly identified as a British subject and Britain was his home. Herzl’s courting of British imperialism was far more strategic, but the identification with imperialism whilst more generalized was a genuine one. Both Herzl’s *Altneuland* and Zangwill’s *The Position of Judaism* (and the related texts under discussion) should be read with reference to **Chapter 2** as both thinkers fundamentally believed in the dream of the “Settler Empire” as an ongoing project, in much the same way as a Leo Amery or a Jan Christian Smuts did, seeing Zionism as merely the extension of this empire of modernity that would ultimately go on to enlighten and liberate the world. The contradictions of this vision are of course implicit in the vision itself and both writers embody them, in their liminal place as insider/outsideers ambivalently within it.

The other side of the Settler Empire will then be addressed in the figures of Louis D. Brandeis and Horace Meyer Kallen, two prominent figures in the American Zionist movement at the beginning of the twentieth century who played key roles in lobbying the Wilson administration in its support for the Balfour declaration and in attempting to garner American Jewish support for the Zionist cause. As Hilton Obenzinger has noted, both Brandeis and Kallen openly admitted on numerous occasions -in reference to Zionism- that they really came to their Judaism via Americanism (Obenzinger 2008). This position provides a jumping off point to reflect on what it is about America and in particular the American progressive tradition, which both individuals were central figures within, that was either particularly Jewish or rather particularly Zionist. Brandeis, who never wrote systematically on Zionism is of interest mainly due to what appears to be his intuitive understanding of settler colonialism and what Zionist settler colonialism would require in Palestine. Whilst most of his pronouncements on the subject were speeches to garner support for the cause, rather than in-depth thinking about the project on the ground, he repeatedly, and I believe unknowingly, highlights important links between American and Zionist settler colonialism.

Kallen on the other hand was a systematic thinker, who developed a theory of ethnic attachment designed to allow hyphenated peoples, such as Jewish-Americans, to exist where the question of dual loyalty would have been resolved in a transnational world in which America and a prospective new “Zion” stood as the archetypal norms. Kallen would pen numerous memoranda in service of supporting the Zionist movement in America, to lobby the American Government, and in solidarity with the World Zionist Organization in Europe. It is argued that, since he often edited and re-wrote, or penned memoranda and papers un-named, that it is difficult to know precisely how substantial his influence was on American Zionism to roughly 1919 (Schmidt 1995). What is principally interesting for

us is that as far as the conventional narrative vis-à-vis the development of the Zionist movement goes, American Zionist organizing is largely seen to take a back seat to that in Britain and America after the Balfour declaration and the establishment of the British Mandate for Palestine, with the Americans only really coming back into the story after 1948, and especially in the wake of 1967. Furthermore, with this, even in the American Zionist scene, Kallen became side-lined as simply too “American” in his idealism during the same period, and never really had an ongoing impact beyond the early 1920s. However, despite this, and having never visited Palestine, in two texts penned in 1918 and 1919 Kallen would outline his vision for the future state of “Zion”. Both are remarkably prescient and closely foreshadow the Yishuv as it developed and the state of Israel as it then came to be. The question then remains: how could this supposedly disconnected “American” pragmatic idealist propose such prophetic visions of a settler colonial enterprise in Palestine? I argue it is because of his understanding of American progressivism, America’s historic relationship with Hebraism as related in **Chapter 2**, and both of these as they pertain to the legacy of settlement in the country. If Kallen’s vision for Palestine is a consummate settler colonial one, it is as such because he is an American.

Our last texts are two by Arthur Ruppin, *The Jews of Today* and *Agricultural Colonization of the Zionist Organization in Palestine*, both penned during the period of the second Aliyah, the period when Ruppin oversaw the beginning of successful settlement in Palestine, and the beginning of the end of the land’s designation under that name in common parlance. Whilst Ruppin’s role as a, if not, *the* key planner and overseer of Zionist settler colonialism is not a novel history, what I believe is a novel contribution to the history of Zionism is how Ruppin materialized the tropes and discursive figures Piterberg identified in Zionism, and that we excavated in the wider Protestant messianic and restorationist tradition in **Chapter 3**. Ruppin, without whom the founding generation of the state of Israel would not have been shaped by the institutions which inordinately bear the mark of his technologies of settler colonial social organization and control, was a product of post-Enlightenment reason, of race science, social Darwinist ideology and eugenics. However, the practical effect of this on the ground in Palestine was the creation of a pure settlement colony, which bore an incredibly close resemblance to accounts of the covenantal social organization of the ancient Hebrews as recorded in the Bible. Where in other societies, such as that of the New England Puritans, the Ulster-Scots, or the Afrikaners in South Africa, such has been arrived at by an overdetermination of social being by recourse to the security of the scriptures amidst the perils of a settler scenario, in the case of the Yishuv under Ruppin, it came in reverse, via secular discourse and was materialized on the land well before recourse to the scriptures made the link apparent.

Chapter 4 closes with an examination of David Ben-Gurion and his encounter with the Bible, as an example of a secular settler who came to the Bible via the ethnic cleansing of Palestine. Ben-Gurion

encountered the Bible, not via “learning from the land” but rather via learning from its explicit erasure. From this he came to self-determination, in history and in the present, and with it, to Zionist supremacy over the Palestinian other.

Chapter 5 Closes the thesis by returning to the question of the tension between the universalization of self-determining subjectivity in the state and the violence of the state sovereign. I argue that whilst this “sovereign power constituent-power dyad” would ultimately remain unresolved amongst the calcified historic hierarchies of the European metropole, an outlet for its resolution would be found in the “historyless” space of the settler colonies. This is both how settlers would understand the enterprise in their discourse and how the settler colonies would be framed heuristically by scholars in the twentieth century as they looked to break out of the as yet unresolved and ultimately hegemonic problem of the “sovereign-power constituent-power dyad.” In both cases, the space of the frontier, that is, Indigenous country, and the Indigenous themselves function as a medium through which settlers “become” truly sovereign, and actualise their sovereignty on the land. **Chapter 5** will, therefore, seek to analyse the play of plural sovereignties in settler colonial frontier societies, to explore the various means through which settlers invade, occupy and appropriate native lifeworlds. It will break down the concept of sovereignty into a number of distinct but interconnected registers. This plurality of overlapping sovereignties, operating in unison and discretely, will be argued to have played a formative role historically in settler colonial structural invasion. Through this, settlers mobilized Indigeneity *against itself* to take its *place* on the frontier. After taking the historic examples of this process in America and Australia, I will finally focus on the case study of contemporary Palestine/Israel as an example of the institutionalization of what has been in the past an ad-hoc and chaotic process. I will show how the state of Israel and its settlers in the Occupied Territories utilize the radical decentralization of state sovereignty as a technology of structural invasion through which they strangle, unsettle and ultimately seek to end Palestinian social reproduction on the land.

1

A GENEALOGY OF THE SELF-DETERMINING SUBJECT

This Chapter will excavate a genealogy of self-determination and the post-Enlightenment European self-determining subject, constituted as it was in the negation of ‘Others’ in the settler colonies. This project produced a subject, and a reason unique to it, that was set a priori to the world of extension and of extended things. The production of an epistemic, rather than an ontological connection to the lifeworld, or learning from internality, from the self, rather than relationally, or “from the land” would have profound consequences for the “others of mankind”; mankind here conceived of as the constructed universal world of reasoning subjects that the project of self-determining subjectivity ultimately sought to extend from itself. The genealogy will chart the project from the figure of the individual subject in Descartes to the subject in common and in the state in Locke, Hobbes and Kant, and the ethical implications of this in the latter, to the question of the universalization of its subjectivity in the figure of the Hegelian state, a question that I believe would be ultimately unresolved in the European context. This theoretical and political cul-de-sac will be returned to in later chapters, where the settler colonies provided an outlet that Europe could not.

1.1: The ‘Thing of Internality’: Cartesian Disembodiment

The foundation on which the centrality of self-determination and the self-determined subject in the political realm has been based is that of the concept of internality. The securing of the space of internality is the essential move in discourses of self-determination, ensuring that Descartes’ ‘thinking thing’ is entirely grounded in the notion of internal-determinacy, with everything in the external world becoming what the subject is not, set against the self-determined, internal ‘I’. Whilst it is argued that Descartes’ formulation accounts for a radical break in philosophies of subjectivity, DaSilva has shown how at least as early as Plato and continuing through the emergence of Christianity and Augustinian Stoicism, the privileging of the internal realm has been a recurrent concern. The novelty of Descartes is

in his attempts to write a physics or mathematics (Foucault 2002, 62) of subjectivity in response to the threat of external regulation posed by the natural sciences to the privileged position of internality (da-Silva 2007, 39). Cartesian accounts of subjectivity are based on the framing of an inner 'substance' exclusively dedicated to the act of thinking, an exclusively *affecting* thing defined in the negation of all *affected* external substances. Thus, Descartes states in conclusion to his discovery, that: 'I was a substance, of which the whole essence of nature consists in thinking, and which in order to exist, needs no place and depends on no material thing' (Descartes in Edkins 1999, 21).

Thus, Descartes sought to release the thinking thing from the dual subjections of external regulating reason, in science or the laws of nature, and of the outer determinacy of the extended world (da-Silva 2007, 41), a world of affectation and sensation of which the body was symptomatic. Whilst the body might be used, as 'that exterior dimension of the knowing subject through which it relates to the things it seeks to know' (da-Silva 2007, 41) the very fact that it is, or can be such a tool is due to its affectability, as such, it is secondary and external to the thinking thing. Descartes goes so far as to claim that the thinking thing, the 'I', 'can exist without' the body (da-Silva 2007, 42). The thinking thing (the soul or mind) then is extended ontological primacy in the world as the only (earthly) thing that thinks, or rather, the only thing endowed with the ability to reason; its essential characteristic for Descartes. The mind is, therefore, the only thing on this earth endowed with the ability to know.

Knowing, as the exclusive feature of the mind with reason (da-Silva 2007, 41) becomes in Descartes akin to a Mosaic commandment against idolatry. Characterised as the sole action of the mind alone, being and truth are determined only from the internal position the mind occupies: nothing outside of the mind plays a role (da-Silva 2007, 43). In a single determination all ontological attachment to the body, to land, to myth, to the entire extended universe, is rendered suspect, not worthy of the label 'reality'. The external realm must be displaced to secure the articulation of the distinguishing characteristic of the mind, which as the sole internally determinate thing becomes related only to transcendental, divine causation. Here we come to what da-Silva understands as the defining statement of modern thought, that through the rise of the natural sciences (regulating reason) and the excavation of the internal realm, reason becomes 'the exterior, [...] universal sovereign of the world of thing [*sic*] and an attribute of the mind of *man*' (da-Silva 2007, 48)(italics in original). The universe is then ordered by a secular force, a priori reason existing in the mind of man, which he must draw out from within himself, and as a semiotics (Foucault 2002, 33) to be deciphered in its regulation of nature. Where ontological connection to elements of the external universe is discarded, the mind with reason asserts an ontological connection to reality itself.

Through an assumption of an ontological connection or intimacy with the very stuff of reality, the units of being, Descartes' physics of subjectivity isolates internally-determinate human 'being' from the

external world and proposes a radical difference of modern human productions and activities founded on the difference of this particular type of human 'being' from all else (Rorty 1979, 8-9). Descartes' attempt to make a science of philosophy required that the turn inward could allow the representation of 'ineluctable truth' (Rorty 1979, 9) through his notion of 'clear and distinct ideas', the units of measurement in his physics of subjectivity, being, and knowledge. The truths represented in the study of the units of being imposes assumed 'limits on the possible results of empirical enquiry' (Rorty 1979, 9) and amount to the first appearance of the idea of self-subjection in the internal realm, which, due to its isolation from external affectation reinforces the self-determination of the subject rather than calling it into question. Rorty describes such recourse to transcendent, a priori, or innate affectation as an attempted escape from historic contingency, 'to find nonhistorical conditions' to account for and contribute to, historical development (Rorty 1979, 9). Such an endeavour allows the imposition of a permanent, universal idea of human reason and productivity in the world as a replacement for divine causation. I would describe it as a phase in emergence of an evangelical secularism, which, though it would not entirely do away with the divine, sought to bring about revelation through human action in the world. This occurred in the face of religious warfare and schism and the incipient process of disintegration of centralized religious authority and its universalistic message, beginning with the Reformation.

The work of deploying the reasoning mind to the identification of the units of being and the accurate representation of being and the world in Descartes' ontoepistemology follows a transition in the methodology of accounting for reality away from what Foucault has termed the 'episteme of resemblance' (Foucault 2002, 30). Here knowledge production was informed by the play of sympathies and antipathies between the things of the world in which knowledge of a thing included its metaphoric content, its folkloric symbolism and how it related to other things in the chain of being (Foucault 2002, 30-33, 35-37). This account of what a thing 'meant' came to be replaced by a taxonomic ordering of the units of flora and fauna, metaphysics and phenomenology, where dissection and accurate representation of the thing, devoid of all but purely ocular content (Rorty 1979, 13) would come to prominence. Seeing and examining as an exclusive means of knowing in natural history comes to inform Cartesian philosophy via a metaphor of ocularism, just as the search for the units of being mirrors the measurements of physics or how geometry mapped accurate representation in Renaissance art with via the assumption of single point perspective (Ermarth 1998, 18). The philosopher comes to general truths via the internalization of universals 'just as the eye of the body knows particulars by internalizing their individual colours and shapes' (Rorty 1979, 41). The ocular, taxonomic, or archival tendency in the sciences and in the 'science' of philosophy replaces a way of knowing the world that is

closer to dreaming¹ than looking, examining and seeing, and the associated acts of desiring, grasping and comprehending in the literal sense of these terms. This 'inner eye' observes representations 'hoping to find some mark which will testify to their fidelity' (Rorty 1979, 45). The search for meaning in a complex chaos of appearance and sensation becomes at least secondary to the quest for the certainty of truth, or of falsehood. Since this process of observation must begin in the inner space of bodily sensation, of affects like desire, mood and the like, the observance of this inner eye must be separated from affect, must ignore affection in the self-subjecting act of truly rational thought, so that rational knowledge is self-determined.

1.2: The Madness we call Reason

The problem Descartes approaches, however, is that in his foundational approach to the units of being and consciousness he is unable to excavate the core of being. The causes of rationality, the force behind the act of consciousness, in the sense that to think, or with regards to Descartes, to doubt, is to signify a mind that 'has something' and it thus follows that the basic units of being are already accounted for by an a priori 'mode of certainty' (Husserl 1970, 82) or self-evidence. Whilst it is not my concern here to question the basis of Cartesian truth claims or discuss the possibility of truth at all as such, I would like to note a theme in the philosophical discourse on the self-determining subject. There seems to exist an anxiety surrounding the very question of foundational philosophy, arguably that of a somewhat desperate search for foundational criteria, basic units of being and consciousness with which once and for all to secure the internal realm and self-determination, which are never found. A transcendental cause becomes the substitute for this absence at the centre of the subject as the only means to secularise metaphysics. The question, of course, arises in which it must be asked 'why is it necessary to secure this foundational ground' and it seems the answer becomes simply that it is because the very discourse of reason, of truth and certainty, the taxonomic drive, demands an origin, a perfect substance to act as a basis for legitimacy where none is to be found. This is relevant to me because I believe that in the waning of centralised religious authority where conventional religious notions of the divine increasingly become blurred with secular ones, we see attempts construct a new transcendent cause. The 'disenchantment of the world' which Adorno and Horkheimer see romanticism as a response to, I believe, has precursors at the very moment of the emergence of sovereign reason. The dream world is negated by reason and the void that empirical science had yet to fill is occupied by the construction of a new mythology, a central figure of which is self-determination.

¹ I will refer to this past way of being and knowing as the 'dream world' following Freud's account of the echoes of folklore and metaphor in dreaming, alongside a notion of Gramscian "common sense ideology" that I believe we might attribute to the culturally syncretic ways of knowing the world that resist the centralization of state, cultural and religious authority and may help us to contextualise indigenous ways of knowing.

Therefore, reason is one amongst a number of ways of knowing the world, of constituting self-identity and of making truth claims. Indeed, the constitution of reason in the negation of other ways of knowing implies its opposite, as unreason, irrationality or madness. The figure of madness is considered by Descartes in relation to reason, is central to its constitution in his theory and is a useful tool to articulate the problem discussed above. Madness poses a threat to reason as a boundless 'free subjectivity' (Derrida 2001, 50-1) unencumbered by self-regulation that indicates a logic and ordering of reality that is essentially foreign to reasoned representation, 'one that does not distribute the multiplicity of existing things into any of the categories that make it possible for us to name, speak, and think' (Foucault 2002, xxi). Madness is the threat of 'alien reason', which is also reason's logical other, the very threat of which to the subject is that of madness itself. Madness threatens that we might become lost in an alien reason unable to articulate anything at all, spoken for by the psychiatrist, (Derrida 2001, 40) the clinician, the authorial voice of a legitimated reason that we are denied access to.

Madness functions for Descartes as a cypher for the deceptive nature of sensation. The externality of the body must be excluded if we are to think the first rational thought. Yet beyond this, madness at the same time undermines the very notion of radical doubt, for there are things we 'cannot reasonably doubt' unless of course, we are mad. (Derrida 2001, 56). Clear consciousness leaves room for doubt, but radical doubt loses its power if deception itself can function as a universal truth (Derrida 2001, 56), this is the realm of the mad. Descartes argues that 'simple and intelligible things', 'certainties and truths of a non-sensory and non-imaginative origin' (Derrida 2001, 56) secure the ground for knowledge based on the logic that a mathematical axiom is true whether one is conscious or dreaming, yet also casts doubt on this assertion based on the distortions of sensations of time and space -the most basic of simple intelligible truths- in the dream state. All this is to say that the ability to 'think' other than reason exists at the centre of every subject and is ever present either as dreaming or madness. Descartes only solution is to resort to divine perfection to shore up the threatened position of reason, casting madness (and presumably dreaming) as failures of the will of the rational subject. To think rationally one has to step away from the sin of unreason (Derrida 2001, 63). The cogito itself is more than capable of madness, with only the deity to protect against this sin. Thus, Cartesian reason, with the cogito at its centre is all but an oxymoron, except for the grounding truth of a Christian God. We might reformulate the famous Cartesian dictum in the light of this, 'I think, in a certain constrained and reduced way, therefore I am, sane.' The thinking thing is then divided against itself, with the free subjectivity of madness constrained by the self-subjection central to self-determination. Thinking is thinking in a specific and constructed way, a thinking based on the unidirectional certainty of truth/falsehood, as opposed to dialectical or other ways of knowing.

1.3: Self-determination in Human Societies: Hobbes' Leviathan

Philosophy becomes considered after Descartes as a science, reason moves from the stage of internality and 'announces bodies in the external world' (Husserl 1970, 85), metaphorically colonizing first the body itself, 'like settlers inhabiting a place' (Veracini 2010, 93), and then 'the world of things' which it orders and regulates just as it operates, through conscious self-subjection, in the mind of the self-determining subject. The question then becomes: How does this new 'secular sovereign ruler' operate 'in the collective entities constituted by the only rational existing thing' (da-Silva 2007, 49)?

The newly constructed rationalist mythology required temporal situating just as it was effacing its negative other, the culturally syncretic chaos of the dream world, and its own particular historic contingency. Reason in man and his social and political prostheses would be announced in history with a foundation, a past and a future trajectory.

Hobbes is arguably the first European thinker to develop the founding mythology of enlightened modernity in his discourse on the state of nature, and his solution to 'natural existence' in his artificial 'man-god', the state leviathan. The discussion of Hobbes' 'warre of all against all' has tended to focus on his use of the settler colonies in North America as a basis for his construction of the primordial human community. Whilst the implication in *De Cive* and *The State Leviathan* is that Hobbes is using indigenous communal life as an example, it seems that his use of First Nations is merely that of an abstract framing device, which relies on a general ignorance in Europe and England as to the societies encountered by English settlers for its plausibility. This was a view which it seems very likely that Hobbes himself did not share (Aravamudan 2009, 40 footnote). I would argue that Hobbes is constructing a new mythology or foundation story for European modernity that has far more to do with the contemporary political scene at home than anything encountered in the settler colonies. The native encountered in Hobbes is surely a negative foil for the rational Western European (and Protestant) subject, though I would argue that the basis for this figure of the native is not native life at all, but rather a composite of anxieties regarding religious conflict, behaviours which the wars of religion in Europe engendered,² and the English Crown's ongoing war with its Celtic periphery as it attempted to centralise absolutist power (Aravamudan 2009, 40). Hobbes' new myth and associated assumptions stemming from it function as a discourse that erases – even the possibly intended figure – of Europe itself as the real 'primitive' society where external determinacy reigns supreme in the violent and disordered life of necessity. Aravamundan argues that a more likely situation in the settler colonies that appears to parallel Hobbes' description of the war of all against all, was the internal political and

² See for instance (Kalyvas 2003) on the example of the English Civil War.

social anarchy in the collapsing and starving Jamestown colony, rather than the complex federated tribal organizations and alliances that early settlers encountered (Aravamudan 2009, 47). Hobbes superimposes 'a myth regarding the birth of politics on a general background of the European conquest of the Americas' (Aravamudan 2009, 55). In doing this he not only effaces the political and social existence of indigenous communities (Aravamudan 2009, 55), but simultaneously justifies the Western, European, Protestant position as the apex of human civilization whilst using his own founding myth of European modernity to superannuate indigenous life to an ancient past at the origin of a teleology of history and the base of a hierarchy of humanity. Indigenous life is rendered outside of rational existence, by way of external necessity or 'want of leisure', through which Hobbes denies the possibility of indigenous philosophical and therefore -the implication is- political life, describing indigenous knowledge production by way of agricultural metaphors as random, haphazard and irrational (Aravamudan 2009, 60-1). Beyond this, Hobbes' act of mythmaking works to erase the founding violence of European modernity, the very founding violence and anarchy which constitutes the war of all against all, by associating it with indigenous existence and using this intertextual construction as the justification for the creation of the synthetic 'man-god', the state Leviathan.

Leviathan, as both the metaphor for state power and the great sea monster in the Book of Job is a figure that sheds light on the inherent tensions within aspirant centralizing power and the resistance of a chaotic culturally and theologically syncretic world to such acts of consolidation. Both in the Bible and in the hands of Hobbes, Leviathan evokes the tension between

visions of the stable moral universe, in which God has crushed the monsters and sits enthroned over chaos, and [...] visions of a world on the edge of collapse, in which the monsters are alive and well and it is not always clear whether God is with them or against them (Beal 2002, 90).

Hobbes attempts to re-establish this cosmic order against the formless chaos of the world where the self-determined subject is continually confronted with others whose existence refutes the very notion of rational order. The Leviathan is a figure through which Hobbes attempts to re-sacralise order against the chaos of religious warfare and competing claims to religious authority, knowledge, meaning and power. Hobbes' task is quite literal, the creation of 'artificial life' which he credits as a uniquely human art (Beal 2002, 91), human reason in the regulation of the natural universe acting as a mirror of the divine, specifically described as an imitation of nature (Beal 2002, 91) through the language of anatomy. This mortal-god is very much of the Old Testament, conforming members of the commonwealth in covenant by way of both salvation against the outside and internally through the threat of sovereign terror. Like the Leviathan of Job, the state is not an answer to 'why there is evil in the world?' but rather 'the silencing of such a question' (Beal 2002, 97). Leviathan functions as 'an imposition of order without justice that puts the subordinate, even subversive questioning of the individual to rest' (Beal 2002, 98). The subject's individual particularity becomes obliterated as an

irrelevance in the face of Leviathan. Here the abstract entity and terrible power of the state as Leviathan parallels the abstraction of the universal subject, in terms like 'humanity' or 'human progress'. The claim to universality in human affairs comes as a *fait accompli*, and those excluded from its designations face the full force of its violent potential.

The need for such a mythical figure in human affairs comes to Hobbes via his understanding of individual subjectivity in much the same way as Descartes understood madness. The core of internal being for Hobbes is characteristic of this 'free subjectivity', with the threat of madness haunting the self. Thus, it is the duty of all subjects 'to practice self-restraint so that, unruly, lustful, unguided passions do not render them so unsteady that they fall into madness and "lose themselves"' (Connolly 2002, 69) to outer determination, such that they become left to be disposed of by the sovereign. As with Descartes –though far more simply put– in Hobbes' account of the subject rationality is sited as a portion of the otherwise unknowable will of God given to humans in the form of reason, so good or reasonable conduct is again accounted for by way of transcendental causes, whereas evil or irrational behaviour becomes the sole responsibility of the subject, much as in keeping with Protestant Christianity of the period (Connolly 2002, 6). For Hobbes, difference in terms of otherness is, therefore, a failure to fully manifest one's humanity, thus falling into inhumanity and out of reality.

The importance of Hobbes for my purposes is threefold: his introduction of a founding, or creation myth of European modernity, his introduction of the idea of an abstract, artificial, 'metahuman' in the form of the State Leviathan, and finally his use of the figures of religious myth in the construction of a human institution for the safeguarding of the political realm. It is arguable that Hobbes is the first to articulate what has become known now as 'political religion' the arrival of the political claiming for itself 'the prerogative to determine the meaning and fundamental aim of human existence for individuals and the collectively, at least on this earth', by 'subordinating the destinies of individuals, and the collective to a supreme entity' (Gentile 2006, xiv). It is telling that at the time of the publication of *The State Leviathan* contemporaries of Hobbes in England considered it a heresy (Aravamudan 2009, 69), seeing for themselves the implications of the use the figures of religion in the constitution of a political institution. It is perhaps ironic that the dawning of secular modernity in the international states system would be founded, post-hoc, on such an overtly religious myth as that of the Leviathan, here enlightenment mythmaking quite literally replaces the myths of pre-modernity and becomes actualised materially in the modern state. Leviathan leaps from the pages of the Bible in the form of the sovereign state. This is myth made reality, for the state may be argued to be able to realistically accomplish the things that are suggested of God and Leviathan in the biblical narrative as far as those subjected to its violence are concerned. Instead of Enlightenment sweeping away the darkness of mythology in the Hobbesian state, it is literalized, its power as real for subjects as the force of an army.

1.4: Self-Determination in Human Societies: From Subjectivity to State in Locke

The Lockean approach to the problem of subjectivity cannot be separated from an ‘overall political strategy’ which it functions as a necessary part of (Tully 1993, 181). Locke’s historic contingency, a transitional period in the relations between European powers from a question of religious conflict to one of economic competition between states and incipient imperial powers, would shape his solution to the problem of individual and collective self-determination. Locke’s major contribution to the question of religious conflict and state power was to argue for a new governmental prerogative, that of the preservation of life, (Tully 1993, 182) here understood as both the ‘welfare’ of individual subjects, their social institutions and of the state itself, instead of the protection of the faith. The state would secure a degree of internal religious diversity in its protection of ‘life’, and ‘administer [...] relations of commercial exploitation, colonization and military power’ in the service of increasing individual state power –and logically, its ability to secure ‘life’- rather than defending and securing the ‘true faith’ by warfare (Tully 1993, 181, 182, 191). Locke here grounds the modern political-theological project: ‘where life’ on earth ‘is wagered on *our* political technology’ (Tully 1993, 182), rather than on the power of the Church and ultimately the will of the divine.

This humanistic approach to the political is rather ironically –though as we will see, following an emerging pattern in questions of political theology, somewhat logically- influenced in part by the resolving of religious controversy concerning the will of God and whether or not man could interpret or even play a hand in divine revelation. Aquinine intellectualism from the 13th Century on in England described a rational God and a corresponding universe ‘in accordance with rational, purposive, “Divine Reason”’ (Tully 1993, 203). As such:

God created the universe in accordance with reason and thus it is a rational and purposive order governed by the law of reason or eternal law. In addition, god created Aristotelian essences, causes, or forms which incline things towards their ends; that is, acting in harmony with eternal law. It is possible by reason to know the nature or essence of things and from these definitions to demonstrate the necessary relations among things, and so to understand the relational and purposive order of nature (Tully 1993, 203).

Here, God places a semiotic code in nature that can be deciphered and read by man through use of the reason available to him internally by divine causation. Through this man may be party to a knowledge of the ends of the universe, he may read, understand and speak the divine teleology. This theory of knowledge was subject to attack based on the idea that an omnipotent God could not, by its nature be constrained, imprisoned or subject to reason. In this formulation ‘the universe is a contingent creation of God’s will’ and ‘contingently related particulars and the “laws of nature” are observed regularities which God could change at any time’ (Tully 1993, 203). This notion of divine voluntarism would be revived in the return to Old Testament fundamentals after the Reformation, especially in England, (Tully 1993, 203, 205 footnote) and would inform enlightenment epistemology as the discourse of

deciphering contextualised, complex and relative meaning in the universe becomes surpassed by a positivist empiricism in the search of 'regular' and 'probable' truths (Tully 1993, 204).

Ocular, observing, taxonomic reason becomes in Bacon, a tool with which we might lay out the natural universe in terms of its use and value to us (da-Silva 2007, 46-7). Such an ontoepistemology declares that the only method for the uncovering of divine reason, or the *nomos* of the universe, is through progressive acts of an empirical revelation of the contingency of reality, as the acts of will of an omnipotent God. The relevance of theology in the development of the natural and then the human sciences is perhaps best testified to by the efforts that early practitioners of science in Europe went to, to provide scientific support for the contingency of divine will in history. Perhaps most notable in this regard is Isaac Newton's eschatological effort to order the biblical teleological narrative, through the basic units of physics and mathematics, into natural-historical temporality to prove the historic authenticity of the Ancient Hebrews and through them the 'truth of religion' (Katz and Popkin 1998, 90-1). The voluntarist tendency further helps to shape the notion that the subject and not God is responsible for 'good' and 'evil' which cannot be determined as 'necessary properties of actions' which 'would limit God's freedom.' "Good and evil are rather external evaluations of actions relative to a law or standard' (Tully 1993, 205) (Husserl 1970, 85). This brings morality into the domain of human affairs in which the subject must secure itself through the process of self-regulation.

Much like Hobbes, Locke is aware of the potential for affectation in the internal realm of the subject, of the threat of the free subjectivity of madness, un-reason and irrationality in an internal realm which he conceives of as a *tabula rasa*, open to a multiplicity of formative sensory impressions from the external realm, whether this be 'passions of the body' or the doctrines of an organized religious faith (Tully 1993, 205-6). Though Locke argues that belief in reason must be an individual, voluntary act, the affectable nature of the internal realm in his formulation means that he has to construct a synthetic method to *compel* the subject to resort to reason. Locke advocates the necessary development of 'an artificial inclination towards a passion to suspend, examine and *assent* in accordance with the correct grounds' for reasoned knowledge (Tully 1993, 200). Locke acknowledges that a 'love of truth', the consideration of the empirical units of reality as outlined by the voluntarist ontoepistemology has to be inculcated in the individual. Therefore, with Locke externality is displaced by way of a means of education in a 'reason' ultimately linked to a relatively unknowable transcendent cause and by the application of such an education in the internal realm itself. Once again, self-determination must be secured by an election to self-subjection which here must be paradoxically ensured by external determinacy.

This contradiction follows into Locke's construction of self-determination in the social realm, where collective life threatens individual freedom by way of the acts of 'unrestrained wills' and rational

subjects must, therefore, consent to the construction of a synthetic rational body to ‘enact and administer rules that will preserve [...] property’, which here entail, ‘life, liberty, and estate’ (da-Silva 2007, 52). The rational subject displaces outer-determination by electing to it and making it ‘an effect of individuals’ [...] rational decisions’ (da-Silva 2007, 53). Locke though does not conceive of this election to external-determination as a limit, rather it is ‘the direction of a free and intelligent agent to its proper interest’, based on the logic of the rational subject possessing will and understanding and interpreting the regulation of reason in nature, the universal nomos (da-Silva 2007, 50, 52).

The basis on which Locke grounds his accounts of self-determination, liberty and property is, in a repeat of the Hobbesian mythological move, a creation narrative using indigenous existence as a foil in the form of an imaginary past, teleologically linked to a modern, rational social organization in the present. More so than Hobbes before him, Locke explicitly defines political society in the negation of a particular account of indigenous existence (Tully 1993, 142), which comes to justify English settler colonialism in North America and influence the representation of and behaviour towards indigenous communities facing settler invasion across the settler colonial world, arguably to the present.

The key figures informing Locke’s notion of self-determination are all drawn from a direct negation of the indigenous life-world. There is enough circumstantial evidence to support the idea that Locke was consciously evoking a picture of ‘America’ that did not correspond with that recounted by settlers on the ground, or indeed the accounts in his own personal library concerning colonization in the Americas, or aboriginal and specifically Amerindian ways of life and social organization (Tully 1993, 140-1). Indeed, it seems there are two America’s that inform Locke’s notion of the settler colonies as spaces of pure productive potential, yet to step into the teleology of history. The first is not, in fact, North American continental lands, but rather the genuinely uninhabited island of Bermuda, described in contemporary accounts as a miraculous, virginal, and bountiful space for free exploitation (Aravamudan 2009, 48). This space becomes superimposed on the *Tsenacomacah* –the indigenous name for the area containing the Virginia colony, meaning ‘densely inhabited land’– (Aravamudan 2009, 45)– as Locke merges Bermuda and his mythical ‘America’ together.

Firstly, Locke describes a scene of natural law in the American settler colonies, the colonial encounter he evokes taking place ‘Perfectly in a State of Nature’ (Tully 1993, 141). This is in keeping with the emergence of international legal accounts of indigenous existence that became used to justify the conduct of colonists and settlers by reference to a notion of ‘natural law’ constructed wholly in Europe. The notion that both settlers and natives were existing in a state of nature allows for settlers to avail themselves of ‘natural rights’ to land use, and its appropriation –‘without authorization from a constituted political authority’ (Tully 1993, 142)– and to reparation for acts transgressing the bounds of the natural system, which Europeans had themselves constructed, and which allowed Europeans, in

response to such acts, to disenfranchise natives of their 'natural rights'. In a process of double subjection –to nature and the minds of those deemed by right of reason to interpret its laws- natives are found in violation of their 'own' natural law, to be disposed of by rational actors, either by enslavement or execution (Tully 1993, 143-4). Here the rational self-determining subject constructs both nature and external things within it and subjects them to the reason found in nature and within the self-determining subject itself.

Not only does the constitution of a system of natural law allow for the use, appropriation and expropriation of land and the disposal of natives, it also functions as a key theme in accounting for the necessity of self-government, or self-determination in collective life. The tendency in reading Locke's *Treatise on Government* sees a simple case of incompatibility between the natural state, collective life in it and liberal, republican freedoms. What seems to have been lost is that the necessity for self-government –in terms of the protection of, life, property and liberty- comes not from the state of nature in itself, but rather from the penetration of money capital and acquisitive settlers fuelled by the corresponding profit motive and disputes over acquired property –in the form of land and its produce- into a 'state of nature' and the contest for territory within it between competing European powers. Only a state of nature which contains labour mixed with land and corresponding relations between subjects and property renders collective self-government in the Lockean form necessary, to protect settler subjects from themselves.

Locke's founding myth of 'America' –and by implication of all primitive societies modernizing towards institutional forms of government- turns to religious figures to fully dispossess native title to land. Locke characterises native use of land –such as hunting, non-sedentary *and* sedentary agriculture, composting and more general shared usage, amongst others (Tully 1993, 154-156)- under the umbrella term 'natural labour'. Natural labour does produce a kind of property through the mixture of labour and land. However, it never attains a status comparable to European acts of labour, for Locke does not see husbandry or cultivation in the act, merely a single act of natural labour –the picking of berries or catching of fish- rather than labour in a system of modern production. Natural labour produces for subsistence whereas human labour produces a surplus for profit and thence produces private property. Locke creates an 'eternal object' in the figure of private property which mediates 'between the general and the particular by appropriating the quality of [a] universal' (Fitzpatrick 1992, 50). Through its use in the construction of a founding myth of modern civilization, private property serves as a coercive force -akin to the artificial 'love of reason' mentioned above- provoking the will to self-consciousness, 'the modality of appropriating nature' and the need to develop a self-determined collective political society (Fitzpatrick 1992, 50). The effacing of other forms of 'profit' such as gift giving or even conventional profit in the actual exchange of private property between natives and settlers that had

been ongoing for at least a century when Locke wrote his Treatise, as well as the cultivating acts that are identifiable in indigenous social reproduction, was tied to religious doctrine, through an interpretation of the Genesis narrative.

Although god gave the 'World to men in Common', he did not mean that they should leave it 'common and uncultivated', but rather that they should 'draw from it' the 'great conveniences of life' [...] he 'gave it to the Industrious and Rational, (and Labour was to be his *Title* to it)' (Locke in Tully 1993, 156)(italics in original).

Locke thus defines surplus production for market sale, and the acquisitiveness it cultivates in the rational subject as the rational interpretation of the will of God, a leap from the voluntarist position that defines his notion of the subject to a more evangelical one. In the failure of desire to inspire the enlargement of the possessions in native societies, Locke finds natives literally stagnant. Through deficiency of will natives are incapable of material progress and the political and philosophical fruits of the 'great conveniences of life'. The motif of the listless and lazy native, a ghostly apparition from the past, can be directly related to the failure of self-determination through their inability to rationally interpret the will of God. Spatial, temporal and productive stagnancy comes to be the lot of the native, whilst spatial, productive and material expansion comes to define the self-determining settler subject.

1.5: Self-determining Subjectivity as Enlightenment in Kant

Whilst Kant is far more famed for his attempts at deciphering subjectivity and the question of morality in society, it is arguable that his works of physical geography and racial anthropology which preceded his Three Critiques can be used to reveal the degree to which Kant's works on morality and subjectivity draw on a negative depiction of indigenous peoples in the colonial world. Kant places man in nature and via Cartesian dualism argues that nature is also manifest in man both externally in the body and in the internal realm as soul or spirit (Chukwudi 1997, 105). Thus, there is the natural aspect of man, the bodily, the physical, that of the extended world, and the internal, psychological and moral aspect of the soul. Kant argues that his study of anthropology concerns the latter aspect (Chukwudi 1997, 105), the key question being 'what nature makes of man' and 'what man makes of nature' in the world and in himself. The category of inner determination is hence as crucial for Kant as it has been shown to be for Descartes and Locke before him. This is relevant since:

the human individual is a moral agent because one is capable of experiencing oneself as an ego, an 'I,' who thinks (self-reflects) and wills. It is this capacity for consciousness and agency that elevates the human being beyond the causality and determinism of physical nature in which the individual is nevertheless implicated by embodiment (Chukwudi 1997, 106).

Through the application of 'pure' scientific and causal knowledge of nature and 'pragmatic', moral knowledge of self-regulation in the human individual –in short, political knowledge– the enlightened European subject arrives at a position from which it may constitute and subject nature and the externally determined in nature, to reason. Reason is, therefore, that which is found in the regulation of nature –the *nomos* of the universe– and is also an exclusive attribute of the mind of man (da-Silva

2007, 48). The rational, moral, subject is here radically separated from the extended world, ‘who by reason of his pre-eminence and dignity’ he is ‘wholly different from’, and can ‘master and rule at will’ (Kant in Chukwudi 1997, 107). The purpose of Kantian critical philosophy is to produce a theory of knowledge encompassing both the internal and external realms, in an attempt to make up the ground lost by philosophy to the natural sciences, describing a physics of internal and external nature with which to ground morality and moral action (Chukwudi 1997, 107). Morality completes the separation from extended things, raising man ‘infinitely above all other creatures living on earth’ (Kant Chukwudi 1997, 106), above even his own body, in keeping with the Cartesian notion that there is a substance in the internality of the properly human ‘being’ that exists before, apart from and beyond the mere physical universe. Kant’s physics of subjectivity and morality then aims at fixing a non-empirical and transcendent substance at the core of the subject to something as concrete as the Newtonian laws of physics (Chukwudi 1997, 107). The result of such an attempt to isolate and confine something as contingent on history and tradition and as changeable as the ever-renewing and reproductive nature of cultural formations as morality, sees Kant effectively drawing the particularity of the post-Enlightenment, Western European, Protestant and male subject as the ground upon which to found an abstract, neutral and universal subject (Edkins 1999, 23). Upon this now universal- ground, man may develop his ‘capacity for action directed toward self-perfectibility’ (Chukwudi 1997, 112) ‘perfecting himself according to the purposes which he himself adopts’ (Kant in Chukwudi 1997, 112). Kant here places the subject into a blurring of secular and religious teleology, where the ‘perfection’ against which the subject measures itself is both the figure of the deity in Judeo-Christian theology (Goldberg 1993, 17) and a secular-eschatological ‘end of history’ in human perfection. These self-perfecting humans then operate in society to ‘effect the perfection of man through cultural progress’ (Kant in Chukwudi 1997, 112). Though this is not an automatic process, only through self-subjection directed toward inner perfection will this be achieved:

The sum total of pragmatic anthropology, in respect to the vocation of the human being and the Characteristic of his formation, is the following. The human being is destined by his reason to live in a society with human beings and in it to *cultivate* himself, to *civilize* himself, and to *moralize* himself by means of the arts and sciences. No matter how great his animal tendency may be to give himself over *passively* to the impulses of comfort and good living, which he calls happiness, he is still destined to make himself worthy of humanity by *actively* struggling with the obstacles that cling to him because of the crudity of his nature (Kant 2006, 229-30)(italics in original).

Here Kant seems to be literally enacting –in his consideration of the means through which humans acquire their ‘humanity’– what Foucault describes as the constitutive role of discourse in ‘practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak’ (Foucault in Edkins 1999, 47). Kant is constituting, or inventing ‘man’ on the stage of modernity (Foucault 2002, xxv-xxvi), placing a ‘new man’ in teleological history. Alongside man, the ‘I’, or ego, on the stage of modernity, Kant is also constituting an individual and social superego through his requirement of self-subjection in the service of individual and collective perfectibility. Whist the construction of the subject and a moral structure through which

it might operate can be seen as a novelty in human subjectivity, it is crucial to remember that Kantian truth claims regarding the question of morality are based on the historic contingency and context of Judeo-Christian tradition in a Western, Protestant, European interpretation of Old Testament asceticism (Goldberg 1993, 17).

Kantian humanity is thus judged as the potentiality in humans to transcend the animalistic 'crudity' of their nature, where the life of necessity in external determination is at best an obstacle to the realization of the essence of self-determined humanity – their 'ethical nature' – (Chukwudi 1997, 115) and at worst an evil (Chukwudi 1997, 112). Whilst Kant's logic regarding the potentiality of the human animal seems to leave open the path of transcendence to all, his discussion of such potentiality in Amerindian and African peoples, and the reasons why they fall short of truly human potential where white men do not, puts the universality of Kantian humanity into question and arguably also informs the construction of his critical philosophy.

Kant regards the conventional geography in which human collectivities develop as having a determining role in the subsequent development of individual 'moral geography' but ultimately he sees the essential core of morality in humans as not explainable by 'means of causal [external, physical, and climatic] causes' alone, rather lying in the '[moral] nature of Man himself' (Kant in Chukwudi 1997, 115-116). For Kant Amerindians 'cannot be educated' and their internal self-regulation is impossible – due to a lack of 'affect and passion', they have no motivating force and due to this lack, 'are not in love, thus they are also not afraid [...] hardly speak, do not caress each other, care about nothing and are lazy' (Kant in Chukwudi 1997, 116). Africans on the other hand are educable to a degree, though not to rationality, and are characterized as automatons to the necessity of nature who may be violently trained 'but only as servants (slaves)' (Kant in Chukwudi 1997, 116) due to their excess of 'affect and passion' and subsequent fear of violence (Chukwudi 1997, 116). They are entirely subjects of external determinacy whether it be to that of nature or the reason of rational actors. It is not difficult to see here how the contemporary colonial and settler colonial world informed Kant's consideration of European others. Africans are trainable and of use, since they can act as a substitutable unit for European labour in the settler colonies. Amerindians, on the other hand, have no use in the plantation economies and therefore the characterization of their essence that we first saw in Locke comes to inform Kant's understanding of their essential moral nature. Their role or lack of a role in an emerging political economy sees them morph into mythical, ghostly apparitions by way of their resistance to expansive, profit-making life in a capitalist system. Amerindians are eliminable and thus appear as barely present at all in a characterization that will become recurrent in comparable ways in Europhone settler colonies.

Against this characterization of the others of Europe Kant situates the self-determining subject in Europe – ‘the white race’– as uniquely possessing ‘*all* motivating forces and talents *in itself*’ (Kant in Chukwudi 1997, 117)(my italics). It is because of his siting of the fully realizable potentiality of the human in the European subject that the question posed in his critical philosophy might be answered. The question of how one might orient ‘oneself geographically in space, mathematically in space and time and logically in the construction of both categories in other sorts of consistent whole’ (Chukwudi 1997, 120) is addressed through the interweaving of the unique moral geography of European societies with the transcendental causality of inner determination in the enunciation of a moral philosophy.

The central premise upon which Kant builds his notion of being and knowledge in the European subject is that the world as it intuitively appears must already be a construct of a priori faculties or units of ‘pure institution’ and ‘pure reason’. These are Kant’s version of the units of measurement present in mathematics and physics (Husserl 1970, 92-3). These ‘pure’ perceptions of time and space are for Kant aspects of consciousness that exist before and beyond all experience (da-Silva 2007, 59), allowing him ‘to describe the conditions of the possibility of a kind of knowledge “altogether independent of experience, and even of sensuous impressions”’ (da-Silva 2007, 59). Here, reason becomes fully transcendent in secular terms, beyond humanity and the mind of man, to be found in and of the universe, yet connected to man in terms of its parallel existence in the internal realm. This renders externality as ‘always already an effect of the tools of the mind’ by way of the reason it shares with that regulating nature (da-Silva 2007, 60). Thus, the internal realm, the ocular ‘I’, takes its place in the transcendental as fully inner determined in the Kantian metaphysic. ‘*all representations [...] whether they have or have not external things for their objects, still in themselves as determinations of the mind, belong to our internal state*’ (Kant in da-Silva 2007, 61)(italics in original), ‘with the material of the sense data’ arising ‘from a transcendent affection [for] things in themselves’ (Husserl 1970, 95). Whilst this presupposed transcendental core of being ‘cannot be objectively knowable’ (Husserl 1970, 95) its presence is to be assumed as the locus on which the whole project of Kantian knowledge production and this particular regime of truth turns. Kant constructs modernity’s self as a self-commanding, autonomous, and legislative, rule-making subject, or a subject of universal *poiesis*, that is, a subject endowed with the productive capacity to make and remake the world and itself in it (da-Silva 2007, 70). It is this newly constructed category that fully places man in a secular teleology of history to rival the contemporary divine narrative, paradoxically fixed in a now properly historic temporality.

The ‘welfare of state’ first argued for in Locke, and the sovereignty which protects ‘the people’ in the metaphorical and synthetic ‘body of the state’ argued for by Hobbes comes to its fullest contemporary expression in the American and French revolutions. The legitimacy of state and its right to rule is no longer vested in an often ultimately mythical genealogy of royal bloodlines, but rather in the creation

narratives and founding myths of reasoned, Enlightened modernity. Like the metaphor of the internal realm of the self, colonizing and settling the extended body, myth functions as the means by which the sacred colonizes the 'formless modality of pre-creation' (Fitzpatrick 1992, 19), the sacred transcendent 'renders human existence possible, prevents it that is, from regression to the level of zoological existence' (Fitzpatrick 1992, 16). With the coming of the age of secular reason, the universe rendered knowable to the gaze of the ordering, taxonomizing 'I' is re-encharmed with a new mythology. The mystics of Enlightenment reason repeat a mythical creation story:

Their enterprise was for them only the repetition of a primordial act: the transformation of chaos into cosmos by the divine act of Creation. By cultivating the desert soil, they, in fact, repeated the act of the gods [or civilizing heroes] who organized chaos by giving it forms and norms. Better still, a territorial conquest does not become real until after—more precisely, through—the ritual of taking possession, which is only a copy of the primordial act of the Creation of the world (Eliade in Fitzpatrick 1992, 20).

It is arguable that all creation narratives are concerned with more than just the consecration of territory, the mythological act of settlement and conquest is part of a wider sacralising move, 'the expression of a mode of being in the world' (Barthes in Fitzpatrick 1992, 21). The 'New World' in the post-renaissance period was not just the Americas, the wider settler colonies or the colonial world, it was a structure of feeling or mode of being in which *poiesis* became the lot of a particular section of humanity. The post-enlightenment subject arrives on the stage of history remaking the world and himself in it. The 'new man' logically follows the 'New World' where secular enlightenment takes on the modality of evangelicism as a political religion far wider than that confined to individual states or ideologies. The 'civilizing hero' in this mythical narrative is the abstract, transparent, race and gender neutral, universal subject of history, one whose particularity is effaced by its occupation of the necessarily neutral 'position of [...] universality' (Edkins 1999, 31). This is an essentially fictional narrative. As Derrida describes it:

By an odd fate, the very metaphysicians who think to escape the world of appearances are constrained to live perpetually in allegory. A sorry lot of poets, they dim the colours of the ancient fables and are themselves but gatherers of fables (Derrida and Moore 1974, 11).

These 'White Mythologies' do not just occupy a position of transparency or anaemicness in the invisibility of an identity constituted in negation of marked others both in the core and periphery, but also efface the composite and contingent nature of Western identity, in favour of homogenous, unified, universality, by erasure of the traits of otherness that were always present in the metropole and in the subject itself. The transparent subject is always marked by anxiety towards the 'before', the culturally syncretic chaos of the dream world:

For civilization, purely natural existence, both animal and vegetative, was the absolute danger. Mimetic, mythical, and metaphysical forms of behaviour were successively regarded as stages of world history which had been left behind, and the idea of reverting to them held the terror that the self would be changed back into the mere nature from which it had extricated itself with unspeakable exertions (Adorno and Horkheimer 2002, 24).

This attitude to the recent past is exemplified by the Protestant puritanical turn against the sensuous degeneracy of Catholicism which shapes much of enlightenment mythmaking (Adorno and Horkheimer 2002, 22). The metaphysicians of enlightenment then attempt to lay bare a tabula rasa for the unified subject, a secure ground from which to construct a new 'artificial structure' for both subjectivity and history. Where Locke and Hobbes found a new mythological temporality, Kant and the post-Kantians become its historicists and father its historic actors.

Kantian enlightened reason marks the arrival of an ascetic practice of internal self-discipline as an attitude and performance (Foucault 1984, 39) on the newly constructed stage of exteriority. This is the world as constituted by reason (Adorno and Horkheimer 2002, 20), against which the rational subject was defined in negation as the only self-constituting thing. This self, internally subjected to 'its own logic' functions as an autonomously directed form of thought through which there arrives 'an eager expectation of change' and 'a prejudice in its favour' (Kedourie 1961, 13). This passion for reasoned change that reached an apex in the French Revolution where reforming reason was not to cease its remaking of the world 'until society in all its particulars conformed' to its ends (Kedourie 1961, 13). Change here is no longer confined to the individual, the collective or the singular state itself, but rather exists as a permanent movement in all externality knowing no fixed spatial bounds. Politics in this period –and arguably well into the 20th Century– becomes a matter of intimate conviction on the part of rational self-determined and directed subjects, a secular deism, dependent on 'no external law' (Kedourie 1961, 28). With his discussion in *The First Definitive Article for Perpetual Peace* Kant draws enlightenment reason in republican government on the global stage, the implication being that the ends of humanity may rely on the permanent extension of reasoned subjectivity and reasoned rule to the entirety of the world (Kedourie 1961, 28). Yet, like all visions of apocalypse, the salvation of all 'humanity' in this case does not really extend to all, rather just those who maintain the covenant with the divine, or for our purposes, those who truly manifest their humanity.

For Kant, freedom in self-determination and in self-regulation becomes an objective political good. 'Self-government' becomes preferable to 'good government' (Kedourie 1961, 30), no matter the potential violence this may entail:

One must be free in order to learn how to use one's powers freely and usefully. To be sure, the first attempts will be brutal, and will bring about a more painful and more dangerous state than when one was under the orders but also under the direction of a third party, but one never ripens into reason except through one's own experiences, and one must be free in order to be able to undergo them (Kant in Kedourie 1961, 29).

Further, Kantian freedom, in keeping with the concept of internality as indicated in Cartesian dualism, does not seem to be limited by any external circumstances. As Kedourie concludes of Kant, 'A man can be imprisoned in the worst of dungeons, or suffer the most odious of tyrannies, but he may still be free, if his will is free' (Kedourie 1961, 23). As such the Kantian moral subject somehow seems to exist

outside all external power. Freedom in self-subjection to moral imperatives, that is, in reason becomes a purposeful yet entirely disembodied and empty authority. This is productive energy shorn of any 'end'; just neutral force fuelled by its own energy in intimate conviction. Freedom is:

the strength of a man's maxims in following his duty. All strength is known by the hindrances which it can overcome; with virtue, these are the natural inclinations, which can come in conflict with the moral prescription; and since it is man himself which puts these hindrances in the way of his maxims, virtue is not only compulsion to oneself. . . .but a compulsion to a principle of inner freedom (Kant in Kedourie 1961, 30).

The compulsive direction towards self-regulation and 'inner freedom' sees again the attempt at detachment from all external conditions; 'morality proceeds from self-regulation and may not be shackled to things as they are' (Kedourie 1961, 30). The only limits to freedom are self-imposed. Freedom in self-determination is located exclusively in the internal realm, historic contingency and actual context are deliberately negated. To quote the post-Kantian Schleiermacher: 'each of my acts is but a special phase in the unfolding of a single will [...] Come then what may! My will rules fate, as long as I relate everything to its comprehensive purpose, and remain indifferent to external conditions' (Schleiermacher in Kedourie 1961, 31). Here the Kantian subject on the stage of externality appears much as did the voluntarist position on the omnipotence of God, only now the universal subject of history truly arrives and occupies the space of the divine sovereign.

Against reason then is 'the whole force of nature [...] a mere undifferentiated resistance to the abstract power of the subject' (Adorno and Horkheimer 2002, 70). The others of post-Enlightenment reasoned subjects exist in the sensuous pleasurability of inter-subjectivity. They commit the betrayal of idolatry, that is, 'self-abandonment' to an 'Other', to externality, (Adorno and Horkheimer 2002, 82). This inspires a furious interpellation from the self-determining subject:

The signs of powerlessness, hasty uncoordinated movements, animal fear, swarming masses, provoke the lust for murder. The explanation for the hatred of woman as the weaker in mental and physical power, who bears the mark of domination on her brow, is the same as for the hatred of the Jews. Women and Jews show visible evidence of not having ruled for thousands of years. They live, although they could be eliminated, and their fear and weakness, the greater affinity to nature produced in them by perennial oppression, is the element in which they live. In the strong, who pay for their strength with their strained remoteness from nature and must forever forbid themselves fear, this incites blind fury. They identify themselves with nature by calling forth from their victims, multiplied a thousand-fold, the cry they may not utter themselves [...] "These senseless creatures!" (Adorno and Horkheimer 2002, 88)

This furious anxiety towards the sensual threat of the extended world is not just theoretical, it is actual. As Slotkin discusses of settlement in Virginia, miscegenation between settlers and natives, and a synthesis of 'popular Christianity' of the homeland with indigenous ways of being are interpreted as a material threat and inspire material reaction on the part of Puritanical authority (Slotkin 1975, 62). The abstract totality of self-determining subjects seeks to do away with the mythology of Catholicism and the sensuous, pleasurable syncretism of 'pagan popular religion' that existed beneath it, attempting to complete a move that centralizing powers before had never achieved, the exposure of the entirety of the dream world to the light of taxonomizing, ordering reason.

1.6: From Subjectivity to State in Post-Kantian Philosophy: Hegelian 'Spirit'

In post-Kantian German idealism, we come to the final reconciling of properly 'human' self-consciousness in self-determination with its actualization on the stage of history and the global in the form of the state, a philosophical turn that will be particularly influential in the development of Zionism. The arrival at a point in which human self-consciousness becomes transparent to state power is the true 'baptism' of modernity that Herzl had initially sought for European Jews through religious means (Lowenberg 1996, 111), in which the subject and state become the reflection of one another. Zionism did not simply have to aspire to be a European political movement –here I would argue that the nationalist designation is not strictly necessary or relevant- 'outside of Europe' (Piterberg 2008, 36, 42) it had to step into 'history' as a political movement in which the people and the state are intertwined. The 'New Jew' would not be constructed fully as a historical subject without the necessary aspiration to a reconciliation between individual consciousness and state power we see articulated in the political philosophy of Hegel.

The state that is aspired to by the post-Kantians and later by Hegel is not one which was ever truly achieved. The aspiration though, would lead to a reification of the state in actuality as the institutional realization of 'perfect freedom' (Kedourie 1961, 38). This organic fusing of state and society would be most fully articulated in civic and reactionary nationalist movements, but its origin lies decidedly in the dreams of universal subjectivity and utopian emancipatory politics. In the philosophy of German idealism, this state is more the sense of a 'forthcoming event', or 'adult stage' of humanity' (Foucault 1984, 33). This is a golden age of the future implied in the sacred-secular divine teleology (Foucault 1984, 38).

For da-Silva, Hegel completes the figure of self-consciousness by overcoming the founding dichotomy of the internal realm against the extended world (da-Silva 2007, 71). In Hegelian philosophy, the ontological connection the self-determined subject asserts with reality itself first articulated by Descartes becomes the central figure of concern. Transcendental poiesis (da-Silva 2007, 70) –that is, the innate potentiality in the self-determined subject to make and remake the world and himself in it- becomes the subject's mode of being in the world when it realises that 'the universal foundation it shares with exterior things has always [...] been [itself]' (da-Silva 2007, 70). Hegel transfigures the transcendental cause in Kant –pure reason- as a desiring or living thing, which he terms 'Spirit', a force of infinite productive potential (da-Silva 2007, 72). Again this transcendental figure is uniquely available to the self-determined subject since 'Only one thing, the one that shares reason's powers, the mind' –that is the self-determined consciousness- 'can recognize' the truth of Spirit (da-Silva 2007,

72). Thus, for Hegel, self-determination is the uniting of consciousness in the subject with Spirit to achieve self-consciousness. ‘To the extent that we are self-determining we participate’ in the universal, the infinite, productive, potentiality of Spirit (Wallace 2010). Only something that ‘makes itself what it is’, rather than being subject to any external determination ‘*is itself*’ in a stronger sense than the determinate’ (Wallace 2010)(my italics). This relies on an a priori measure of ‘open thought’ through which ‘the mind is transparent to reason’ and must be maintained by constant internal subjection rendering the reasoning subject ‘less or more fully real’ (Wallace 2010).

Hegel rejects scientific –and arguably Cartesian and Kantian– reason as that which can only conceive of thought as another ‘fixed [...] unmoving universal’, a reason that is alienated from the active, productive potentiality of Spirit (da-Silva 2007, 79). Hegel also critiques previous attempts at ‘observing reason’ for articulating the Cartesian dualism between internality and the external and for failing to recognize that ‘whatever the thinking individual is is but a manifestation of the given conditions of the world’ (da-Silva 2007, 78). Yet this apparent acknowledgement of contextual, historic contingency is negated when the action of Spirit in thought and self-consciousness is ‘the act of becoming what it always has been’ an action that is ‘not [...] produced by an exterior force, but is the thing itself’ (Hegel in da-Silva 2007, 78). Spirit becomes the active force of particular ‘human’ potentiality in history and history itself is the actualization of Spirit ‘in human institutions and products’ (da-Silva 2007, 80), a circular teleology in which the ends of humanity are whatever objective ‘goods’ humanity happens to produce, whether the means are peaceful, violent, rational or irrational. This, Hegel terms as ‘the cunning of reason’ (Avineri 1974, 231), that is, the dialectical progress of reason in history. For Hegel, through the cunning of reason in human affairs the stage of ‘World History’ was coming into being. It was specifically located in Western, Protestant, Europe, where history was reaching its ‘culmination in a community which [was] in conformity with reason’ and which embodied freedom (da-Silva 2007, 79). The passage the cunning of reason had travelled was from east to west through time, beginning, much as in contemporary accounts of the progress of civilization in the original “patriarchal” forms of human societies in the far East, the Orient and in Persia and passing westward with the rise of ancient imperial powers to Greece and then Rome. Christianity plays an important role in the eventual culmination of ‘World History’ in Europe, uniquely providing in Hegel’s eyes the concept of universality in much the manner as philosemitism has conceived of it, with Paul reformulating ‘Judaism as a universalistic message [...] overcoming [...] all particularity, of which Jewish particularity stood as emblematic’ (Karp and Sutcliffe 2011, 10). Where Spirit through the cunning of reason has passed through certain societies it has not returned, with Hegel dismissing great swathes of the globe as failing to realise full self-consciousness and therefore a

full presence in reality,³ a reality that the Hegelian self-determined subject has the potential to enter into ontological connection with via its intimacy with transcendental poiesis in Spirit.

This full embodiment of freedom is to be achieved for the post-Kantians and Hegel in the state. '[The] people' become the representatives of legitimacy through a transparency between individual subjects, the collective of subjects – 'the people'- and the state. Collective, self-conscious being in 'the people' then is 'actively involved in destroying the traditional knowledge of peoples, perceived' from this point on 'as minorities destined only to spread obscurantism' (Lyotard 1984, 30-31). Therefore, a majority of actual human beings both internally in Europe and outside it are rendered foreigners in their own lands and in history, in the sense that they are in their very existence rebels against reason, morality and human productivity. Thus the 'necessarily abstract subject' –that of the individual self-determining subject and its collective manifestation, in 'the people'- 'depends on the institutions within which that subject is supposed to deliberate and decide and which comprises all or part of the state' (Lyotard 1984, 30-31). The abstract subject then becomes reified and attains the veneer of materiality by its valorisation in the institutions of the state its knowledge and political prescriptions attain the status and authority of norms (Lyotard 1984, 31). Hegel argues for such a process to take place in the state –in his *Encyclopaedia* (1817) – which through Spirit would train a fully legitimated subject of knowledge and society subject to truth in learning and justice in social obligation (Lyotard 1984, 32). The Hegelian vision is of a state that represents 'the externalization of reason as freedom', the state here being a 'people's' 'rational and self-conscious freedom, objectively knowing itself' (da-Silva 2007, 85). The embodiment of Spirit in the state then occurs for Hegel by transformation of the Lockean formulation when:

free self-consciousness finds itself objectified in an "other" free self-consciousness when the [...] subject finally realises that the sacrifice that institutes the political, the collective, is no sacrifice. The moment of recognition, when in the particular "individual" it is recognized that "this existing, unchangeable essence [the nation] is the expression of the very 'individuality' which seems opposed to it; the laws proclaim what each individual is and does; the individual knows them not only as his universal objective thing-hood but equally knows himself in them, or knows them as particularised in his own individuality, and in each of his fellow citizens (da-Silva 2007, 79).

Thus, Hegel outlines a secular social transcendence made manifest in the state as the self-reflection of the –and every– self-conscious subject, a collective of pure productive will, completing the arrival of evangelical secularism, the hand of man fully in the domain of the previously divine, enacting the ends of the humanity and the universe. The synthetic person of Hobbes' Leviathan becomes fully realised in this state, the collective of individual self-determining subjects forming its body. But this new abstract

³ For Hegel's dismissal of Africa, China, the Orient and Islamic civilisation especially and the contemporary relevance of Hegelian thought in Zionism see Hegel in Halbrook, S. Left Hegelianism, Arab Nationalism and Labour Zionism, *Journal of Libertarian Studies*, vol.VI, no.2 (Spring: 1982) p.182-183, Avineri, S. *Hegel's Theory of the Modern State* (Cambridge: 1972) p.223-224, p.225 and Turner, B, S. Avineri's View of Marx's Theory of Colonialism, *State and Society*, vol.40, no.4 (Winter: 1976/1977) p.387-388

sacred person, whilst representing a ‘providential force capable of providing protection and safety to modern man’ is in possession of ‘all the technical, military and psychological power of the modern state’ (Gentile 2006, 15). Hegel is fully aware of the potential for violence in such a formation, a violence that is realised in the French Revolutionary Terror, in which the modern self-determining subject on the stage of history engulfs the resistant force of the ‘before’, the *ancien regime* and the dream world, in ‘the fury of destruction’, enacting abstract universality on real human bodies, societies and traditions. As Žižek explains of the violence of abstract, universal freedom in Spirit:

The monstrosity of the revolutionary terror is an absolutely indispensable “vanishing mediator” – this outburst of radical negativity which undermined the old established order; cleared the slate, as it were, for the new rational order of the modern State. The same holds for [...] the opposition between the subject’s immersion in his concrete social life-world and his abstract individualist/universal moral opposition to this concrete inherited universe; in this choice one has to choose [morality] that is, the act of the individual who, on behalf of the larger universality, undermines the determinate positive order of *mores* which defines his society (Žižek 2000, 94)(italics in original).

The coming to universality, to reality, ‘is the very opposite of the peaceful neutral medium of all particular content’ only through violence can ‘universality become “for itself”; only in this way can “progress” take place’⁴ (da-Silva 2007, 87). Hegel as Kant before him is fully aware of this fact, although he was not an apologist for the Revolutionary Terror. For my purposes, with the advent of modern political religion secured by way of the sacred-secular violence invested in state sovereignty, the genealogy of the self-determined subject would never pass beyond the advent of sovereign terror. This genealogy placed all the power and authority of Enlightenment technologies of scientific, economic and philosophical domination in a particular European, Protestant, white, male, sovereign subject, conceived of as a universal and legitimated actor. This subject was constituted negatively against and stood directly in negation of the ‘others of mankind’. This subject, actualised in self-determination and self-government in the state would ‘on behalf of’ the abstract ‘wider universal’, subject the *actual* bodies, societies and life-worlds of indigenous peoples in the settler colonies to the mediating violence of sovereign terror. The mythical founding of ‘the New World’ would be manifest materially in the settler colonies, to lay bare the ground for the construction of utopian settler societies in an act of self-determination reserved for specific types of human beings.

⁴ We would likewise do well to remember that where the coming to self-consciousness in self-determination through the medium of the state *takes place* vis-a-vie the *ancien regime*, a parallel taking of *place* will occur where this process is *displaced* into settler colonies and their own frontiers.

2

THE SETTLER SUBJECT ON THE STAGE OF THE GLOBAL

This Chapter will follow the transnational constitution of the settler subject through the transits it made between the two wings of the “Settler Empire” and arguing for this disparate identity’s construction as a constitution by negation of an equally transnational spectrum of marked Others, subaltern and Indigenous. A secular teleology of history of an “Anglo-World” will be excavated to be counterposed against a messianic teleology of history of Anglos as latter-day Hebrews in later Chapters. This teleology, like the identity it would produce was a constitution by negation, of Otherness in Europe and in the incipient colonial world, and the figure of the Jew. Through the transits of the Settler Empire we will see the production of the technologies of settler colonialism, its informing logics, key amongst them, movement, space and displacement. In all of this the native would shape state and subject, even in its absence “insistently” returning to haunt the settler. The native presence calling the technologies of erasure, assimilation, control and extermination into being. The Chapter concludes by examining the late Patrick Wolfe’s recent contribution to settler colonial theory in the settler technology of “pre-accumulation” and how this can be usefully incorporated into the idea of isopolitical association, a technology that arguably was instrumental in binding the Settler Empire together, allowing reciprocal transfer of ideas, people, laws and technology between settler states, and how this itself became later institutionalised in the State of Israel’s Law of Return.

2.1: A Concept too Broad?

The question of apprehending a cohesive identity amongst European settlers in the two wings of the settler empire –that is America, the original 13 colonies and the western expanse that would become the United states, and Greater Britain, the United Kingdom and its settler colonies- is arguably something of a fool’s errand. Given normative understandings of the international states system, nationalism, ethnicity and race, it is surely open to the question “what, if anything could possibly

cohere such a widely dispersed and historically disparate group of peoples, and how could such a broadly defined identity prove analytically useful?" It is my intent to show that there is indeed such an identity present between the two wings of the settler empire at a period between the 19th and 20th centuries, roughly dating between 1850 and 1950 –though there are a multitude of traces that stretch back and beyond further- and that this identity was both crucial to the material development of the settler states in question and fundamentally tied to the notion of internal-determinacy described in the previous chapter. This identity and an ideology of “settlerism” (Belich 2009, 164) stemming from it would function normatively in the period under discussion, its inner dynamics were shared across the settler empire, and, importantly within Zionism.

Despite the practical ethereality of such a widely bounded notion as that of “the Anglo world” or the “white West” and the apparent problematization of grouping both the British Empire and The United States of America together as a more singular entity than the conventions of international relations discourse would find tenable, there is analytical worth in the endeavour. Of course, the dreams of officially sanctioned reunion between cleaved halves of the first British Empire, the two wings of Anglo-settlerism, never achieved even as much as a customs union (Bell 2007). Yet, as we shall see, a perceived unity of identification and interests needn’t have taken on such a concrete institutional form to have had a profound impact on world politics. As Belich states:

After 1783, the Anglophones were never again to share a single state [...] They had become a transcontinental, transnational entity, and ‘Anglo-World’, like the ‘Arab world’ or the ‘Iberian world’. Such entities were politically divided and sub-global, yet transnational, intercontinental, and far-flung. They comprised a shifting, but interconnected mélange of partners and subjects. Transfers of things, thoughts, and people, lubricated by shared language and culture, were easier within them and from without. Changes flowed more easily within the system, and were received more readily (Belich 2009, 49).

Despite violent fraternal struggle and political separation, there is a case to be made that Britain and America can be understood as a single economic –and in many ways, cultural- unit into the late 19th century.⁵ But the self-conscious unity of identity between the Anglophone metropolises and their settler colonies went far further than this. As Katzenstein describes it:

In the tradition of Winston Churchill [the Anglosphere] enjoys today support among conservatives as a community of states that is united by traits such as liberal values, Protestantism, individualism, an achievement culture, a life of private grace testified to by worldly success, the use of the English language, common law, Parliamentary rules, and other ancient British traditions (Katzenstein 2012, 1).

Katzenstein describes Anglo-America as ‘a clearly identifiable part of what is commonly referred to as the West’ which ‘exists [...] in the form of multiple traditions that have currency in America, Europe, the Americas and a few outposts in the Southern Hemisphere’ (Katzenstein 2012, 1), namely the former British dominions, and in the present, as far as the norms of liberal economic policy are concerned,

⁵ For the dynamic mutual development of the British and American settler empires see (Belich 2009, 456-501).

Japan. But most importantly the “West” as far as it cohered in the realms of political and economic power around the two wings of the settler empire at the fin de siècle functions as ‘a distinct sphere of communication, interaction, and interest that constitutes what is considered legitimate in politics’ (Arturo Santa-Cruz, quoted in Katzenstein 2012, 4). This is then, a space of identity and politics that bounds the right to rule, the authority to do, or rather to determine, and not *to be determined by*. It is a space of power-knowledge whose object is the ordering of the world. When the Nazis sought to claim this kind of power as rightfully theirs in the 1930’s they were plainly aware of the existence of the settler empire, that lesson in and counterpart to their racialized dreams of world supremacy (Young 2008, 233) (Carr 2016, 74-75).

2.2: A Paradoxical Politics of Identity

One of the problems of framing such an identity lies in its apparent ill fit into the period itself, an era often described in the language of nationalism and imperialism, and not that of globalization so common at the end of the twentieth century and beginning of the twenty first. Whilst there is little doubt that this era was that of the nation state, it is obvious from the perspective of settler colonialism that some nation states were more territorially bounded than others. Lake and Reynolds note that one part of the problem is down to the outstanding success of Anderson’s model of the imagined community, the stress being on the imaginary, the affective ties of communal imagination. Yet since Anderson’s focus was on the national imaginary it has been somewhat overlooked that these communities needn’t be purely national, that is, territorially national in scale (Lake & Reynolds 2008, 6). Lake and Reynolds capture the relatively unbounded scope of this identity –in their words ‘whiteness’- describing it as ‘A mode of subjective identification that crossed national borders [...] at once global in its power and personal in its meaning, the basis of geo-political alliances and a subjective sense of self’ (Lake & Reynolds 2008, 3). Indeed where the focus on nationalism and the nation state has occluded the degree to which both the British and American states were in fact transnational entities, critical whiteness studies have followed suit, tending to focus purely on the national or local scale and failing to see the history of whiteness as a fundamentally transnational formation (Lake & Reynolds 2008, 4). As Belich notes ‘The nation is only created by public communication about it’ (Belich 2009, 456), thus there are political, cultural, and economic units that ape Anderson’s national form that have largely been overlooked as legitimate units of analysis in discussions of global politics. Furthermore, the revisionist study of nationalisms that began in the 1980’s through the works of Hobsbawm, Anderson, Smith, Gellner, and many others, has tended towards a binary opposition between civic and organic forms of nationalism, with the former sited in the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, and the latter in Central Europe. The study of settlerism seems to indicate that such an opposition is untenable, with civic and organic modes of identification operating together on a

transnational scale across the settler empire. Whilst civic nationalism, that is, a nationalism of *citizens* is plainly present in such transnational polities as the British empire, what has been lost is the fact that the organic mode of attachment has considerable transnational identifications too. Indeed as we will later see, it is arguably the case that the polities of the settler empire see the bridging of the gap between the two apparent poles of national identification. Both operate together in settler scenarios.

All this occlusion I believe primarily a result of the relative failure to consider the domestic and international histories of settler colonialism, fundamentally transnational as they are. Britain and America, their metropolitan capitals and their expanding settler frontiers, were held together by unprecedented transits of bodies, commodities, technologies, knowledges and ideas. This was an imagined community that has until recently received scant attention from the intellectual mainstream.

One further problematic in the history of this transnational identity is one of terminology, or rather the language in which it was apprehended at the time. The term 'race' is certainly the most common form through which this imagined community was understood by the late 19th century, though our contemporary distinction between the biological determinism of (scientific) racism and that of the cultural framing of race does not helpfully apply in the context in question (Bell 2014, 419). The term 'race' as applied by the populations of America, Britain and her settler colonies, could be used to describe such varied real or imagined communities as the English, Anglo-Saxons, Teutons, Aryans, Germanics, 'the English-speaking peoples', white men, or even Protestants. As Bell explains

Race [...] was usually figured as a *biocultural assemblage*, a hybrid compound of 'cultural' and 'biological' claims about human evolutionary history, individual and collective character, comportment, physiognomy and mental capacity. Differences between specific accounts of race were focused principally on the emphasis placed on (and within) the 'cultural' and 'biological' dimensions (Bell 2014, 420)(italics in original).

Thomas Carlyle presents us with an example of the kind of fluid disparateness of such an imagined community and of the kind of attachment that unprecedented dispersal and distance might require when he states in the tellingly titled *On Heroes and Hero Worship* that:

before long, this island of ours, will hold but a small fraction of the English: in America, in New Holland, east and west to the very Antipodes, there will be a Saxondom covering the great spaces of the globe. And now, what is it that can keep all these together into virtually one Nation, so that they do not fall out and fight, but live at peace, in brotherlike intercourse. [...] what is it that will accomplish this? Acts of Parliament, administrative prime ministers cannot. America is parted from us, so far as Parliament could part it. Here, I say, is an English King, whom no time or chance, Parliament or combination of Parliaments, can dethrone! This King Shakespeare, does not he shine in crowded sovereignty, over us all, as the noblest, gentlest, yet strongest of rallying-sign; indestructible; really more valuable in that point of view than any other means or appliance whatsoever? [...] Yes, this Shakespeare is ours; we produced him, we speak and think by him; we are of one blood and kind with him (Carlyle in Young 2008, 227-8).

Thus, the race extends as far as the speakers of -and thinkers in- Shakespeare's English, as far potentially as the transits around the globe of the works of Shakespeare. This is a race united under the heroic textual feats of their culture sovereign. The need for an identity or bond of attachment in the realm of imagination and affect and key to the cohesion of an Andersonian imagined community, due

to the problem of transnationalism, is repeatedly articulated by many of the advocates of the Greater British project at the end of the 19th century. For Charles Wentworth Dilke –effective coiner of the term Greater Britain- the Anglo-Saxons were a race ‘moulded together by commonality of institutions and language’ (Young 2008, 197). For Godwin Smith it was ‘the connexion of blood, sympathy, and ideas’ (Young 2008, 194) whose transits of the settler world extended the bounds of the race as they circuted the globe, ties which would not be cut by the petty mechanizations of the Westminster parliament –the *political* separation of Britain from the 13 American colonies being the looming example of this. Vucetic reminds us that ‘Unlike Germany and Italy the ‘race’ never became a nation-state; but that ‘much like pre-unification Germany or Italy’ this “Greater Britain” ‘was very much a social, cultural, and economic reality’ (Vucetic 2012, 108).⁶ The aspirations contained in this identity, or “race patriotism” as Arthur Balfour termed it were decidedly global in scope, bounded ultimately only by the limits of political power and collective imagination. Taken as Bell’s disparate bio-cultural assemblage, an attachment to nation that exists transnationally between metropole and colony, and a self-consciously assumed authority to do, and right to rule, the subject of the settler empire is perhaps best expressed by one of its most important advocates, Lord Milner, who described himself as

a British (indeed primarily English) Nationalist. If I am also an imperialist, it is because the destiny of the English race, owing to its insular position and long supremacy at sea, had been to strike fresh roots in distant parts of the world. My patriotism knows no geographical but only racial limits. I am an Imperialist and not a little Englander, because I am a British Race Patriot. It seems unnatural to me [...] to lose interest in an attachment to my fellow-countrymen because they settle across the sea. It is not the soil of England, dear as it is to me, which is essential to arouse my patriotism, but the speech, the tradition, the spiritual heritage, the principles, the aspirations of the British race. They do not cease to be *mine* because they are transplanted. My horizon must widen, that is all. I feel myself a citizen of the Empire. I feel that Canada is my country, Australia my country, New Zealand my country, South Africa my country, just as much as Surrey or Yorkshire” (Milner in Schwarz 2013, 99).

This transnation, if it can realistically be ascribed a solid territory at all is perhaps best understood –in Milner’s terms- as wherever the English happen to be. These transnationalists it seems, take their nation with them.

2.3: Transits of Empire

Heralds of the settler empire, like Dilke, Godwin Smith, J. R. Seeley and E. H. Freeman were but one human component of the self-conscious articulation of a dream of globe straddling community. The

⁶ It is worth noting the question of nationalism, transnationalism and the case of Germany as set against the rise of the settler empire. As Horsman suggests ‘In Germany in the early nineteenth century, ideas of Teutonic greatness were used most frequently to strengthen demands for nationhood. But the English were attracted to the idea of their race as a regenerating force for the whole world’ (Horsman 1981, 77). One suspects that something of the false binary existing between organic and civil nationalism lies somewhere in the fact that Anglo (trans)nationalism aspired to a (still exclusionary) universalism, whereas the “Germanic” variant proceeded along more particular and localized exclusionary lines, since, as Bell states ‘the antonym of national, in the dominant strands of Victorian political thought, was not the foreign, or cosmopolitan, but instead, the provincial, the parochial, the narrow’ (Bell 2007, 117).

vision within their scholastic output would be reinforced by the discourse produced by a whole generation of politicians, in Washington, Westminster, Melbourne, Victoria, Wellington and Johannesburg, who both evoked the grand imagined community and made numerous circuits within it. These settler polities would in turn self-consciously ape one another, with America –as a site of English legal and institutional tradition- proving the most popular example to build on and improve from (Lake & Reynolds 2008, 139). These settlement colonies would often look to their fraternal counterparts for legislative technologies, particularly with regard to the native question and immigration restriction, the literary test and colour bar in particular making transits from Mississippi to Washington, and then to Natal, Australia and eventually to South Africa and the Yishuv in Palestine (Lake & Reynolds 2008, 4, 63, 222-3) (Piterberg 2008, 69-78).

Paralleling these transits was of course a human stream of settlers and their technologies of social organization and class contestation –such that would morph into a politics of race upon arrival at their destinations (Mann 2005) (Hyslop 1999). One of the most important examples of this is the transits of trade union activity within and between the two wings of the settler empire, the seed being planted in the gold fields of New South Wales, California and British Columbia and spreading to South Africa, whilst at the same time remaining connected to metropolitan trade union activity and having significant impact in the ‘domestic’ politics of the metropole as well (Hyslop 1999) (Lake & Reynolds 2008) (Schwarz 2013).

Beyond the transit of human bodies and social relations, a vast infrastructure of communication began to take shape with the technological innovations of the steamship, the telegraph, radio and the still and film camera. This collapsing of time and space (Bell 2007) allowed a tangible connection to the outer limits of the polity and a condensed and dramatic image of them as well (Schwarz 2013). The very existence of these technologies, in turn, influenced the imagination of the heralds of the settler empire, allowing the dream of a vast interconnected polity across boundless space, a *virtual* world state (Bell 2007, 88).

2.4: Constitution by Negation

If the most florid accounts by the heralds of such a vast transnational polity existed more in the realms of dreams of a utopian future, the coherence of such an identity for settlers on the ground was perhaps a much less impressionistic and rather more concrete process. As Mann has stated of the colonial encounter in the Americas, ‘No European doubted who was native and who was European’ (Mann 2005, 74). Yet, the cohering of an identity of similitude in the latter half of the 19th century between a widely dispersed body of settlers that contained the English, High, Lowland, and Ulster Scots, the Irish, Germans, Scandinavians, and eventually French and Spanish settlers, along with an assortment of

central and Eastern European emigrants at the *fin de Siècle*, and –after the racialization of anti-Semitism in Europe- Jews, was principally conceivable due to the structuring of identity more around an idealization of “who we are not” than it was based on a singular and tangible “who we are”. This was a process in which a core of “English speaking peoples”, Anglo-Saxons, or “white men” –an identifier that was mutable, yet in almost all cases, bounded ultimately by physiognomy⁷ was expanded to include previously excluded Europeans. As Belich has noted of the absorption of Germans into the Anglo-Saxon race, ‘scholars traditionally emphasize racialism’s powers of exclusion, but it also had great powers of *inclusion*’ (Belich 2009, 63) (Italics in original).

Yet, Belich perhaps misses that racialism’s powers of inclusion and exclusion were often dialectically related. The initial core of Anglos and its expanded whole, were both profoundly consolidated as “the race” by way of a process of differentiation from and negation of the ways of being of a transnational spectrum of peoples of colour. This started with the racialization of natives and slaves against settlers in North America, the negation of the former being directly related to the structuring of settler society. As Schwartz describes, the social form of Anglo-American settlement is a system in which ‘land development creates both sides of the [economic] balance sheet simultaneously, and out of nothing’ (Schwartz 2012, 56). Thus, the expansion into native territory is a recurrent primitive accumulation, in which future return on investment in “free” land is met by the influx of settlers, the institution of chattel slavery, or both, into evacuated native territory. Thus ‘in-migration driven by land development [...] makes the constant renegotiation of internal racial and cultural boundaries [...] endogenous to economic growth in Anglo-America’ (Schwartz 2012, 56). Here, identity formation is shaped in large part over questions of the ‘proper acquisition, use, and development of land [...]’ (Schwartz 2012, 56, 58). By the late 19th century this process of identity formation by exclusion and negation would rapidly expand to include a whole “world” of colour as settler societies sought to extend their supremacy in social reproduction over that of the natives, to non-white immigrant communities. So, the figure of the white man was constituted transnationally by others at home and abroad, in the colony and the metropole. As Schwarz describes the white (male) subject:

In the *first* instance, his persona as a white man derived from the elaborate system of symbolic classification – of race and gender, class and sexuality, and so on – which prevailed. Thus, when new social figures entered the

⁷ The bounds of whiteness in the settler colonies would extend from the Anglo core to include Catholics (French, Spanish, and later the Irish), Eastern Europeans etc, but the outer boundary was decidedly that of Europe. There were those who would be racialized despite phenotypical appearances, such as prostitutes, single mothers, homosexual men, (McClintock 1995) (Schwarz 2013) and more generally in some discourses urban workers in the metropole. Others could pass the other way at times, Jewish women being an example (Valman 2011). On very rare occasions it was speculated, principally by American abolitionists, that manumitted black women could “become whiter” by way of a kind of Lamarkian evolutionism through proximity with white society (Guyatt 2016). Similar arguments would also adhere at times vis a vie the natives in America, prior to their coerced dissolution into settler society that marked the end of the open frontier. See (Guyatt 2016), (Wolfe 2016).

Victorian social landscape—the contagious prostitute, the destitute alien, the homosexual man, the hooligan, and the ever-expanding spectrum of those deemed unfit—they appeared far removed from the world of the respectable white man. These putatively dissolute beings came to experience directly the coercive, administrative attention of the state. But the discursive naming and organization of these recidivist characters, together with the consequent moves towards their incarceration and surveillance, served to quarantine the white man from the social contagions of the day, leaving him pristine and the object (in Gramsci's terms) of the gentler, educative, or 'prize-giving' activities of the state. *Their* presence did much to shape *his* world. The luminous presence of the white man, [...] was predicated on the organization of darker social forces, not only overseas but at home as well (Schwarz 2013, 21) (Italics in original).

The transnational constitution of this identity informed the gradual expansion of its bounds as a singular whiteness produced its opposite in a unified "colour line", the greater the apparent threat from a homogenized transnational blackness, the greater the powers of inclusion (for specific ethnicities) of whiteness. This was informed in large part by the cognisance of settlers in the multiracial British Empire of their potentially precarious position, to quote New Zealand Prime Minister Richard Seddon:

though united in the whole, [the Empire] is, nevertheless, divided broadly in to two parts, one occupied wholly or mainly by a white ruling race, the other principally occupied by coloured races who are ruled. Australia and New Zealand are determined to keep their place in the first class (Lake & Reynolds 2008, 164).

Cognisance of this, and of the insufficient rate of settler social reproduction vis-à-vis the demographic threat posed by coloured peoples to the shape of the nation led to an effort to expand the boundaries of whiteness. This 'cultural pluralism' as the Jewish American sociologist and Zionist Horace Kallen termed it, was seen as the pinnacle of liberal democratic politics. Cultural pluralism was made possible by the peculiarities of settler colonial social organization, in which the contradictions of a millennia long struggle for national existence in Europe were erased, the settler colony functioning as a tabula rasa for a new truly democratic politics (Obenzinger 2008, 657). Kallen described America as a cultural 'orchestra' of multiple ethnic heterotopias, this was the 'perfection of European civilization' in America (Obenzinger 2008, 657), the ultimate boundary of which was that of Europe itself, excluding Blacks, natives and immigrants of colour. The logic of Kallen's project was partially a product of his Zionism, in which he sought a means of inclusion in American society for Jewish immigrants that was directly related to the exclusion of blacks and marked others, the otherness of Jewishness rendered less distinct by contrast with that of blacks, natives and assorted "coloured" immigrants (Obenzinger 2008, 658). This logic was entirely in keeping with a wider project of inclusion (of those who could be assimilated into whiteness) to shore up the position of white settlers against those who would be excluded. This was a self-conscious and openly discussed project of racial engineering by settler politicians and intellectuals obsessed with the question of demographics. The policy of the consolidation of whiteness against colour is perhaps best summed up by Jan Christian Smuts at the dawn of the Union of South Africa when he proclaimed:

the whole meaning of the Union in South Africa is this: we are going to create a nation—a nation which will be of a composite character, including Dutch, German, English, and Jew, and whatever white nationality seeks refuge in this land—all can combine. And all will be welcome (Schwarz 2013, 292).

Indeed as Lake and Reynolds suggest, the politics of exclusion internal to white settler colonies was extended outward through reference to the threat posed by a ‘rising tide of colour’ at the fin de siècle, in a concerted and self-referential project of immigration restriction between settler colonies and their metropolises that amounted to ‘a version of racial segregation on an international scale [...]’ (Lake & Reynolds 2008, 5).

2.5: A History of “what we are not”

The negation of difference, the posing of a binary opposition between the boundless, transnational and universal and the narrow, local and parochial that adhered in this settler identity during at least the century between 1850 and 1950 has a genealogy that can be traced to two great epistemological ruptures that effectively separate the medieval and modern in Europe. For our purposes we will be mostly considering their impact between England, the United Kingdom and the settler empire. The Renaissance and the Reformation are of course subjects whose history there is no space to extensively plot here, our focus will be their epistemological impacts on the concepts and practices of recording and dealing with the ideas of space and time, and most crucially the development of modern historicism in England.

In mid-sixteenth century England there was a confluence of questions of epistemological and politico-religious authority that would begin to produce a peculiarly English teleology of history. This teleology was concerned in large part with producing England as both exception and exemplar, as a novel particular case and as a universal example. This process of differentiation from multiple figures of otherness created a singular cohesive idea of a timeless, essential Englishness; a vehicle for the destined progress of the English.

2.6: Space, Time, and History

This project commenced in Renaissance reconceptualizations of space, beginning in the rejection of a regime of discontinuous resemblance of the medieval period, towards realistic representation in modernist Renaissance art. Discontinuity in time and space created an absence of perspective in medieval painting, that is, an absence of positionality for the abstract figure or figures of the spectator, a concept that was itself alien to this genre of cultural production (Ermarth 1998, 10). Instead, our abstract modern spectator would be ‘simultaneously in several different places’ creating an absence of spatial continuity, since ‘there is no point of view at which’ the implied spectator of modernism ‘is supposed to stand’ (Ermarth 1998, 10). As Ermarth explains:

This spatial discontinuity gives primary value to detail. If you must know a thing not through measuring its relationships to neighbouring things or to similar things but by referring it to various appropriate prototypes, then you pay close attention to its discrete features. The habit “of accentuating every detail, of developing every thought and every image to the end, of giving concrete form to every concept of the mind” belonged to a

general habit of mind intent more upon congruence than upon continuity. Even spaces were considered objects in themselves, and each space was thought to end at the edge of a neighbouring object (Ermarth 1998, 10).

This resembles the realm of divine revelation, of impressions and intuitions, of a world of relation drawn together by powers of magic. It is the world of dreams, not of rational representation and explanation. In some degree this is a mirror image of our world of representation. Instead of single point perspective, coordinating 'pictorial space so as to produce a common horizon for all potential perspectives' (Ermarth 1992, 26), that is, a universal perspective, we have a tendency to 'isolate each thing as a special entity' with its own special relation to 'the eternal verities'. Things had their proper places 'not in relation to each other', that is, in relation to a universal abstract observer, 'but to the centre of the universe' (Ermarth 1998, 13). There is no abstract observer here, indeed the spectator is not really the observer at all. The observer and the thing observed are all part of the matter of the divine. Where modernism separated the observer from the observed, the regime of resemblance sites what we would think of as observers or spectators as within the thing itself.

Realistic spatiality in modern painting supplies us with a complex technology of geometrical instruments that allow us to apprehend it realistically, so that we can assume the shape and spatiality of things based on unconscious inferences we make vis-à-vis the objects and spaces observed in relation to all other objects and spaces, from our position as a spectator to the scene depicted (Ermarth 1998, 18). Thus, space is homogenous and uniform. The reality, the realism, or the truth of the depicted scene 'can only be gathered from a series of implied viewpoints, and can be fully grasped only as an abstraction from immediate experience', by way of our unconscious understanding of the technology or rules of perspective. Ermarth argues that a similar reconfiguration adheres in modern narrative and importantly in historicism, the discourse of history being one of the preeminent means through which we make sense of the world. In medieval histories we find a peculiar and alien *mélange* of apparent chaos in plotting, in the direction and purpose of the narrative and an absence of 'logic of narrative, of sequential causality', that is, an absence of 'the logic of human freedom and choice' (Ermarth 1998, 11). The act of engaging in modern, realistic narratives is in large part the re-confirming of these logics and the reassertion of their truth. Thus the act of reading in modernity (as opposed to pre-or-post-modernity) is the ritualization of the re-inscription of the discursive order implied by the genre, as Ermarth states of the detective story (Ermarth 1992, 19). This is the ordering, or wholesale obliteration of disruptive material that the genre itself calls into being for its very meaning, it is that which structures the narrative and procedures of truth in the first place. In this way the act itself is a constitution by negation.

Where realistic representation in the image involved a homogenization of space in the rules of geometry and perspective, the genre of modern history homogenizes time *and* space. Thus, historical time is

the belief in a temporal medium that is neutral and homogenous and that, consequently, makes possible those mutually informative measurements between one historical moment and another that support most forms of knowledge current in the West and that we customarily call “science” (Ermarth 1992, 20).

The notion of historical time then establishes the prototypical teleology of history. The rational subject is the thing that establishes its being representationally against that which it is not. The thing of internality, already an abstract figure, is then placed at an abstract window looking out towards the infinite horizon time, either forwards or backwards, this window on time functions as the formal agreement among viewpoints, the counterpart to the consensus of potential spectators to the realistic artwork (Ermarth 1992, 27). The rational subject and the consensus among viewpoints is the narrator, ‘that complex function without individual definition’ maintaining ‘the communication between past, present, and future, and thus the possibility of causal sequences between one to another’ (Ermarth 1992, 28). A teleology of history implies this “no-one” and “everyone” subject, a thing interchangeable for any other conscious thing, at anytime and anywhere. It is a fundamentally abstract thing, alienated from actual, affective, embodied experience. It is complimented by another abstract and alienated whole, that of history itself, a practice of generalization produced out of the realistic drive for singular truth, where, ‘the identity of anything—that is, its rational, structured, formal quality—can only be discovered in relationship, and so, in realism, discrete forms are replaced by continuities, stasis is replaced by implied motion, and hierarchy is replaced by horizon’ (Ermarth 1998, 16). The singular moment, like the embodied and grounded experience, becomes a part of the flow of a teleology of history, itself a forward motion towards transcendence, a dialectic relation of one moment to the next, and on, and on (Ermarth 1992, 31).

So, the discourse of history produces a restless flight into the past in search of origin and into the future towards a moment of transcendence. It is arguable that this is ultimately the moment when the human ‘sciences’ became inflected with the laws of nature of the natural sciences. Perspective, the child of mathematics, helps to shape a perspectival relation to history and a dialectical mode of thought ‘supressing any current material definition in favour of a dematerialized, literally immaterial elsewhere’. For every dialectically produced subject ‘there is a transcendental ego; for every “here” and “now” there is a necessary “there” and “then”’ (Ermarth 1992, 33).

It is through this rupture in epistemology, posed as a useful means for asserting international politico-religious authority in England, that the modern history of “The English”, and ultimately of the white settler subject began to be imagined.

2.7: History as Recovery

The project to recover an authentic British identity was preceded in mainland Europe through the Renaissance attempt to ‘recover from the corruptions of time the true Greek and Latin scripture’ in

order to salvage through comparison of a multitude of ancient texts, the singular truth of Christian theology (Ermarth 1998, 30). This search for ‘unity among the differences’ sought to produce a singular truth that was essentially elsewhere, abstracted from any one human source, with a faith in the idea that the common denominator of all would profess a truer harmony than that expressed in any one version (Ermarth 1998, 30). This truth was an exercise in modern rationality, its authority stemming from the realistic technology utilized by the sum of those conscious subjects enacting the recovery. This project, associated with the scholasticism of Erasmus, sought, in his own terms to discover ‘the “invisible church”’ that would function as the ultimate source of authority for all Christian sects, ‘the *form* of the whole that alone made interpretations of particular cases possible’ (Ermarth 1998) (my italics). This is religious authority stretching backwards and forwards in linear, sequential time.

This project for asserting authorial unity on Christianity was rather ironically underway during the lasting schism of the Reformation in Europe. In the case of England it is argued that the Renaissance novelty of realistic representation meaningfully arrived only after the rupture of the Reformation. It arrived into a political scene in which it was readily adopted by Henry VIII as a tool for establishing his historic legitimacy in the face of foreign Catholic power. As Ermarth argues of realism in historic narrative

This search for the hidden bond of unity extended far beyond philological research into all fields of conceptualization, and, in the period from the mid-1530s onward, into the field of English politics. When Henry VIII needed a theory to fit his *fait accompli*, Cromwell recruited an army of anonymous humanists who served as apologists for the King in explaining his break from Rome and produced treatise on every subject from marriage and divorce to theology and ritual (Ermarth 1998, 31)(italics in original).

Horsman notes that it was during the reign of Henry VIII that the search for a ‘pure English Anglo-Saxon Church’ began, which sought to consolidate the break from Rome through recovering the pre-1066 Saxon church and liturgy. The likes of John Wyclif traced the origins of the Saxon Church back to the mythic Joseph of Arimathea and the “First” Church in Palestine, and in doing so extended the English Reformation back into the 1300’s (Horsman 1981, 9-11). This was not simply a project obliterating or eradicating Catholicism in the British Isles, the sudden rendering of British subjects as other than Catholic. Rather, via historical temporality and the figurative consensus in single point perspective, or more simply, representation, the teleology of history was opened to the individual consciousness in novel ways. As Ermarth explains

Historical time, and the consciousness coextensive with it, is at least potentially interchangeable among individuals, because it is consciousness of the *same* thing: an invariant world, one that changes according to certain laws that do not change. An individual perspective is only arbitrarily limited; it is only the “accidents” of language, nationality, gender, and so on that obscures this potentially cosmic vision (Ermarth 1992, 30)(italics in original).

The convention of self-consciously inserting oneself into history, and beyond, into the cultures of others has been described by Stephen Greenblatt as ‘improvisation’ and depends on ‘the ability and

willingness to play a role, to transform oneself, if only briefly [...] into another' and to transform another's reality 'into a manipulable fiction' (Greenblatt 1980, 61). As Greenblatt states of the incipient Protestant Church in England at the time, 'the Anglican Church and the monarch who was its supreme head, did not, as radical Protestants demanded, eradicate Catholic ritual, but rather improvised within it in an attempt to assume its power' (Greenblatt 1980, 63). By assuming the position of an interchangeable Catholic subject and apprehending that subject's relationship with Catholic symbolism, the Anglican Church attempted to carry with them the Catholics of the British Isles into the ideological fiction of incipient Anglicanism by fictionalizing the reality of Catholic ritual. Whereas Henry VIII was merely the first Anglican monarch invested with the divine right of Kings, through the works of ideology by his schism's later apologists, his daughter Elizabeth appropriated and absorbed the image of Mary, mother of God, a symbolically authentic figurehead around which to build Anglican authority. This dovetails with an important inner dynamic of constitution by negation, that it is not a simple binary, with the meaning and identity of the negated other on one side and a void on the other. Rather, the two exist within one another. As Fanon stated 'not only must the black man be black; he must be black in relation to the white man [...]' (Fanon in Schwarz 2013, 187), the two must exist relationally. "We" alone is impossible, without the "what we are not" which "we" are psychically parasitic upon, "we" cannot be imagined.

This insertion of conscious agents into historical time would become a wider project of recovering a peculiarly English teleology of history. As the motion of Historical time established a hidden temporal whole, so modernist realism bled into conceptions of abstract identity 'simple location, consciousness, the subject, and social "laws"' that governed understanding of 'metaphors of psychic as well as corporate existence' (Ermarth 1998, 26). In keeping with this, the new impetus into imagining the ancient English past did not stop at establishing the authenticity and authority of the English Church, a dream of 1000 years of negating papal authority. Soon, the abstract sovereign state, property, and a peculiarly English, protestant inflected subjectivity began to emerge. It would be intellectually solidified by the likes of Hobbes and Locke, via Thomas Starkey's universalist revision of Aquinian natural law (Ermarth 1998, 31-2).

2.8: Recovering Anglo-Saxons: Producing *Ur*-settlers

Prior to the 16th century, notions of ancient English authenticity relied on the myths of Arthurian legend. The narrative of the indigenous pagan King uniting the Angles, Celts, and Saxons proved a useful tool for British Kings seeking to link their regimes to a pre-Roman authentic and unified Britishness (Young 2008, 15-16). As the break with Rome was consolidated in politics and history under the Stuarts, the Arthurian legend's narrative of composite Celtic Catholic and Saxon identity no longer suited the will to distinguish and separate the externally determinate Catholic Celts from the

true English, those eternally inner determinate Saxons. English historians broke with the narrative of Geoffrey of Monmouth and instead looked to the texts of Tacitus to establish the English as ultimately the products of the Germanic tribes of the Black Forests of Northern Germany, those who it was argued had ultimately brought about the fall of the Roman Empire (Horsman 1981, 10-13). In national mythology, as with the recovery of the pure English Church, the negation of the foreign, the tyrannical, the Catholic, was crucial.

As the increasingly fractious relationship between the Crown and Parliament developed towards the English Civil War, the notion of foreignness extended beyond the purely Catholic other, becoming informed by ideas surrounding what was authentically British as against what had been a foreign imposition. The process of “recovering” the truth of the ancient Saxon Church morphed into the recovering of ancient, authentic Saxon political traditions, that which were argued to have been usurped by absolutist royal authority beginning with the Norman Conquest and its oppressive feudal tenures (Horsman 1981, 13). This foreign tyrannical authority was set against Tacitus’ pure race of Germanic tribesmen who were alleged to have settled the British Isles and Saxonized them. The emergence of the myth of Saxon uniqueness was tied, through the emerging teleology of history of the English, to repeated bouts of rejection and resistance to tyrannical authority, from Imperial Rome, to the Norman Conquest, and Henry VIII’s rejection of papal authority. All led towards the present rift between Parliament and the Crown. The rebellious Parliament asserted that English rights were rooted in immemorial law and custom. The Saxon *Ur*-settlers were cast as autochthonous liberal democrats, their mythical King Alfred having instituted annual sessions of Parliament and universal male suffrage (Horsman 1981, 14). The common law courts, the House of Commons, and the liberal practice of fee simple land tenure were all drawn back in time to the mythical settlement of the Saxons (Horsman 1981, 14-15). Horsman cites the revolutionary generation in England as effectively initiating the Whig theory of English history, in which Saxon *Ur*-settlers enacted a near millennia long Reconquista of English liberty, bookended by the Magna-Carta and the Glorious Revolution:

As a result of these victories England was a nation with a continuity of law and institutions stretching back more than a thousand years, a nation inhabited by Anglo-Saxons, who had always been freedom loving and had always exhibited an outstanding capacity for good government (Horsman 1981, 14).

It is through this myth of the Saxon *Ur*-settler extirpating the Celtic native and in time Anglicizing the fraternal Norman invader (and in some telling’s of the story, all the natives of the British Isles) that a certain implacability emerges in Anglo-Saxon identity. The English are always from “somewhere else”, ‘being English was always about being out of place, about displacement from an earlier point of origin’ (Young 2008, 19). Being English was about being settlers.

It is through this lens that we must understand the American Revolution, for many of the settlers of the American revolutionary generation their identity as Anglo-Saxons was intrinsic to their politics, indeed,

before it became a truly popular identity in United Kingdom, the myth of Saxon origins would first prove decisive in the settlement of the Americas and the cleaving of the two halves of the first British Empire. It was through the lesson of America and British reflection on it vis-à-vis its relationship with its settler colonies in Canada, the Antipodes, and eventually South Africa, that Anglo-Saxonism became a popular racial identity in 19th century England.

2.9: Anglo-Saxonism Shapes American Settlement

The American revolutionaries applied the Anglo-Saxon myth to their dispute with the Crown in the late 18th century. Many settlers in the preceding century had settled in the Americas precisely because they believed that ‘the English constitution had not been cleansed of the religious and political abuses that had emerged’ since the Norman Conquest (Horsman 1981, 15). Their understanding of liberty, as based on the recovery of the Saxon myth, directly effected their understanding of popular sovereignty and their approach to the use of land. The myth of the Saxon *Ur*-settler directly effected the eventual shape of structural invasion in North America. The mythical image of pre-Normanite Saxon England in the American Imagination involved a focus on devolved local power and although the term was not yet relevant, a federation of small political units. Beyond this, myths of an elective King (and eventually a President), annual parliaments, trial by jury, and the organization of land held by farmers in fee simple emerged (Horsman 1981, 21). As Horsman notes of Thomas Jefferson

he hoped Virginia would divide its counties into wards of about six miles square [which] “would answer to the hundreds of your Saxon Alfred.” In each of these wards Jefferson wanted an elementary school, a militia company, a justice of the peace, a constable, responsibility for the poor and roads, local police, an election of jurors, and a “folk house” for elections. “Each ward” wrote Jefferson, “would thus be a small republic within itself” (Horsman 1981, 23).

When settlers brought ‘their sovereignty with them’ (Veracini 2010) to the Americas, this sovereignty was a decidedly modern product of the new historical imagination. The provision of fee simple land tenure contained within the American settler understanding of their sovereignty, and based in the recovery of the truth of the English as Saxon *Ur*-settlers, profoundly impacted the dissolution of native sovereignty through the introduction and eventual imposition of alienable property. As Wolfe explains:

settlers became the sort of people who could own rather than merely occupy. What, then, was the supplement that the sovereign added to natives’ right of occupancy to produce the expanded confection that was passed on to the settler? It was, of course, the element of dominion, asserted by the sovereign at the moment of discovery, which had not been the natives’ to transfer. Again, therefore, sovereignty converges with race: only Indian occupancy was detachable from title. Fee simple in the United States, as in other settler colonies, remains traceable to a sovereign grant. Property starts where Indianness stops (Wolfe 2007, 134).

Thus, the performance of Saxon settlement as one of several restagings of mythical settlement in North America, including the Conquest of Canaan,⁸ was more than just that. The performance would go on to

⁸ Saxons were not the only mythical *Ur*-Settlers. Richard Waswo discusses the persistence of the Trojan myth of settlement as profoundly shaping the symbolism of The West’s teleology of history (Waswo 1997). Likewise Gabriel Piterburg discusses the Zionist mythology of the conquest of Canaan that emerged out of

shape the constitution of the United States as ‘American lawyer-politicians, a numerous and dominant breed, ensured that in the early years of the new nation the general historical belief in the free Anglo-Saxon past would be reinforced by numerous examples drawn from the roots of English [...] law’ (Horsman 1981, 24). Yet the restaging of the mythological Saxon past in the Americas was also an absorption and appropriation of native ways of being, as frontier settlers improvised within and manipulated native social institution and custom to effect the devolution of sovereignty and the production of a mythology of self-rule (Slotkin 1975, 63, 159). This was later followed by settler intellectuals (especially the Federalists) who sought to appropriate native governmental customs for their political project (Mann 2005, 108). The native occupied the preeminent resource in the settler colonies: land, but s/he also occupied a powerful discursive substance in native ways of being that settlers could mobilize against indigeneity and appropriate for themselves, as the Protestant Crown had done through Catholicism previously.

The break with the Crown signals the beginning of the truly transnational phase of this settler identity, for as Belich states, the ‘Americans rebelled in 1775, not because they saw themselves as a distinct nation, but because they felt that they were not being treated as British *enough*’ (Belich 2009, 49) (Italics in original). The Crown failed to accede to their immemorial Saxon rights, that is, their right to liberty and the pursuit of happiness. These rights directly translated into a logic of territorial expansion to accommodate the individual’s right to possess, develop, and to sell their alienable property, a property whose existence was fundamentally based on the removal of native bodies, extirpation of native title, and, the importation of the institution of chattel slavery. This led to the rupture, which was again cast in the terms of a foreign, that is, fundamentally non-English, tyranny. This tyranny (part of the “what we are not” of American settler identity) became discursively linked to the condition of the natives and of slaves, that is, to those who defined the condition of the settler by their not occupying it, and existing at the discretionary power of another (Rana 2010, 199). The tyrant, slave to rapacious desire, and the racial other, slave to their masters and to the tyrant was defined by their fundamental external determinacy, as opposed to the inner determinacy and sacred, ancient rights of the settler.⁹

2.0: America Shapes Anglo-Saxonism

The idea of an Anglo-Saxon race truly became a transnational project in the eighteenth century, with the example of American settlement providing considerable justification for the enterprise. American intellectuals did not simply absorb ideas surrounding recovery of the ancient past to define their racial

David Ben-Gurion’s “bible project” in the 1950’s, an attempt to tie Zionism, that is, a supposedly ancient Israelite nationalism, to the founding of Jewish monotheism under Joshua (Piterberg 2008).

⁹ The perceived threat of Catholic external determinacy was still, towards the end of the eighteenth century, a profoundly shaping influence, the fear of American settlers that the Catholic French conquered by the Crown after the Seven Years War would be accorded comparable rights to their British counterparts caused considerable religious furore on the part of settler political and religious elites, see (Rana 2010).

being from the Old World. America also ‘fed European racial appetites with scientific theories stemming from the supposed knowledge of blacks and Indians’ (Horsman 1981, 3). Most importantly though, the American epic was being consumed by British intellectuals as they sought to define the scope of their new transnational identity. The influence of the American example cannot be underestimated. The term Anglo-Saxon as a racial designation first begins to appear in British intellectual and popular discourse during the Canadian Rebellions of 1834. The response to the rebellions and a number of other crises in the British Empire would be informed by an understanding of the essential characteristics of the Anglo-Saxon race, and a consideration of the lessons of America in dealing with them.

The ‘public moralists’ (Bell 2007) of Victorian Britain were keenly aware of the American Revolution as an example of centralized governmental overreach, intuitively recognizing as Belich did more than a century later, that American settlers revolted because they believed that they were not being treated as sufficiently British (Bell 2016). The notion of the race then, as being essentially one and the same in custom, law, interest, and feeling, between Britain, America, and the Dominions was practically a matter of common sense in their prolific discourse on the subject. America was both the lesson and the example to be emulated. In short, in America lay the future of the race. As Charles Wentworth Dilke stated

In America, the peoples of the world are being fused together, but they are run into an English mould: Alfred’s laws and Chaucer’s tongue are theirs whether they would or no. There are men who say that Britain in her age will claim the glory of having planted greater England’s across the seas. They fail to perceive that she has done more than to found plantations of her own – she has imposed her institutions on the offshoots of Germany, of Ireland, of Scandinavia and of Spain. Through America, England is speaking to the world (Young 2008, 197).

The Canadian rebellions, in which a unified Anglo-Saxonism was cast against a still importantly Catholic France (Young 2008, 182, 183), were to be a lesson in history, whereby the British Empire could either repeat the sins of the past, of the American tragedy, or transcend them by way of a new kind of transnational politics of identity. Though the dream of Greater Britain or sometimes even a United States of Greater Britain¹⁰ varied depending on the dreamer, between a globe-spanning federation of self-governing states, to a confederation of sovereign domestic parliaments with an imperial chamber uniting them all in questions of international policy, some even dreaming of the reuniting of Britain and America, there were two essential tenets. The first was that unity of race was key to the survival of the whole. The second, that this unity would only be achieved through the medium of the devolution of centralized metropolitan power towards the political self-determination of the settler colonies (Bell 2007). The metropole would have to concede in the future what was only

¹⁰ Coined by J. R. Seeley.

conceded through the American revolutionary war in the past. The model for this project of devolved power to the settler colonies was of course the American federation of states.¹¹

2.0.1: *Upopulus*: Nowhere and Everywhere People

Indians, native and African Americans, Aborigines, and, up to a point, European others such as the Irish, all represented racial degeneracy in the 19th century discourses of race. However, they also represented narrow, local, parochial identity. This attachment to territorially bounded place was argued to have been rejected by the Anglo-Saxon, the born settler. These peoples were, in a very real sense, understood to be part of the past. They had “left” or been left, by History. The nomad in the consciousness of the heralds of race in the 19th century was not the native, s/he was the settler. The “homeliness” that characterizes much of the discourse on this empire of Anglo-Saxons was paradoxically not rooted to any one home. As the myth went, Anglo-Saxons, following the ancient tradition of their ancestry, were naturally, racially, predetermined to settlement. The boundaries of identity linked to local, narrow territoriality dissolved. With regards to the English, as Young states, ‘England had no visible inside or outside. It was everywhere’ (Young 2008, 191). As Martin F. Tupper claimed in the *Anglo-Saxon Magazine* in 1849, ‘The whole of the Earth may be called the *Father-Land* of the Anglo-Saxon. He is a native of every clime – a messenger of haven to every corner of the planet’ (Tupper in Young 2008, 185). Here the Anglo-Saxon is not simply the *Ur*-settler, s/he is the *Ur*-native as well, always already a native in the land arrived at, since always, already the authentic historical subject. The settler does not merely exist in place but transcends it and exists authentically, everywhere. The whole world in this vision is simply there, awaiting the *return to history* of its fabled subject, the Anglo-Saxon settler. Jodi A. Byrd cites an early example of both this new planetary ontology and the affinity felt between Anglo-settlers in the curious case of Captain Cook during the American war of Independence. Whilst the British and American navies were at war in the Atlantic, Cook was granted an American passport to traverse the war zone peacefully (J. A. Byrd 2011, 2), as Benjamin Franklin had taken a specific interest in his voyages of discovery. Later, during the war of 1812, Captain Paul Cuffe was granted similar safe passage by the British to scout for sites of settlement in West Africa, in the American project to settle freed slaves out of America, and thus ensure the safety of the white American democratic project after the interracial ‘tragedy’ of emancipation and reconstruction (Guyatt 2016). This reciprocal acknowledgement that the project of settlement transcended and existed above the petty mechanizations of purely state level politics indicates a shared

¹¹ For a full account of the various projects of Greater British federation see (Bell 2007).

vision, in which the settler was the native of an entire planet, a planet that had to be made secure for the flourishing of settler democracy.

Young notes in settlement that there is a curious ‘doubling of the origin’ taking place, with the settler reinforcing their metropolitan identity by the very act of going overseas and settling distant lands (Young 2008, 19). Such identity as a “repeating echo effect” is not unique to Anglo settlers. From Hegelian historicism to the race history of the Aryans, there was an intellectually popular notion of a Western civilization, extended back into time and into the East and conceived of as constantly ‘on the move’ toward the present and into the West. The westward march of civilization was a common trope in European modernist thinking, as Aryanist August Fredrich Pott claimed, ‘*Ex oriente lux*: the march of culture, in its general lines, has always followed the sun’s course’ (Pott in Horsman 1981, 25). Yet in the organic nationalism of Herder this concept as it remained in Central Europe took on a far more territorially bounded shape¹², informed in Germany particularly by the limitations to its imperialist ambition posed by imperial France, Russia and Britain, and in Bismarck’s early distaste for overseas colonialism (Mann 2005). This boundedness in national imagination would ultimately reach a more “Anglo-Saxonist” destination only with the arrival of Nazi ambitions with regards to the expansion of an Imperial Germany, informed in some degree as they were by the American national epic.

2.0.2: *Upopulus* and the Structural Logic of Settler Colonialism

What the Anglo-Saxonism of Britain and America shared with the Aryan narrative is the notion of ‘displacement from an earlier point of origin’ (Young 2008, 19), the idea of always having come from somewhere else, that is, a particularly settler oriented state of being, the binary opposite of the native, who had always been attached to –and subsequently detachable from– “this” land, back into the distant realms of mythological time. This was an identity enmeshed in movement, often quite tangibly, not only because, as in the case of Scottish settlers, within the space of single generations they had settled Ulster and then North America (and correspondingly dispossessed native Irish and then Indigenous peoples in the Americas), but of the succeeding generations of settlers in the westward expansion of the conditions of settlement from the original 13 colonies towards the Pacific rim. Such a state of being is perfectly described in de Tocqueville:

it would be difficult to describe the avidity with which the American rushes forward to secure this immense booty that fortune offers ... [with] a passion stronger than the love of life. Before him lies a boundless continent, and he urges onward as if time pressed and he was afraid of finding no room for his exertions ... Fifty years have scarcely elapsed since Ohio was founded; the greater part of its inhabitants were not born

¹² Herder’s account of nationalism was both bounded and plural, imagining a world of nationally distinct peoples bounded in the nation state system, which, at least on the surface appears to run in a contrary direction to the unboundeness of the civic (and I argue also organic) nationalist imperialism that developed in England, France, and America. Prussian settler colonialism in what would become Poland in the 20th century is of course another matter.

within its confines; its capital has been built only thirty years, and its territory is still covered by an immense extent of uncultivated fields; yet already the population of Ohio is proceeding westward, and most of the settlers who descend to the fertile plains of Illinois are citizens of Ohio. These men left their first country to improve their condition; they quit their second to ameliorate it still more; fortune awaits them everywhere, but not happiness (de Tocqueville *Democracy in America* in Schwartz 2012, 56).

Importantly the settler state of being as movement, as expansion into emptied territory is directly related to the logic of structural invasion and the institutions of settler land use imported into the native lifeworld. As stated before, settler expansion accrues through the devolution of centralized state power into the hands of individual settlers and land speculators themselves, a future return on investment in emptied and therefore either cheap or “free” land. Settler identity as eternal nomadism is based on a recurrent primitive accumulation, of native land, of slave labour, or both. Indeed, Anglo settler colonialism prior to frontier closure can be seen to positively reject and make impossible the kind of centralized planning and centralized sovereign power implied in the Wakefieldian approach to settlement¹³, as many early settlement entrepreneurs discovered to their cost in Australia (Marx 1991, 932-33). One could import settlers into a country, but without importing the social relations of English industrial capitalism, one could not retain them as labour upon arrival as they exited into space to become owners of land themselves (Piterberg & Veracini 2015, 467-8).

Beyond this, the settler propensity for movement into space in search of “expansive freedom” (entailing the “relative equality and independence of freeholders” (Rana 2010, 5) and emphasizing “continuous popular mobilization and direct control” by social insiders “over the sites of political decision making (Rana 2010, 2)) would inform the development of state practices towards settlers that homogenized the shape of various settler societies across the conventional boundaries of national state borders. The propensity of flight into land to be emptied of indigenous sovereignty and bodies by settlers forced metropolitan states to compete for them by way of developing institutions favorable to settler notions of expansive freedom as settlers readily moved to wherever this was offered. Settlers repeatedly gave up their national flag for better offers elsewhere, even in times of mutual hostility between the states involved, as the history of settler transfers between Canada and the United States attests too (Belich 2009, 152). What mattered was not purely national identity, but the institutional and political framework that allowed one to exist as a *settler*. As Schwartz states of the relationship of outbidding between America and British Canada, ‘the key [...] was access to land. Settlers would align themselves with whoever offered them secure tenure, more land, and self-governance (Schwartz 2012, 64). Several centuries of this peculiarly fraternal competition between the British and American settler empires produced an isomorphism in their domestic institutional makeup (Belich 2009, 167-8), already substantially similar due to the exportation of English institutional technologies in the first place. In

¹³ The unusual exception with regards to Anglo settler colonies to this rule is New Zealand, the *relative* survival of Maori presence on the land and in the political cultures of New Zealand is arguably in part related to this.

very real ways, the two wings of the settler empire mutually constituted each other's institutional politics and politics' of identity, based in large part on the propensity of settlers to *move*.

By the 19th century the discourse of movement, of racial attachment to nowhere and everywhere, had come to litter pronouncements on Anglo-Saxonism and the dream of the settler empire. Anglo-Saxon settlers were no longer simply people or a people, they were described as forces of nature. By 1844 *The Times* describes the Anglo-Saxon propensity for settlement and conquest in terms that bring to mind a flower, pollenating the planet:

The Anglo-Saxon race is naturally multiplying and spreading. It is always producing the physical material of new empires and is [...] fertile in the virtues and capacities necessary to found and govern them. It yearly throws off swarms of men and families of heroes. The stimulus of enterprise is deep in its nature. Without an effort, it scans the world; and without that miserable foppery of ambition which wastes the energies of other nations, it quietly marks for its own the riches of every unoccupied shore. Its natural advantages develop [*sic*] and assist its tendency. Here, then, is such an opportunity of peaceful colonisation as the world has not yet seen. The results must be great, and may be good. We cannot help breaking our narrow limits and overspreading the world (*The Times* in Young 2008, 182).

Advocate of a British world federation, J. R. Seeley, describes the English as akin to the disembodied spirit of history when he states that 'England will be wherever the English are found, and we shall look for its history in wherever places witness the occurrences most important to the English' (Young 2008, 210-11). E. A. Freeman describes "England" as something close to Young's "echo effect", a serialization, repeating around the world:

What is England? [...] The old Teutonic name speaks for itself; it is the land of the English, the land of the English wherever they may dwell. Wherever the men of England settle, there springs to life a new England. There was a day when Massachusetts was not England; there was an earlier day when Kent itself was not England. The elder and the younger land, the land beyond the sea and the land beyond the Ocean, have been made England by the same process (Young 2008, 214).

This characterization of England and Englishness resembles a current or flow making its way around the planet and through history like a revitalizing wind, bringing the places it passes *into history*. Before Massachusetts was fertilized by the pollen of Englishness, it did not, historically, and to all intents and purposes from the perspective of this discourse, exist. England then, is no longer territorialized and the English are no longer embodied, they have assumed a higher register of meaning, they have become a universal and abstract entity. Thus, the particular, embodied, and perhaps crucially, territorially bounded identities of a vast spectrum of peoples of colour, colonised or otherwise were set against the English, the nowhere and everywhere people. No longer conceived of in terms of petty race or ethnicity, they functioned as something more than just the race at the summit of a hierarchy of humanity, they transcended it, as the race beyond race and assumed their own self-given authority to adjudicate and manage the rest of the world. This then is the end arrived at by many post-colonial literary critics, where white writers expressed their identity in the negation of colour:

In order to escape from the veil of nothingness that whiteness represented to these writers in the New World, they employed blackness in their texts as a means by which to define their newly realized selves as white. And

they defined this whiteness, and thus themselves, as universal, transcendent, pure, and righteous. Though whiteness ceased to represent the fearful unknown, specifically the boundarylessness of the New World, it retained its status as the universal standard, the norm against which others were measured. In searching for a definition of themselves as raced, these early nineteenth-century American writers represented themselves as unmarked, unraced (Ingram 2001, 158).

In their self-perception they have become the constitutive outside of race, that which coheres it, as that which is different from itself. Thus, everything that makes up the diffuse but clearly recognizable meaning of race for whites, that is cultures, of art and of politics, customs and institutions of democracy, are understood as *non-racial* and universal today. Whereas the disinterested scientific signifiers of “race” still linger in their application to the always, already marked bodies of non-white others.

Racial others are expected to speak and have knowledge only of their own race; white people, on the contrary, have assumed the privilege of speaking for the human race [...]. Because they are ostensibly without race, not simply one race among many, whites have come to represent the standard against which all else is defined (Ingram 2001, 158).

2.0.3: Morality, Settlement and Greater Britain: Re-creating Anglo-Saxons

These florid accounts of the race did not, of course, exist in a vacuum, they were part of the project of competition for settlers between Britain and America (though they never really sought to fully separate the two wings of the settler empire). With a view of rising power in France, Russia, and the newly unified German federation and a sense that the booming America would soon potentially outstrip Britain in terms of political and economic power, coupled with the fact that the vast majority of emigrants in the first half of the 19th century were heading for America and not the dominions (Belich 2009), the heralds of settler empire sought to reimagine the denigrated image of the settler on the open frontier in the eyes of the British public. Concomitant to this was a parallel process of rehabilitation of the frontier settler in the American metropolises of the East Coast, as the westward march of settlement reached the Pacific Rim.

The essential domestic argument for settler migration to the dominions was quite consciously one of relieving the pressure of class contestation and overpopulation at home. In a kind of Malthusian anti-socialist paranoia, British political and intellectual elites sought the transportation of surplus labour population to the colonies, to relieve the pressure of social contradiction in the metropole and to encourage the growth and strength of the colonies. Through this they hoped to establish a friendly settler empire of interdependence through which Britain could continue to compete on the international stage, all bounded securely by the ties of race. As with much of the politics of settler colonialism, the domestic and international mutually informed one another. Reacting to the ‘base materialism’ of Benthamite Utilitarianism or “Manchester liberalism” and concomitantly to the lurking

threat of socialism, a threat of increasing scope as the number of bodies comprehended by the franchise sporadically increased (Bell 2007, 47), the public moralists of Britain sought to propound a decidedly Americanized liberal republicanism through which Britain might, via settler colonialism secure

the future progress and moral character of the polity with a belief that the ultimate harmony of sectional interests could be secured through judicious constitutional engineering, promising the intellectual and political elite the institutional means to harness “improvement” while simultaneously taming radicalism and the damaging consequences of mass democracy (Bell 2007, 17).

These liberal republicans effectively sought to match the free movement of capital within the Empire with that of the free movement of labour, a concept very unusual in the present. In so doing they sought to ensure the domestic and international security of the race. Such a project was one of civilizational destiny, not of the petty concerns of clear and immediate economic and social benefits. J. S. Mill was indicative of this millennial settlerophilia¹⁴

The question of government in the work of colonization involves the future and permanent interests of civilization itself, and far outstretches the comparatively narrow limits of purely economic considerations. But even with a view to those considerations alone, the removal of population from the overcrowded to the unoccupied parts of the earth’s surface is one of those works of eminent social usefulness, which most require, and at the same time best repay, the intervention of government (Mill in Bell 2007, 50).

Whilst these thinkers self-consciously looked to the future, their image of the “new man” was an act of recovery of a mythic, Anglo-Saxon past; a vision of an *Altneuland* overseas, a future utopia harking back to an imaginary utopian past. This *return to history* involved the re-creation of the mythic, morally simple “broad shouldered agricultural worker” as constituted in the negation of the clever, “festering, disease ridden, industrial worker”, he who was “no longer hardy and content” but instead “decaying and degraded”, and as the logic goes, soon to be clamouring about his station politically. Industrial capitalism produced marked, subaltern bodies, to be washed clean, and white, in the colonies (Bell 2007, 52). The passage to the colonies, across the seas, like their Saxon ancestors and arrival in a boundless space for agricultural production was to be the medium that returned the degraded English subject to history, a concept we shall see is repeated in Zionism, and indeed throughout settler colonialism. Some were resigned to the immutable destitution of the industrial proletariat, but sought to save the lower classes in the depressed countryside from the racialized degeneration of the city. Lord Brabazon hoped that ‘the flow of this stream of strong healthy life could be directed to the colonies before it had become polluted by contact and mixture with the foul cesspools of the city’ (Brabazon in Bell 2007, 53). J. A. Froude thought that the state might intervene in the racial health of its population, so as to reawaken the character of the ancient English, lost on one side to the degeneration of body in industrialism and on the other to the degeneration of mind and character produced by material abundance and the life of repose which polarized and destabilized society (Bell 2007, 146). The solution

¹⁴ Mill would become much less optimistic in the latter half of the 19th century.

to the contradictions inherent in advanced civilization was then the levelling of life that the colonies and their space provided. Movement into space would reorganize social hierarchy and breed better, sturdier, moral subjects. As Froude argued, the

wealth of a nation [...] depends in the long run upon the conditions, mental and bodily of the people of whom it consists, and the experience of all mankind declares that a race of men sound in soul and limb can be bred and reared only in the exercise of plough and spade, in the free air and sunshine, with country enjoyments [...] never amidst foul drains and smoke blacks and the external clank of machinery (Froude in Bell 2007, 146).

Such ideas were repeatedly circulated in the discourse on settlement, with the act of settlement itself recreating the ancient Saxon spirit. As John Robinson argued, ‘from time immemorial it has always required a certain self-sacrifice and hardlihood for men and women to root up old ideas and associations and face the unknown conditions of a new world’ (Bell 2007, 53). Settlers themselves were of course educated in their new mythic status as new subjects, whose climate and material position, having returned to the sacredness of the soil, reconstituting them in the mould of ancestors. “The Colonist” a New Zealand school textbook stated

must be of sturdy character, persevering, unflinching in the face of difficulty, steady of nerve at those moments when he is exposed to terrible dangers, willing to endure hardship, and not too proud to labour with his own hands; he must love the land, as the old Teuton fathers of the English loved it; he must be active, enterprising, eager to take advantage of new opportunities for bettering his position in the world, moved by the trading as well as the farming spirit; he must delight in the sea, which is to bear him to his new home, and upon whose bosom he will entrust the fruits of his labour at home. All of these characteristics are present in the national English character (Bell 2007, 142-3).

Thus, the outmigration of settlers was cast as a replaying and reviving of the decadence of Rome by the Germanic tribes of the black forests, of the settlement of England by the seafaring Saxons. Importantly it was understood as what the race had *always done* and what it would do into the future, as the *Edinburgh Review* clearly outlines in 1849:

the true mission of the Germanic peoples was to renovate and reorganize the western world. In the heart of the forest, amid the silences of unbroken plains, the Teuton recognized a law and fulfilled duties, of which the sanctity if not the memory, was nearly extinct among races who deemed and called him a *barbarian*. He felt and he revered the ties of family life, chastity in women, fealty in man to his neighbour and his chief, the obligation of oaths, and the impartial supremacy of the laws. And it is in the portraiture of the Teuton doing his appointed work, in re-infusing life and vigour and the sanctions of a lofty morality into the effete and marrowless institutions of the Roman world, which is drawn in the volumes before us. (*Edinburgh Review* in Horsman 1981, 68-69)(italics in original).

The current of communitarianism in this discourse is perhaps surprising given that republican attachment to notions of moral community is not traditionally associated with Victorian Britain. The reaction against liberal and socialist materialism emphasized moral citizenship of course, but it was a citizenship that was less purely political than it was racial, this was a republicanism for sure, but a peculiarly English one where individualism and communalism rest alongside one another. The duty of the citizen and the duty of the individual as a member of the wider race were indistinguishable. Like the Kibbutz movement in Israel the collective duty was to the race by way of the mixture of one’s labour with the land, a secularization and collectivization of the religious duty towards a

commonwealth of increase that we see outlined in Locke a century before, and that which we might trace back further into the Old Testament as the covenantal contract between the ancient Hebrews and God. Indeed, Froude's republicanism even stipulates the requirement of instilling an Old Testament "fear of god" in his prospective subjects to ensure their hardy labouring for the race (Bell 2007, 147). The land then was a sacred medium for the revival of the subject, the return to the soil was an education in it. This was quite literally a national service, as Lord Curzon states

Outside of the English Universities no school of character exists to compare with the Frontier [...]. I am one of those who hold that in this larger atmosphere on the outskirts of Empire, where the machine is relatively impotent and the individual strong, is to be found an ennobling and invigorating stimulus for our youth, saving them alike from the corroding ease and morbid excitements of Western civilization. To our ancient Universities, revived and re-inspired, I look to play their part in this national service. Still from the cloistered alleys and the hallowed groves of Oxford, true to her old traditions, but widened in her activities and scope, let there come forth the invincible spirit and the unexhausted moral fibre of our race. Let the advanced guard of Empire march forth, strong in faith of their ancestors, imbued with a sober virtue, and above all, on fire with a definite purpose. The Empire calls, as loudly as it ever did, for serious instruments of serious work. The Frontiers of Empire continue to beckon. May this venerable and glorious institution, the nursery of character and the home of loyal deeds, never fail honouring that august summons (Curzon in Schwarz 2013, 114).

2.0.4: The Moral and Ethical Purity of the Settler Colonial Frontier

If the republican Anglo-Saxonism of British public moralists was produced in relation to anxiety over political crisis at home and abroad, in the settler colonies, identity, politics and the very shape of society was structurally predicated on the native question and on the racialization of peoples of colour. All of this would be transmitted back to the metropole, the identity of the settler subject constituted in transits through the settler empire as a whole. As at home, abroad, the shape of Anglo-Saxonist identity was profoundly informed by notions about climate, the land and the passage to the colonies moulding the individual into the form of their recovered mythic ancestor.

The identity of the settler colonist was then formed in his adversarial engagement with the hardships of settlement; the "terrible dangers" s/he was to be exposed to in the passage and process of settlement. Yet this focus on the indifferent land and sea occludes, quite deliberately in a discursive sense, the preeminent "danger" of the settler colonies, that is, their being occupied by the native, and their attraction, as sites of explosive capitalist development, of the labour of peoples of colour. When Anglo-Saxonism extended its bounds from the purely English, to the Irish, and then to emigrants from Europe, the boundaries of "who we are not" became concretized on the issue of colour. Cultural

pluralism in the settler colonies would produce a homogenized European whiteness, constituted in the negation of peoples of colour, domestically and transnationally.¹⁵

The notion of the doubling of the origin, the creation of copies more authentic than the original first seen in the American Revolution (where settlers embodied the true spirit of the Glorious Revolution, only out of England, where monarchical tyranny had made it impossible) is an endemic characteristic of settler colonialism. We see it in Kipling's reporting of the Boer War, depicting Australian soldiers as tall, healthy, and heroic, set against English "tommys", decrepit, small, practically pigmies (Schwarz 2013). The Australian and the tommy's very physiognomy was tied to the climate and space of their respective origins, the boundless frontier and the crowded, filthy rookeries of industrial England (Bell 2007). In contemporary Israel the same pattern adheres but has deepened and proliferated into a relative common sense in the present. The entire ideological coherence of Zionist identity relies on the realization of authentic Jewishness in Israel against exilic existence in the diaspora. As celebrated Israeli novelist Amos Oz characterizes it to an American Jewish audience, existence in Israel and existence in "exile" is the difference between participating in a 'museum' and in 'live drama'

my point is that in all exiles, including America, Jewish culture is essentially in danger of becoming a museum where the only proposition that parents can make their children is, please do not assimilate . . . The other option . . . is live drama. And live drama is no rose garden [...] It is a perpetual struggle; sound and fury. Sometimes even bloodshed. But Israel is the only place in the Jewish world now, where there is a live drama on a large scale at work (Oz in Piterberg 2008, 96).

What is crucial here is not just that this parallels almost exactly the kind of nostalgia for a lost "home" that had now become a relic, a museum piece, to be viewed and imagined from afar. American Jewish existence is for Oz, not real Jewishness, it is existing in a museum. What is more telling in his description of authentic Jewishness in Israel is its description of struggle, of bloodshed and violence, for it is in this, in the violence directed at the negated other, where the moral and ethical purity of the frontier is formed. As Rose has recorded, repeatedly, during increases of colonial violence and indigenous resistance in Palestine

the number of *olim*, or pioneers, among emigrants climbed, only to fall during periods of relative calm; the rate of emigration from Britain rose [...] in the year after the Yom Kippur War, increased with the outbreak of the Second Intifada in 2000 and continued to climb up to 2002 (Rose 2005, 6).

Yet, as the violence of the Second Intifada began to wind down, emigration dropped off to its lowest level since 1989 (Rose 2005, 6). If we return to Amos Oz we see something of what is happening here when he discusses his own metropolitan identity as set against that of the *olim*

The new Jews were no more familiar to me [than the old kind], perhaps less. They were just the opposite, but I never saw them; they were not to be seen in Jerusalem. They were far away. They breed in the kibbutzim, in the Palmach, in the Negev and Galilee. Always elsewhere. They are tough and blond and tender and powerful

¹⁵ Initially Anglo-Saxonism was credited as dissolving European difference, of Saxonising various European others. By the end of the 19th century, and in the settler colonies in particular, however, the discourse shifted from Anglo-Saxon identity to that of whiteness.

and uncomplicated. They toiled over the land all day and in the evening, made wild love to the kibbutz girls, and then later at night picked up their submachine guns, and dashed out to smash the hostile red Indians or Arabs, before calling it a day (Oz in Piterberg 2008, 52).

The difference between Oz, presumably not strong, powerful, and uncomplicated and these frontier warriors is stark. They are heroic, decidedly Aryan giants, they exist and only exist on the frontier and not in metropolitan environments, because the frontier with its opportunities for commune with the land and for violence against the indigenous other produces them.¹⁶ Their life is rendered morally uncomplicated and pure, by way of proximity to the land, land dispossessed of its indigenous inhabitants and to the indigenous resistance to that dispossession.

Perhaps the starkest example of this is the genre of scouting literature that proliferated in the settler empire at the turn of the century, putting as it did, the moral and ethical purity of the frontier into simple terms for consumption by children. Baden-Powell's *Scouting for Boys* and its eventual counterpart *Scouting for Girls* were deeply indebted to his time as war correspondent and colonial celebrity during the Boer War (Schwarz 2013, 235). The ideas on scouting brought home to the metropole were imbued with a romance of the South African frontier, both that of the hardy life of self-reliance and that of the ever-present threat of the surrounding native presence. When Agnes and Robert Baden-Powell instruct girls to not 'only look at the path before you, but frequently turn and look back', to 'Notice the features of the country behind you, to see what your road will look like coming back again' (Proctor, T. Block, N. 2009, xxiii) they are evoking for a metropolitan audience both the intimacy of the settler with the land, *and* with the native threat. The entire discursive coherence of the early scouts movement was predicated on a naturalized, surrounding native presence, when scouts or girl guides engaged in the performance of patrolling or outdoors self-sufficiency, when Agnes Baden-Powell sought to conjure up 'a delightful and thrilling reality' (Proctor, T. Block, N. 2009, xxvii) for her girl guides, this was predicated on the naturalized presence and threat of native invasion into settler territory, settler society and the very social body of the white settler state. As Schwarz indicates, often, Baden-Powell's recounting of settler violence against the native invader would directly inform his later pronouncements and instructions vis a vis scouting. In his pre-*Scouting for Boys* reporting, he regales the reader of the heroic feats of children '[repelling] native attacks with hand grenades and service revolvers' as evidence for 'what a London girl can do' (Schwarz 2013, 117). In this he is already producing the basis for the scouts movement, that is, a performance of settler life and the violence of settlers vis-à-vis the native. Baden-Powell sought to bring the purity of the frontier home, to re-

¹⁶ And *reproduces* them. The references to sex in the excerpt are telling. The heteronormative, erect, and virile figure of the Hebrew man, playing his part in the reproduction of the nation and reproducing with the homely Hebrew woman, confined in this image to the Kibbutz -her natural home- is produced at the frontier. His straightness, his virility, his sexual purity, is a product of his proximity to the native and his violence against them.

engineer the metropolitan youth towards the heroic figure of the settler who was made rectilinear, white and morally pure by the certainties of the frontier.

Where previously an abstract identity, the violent and uncomplicated certainties of the settler colony and the frontier concretized what the white man was. As Schwarz argues ‘confronted face to face with his constitutive other, the white man in the colony could more fully realize himself than his counterpart in the metropole’ (Schwarz 2013, 145). Existence in the metropole was complicated, the lines between decadence and moral purity blurred by capitalist modernity and the progressive and reactionary ideologies generated in response to it. Metropolitan society was fragmented, riven by class, and contradiction, the settler colonies offered a mirror image of this, the positive reverse. As Schwarz explains

In mid-Victorian Britain, internal disruptions to the social order could take on the disposition of racialized tribes—the savages of the rookeries, the Irish when out of place [...] all darkness and chaos—while those living their lives on the frontier could assume a kind of hyper-whiteness, a shadowless space of burning sunlight which served as a permanent counterpoint to the perceived decay corroding the imperial centre, mired in shit and darkness (Schwarz 2013, 80).

Where these subversive racializations in the metropole threatened the stability of society, racialization on the frontier offered a concrete binary. The inside and outside of society, so complicated in the figures of, for instance, the homosexual man, the prostitute, the working woman, the “Judaized” industrial radical and the assimilated Jew; all these distinctions were flattened in the settler colonies where the difference that mattered was that of race. This did not just produce allegedly morally uncomplicated subjects, it created the potential for a morally uncomplicated society. This binary opposition could be achieved by simple, practical means such as extirpation or segregation. Whilst class hierarchies separated many Europeans from each other in terms of where they lived or worked, they could mix relatively freely in society. In the settler colonies, where the determinate distinction between social insiders and outsiders was race, segregation, assimilation and extermination were the rule, not the exception. Real walls, real “reserves”, real genocides are easier to construct or pursue than figurative ones, though settlers would of course do both.

The settler frontier, then and now, presents for a metropolitan audience a fantasy of moral and ethical purity, Israel today is the virtuous counterpart to the mire of multicultural degeneracy and danger of Melanie Phillips’ *Londonistan*, with real walls of separation instead of a lie of assimilation into British values. At the *fin de siècle* the proconsular elites of the British Empire arrived home with the urgency of the frontier shaping their approach to domestic politics. Where the tide of colour threatened the extinction of Britain’s civilization in the colonies, the degeneration and decadence of the metropole threatened the extinction of true whiteness at home. The survival of whiteness at home required that the population of the metropole assume the ethical and moral burden of those on the frontier. Today, the battle is all but lost, with really authentic and distinct racial identity having left the mother country

altogether. It exists today, though is still under threat, in Australia, with its much-eulogised immigration restrictions, in Israel, where the very design and direction of the state itself is built upon the consolidation of the racialized binary. It is entirely appropriate that the internet savvy Alt-Right white supremacists of contemporary America and Europe now view Israeli ethnocracy as the example to be emulated (Haaretz 2018).

When Albert Memmi commented that "every colonial nation carries the seeds of fascist temptation in its bosom" (Memmi 2003, 62-63) he recognized the moral and ethical purity of the colony as set against the complexity of metropolitan society. Moral complexity at home invites a fascist authoritarian "powerful enough" to seek out and extirpate the invisible disorders and dissidents of society (Schwarz 2013, 250). Colonialism, by creating the racial other and resistance to itself at once, invites the fascist approach to social control at the outset, displacing the gaze of authoritarian surveillance and violence from "us" to "them". The fascist's violent disdain for intellectual abstraction, for listless cosmopolitanism and affection for the uncomplicated agricultural yeoman is not merely coincidentally similar to that of settler colonialism. The way to moral purity in the metropole is fascism; the way to moral purity in the colony is the violence inherent in its very being.

As stated before, Europeans did not question who was a European and who was a native, though indigenous people's identity had to undergo a profound shift in the presence of a body of peoples claiming indigenous territory as their own, the native becoming a foreigner as the binary consolidated settler society. Australian Prime Minister Arthur Deakin clearly indicates this when he justified the White Australia policy, the effective extension of the binary settler/native to encompass whiteness/colour. Unity of race is here

The profoundest instinct of individual or nation—the instinct of self-preservation—for it is nothing less than the national manhood, the national character, and the national future that was at stake. [...] No motive power operated more universally [...] and more powerfully in dissolving the technical and arbitrary political divisions which previously separated us than did the desire that we should be one people and remain one people without the admixture of other races (Schwarz 2013, 144).

As Mann has noted, in the settler colonies 'ethnicity trumped class' (Mann 2005, 79), the colonies were not just tabula rasa for egalitarian politics due to their expanses of exploitable and dispossessable space, they levelled the hierarchies of the Old World by way of the binary between settler and native, between white and colour. As Deakin states quite literally, the 'natural' ties of race dissolve the 'arbitrary' divisions of politics and class. This was a matter of the very survival of the species "white", for as we shall later see, it was not just the threat of colour to the social reproduction of white settler society that was perceived as a direct threat, people of colour were immutably unsuited for settler democracy as well, by direct reference to their external determinacy.

2.0.5: Frontiers of Identity

Thus, whilst the white man was ascendant in the settler colonies, his identity secured by the physical and epistemological violence that cohered it, there was a profound ambivalence at play. The binary cohered white society for sure, but it did so on the precipice, the threat of the overwhelming power of colour ever present in white identity. The apocalyptic fantasies of “being driven into the sea” are not novel to Zionism in Palestine, they are a fundamental component of an identity so secure and cohered on the surface, yet wracked by ambivalence beneath it. Indeed, if there is a discursive figure that best characterizes the period under discussion, the notion of white ascendancy to world supremacy alongside apocalyptic visions of its own extinction is surely it. The settler archive is replete with this paradoxical sensation, as Lake and Reynolds describe it, ‘whiteness was born in the apprehension of immanent loss’ (Lake & Reynolds 2008, 2). This sensation traversed and proliferated the settler empire informing settler attitudes to a spectrum of peoples of colour.

Perhaps the best textual example of this is Charles Pearson’s 1893 *National Life and Character*, a gloomy assessment on the future of white settler supremacy by an author who should be understood as a settler himself. Effectively *National Life and Character* challenged the common position that Anglo-Saxonism was rising ‘triumphant from the doubtful struggle’ (Charles Dilke cited in Lake & Reynolds 2008, 76) for world race supremacy. That such an idea was a profoundly ambivalent one speaks to the popularity of Pearson’s book, which rather than being dismissed as doom-mongering, became a wildly successful work in intellectual and political circles in both wings of the settler empire and was interpreted as a call to arms. Though the book itself was somewhat agnostic on the rights or wrongs of the rise to self-government for coloured peoples, arguing that such change was inevitable, its reception and instrumentalization as an argument for immigration restriction across the Anglo-settler world, and the ‘penning up “within the limits of Asia something like half the whole number of mankind”’ (Pearson in Lake & Reynolds 2008, 77) indicates something of the ambivalent position many white settlers found themselves in, both masters, and yet also at the mercy of a multitude of peoples of colour in a situation in which the separation between the domestic and the foreign was largely becoming undone.

If whiteness against a world of colour was one side to the equation of ambivalent settler identity, on the other was the original distinction, between settler and native, where the Native repressed continued to structure the settler-colonial society (Wolfe 2016, 33). Though Wolfe uses the notion more specifically in relation to the institutions of state, I would like to refer it to the constitution of the settler self here, since I would argue that both subject and state ultimately intersect with one another. The settler state is the ongoing project of replacing the territoriality of the native lifeworld with that of another, alien system of being on the land. It is also a process which is ultimately structured by the presence of the native, for whom it must produce institutions and practices to eliminate. These twin

processes, therefore, bring into focus and accentuate the existence of those whom the settler would rather forget. So then, the settler subject is forged in a similar process over, above, and through the negation of the native subject. Neither process can entirely do away with the native, since the existence of the native is one of the primary loci upon which the constitution of the subject/state turns. Despite the genocidal drive, the native can never really be, literally or figuratively, eliminated, since in calling itself into being the state/subject must also call into being that which it supposedly exists instead of.

This problematic, brought into view at the level of the state by a complex technology of elimination producing concrete institutions and arms of state for the specific purpose of native elimination in the form of Bureaus of Indian Affairs, the institutionalization of “Native citizenship”, policies of child ‘abduction, religious conversion’ and ‘resocialization in total institutions such as missions and boarding schools [...]’ (Wolfe 2016) has a counterpart at the level of the subject. Whilst on the surface not as concretized as state-level institutions and practices, the relative impossibility of a “clean” negation of the native has its signposts in discursive moves and textual production, where the white settler subject cannot be truly articulated without a figure of the native, summoned into being by the process of negation itself.

2.0.6: The Dangers of Proximity

One of the preeminent articulations of the doubling of the origin we see in settler colonial scenarios comes directly from the proximity to nativity. Settler celebrities, when in the metropole at least, such as Jan Christian Smuts¹⁷ attained their position in metropolitan society through their expertise in knowing the native other. Indeed, I would argue that the ability to know the native, the central conceit at the heart of the act of participating in the colonial officialdom of the British exploitation and Settler Empire functioned as something akin to the coming of age ritual in 19th and early 20th century British society. Knowing the native, and with it, being tasked with the self-governance of the native question, was the doorway from simple subjective identification to that of a racialized identity that came with significant discursive and actual power and authority. As Schwarz states

To speak in such terms was to imagine a world in which the figure of the white man was properly at the centre of things, working not only to propound the stated virtues of whiteness and masculinity but also [...] functioning as a means to hold in place the given hierarchies of social difference, *tout court* (Schwarz 2013, 23)(italics in original).

¹⁷ It is difficult to overstate the importance and celebrity Smuts held in Britain at the beginning of the 20th century, his colonial “expertise” saw him intimately involved in the Union of South Africa, the chamber of ministers during the First World War, the Balfour Declaration, the planning and constitution of the League of Nations, and the drafting the preamble to the United Nations charter. Beyond this Smuts was a visiting scholar to Oxford University delivering the Rhodes Lectures in 1929, held the post of Rector of St Andrews University, and was asked by Lloyd George to advise on the Irish Crisis in 1916-17 (Schwarz 2013).

To know the native, as was the effective role of the settler colonial proconsular official, was to be vested with the supreme authority to embody and to decide on all of social difference. It is no coincidence that the likes of Smuts were considered authorities on the Irish and Suffragette question in metropolitan society. Knowing the native other, and in the act, knowing the self, made one in a sense, an expert on difference itself. As Schwarz notes of juvenile whiteness in Victorian and Edwardian boys' literature, the white protagonist 'becomes a figure whose very rationale was based on his capacity to repudiate anything which differed from what he himself was.' Schwarz goes on

In the most arresting of these narratives, however, the reader is presented with the young hero learning to overcome his own internalized transgressions to curb his own tantalizing infantile desires to identify with anything other than the rectilinear white man (Schwarz 2013, 178).

As in the Cartesian thinking thing, so too, via racialization, in the white male subject. But what is interesting here is quite how perilously close the white subject has to come to the abjected nativity that constitutes it to come into being. As in questions of the settler state, in the realm of the subject the native repressed is never very far away. If we look to discussions of the settler colonist-native encounter we can see how this closeness was a perennial anxiety. Indeed the appropriation and improvisation within nativity, that is, the transit through nativity that the settler subject makes in constituting itself, was a recurrent concern for metropolitan authorities from the earliest days of settlement.

Slotkin discusses how in the eyes of Puritan emigrants to North America, the indigenous New World functioned as something like a mirror image of the metropolitan, Protestant society they had left. Having fled the idolatry and "paganism" of Catholic oppression, settler authorities produced an inversion of their protestant society that reflected both their anxieties vis a vis Catholicism and something far more subversive. Not only was native society cast in the familiar clothes of degenerate Catholic affective faith, it represented an escape from the regimens and disciplines of Protestant civilization (Slotkin 1975, 63). Settlers on the frontier improvised within the institutions of native society that they didn't -couldn't- understand, and the fabled "free space" of the new world, to produce neo-pagan rituals such as a reconstituted May Day celebration and the festival of "The Lord of Misrule" (Slotkin 1975, 63). Whilst religious authorities condemned these libidinous practices they indicate to us that there was a substance *in* indigeneity that was dangerous but desirable, to be appropriated to the gain of settlers.

In order to survive the Indian's world, [...] English settlers would have to adjust their habits and ways of thinking to what world; but this adjustment involved some diminution of their sense of Englishness, a figurative marriage with the Indians that threatened damnation (Slotkin 1975, 66).

Settlers could find expression for the unutterable, inarticulable contradictions of their metropolitan society in what they apprehended as the free space of indigeneity. The frontier was a productive escape where the colonist could go about his adventures and transgressions unburdened and unseen (Said

1988, 77). Indigeneity offered an escape, and a means of knowing the land, and how best to exploit it and the indigenous themselves. The folk heroic figure of the Indian Hunter is perhaps the most famous products of this appropriation of indigeneity in America. Beyond this the space of the frontier and the behaviours deemed appropriate in it, proved particularly subversive to Anglo ideas of social order. Belich has recorded how despite the notions of republican self-reliance that began to be articulated after the American Revolution and were picked up by the British heralds of Settler Empire, utopian notions of a return to a mythological “Merrie England”, intrinsic in these discourses did not easily fit into notions of responsible self-government. Belich describes this discourse as “informal settlerism” the most subversive of whose themes was

the idea of abundance without work. Formal settlerism always stressed the need for hard work; informal settlerism emphasized that natural fertility and abundance diminished it. ‘I cannot describe to you the ease with which every one seems to live.’ ‘People get rich here without much trouble or exertion.’ ‘Every labouring man’s house abounds with plenty.’ ‘The farmer reckons to work three months in the year.’ ‘The people will not work, they can live with the greatest of ease and don’t want to be rich.’ This was anathema to formal settlerism. In 1819, an emigrant’s guide indignantly repudiated a periodical article which claimed that, on Prince Edward Island, ‘industry is not required’; ‘amusement is the sole duty of the farmer’; ‘the poorest families will set down to a roast pig, wild ducks, and salmon, every day’ (Belich 2009, 159).

What Belich misses here is that this ‘virgin bonus’ as he terms it was in large part the result of millennia long ecological husbandry, whether it be the cultivation of hunting grounds and the internal food chain that rendered them reproducible of North America or the use of fire and billabong to maintain and cultivate a basis of subsistence for Aboriginal tribes in Australia. Settlers arrived in native territory and interpreted it as a free space of extraction, one that in some respects bears a remarkably close resemblance to what little Marx formulated on the post-revolutionary utopian scenario. Here, the native lifeworld was translated into an image of the utopian imagination, and whilst mostly a myth in itself, given that the reality of life on the frontier was far from utopian, the notion of a “Merrie England” across the seas where the contradictions of the metropole evaporated in favour of a life of repose proved attractive to future settlers. Both the Indian-hunter/banditti, that is the settler “going native” and this perhaps more far-fetched notion of a folk utopia awaiting future emigrants indicate that beyond the boundaries of the formal Western world there lay a substance in indigeneity that was potentially powerful yet at the same time dangerous, both images of the settler impersonating the native could prove disruptive to settler social order.

The fact that the indigenous world offered temptations to the settler was not just an anxiety of religious or moral authorities, though these are of course the social mediators through which it was most often expressed. There is something deeper at play here, indigeneity, and the space it was perceived to exist in was a positive antonym of European notions of hierarchy and order. Like the space of neophytes in initiation rituals, the space beyond the frontier, or at least proximate to it represented the “anti-structure” to a metropolitan structure. Here, the initiates, in this case settlers on the frontier,

found that 'secular distinctions of rank and status disappear or are homogenized' (Turner 1991, 95). When Mary Douglas states that 'all margins are dangerous' and that 'any structure of ideas is vulnerable at its margins' (Douglas 2001, 122) she was indicating that at the margins, at the transgressive space of the initiation ritual, there is a danger, yes, but in that dangerous, liminal space there is also great power. The dangerous implication is that the supposedly unstructured space of indigeneity offers a means to level the differences of structured society, if only temporarily. As Turner notes, this is not just some abstract philosophical idea, it was in its own way a rite of passage in the colonizing society, and it has concrete effects on the subjects who undergo it:

Liminality implies that the high could not be high unless the low existed, and he who is high must experience what it is like to be low. No doubt something of this thinking, a few years ago, lay behind Prince Phillip's decision to send his son, the heir apparent to the British Crown, to bush school in Australia for a time, where he could learn how to "rough it" (Turner 1991, 97).

The Smuts' of the Settler Empire were in large part constructed out of this (Smuts' Boer ancestry adding another level again to the dynamic). Yet the contact zones between settler identity and indigenous bodies and space were also obsessively policed. Just as the notion of indigenous being and space as a means to the levelling of metropolitan social norms could obviously function as a danger in the eyes of metropolitan state power, so too it could be transfigured as an insidious threat to the biological health of society. The frontier could function as a point of convergence where the lines of race, gender and nation were seen to come too close together for comfort, the disordered space of native sexuality being one of the preeminent potential disruptors of metropolitan, public, and social norms. The ethical and moral purity of the frontier has to of course be produced in the tension, or rather the almost magnetic repulsion between society and its constitutive outside. The concrete fact of ethical and moral purity was created institutionally through the enforcement of segregation, where the transgressions implicit in a heavily male settler society were spelled out through an intensive drive to occlude their existence and, logically, to create an idealistic image and prototype of a society where they could not exist in the first place. As Schwarz states of mid-nineteenth century British Columbia:

Even as moral reformers dwelt upon the dangers of white men having sexual relations with First Nation women, the practice was common, both in the towns and outside. So too were all-male households, signalling the possibilities for what was perceived to be another sort of vice. Drink, gambling, and violence were common pastimes, and prostitution served as an alternative means of employment for both white settler and First Nation women. Far from the colony representing all that was deemed best about the values of Victorian civilization, it more resembled its grotesque parody. Political and civic leaders, clerics, and respectable families of substance pressed to eradicate this colonial disorder. In 1861 the YMCA opened a branch in Victoria; temperance societies, literary institutes, and libraries were founded. Anglican and Methodist missionaries sought to instil the virtues of monogamy. Policemen were discouraged from living with First Nation women. Urban areas became more rigidly segregated racially, with dance-houses and brothels coming under stricter controls. Under the pretext of smallpox epidemics in the early 1860s, curfews were imposed on the indigenous inhabitants of the towns, forced removals took place, and a pass system was introduced, not merely intensifying the division between settler and native, but doing much to assemble the personality of 'the native' (Schwarz 2013, 69).

Thus, this intensive assembly of society and subject was also a project of assembling the native, based on the peculiarities of one society invading another and on multifarious discreet but connected discourses of settler representations, distortions and wholesale appropriations of native being.

2.0.7: Abjection through Intimate Violence

Yet despite this thoroughgoing attempt to order, concentrate and negate native being out of existence, and especially out of the settler self, the ongoing recurrent and brutal physical violence directed at indigenous peoples throughout the contact zones of the settler empire seem to testify to the impossibility of the abjective process. The vehemence of the desire to separate the self from its constitutive outside speaks to the futility of the process, but as Arendt and more recently Wolfe have shown vis-à-vis anti-Semitism in Europe it is perhaps the degree to which the native actually resembles part of the representation of who the settler is that may prove crucial. In the European scene the figure of the racialized Jew came to represent the unacceptable face of Aristocratic privilege and bourgeois-capitalism. What was deemed damnable in the Jew, “greed, novelty, cunning, inauthenticity, parasitism, and the like” was, when located in gentile bourgeois society seen as a positive, though often denied, virtue. This is how the Jew came to function as a displaced focus of hatred towards the new and disruptive capitalist system from the aristocracy and proletariat alike. For the new bourgeoisie themselves, the Jew functioned as something rejected within the self: ‘The anxiety of the parvenu bespeaks a rootlessness that is cosmopolitan in its lack of fixity, a deterritorialized shiftiness that reflects capital’s own movability’ (Wolfe 2016, 93). Thus, a cross class coalition was established against the monolithic figure of the Jew, who could come to assume the position of both the grass-roots socialist rabble and of the mythical Elders of Zion who existed above the capitalist secretly pulling the strings.

In many settler scenarios all that was alleged of the native: listlessness, a tendency towards nomadism rendering them ungovernable; the wasting of the ‘bounties of the earth’ and even destruction of them, as settlers often understood indigenous practices of land use, all in fact rather better characterize the settler. It is arguably the closeness of the representation of indigeneity to the settler self-image that can explain something of the ‘righteous fury’ (Pappe in Lloyd 2012, 70) directed at the native. What is more, when natives adopted settler norms of agriculture, language, institutional government, religion, law and trade, but crucially not institutions of alienable property in land in North America, they were met if anything with greater use of coercive force and physical violence, not less (Mann 2005). Indeed, such practice in Spanish California played out in this manner quite literally, with unchristianized Indians treated by reference to their god given nature as free men, and those who were baptized and concentrated at Franciscan missions subject to a state of slavery (Mann 2005, 87-88). The native “playing” settler it seemed, whilst openly advocated by settler society as a desirable end and as the

thrust of their civilizing mission, was often too uncanny an image to be countenanced, so alike perhaps as to make a mockery of settler being. Elsewhere, the products of officially sanctioned intermarriage in America, like Creek-Scottish Indian leader Alexander McGillivray, found themselves judged to be especially dangerous via reference to their being ‘half breeds’ (Guyatt 2016, 134); the admixture of white blood into the red of supposed Indian savagery creating a ‘mimicry at once’ invested with ‘resemblance and menace’ (Bhabha 1984, 127). McGillivray’s particular skill at diplomacy and geopolitical intrigue disrupted the authority of the settler colonial discourse of self and of state.

The native as a presence ‘out of place’ and ‘out of time’, as disrupting the notions of settler democratic autochthony, can be seen played out in the recurrent sporadic bouts of genocidal violence that tended to initiate in settler recourse to a notion of “indigenous Justice” or justice appropriate for the indigenous on the frontier. Settler reaction to native resistance is always cast as just that, a reaction, a recurrent self-defence. The settler disavows the founding violence of their society even prior to their arrival, given that the entire enterprise is discursively an act of self-defence, the recovery of a utopian past that had been “taken away” at some mythological point. The native is just another obstacle to a historic grievance. The settler colonial move can be understood as a preemptive act, and the self-understanding of settler recourse to physical violence and warmaking is routinely based on the notion of preemption. But preemption to what? If we are to take it at the level of individual and social pathology it is surely the disruptive presence of the indigenous on the land. The land is owed and destined to the settler prior to their arrival. However, in the tradition of Freud’s primal scene this notion is rendered a humiliating absurdity by pre-existing indigenous presence on the land (Veracini 2010, 87). The native, by a pathological discursive gymnastics is the foreign body, the uncanny alien object disrupting the maternal embrace with the land. To Afrikanders the Zulu is literally referred to as an emigrant, a newcomer. In Palestine refugees returning to their villages and fields across the border with Gaza after 1949 become ‘infiltrators’ (Aparicio 2013), precisely that thing which “slips through” a border or boundary unseen and is vested with similitude and mimicry –an uncanny alien, explicitly dangerous and therefore designated for death.

Sir Alfred Lyall articulated the sense of corporeal violation in conflict at the frontier when he stated that

Among compact and civilized nationalities an exterior frontier, thus carefully defined, remains, like the human skin, the most sensitive and irritable part of their corporate constitution [...] to break through it violently is to be inflicting a wound which may draw blood (Schwarz 2013, 112).

When the indigenous practices physical violence against the settler the reaction is one of abjection, that involuntary revulsion and psychic gag reflex, usually followed by a resort to spasmodic, furious, violence. The resistance of the native, symbolizing as it does the role of settler as usurper, as foreign, as an inauthentic interloper whose claims to the land lie in the realm of fantasy, sees the recourse to ever

greater and greater acts of disproportionality. This “Nero” complex as Memmi termed it, starts with the fantasy rupturing tacit acknowledgement that the settler is not the righteous, authentic subject in the colonial scenario, that his position is one of ‘non-legitimate privilege[...]’. This is then his conscious self-objectification, he assumes, not the position of universal subject of history, but instead becomes the object: colonizer. This continues through a logic of legitimizing his position by way of de-legitimizing the position of the colonized, through ever greater acts of oppression so that the colonized assumes the image of one legitimately condemned to his position. This proceeds as an irresolvable feedback loop:

the more the usurped is downtrodden, the more the usurper triumphs and, thereafter, confirms his guilt and establishes his self-condemnation. Thus, the momentum of this mechanism for defense propels itself and worsens as it continues to move. This self-defeating process pushes the usurper to go one step further; to wish the disappearance of the usurped, whose very existence causes him to take the role of usurper, and whose heavier and heavier oppression makes him more and more an oppressor himself. Nero, the typical model of a usurper, is thus brought to persecute Britannicus savagely and to pursue him. But the more he hurts him, the more he coincides with the atrocious role he has chosen for himself. The more he sinks into injustice, the more he hates Britannicus. He seeks to injure the victim who turns Nero into a tyrant. Not content with having taken his throne, Nero tries to ravish his only remaining possession, the love of Junia. It is neither pure jealousy nor perverseness which draws him irresistibly toward the supreme temptation, but rather that inner inevitability of usurpation—moral and physical suppression of the usurped (Memmi 2003, 97).

This pattern of preemptive violence, resistance, escalation and disproportionate response characterizes the sporadic bouts of genocidal violence on the settler frontier. As Mann notes of the settlers experience of indigenous retaliation: ‘their world seemed turned upside down, inducing fear, panic, and repression disproportionate to the actual threat’ (Mann 2005, 96). This was violence beyond the punitive, the act of exemplary repression, beyond even the rapacious desire for land. This was a violence produced in the very undermining of settler notions of being, a pathology of self, born out of proximity to actually existing authentic indigeneity. The ritualized powers of social anti-structure that produced “Indian Hunters” —such as Sir Humphrey Gilbert, Daniel Boone, transnational “professional killer” Sugarfoot Jack, and more recently self-described appropriators of native customs of reciprocal revenge such as Ariel Sharon and Meir Har-Zion¹⁸— operated alongside the ‘ideologically induced moral shudder’ (Mann 2005, 96) of panicked retaliation against the “senseless” practices of native resistance. At the frontiers of violence it seems the morally pure and rectilinear figure of the white man became something rather

¹⁸ Respectively, the 16th Century English Military official in charge of the Irish province of Munster, who pioneered the use of “trophy” taking, a practice in tune with the scalping of victims to prove numbers of natives killed (Dunbar-Ortiz 2018); the first celebrity “backwoodsman” of American national legend (Slotkin 1975); an English convict transported to Tasmania who participated in the genocide of the Tasmanian Aborigines, travelled to California where he became a Militia leader, before finally taking up the practice of scalp hunting in the Arizona borderlands where it seems he was executed by his contemporaries on account of his brutality to Apache children (Mann 2005); protégé of Sharon, who he encouraged in exacting revenge against Palestinian Bedouins (Kimmerling 2006).

unflattering by way of the ambivalence inherent in settler identity and his proximity to his constitutive other.

Such a situation is only taken a figurative step further in the case of Zionism. Here, not only is the native symbolically a part of the settler self, but, as far as the science of genetics can prove, also an actual distant ancestor. The Palestinian native is surely more authentically “Israelite” than European Ashkenazi Jewery itself, undermining the very logic of return to Eretz Israel, as a settler like David Ben-Gurion well knew (Sand 2010, 185-6). The sober “native expert” on the precipice of the realization that ‘the self [was] in fact the other’ (Gover 1994, 191) becomes a contradictory figure, both invested with masculine, heroic prowess, and at the same time acting out infantile destructive urges at the symbolic borderland of the ritual “boy becoming man”. The infant, recognizing nothing outside itself, relates to the world as an extension of itself. Transcendental poiesis, then, is both the heroic feat of making history and a sadistic orgy of destruction at once. When soldiers in “the most moral army in the world” scrawl obscenities and defecate on Palestinian property and in Palestinian homes, they are continuing a practice of perverse and juvenile violence long established in the settler archive.

2.0.8: Pre-accumulation as Isopolitics: Transnationalism, Migration and the technology of Settlement

As, at this point, is perhaps stating the obvious, settler colonies are constituted transnationally along multiple registers of transnational association and interaction. But the obviousness of such a statement should not obscure the specificities of the transnational structures, technologies and political and cultural institutions at play in the development of the settler world. Of this architecture of settler empire, the means for facilitating the transfer of populations, politics, culture and their political economic and institutional cultures between metropole and colony –and often back again– is paramount to understanding the successes of settler colonialism. To state it clearly, without the transfer of pre-accumulative “capital” (Wolfe 2016) via isopolitan relations between colony and metropole, no settler colony could survive, let alone prosper.

2.0.9: Pre-accumulation

The total war on native social reproduction in the settler colonial scenario is facilitated by the fact that successful colonizers arrive in native territory ‘already vested with a multitude of historical preconditions that equip them to prevail in their encounters with local populations’ (Wolfe 2016, 20); it is these preconditions that Wolfe describes as pre-accumulation. Settler colonizers arrive in native lands as imperial subjects, in the first instance usually as coerced indentures or convicts. Despite their

relative lack of liberty, settlers arrive with the backing of century's old projects of imperialism and pre-requisite technologies of colonial exploitation. This not only directly supports their invasion of native land via sheer technological, tactical, and economic might, but is reinforced by its connection to nodes in a transnational network of capital accumulation. The economic flows back and forth between the settler and classical colonial empire, that is, the proximity between settler and exploitation colonialism—sometimes practically indistinguishable in an economic sense, as with the proximity of the profits of chattel slavery to both the wider imperial economy and settlement itself—makes this clear. Without this wider economy and some of its principle commodities such as cotton and wool, the success of settlement in the United States and Australia respectively would have been severely undermined, if not impossible.

The very binary native:settler, speaks to the dynamics at play here, for as we know, the settler seeks to occupy and replace native social reproduction on the land and does so by integrating “settler territory” into a transnational political economic network. Thus, on the settler side of the binary there is the invasion of land. Land itself is an integrating commodity, especially in the case of the post-revolutionary United States where it functioned as a means to repay war debt, to service a debt based development model more generally (Schwartz 2012, 67) and fed the metropolitan economy in the east coast. Into this land come a relatively limitless stream of settlers and therefore a corresponding settler expansion, that is, the destruction of native territorial existence which is supported in multifarious ways by a wider transnational economy. On the other hand, there is native territory, shrinking and relatively fixed in terms of its integration into a wider political economy; the exception of the fur trade in the North Americas, providing nothing qualitatively comparable to the transnational elasticity of Western imperialism and of capitalism itself. As Wolfe states:

Once established, European colonialism acquired global reach, a characteristic that *endowed the project with an effectively unlimited capacity to reproduce itself*. In settler colonies this near inexhaustibility opposed itself to the relative fixity of the Native stock, [...] the finite aggregate of material assets that remains locally available for Native societies to reproduce themselves over the long term (Wolfe 2016, 20) (My italics).

Indeed, often, the depredations of capital on natives as well as settlers in one part of the settler empire directly reinforced the depredations of settlers on native land and life in other parts of the empire. The example of Ireland is instructive. Here, pre-accumulation functioned as a means of creating refugees to supplement the stream of bodies into the Americas and eventually the Dominions. Recurrent cycles of changing land use in Ireland, from subsistence agriculture, to cattle grazing, to the production of root vegetables; and then again at the behest of colonial officials beholden to market mentality, back to the land intensive grazing of cattle (Schwartz 2012, 61), produced sporadic, but substantial emigrations and refugee flight from Ireland on the part of both Ulster Scots and native Irish Catholics between the 17th and 19th centuries. “During the 1800’s a net outflow of 7 million people meant that the Irish

constituted between 18 and 25 percent of the population of the Americas, Australia and New Zealand by 1890” (Schwartz 2012, 61). Indeed, the effect of colonial exploitation economics in Ireland was so substantial in the 19th century that Ireland actually suffered net population decrease in the century’s European population explosion (Schwartz 2012, 61). This would directly and physically effect the lives of natives in America when, due to Protestant discrimination on the East Coast, Irish and other minority emigrants found it far easier to acquire property and political representation in the states of the expanding western frontier (Rana 2010, 166). Thus, Irish emigrants and refugees both functioned as an engine of economic growth on the east coast and as part of the frontier vanguard simultaneously in the west. Beyond Ireland, successive waves of emigration from an industrializing and warring Europe would sustain the growth of the settler colonies. In a very real sense, the multiform contradictions of European civilization functioned as fuel for the colonizing machine.

This transnational settler machinery works as a feedback loop, always expanding into native territory as it, and capital, reproduces itself. The native experience is on the other hand one of diminishing returns, often inflamed further by “eco-cide”, that is, the transportation into native territory of foreign diseases, flora and fauna, and the ecological disaster of western modes of agriculture and animal husbandry. Whilst the former is technically located in the realm of the natural, their injection into the native lifeworld relied on the transnational machinery of colonization. Further, as Michael Mann notes of the selective treating of smallpox in slave populations but not in native reservations, or of the spread of venereal disease in native women leading to a collapse in native sexual reproduction, the natural would be mobilized in a material sense as it had been discursively in the original colonial encounter, to eliminate the native (Mann 2005, 89). Furthermore, as we have seen, the land into which settlers arrived is as Wolfe terms it, already ‘value added’ (Wolfe 2016, 21), that is, the material bounty of the virgin lands of settler mythmaking was a product of millennia long native husbandry. Primitive accumulation theory assumes that accumulated land has at least to be prepared for production, in the case of much native territory we might state that such costs were offset at the outset, this is pre-accumulation.

Beyond this, the occlusions, distortions and narrative erasures of settler discourse are also a kind of pre-accumulated capital, equally embedded in European imperialism, as they stem from the Enlightenment logics of eliminating contradictory material, from Descartes, to Marx and beyond. When Wolfe states that settlers brought with them ‘a historical endowment of consciousness’ (Wolfe 2016, 21) he is referring to pre-accumulation as the Enlightenment’s epistemological violence toward the other, which is embedded at the core of scientific reason and the Enlightenment subject itself. Thus, the Enlightenment subject came to the native world and created race and nature, producing a vision of the New World that was as eliminatory and destructive of native being as the physical machinery of

settlement was of native existence. Settlers saw empty space where there was complex society and natural extinction in the face of history where there was ethnic cleansing and genocide, all pre-determined by European modernity.

There is nothing quite like the concept of pre-accumulation to reveal one of the central concepts of Wolfe's work on settler colonialism, that 'invasion is a structure, not an event' a phrase so common to the paradigm that perhaps it has lost some of its profound import. One of the most evocative narrations of this idea, and the relevance of pre-accumulation internal to it, comes from Wolfe's 2006 essay on the elimination of the native. Wolfe quotes a witness to an 1830's Cherokee¹⁹ removal in Mississippi, undertaken ostensibly to better exploit the territory in question through the importation of chattel slavery:

Families at dinner were startled by the sudden gleam of bayonets in the doorway and rose up to be driven with blows and oaths along the weary miles of trail that led to the stockade [...] Men were seized in their fields or going along the road, women were taken from their wheels and children from their play. In many cases, on turning for one last look as they crossed the ridge, they saw their homes in flames, fired by the lawless rabble that followed on the heels of the soldiers to loot and pillage. So keen were these outlaws on the scent that in some instances they were driving off the cattle and other stock of the Indians almost before the soldiers had fairly started their owners in the other direction. Systematic hunts were made by the same men for Indian graves, to rob them of the silver pendants and other valuables deposited with the dead. A Georgia volunteer, afterward a colonel in the Confederate service, said: "I fought through the civil war and have seen men shot to pieces and slaughtered by thousands, but the Cherokee removal was the cruelest work I ever knew" (Wolfe 2006, 391-392).

Wolfe then goes on to state:

On the basis of this passage alone, the structural complexity of settler colonialism could sustain libraries of elaboration. A global dimension to the frenzy for native land is reflected in the fact that, as economic immigrants, the rabble were generally drawn from the ranks of Europe's landless. The cattle and other stock were not only being driven off Cherokee land; they were being driven into private ownership. Once evacuated, the Red man's land would be mixed with Black labour to produce cotton, the white gold of the Deep South. To this end, the international slave trade and the highest echelons of the formal state apparatus converged across three continents with the disorderly pillaging of a nomadic horde who may or may not have been "lawless" but who were categorically White. Moreover, in their indiscriminate lust for any value that could be extracted from the Cherokee's homeland, these racialized grave-robbers are unlikely to have stopped at the pendants. The burgeoning science of craniology, which provided a distinctively post-eighteenth-century validation for their claim to a racial superiority that entitled them to other people's lands, made Cherokee skulls too marketable a commodity to be overlooked. In its endless multidimensionality, there was nothing singular about this one sorry removal, to which all of modernity attended (Wolfe 2006, 392).

In these two passages Wolfe reveals the pre-accumulative assemblage that is effectively structural invasion. The interwoven importation into native territory of European capitalism wholesale, with its attendant class structures and contradictions, and the basic commodifying unit of property itself, injected into a social structure where it had never existed in the past. This is both the figure of the army supervising the eviction, and the "lawless" rabble that is the settler frontier vanguard. Indeed, the

¹⁹ The Cherokee, one of the "five civilized tribes" as they were known, had adopted what were considered the sedentary agricultural practices of settler society -in fact many indigenous peoples in the Americas practiced sedentary agriculture for millennia-, but refused to adopt settler norms of land tenure, they refused to assume the imported norm of private property.

two together are the sign of decentralized sovereignty, informed as it is by European norms of state power and inverted here at the colonial frontier, as an expression of displaced contradiction from Europe. The rapacious rabble then proceed to devour everything, the land, the animals, the dead, the past and future of native society, symbolizing the epistemic component of pre-accumulation, that is, the injection into native territory of the acquisitive, individual, liberal-republican social subject, directly enacting the “expansive freedoms” synonymous with the American national epic. This then is the convergence of European history as a pre-accumulative, self-sustaining battering ram, smashing its way into ever diminishing native territory and being, in a fury of creative destruction. Where I would like to add to this understanding of structural invasion is to articulate the institutional vehicle that made this process possible. That institution, informal at first, but organized over the passage of time and largely perfected in the state of Israel’s Law of Return, is “racial isopolitanism” (Bell 2014, 423).

2.0.0: Isopolitics

Isopolitics is essentially a practice in which two or more formally independent states grant citizenship rights to their respective members, the term itself deriving from the Roman *isopoliteia*, and such practices in the Classical period (Bell 2014, 243). Its use in the modern context in English appears to emerge with the study of the Roman period at the end of the 19th century. Bell locates it in the work of scholar of British Imperialism and consummate Anglo-Saxonist, A. V. Dicey, who applied it to the question of reuniting the severed halves of the first British Empire. As Bell defines it in relation to its 19th century usage

An isopolity is a single political space in which citizens of all incorporated communities are free to move across borders and engage fully in civil and political life. It creates a form of political society that supplants the sovereign state, as traditionally understood, without necessarily creating a new overarching set of supra-state institutions (Bell 2014, 423).

Outside of Bell, there does not seem to be any systematic work on the concept in scholarship on the British Empire. With regards to the settler colonial paradigm it appears that only Veracini has discussed the idea at any length. This is surprising, since as Veracini rightly states ‘all settler colonial polities had [isopolitical arrangements] in place for a long time after their respective declarations/assertions of sovereign independence.’ (Veracini 2013). Without frameworks of isopolitical relations between Europe and all white settler colonies, the latter could not have survived. Where Bell focuses on the recognition of isopolitics as a political object by 19th century intellectuals, he does not seek to trace back the history of isopolitical relations to longstanding normative practices, preferring to locate the concept solely in the context of discussion of the project of Greater Britain. Where Veracini focuses on the history of isopolitics tout court and its present relevance vis-à-vis America and Israel, he does not seem to acknowledge the presence of significant isopolitical relationships within, that is, between settler colonies, the settler empire as a whole towards the end of

the 19th century, and the influence of this on the development of settler state immigration policies in the present, especially in Israel.

2.0.0.1: De-facto Isopolitanism in the Settler World, or Isopolitanism 2.0

One of the first questions of isopolitanism that Bell and to a lesser extent Veracini's focus has occluded is the level at which it has operated. Perhaps due to the study of isopolitanism in the Roman world, there is a tacit emphasis on the idea of isopolitanism as instituted at the state level; where this was true in the classical period, it was not at the outset true of the anglo settler colonies. Indeed. I argue that the initial impetus in the direction of isopolitical relations between Europe and the Americas was at the level of settlers on the ground themselves, when it was later picked up and written into immigration and naturalization law it had been operating as a norm for some time. As Rana records, prior to the revolutionary war in north America, settler colonial assemblies were encouraging emigration through expanding the rights of official aliens in their territories. This was done in spite of the Crown, not with its approval: 'Neither royal charters nor parliamentary statutes, nor common law principles explicitly conferred upon colonial authorities the right to adopt aliens as subjects [...]', yet, the right to do so 'was aggressively asserted regardless as to whether such rights were recognized in London or not' (Rana 2010, 59). In the century before the war of independence various legal novelties, such as group naturalization on the 'professing of Christianity' and alien voting rights, were undertaken in New York (1683), South Carolina (1704), and Pennsylvania (1706). Even in these cases, the laws simply legalized what had been taking place for some time (Rana 2010, 60). During this period the norms that were later officially institutionalized were bounded by race and religion, with the franchise retroactively extended to French Huguenots in South Carolina and normative practice extending it to German Protestants, without any legal mechanism in place in Pennsylvania by the 1740's (Rana 2010, 60). The outer boundary was of course race. Whilst not all whites could avail themselves of these developments, all people of colour were excluded. By 1790, the post war United States rendered state innovations in naturalization and normative practices on the ground officially legal at the federal level, restricting rights to naturalization to 'free white persons' —the stipulation free was important; states on the expanding frontier were not interested in the importation of paupers, in keeping with the general exclusion of the externally determinate— this remained in place until after the Civil War (Rana 2010, 116, 118).

The logic informing the extension of the franchise to specific "insider" aliens was decidedly settler colonial. The basis of American freedom or liberty was space, space in which to ensure ones economic independence by way of working the land. The greater the body of free and independent voting settlers, the greater their collective power vis-à-vis centralized government, settlers always seeking as

they do, both its protection and freedom from its interference. The former is of course as crucial as the latter, government secures territory within which freedom is operative, settlers enact it, but by doing so inflame relations with the indigenous, thus requiring more central government power to protect their expanded base of individual and social freedom. Prior to the revolutionary war, British domestic economists, beginning as they were to focus on industrialization, which required as it did, a labouring population, became 'deeply ambivalent toward increasing Anglo emigration' (Rana 2010, 59). But this ambivalence was transnationalized. Not only was Parliament concerned about maintaining a labour pool at home, it was also keen to maintain the fur trade, reliant as it was on relatively friendly relations with the indigenous population. The settler desire for emigrants and land contradicted the basic policy of Parliament at home and abroad, and settlers continued to undermine the Crown on these two basic grounds until the war of 1776. After the war, land, and bodies to settle it became an even more profound need on the part of the newly independent government, which serviced its war debts by land sale to an ever expanding pool of settlers both from abroad and from within the polity already. Economically and socially settlers reproduced society directly, therefore a policy of European immigrant inclusion, already underway for nearly a century became official state policy. Immigration inclusion and settler expansion were mutually reinforcing, and policies favoring greater inclusion followed the westward march of frontier settlers, with often the most inclusive policies extending westward with the edge of the frontier. It is no coincidence that both the most inclusive and therefore democratic *and* the most genocidal states were those on the Pacific rim (Mann 2005, 108-9), as Washington and local state legislatures on the western frontier sought to maximize "internal" settler social reproduction and minimize the social reproduction of its "external" indigenous populations and "foreign" (black and Mexican) counterparts (Rana 2010, 166-7).

What is crucial to note here is that new immigrants and even prospective immigrants who had not left their metropolitan states had significantly more rights in America than they did at home. They also greater rights, on an entirely different qualitative order of magnitude than various communities, some of whom had been living on the North American continent for millennia. This is something more than the classical isopolitism of the Roman period, indeed it is a great deal more than even that which Dicey in the late 1800's foresaw for his dream of Greater Britain. This is an isopolitism that is directed precisely at encouraging an influx of settlers, not merely ensuring their mutual equality between states. This is the leveraging of the pre-accumulative potential in population demographics in Europe with a view to expanding "liberty". This liberty in all its rhetorical guises in settler discourse, means very precisely, the expansion of the conditions of settlement.

I understand this pre-accumulative-isopolitism as something like a great figurative amoeba, with nodes in the East Coast of America, and later the Dominions, extending itself into Europe and into its

fraternal settler colonies. Its border is a semi-permeable membrane, through which at varying points in history only some may pass. By an almost osmotic quality, the settler colony which leverages inclusive democracy—and consequently the exclusion of racial others—absorbs settlers from Europe or other settler colonies. We see this taking place especially between British North America and the US in the period between the revolutionary war and the war of 1812. That the two states in question were not on remotely friendly terms made little difference to population transfers between the two. As the American treaty system acquired territory further west, so the stipulations of naturalization policy developed to ensure the osmotic influx of maximum numbers of settlers. The 1850 Oregon Donation Land Act and later Homestead Act allowed aliens access to land grants as long as they ‘[declared] intent’ to naturalize (Rana 2010, 116). By the mid 1800’s in the West, aliens attained suffrage, which persisted whether or not they actually went on to complete naturalization (Rana 2010, 116). When the various discoveries of gold and lucrative mineral deposits occurred throughout the settler empire at the end of the 19th century, settlers *and even their trade unions* (Hyslop 1999) passed from Australia to America, and vice versa; from America and Australia to British Columbia, and from Australia and England to South Africa (Hyslop 1999, Lake & Reynolds 2008, Schwarz 2013). Wherever they arrived, they arrived—essentially—as citizens, invested with the right to vote and to hold political office. When Lake & Reynolds speak of settler immigration policies as amounting to ‘segregation on an international scale’ (Lake & Reynolds 2008, 5), it is this to which they are referring.

In the British Empire the isopolitan process followed similar patterns, though until formal independence settlers in the dominions never obtained the same degree of freedom as their counterparts in America. The process in the Empire was an informal division between white and non-white imperial subjects, all who possessed some basic rights granted by the Crown, but with settler and colonial authorities enhancing the rights of white settlers above non-white populations by way of immigration and voting restrictions. This institutional segregation was almost exclusively produced in the settler colonies themselves, often at odds with the metropolitan authorities, and fought for at points by resorts to civil disobedience and political violence.²⁰

Whilst a version of isopolitical association existed at the outset of the second British Empire, racial isopolitanism was born in and then proliferated from Australia. Initially the project developed out of securing of the position of the Australian white labouring population against the threat of Chinese labour competition. Indeed the conquest of labour and pre-accumulative racial isopolitanism are intrinsically related to one another, and share similar foundational logics. As Gershon Shafir has shown of the Zionist conquest of labour and its institutional mechanism in the Histadrut, the two provided an artificial high wage economy in a territory where low wage subsistence agriculture proliferated,

²⁰ See (Hyslop 1999) for an account of the labour question in the Transvaal in 1914.

providing ‘all that was necessary for an immigrant to sink his roots into a low wage country’ (Shafir 2005, 49). Racial isopolitanism similarly provides a means of slotting emigrants into the political economy of a foreign territory, their “standard of living” here translated into citizenship of the territory in question, that is, a means for their representation, their ability to acquire property; to organize, often in transplanted trade unions and to attain political office. In both the Yishuv and in Australia this extended to a multitude of socialized functions to maintain the settler standard of living. In the Australian example this included wage protection, pensions for the old and infirmed and a welfare allowance for single mothers (Lake & Reynolds 2008, 156,158). In the case of the Yishuv the Histadrut provided labour protection, healthcare, social services, consumer and marketing cooperatives and unemployment and housing provision. In essence what Australia pioneered and what the Yishuv would eventually replicate was a means of ensuring the political integration of new emigrants into the settler society. This process was repeatedly discussed in terms of the inclusion of those who would reproduce settler society, against the exclusion of those who would not. In the words of the California legislature in 1905: ‘Japanese labourers were mere transients who did not buy land or build houses. They contributed nothing to the growth of the state. They added nothing to its wealth and were a blight on the prosperity of it’ (Lake & Reynolds 2008, 172). Leo Amery perhaps best extrapolates this line of thought in his discussion of the fate of South Africa after the ending of the Boer War:

We have fought, not to maintain the white man’s burden, but to vindicate the white man’s birthright—*the right of all white men that come into a new country, and join the work of developing and making it, to claim their share of its political privileges* (Amery in Schwarz 2013, 230) (My italics).

The means for achieving this was through racial isopolitanism, which effectively functioned as a conquest of politics, to be conquered for those who fit the racial designation: white. To be clear, racial isopolitanism was a means of ensuring white settler rule in the colonies by expanding the pool of the included against the excluded. That this took the form of a relatively radical social democracy for white settlers is not coincidental, it was the means which attracted white settlers and the means through which present white settlers consolidated their position against a world of colour. It is the outward face of the exclusion of the native from settler society before the closure of the frontier.

When we talk of settler democracies, their exclusionary and genocidal nature are often referred to as the “dark side” of their democracy; this misses the point. These were not democracies in spite of their racist immigration policies and genocidal behaviour towards the native, such practices were precisely why we understand these states as radically socially democratic at all. Furthermore, there is a positive correlation between the degree of insider egalitarianism and the degree to which racialized outsiders were excluded. The pioneering sites of settler social democracy —California, British Columbia, Australia, South Africa; and later Israel— were, by definition, the pioneers of racial exclusion. From its beginning in Australia and eventually the white Australia policy, this practice of grass roots leveraging

of the economic and political ground in favour of settlers and at the expense of natives and immigrants of colour would osmotically make its way to the Transvaal in South Africa as the mining industry in Australia bottomed out, with many Australians who came to fight in the Boer War remaining on to work the mines on the Rand. It is because of the isopolitical bond between Britain, Australia and South Africa, that much of the institutional infrastructure of labour organizing could be transplanted wholesale from one country to another. Indeed this existed beyond the bounds of the British Empire itself as the Amalgamated Society of Engineers —key players in South African labour disputes— even had offices in North America, directed and funded out of London (Hyslop 1999, 414). The South African labourite radicalism that would eventually be enshrined in the Apartheid policies of the Nationalist Party was an import to South Africa from Australia. Whilst the Cape's Afrikaner population were hardly predisposed to equality between black and white, it was Englishmen who came to Australia and then to South Africa via the mechanism of racial isopoliticism who effectively laid the groundwork for South African Apartheid. As Hyslop states

British unionism was directly involved in the creation of South African industrial segregation. For anyone inclined to seek the roots of labour racism in Afrikaner racial ideologies, it is worth noting that, at the first conference of the South African labour party in 1909, there was not a single Afrikaans speaking delegate present (Hyslop 1999, 415).

It was also the South African Labour party's industrial segregation that would directly inform the racialism of the Zionist conquest of labour in Palestine, as an analogue Chaim Arlosoroff, the Jewish Agency's Political Director, deemed worthy of emulation in the Yishuv (Piterberg 2008, 69-78).

2.0.0.2: The Law of Return: Racial Isopolitics in the Twentieth Century

Where racial isopoliticism was at best an informal practice in the Settler Empire, after independence in the State of Israel it became a Basic Law, effectively part of the state's founding constitution. The Law of Return (1950) is incredibly similar in its character to the naturalization legislation that was applied in the pre-revolutionary American colonies, in that all it requires of an *olim* (a Jew wishing to immigrate to Israel) is that they 'express [their] desire to settle' (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2003). As long as the above are not deemed to be a threat to the state, or deemed to endanger 'public health' they are to be granted a visa. Likewise, all Jews already present in the state fitting the above criteria were to be immediately naturalized (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2003).

However, despite this for its time uniquely open door racial isopoliticism policy, it did not provide the necessary numbers of Europeanized migrants into the state to offset against both the remaining native presence and the influx of Mizrahi in the 1950's or the sudden problem of a massive native presence with the conquest of the West Bank and Gaza in 1967. In the late 1960's the state therefore sought to

extend the definition of the Jew vis-à-vis a modification of the Law of Return in what was termed the ‘grandchildren clause’:

it enabled not only Jews but also their “non-Jewish” children, grandchildren and spouses to immigrate to Israel. It was enough for one grandparent to qualify as a Jew for the offspring to become citizens of Israel. This important clause would later open the door to the huge influx of immigrants that began in the early 1990s, with the fall of Communism. This immigration, which had no ideological dimension—Israel had begun in the 1980’s to urge the United States not to accept Soviet Jewish refugees—meant that more than 30 percent of the newcomers could not be registered as Jews on their identity cards (Sand 2010, 291).

The influx of settlers from the former Soviet bloc, which had been preceded by Israeli state collaboration with Nicolae Ceausescu’s regime to limit the ability of Jews in Romania to choose the destination of their emigration (Sand 2014, 21), reveals an important theme however. Despite being a crucial development in the history of settler colonial technologies of structural invasion, racial isopolitics in the Israeli case has arguably been considerably less successful than that which preceded it in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The World Zionist Organization and then the State of Israel has had to repeatedly lobby for states to manipulate their immigration policies so that it might effect the isopolitical faucet in favour of Palestine rather than say America, or elsewhere. It is worth remembering that Zionism overtly inflates the attractiveness of Israel as a destination for migrants and even refugees; many, even holocaust survivors, had preferential destinations that the state of Israel sought to deny them for reasons of a settler nationalist ideology. The restrictive criteria that Zionism dictates—despite a degree of leeway in the definition of who *really* counts as a Jew, as opposed to who could be defined as a white European in the case of America, Canada, Australia or South Africa—has meant that racial isopoliticism can only have limited impact on the demographic question. Yet it is entirely open to debate as to whether the present regime of Zionist settler colonialism ultimately worries much about this, since the isopolitical bonds that do exist at present do so at the level of affect. The importance of isopolitics now is perhaps more the small number of Americans in the Occupied Territories, the number of wealthy Israelis in America and the large number of American Jews with a strong vicarious settler attachment to the state of Israel (along with the relative constant that is American evangelical support).

What is important for us to remember, is that the concept of isopoliticism lies at the core of the Zionist enterprise and of the State of Israel. The state understands and outwardly declares itself to be the state of the Jewish People, for whom it conquers and holds the land in trust. The state also requires that no distinction is to be made wherever a Jew is in the world. The legal underpinning of the Law of Return is that whilst most Jews may not want to be naturalized in Israel, as long as they can prove matrilineal descent, they are in theory, citizens in waiting. These potential citizens have more rights in the state than the Palestinian citizens of Israel and infinitely more rights than the abjected populations of the Occupied Territories. This is the core of Zionist racial isopoliticism today, an isopolitical underpinning of Zionism that sees Zionist settler colonialism travel the world and rear its head in the domestic politics

of states and in questions that ultimately should have nothing to do with the state of Israel, but arise all the same because the state of Israel asserts a right to speak on behalf of Jewish populations worldwide. It does so because these populations are potential citizens-in-waiting, for the most part at the expense of the right for Palestinians to speak at all.

3

SETTLER SUBJECTS ON THE STAGE OF HISTORY: HISTORICISM, MESSIANISM, AND ZIONIST SETTLER COLONIALISM

This chapter seeks to trace the origins of Zionism not in the Jewish tradition, though of course there were precursors there (Raz-Krakotzkin 2002), but rather in that of Christianity, and Protestant Christianity specifically. In doing so we will see that Zionist narrative follows a very close logic vis-à-vis the interpretation of the Bible, to that of the Protestant tradition. Indeed, a number of ideological tropes informing Zionism identified by Gabriel Piterberg can be seen prefigured in the restorationist tradition of Protestantism, centuries before their formulation in Zionism. The Protestant biblical interpretive tradition, through its activist approach to the scriptures, would inform not only the development of historicism, the nation state and the spirit of revolution in European modernity but also profoundly shape the development of the Anglo-Settler World. Consequently, the Zionist movement and ultimately, the state of Israel would become a lasting legacy of the Settler Revolution.

3.1: The Jews in Themselves: The Origins of Philosemitism and Christian Zionism in England

The origins of restorationism in Protestantism ultimately exist in the messianism inherent in the Christian faith and the tension involved in containing that messianic tendency within an institutional and authorial structure as set against the danger posed by the emancipatory potentiality inherent

within the messianic idea itself, such as is reflected by the very figure of Christ. To put it simply, Protestantism would mark an epochal shift in Christianity, where the progressive potentiality of the messianic idea, the force of the eschaton, would be wrested from the hands of constituted “imperial” clerical authority at various moments in the post-Reformation environment and gradually make its way into the realm of the formerly profane. The question of Zionism is one of both the Christian re-interpretation of the Hebrew Scriptures and then the Zionist re-interpretation of this towards the development of a nationalist-settler ideology. As such, a good a place to begin our excavation of Philosemitism and the restorationist tradition is the early discussions of the purpose of the self, and of self-determination in the Christian faith, where the danger of the potentiality of the messianic can first be seen.

Perhaps the first precursor to Protestantism in the Christian tradition was the appropriately Britannic theologian Pelagius’s approach to the question of original sin. Pelagius reasoned that if ‘the God of the Bible enjoyed a freedom of will that enabled him to create the world and mankind out of nothing’ and if ‘God made man in his image, man, in turn, has a free will’ (Todorov 2014, 14-15). Arguing that since man in the image of God cannot be a fundamentally fallen being, and that this being so, he has not inherited the sin of Adam, but rather only imitates ‘the behaviour of [his] ancestor’ (Todorov 2014, 15), acquiring sin in the world, man can thus save himself in the world as well. Such reasoning opened the way to the idea that God had imparted his grace to more than just Christians, for all mankind in the world were in his image, and logically that there were ‘virtuous pagans’ who might be saved too, a position undermining of Christian proselytism. What is most relevant to us in Pelagius’s position is its foreshadowing of the discourse of self-determination. Pelagius argues that the ‘first quality required of humans is not submission to dogma or the Church, but self-control and strength of character; not humility, but taking your destiny into your own hands’ (Todorov 2014, 17). Pelagius in short, is interested in the autonomy of man. Toderov argues something of a Promethean certainty on the part of Pelagius, who, having discovered that man is as a God in the world is then set in train to potentially do anything in service of his goals, including demanding the sacrifice of himself and others in service of divine perfection (Todorov 2014, 19).

Naturally, such a position would not sit well with constituted authority. Historically, the general position in both Christianity and Judaism (though for different reasons) has been to err against messianic expectation in the earthly realm. Responding to Pelagius from the perspective of that constituted authority, Augustine articulated a far more modest vision of human consciousness:

There is something of man, which neither the spirit of man that is in him knoweth [...] nor do I myself comprehend all that I am. Therefore, is the mind to strait to contain itself [...] For that also is a mournful darkness whereby my abilities within me are hidden from me (Todorov 2014, 19).

For Augustine, man is not to be judged as he would in the Pelagian paradigm, for he quite literally knows not what he do(es), and original sin is merely an acknowledgement of the lack of transparency of the subject to itself. The Augustinian position largely supports the hegemonic position in Christianity up to the Reformation, from Paul on, that extracted the Christian from the here and now and placed salvation and the end of time beyond history (Hall 2009, 28). The Yahwistic faith of the ancient Hebrews was grounded in the promise of an immanent messiah, who ultimately –and to great consequence for the theology of Judaism– didn’t arrive. For Christianity –the literal meaning of which is ‘messianic’ (Tuveson 1968, 4)– the figure of Christ was a messiah in the world. Christ then died and rose again, transcending the order of the world only to disappear from it. Consequently, a faith rather more concerned with the hereafter and the immaterial than the material present was formed.

As Hall argues of Pauline Christianity, the “Christian” was ‘conceived of [...] as one who had died to his former self, becoming a new creation by his mystical integration with the transcendental Christ’. The symbolism of Baptism and Communion served as rituals removing the Christian from the profane earthly realm and inoculating him from ‘the terror of history’ (Hall 2009, 28). As with the individual Christian, so too with history. The life and death of Christ marked for Augustine an epochal shift of apocalyptic significance, displacing the ‘ancient Israelite emphasis on history as the narrative shifts in Yahweh’s favour or dissatisfaction toward his chosen people’ (Hall 2009, 30) and the classical notion of time as an eternal cycle (Löwith 1949, 160). Now history too was universal, and temporary, for only God was eternal (Löwith 1949, 163). Christianity as an established religion cohered around a notion of salvation whether in this world or the next which created an inherent problem for itself. If history ‘was primarily a history of salvation and, as such, the proper concern of prophets, preachers and teachers’ (Löwith 1949, 5) then history was endowed with a purpose and would draw in those who might interpret it and come to their own conclusions. The word would have to be mediated by the church, its teachings contained in a catechism, and its preachers and teachers institutionalised in a clergy. The messianism inherent in Christianity in short, would have to be contained.

The first really apocalyptic thinker in what I would term the Protestant tradition, was not a Protestant at all, preceding the Reformation by some three centuries. Joachim de Floris arguably helps found a tradition in historicism that would remain alive into the 20th century and beyond. Joachim established the Revelation of St. John as his key cypher to the teleology of history, a cypher allowing him to demonstrate the past, present, and providential future unfolding of the process (Löwith 1949, 147). His exegesis is not flatly linear, it proceeds in a fashion foreshadowing a Taylor or Marx, with each epoch bleeding into, serving as a chrysalis for; or midwife to, the next. Each of Joachim’s dispensations births the next, their stages overlapping ‘since the second begins to appear within the first and the third within the second. At one and the same time, spiritual periods of different level and meaning are

coexistent' (Löwith 1949, 148). This teleology of history was divided into three stages, each stage commencing 'with a period of incubation':

The first is the Age of the Father, characterised by married men [...] beginning with Adam and Eve and continuing until the arrival of Jesus. The incubation period of this stage extended from Creation until Abraham, when the Jews were given the Law by which the elect of mankind lived until the end of this Old Testament dispensation. The Second period is the Age of the Son, symbolized by priests [...] during which time Christians lived under grace and the New Testament dispensation. The incubation period of the Age of the Son began with Elijah, who foreshadows Christ [...]. The third stage is the most dramatic, being the Age of the Holy Spirit [...]. The [...] incubation period would be a time of about three and one-half years [...] when the Anti-Christ would reign, a secular king who would destroy the Christian church. [...] This last stage lay wholly in the future [...]. There would be twelve patriarchs whose task it would be to convince the Jews to accept the inevitable rule of Christ on earth. [...] A holy pope [...] would come forth to lead the Church. This would be a time of love and joy, and the understanding of God would manifest itself in the hearts of everyone. The incubation period in this case extended from the beginning of monasticism in western Europe—that is, from the lifetime of St. Benedict (c. 480-c. 543)—to the present—that is, the thirteenth century (Katz and Popkin 1998, xxi-xxiii).

Relatedly, and most importantly, is what exactly Joachim was doing in his interpretation of the Revelation in reading backwards and forwards into time, in prefiguring moments, events and individuals in the Old Testament with those in the New, and with those to come in the future.

Joachim's interpretation of history, *in what it was* -an extrapolation of Revelation, of things to come- 'necessarily becomes prophecy', in which 'the right understanding of the past depends on the proper perspective for the future' (Löwith 1949, 151). Joachim inaugurates a practice of understanding the past, or rather, interpreting the past, *to bring about the future*. Joachim makes this centrally necessary in his apocalyptic historicism. For Augustine 'religious perfection is possible at every point of the course of history after Christ' (Löwith 1949, 156). In Joachim's scheme of things such perfection is possible 'only at a definite period at a definite juncture' (Löwith 1949, *ibid*) and if we extend his logic into the world of activism, say of the patriarchs who are to convert Jews to Christ, only subject to specific actions *in this world*. This, for all its contemporary religious esotericism, is a practical, activist approach to the scriptures. It is a bringing of the "last things" into the purview of human affairs, from which they had been removed, by the logic of Pauline Christianity and then by the constituted authority of the Christian church in Byzantium and later Rome.

Joachim de Floris thus marks a beginning in the secularization of eschatology and the messianic, of history as apocalypticism in the European tradition. For what is history if not the sense of *telos* and *finis*? The sense of comprehending ends, whose knowledge only comes apocalyptically, from on high at an Archimedean point from which we comprehend the whole? With Christianity generally, but with the messianic plotting of a future-centric historic narrative and a space for human action in it by Joachim specifically, historicism in Europe begins to become more fully future-centric and more actively messianic. This process would gain considerable pace with the Reformation.

3.2: The Nationalization of Religion and the *Ur*-Nation

The Reformation in Europe saw the coming together of a number of developments which would profoundly shape modernity. These were, the printing revolution, foreshadowing capitalism; conflicts between state and imperial religion, foreshadowing nationalism and the nation state; and the question of the mediation of the Biblical text, foreshadowing modern political ideologies and the rise of the reasoning subject. All three of these developments would dovetail together to inform the genealogy of settler colonialism and ultimately Zionism in England under Henry VIII, whose “caesaropapism” subordinated the formerly imperial church to the King and reconstituted it as a church of state under his own authority, with the English aristocracy administering the state religion (Hall 2009, 75). It is worthy to note that what Henry VIII undertook was not a novelty in the history of “the West”. In Carlton Hayes’ terms, it follows a pattern first seen in the ‘deification of the Roman Emperor’ after a period of scepticism on the part of Greco-Roman philosophers and mystics. The latter began to experiment in new spiritual and philosophical cults during the period. This process, Hayes argues, would eventually see Christianity syncretically forged out of Judaism and paganism to become the religion of state in the Roman Empire (Hayes 1926). In England, the intellectual scepticism sparked by Luther created a space for Henry VIII to instrumentally carve for himself a local religion. This religion

bore a striking resemblance to the Roman Church, differing most substantially in who controlled it, but demonstrating a similar willingness to engage in action [...] to *control* the spread of Protestant ideas, especially among the lower strata, lest heresy lead to popular uprisings (Hall 2009, 76).

Hayes confirms such a view, but reminds us that supplementing the accruments of the Catholic *ancien regime*, were older palimpsestic traces, the Roman scene apparently repeated in Reformation Europe.

as one studies historic Protestantism one is impressed less by the novelties which the Reformers introduced into the content of Christianity than by the conservatism with which they clung to certain central dogmas and rites of the older Christian Church. They borrowed plentifully from Catholicism, whilst at the same time they appropriated much from the intellectual movements of their day and put themselves especially under new obligations to ancient Judaism (Hayes 1926).

In short, Henry’s effort to wrest power from Rome did little to limit the tendency of constituted religious power to guard against the decentralising motion of millennial expectation, and the apocalyptic inherent in Christianity to begin with. It is in the institutions of the newly minted English Church that the seeds of later truly Protestant millennialism would be sewn.

Eugene Rosenstock-Huessy inverts the conventional narrative vis-à-vis Henry VIII’s claiming of the Reformation for England, arguing that rather than ‘invading the liberties of parliament’ the king had in fact laid the permanent foundation for ‘a Parliamentary invasion of the’ former ‘liberties of the Church [...]’ (Rosenstock-Huessy 2012, 155). Henry’s importation of Catholic-style constituted authority into an

English mould would set up, through the arbitrariness of royal succession, potential Catholic monarchs reigning over a protestantizing laity and thus a popular narrative of persecution, whores of Babylon and Anti-Christ. Meanwhile, the English gentry in Parliament were delivering ‘the Church of England into the Commons’ (Rosenstock-Huessy 2012, 154). The Book of Common Prayer ‘published by the Kings bishops in 1549’ radically altered the conventional hierarchy of worship and communion prevalent in Catholicism, and even within the conventions of Lutheran worship on the European continent. With ‘common prayer’ replacing ‘divine service’ the notion of localized entreaty displaced submission to the transcendent:

by the stroke of a pen the proper order of things (sacraments that radiate from a holy centre to the circumference of the community) is replaced by the [...] fiction of a self-sufficing community, created not by apostolic succession, but by a granted equality of all the members, old and new (Rosenstock-Huessy 2012, 156).

Where in the time of Augustine the history of the world had been the unfolding sacred telos of the Holy Roman Empire, divine history becoming the history of Empires (Hall 2009, 30), so under Henry, via his enterprising gentry, history was further brought under the purview of human actors into the control of states and their Parliaments. Further concessions to a foreshadowing of English notions of collective self-determination appeared in the Book of Common prayer, the praying community replacing the priest as the subject of the service. Where Luther had merely opened the space for Christians to insert themselves into the position of “I” in a personal sense, as did the priest performing the Mass ‘the Book of Common Prayer abolished the “I” and ‘Anglican ritual used “we”’ (Rosenstock-Huessy 2012, 156). Rosenstock-Huessey refers to the Book of Common Prayer as the ‘public spirit of England’ (Rosenstock-Huessy 2012, 155), through it the English gentry granted themselves a liturgy and a religious supremacy, or so they believed, over and above of that which could be claimed by a king or queen. In an age where legal fictions were being developed to institute a partial democratization of the state, however, the English gentry were apparently unable to see the religious fiction they were creating with regards to their religious equivalent of the “commons of the realm”. ‘As gentry, they were willing to accept a visible head of the Kingdom. But as Puritans, their Kingdom of Heaven was not likely to tolerate a visible head of the Church of England’ (Rosenstock-Huessy 2012, 158). The final move would ultimately be to make a legal fiction of their king. The English here were institutionalizing themselves as a chosen or *choosing* people in a secular sense, as they embarked on the road to modern oppositional politics. They brought the divine rights of the king into the hands of the commons.

With regards to the upheaval and waves of persecutions and counter-persecutions that went on in England, Scotland and Ireland (and more broadly in Europe) during period of the Reformation, the English Civil War and the Glorious Revolution, what is most important for us is the reinterpretation of the Old Testament scriptures and the Pentateuch. It was through this that a reacquaintance with the narratives of the ancient Hebrews, and a general tendency towards the study of Hebrew emerged. This,

however, did not translate into a tendency towards a reacquaintance with or study of contemporary Jews themselves (Sutcliffe 2011, 68). The printing revolution which helped precipitate the Reformation and spread its doctrines throughout Europe brought the Biblical text from the ecclesiastical language of Latin into local vernaculars, creating, as Shlomo Sand terms it, history's first 'bestseller' (Sand 2014, 141). Shorn of the authority of the papacy and the necessity for mediation by the human infrastructure of the Latin speaking Catholic clergy, the text became available for individual interpretation as never before. Cut off sufficiently from European Catholicism and Protestant Lutheranism (Sharif 1983, 17), the English related their persecution at the hands of a localized on again off again Catholic oppressor to that of the ancient Hebrews' travails amongst its powerful neighbours. It isn't difficult to see why this came to be. Whilst this era of incipient oppositional politics saw an emergent interest in theories of republicanism, the English gentry were highly unlikely to cohere around an identity shaped by representations of ancient Rome, since contemporary Rome was the current source of one of their preeminent vexations and ancient Rome a hive of polytheistic heathens (Sand 2014, 143). The ancient Hebrews on the other hand, conquered Canaan as the English were making to conquer Ireland and Scotland beginning under Henry VIII. The English were thus fortifying themselves against the power of an apparently ascendant Empire like the Maccabees (Sand 2014, 143). Such mythology served as a powerful image worthy of emulation for a people increasingly seeing itself as chosen.

Of specific interest for us is the lifting of the concept of the Covenant from the Old Testament and its application in contemporary English puritan politics during the Civil War years. In the Biblical context the covenant is a deal struck between Yahweh and Abraham –and later between Yahweh, Moses and the Israelites– of an 'if-then' character:

If ye walk in my statutes and keep my commandments, and you do them; Then I will give you rain in good season, and the land shall yield her increase, and the trees of the field shall yield their fruit, and your threshing shall reach unto the vintage, and the vintage shall reach unto the sowing time, and ye shall eat your bread to the full, and dwell in your land safely (Lev. 26:3-5 cited in Akenson 1992, 13).

The covenant between Yahweh and Abraham is essentially a simple contract. The contract becomes more complex with the Mosaic code but the essential logic remains. This logic can be summarized in a psalm ascribed to King David: 'I was also upright before him, and I kept myself from mine iniquity. Therefore, hath the Lord recompensed me according to my righteousness, according to the cleanliness of my hands in his eyesight' (Ps. 18:23-24 cited in Akenson 1992, 16). In short, if his people adhere to their covenantal duties Yahweh will grant them their covenantal rewards. The covenant grants Abraham and 'his people' (Israel) the land of Canaan, 'the land wherein thou art a stranger' (Gen. 17:6-8 cited in Akenson 1992, 14). This latter fact is an important symbolic figure which will become significant when the imagery of covenantalism travelled to the settler colonies, where the low became high and the "oppressed" the master. In Reformation Europe the re-interpretation of the Abrahamic and Mosaic covenants became profoundly important during the wars of religion where they featured as

‘a [...] revolutionary symbol bound up with [...] the book of Exodus and other narratives of suffering and conquering’ (Moots 2012, 172) and as blueprints for emergent models of oppositional politics. Christian exegesis on the Pentateuch extended Yahweh’s promises from the Hebrew patriarchs to the Christian church. In Zurich in the 1530’s the shape of state and church was argued to be modelled on the Abrahamic patriarchs, who in this secularizing version functioned as ‘civil magistrates who bore responsibility for the corporate expression of faithfulness among the people’ (Moots 2012, 174); the separate jurisdictions of Church and State, here cooperating in a Christian commonwealth covenanted under God. In England a similar process was underway. When parliamentarians cast themselves as ancient Israelites during the Civil War years, various covenants (1638, 1642) –the inspiration of Scottish Presbyterians– would be entered into, and the biblical example itself would come to inform notions of the legitimacy and authority required to govern. Just five short years before the execution of Charles I, Samuel Rutherford is indicative of this trend in his *Lex, Rex, or the Law of the Prince*, which used the Old Testament to argue for a three part covenant between the king, the people, and God, ‘in which God works through his people’. The essential argument here was that the people were not bound by God to obey a tyrant (Moots 2012, 179).

Whilst covenantalism opened a space for an incipient oppositional politics and arguably modern democracy, it also opened a psychological state of being in the world and in historicism, one that is arguably at odds with that which existed prior to the Reformation. If covenantal blessings are granted for covenantal duties, Akenson argues that ‘it is a small and natural step in covenantal thinking to affirm that the possession of right (whether in possession of economic prosperity or military power) is evidence that one is morally right’ (Akenson 1992, 17). This is, in the terms of historicism, a kind of permanent mentality of victors’ history. It informed everything from the historic “rightness” or moral superiority of Protestant Christianity to the notion of a history of the victors as a moral norm in the recording of history. It also shaped the general telos of history itself as a consensus that “this is the way things happened” and that because they happened this way, (via our selection of what is interesting to us in the present, in the past (Löwith 1949)), that this was a truth claim that established authority and power in the “truth” of history and functioned as a moral claim in this world. Covenantal thinking ultimately, again, establishes the rightness of authority based in its existence as such.

The English Civil War, and with it the Regicide, brought secular messianism into European history, interwoven as it was with religiosity. The breach it made in the symbolic order, or rather the ‘disturbance in being’ (McPartland 2012) that it signalled was momentous. It announced the arrival of revolution, and arguably modernity, in an event that was beyond legality but comprehended by a natural law that was in its incipiency and informed by the emergence of the science of astronomy via ‘Copernicus, Kepler and Galileo (Rosenstock-Huessy 2012, 161). That the language through which we

understand the event today has its origins in the motions of the heavenly bodies, signals something of the reverberations the events must have made at the time. It was both of the world and yet beyond it, cosmic, in a sense. Man may not exactly have become as a God but perhaps he had created a new deism, neither wholly secular nor wholly religious. It is this secular deism, very much a matter of faith, but not always or necessarily a matter of *religious* faith, that would have profound importance in the development of Christian and Jewish Zionism.

3.3: English Restorationism and “Republicanism”: James Harrington, the first Zionist?

The reinterpretable scriptural ferment in England in the sixteenth century would produce the first tentative efforts at prophesizing the return of the Jews to Palestine, of little surprise perhaps, given the image of the Israelites the English were fashioning for themselves. Relevant here too is the arrival of Hebrew, the Torah and the Kabbalah into circles of the European intelligentsia roughly coincident with both the Spanish Reconquista and the discovery and colonization of the New World (Sharif 1983, 14). What is of note is the way in which Jewish restoration was advocated and how the Book of Daniel and the Revelation of St. John was understood against its previous interpretation and away from the notion that the Jews would be converted to Christianity prior to their spiritual “return” as in Joachim, towards a *literal* return and then a later conversion. Protestant literalism, especially in Calvinism, signalled a break with the ‘profane sempiternity’ of Augustinian Catholicism and its detachment from the material world, in favour of the world of grace in the hereafter (Hall 2009, 81). Alongside this, print and mercantile capitalism created a new age of ritualization whose locus would eventually become more focused on calendar, clock and bureaucracy than cosmic cataclysm and religious festivals. Time, once largely irrelevant to the divine plan in the grand scheme of things, ‘became something not to be wasted in sloth, and collective historical action became a basis to transform society into the millennial kingdom’ (Hall 2009, 81, 89). The apocalyptic was being brought to earth and made material. In this period, prophetic thinkers became particularly interested in the specific, one might say, scientific, dating of the coming apocalypse and the place of Jewish restoration in it. In their doing this, the notion of restoration would become increasingly secularized itself.

Thomas Brightman’s (1614) exegesis on the Book of Daniel is interesting for us not so much because he argues for restoration, literally:

for first the Jewes shall be here gathered together who now live as exiles and out of their owne countrie. All the Prophets speak of this returne which they shall aduance and take in hand, not for religions sake, as if God could not elsewhere be worshipped, or as if it were necessary to bring in the legall worship againe, but not to striue anye longer as strangers and inmates with forraine nations (Brightman, 1635).

But for the apparently secular language of his perspective, and its presaging of modern Zionism. First the Jews are foreigners, strangers, inmates in, we can assume, Europe. They are not from Europe and must be returned to *where they are from*, ergo Palestine. Secondly, this is not argued, at least here, *even for the sake of the prophecy* but rather due to their foreignness. Brightman is essentially advocating for the ‘negation of exile’ (*shelilat ha-galut*) a concept Gabriel Piterberg argues is a central ideological trope of Modern Zionism (Piterberg 2008, xiii). This concept is of importance for us since it relates to both historic Christian attitudes to Jews²¹ and to the differing attitudes to history itself in both faiths. The central distinction and dispute that Christianity held against Judaism was its failure to recognize Christ and in his crucifixion, the coming of and “Age of Grace” in Augustinian terms. That is, the Jews failed to recognize a new dispensation, a progression from one old testament to a new one, and an epochal and historic change. Judaism, recognizing no messiah in Christ, saw no change, no historic progression. Jews were, in the Christian paradigm, then, excluded from the Age of Grace by their non-recognition of its arrival. Therefore:

the idea of returning to history, and the concomitant historiographical "return" of the Jews to the writing of history, follows a fundamentally Christian attitude concerning the Jews and their destiny. It assumes the existence of a significant history from which the Jews alone were excluded, such that, as an essential part of it, they had become alienated from themselves. In the Christian view, the Jewish exile was indeed a retreat from history in the context of the unfolding of Grace. According to this approach, history was *historia sacra*, the history of the Church, which only embraced the believers—those who accepted the Gospel and therefore entered the domain of Grace. The Jews, in their stubbornness, had taken themselves out of history when they refused to accept the Gospel. Significantly, Christian authors also claimed that history would reach its fulfilment only when the Jews *returned to it*: that is, when they accepted Christianity and the truth of the Gospel (Raz-Krakotzkin 2007, 536)(italics in original).

Brightman is arguing for such a return in the language of Philosemitism *and* Anti-Semitism. Brightman wants the Jews to be redeemed for Christianity but he also believes that they are an alien people in Europe. Of course, Brightman was writing before readmission of the Jews to England, and it is highly unlikely he knew many actual Jews himself.

Sir Henry Finch (1558-1625) is forceful in his literalism, that of a Philosemite lawyer and layman (Kobler 1951, 111). He outlines plainly in his prophecy his break with the symbolism of Catholic approaches to the theme of restoration:

Where Israel, Judah, Tsion, Jerusalem, etc., are named [...] the Holy Ghost meant not the spiritual Israel, or Church of God collected from the Gentiles, no nor of the Jews and Gentiles both (for each of these have their promises [...] apart) but Israel properly descended out of Jacob's loynes [...] The same judgement is to be made of their returning to their land and ancient states, the conquest of their foes, the fruitfulness of their soile, the glorious Church they shall erect in the land itselfe of Judah, their bearing rule farre and neere. These and such are not Allegories setting forth in terrene similitudes but meant really and literally of the Jewes [...] Neither

²¹ These attitudes can arguably be dated to the definitive split between the two religions, when syncretism ended and a period of polemical distinction began, in which the enduring Christian perception of Judaism is argued to have been formed, solidifying roughly around the fourth century C.E. See Raz-Krakotzkin 2007, 534.

were Josias or Cyrus more plainly named hundreds of years before they were born then these things are plainly delivered the confirming of that people's faith (Finch in Kobler 1951, 113).

Here Finch makes several claims of import; primarily that the literal restoration of the Jews to Palestine refers to a group of descent, drawing back to the covenant made with Abraham, and therefore tied by it, to the land which the covenant promised. This foreshadows a Jewishness understood as an ethnic or racial designation rather than a designation referring to a proselyting religion like Christianity. This is important, specifically because in the first instance there was at least some speculation at the time as to whether the Jews were really so exclusive a grouping or whether in the kingdom of the Khazars –though unnamed, at least alluded to– in the Caucasus represented an example of their proselytizing (Kobler 1951, 110). Secondly, it is important because, whilst in the Christian tradition the Jews are ubiquitous as a distinct and exclusive, non-proseletizing people, at least in the Jewish traditional interpretation of the Torah and in Talmudical commentaries there are a number of examples suggesting a tradition of proselytism (Sand 2010, 151, 154, 157, 173-4). All this is to say is that Finch, like Brightman before him, who he was influenced by, also regards the Jews as alien to Europe *by definition*. He too is foreshadowing the Zionist notion of the negation of exile; that to be Jewish in Europe, or indeed anywhere that is not the Land of Israel, is to be out of place and relatedly, out of history.

Also important here is Finch's returning of the Jews to the Christian teleology of history –which Brightman was doing as well– whilst the Christian tradition vis-à-vis the Jews in the Old Testament was to regard them as an example of backsliding and falling out of favour with He who they had covenanted with, Finch's exegesis 'means that Jewish history is again understood as a unity stretching from biblical times until the present and future days' (Kobler 1951, 114). With this "return to history",²² Finch is also secularizing the revelational redemption of the Jews in the biblical narrative. Now they are not simply being brought back to Christ, Finch's Jews are, once restored to Palestine, to form 'a body politic where all other corporations in the world are but counterfaits [...] where "knowledge, wisdom, pieteie, justice, temperance, honour, and magnanimity will be found' (Kobler 1951, 115). Finch is here predicting something far more modern than religious prophecies are usually given credit for, he is, however briefly, outlining something rather close to the secular utopia of a Thomas More or a James Harrington, the incorporation of the Jews into a body politic in Palestine. This apocalyptic utopia, Finch believes will convert first the East by its example, and then 'even the rest, the Christians, shall of their own accord submit themselves and acknowledge their primacy' (Kobler 1951, 115). Finch thus removes a contradictory material from Europe, and in *displacing* it into space in Palestine, fulfils prophecy, bringing the Jews back to God, saving Christian Europe and Jewish Palestine alike.

²² (*ha-shiva la-historia*) (Piterberg 2008, xiii)

The notion of literal return was not confined to puritan thinkers either, it can be seen in early rationalists like Locke and Newton too (Merkley 1998, 37). Locke described the restoration in his *Commentaries on St Paul's Epistles*, arguing that

the Jews also, if they continue not in unbelief, shall again be grafted into the stock of Abraham, and be re-established the people of God. For, however they are now scattered, and under the subjection to strangers, God is able to collect them again into one body, make them his people, and set them in a flourishing condition, in their own land. For if you, who are heathens by birth, and nor of the promised seed, were, when you had neither claim, nor inclination to it, brought into the church and made the people of God; how much more shall those, who are the posterity and descendants of him to whom the promise was made, be restored to the state, which the promise was vested in that family (Locke 1824, 392-393).

Here Locke reaffirms both the original Abrahamic covenant —and thus the Jews a people whose identity is based on descent by definition, as opposed to one based on religion— and the extension of the Hebraic covenants with God to Christianity, and in doing so affirms Christians as universal, cosmopolitan, “everywhere” people and Jews, as a particular, localized one. The Jews are strangers, scattered and we may assume, the antithesis of a flourishing people, because of *where* they are.

Where Brightman and Finch confined their speculation to the religious text and secular discourse bled from it, other Protestant thinkers were more explicitly secular in their Philosemitism, seeking to tease contemporary lessons from the ancient Hebrews for practical application in the contemporary world. One of the primary locations of this endeavour was in the field of natural and common law, where the legalism of the Books of Leviticus and Deuteronomy provided welcome analogues for European legal thinkers. Despite the logical governmental norm that presents itself in the Hebrew Bible being that of monarchy —and being that which the Jewish interpretive tradition tends to foreground (Sutcliffe 2011, 68), in particular in the figures of David and Solomon— Protestant Philosemitic intellectual entrepreneurs of the seventeenth century sought to draw lessons in republican governance, with specific reference to the Mosaic commonwealth, as ‘Protestants themselves engaged in forging new — and, it was hoped, more godly— structures of social and political organization’ (Sutcliffe 2011, 69).

The Dutchman, Petrus Cunaeus’ *Hebrew Republic* was an important early step in the use of the Old Testament and its narratives as an applicable analogue to contemporary European society and politics. Cunaeus used the example of the factionalism, fratricide, decline and fall of Judaea and Israel as set against the rural utopic peace and simplicity of the earlier “republic” as a lesson to be applied to the Dutch states. The Hebrew republic is a lesson against factionalism and a model for transcending ‘faction altogether’ (Sutcliffe 2011, 74). So far this is essentially in keeping with the conventional religious understanding of the Jews, in that it is their backsliding and iniquity before their God that has led to their decline. What is novel in Cunaeus’s account is his depiction of the Hebrew republic. It is a sempiternal utopia, cut off from surrounding history, and importantly commerce:

While increasing trade intensified the contacts among the various nations around the Mediterranean and eroded the differences between them, only the Jews were immune to this trend: “only the Jews, living in their

own land, and content with the wealth and nature produced there, led a life free of commerce. They did not cross the sea, nor did they visit foreigners or receive them.” Their economy was exclusively agrarian. There was no such thing as a Jewish craftsman, which should be regarded as “a great compliment, not a criticism; for how can it be a noble act to invent things that are of no use to respectable citizens?” (Sutcliffe 2011, 74).

Here, Cunaeus is at least tacitly articulating a premise inherent in the “return to history” and the “negation of exile”, that utopic perfection and a return to world history for the Jews as a sovereign people will only be achieved by returning to the land promised to them in the Abrahamic covenant. But he is also introducing another concept, one that will become crucial in Zionism: that Jewish separatism, on a basis of ethnic, economic, and spatial exclusion –all, as we have seen, inherent themes in the utopian imagination– will be essential for survival. For Cunaeus, of course, this is the survival of the Dutch as a free people against the power of Catholic Spain, *and* the insidious danger of commerce – here not just of the economic kind, but of people, things, and ideas. It is worth noting that the religious and political upheaval in the Dutch states at the time would produce a settler movement in the Afrikaners, who took a covenantal interpretation of the Old Testament to Southern Africa and applied it to their situation there, almost coincident to the Zionist movement in Palestine.

The rural romanticism of Cunaeus, as we have already seen, was shared by many in England, at the time, and would be well into the future. John Selden, as Grotius had done before him (Sutcliffe 2011, 76), set out to ground his natural law in the peculiar precedent set by the Noachite precepts. As Sutcliffe explains:

The Hebraic biblical narrative, hovering ambiguously both within and outside history, [...] enabled Selden to situate the roots of legal morality in a similarly ambiguous position. This ambiguity was vital for his broader theory of jurisprudence. For natural law to have any purchase, it needed to be universal in the extent of its authority. However, Selden regarded these basic principles as standing at the outset of a process of legal evolution, the historicity of which was key to his understanding of the essence and strength of the English common law tradition (Sutcliffe 2011, 78).

Selden’s interest in the Jews extends as far as their sacredity vis-à-vis their place in the Holy Scriptures and allows him to found the authority of his natural, secular law. As with Cunaeus though, the Hebrews served as an analogue through which to model his intellectual project on, for as ‘God first gave laws to all mankind’ i.e., natural law, ‘afterwards he gave peculiar laws to the Jews which only they were to observe’, common law (Sutcliffe 2011, 79). The Hebrews serve as a substance through which to play out ideas of gentile contemporary politics and philosophy. As far as contemporary Judaism is concerned, there is very little active interest if not outright scorn.

The most interesting albeit brief consideration of actual Jewish restoration in this period comes from the utopian imagination of James Harrington. In his *Oceana*, Harrington offers both a model of and history lesson on republican government. The Mosaic Republic features alongside numerous other examples, including Rome, Athens, Sparta and the contemporary Venetian Republic, but is offered as ‘the most perfect model for the English regime’, it being exceptional amongst all others due to the divine origin of its laws (Sutcliffe 2011, 81). What is most interesting in *Oceana* however is not

Harrington's perspective on the Mosaic Commonwealth, but his depiction of the Island states of *Oceana* and *Panopea*, clearly England and Ireland respectively. *Panopea*, Harrington tells us is

the soft mother of a slothful and pusillanimous people, is a neighbour island, anciently subjected by the arms of Oceana; since almost depopulated for shaking the yoke, and at length replanted with a new race. But (through what virtues of the soil, or vice of the air soever it be) they come still to degenerate; wherefore seeing it is neither likely to yield men fit for arms, nor necessary it should, it had been the interest of Oceana so to have disposed of this province, being both rich in the nature of the soil and full of commodious ports for trade, that it might have been ordered for the best relation unto her purse. Which in my opinion (if it had been thought upon in time) might have been best done by planting it with Jews, allowing them their own rites and laws, for that would have brought them suddenly from all parts of the world, and in sufficient numbers; and though the Jews be now altogether for merchandise, yet in the land of Canaan (since their exile from whence they have not been landlords) they were altogether for agriculture; and there is no cause why a man should doubt but, having a fruitful country and good ports too, they would be good at both (Harrington 1992, 6).

Harrington thus suggests that a protectorate of sorts might have been arraigned by *Oceana* over *Panopea* into perpetuity

Panopea well peopled would be worth a matter of four million dry rents, that is besides the advantage of the agriculture and trade, which with a nation of that industry comes at least as much more. Wherefore Panopea, being farmed out to the Jews and their heirs forever, for the pay of a provincial army to protect them during the term of seven years, and for two millions annual revenue from that time forward – besides the customs, which would pay the provincial army – would have been a bargain of such advantage, both unto them and this commonwealth, as is not to be found otherwise by either (Harrington 1992, 6).

Lastly, Harrington outlines the settlement of Jews in *Panopea* in his utopian narrative because he fears the consequences of admission of Jews into a non-Jewish society. Re-admission was a central topic of debate at the time of writing and Harrington was specifically critical of the 'de-facto acceptance of Jewish settlement in England' (Sutcliffe 2011, 82). Harrington's objections to Jewish admission to England were symptomatic of European Judeophobia and foreshadow late eighteenth century and nineteenth century anti-Semitism. He believed that

To receive the Jews after any [...] manner into a commonwealth were to maim it; for they of all nations never incorporate but, by taking up the room of a limb, are of no use or office unto the body, while they suck the nourishment which would sustain a natural and useful member (Harrington 1992, 6).

Harrington is foreshadowing a number of relevant ideas here. First, as with all the previous authors under discussion –and we may include Harrington amongst the restorationists, as in keeping with interpretations of the Revelation of St John, the planting of the Jews in Ireland (as well their re-admission to England) could be understood in the divine prophecy as a moment in their “fuller dispersion” before their return to Palestine– Harrington maintains that the Jews must secure an exclusive, separate existence. Second, he is outlining a settler enterprise. Importantly the dispossession of a native population is a restaging of the conquest of Canaan –the contemporary example of Cromwell in Ireland no doubt fresh in his mind– to make way for his fantasized Jewish settlement, through which the Jews, long masters of the art of commerce in his eyes, will be returned to agriculture. This is significant since, as we have already seen, such a discourse of taking urban populations and turning them to rural work in settler colonies would become a key trope in the

ideology of the settler revolution and we may speculate that it has at least one of its origins in the rediscovery of the Hebrew scriptures by Protestants, already at this early stage of incipient capitalism looking for escapes from the apparent dangers of commercial life. Thirdly, Harrington offers an image of England and its Jewish protectorate, surely the first to do so, some two hundred and sixty years before an approximation of as much would be formally adopted as British government policy in the Balfour declaration. Remarkably, many of the reasons for doing so, as we will later see, had changed very little.

But perhaps most interesting in Harrington, Selden, Cunaeus and others besides, is their use of the Hebrews as a foil for their ideas at all, when they were so averse—at best—to actual living Jews and Judaism. The ancient Hebrews and the spectre of dangerous commercialism that haunts the utopian visions of Harrington and Cunaeus indicates that these authors were not *just* interested in Hebrews historically. Jews, or an idea of Jews, were present too, if at least in a conspicuous absence (Harrington barely mentions his plan for *Panopea* again, after having introduced the idea). James Holstun has argued how the emergence of utopian writing in the Renaissance is a product of an encounter ‘between a body of texts and a subject matter: displaced population’ (Holstun 1987, 34). Holstun describes how during the evictions and enclosures of the sixteenth century in England and the violence and dispossession in the New World, various displaced populations made their way into utopian texts (Holstun 1987, 35). The spirited away and unnamed original population of *Panopea* indicates how displaced populations inspired and became tools of the utopian imagination. The Other functions as a medium for self-realization in a utopian thought experiment, much as we have seen previously in discussions of the mobilization of indigeneity towards solving pressing political and philosophical problems of the West. It is of little surprise then, that in an era when the Old Testament was at the centre of religious and political life ‘early modern millennial utopianism rediscovered Europe’s archetypical displaced population, the Hebrew nation, seeing its conversion and utopian fixing as a pressing political project for the latter days’ (Holstun 1987, 35). Harrington appears to be interested in pre-emptively displacing the social contradiction signalled by the arrival of an apparent Jewish commercialism in England and he was far from alone in his fears at the time. The romance attached to the agrarian myths surrounding the ancient Hebrews and the discourse on rural republicanism that inspired much of the utopian thinking at the time was profoundly at odds with the associations Protestants had of contemporary Jews; ‘Ancient myths and contemporary realities pulled in diametrically opposite directions’ (Sutcliffe 2011, 71). These diametric opposites also quite closely track one of the central concerns of republicanism *and* one of the central structures of settler colonialism, that of a suspicion of governmental and commercial power and the decentralization of sovereignty respectively. Of course, these complexes are not diametric opposites, decentralized settler sovereignty always brings the state in the rear with it. The settler on the frontier needs the central state to exist as

such and landed rural property could not survive without the government that protects its right to exist or the commercial centre that finances it. The English gentry had through eviction, enclosure and colonialism overtaken the monarchy and dressed it up as biblical drama. And here perhaps we come to what is really going on when a Protestant millennialist fantasizes about planting Jews in Ireland, or dreams of a Dutch state along the lines of the ancient agrarian Hebrew Republic whilst his own state is on the precipice of becoming perhaps the first commercial centre of capitalist modernity. As we have seen Hannah Arendt argue of the German bourgeoisie of the nineteenth century, it seems well prior to this something of the same process was already going on and that for some of the Protestant republicans of the seventeenth century, they were the phantom “Jews” of their own imaginations.

3.4: Messianism in a settling society: Philosemitism and Christian Zionism in America

In England, first with Cromwell’s theocratic dictatorship and then the restoration, messianism and the secular apocalyptic of revolution was once again drawn back in by the centripetal powers of constituted authority, and as per the Christian tradition, held in check once again. The works of both Brightman and Finch would only be published after their deaths as prophetic speculation was still a perilous endeavour. The re-consolidation of power produced a significant displacement of radicals into the settler colonies in North America. The displacement of contradiction that founds settler colonialism occurred most famously in the ferment that would create the consolidation of the constitutional monarchy in the British Isles, displacing considerable religious radicalism into the American settler colonies, particularly the corporate congregationalism of the Puritans (Obenzinger 1999, 28). Where the English saw themselves as like the Israelites, the persecution in England, the sojourn in Holland of the passengers on the Mayflower, and the passage to the New world, formed in the mythology of the early Puritan settlers a distinct parallel with that of the biblical Hebrews. But as Merkley argues, this was something more than just a parallel, ‘They believed that their experience was truly a living out of the Exodus experience. They interpreted their experience as a reliving of the history that formed the ancient People of God’ (Merkley 1998, 54). No longer, as with a Joachim, were they merely prophesizing, the American settlers in the New World were transcribing their prophecy into the very earth itself, the land became holy text. In what Hilton Obenzinger describes as ‘Christianography’ (Obenzinger 1999, 24), the first organic intellectual of American settler messianism, Cotton Mather, declared that America would be ‘legible in God’s promises’ (Obenzinger 1999, *ibid*). His eulogia on the life of the founder of the Massachusetts Bay Colony, John Winthrop, follows such a perspective:

Accordingly when the noble design of carrying a colony of chosen people into the American wilderness, was by some eminent persons undertaken, this eminent person was, by the consent of all, chosen for the Moses, who must be the leader of so great an undertaking; and indeed nothing but a Mosaic spirit could have carried him through the temptations to which either his farewell to his own land or his travel in strange lands must needs expose a gentleman of his education (Mather in Merkley 1998, 54).

In America, the types and anti-types of prophetic discourse, usually confined to the books of Daniel and Revelation, emerge in the unfolding of the telos of history, as the epigraph of Winthrop's tombstone testifies to:

But let his mourning flock be comforted
Though Moses be, yet
Joshua is not dead;
I mean renowned Norton; worthy Successor to
Our Moses is to be,
O Happy Israel in America,
in such a Moses, such a Joshua (Merkley 1998, 54).

From the beginning then, America was a palimpsest, written over twice. This is not just in the case of Puritan settlers, but from Columbus on, who regaled of his voyages later in life in his *Libro de las Profecias (Book of Prophecies)*, written between 1501-1502 (Newman 2016, 129), the American continents had functioned as a substance for the playing out of a transnational biblical exegesis. In particular individuals this character of America is visible with enhanced clarity. One such character is George Sandys, a Colonial traveller, who, prior to his more enduring career as an "Indian killer" on the Virginian frontier, played the role of an early ambassador of English mercantile capitalism and incipient imperialism in the Middle East and Palestine (Obenzinger 1999, 17). Sandys description of Palestine represent a stark contrast to that which we have seen with regards to the New World:

Those rich lands at this present remain wast and overgrowne with bushes, receptacles of wild beasts, of theeves, and murderers; large territories dispeopled, or thinly inhabited; goodly cities made desolate; sumptuous buildings become ruines; glorious temples either subverted, or prostituted to impietie; true religion discountenanced and oppressed; all Nobility extinguished; no light of learning permitted, nor Vertue cherished; violence and rapine insulting over all, and leaving no security save to an abject mind, and unlookt on poverty (Sandys in Obenzinger 1999, 19).

Sandys is of course relating what he sees at present to what supposedly was "once" there, the past takes precedent over the present, and in a sense, this represents an exiling of the land from history, as the Jews are exiled from history and the land itself. But beyond this, we also have the spectre of the extreme fertility of the New World and the extreme wastage of Palestine. Yet wastage is key in both scenarios; the bounty in Palestine is merely located in the past, that in the New World happens to be wasted in the present. For Sandys Palestine is a waste of 'wild beasts, of theeves, and murderers [...]' for his contemporary in Virginia, Samuel Purchas, the native Algonquians were 'more brutish than the beasts they hunt' who 'range rather than inhabite' the territory of the New World. Thus, by the logic of *vacuum domicilium*, both Palestine and Virginia were empty spaces (Obenzinger 1999, 15), and both a *tabula rasa* upon which one might inscribe new Israelites.

3.5: Progress, Holy War, and Holy War by Other Means

Sandys was one of a great many soldiers of fortune who would end up in America, men who would fight in the religious wars of Europe, would be shaped by the emergence of political oppositional politics of the Civil War years in England and the creation of the modern citizens volunteer army; men

who would be shaped by the sacred and the secular in its construction of the social *and* in its construction of the self. These men would bring the religious fervour of the internecine religious conflicts of the Hundred Years War to the American continent, alongside the secular technologies of incipient nation statehood. As Grenier states:

Fueled by the passions of the Reformation and Counter Reformation, late-sixteenth- and early-seventeenth-century European soldiers had little compunction about, and some would say [...] a preference for, putting towns to the torch and non-combatants to death (Grenier 2005, 21).

In America, where the first conquistadors would arrive under the authority of the papacy and papal bulls concerning the treatment of the native that were directly informed by the Crusades, defining the native as infidel and their lives and land forfeit, the religious and secular justification for conquest were never very far from one another (Fredrickson 1981, 8). When we state that settlement is a state of warfare, we are essentially taking the terms of Foucault in *Society Must be Defended* that politics is ‘war pursued by other means’ (Foucault 2003, xviii), we are also stating that this warfare is one understood to be conducted at the level of the sacred and the profane. The settler importation of European social structures –minus concomitant social contradiction– into indigenous space is not just structurally violent, it is understood and enacted as war, and a holy war at that.

When settlers and natives came into contact and violent conflict over the use of Pequot land and resources surrounding the Massachusetts Bay Colony, the settler interpretation of Indigenous retaliation quite quickly developed into a way of making war that bled into subjectification and a socializing approach to indigeneity alongside conventional violence and extermination. As Grenier argues:

The pre-contact Indian culture of war making among the Eastern Woodland Indians often was a mix of a highly evolved and ritualized system of limited war and the quest for individual glory. Within the Indian conceptualization of “mourning war,” particularly among Iroquoian peoples, vanquished foes and captives often “replaced” losses in native communities. Indian raiding parties would venture forth, take captives, return to the war party’s home village with those captives, and apportion them among grieving clans (Grenier 2005, 27, 28).

Indian war making in the early colonial years was inherently limited, undertaken to revenge honour and losses, in this way it was also inherently reciprocal. Small parties ‘relied on speed and caution in striking and retreating, possessing of course a perfect knowledge of the terrain and climate’ (Dunbar-Ortiz 2018, 44). Unable to effectively defend against this culture of war making, or to respond in kind and considering the indigenous way of war dishonourable and barbaric, settlers elected to attack the entire Pequot social body, razing entire villages, destroying crops and hunting grounds so as to ‘starve them out’ and specifically electing to target women, children, and the elderly in acts of collective punishment (Grenier 2005, 22). The combination of a highly developed sense of social and religious superiority, an inability to understand or face the indigenous in a reciprocal way, and an insatiable

desire for land and the social reproduction of the settler community that it afforded, led Europeans to quickly resort to tactics that closely resemble modern counter-insurgency warfare.

Twenty-first century counter-insurgency involves the insertion of what Patricia Owens terms the ‘domestic’ into the logic of war-making, where the counterinsurgent is defined as not just a soldier but also a ‘propagandist, a social worker, a civil engineer, a school teacher [and] a nurse [...]’ (Owens 2015, 19). US military advisor David Kilcullen ‘[argues] that armed social work encompasses “community organizing, welfare, mediation, domestic assistance, economic support – under conditions of extreme threat requiring armed support”’ in what amounts to the insertion of the discourse of social welfare into the logic of war (Owens 2015, *ibid*). Here we see the stage of the biopolitical, or, that of governmentality, originally as it is argued, adopted domestically in Europe in the nineteenth century making its way into the foreign policy of the twenty-first. Modernizing European states developed means of subjectification of their civilian populations outside of the dangerous spectacle of direct state violence, such as is described by Foucault in *Discipline and Punish*. In what Althusser terms “interpellation” subjects are called into being by the ideological state apparatus which socializes them into disciplined members of society, by way of the policeman, the doctor, the teacher, and so on (Althusser 2014, 190). In ‘the liberal way of war’ (Groves 2016), the domestic in liberalism, that is the ordering and regulation of society into normalized “identities” which it produces –sexual, racial, economic, social– is translated into liberal foreign policy in the form of modern “domesticating” counter-insurgency. Indeed, the domestic and foreign in liberal governance have never really been entirely separate as liberal economic notions of worldwide complex interdependence and liberal peace theory indicate. True liberalism is utopic, and I would argue in its own way messianic, though relying on a messiah that must never arrive. This liberalism is world-spanning and requires a stage on which international institutions can regulate and facilitate the playing out of. This political system cannot tolerate “problem” or “failed” states, which are earmarked for intervention and reform.

Settlers in the pre-revolutionary era spoke a language of domestication and discipline too when referring to the indigenous people who they were violently eliminating on the frontier. To quote George Wyatt, advisor to the governor of Virginia:

Game are the wild and fierce Savages haunting the Deserts and woods. Some are to be taken in Nets and Toils alive, *reserved to be made tame* and serve to good purpose. The most bloody to be rendered due to revenge of blood and cruelty, *to teach them* that our kindnesses harmed are armed (Grenier 2005, 23) (My Italics).

Land and settler arms were intrinsically related, the expansion of settler liberty required the invasion of native lands and, therefore, war on the native population. From the mid seventeenth century states began to pass legislation that required male settlers be armed:

Virginia, the first colony, forbade any man to travel unless he was “well armed.” A few years later, another law required men to take arms with them to work and to attend church or be fined. In 1658, the colony ordered

every settler home to have a functioning firearm, and later even provided government loans for those who could not afford to buy a weapon. Similarly, New England colonial governments made laws such as the 1632 requirement that each person have a functioning firearm plus two pounds of gun powder and ten pounds of bullets. [...] No man was to appear at a public meeting unarmed (Dunbar-Ortiz 2018, 35).

Settlers were in essence soldiers, counter-insurgents —though we might also muddy the binary— at one and the same time. On the other side then were those to be eliminated, either by extirpation or by assimilation. The key is that the indigenous, in their elimination were to be subjectified in their enduring it. The elimination of the native in America came to its zenith in the mass subjectification of indigenous peoples in the nineteenth century under the Bureau of Indian Affairs. What is crucial here, is that the Bureau was a military enterprise, administered by the war department. Indeed, this pursuit of politics by other means in American militarism in the nineteenth century was merely in its infancy, and many of the practices and practitioners of the Bureau of Indian Affairs would take their technologies of warfare and socialization directly into foreign policy via the American invasion of the Philippines (Groves 2016).

This administration of nativity occurred within the paradigm of American messianism as well, which framed almost the entirety of the debate on the indigenous question, whether it be passive acceptance of the disappearance of the native, positive willing of it on; the desire to save, uplift, and civilize the native; to belief that the indigenous of North America represented one of the lost tribes of ancient Israel and even that they might be subject to restoration (Goldman 2004, 92), one of the more radical proposals for native elimination in American history.

What is important here is that this major process in the formation of America, the persecution of politics by other means against the original inhabitants of the continent, is not just paralleled in the American messianic self-understanding, the two are mutually constitutive. American historic self-understandings of the seventeenth to early twentieth centuries are a telos of revelation as progress. Where in European Catholicism and in Judaism —and even largely in English Protestantism when the state reasserted control during Cromwell’s protectorate and then after the Restoration— messianic fervour and speculation were for the most part fringe practices, particularly due to the tendency towards sectarianism it causes. In American Protestantism sectarian splintering was positively the norm. Further, as Tuveson argues in the American case, well before it became a secular idea, progress in the here and now was broadly a religious concept in America:

It would be natural to think that the secular idea of progress, together with the scientific revolution, had exerted an effect on theology, and that the millennialism was a way of adapting religion to the new secular optimism. It is true that an amelioration of the conditions of life was going forward. It is also true that the fact of the Reformation gave Protestants an access of confidence in the future. [...] Yet all of this is far short of an “idea of progress.” And in fact the idea that progress is the “law” of history, that it is ordained, was religious before it was secular. It has been remarked that the late seventeenth-century champions of the “moderns” lack “at least three essential attributes of the developed, nineteenth-century faith in progress. These are: universal inclusiveness, inevitability, and infinity. “Total progress in all realms of being—the fullblown theory—is a late

eighteenth-, really a nineteenth century French concept.” But all of these three attributes are present in the millennialist commentaries a century before Condorcet and Saint-Simon (Tuveson 1968, 38-39).

The essential American apocalyptic Tuveson describes is one in which the fundamental pathological psychology that a covenantal mindset can engender with regards to the perception of material success and prosperity and a revelational telos of history, in which the history of America is the unfolding of a biblical epic—one that in a very real sense, has already been written— created a progress centric understanding of America’s place in the world, and a relatively boundless optimism in progressivism more generally. America’s messianic self-understanding in these terms bears considerable similarity to emergent secular teleologies of history. The American messianic understanding is of a progressive beating back and ‘putting down of Satan’ and his evil, proceeding in stages, ‘But the prophetic interpreters maintained, each *from* of evil, in each period is *sui generis* and when it has been crushed, is permanently out of the way. So the course of history is the progressive destruction of the various kinds of control Satan has possessed]’ (Tuveson 1968, 43-44). This understanding has close parallels to what we might call Joachim de Floris’s philosophy of history. As Hilton Obenzinger describes it, in America

The classical notion of *translatio studii*—of the westward course of empire—[was] radically transformed into a millennialist Protestant “errand into the wilderness”: Jerusalem is to the west of Babylon, Rome to the west of Jerusalem, and the New Jerusalem even further west in “regions far enough beyond the bounds wherein the *Church of God* had, through all former ages, been circumscribed (Obenzinger 1999, 24)(italics in original).

The beating back of Satan and the spread of the Gospel were but two sides of the same coin, as progress was to the uplift of mankind and civilization of the Indian. American progressivism had its origin in its messianic imagination and played substantial part in the elimination of the native.²³

American settlers inscribed their Christianography onto the continent, progressing westward to the Pacific as they strove towards the messianic kingdom of the future, but as in the implicit teleology of history in a Locke or a Hobbes, as we have seen, Americans were also drawing theirs backwards in time too, into the mystical past, re-inscribing their contemporary politics onto the narratives of the biblical Hebrews. Samuel Lagdon’s sermon, *The Republic of the Israelites as an Example to the American States* is an indicative example of this which highlights how the structure of settler society

²³ It is interesting, with regards to the benevolent amelioration of the native –and indeed the slave– in America, which occupied many religiously minded American progressives, how similar their prescriptions were to those of later English evangelical proposals for the amelioration of the conditions of the Jews. Specifically, Indians would be enticed to adopt settler practices of ‘plain learning and husbandry’ in educational institutions specifically built for the purpose (Guyatt 2016, 47) and normalized practices of agriculture and land tenure. The irony of preparing a people whose culture of agricultural husbandry had a provenance of millennia was apparently lost on the benevolent Americans. Ultimately in both the case of the native and the slave, American settler colonial benevolence, like that of the English evangelicals, seemed only able to offer out-settlement. To the native and the superfluous racial other settler colonialism it seems, can only offer more of itself. See (Guyatt 2016).

could be stitched onto the biblical narrative and how the biblical narrative too, could come to inform the settler perspective.

Lagdon's interest is in the Exodus and its first importance for us is his attempt to broadly strip the theological from the biblical narrative. For sure, Yahweh is mentioned, as is the godliness of the Hebrews, but the deity is a secondary concern, he founds the order that interests Lagdon, but is otherwise relatively absent from his account. What is relevant is what Moses and the Hebrews *elect* to do with what their God has given them:

When first the Israelites came out from the bondage of Egypt, they were a multitude without any other order than what had been kept up, very feebly, under the ancient patriarchal authority. They were suddenly collected into a body under the conduct of Moses, without any proper national or military regulation. Yet in the short space of about three months after they had passed the red sea, they were reduced into such civil and military order, blended together by the advice of Jethro, as was well adapted to their circumstances in the wilderness while destitute of property. Able men were chosen out of all their tribes, and made captains and rulers of thousands, hundreds, fifties, and tens: and these commanded them as military officers, and acted as judges in matters of common controversy (Lagdon 1788).

From this primitive version of a government, Lagdon proceeds to argue that not only was a constitutional representative government with an executive legislative separation of powers established, but essentially a democratic electorate as well:

But the great thing wanting was a permanent constitution, which might keep the people peaceable and obedient while in the desert, and after they had gained possession of the promised land. Therefore, upon the complaint of Moses that the burden of government was too heavy for him, God commanded him to bring seventy men, chosen from among the elders and officers, and present them at the tabernacle; and there he endued them with the same spirit which was in Moses, that they might bear the burden with him. Thus, a senate was evidently constituted, as necessary for the future government of the nation, under a chief commander. And as to the choice of this senate, doubtless the people were consulted, who appear to have had a voice in all public affairs from time to time, the whole congregation being called together on all important occasions: the government therefore was a proper republic (Lagdon 1788).

Lagdon further recognizes a tribal federalism, or decentralized sovereignty in the political formation of the ancient Hebrew Republic. The American state system replicated at the micro level:

And beside this general establishment, every tribe had elders and a prince according to the patriarchal order, with which Moses did not interfere; and these had an acknowledged right to meet and consult together, and with the consent of the congregation do whatever was necessary to preserve good order, and promote the common interest of the tribe. [...] There was a president and senate at the head of each, and the people assembled and gave their voice in all great matters: for in those ages the people in all republics were entirely unacquainted with the way of appointing delegates to act for them (Lagdon 1788).

Thus, the republic of the ancient Hebrews replicated the bacterially reproducing sovereignties of the early post-Revolutionary United States, whose settlers whether on the East Coast or on the frontier were so ill disposed with appointing 'delegates to act for them.' One can assume that for Lagdon, such a sovereign bacterialism would greatly help in the subsequent conquest of Canaan. Lastly, and importantly, Lagdon is able to reconcile this whole narrative with an understanding of self-determination. While much of this story is the result of the direct intercession of the divine, the Hebrews submission to Him is entirely voluntary, they elect to enter into the Mosaic covenant:

a people, who enjoyed the most rational liberty, and yet were under the most voluntary and absolute subjection to authority, free from all the convulsions and revolutions which frequently arise from the raging folly of the populace, must become famous (Lagdon 1788).

The Mosaic covenant with the divine is a voluntary association, like the Lockean social contract and like the latter, Lagdon believes the former was ‘such as [was] always necessary for civil society. Life and property were well guarded, and punishments were equitably adapted to the nature of every crime’ (Lagdon 1788).

Lagdon is but one example of not a fringe tendency in American intellectual culture, but rather the norm, where the sacred and secular understandings of what America symbolized, what America was and what America was supposed to do in the world were inseparably intertwined. Tuveson argues that in Christianity there exists two eschatologies side by side, that of saving the individual soul and that of saving the world, ‘the two [...] are interlocked, the first making the second possible’ (Tuveson 1968, 4). I would argue that this “particular universal” characterizes the American messianic condition. The notion is made in bad faith, because there is generally little consideration of why the saving of the self will then go on to save the world. As social, economic and political power in America grew, so too did the notion of America’s providential place in the world and its sense of divine mission, its sense of being observed. This sense of observation was reciprocated with a romantic attachment to America, its liberal institutions and its political-religious zeal, in the likes of de Tocqueville. Americans not only thought they would save the world, many Europeans thought as much too. In all of this, this newest state was cut through with messianism, often framing the antithetical:

Even oppositional or rebellious impulses would often push against the envelope of the core myth without going beyond [Christian] bounds. For example, when Thomas Morton established one of the earliest “counter-cultures” at Merrymount, he titled his humanist defence of nature religion, sensuality, and amalgamation with native cultures *New English Canaan*. When African slaves sang of escape to the Canaan of Canada or the North, the Promised Land was concretized in a counter hegemonic Christianography. When Nat Turner, inspired to revolt by messianic visions, was captured, he was executed in a town in Virginia called Jerusalem, providing an ironic intersection of biblical traditions. And even when Southern pro-Confederate preachers like Benjamin Palmer justified slavery, they employed the myth of the curse of Ham and envisioned secession from the North as the escape from Pharaoh and as the division of Israel (Obenzinger 1999, 30)(italics in original).

But this Protestant settler culture could just as easily understand its place in the world in rather more secular terms as well, and increasingly into the nineteenth century, secular understandings of American progress appeared to mix relatively freely with the more religious variants. Indeed, coincident with the Saint Simonians in France, settler communities cohering around the secularizing millennialism of the likes of Robert Owen (Nash 2000, 76) and other more fringe religious-socialistic tendencies (Taylor 1982, 116) exploded into the West with American settler expansion. There was often little to distinguish these socialistic entrepreneurs from travelling preachers. We might take Carlton Hayes’ argument further and argue that this was simply the deeper splintering of Protestantism into even more ‘innumerable denominations’ as a ‘modern parallel to the ancient deliquescence of Graeco-

Roman Paganism' (Hayes 1926) that in Hayes' analysis went on to eventually inform the birth of Christianity, though in ours perhaps only signals a parallel evolution with Zionism.

What is important in the American case is, as we shall later see, how close some of these religious socialistic settler experiments were to the missionizing of the Jews and the indigenous in America and in England and to early attempts at restoration. Perhaps the most famous proponent of missionizing the Jews in America was also the most famous proponent of doing the same to the indigenous. Elias Boudinot believed that the natives in America were a "lost" tribe of ancient Israel and took it upon himself to see to it that he might therefore convert them to the Protestant faith, therefore, eliminating them as what they were; namely natives. Boudinot would later in life fund his protégé –Jewish convert and founding member of the London Society for Promoting Christianity Amongst the Jews– Josef Frey's plan to establish farming colonies in America 'that there they might have an opportunity of earning their bread by their own industry (Frey in Goldman 2004, 102). Frey was also instrumental in laying the groundwork for the missionary scene in London, into which Anthony Ashley Cooper would step in the mid-nineteenth century. Frey's efforts to evangelize the native in America would extend directly to Jews from Europe, whom he attempted to return to agriculture in America –and then to the true faith– on similar training farms to those he had hoped to achieve similar results with the natives (Goldman 2004, *ibid*).

Yet with all of the above considered, American messianism did not much direct its concern to actual contemporary Jews until at least the late nineteenth century, despite the missionizing efforts of Boudinot, Frey, and others. The reason for this was very simple. In colonial and then independent America there were very few Jews for Christians to direct their attentions to. With regard to Christian and Jewish Zionism, when they did arrive in greater numbers, Jews were by and large actively hostile to conversion and restorationist plans, which in many ways actually helped to cohere the community (Goldman 2004, 91).

Where evangelicals like Boudinot and Frey were successful on the other hand was in the consumptive presence of Palestine in the imagination of America. Towards the end of his life Boudinot would found the American Bible Society, an explicit attempt to counteract Jeffersonian secular scepticism in American life (Goldman 2004, 94). As Goldman explains:

A few years after Boudinot's death in 1821 the American Bible Society embarked on what historian Paul C. Gutjahr has called "the most ambitious scheme in the history of American publishing," namely, to provide every American household with a copy of the Holy Scriptures. By 1830 the Bible Society was on its way to distributing over half a million Bibles throughout the United States. In the subsequent thirty years the annual production of Bibles increased greatly, and by 1860 the American Bible Society was printing a million Bibles a year. Many of these editions were illustrated with scenes from the Holy Land. Throughout the country families were familiarizing themselves with the landscapes of the Galilee and the domed structures of Jerusalem. All of this would interest American readers in the history of Palestine and influence American ideas on the fate of the Holy Land (Goldman 2004, 110).

One of the areas where perhaps all this interest in Palestine, messianism, the ancient Hebrews and restorationism in America can be seen, is in the Blackstone Memorial of 1891. The work of fundamentalist preacher William Blackstone, whose *Jesus is Coming* was one of the most widely read millennialist texts in nineteenth century America (Sharif 1983, 93). The memorial, petitioning President Benjamin Harrison, is interesting for a number of reasons. Firstly, it precedes Herzl's *Der Judenstadt* by five years and the first Zionist congress by six. Secondly, despite his Fundamentalist evangelical pretensions, Blackstone grounds his argument in the secular language of international politics:

Why shall not the powers which under the treaty of Berlin, in 1878, gave Bulgaria to the Bulgarians and Servia to the Servians now give Palestine back to the Jews? These provinces, as well as Roumania, Montenegro, and Greece, were wrested from the Turk and given to their natural owners. Does not Palestine as rightfully belong to the Jews? (Blackstone 1891).

Blackstone hardly mentions his religious motivations at all in the text and appended notes to President Harrison, suggests the Ottoman Empire be persuaded through the language of improvement and suggests in the secular language international finance and anti-Semitism that Jewish bankers will sweeten the deal by paying off the Empire's national debt (Merkley 1998, 69). Of most importance to us however is the list of names that Blackstone is able to attach to his petition. It is a veritable who's who of four hundred and thirteen of America's political, economic, civic, cultural, and religious powers of the time. Including the speaker of the House of Representatives, a Supreme Court Justice, John D. Rockefeller, J. P. Morgan and several editors of national newspapers (Merkley 1998, *ibid*). Whilst the petition was ultimately unsuccessful, because most Jews were actively resistant to such restorationist plans, it shows the deep connection in the mind of America to the restorationist tradition, the image of Palestine and the messianic.

4

ZIONISM AS PRACTICE: TEXTS IN CHRISTIAN AND JEWISH ZIONISM AS SETTLER COLONIALISM

This Chapter seeks to conduct a close reading of several key Christian and Jewish Zionist thinkers who have not as yet been subject to a settler colonial analysis. It will show that in the case of the Christians, all of whom were Protestants, their Zionism pre-figures Jewish Zionism proper and that certain settler colonial tropes mark their thinking. These tropes can also be seen carried through into the Jewish thinkers too. Several thinkers under analysis here I believe will reveal novel insights to scholars of the settler colonial paradigm, the history of Zionism and the Palestine/Israel conflict more generally. In particular, George Gawler is shown to be, I believe, the first truly settler colonial thinker to propose a plan for Jewish settlement in Palestine. Louis Brandeis and Horace Kallen are shown to comprehend the dynamics, necessities, and political form of settler colonialism, and to intuit what would be required of the settlement of Palestine for the Zionist project there to be successful. The corresponding effect to the native is made clear in their writing, revealing the substantial links between the experience of settler colonialism between Palestine and America. Lastly, Arthur Ruppin's little discussed social Darwinist thinking will be understood as the blueprint for pure settlement colonialism and as the origin for the materialisation of a covenantal social form in the Yishuv, where historically such has only been applied to Israel in the wake of 1967 and the rise of the Likud and the religious settlers of the Gush Emunim. The chapter in general will show how the themes under discussion thus far in the thesis (the construction of the subject, the construction of state and of settler technologies and the figures and tropes of settler colonialism; those of self-determination, of the displacement of contradiction, of constitution by negation and the concept of a transnational settler imperial world) are all brought forth, especially in the Jewish Zionist texts. The chapter closes with an examination of Israel's first Prime Minister –and simultaneous Defence Minister– David Ben-Gurion's encounter with

the Bible. Ben-Gurion offers an example of Zionism truly embodying the Protestant approach to both the Bible and Western future centric, eschatological, victor's historicism, self-justified by its existence as such. His biblical encounter by way of a conclusion, marks the constitution by negation of the settler subject as Israeli; his understanding of self-determination obliterating any reciprocal determination with the native Other.

4.1: The Evangelicalism of Anthony Ashley Cooper

I do not want to re-capitulate the familiar story of Lord Shaftsbury and English Evangelical support for Jewish restoration in Palestine here, as it has been documented much more forensically than I have the space to do justice to. As our perspective does not wish to delve into the minutiae of the subject, a brief summary will suffice: from the mid 1820's a wealthy group of prominent English Evangelicals, forming around the London Society for Promoting Christianity Amongst the Jews in the wake of William Wilberforce's Clapham Sect, and its activist successes vis-à-vis abolitionism, would become prominent in lobbying for British governmental support for the amelioration of the condition of Jews both in Palestine and in Eastern Europe. Their principle successes in this regard would be the establishment of a British consulate and joint Anglican-Lutheran Bishopric in Jerusalem. A great deal of their success in this regard was due, it is argued, to the position of Lord Shaftsbury, related by marriage to Lord Palmerstone, British Foreign Secretary in the 1830's and '40's. Though the ultimate aim of these evangelicals was the conversion of Jews, an end to which they were profoundly unsuccessful, where they were successful (though we might say rather, where the British government was successful) was in insinuating themselves into Palestine and the Ottoman Empire, using the case of humanitarian intervention on the part of the region's Jews as the excuse.²⁴

What is relevant to us is the wider political scene into which active evangelical interest in restoration emerged, which was the context of imperial expansion and regular war with Catholic and then, after the revolution, atheistic, France (Lewis 2010, 47). The French Revolution functioned as something of an epochal shift in messianic speculation for evangelical thinkers in England and in America, it was interpreted in something like a religious accelerationism, as a sign of the unfolding of divine providence (Tuveson 1968, 50). English evangelicals considered the cataclysm for French monarchical Catholicism 'an anchor for prophetic forecasts' which brought an end to quietism in evangelical circles that had largely prevailed in the wake of the Glorious Revolution. They hoped for a Gallic Reformation to follow the Revolution and an increasing activism inflected their evangelism (Lewis 2010, 36-37). That much the same could be said of enlightened French Catholics and atheists who populated the

²⁴ For more comprehensive histories of these events see (N. Rose 1992) (Lewis 2010) (Tuchman 2001) (E. Bar-Yosef 2003).

‘philosophical societies’, Masonic lodges and cultural clubs that ‘laid the seedbed of Jacobinism’ (Hall 2009, 116) merely indicates that a secular messianism informing an activism in politics would be as prevalent as secular politics used as a tool to bring about the “sacred” millennium, as the evangelicals, particularly in the figure of Anthony Ashley Cooper, would personify. At home and in the Empire, evangelicals would attempt to influence and inform policy towards social uplift and imperial benevolence, and prior to the question of Jewish restoration, even active projects of settler colonialism. William Wilberforce in particular was actively involved in efforts to settle freed slaves from America in Sierra Leone (Guyatt 2016, 262-263). By the late 1830’s Anthony Ashley Cooper, the 7th Earl of Shaftsbury was publicly identifiable with the reformist evangelical movement, compared favourably to Wilberforce and insinuated by marriage into the British political elite (Lewis 2010, 109). Shaftsbury’s relevance for us here is not in his lobbying of Lord Palmerston or his involvement in the Jerusalem consulate and joint Bishopric, but rather how he would articulate particular themes, Zionist and settler colonial, that would be later re-stated and enacted by Jewish Zionism.

Cooper’s most famous sustained public intervention on the question of Jewish restoration came in the form of a review of Lord Lindsay’s 1838 account of his travels through Egypt and Palestine, bringing together several consummate English preoccupations, namely Philosemitism/Anti-Semitism, Orientalism and Palestine travel literature.

Cooper opens his consideration of the Holy Land with a familiar account of its wastage, here at the hands of Mohammad Ali and Ibrahim Pasha, but this is preceded by the mention that the lands all ‘await the appointed hour (so we may gather from every narrative) to sustain their millions; to flow as old, with milk and honey’ (Ashley-Cooper 1838, 166). Mohammed Ali is taking the region away from its apparently natural, ancient state, away from agriculture: ‘Everywhere the land is falling out of cultivation, villages are deserted, houses are falling into ruin and the people are disappearing’ (Ashley-Cooper 1838, 170). The wastage of the land is but part of a working out of grander developments.

Cooper sees Mohammed Ali as a prophetic figure predicted in Isaiah, who has opened Palestine for Europe:

Mohammad Ali, and his ferocious son-in-law Ibrahim Pasha [...] are mild as sucking doves towards independent Europeans; their savage violence has opened Egypt and Syria to the traveller from distant lands and rendered the journey easy and secure [...] their rule, which has, up to the present time, evidently fulfilled an order of Providence, by unfolding to our view all the scenes and localities of Holy Writ, may, perhaps, be in a course to prepare those regions of the East for other yet wider and more important changes (Ashley-Cooper 1838, 171).

So Palestine is in a wasted state, ‘the land that once maintained whole nations like the dust of the earth for multitude, is almost emptied of her people; and her soil, already is a state of miserable neglect, will soon be entirely desolate without hands to till it’ (Ashley-Cooper 1838, 176). The conceit seems this:

without its people the land cannot survive. We might hazard a guess that the concomitant is true, that without the land, its people cannot survive either, as Cooper will later appear to suggest.

From here Cooper then gets to his central point:

Two great rivals, the Sultan and his rebellious Pasha, are striving for the permanent possession of a country, which misgovernment is rendering utterly worthless. Which of the twain may triumph, if left to themselves, no one can pronounce; and the powers of Europe seem uncertain on which side to bestow their interposition [...]. But meanwhile a third claimant is, constantly though silently, fostering his pretensions to the enjoyment and rule of this ancient land, founding them on a prescription that transcends all history, and clothing them with a sanction, to which the world itself must ultimately do homage [...]. We have alluded, in the commencement of this article, to the growing interest manifested in behalf of the Holy Land. This interest is not confined to the Christians—it is shared and avowed by the whole body of the Jews, who no longer conceal their hope and their belief that the time is not far distant when, ‘the Lord shall set his hand again the second time to recover the remnant of his people [...] and shall set up an ensign for the nations, and shall assemble the outcasts of Israel, and shall gather together the dispersed of Judah from the four corners of the earth (Ashley-Cooper 1838, 176-177).

Whilst Cooper initially suggests that Jewish support for restoration is not manifest, that Jews are ‘constantly though silently’ fostering their pretension, which suggests that he may understand the Jewish relationship towards Palestine, Jerusalem et al, to be a symbolic, theological one. He then however immediately states, confusingly, that Jews are ‘no longer concealing their hope’ in imminent restoration, in religious terms, and goes on to elaborate that he believes that the Jews are now expressing their hope in restoration in a form that approximates the Protestant evangelical expression of the same (Ashley-Cooper 1838, *ibid*).

As will become a general theme vis-à-vis the belief verses the reality of support for Zionism proper, Cooper is wildly misinformed in his estimation. Lewis argues that some basic factors informed Cooper’s misdiagnosis of the support for restoration, the foremost being his contacts with the Jewish community, which were almost exclusively with *Jewish converts* to Christianity. Indeed the article in question exclusively relies on the works of Jewish Converts to evangelical Christianity for its information both on the supposed desire of Jews for restoration and for actual data on the numbers of Jews in Palestine and on numbers of Jews “returning”. These were works that themselves promoted the theme of missionizing the Jews (Lewis 2010, 154). On a very basic level Cooper did not know, or socialise with Jews as Jews and did not encounter them in his social milieu (Lewis 2010, 162).

Cooper’s theological misunderstanding is most crucial, because it is a distinction that will frame Zionism as a settler nationalist movement as set against Judaism as a religion. For Cooper, and for Christians, whose religion, at least in Europe has sat in ascendancy for over a millennium, their religion, despite schism, shaped the state system that emerged in modernity. It was perhaps natural to think that the Jews might yearn to be deposited back in “their homeland” as Christian interpreters of the Bible termed it. But the territoriality of the Holy Land in the nineteenth century—and long before—was a product of a Christian supremacist imagination. Christianity in power had the institutions to

channel and control pilgrimage; Judaism, supplanted and weakened could not, and ‘particularly [...] the Jews of Ashkenaz’ opposed it (Sand 2014, 131). Where in Christianity the messiah came to earth, walked in Palestine and died there, the Jews’ did not, their religion cohered around the Torah and Talmud and ultimately transcended place, at least in all but some fringe denominations (Lewis 2010, 157) (Sand 2014, 102,178). Of course, Christianity too is not a religion entirely focused on place, but with the founding of its great religious centres at the sites of its martyrdoms, as opposed to Judaism’s centring around absences and exiles, place is far more material in Christianity. The great irony is that ‘Whereas Judaism started out as a religion focused on a physical centre, from which it was subsequently detached through a process of spiritualization, Christianity in many ways developed in the opposite direction’ (Sand 2014, 136). When it came to the supposed eternal yearning which evangelicals spoke of with regard to the Jews they were mostly talking about themselves, as had their English Puritan predecessors.

Cooper does close this section by conceding, however, that the literal interpretation of ‘the year that approaches, oh bring us to Jerusalem’, ‘prevails more strongly [...] among the converts to Christianity’ (Ashley-Cooper 1838, 180), but it is telling that he then goes on to attack the emancipated Jews of Europe, using precisely the same logic through which he praises his phantom literalist-restorationist Jews.

Assimilated Judaism is characterized in the language of disease:

These reforms, which have so favourably exhibited their intellectual powers, have proved fatal to their sentiments of religion:—disregarding or denying the truths on which even the Talmud rested as a basis, they have scorned to purge away its dross; and, having broken from the trammels of Rabbinitism, strut about in the false freedom of rationalism and infidelity. The leprosy has not yet spread itself over a large portion of the people; the chief seat of the disease lies, of course, in Germany; but many individuals have caught the contagion in Lemberg, Brody, Warsaw, and other towns of Poland. In Germany they are engaged in the formation of a literature of their own, and wield a portion of the daily and periodical press; new modes of worship are introduced; and the national expectation of a Messiah, being frittered away in figurative applications, is debased, and yet satisfied, by their share in the revolutionary changes of the European states. In France, a kindred sentiment prevails; they desire even to abandon the name of Jews, and assume the appellation of *Frenchmen-Israelites*, or ‘adherents of the Mosaic religion’: Having been emancipated, in the change of policy that followed the revolution in that country, from many of the burdensome and injurious restrictions, they hail in this ameliorated condition the advent of the Messiah (Ashley-Cooper 1838, 180-181)(italics in original).

Beyond the clearly anti-Semitic tone with regard to assimilated Jews, what is interesting here is how Cooper objects to European nationalisms. From his own perspective of British imperialism, the transnationalist pretensions of British identity and its imagined position outside of Europe apparently shields him from identifying with the rise of European nationalism, all whilst he foreshadows very precisely the anti-assimilationist rhetoric of Zionist settler-nationalism. European Jews are secularizing and they seek a *national* messiah, yes, but crucially they sought one and have claimed him, *in place*, they do not seek to embark *into space* and bring about the return of Cooper’s messiah in Palestine. They remain —though he clearly acknowledges that they are liberating themselves— alien elements in

Europe and are apparently losing their identity as “real” Jews. This argument, or at least a variant of it, will become a key trope of Zionism proper.

Cooper closes his treatise on the restoration with arguments for British support of the endeavour, both of which are relevant to us here. First, he articulates an argument that will essentially be recapitulated by the British War Cabinet in its justification for supporting the Balfour declaration. In a common trope of Anti-Semitism/Philosemitism —though as we have seen often the two bleed into one another— Cooper ascribes almost supernatural powers to the Jews, through which, British support for restoration cannot but help to avail itself of. This is not an argument made in religious terms, it is entirely secular. Cooper states:

Throughout the East [the Jews] nearly monopolize the concerns of traffic and finance, and maintain a secret but uninterrupted intercourse with their brethren in the West. Thousands visit Jerusalem in every year from all parts of the globe, and carry back to their respective bodies, that intelligence which guides their conduct, and influences their sympathies. So rapid and accurate is their mutual communication, that Frederick the Great confessed the earlier and superior intelligence obtained through the Jews of all affairs of moment. Napoleon knew well of the value of an Hebrew alliance; and endeavoured to reproduce, in the capital of France, the spectacle of the ancient Sanhedrim, which, basking in the sunshine of imperial favour, might give laws to the whole body the Jews throughout the habitable world, and aid him, no doubt, in his audacious plans against Poland and the East (Ashley-Cooper 1838, 189).

Essentially, the tentacles of what approximates an Elders of Zion might be utilized by British imperialism to better exercise its power in Europe, the Middle East and across the globe.

More importantly for our purposes is Cooper’s next statement, in which he outlines a teleology of history in which Protestant benevolence towards the Jews has accounted for its worldly greatness. It is a history that begins with Cromwell’s readmission of the Jews to England:

No sooner had England given shelter to the Jews, under Cromwell and Charles, than she started forward in a commercial career of unrivalled and uninterrupted prosperity; Holland, embracing the principles of the Reformation, threw off the yoke of Philip, opened her cities to the Hebrew people, and obtained an importance far beyond her natural advantages; while Spain, in her furious and bloody expulsion of the race, sealed her own condemnation. ‘How deep a wound’ says Mr. Milman, ‘was inflicted on the national prosperity by this act of the “most Christian Sovereign,” cannot easily be calculated, but it may be reckoned among the most effective causes of the decline of Spanish greatness’ (Ashley-Cooper 1838, 191).

Here again, we have a version of Arendt’s formulation vis-à-vis Anti-Semitism in Central Europe. Cooper displaces practically the entirety of a rootless, transnational, British capitalism’s ‘blood and dirt’ (Marx 1991, 926) onto the figure of the Jew and his supernatural power. Whilst he extols British greatness here, Cooper spent much of his political life attempting to ameliorate the condition of victims of British capitalism at home and in the empire and the prescriptions he and the evangelical missionary movement had for ameliorating the conditions of the Jews themselves —a return to agriculture by way of training farms (Lewis 2010, 53)— were informed by the same ruralism and aversion to the effects of urban capitalism that characterised the republicanism of J. R. Seeley or J. A. Froude (Bell 2016, 48). Again, the displaced population serves as a material —a tabula rasa of sorts— for the playing out of social anxieties vis-à-vis the other, though these anxieties seem to concern the self rather more than

they do the other.²⁵ It is only starker in the case of the Jews in this example because they are the *Ur--* Other against which Christianity constructed its universalist message, and upon which evangelical missionizing Protestants like Anthony Ashley Cooper set out to distinguish themselves from all other denominations by way of their great beneficence towards.

4.2: Laurence Oliphant and George Gawler: Classical, and Settler Colonial approaches to Restoration

Both Oliphant and Gawler were active functionaries in the Empire, both were religious, though Oliphant's faith, as we shall see, was of a fringe character, even amongst the evangelicals like Ashley Cooper whom he rubbed shoulders with in London. Their two prescriptions for restoration mark the distinction between classical exploitation and settler colonialism. Although in terms of the timeline of Christian Zionism, Gawler's plan came first, because it is the closest in terms of its similarity to eventual Zionist settlement in Palestine, I will deal with it after having considered Oliphant and his proposals.

Oliphant's life prior to the travels in Palestine and Lebanon which he would record in *The Land of Gilead*, are at least tangentially relevant to his proposals for restoration. Born in South Africa, raised we might say, transnationally across the empire, his biographer Anne Taylor argues his first encounter with a utopian social formation at Newera Elliya in Ceylon as a child had lasting impact on his personality, influencing his later forays into religious esotericism and religious-socialist settler colonial experimentation in America (Taylor 1982, 10, 115). Oliphant was raised an evangelical, but judging by the account of them he presented in his satire *Piccadilly*, despised them, particularly their missionizing practices (Taylor 1982, 115-4). In 1859, Oliphant, profoundly disillusioned by the implicit messianism but lack of praxis in Christian piety, encountered the American travelling preacher Thomas Lake Harris as he was passing through London. Harris, who, while visiting Scotland and the North, had been 'moved by the scenes of poverty he had witnessed [there] [...]' (Taylor 1982, 122), would develop a settler colonially inflected millennial cult to overcome such evils.

Harris, a product of the American "great awakening", mixed evangelical Christianity, Swedenborgian spiritualism and utopian-socialism and professed intimate knowledge of numerous settler-socialist-religious projects in America such as the Owenites²⁶, the Oneida Community and the Mormons. Harris quickly assembled a congregation in London high society including Oliphant and his mother, which

²⁵ It is worth noting, as Lewis does, that Cooper nursed a profound sense of victimhood concerning his religious beliefs (Lewis 2010, 111), and that he and his cohort of co-religionists feared being considered eccentric or even mad due to their belief in the restorationist project (Bar-Yosef 2003). Cooper, despite his political and social standing, was a self-styled outsider.

²⁶ Oliphant would actually marry into the Owen family after the death of le Strange in Palestine in 1886.

intersected with the likes Ashley Cooper, Lord Palmerston and the heart of British hereditary power (Taylor 1982, 118, 119, 124). At the onset of the Civil War Harris returned to America:

He anticipated chaos, [...] and in chaos he foresaw golden opportunities for spiritual regeneration that he must be on hand to direct. He collected a group of the faithful in New York and went with them to the comparative isolation of Wassaic in Dutchess County about eighty miles up the Hudson River. There the members of the Brotherhood of the New Life, by 'breathing together' would become a centre of divine power and, ultimately, regenerate the world (Taylor 1982, 123).

Oliphant, his mother, and wife, Alice le Strange, would all eventually make their way to Harris's utopian community. The logic of Harris's teaching, whilst entirely hypocritical—in that Harris himself did not adhere to it—was analogous to settler colonial logics and would have parallels with Zionism in Palestine. The new society and new subjects that the Brotherhood of the New Life were set about in creating required splendid isolation. The underlying logic of English and American rural republicanism and the related settler structural logic of displacement of social contradiction were both present in Harris's designs for seeking a tabula rasa for the construction of a new society. Harris too, via his modern evangelism, saw man's hand in the divine plan. His Swedenborgian spiritualism—'liberal and optimistic, affirming that man was at liberty to progress and capable of doing so' (Taylor 1982, 119)—was a piece of the messianic sacred-secular progressivism that informed the bacterially reproducing settler-religious and religious-socialist communities in America in the nineteenth century. This process, part of the wider thrust of the American state's drive towards the Pacific and its self-understood march into world history, can be understood as it was by Carlton Hayes; as the further syncretism of Protestantism with other forms of faith and its continual splintering into a new kind of religiosity. Though Hayes' object is strictly nationalism as religion, we might posit that utopianism more generally is the real religious 'sense' (Hayes 1926) of the settler scenario, forever pushing out and away from constituted authority into new isolates, where the formation of new social forms and identities might be discovered over the next horizon.

Harris put his followers, including Oliphant—one time clandestine agent of the Crown and foreign correspondent of *The Times* in the Crimea—to work, labouring on the land. 'Each member of the community' had to 'purify himself by manual labour', 'Familial ties had to be broken to allow for the process of spiritual regeneration' and 'love for mankind' would then 'replace love for individuals' (Taylor 1982, 124). Of the enterprise, Harris said that 'Our work is to rear hero-martyrs' (Taylor 1982, 142).

The Oliphant's appeal to Harris was, like many of his followers, their wealth, funding his purchases of land, and the lifestyle "the Father" lived, while his followers worked the land. Oliphant and Le Strange would break from the Harris cult, but their esoteric spiritualism—'divine respiration' or '*Sympneumata*' as the mature form Oliphant developed would be termed—followed them to Palestine. The properties they purchased for Harris in Brocton New York would also function as refuges and

training farms for Romanian Jews whom they could not immediately transport to Palestine (Taylor 1982, 218).

It is perhaps not surprising that given his experience of settler colonialism in the Harris cult and his knowledge of British imperialism from his time as a functionary within the Empire, Oliphant's ideas vis-à-vis restoration revolved more around classical rather than settler colonial logics. Though this was the case, just as colonialism and settler colonialism can exist alongside and within one another, so too, Oliphant's discourse on restoration contained the themes of both. In *The Land of Gilead* Oliphant asserts the classic Lockean position on the de-facto right to settler title and to the dispossession of its original inhabitants in the process of establishing it. Interestingly, he does so *after* noting that a solution in which both Arab and a new population of settlers might be equally accommodated:

The fact that this rich and luxuriant country should be only sparsely inhabited by a wandering population, possessing no legal title whatever to the soil, specially adapts it to settlement, by a fixed and permanent population who could be established there without injury to the Arabs; for regulations might easily be devised under which the interests of both could be safeguarded and assured. In point of fact, however, the Arabs have very little claim to our sympathy. They have laid waste this country, ruined its villages, and plundered its inhabitants, until it has been reduced to its present condition; and if they were driven back to the Arabian deserts from which they came, there is abundant pasture in its Oases for their camels and goats (Oliphant 1880, 285).

This doctrine of assumed improvement in the future, of mixing ones labour with the land to make it ones property, has a genealogy of its own via Locke and the re-interpretation of Genesis 1:28: 'be fruitful and multiply and fill the earth and subdue it' (Newman 2016, 134). It was repeatedly used in writing by Anglo-settlers to justify the extinction of native title in North America (Newman 2016, 134-135). Here it arrives in palimpsest in the form of the esoteric settler-spiritualist and imperial traveller Oliphant, to be applied in the apparent neighbourhood of the Genesis narrative itself. This brings into sharp focus the settler colonial historical archive that Zionism would concentrate and direct at Palestine and Palestinians.

Oliphant's description of the present Jews in Palestine closely foreshadows the mainstream Zionist position regarding them, especially that of Herzl. It indicates how closely Western European Zionism maintained the Orientalist position vis-à-vis the peoples of the region, but also, how non-Jewish Zionists like Oliphant articulated something practically identical to the negation of exile that would come to form a central component of Jewish Zionist ideology towards non-conforming Jews in Europe and even in Palestine. As Oliphant says of the Jews of Safed:

One seems transported into the ghetto of some Romanian or Russian town, with a few Eastern disagreeables added [...] The majority of the Jews here are supported by a charitable fund called the *Halukah*, which is subscribed to by pious Jews all over the world as a sacred duty [...] The practical result of this system is to maintain in idleness and mendacity a set of useless bigots, who combine superstitious observance with immoral practice, and who, as a rule, are opposed to every project which has for its object the real progress of the Jewish nation. Hence they regard with alarm the establishment of agricultural colonies, or the inauguration of an era of any kind of labour by Jews in Palestine (Goldman 2009, 68).

Where Oliphant rejected what he saw here as Jewish Orthodoxy, much as he despised the orthodoxy in Christianity; in fringe groups such as the Romanian BILU, Oliphant found kindred spirits, whose asceticism and esotericism mirrored Oliphant's experiences with religious-socialist settlement and the spiritualism he would eventually put into prose at Haifa. The BILU intended to send a vanguard of settlers to Palestine, 'an elite whose members would be called on to make sacrifices in their private lives (including abstaining from marriage),' who, through a return to labour in the holy soil, would 'achieve their exalted purpose' (Taylor 1982, 210). Though Oliphant was ultimately unsuccessful in lobbying the Porte to accept them into the country, many would end up in the former Harris commune in Brockton, New York (Taylor 1982, 218).

Though his consideration of restoration in the main body of *The Land of Gilead* indicates a settler colonial bent in his perspective, both the appendixes he includes of press clippings in support of his projects and the proposals he made to the British government officials indicate the opposite. The plan he apparently divulged to Benjamin Disraeli (Moruzzi 2006, 66) involved the setting up of:

A limited company [...] formed with capital subscribed throughout the western world. This company would have powers of administration, police and customs, and would build roads and a railway. [Oliphant] foresaw that Jews who would settle there would be rich enough to be able to employ as agricultural labourers the *fellahin* who already lived on the land. They would have to agree to become Ottoman subjects, and guarantees as to the title of the land from the [Ottoman] government would be essential (Taylor 1982, 192).

The key problem here with regards to settlement, is that it could not have been successful, at least in solving the Jewish question as Oliphant saw it. For whatever capital outlay for the setting up of the infrastructure of the colony, the plan requires 'Jews rich enough to employ' labour. This is a plan for the setting up of a Rhodesia, or a Kenya, not an Australia or an Israel. More precisely, as the first Aliyah of Jewish Zionists would discover, agricultural colonies employing native labour are of small use to settler communities beyond the enrichment of the employers of said labour and the expansion of the natives' base of economic subsistence. In short, Oliphant's scheme as described was a colonial project, not a settler colonial one and marks that distinction.

Likewise, the press clippings in the appendix to *The Land of Gilead* tell the same story, of Jewish colonists presiding over Arab labour:

[The Jews] would bring their business intelligence, their industry and their wealth to bear upon the new enterprise, and would give it an energetic and enlightened impulse. It is, above all, to those Mussulman refugees whose fate is the source of constant uneasiness to the paternal government of the Sultan, that Mr Oliphant looks to furnish the popular working element of the youthful colony. By transferring to the Belka some thousands of these sober, enduring, hardy, and experienced agriculturists, the success of this great 'model farm' would be insured, and the happiness of these unfortunates, most of whom wander about homeless, hungry, and without occupation, would be secured (Oliphant 1880, 504).

Indeed, there is a positively anti-settler colonial impulse here, as Arab labour is to be transferred *into* the colony from outside. But the most obvious problem is the simplest. Historically settler colonies have not been peopled by the rich, by those with the capital to transport themselves across great

distances and into alien lands. The first English colonies in North America were not voluntary enterprises and resembled more the prison hulks that founded Australia, than the mythical Mayflower (Wolfe 2016, 26). The Jews that might people a “restored” Zion could not afford to get there and those who could afford to, had little inclination to risk their livelihoods, their assimilated position in European society or their standards of living. Perhaps the only proto-Zionist thinker who understood this, was suitably a product of the British Settler Empire.

There is very little written about George Gawler, outside of the *Australian Dictionary of Biography* and a few South Australian amateur histories.²⁷ He presided over the extinction of native title in the South Australian colony and opened the site of what would become Adelaide for settlement. After vastly expanding the Governate’s spending to cover surveyance, land clearance and the expansion of settlement, he was recalled from his post in 1840 due to the debts he ran up (Hetherington 1966). However, the principle that settler colonies should, indeed required, the ability to accrue considerable debt whilst expanding their base of settlement –the profits of which could be recouped later– would, I believe, inform his thinking vis-à-vis Jewish restoration.

He published two pamphlets on Jewish restoration, one directed at religious restoration and one, to be considered here, in 1845, concerned with the practical side of things. Gawler commences his pamphlet as Ashley Cooper did his *State and Prospects*, with an account of “Syrian” desolation, into which an interloper has apparently stepped: ‘the unlettered and restless Bedawy, wanders through deserted towns, and thorn covered-plains, “monarch of all he survey;” or reigns, almost as absolute, in defiance of all constituted authority’ (Gawler 1845, 5-6). Here the Bedouin practically assumes the familiar trope of both the marauding Indian of the American West and the wandering Aborigine of the Australian wilderness, the motif of emptiness compounded through his paraphrasing of William Cowper’s poem *The Solitude of Alexander Selkirk*. Palestine is empty, a point Gawler reiterates in a passage that offers something of a grim augury of the narratives that would be constructed around 1948:

Under such circumstances, in this nation of Great Britain, which Divine Providence has remarkably constituted as an instrument of welfare to the world; the question may well be forcing itself upon the minds of reflecting men —is there no preventative for this torrent of evil? And to this enquiry the answer would seem most naturally to follow. REPLENISH THE DESERTED TOWNS AND FIELDS OF PALESTINE WITH THE ENERGETIC PEOPLE WHOSE WARMEST AFFECTIONS ARE ROOTED IN THE SOIL (Gawler 1845, 6).

With regards to the work of practical colonization in Palestine, Gawler begins by suggesting that whilst it may not be possible to legally establish freehold tenancy under Ottoman law, that the letter of the law might be essentially abrogated by essentially establishing leases of such length ‘that they should occupy such property on tenures nominally temporary, but amounting in effect to freehold possession’

²⁷ See Borrow T. *Lieutenant-Colonel George Gawler* (The Pioneers Association of South Australia: 1955) for example

(Gawler 1845, 15-16). Where this is not possible Gawler suggests that great powers such as Britain might force the Porte to accede to such a state of affairs anyway. This is crucial, for as Wolfe reminds us, settler colonialism takes place at the level of usufruct (Wolfe 2012, 155) or rights use to land. What Gawler was intimating —that British power could de-facto alter the regime of rights use to land on the ground in Palestine— Zionism proper would utilize as one of the core practices of consolidating its land base by purchasing with the land the right to hold it in perpetuity.

Gawler divides the settlers to be transported to Palestine into three groups, essentially, those who are entirely self-sufficient (those who could afford transit and land on arrival), those who have some capital, and those who have none and who would need to be entirely subsidized (Gawler 1845, 21-22). All are allocated land in proportion to their place amongst the three groups. Those who are entirely subsidized by the colony would obtain

at once, on arriving at their place of destination, a site for a house; and as they might desire it, land in the proportion, of about one acre for each adult in their families, for every two children above, or for every three children under, ten years of age —with the possibility of the extent being increased on future application and permission (Gawler 1845, 22).

The partially sufficient would receive roughly double this quantity of land, the self-sufficient, roughly six times. The classes are not fixed designations and Gawler expects settlers to be able to rise through the designations over time.

The crucial aspect of Gawler's plan is how the labour of the colony would be organized. The two bottom classes were to constitute the subsistence base of the colony, but he did not want the first class to be excluded from the work of subsistence farming either:

The second and third classes would constitute the essential subsistence of the colony. They might exist on the small allotment system, without the first class; but their prosperity and prospects, and the general character and influence of the whole undertaking, would be most materially improved by the mixing of a due proportion of the first class with them [...]. The proportion of the 3rd class, should never be less than four effective men to every 100 acres of the total amount of land claimed for the first class. This proportion might leave a surplus of labour in reference to the requirements of the first class; but as the labourers would be in possession of their own small allotments for the production of the absolute necessities of life, no serious evil could arise from the preponderance. The second class, with casual assistance from such surplus labour, might be expected to be equal to their own wants in cultivation (Gawler 1845, 22).

The image here is something of romantic tableau of rural America, with judges and politicians working side by side on their own parcels of land with subsistence farmers. It is also, structurally, that of the Colonization Commission for Poznań —so inspiring for second Aliyah Zionist technocrats (Bloom 2008, 193). The Colonization Commission for Poznań relied in part on an allotment system to shore up the subsistence base of German settlers against Polish natives (Piterberg 2008, 85). Gawler also proposes, that much like the later colonization attempt in Poznań and the Zionist enterprise in Palestine itself, that the settlement should be contiguous, forming 'one block' (Gawler 1845, 23).

Lastly, and crucially, Gawler states that the entire project must be founded on substantial outside investment and informs the reader that it will not deliver a return in the short term. Gawler expects a period of several years before the colony will begin to establish itself in self-sufficiency, after which outside subsidy would cease (Gawler 1845, 29). In many ways, his plan for the restoration of the Jews to Palestine seems to be an example of what he might have liked to achieve had he remained at his post as governor in South Australia.

Beyond his specific plan for Palestine, Gawler holds the kind beliefs we have become accustomed to with regards to British restorationists. He articulates an understanding of the British as peculiarly Hebraic themselves and that this is part of a process of historic change: ‘As time rolled on, the high and sacred principles which Jews inscribed, Jews preserved, and Jews transmitted, became more widely diffused, and more profoundly received in Great Britain than in any other nation’ (Gawler 1845, 33). Lastly, and importantly, like Ashley Cooper and many later Zionists, Gawler objects to the notion of assimilation in Europe. When outlining the potential motives in support of restoration he states:

With regard to Great Britain and Turkey, motives and power are evidently sufficient. There are inducements of the highest order for the British Crown Government, Legislature and Nation, to enter upon the work with their combination of power and resources. There are sufficient reasons the Turkish government should accede to the proposition, and exert its power to open its desolate wastes to improvement. In reference to the third and last great link of the chain, the Jews, the sufficiency of active motives may not be so generally apparent. Reckless persons among them have been known even of late years to say, “Wherever I can prosper there is my Jerusalem;” and common spectators mixing such symptoms with the prejudices of their own education, may still think that this is the spirit of the Jewish nation at large. Observers, however, who have been giving close and candid attention to the state of their opinions and feelings, will, I am most sure, join with me in declaring that this is not the spirit of the nation, but of unworthy exceptions to its tone and temper (Gawler 1845, 39-40).

Thus, Gawler recapitulates Ashley-Cooper’s position, objecting to those amongst the Jews –quite clearly the vast majority in 1845– who adopt the traditional Jewish position on Jerusalem as a spiritual symbol, who seek to make ‘their Jerusalem’ *in place* rather than returning to the material Jerusalem *in space*. Gawler’s Christian territorialisation of the Holy Land thus informs his misunderstanding of Jewish theology, a basic position underlying all the restorationists we have considered: that the Jews are fundamentally an alien people, a contradictory material in Europe who, therefore, must be displaced, preferably to Palestine.

4.3: Zionism and Empire: The Settler Imperialism of Theodor Herzl and Israel Zangwill

Our primary interest with Theodor Herzl will not be with his prodigious efforts in mobilizing the fledgling Zionist movement, or his attempts at solving the Jewish question via the connections he fostered and practice of intensive lobbying of European powers that he initiated. Rather, we will be concerned with the way in which Herzl’s thought conforms or diverges from the currents we have already encountered thus far, how this Zionism represents a continuity with the secular-sacred

messianism of Christian Zionism/Philosemitism and ultimately, how this informs the imperialism and settler colonialism in Herzl's thinking, which he made most explicit in his utopian novel *Altneuland*.

Herzl entertained several fantasies of Jewish emancipation prior to a growing acquaintance with Viennese nationalist politics and a disillusionment with the prospects of finding a solution to the Jewish question in Europe. His three fantasy solutions to the problems of the Jews in Europe are useful in charting the change in his thinking. They mark the personal, the social and the political and historic means of making change in the world (Lowenberg 1996, 111) and are worth considering prior to his Zionism, since they all seek, however fantastically, to make change in place rather than seeking it in space.

Herzl's first fantasy is to almost literally duel anti-Semitism to death. He considered that 'Half a dozen duels will do a great deal to improve the position of Jews in society [...]' and contemplated challenging some of Austria's most famous anti-Semites to fight. If he were killed, a posthumous letter would then be published, announcing 'to the world his victimization from anti-Semitism; 'the most unjust movement in the world' (Herzl in Lowenberg 1996, 111). If

however, it had been my lot to kill my opponent and be brought to trial, then I would have delivered a brilliant speech which would have begun with my regrets for the death of a man of honour [...] then I would have turned to the Jewish question and delivered an oration worthy of Lassalle. I would have sent a shudder of admiration through the jury. I would have compelled the respect of the judges, and the case against me would have been dismissed. Thereupon the Jews would have made me one of their representatives and I would have declined. I would refuse to achieve such a position by the killing of a man (Herzl in Lowenberg 1996, *ibid*).

Strangely, whilst Herzl objects to the anti-Semitism of his slain fantasy opponent, he still refers to him as a 'man of honour' (Herzl in Lowenberg 1996, *ibid*). The anti-Semitism here is apparently separable from the anti-Semite, as if it were really not of him at all, something alien to his being and a consequence of the Jew in Europe perhaps? "Honour" will be a repeated figure in Herzl's discourse, as his next fantasy of emancipation for Jews would indicate. Herzl dreamed of leading all of Austria's Jews to mass conversion into the Catholic Church, this time, the language and the project is not of recognition as before, but a visible ritual act of mass assimilation: 'We must submerge in the people.' (Herzl in Lowenberg 1996, *ibid*). Here again though, for Herzl and the elites of the community the question of honour is still paramount; they would remain Jews and propagate the mass conversion, as pseudo Catholic missionaries, of the 'children and the masses only' (Herzl in Lowenberg 1996, *ibid*).

Herzl's last fantasy, that he would compose a play through which a new understanding between Jew and Gentile might be achieved, became a reality, at least in that he wrote it in a productive fever over seventeen days (Lowenberg 1996, 112). *The New Ghetto* essentially recapitulates Herzl's dream of duelling anti-Semitism to death. Its hero, Dr Samuel, ceases to be really "Jewish" by his contact with honourable Christian gentlemen. They teach him 'honour', as he explains: 'to honour a man without crawling at his feet, [...] to be proud without being arrogant' (Herzl in Lowenberg 1996, 112). Dr

Samuel is eventually killed in a duel and in his dying words imparts his lesson to the Jews: ‘my brothers, there will come a time when they will let you live again –when you know how to die’ (Herzl in Lowenberg 1996, 112).

It is perhaps telling and a rather grim omen that as far as Herzl’s imagination was concerned, the way out of the Jewish bind in Europe up to this point was ritual assimilation or death –honourable or otherwise. To remain in Europe for Herzl, Jews would have to cease to be (Jews); an elimination of a similar character to that faced by indigenous peoples in settler colonies. Herzl’s obsession with the honour of aristocratic European anti-Semites would seem to be a classic case of identification with the aggressor (Freud 1993, 116-7). Given as we have seen, that anti-Semitism turns on that which European wealth and power in modernity displaces in itself as parvenu onto the Jew, this is little surprising, especially if we consider that several of the objects of this identification for Herzl, such as Karl Leuger, were also successful populist anti-Semitic politicians (Lowenberg 1996, 116).

The figure of Jewish honour, produced via its mutually constituted European aristocratic counterpart, would be introduced in *Altneuland* in the figure of Kingscourt, who was tellingly, an Americanized Prussian; Kingscourt is both a European aristocrat and a settler. Kingscourt is regaling the novel’s protagonist, Freidrich, of his time in the cavalry:

“I’m reminded,” continued Kingscourt, “of an affair I once had with one of your fellow-nationals or co-religionists [...] In short with a Jew. It happened in the regiment. We had a volunteer there. Cohn was the creature’s name, a low... excuse me! This Cohn was a damned bow-legged fellow, as if created for the cavalry. It happened during the riding lesson. I made the swine jump the barriers. That is, I wanted to make them jump. They didn’t want to, or couldn’t. It was a bit high, that’s true. Well I cursed them as such God-forsaken swine deserved [...] I went for Cohn in particular. ‘You probably ride notes of exchange better,’ I sneered. The blood rushed to the Jew’s face. He took the Jump, but fell and broke his arm. That worried me for a while. Why must such carrion have a sense of honour into the bargain?”

“Do you think a Jew should have no sense of honour?”

“Oh, I say! How you twist my words [...] Well, and if the Jews have a sense of honour, why do they put up with all the mischief?”

“What would you have the Jews do, Mr Kingscourt?”

“What would I have them do? Really, I don’t know. Something like that Cohn in the Tiding school, I respected him more after that.”

“Because he broke his arm?”

“No, because he showed that he had a will of his own [...] If I were in your place, I’d do something bold, I’d do something big, something that would make my enemies gape. Prejudices, my dear fellow, there will always be. The human pack nourishes itself on prejudices from the cradle to the grave. Well, then. Since prejudices cannot be wiped out, they must be overcome [...] The more I think of it, the more it seems to me that it must be quite interesting to be a Jew these days. Just because one has the whole world against him” (Herzl 1916, 23-4).

Here we have we have Herzl’s position on honour condensed down to a fine point. Having honour is having a will of one’s own. This scene offers a paradoxical self-determination; paradoxical as the very concept of self-determination is, because it is impossible. It is only by Kingscourt’s anti-Semitic insult and his later recognition of Cohn that self-determination becomes manifest. It is almost all externally

determined. In it we have a classic fact of Zionism: that it positively needed anti-Semitism, indeed, that arguably in this paradoxical self-determination, the recognition it required at the moment of statehood was explicitly from an anti-Semitic Europe and America. In the mind of Herzl, and I would argue, in much of the symbolism of Zionism, it is this belief in ‘doing something bold’ and in being observed in doing as much, that would form a crucial component of Israeli settler self-identity and support for its project on the part of observing parties.

Herzl appropriately inculcated much of the anti-Semitism of the Austrian nobility which he recounted in his diaries that he wished he had been born into, combining its anti-liberalism with a futurist romanticism –the future component of a teleology of history which went back to a pre-diaspora Kingdom of Israel (Piterberg 2008, 31). The Palestine he wished to create as a home for the Jews would be informed by Eurocentrism, his captivation with technology and his failed dreams of a career in architecture (Lowenberg 1996, 118). What he could not build with his hands, he would construct with words. As Lowenberg recounts, on a visit to Palestine in 1898, after seeing Jerusalem for the first time, he inverted a Jewish prayer, proclaiming: ‘When I remember thee in days to come, O Jerusalem, it will not be with pleasure. The musty deposits of two-thousand years of inhumanity, intolerance, and filth be in your foul-smelling alleys’ (Herzl in Lowenberg 1996, 118). He went on:

If Jerusalem becomes ours and I can still do something at that time, the first thing I would do is clean it up. I would remove everything that is not holy, set up workers’ housing outside the city, clear out the filth nests, and tear them down, burn the non-holy rubble, and move the bazaars elsewhere. Then, while keeping the old style of architecture where possible, build a comfortable, airy, sewerred, new city around the holy places (Herzl in Lowenberg 1996, 118).

Here Herzl is engaging in a classic example of the utopian imaginary, what Harvey refers to as ‘spatial play’, the spatial exclusion of disruptive social forces (Harvey 2000, 99-100). In this case, much of the living community of Jerusalem is removed so that the old city might be entirely replaced, its contradictory material displaced in a flurry of creative destruction. Such a process is also an innately settler colonial logic. Herzl is building his imaginary Jerusalem in *place* of the one that already exists. It is all the more important to recall this discourse from the nineteenth century on Jerusalem, when in 1967 in the space of a few days the Mughrabi Quarter was bulldozed to create the plaza for the Western Wall (Sand 2014, 2), or when one walks through the wide renovated alleyways between fortress like buildings in the Jewish Quarter on Ha-Mekubalim in the present.

Herzl’s approach to Jerusalem in the first section of *Altneuland* reflects some of the reasons why he wanted to clear the slate of the city and build it anew. His travellers, Friedrich and Kingscourt, first disembark at Jaffa and travel across a practically post-apocalyptic wasteland; ‘a picture of desolation’ which looks as ‘if burnt over’ (Herzl 1916, 25). To this Friedrich remarks: ‘if this is our land [...] it has declined like our people’ (Herzl 1916, *ibid*). The implication for the reader is that the negation of exile, the return to history and to the land as expressed in most restorationist discourse up to this point,

describes a symbiotic relationship between a national people and their homeland. If this relationship is voided, both will suffer.

When the two arrive in Jerusalem at night it is worthy of Friedrich's tears, his awe and his proto-Zionist yearnings. But this is the case only at night, when it is empty of Oriental subjects. In the daylight

Jerusalem [...] was less alluring—shouting, odours, a flurry of dirty colours, crowds of ragged people in narrow, musty lanes, beggars, sick people, hungry children, screeching women, shouting tradesmen. The once royal city of Jerusalem could have sunk no lower (Herzl 1916, 26).

When it is alive with commerce—that of trade, bodies, and sounds—Jerusalem is profaned, Herzl must imagine it as emptied, with its disruptive contradictory forces at the very least shifted to the outside. Only then can he apparently imagine it as holy and suitable for the injection of modern European subjects.

The displacement of contradiction, that central and recurrent move in settler colonialism, of displacing revolution, is more than just the application of theory to settler colonialism after the fact; it permeates the settler logic and Herzl's Zionist thinking. Herzl speaks of *literally* forestalling a revolution in Germany by Jewish outmigration. In a letter he composed to the German Kaiser, Herzl stated:

If Jews emigrate [...] you thereby gain, or rather, preserve, genuine German citizens, *forestall a revolution* which might be hard to contain, weaken socialism which the oppressed Jews must flock to because they are cast out of other parties, *and gain time for the solution of social problems* (Herzl 1960, 62) (My italics).

We can usefully understand the settler move as a revolution deferred and projected outward, away from the consolidated hierarchies of the metropole. Herzl repeatedly narrates as much in the “state”²⁸ and society he narrates in *Altneuland* which his protagonists return to after having withdrawn from the world for 20 years. The politics of the New Society for a start has displaced all partisan interest, indeed, the term “politician” is deemed an insult ruled slanderous by the courts (Herzl 1916, 43). In short, politics is not about securing one's interests, all class contestation has been *displaced*. David Littwak explains the situation thus: ‘Nations with unbroken histories have to carry burdens assumed by their ancestors. Not we’ (Herzl 1916, 44). The calcified hierarchies of European history have been displaced too. When explaining the construction of the infrastructure of the New Society, Littwak speaks of ‘beginning at the beginning’:

There was one of the great advantages of having begun from the beginning. Just because everything here had been in a primitive, neglected state, it had been possible to install the most up-to-date technical appliances at once. So it had been with the city planning, as they already knew; and so it had been with the construction of the railways, the digging of canals, the establishment of agriculture and industry in the land. [...] The Jewish settlers who streamed into the country had brought with them the experience of the whole civilized world. The trained men graduated from universities, technical, agricultural and commercial colleges had brought with them every type of skill required for the building up of the country. The penniless young intelligentsia, for

²⁸ The inhabitants of Herzl's New Society make pains to point out that they do not occupy a state as such, though it is difficult to parse under what authority they actually exist, as Herzl was no anarchist.

whom there were no opportunities in the anti-Semitic countries and who were sunk to the level of a hopeless, revolutionary minded proletariat, these desperate, educated, young men had become a great blessing for Palestine, for they had brought the latest methods of applied science into the country (Herzl 1916, 71).

Herzl here is explaining the benefits of a tabula rasa for a new society; a clean slate, where the structures of history, of class, do not exist and work can begin from the ground up, or at least where what does exist can be easily eliminated. All that remains then is to sink foundations in the cleared territory via the preaccumulative storehouse of a Jewish technocratic intelligentsia, who, if left to their own devices in place, might undermine the fabric of European politics and society. Herzl's utopia is an escape from radicalism, which he narrates from the primary move from place into space, down to the economic order of the New Society itself, which he modelled on the Mutualism of the Rochdale and Rahaline cooperative societies (Herzl 1916, 82-83). Littwak explains an economic order that is both paternalistic and anti-socialistic:

In my firm for instance, you will see an interesting example of a mixed form. I am the owner. My employees have a co-operative society which, with my approval and encouragement, is becoming more and more independent of me. At first they had only a consumers' co-operative society, but later they expanded it to include a savings fund. You must remember that our workingmen, as members of the New Society, are automatically insured against accidents, illness, old age, and death. Their savings-capacity is therefore not split up by provision for these contingencies [...] We have no differences over wages or anything else. It is, if you choose to call it so, a patriarchal relation, but one expressed in ultra-modern forms. If a demagogue were to try to incite my men, I should not need to have him thrown out—they'd simply laugh him out of court, so that he'd be glad to run away. They know what they are about, and there's an end to all vague socialistic notions (Herzl 1916, 52).

This economic displacement of contradiction is particularly significant for us since it very closely foreshadows the consolidation of settlement in Palestine during the Second Aliyah under Arthur Ruppin. Beyond this, displacement positively pervades the novel above and beyond the narrative itself; it transcends it. The figure of the Arab, displaced almost entirely, is consolidated in the lone character of Reschid Bey; the German-speaking and accented landowner. Herzl's bourgeoisie Arab ventriloquism through the character of Bey; whose comment on the Arabs of Palestine, that 'those who had nothing, stood to lose nothing' (Herzl 1916, 69), indicates that the land was not theirs to lose in the first place. Otherwise, Arabs are only ever seen from a distance, in the form of their villages, displaced from the narrative of the novel almost entirely. They exist as pockets in an ocean of modern techno-utopia, much as the Palestine of old also goes unmentioned, quietly spirited away beyond some temporal border.

Herzl's imagination of Zionism, as simply the transfer of European subjects and technologies into new territories, that is, as a natural extension of European imperialism, is repeatedly articulated in *Altneuland*. Our protagonists are repeatedly told that the utopian project is merely the result of the transplant of existing European, American and British Settler Imperial technologies into the country (Herzl 1916, 39, 45, 71, 92). Herzl's fondness for imperialism is in keeping with what we know of his manoeuvrings and statements outside of his fiction. He understood the British Uganda proposal as an

opportunity to found a Jewish colony that would then go on to support settlement in Palestine, referring to it as 'a miniature England in reverse'; the overseas colony eventually founding the motherland. This phrase, according to Bar-Yosef 'preserves the imperfect colonial mimicry that stands at the heart of the Zionist project.' (Bar-Yosef 2009, 185). He also sought to recruit the support of Cecil Rhodes for the Zionist project, though Rhodes died before he was able to arrange a meeting. What he wanted from Rhodes however was not material. In writing to him he stated: 'What I want from you is not that you should contribute a few guineas to our fund or that you should lend them to me, but that you should place the stamp of your authority on the Zionist scheme.' (Herzl in Levene 2009, 211). Rhodes, as one of the principle men behind the British conquest of Southern Africa and what would eventually become Rhodesia and former Prime Minister of the Cape Colony, was exactly the kind of British imperialist that Herzl sought to imitate.

Herzl's veneration of British imperialism in Africa appears in *Altneuland* via a meeting he records in his diaries with the bacteriologist and Zionist Alex Marmorek. Marmorek wished to study malaria with a view to eliminating it in the incipient colonies in Palestine, and then perhaps going on to 'open Africa to European culture' (Herzl 1960, 950-951), the way apparently being blocked by the mosquito borne protozoa. The vision for Africa in the fictionalization of this meeting Herzl provides for the reader in *Altneuland* is entirely in keeping with similar late settler imperial designs of the likes of Jan Christian Smuts, Cecil Rhodes and Leo Amery:

Steineck [...] led the way through his laboratories, which were patterned after those of the Pasteur Institute in Paris. His numerous assistants were not disturbed by the presence of the visitors, and quietly went on with their work [...]. One, however, turned on the Professor with rough good nature. "Leave us in peace, sir I have no time for all these catechisms. Else this fellow will escape me again!"

Steinbeck obediently marshalled the visitors out of the room. Outside, he remarked, "He is quite right. The fellow he referred to was his bacillus. Understand?"

"I work here," he added a moment later, showing them into his own laboratory, which was simply equipped as those of his young assistants.

"At what, if I may ask?" inquired Friedrich.

The scientist's eyes grew dreamy as he replied, "At the opening up of Africa."

The visitors mistrusted their ears. Was the seeker after scientific truth a bit mad?

"Did you say, 'at the opening up of Africa'?" Asked Kingscourt, suspicion gleaming in his eye.

"Yes, Mr. Kingscourt. That is to say, I hope to find the cure for malaria. We have overcome it here in Palestine thanks to the drainage of the swamps, canalization, and the eucalyptus forests. But conditions are different in Africa. The same measures cannot be taken there because the prerequisite mass immigration is not present. The white colonist goes under in Africa. That country can be opened up to civilization only after malaria has been subdued. Only then will enormous areas become available for the surplus populations of Europe. And only then will the proletarian masses find a healthy outlet. Understand?" (Herzl 1916, 93-94)

Herzl then has Steinbeck explain that he intends to solve the problem so that there might be a settler colonization of African Americans too in Africa. Palestine is merely the extension of hundreds of years of European colonialism, of repeated acts of settlement, dispossession and colonization. Herzl is careful

throughout the book to remind the reader that no such dispossession has taken place in Palestine itself, though we only ever meet one Arab to confirm this. His position on the settler colonization of Africa in its entirety and the settlement colonization of it by freed slaves, is neither a novelty, nor was it unusual. Writing to Leo Amory as late as 1924, Jan Smuts –member of the War Cabinet that signed off on the Balfour declaration and confidant of Chaim Weizmann– would argue for something like a United States of Africa:

All the highlands of Eastern Africa from the Union to Abyssinia are healthy for Europeans and can be made a great European state or system of states during the next three or four generations. It is one of the richest parts of the world, and only wants white brains and capital to become enormously productive. But the present tendencies seem all in favour of the Native and the Indian, and the danger is that one of the greatest chances in our history will be missed. The cry should be ‘the highlands for the whites’ and a resolute white policy should be pursued. The fruits of such a policy will be a White state in time more important than Australia. There is land enough for all the vast Native population on the flanks of the highlands. But the Natives by themselves will continue to stagnate as they have stagnated for the last ten thousand years. A great White Africa along the Eastern backbone, with railway and road communications connecting North and South will be a first-class addition to the Empire and will repay all the capital put into it. It is an expansion of the Rhodes policy. Why should it not become your policy? (Schwarz 2013, 303)

Further, this clamouring for settler colonies into the early 20th century was not confined to Boers and Zionists. As Tara Zahra has recently shown, from the 1890’s until virtually the eve of the Second World War, Central and Eastern European states were both encouraging emigrant colonialism, experimenting with isopolitical technologies and lobbying for territories which they could turn into settler colonies of their own (Zahra 2017, 167, 170, 174, 183-4). Herzl’s intuitive affinity with settler imperialism in his vision of Palestine in a settler world order that would one day ‘open Africa to civilization’ was in keeping with the milieu he found himself in, and the imperial system he hoped to become a part of.

Where Herzl was clearly comfortable with taking on the ideological accoutrements of settler imperialism, Israel Zangwill’s thought was more ambivalent on the question of how to solve the problem of anti-Semitism in Europe. Zangwill was certainly enamoured of imperialism, especially British imperialism. He identified the English as part of a teleology of history, one of conquests and transits, that connected the ancient Hebrews to the British settler colonists of the present:

Among this little people Christ was born; and His teaching, more or less transformed and for a century and a half not clearly distinguished from Judaism by the Pagan world, was propagated by Jewish apostles in Egypt, Rome, and Syria, and, so, conquering the conquerors of the world, begat the Greek Church and ultimately the Roman and Protestant Churches–this last Church a product of Christianity crossed again by the Old Testament, and in England in particular generating so Hebrew a type of character that at this day the Englishman is regarded throughout the continent as the Pharisee of Europe. As a colonizer, as a “mother of nations,” England smacks more of Phoenicia than of Rome, and in the making of England’s, Old and New, the Old Testament has counted for more than the New (Zangwill 1895, 427-8).

Zangwill believed that it might be possible to secularize Judaism –helped by what he believed to be the continuity of its teachings through Christianity and Islam (Zangwill 1895, 428)– into a political religion on something of a global scale. This ‘Natural Judaism’ would retain the what he believed to be the real moral and intellectual core content of Judaism, stripped away of the supernatural ‘carriers of

the faith' (Glover 2009, 138). The core components of this he believed were that ancient Israel's record of 'backsliding and castigation' and of the revelation that 'its mightiest heroes' were 'weak and sinful' (Zangwill 1895, 427). In short, Yahweh did not confer righteousness on Israel, rather the religious epic was a morality fable and Israel's faults were as important as its virtues (Zangwill 1937, 82).

Concomitant to this Zangwill found in the Old Testament God a parallel to Spinozan immanence (Glover 2009, 138):

There is one God who unifies the cosmos, and one people to reveal him, and one creed to which all the world will come. In science the Jewish instinct, expressing itself, for example through Spinoza, seeks for "One God, one Law, one Element."; in aesthetics it identifies the True and the Beautiful with the Good; in Politics it will not divide Church from State, nor secular history from religious, for Israel's national joys and sorrows are at once incorporated in his religion [...]; in ethics it will not sunder Soul from Body; it will not set this life against the next, this world against another; even in theology it will not altogether sunder God from the humours of existence, from the comedy which leavens the creation (Zangwill 1895, 436-7).

In this, something of the flip-side of the tabula-rasa for a new society/identity in Herzl, Zangwill saw the destruction wrought on Jewish culture and society by capitalist modernity as an almost creative process. The creative destruction of capitalist modernity provided 'the conditions [...] for the renewal and possible generalization of Judaism into a kind of Comtean religion of humanity, binding sociology, socialism, and natural science' (Glover 2009, 138). This intellectual project informed his settler colonial imagination, as Zangwill framed the Jew as a peculiarly moral subject, particularly suited to the work of imperialism (Glover 2009, *ibid*). This new kind of Jew would provide a means through which the extension of civilization under the British empire could continue via a cooperative effort between Zionism and the Crown (Rochelson 2009, 149). The Empire would provide the vehicle, for Zangwill believed that 'the salvation of mankind [lay] in British imperialism' (Obenzinger 2011); 'the Jewish race [was] to be the medium and the missionary' (Zangwill 1937, 82).

His perspective on moral imperialism, invariably British, saw him rail against what he saw was the corruption of the concept in exploitation colonialism, especially that of the Belgian Crown in the Congo, which he campaigned against (Rochelson 2009, 150). It is this space, between classical exploitation and settler colonialism, that Israel Zangwill's ambivalence as Zionist comes to the fore and where ultimately, he is unable to accept the necessities of successful settler colonialism. Zangwill would repeatedly question the logic of Palestine as the focus of Zionist efforts, his most famous explanation of this came in the context of Chamberlain's East Africa offer:

There is [...] a difficulty from which the Zionist dares not avert his eyes, though he rarely likes to face it. Palestine proper has already its inhabitants. The pashalik of Jerusalem is already twice as thickly populated as the United States, having fifty-two souls to the square mile, and not 25 per cent of them Jews; so we must be prepared either to drive out by the sword the tribes in possession as our forefathers did, or to grapple with the problem of a large alien population, mostly Mohammedan and accustomed for centuries to despise us. At present we are only 12 per cent of the population, and hold only 2 per cent of the land. A good deal of the holy soil is in the hands of private proprietors, and would not be ours even if we got the Charter, while the Crown lands, which belong to the Sultan, and might, therefore, be negotiated for as a whole, are, unfortunately, low, and swampy and fever-haunted. And even these are already occupied by Mohammedans from Barbary and the Balkans. This is an infinitely graver difficulty than the stock anti-Zionist taunt that nobody would want to go to

Palestine if we got it. [...] That every Jew would migrate to Palestine or to a new Jewish State is, indeed, incredible, but then such a migration is entirely unnecessary (Zangwill 1937, 210-211).

What Zangwill could not reconcile vis-à-vis the inhabitants of Palestine, he could however, with regards to the Uasin Gishu plateau, at least initially, in the contexts of the above. Zangwill's pronouncements on colonialism in Africa give us something of an indication as to why this might be the case. In the context of the Uganda offer and of British Settler Imperialism more generally, he would write:

[The British Empire] is still in its infancy; vast and overwhelming as it is on the map, its white inhabitants number only a few millions. There are nearly twice as many people in London as in the whole continent of Australia, and a million more than in the whole of Canada. The British Empire's need of population has been strikingly brought home to us all in South Africa by the necessity of the importation of coolies (Zangwill 1937, 214-5).

The obvious issue here is one of race, Jewish settlers—and we can safely assume that he is talking about only specific Jewish ethnicities here—in Zangwill's mind, would be counted as white by the British. In fact, white settlers objected to the idea of Jews arriving in East Africa (Bar-Yosef 2009, 185). He would express this much several times. As Bar-Yosef has noted, the appeal of Africa is obvious for an oppressed racial minority in Europe, 'The Uganda proposal offered a unique chance to realise [a] racial fantasy: defined against the local savages, the Jews' paleness would shine afar' (Bar-Yosef 2009, 184).

One of the key aspects of the Uganda proposal for Zangwill was that it planted the Zionist Territorial project firmly within the expansion of British imperialism and within a teleology of history embracing the Jews. Zangwill saw the east Africa offer as something of a palimpsestic writing over of history:

The admission of the Jews to East Africa is Mr. Chamberlain's own suggestion, as their readmission to England, after nearly four centuries of exile, was Oliver Cromwell's own scheme. With both statesmen, besides the humanitarian aspect, it is part of the same dream—the dream of imperial expansion. 'The Jews', says Mr. Lucien Wolf [...] 'Could not but appear to Cromwell as very desirable instruments of his colonial and commercial policy.' Mr. Chamberlain has the same large view (Zangwill 1937, 215).

Zangwill inculcated both British messianic purpose and the sense of destiny with regards to the restoration of the Jews of the likes of Ashley Cooper, as well as the anti-Semitic notions of Jewish power that British supporters of the Zionist project believed such support would avail itself of.

Indeed, just how much this informed his identity as an Englishman, or an "English" Jew is revealed in how he understood what it meant to be a Jew in England in the immediate aftermath of the Balfour declaration. In responding to the objection of many Jews in England to the support of the British Government for a Jewish National Home in Palestine, Zangwill would write:

the words 'Jewish National Home' offend the patriotism of certain leading British Jews. They are so very English, you see. You will, perhaps, remember the escaped German officer, who took up his abode in a London Hotel. He spoke English perfectly, he wore immaculate English clothes, he gave a genuine London address. Only, instead of writing, say, 55 Park Lane, he wrote Park Lane, 55. And that little difference gave him away. So you see English-born Jews, bred at English public schools and English universities, sometimes in the English

public service, sometimes even married into old English families, yet betrayed as un-English by just one point –they are against the rise of that Jewish State, with which every true Englishman sympathizes (Zangwill 1937, 333).

So, with regards to being a Jew in England as far as Zangwill is concerned, one is either a Zionist, that is, either committed to the establishing of a Jewish state –at this point for him, in Palestine, but before and later the destination could change– outside of Europe. If one is not so committed, one is not in tune with true Englishness; thus one is performing a mimicry, a fine one for sure, but a mimicry that is imperfect, that someone with the right kind of eyes will be able to see through. To be truly “English” and Jewish, one has to do what the English do, ergo, imperialism and settler conquest *in a state of one’s own*. This must surely be the corollary, because there were many English Jews, indeed, surely the majority, who engaged in both the empire and the settler colonies but did not favour a Jewish National Home. But simply, playing a part was not enough to be really English for Zangwill, if one is not a Zionist, one is essentially alien. Settler colonialism is a paradigm full of reversals. It makes natives foreigners, it makes returnees “infiltrators”. In the mind of Israel Zangwill, it made English Jews foreign aliens, unless they subscribed to the notion that they should seek to transplant themselves to a foreign land.

In returning to the Uganda proposal, once Zangwill was able to correspond with agents on the ground in East Africa, it soon became clear that the problems he saw in Palestine were hardly unique to that country. It is in his consideration of these problems that we may question whether Zangwill intuited the dynamics of settler colonialism, or had the stomach for its implications. Despite the fact that the inhabitants of the Uasin Gishu plateau had no Empire, however “sick”, to safeguard them, Helena Auerbach, the Zionist’s (wo)man in East Africa immediately foresaw the problem: ‘the presence in that country of a large and I believe increasing black native population.’ She continued:

Now it is no theory but an unfortunate fact that whenever you introduce the white man into countries (such as this for instance) where there exists a [...] black population the tendency is for the white man to develop into nothing more than an aristocratic minority. I fear very much that, no matter what efforts were made to the contrary, there would be no openings for our people in E. Africa except in the capacity of capitalist & employer of labour, absurd as this may sound (Auerbach in Rochelson 2009, 152).

Zangwill is apparently willing to see past this, on account of the severity of the need for an exit opportunity for Jews from Europe in the wake of immigration restrictions in Britain and his fear of a resumption of Russian pogroms, but believes that his ‘influential friends’ in the wider Zionist movement do not wish to ‘base the Jewish territory on black labour’ (Rochelson 2009, 153). Despite this, Zangwill still sought to insist on the East African option, citing merely ‘space and opportunity’ as the deciding factors (Rochelson 2009, *ibid*). Neither Zangwill or Auerbach suggests removal of the native population, though Auerbach seems to certainly understand their structural impediment to

successful settlement, concluding in a letter, that ‘I would much prefer our itoland²⁹ where the native problem can never arise’ (Rochelson 2009, 159). Zangwill spoke the language of settler imperialism, and in the character of those who came before him, saw it as a far nobler enterprise than the corrupt practice of exploitation colonialism, but in its usual blind-spot vis-à-vis the elimination of the native, perhaps we find the confusion in his thinking. Ultimately Zangwill’s dream of an outpost of white civilization in the heart of Africa is undermined by the very imperialism that he so admired, which brought in its wake streams of subaltern labour manning the tendrils of the infrastructure feeding its resource extraction. Auerbach’s greatest concern would be the combined problem of the native and the coolie, the two creating a strata of low wage labour economy upon which Jewish settler colonial labour could not socially reproduce itself (Rochelson 2009, 152-3).

4.4: One Zion looks to another: the American Zionism of Louis Brandeis and Horace Kallen

Both Kallen and Brandeis followed something of the logic Zangwill applied in seeking to find a territory for Zionist settlement in East Africa to their Zionism as it related to their identification as Americans and American Zionists. Indeed, Zangwill’s position on America is a useful segue into American Zionism. In his 1908 play *The Melting Pot*, a survivor of the Kishniev pogrom falls for the daughter of one of the pogrom’s Tsarist instigators, the displacement of both to America and away from the calcified hierarchies of identity and history in Europe, allowing the impossible lovers to find one another (Obenzinger 2011). Zangwill, in keeping with his teleology of history in which Judaism worked through Christianity generally and then specifically in English Protestantism, saw Hebraism in America, arriving with Jewish immigration, not as assimilation ‘or simple surrender to the dominant type [...] but an all-round give and take by which the final type may be enriched or impoverished’ (Obenzinger 2011). Both Brandeis and Kallen, liberal Democrats of the American progressive tradition, would come to Zionism via Americanism, as Brandeis would openly concede (Brandeis 1942, 49), and the Zionism they would espouse would be profoundly influenced by the settler colonial culture within which they existed, their own identities hovering between the position of insider and outsider within it.

Brandeis was descended from a family of frontier settlers from Ohio, Indiana and Kentucky. His maternal uncle, Louis Dembitz, was a founding member of the Republican Party in Kentucky and an abolitionist, who took to Orthodoxy later in life (Merkley 1998, 78). Dembitz would arguably be the closest link Brandeis would have to organized Judaism throughout his life. Brandeis was sought out by Herzl’s man in America, Jacob de Haas to work for Woodrow Wilson’s electoral campaign and it is

²⁹ Itoland refers to the International Territorial Organization, Zangwill’s Territorialist wing of the Zionist Organization.

through his position as advisor on Wilson's progressive "New Freedom" platform that we arrive at both Brandeis' understanding of Americanism, and with it his identification with Zionism.

In his speech on *True Americanism*, Brandeis would argue that 'Loyalty to America demands that each American Jew become a Zionist'. He continues:

the immigrant is not Americanized unless his interests and affections have become deeply rooted here. And we properly demand of the immigrant even more than this. He must be brought into complete harmony with our ideals and aspirations and cooperate with us for their attainment. Only when this has been done will he possess the national consciousness of an American. I say "he must be brought into complete harmony." But let us not forget that many a poor immigrant comes to us from distant lands, ignorant of our language, strange in tattered clothes and with jarring manners, who is already truly American in this most important sense; who has long shared our ideals and who, oppressed and persecuted abroad, has yearned for our land of liberty and for the opportunity of aiding in the realization of its aims (Brandeis 1942, 4-5).

Here we have a wonderfully intuitive understanding of American isopolitics, in that the poor immigrant from distant lands is already *truly* American before disembarking, though at this point the technologies of isopolitics were increasingly becoming subject to nativist pressures. However, it is when Brandeis discusses the question of race and nation that is crucial:

Other countries, while developing the individual man, have assumed that their common good would be attained only if the privileges of their citizenship should be limited practically to natives or to persons of particular nationality. America, on the other hand, had always declared herself for equality of nationalities as well as for equality of individuals. It recognizes racial equality as an essential part of full human liberty and true brotherhood, and that racial equality is the complement of democracy. America has, therefore, given like welcome to all the peoples of *Europe* (Brandeis 1942, 8-9) (My italics).

Brandeis' Americanism, and by extension his Zionism, exists in what one must assume is a kind of liberal egalitarianism of nationalities. This is the apparent American exception to Europe, but that this applies to the peoples of Europe is key, because Brandeis knows full well that America is a state of far more than just the peoples of Europe. That he excludes several peoples, the most obvious being the native, Blacks, Chinese, Japanese, and Mexicans, implies that these peoples are *not* a compliment to democracy, which is entirely in keeping with the Democratic Party of which he and Wilson were a part. Wilson himself would institute de-facto segregation in the federal government under his administration (Lake & Reynolds 2008, 292) and there was a long discourse in American politics — especially in Democratic strongholds in the South and California (Lake & Reynolds 2008, *ibid*)— that found racial others to be a specific impediment to the proper functioning of democracies by reference to their inner determination. It was their supposed ability to be manipulated by unscrupulous political entrepreneurs (Lake & Reynolds 2008, 26, 49, 63-4, 65-6, 72) or tendency to fall victim to their own affective natures that concerned Democrats. So, in proffering a vision of a segregationist, Jim Crow era Americanism as essentially indistinguishable from Zionism, Brandeis is really only recapitulating Zangwill's African fantasy, where the coloured masses which isopolitanism hopes to leverage paler bodies against, might help Jews appear that much more European in America and by the same logic, that much more American in Palestine.

Thus, it is in Brandeis's talk of the coincidence between Americanism and Zionism —a coincidence that surely exists— that he unknowingly grants us a lens through which to view both with enhanced clarity. Brandeis shared Zangwill's, and as we shall see, Kallen's, perspective on the Jewish teleology of history vis-à-vis its peculiar place in the Anglo-world. This informed his perspective on the essential

Americanism of Zionism:

During most of my life my contact with Jews and Judaism was slight. I gave little thought to their problems, save in asking myself, from time to time, whether we were showing by our lives due appreciation of the opportunities which this hospitable country affords [...]. My approach to Zionism was through Americanism. In time, practical experience and observation convinced me that Jews were by reason of their traditions and their character peculiarly fitted for the attainment of American ideals. Gradually it became clear to me that to be good Americans we must be better Jews, and to be better Jews, we must become Zionists (Brandeis 1942, 49-50).

Brandeis then goes on to explain one of what he considers the “fruits of Zionism”, the most important of which for him —peculiarly, since he knows little of Judaism— he regards as the revival of Hebrew.

His discussion of Ben Yehuda is particularly revealing, since I would argue, it reveals the essential Americanism of Brandeis' perspective:

[Ben Yehudah] concluded that if Hebrew was to become a spoken language the way to begin with Hebrew was, as with charity, at home. He said he would marry no woman who did not speak Hebrew to him. Fortunately, he found one who could; and Hebrew became the language of his own household. Then he declared he would deal only with those who could speak Hebrew. He was naturally regarded as half crazy. But soon others followed his example. Before a generation has passed, Hebrew became in Palestine the language of kindergartens, of primary schools and of higher institutions of learning (Brandeis 1942, 51).

Now the revival of Hebrew is no doubt an impressive feat of cultural and social engineering, but is not what is described here also a blueprint for a feat of pure settlement colonialism and ethnic exclusivism? If Zionists were to arrive in America and practice this, they would hardly be living in the cooperative harmony that Brandeis is so enamoured of. They would hardly be able to exist. But this is the point, because in this example, Ben Yehudah and those who follow his example, and in doing so effectively cut themselves off from all who do not speak Hebrew, are the Americans, the “real” Americans, who are separated from the native by orders of civilization and mutual comprehension.

What Brandeis is eulogising is what Piterberg has described as a dual society paradigm, in reference to Israeli intellectual culture as it understands Israeli and Palestinian society. As Piterberg explains:

The most important assumption underpinning the dual society paradigm [...] is the purportedly extrinsic nature of indigenous Arab society and of its conflict with the very essence of the settler nation. What I mean by dual society is the emergence of two completely separate and self-contained entities in Palestine: the Jewish Yishuv (the settler community) and the Palestinian Arab society (the indigenous community). Each developed according to its own trajectory [...]. Each trajectory is unrelated to the other, and the only meaningful relation between the two societies consisted in a struggle between two impregnable national collectives (if, that is, the national authenticity of the Palestinians is not altogether denied). It cannot be sufficiently stressed that what is denied by the settler society is not the mere presence of Arabs in Palestine, but rather the fact that their presence and resistance were consequential to the institutional dynamics and collective identity of the settler community and later nation state (Piterberg 2008, 64).

What Brandeis was describing with reference to Ben Yehudah were the incipient stages, intentional or otherwise, of what would inform the ethnic exclusivism of the conquest of land and labour; that which

would found the attempt to separate the Yishuv from the native population of Palestine. This was, as Wolfe would state in reference to the members of Hapoel Hatzair who attempted to ‘abandon market rationality in favour of a Jewish only isolate in Palestine that would reject any labour that was not Jewish’, a kind of ‘wishful *corpus nullius*’; its proponents seeking ‘to conduct their affairs as if nobody else was around’ (Wolfe 2012, 151).

Where Brandeis perhaps most intuitively understands Zionism as a settler colonial project from his position as an American, is in his thinking with regards to what is necessary in founding it. Unlike an Oliphant, or even a Herzl, Brandeis seems to understand that settler colonial projects require substantial economic subsidy that will not necessarily see a return on its investment. In making the comparison between American history and how it might inform the Zionist project he would state:

We are prone to think of America as the home of good investments. But nobody who has looked into American industrial and financial development can fail to know that, with the exception of perhaps the automobile and a few other recent industries, there has hardly been a single field of great business success in the United States, which does not rest on failures. Almost every enterprise in the United States, with the exception of the Great Northern, is built upon a failure. The Atchison, Topeka, Santa Fe, and the Northern Pacific are outstanding instances of successful American railroads. But despite the rich land grants made by the government, both the Atchison and the Northern Pacific went through two receiverships. Stockholders and bondholders who lacked faith to pay burdensome assessments, or were unable to do so, lost all or much of what they personally had invested. This is true also of the original investors in the heavily subsidized Union Pacific. Most of America’s 250,000 miles of railroad have a similar history. But they were great factors in our prosperity. When we think now of American successes, we think not of our beginnings but of the flowers in full bloom. Bear that in mind when you apply the test to our Palestinian undertakings (Brandeis 1942, 130-131).

What is crucial here is that not only does the construction of the great American railways follow the financial logic behind successful settlement, but that these were settler enterprises in and of themselves, and their history is the history of the settlement of the American West. As Schwartz explains:

By populating land emptied of native Americans, [The Federal state] enabled borrowing against that land. [...] The Federal and “provincial states” provided infrastructure more aggressively than did European states. Not only did the Federal government build infrastructure in advance of production, it also built publicly at a time when Europeans built privately. [...] In the North, states provided about 40 per cent of all railroad capital in the 1830’s. [...] A Federal land grant funded the construction of the Illinois Central Railroad [...]. This system was generalized in the 1862 Pacific Railway Bill. [...] The Federal state wanted a railroad network that would tie the entire continent together. Rather than designing it from the top down, the Federal government gave fledgling railroad firms alternating sections of land along their planned routes. This policy put the onus of land development on the railroad company. They could not make money unless the land adjacent to the rail generated sellable commodities to be carried by the system, nor could they raise capital without mortgaging their land grant. So both land and infrastructure were organically connected to immigration, as land was worthless without labour. The Illinois Central Railroad (ICR) received 2.6 million acres of land. But these had to be sold within 10 years or forfeited at auction. So the ICR offered seven years’ credit to settlers and down payments to buyers. It did so through its own land development company, which distributed advertisements in Europe and engaged agents to seek emigrants (Schwartz 2012, 68-9).

Whether Brandeis knew it or not, his example was instructive and the parallel with American expansion apt, as in terms of “borrowing” that which would never need repaying in purely financial terms was one of the means through which the Yishuv and then state of Israel was constructed, in keeping with all successful settler colonial enterprises.

Brandeis would take the American comparison further in drawing similarities between Palestine and California when he visited in 1929, which reveal the fundamental inculcation of the American settler perspective in his thinking. With regards to both destinations, he would state:

Those of you who have been to Palestine know that in character and climate it resembles southern California. It is a miniature California. Like California, it has available water, water that has to be secured, as in California, by pumping and irrigation. But there is plenty of it for all ordinary purposes if it is conserved and utilized. It was a surprise to me to learn that the rainfall in Jerusalem was a little larger than the average rainfall in London. But until recent attempts to conserve water, most of it was wasted. So you have a country which in climate resembles what we have come to regard as the garden of America. But it differs from California in one extraordinary particular and differs very much. Whereas everything in California which nature in its bounty has given, was until a few years ago preserved for man untouched, 1,500 years and more of abuse have done all that could possibly have been done to prevent Palestine from being fruitful (Brandeis 1942, 144-145).

What is interesting here is less the familiar narrative of ruin –disputed by numerous contemporary accounts of Palestine, some of them Zionist³⁰ and the fact that the Zionist movement actively needed to separate itself from the native agricultural economy to survive as such– but rather the multi-layered erasure that is taking place. As Dunbar-Ortiz has noted:

By the time of the European invasions, Indigenous people had occupied and shaped every part of the Americas [...] and were sustaining their populations by adapting to specific natural environments, but they also adapted nature to suit human ends. [...] Rather than domesticating animals for hides and meat, Indigenous communities created havens to attract elk, deer, bear, and other game. They burned the undergrowth in forests so that the young grasses and other ground cover that sprouted the following spring would entice greater numbers of herbivores and the predators that fed on them. [...] Inland a few miles from the shore of present-day Rhode Island, an early European explorer marvelled at the trees that were spaced so that the forest “could be penetrated even by a large army.”[...] Native Americans created the world’s largest gardens and grazing lands—and thrived (Dunbar-Ortiz 2014, 27-28).

It was only after the arrival of settlers and their destruction of native societies and with them native modes of agriculture and animal husbandry that the wilderness of the American mythical epic began to form. ‘Paradoxical as it may seem there was undoubtedly more “forest primeval” in 1850 than in 1650’ (Dunbar-Ortiz 2014, 45). California’s “bounty” was not left for man untouched, it supported hundreds of tribes of native peoples at the time of European conquest, the existence of which someone of Brandeis’ education must have known. The point being that those people couldn’t possibly have had an impact in preserving said bounty in his mind, or have been worthy of it in the first place, for the very reasons we have already covered vis-à-vis their inadmission into Americanism. Their invisibility in his thought vis-à-vis California is common sense. As discourse in the Foucauldian sense, the historic truth of native husbandry in California could not be spoken, by Brandeis, or arguably any other settler in the 1920’s.

In Palestine Brandeis cites the basic logic of the Puritan settlers of New England in their denial of rights use to the native, that which according to natural law, by way of Genesis 1:28, and later Locke, granted it only according to its subduing and improvement (Newman 2016, 135). In California the indigenous

³⁰ For example, see (Doumani 1995), (Kimmerling and Migdal 2003) and (Neumann 2011).

are erased by way of a bounty of fertility that precludes a human presence in the mind of the settler. In the Palestinian example almost the opposite takes place, the land is so supposedly wasted that whoever might technically be there is not worthy of it. Both invite the influx of settlers to avail themselves of the situation. What's more, Brandeis then affirms that despite what '1500 years of abuse' has done to the land, 'Fortunately the neglect of centuries has only ruined Palestine's surface' (Brandeis 1942, 145). The Arab population, a mere surface nuisance, is transient. The land was rich before the Arab, when the Jew was once there, it will be made rich again as the Jewish people return. The symbiotic relationship between the two encompassed in the negation of exile is here reaffirmed.

Horace Kallen arrived in the United States via the Isopolitical faucet from Germany in the late 1880's, the son of an Orthodox rabbi. By the time he was admitted to Harvard in 1900 he was 'extremely repellent about Judaism', finding in 'the Oversoul of Emerson [...] and in the God of Spinoza' the ammunition through which 'to confound the Jehovah of my father and his rule' (Schmidt 1995, 21). He found far more in the heroes and the myths of the American epic than in the religion of his birth (Schmidt 1995, 20), and as a student did not wish to be identified as a Jew (Obenzinger 2008, 655). When Kallen states that Hebraist and biographer of Cotton Mather at Harvard, Barret Wendell, 're-Judaised' him, it is worth remembering that it might only be a slight exaggeration to state that Hebrew scholarship was one of the founding disciplines of the academy in America, with the likes of Mather and Jonathan Edwards, whose scholarly project sought to identify the Hebraic genealogical origins of the Greek philosophical classics, leading the way (Goldman 2004, 77). Though its popularity waxed and waned over the years, Hebraic scholarship in the American academy, like American philosemitism, was a relative constant.

Wendell introduced Kallen to the place of the Old Testament narratives of the Hebrews in the Puritan mind and the 'role of the Hebraic tradition in the development of the American character' (Obenzinger 2008, 656). Wendell brought Kallen to Americanism via the palimpsest of contemporary restorationist³¹ interpretations concerning the Puritan performance of the stories of the Pentateuch. Kallen would develop his own philosophies of Americanism, generally in tune with the progressivism of the early twentieth century, which he would describe as "the American idea", "cultural pluralism", and "Hebraism". All three of these ideas would dovetail together and lead to his justification for activism in the American Zionist movement (Schmidt 1995, 35), and to his own formulation of Zionism itself.

The American idea as Kallen understood it was that, as per the US constitution and the Bill of Rights, the 'equal right of human beings who are different from each other, but who are living together, to life, liberty, and safety' (Schmidt 1995, 35). Kallen would understand this as America's national religion, 'an

³¹ Wendell subscribed to a variation of the British Israelism thesis, arguing that the Puritans actually carried the blood of the ancient Hebrews in their veins (Obenzinger 2008, 656).

ideal to which “all *bona fide* Americans as citizens” are committed’ (Kallen in Schmidt 1995, *ibid*)(italics in original). Here we have the obligation or responsibility taken on by self-consciously politicized subjects of American politics. The idea being that one cannot merely exist in such a formation, one has to actively participate to be a *bona fide* American. One has to take part, to take for oneself, to self-determine. This certainly brings to mind the jealously guarded status of the white settler into whose democratic space the entrance of the externally determinate was positively feared.

Crucial to the functioning of this America was the harmonious cooperation of nationalities. Kallen shared the Italian nationalist Giuseppe Mazzini’s notion of nationality as ‘group individuality’ (Schmidt 1995, 40). In keeping with Israel Zangwill, Kallen’s cultural pluralism was something akin to a liberalism whereby the unit of the individual could be replaced by that of the nation in America. All of this Kallen drew back in a teleology history, again, like Zangwill, to the ancient Hebrews; ‘those champions and vindicators of social justice and international righteousness and peace [...] [whose] spirit [...] literally inspired the democracy of our America’ (Kallen in Schmidt 1995, 38).

Much like Zangwill, Kallen also hoped he might secularize Judaism, a work half achieved he believed since “Hebraism” was already working through history in America in its democratic institutions. He also saw it as imperative, since he believed that a Judaism cohered around a theology would disintegrate ‘much more rapidly than Christianity’ in a secularizing age by way of assimilation. He took umbrage at both Reform ‘modern Judaism [...] for being too detached from Jewish life’ and thought that Orthodoxy could not survive if based on a ‘supernaturalism [that] cannot maintain itself against a practical intelligence which wrests her secrets from nature’ (Kallen in Schmidt 1995, 41-2). In short, Kallen believed that to survive, Judaism required an ‘animating ideal’ to ‘replace its failing supernaturalism’ (Kallen in Schmidt 1995, 42), that is, we may assume, a secular and ideological or a material replacement. In Zionism Kallen saw the opportunity to animate Judaism with its own national religion and with its own American idea, offering a Hebraic rebirth:

To the Jews of the world it [is] [...] a programme of self-help and social justice within Jewry; giving the same rights and responsibilities to both sexes, and actually trying out experiments in economic organization to abolish the exploitation of one man by another without abolishing the impetus towards individual excellence. To the nations of the world [Hebraism] [...] should carry into effect the social and spiritual ideals of the Hebrew prophets [...], it [should] reassert the prophetic ideal of internationalism as a democratic an [*sic*] cooperative federation of nationalities (Kallen in Schmidt 1995, 43).

Kallen’s Hebraism would be essential for Jews in America as well, for if they were to truly contribute to the national harmony in the American “symphony” of nationalisms, they would require a nation and a territory of their own so that their hyphenation in America would be authentic. As Kallen would approvingly quote Mazzini:

Israelites among the nations [...] do not beguile yourselves with the hope of emancipation from unjust social conditions if you do not first conquer a country for yourselves; where there is no country, there is no common agreement to which you can appeal (Kallen citing Mazzini in Schmidt 1995, 40-41).

Indeed, as Randolph Bourne, contemporary of Kallen and approving reviewer of his concept of cultural pluralism put it, in the era of ‘co-operative Americanism [...] dispersion is now the lot of every race’ (Bourne 1916, 279). Hyphenization meant, it seemed to Bourne, being more modern, more cosmopolitan, more American. This was especially true for the Jew because of Zionism, for their being an American precisely because it was *not where they were from*. Indeed, this is a perfectly reasonable strategy to legitimize and cohere identifications in a settling society. As Kallen’s biographer Sarah Schmidt notes approvingly of Kallen’s theory:

Most important, perhaps, was the blow Kallen’s theory of cultural pluralism gave to the ubiquitous charges of dual loyalty. Accepting the assumptions of the pluralist theory meant accepting the implication that “hyphenated” Americans were better Americans. To maintain one’s Jewishness meant the ability to contribute more to the “American symphony”; to support the renationalization of the Jewish people meant helping to restore the valuable “Hebraic note” to the “harmony of civilization.” Advocacy of the Zionist position enabled Jews to regain their sense of self-respect; in doing so, it enabled them to be stronger Americans (Schmidt 1995, 47).

As far as Kallen was concerned, to become better Americans, Jewish Americans would have to become Zionist settlers –vicariously at the very least. As Obenzinger has argued:

To the Americanized Zionists who followed [him], Zionism was an application of the cultural pluralist rationale, that Jews needed a national life in their own land in order to realize more fully their ‘equality in difference’ in America (Obenzinger 2008, 660).

Natives on the other hand are by definition non-hyphenated, they are not “from somewhere else”. Natives have no homeland to which they require the fostering of a connection to, so as to prevent assimilation into the dominant culture of the state (the same state which has such normative value for Kallen). Natives in America or Palestine cannot be these cosmopolitan beings and because of this they lack something. They are all old world, no new, or perhaps beyond both. Indeed, it seems Kallen’s whole project thus far when taken to its logical extremes, to a world of hyphenated cosmopolitans, none strictly tied to a homeland, rather the homeland merely enabling a hyphenated normativity in a world of multinational states, is a world particularly unsuited to nativity. In this world, natives, those for whom identity involves an ontological connection to the land, by it being *where they are from*, are the anomalous, indigestible part.

Nevertheless, the question of dual loyalty is an important one, especially in the case of Kallen, due to the way in which he understood the conversion in himself that the turn to Zionism symbolized. He spoke of it in terms of a liberation, in the language of having been saved and born again:

the turn to Zionism, the turn to Jewishness without any theological commitment, is a liberation [...] it enables [Jews] to accept their roots, [...] it saves them from a constant practice of watchfulness, maybe this fellow thinks I’m a Jew, and so on [...] And a faith which frees a personality from that kind of tension and conflict is a saving faith (Kallen in Schmidt 1995 , 90).

After having been “born again” into Zionism, Kallen would become a central figure in American Zionist organizing and intellectual output, functioning as something of a conduit between the British and

American Zionists during the lobbying efforts by Weizmann that would eventually produce the Balfour declaration (Schmidt 1995, 90-1, 98-9). Whilst his American progressive utopianism is argued to have fallen out of favour with the wider movement after the First World War, as we shall see, his proposals vis-à-vis the state to be actually bear close resemblance to the Yishuv and later State of Israel. It is in this similarity that wider tendencies in settler thought that arguably transcend supposed ideological or pragmatic differences can be seen.

In 1919 Kallen would pen *Constitutional Foundations of the New Zion*, a work in which much of his previous philosophy would crystalize. The text opens with an account of the First World War as a great act of creative destruction that has cleared a space for democratic movements all over Europe and beyond (Kallen 1919, 4). From this destruction the emancipation of the Jews is also revealed. From this scene Kallen also seeks to draw a teleology of history back to the ancient Hebrews, to reveal the force of secular Hebraism in history in a modification of Matthew Arnold's thesis in *Culture and Anarchy*:

The foundations of their ancient tradition are the ideals of social justice and fundamental economic democracy. These are the burden of the teachings of their prophets, these are the substance of the two great codes—that of Deuteronomy and that of Leviticus—in their Bible. From the soils of these codes developed what was relevant in Talmudic law, and the influence of that relevant minimum on the shattering of the power of the feudal baron and the establishment of a freer society by the rise of the middle class is a matter that has not received the attention it deserves. From the American revolution on, there is no great democratic adventure in which members of the Jewish people, nourished on its basic tradition, do not play a large and fundamental role in France, in England, in the Germany of '48 and in the Germany of today, in Russia and in the United States. The ideal of a social democracy was first expressed by Jews in Palestine and has since been largely defended and promulgated by Jews the world over (Kallen 1919, 4-5).

What Kallen is expressing is only a minor alteration to that which Samuel Lagdon expressed some two hundred years previously with the Jewish and later Christian theology stripped away. Kallen presents what essentially amounts to the Mosaic covenant as a legal code that has silently followed human society, like the cunning of reason in history, from the ancient world to the present.

Kallen then moves on to consider Palestine itself, which is so enticing a territory because what it offers what America had once offered, precisely, is *space*, in a temporal-historic sense. As he goes on to explain:

In Palestine men and women are not confronted by the handicaps and difficulties which they must face in England or Russia, or elsewhere in the civilized world. Elsewhere, immense social structures, immemorial vested interests require to be torn down or altered; great populations require to be persuaded, coerced or convinced. In Palestine there are no complicated or immemorial social structures, there are no great populations. The work there to be done is, from the beginning and from the bottom up, a work of construction. In Russia or England again, the areas to be dealt with, the numbers of human beings to be enfranchised are inconceivably great. Always there have been, and will be, factors evading control; mistakes arising, and growing unobserved until too late; undiscovered resistances, omissions, failures. Palestine, on the other hand, offers an area fully within the limits of control, a population similarly within reach (Kallen 1919, 5-6).

As the First World War has violently made space for the emergence of new democratic avenues in Europe, so Kallen clears the slate in Palestine and makes it a tabula rasa for a new society, away from the hierarchies of civilization which were precisely the problem. Indeed, this was a problem that the

progressive movement that he, Brandeis, Wilson and the early 20th century Jeffersonian progressives were confronted with. America was already becoming too urbanized and arborescent for grand schemes of social engineering. Palestine offered a utopian outlet (Schmidt 1995, 42). This was something hardly confined to Kallen and American Zionists, Palestine would function as a utopian outlet for other reformers, particularly those in the Labour Party in Britain. After visiting in 1922, Ramsey Macdonald would register a kind of lament after witnessing the Zionist agricultural colonies in Palestine, that the Labour movement did not have such a tabula rasa to work with:

Placed as we are, we cannot begin with the creation of an agricultural settlement, but if England were in a similar position to Palestine, we should also have to follow the same course. As it is, we shall have to achieve the change by propagating our ideas and methods, by persuading democracy that our way is the right one, and by seizing political power in a constitutional way (Macdonald 1922, 24).

Members of the Labour Party would repeatedly eulogise the Zionist enterprise in glowing terms, especially after the Soviet Union could no longer serve as a legitimate source of inspiration or outlet for utopian affection. The new State of Israel provided Sam Watson, general secretary of the National Union of Mine Workers, with a vision of actually existing socialism³²:

There is a socialist state growing up in the Middle East, and that socialist state contains within itself some of the finest creative impulses mankind has ever seen. If you want idealism go to the Negev and see the young men and women, some of them only 16 years old, making grass grow where it has never grown before. Go out and watch men who are giving up every possibility of high position, without thought of self or reward, and dedicating themselves to turning sand into soil. Go out and watch the greatest trade union organization the world has ever seen—Histadruth [sic]—which owns and controls one third of Israel's economy and assists private enterprise by loaning money to develop other forms of control in industry. The State of Israel is a beacon of light in the Middle East. Here right on the verge of poverty and in the face of terrific exploitation, is a social experiment going on the likes of which we have not seen before (Watson in Feldman 2017, 205-6).

Beyond the potentiality for creative destruction presented in what little there was to 'tear down' in Palestine, where the native population is tacitly acknowledged at all it is to mention that its social structures are not 'complicated or immemorial' and that its population cannot be considered 'great' either, one assumes in terms of numbers or in reputation. Palestinian roots are not deep, their society is, again, as Brandeis saw it, apparently a surface thing. As *people* they *needn't be convinced* and they *can be coerced*.

Once the detritus of the present and living regime of life in native Palestine has been cleared away, Kallen then states that in its place a social constitution of Hebraism will be installed, that is, a return to the *secular* traditions of the ancient Hebrews:

³² One can't help but speculate that the current attachment of elements of the Labour Party to the contemporary State of Israel, a state so apparently at odds with the commitments of a Leftist political vision, stem in part from the coincidence of successful settlement in Palestine and the founding of the Labour Party as a force in British politics. The collective mythologies of both became intertwined as the Party and the State of Israel and its own Labour Party developed in relation to one another.

An ancient people, the oldest in the western world living under law, cannot detach itself from its past and start constitutionally naked and new-born. The Constitution of the New Zion will need to defer to the persistent elements, the basic principles of the Jewish people. It will need to build upon these principles, restored to their first intention, with the distortive accumulations of the ages cleaned away (Kallen 1919, 6).

Kallen is keen to reiterate that this constitution is not a political edifice, but a purely social one. Indeed his proposal is remarkably similar in intention to Herzl's New Society, in which the practice of politics as such is positively abhorred, a situation where the right and the just has been decided in advance and the rest is just the technocratic management of the details:

Neither Deuteronomy nor Leviticus are concerned with political forms. They legislate almost exclusively [...] concerning the just distribution of land and concerning the rights of the poor and slaves. Modern political thinking has confirmed the soundness of this legislation and of the prophetic insight from which it derives. All programmes of reform aiming at the roots of the social evil are economic programmes, not political. The political form is to be determined by the economic readjustment and not *vice versa*. At the foundation of the New Zion, hence, must be laid the principle of Deuteronomy and Leviticus, restated in the terms of the modern conditions of life and action (Kallen 1919, 6-7).

Here we have the first principle of the settler scenario, the reason that the political has been settled already at the outset so to speak is because the principle source of political, class, or economic contestation, is secured in advance. The land has been secured for the people, as per the Mosaic covenant. Contradiction is displaced in advance. But before he will discuss this, Kallen excises his Hebraism from the entirety of the exilic tradition of Judaism:

The corpus of legislation, practices, decisions and so on, which are an interpretation of these principles and are incorporated into the Mishna and the Talmudical law may, as a whole, be ignored. [...] It must be borne in mind that neither Mishna nor Talmud represent the purely autonomous growth of Jewish law. Both are of the essential spirit of the *Galuth* in which the implications of straightforward Jewish law had constantly to be adapted to the conditions of practice set by the laws and customs of the lands of sojourn (Kallen 1919, 7).

Thus, the tradition of some 1500 years of Judaism is to be discarded due to its non-self-determining nature. Kallen's Hebraism will be materialised and literalised by its being embedded in the land of the ancient Hebrews, away from self-criticism and spiritualism. This decidedly Protestant move is a practice of negation of exile par-excellence.

Kallen then moves on to a discussion of his vision for the New Zion as commonwealth, as based on divine covenant, and now on the practices of the Jewish National Fund. As he argues of the origin of any emancipatory project:

The primary and ultimate source is land. The first exploitation of man by man in agricultural communities came through the development of private property in land. [...] The basic principle of the fundamental law of the ancient Jewish state is the principle of the inalienability of the land. The principle upon which the National Fund, the fiscal agency of the Zionist movement, is founded and the principle upon which it operates is the principle that land is common wealth and is inalienable from the Commonwealth. By tradition, by practice and by what is the soundest in contemporary political and economic theory, the first rule of the fundamental law of the New Zion must be that the whole Jewish land shall be the inalienable possession of the whole Jewish people (Kallen 1919, 15).

What applies to the land also applies to 'the mineral resources existing under the soil, with the power in rivers and streams, and so on' and to all infrastructure 'without which national resources cannot be

made available' (Kallen 1919, *ibid*). In *A Memorandum on the Principles of Organization of the Jewish Commonwealth in Palestine* published in the summer of 1918, Kallen, writing in the name of the World Zionist Organization, had advocated for full political democracy in Palestine and full political and civil equality there 'irrespective of race, sex, faith, of all peoples inhabiting the land.' Earlier in the same document Kallen states:

Palestine should be set free from the hard and oppressive rule of the Turk, in order that this country may form a Free State, under international guarantee, to which such of the Jewish people as desire to do so may return and may work out their own salvation free from interference by those of alien race or religion (Kallen 1995, 158).

The question must be, how does Kallen reconcile the former with the latter? The answer must be that he believes there are two kinds of democracy on offer in his prospective state, 'political democracy', that offered to the present inhabitants of the country, which amounts to political and civil equality and 'economic democracy'. Economic democracy is that which he sees in the practices of the Jewish National Fund and in his own vision for a Jewish commonwealth in Palestine, as a continuation of the covenantal practices of the ancient Hebrews narrated in the Pentateuch. As Akenson has shown, these narratives specifically related to genealogy, they concern human reproduction, the matter of keeping Yahweh's people pure, of guarding against miscegenation and through keeping this covenantal duty, being rewarded with the land, Canaan, and covenantal blessings, that is, future prosperity and greatness (Akenson 1992, 14, 16, 22, 23, 26, 28). The narratives of the ancient Hebrews as expressed in Leviticus and Deuteronomy certainly concern legalism, land, and its distribution, but it has nothing to do with modern comprehensions of social justice and rather concerns rights to hereditary title based on a divine injunction.

In essence, what Kallen is expressing is the modern Israeli perspective on democracy vis-à-vis Palestinians inside the Green Line. Palestinians may hold a degree of civil and political rights, but the ultimate right they lack lies in the economic basis of the state. A right to the land held in trust for the whole Jewish people is the base on which the state is founded. This is what Kallen means when he refers to 'economic democracy'. Once Jewish settler sovereignty arrives, native sovereignty is extinguished. This was ongoing at the time of writing, when the Jewish National Fund purchased land from large landowners, who would, prior to its purchase by Zionists 'have bought and sold their holdings subject to the continuing use-rights of fellaheen, whose rent or other forms of tribute provided the return on the effendi's investment' (Wolfe 2012, 155). Zionists bought this right, with the land itself and Palestinian fellaheen lost a right that was not for sale. Zionism attached inalienability to title and modified the Lockean logic of private property, moving it from the level of the individual to that of the nation and thus importing a system of land tenure into Palestine that was a not exactly American, but was certainly informed by it. Kallen would grant civil rights to the native population, but they would not be able to own land, which was the possession of the whole Jewish people. The issue

then, is not whether this is a state for all its citizens, as citizenship is not really what is crucial, national identity is. Already at the start, Kallen has laid out that the political is not the locus on which this state will turn, that will be the economic, ergo, the land; that which the 'citizen', those with only civil rights, has no claim to.

Kallen then further labours this distinction when he discusses a familiar theme, what he refers to as the 'moral equivalent of war' and what to us will be more familiar as the Foucauldian formulation of politics as war pursued by other means; an implicit total war on native social reproduction that requires every settler also be a soldier at the same time. Kallen would describe various arms of the state, such as public health, education and the police force as lines of 'public defence' in his 'moral equivalent of war' (Kallen 1919, 17). The first line of defence of the public body was that of its social hygiene, to be guarded by a federally organized but locally autonomous medical corps. The second line of defence would be that to defend against 'crime and war'. Because of the displacement of social contradiction via economic democratization in land, Kallen theorized that 'the usual distinction between the soldier and the policeman disappears.' It disappears because:

the professional policeman, remaining such all his life, is likely to become unnecessary. Human nature being what it is, there will be crimes against property and against life, but not many, since crimes against property are usually actuated by defects in the social system and in the nature of men, and most crimes against life have the same source. The work of policing will be done by the state's militia, and the state's militia will consist of young men and young women of whose education this work will be a part. In this way everybody will be at one time or another have been a policeman and a soldier, and the menace of a professional police and a military class will have been eliminated (Kallen 1919, 18).

Of course, the mobilization of such a force is tied via economic democracy, to land, land held by the Jewish people in perpetuity. This is why a regular police force and a regular army is unnecessary. So it follows, at the very least, that few, if any mere 'citizens' would be expected to constitute this states' militia. This then begs the question, aside from protection against external enemies, what is the purpose of this force? For it does not really eliminate the military class, it merely consolidates it into one homogenous national group, opposing, surely by its nature, another group.

The third line of public defence, or 'war by other means' is public education, a universal education system, which Kallen ties directly to the public defence of the settler society against "crime and war":

An undesirable but inevitable part of the educational system would be the business of police and military training, and of service on public works. Physical education would, of course, go on from the beginning. But, from the ages of sixteen until the period of graduation, students should receive, in addition to the usual scholastic regimen, instruction in the nature of police work and the duties of a soldier. A period of the school years, tantamount to the length of a vacation, should be devoted to practical service in these branches, the whole student population of the state serving in relays (Kallen 1919, 20).

It is worth comparing this, the utopian vision of a Zionist who the current mainstream narrative on American Zionism of the period considers at this point in his career to be both an outsider in terms of Zionism in America and vis-à-vis the European tradition (Schmidt 1995, 105), with a consummate

settler colonialist in post-independence Israel. On the matter of settlement as defence, and the settler as a soldier, David Ben-Gurion, pioneered the practice in the Defence Services Law of 1949 and the creation of the Nahal Corps (*Noar Halutzi Lohem*), meaning Pioneering Fighting Youth. This specialized cohort of settler-soldiers formed the avant-garde of the kibbutzim and core agricultural settlements and were in effect the formalization of the frontier rabble of America and Australia. Their purpose was not just conquest and native elimination, but the creation of a new social body via the assimilation of immigrants into the new society and the settling and cultivation of land. Kallen would describe much the same process, but here in the context of an educational system, in his 'moral equivalent of war', rather than in the act of actual total war on native social reproduction that in 1948 functioned palindromically as politics by other means and its mirror image. As Kallen described it, this 'democratic education' functions as a compulsory conquest of labour, through which all settlers will pass in building up of the national patrimony:

An even more fundamental aspect of this part of democratic education is service on public works. Much of the misunderstanding between classes of society, particularly between owners and workers, is due to the failure imaginatively to realize each other's lives. And this failure comes from the absence of common fundamental experiences in the business of living. A man who has never actually dug coal in a mine, hauled dung in a wheat-field or mended a road, can never get the outlook of one whose life consists in doing just that and nothing more. [...] Now the education system here outlined is designed to provide all men and women with the maximum opportunity. But it still remains a fact that the basic "dirty work" of the Commonwealth is a work that must be done. It is the common foundation of the more specialized activity of every citizen, no matter his nature or business. Hence every citizen should share in it—share in building the nation's roads, digging the nation's irrigation ditches, shovelling the nation's coal, and so on. Just as there should not be a citizen who at one time or another in the course of his or her school life has not served as a policeman and soldier, so there should not be a citizen who at one time or another in his or her school life has not shared in the basic economic activities of the commonwealth (Kallen 1919, 21).

And here the mask slips, in one word: 'citizen'. Now we see what citizenship in Kallen's state means. No longer is a citizen potentially someone who can have merely civil and political rights in the New Zion; the citizen is finally definitively defined. The fact that this is a conquest of labour does not need to be stated. A Palestinian Arab cannot 'shovel the nation's coal' *by definition*, because s/he is not of the nation. The native cannot *by definition* share in the 'basic economic activities of the commonwealth' because the most basic unit of the common wealth is *land*. This basic unit is the unalienable property of the Jewish people. Kallen may have presaged this by saying that his state will not distinguish its citizens by sex, race, or religion, but this is entirely meaningless given his definition of economic democracy. There is no real citizenship for Palestinians in Kallen's vision of Palestine. They cannot by their relation to the land, become a part of the great project of social becoming that he describes as 'democratic education'.

4.5: From Dreams to Reality, Arthur Ruppín: Organic Intellectual of Zionist Settler Colonialism

Arthur Ruppín hailed from Poznań, though he moved away as a child and studied law at the University of Halle (Piterberg 2008, 81), the site of Lutheran Pietist efforts at reforming Jews to agricultural work in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Lewis 2010, 53-4). In many ways, Ruppín's arrival at the destination "Judaism" via German nationalism, German colonialism, and latterly Zionism, follows closely that of Brandies and Kallen in America. Ruppín's adolescent heroes were German, 'substitutes for his Jewish-Polish father' (Bloom 2007, 332). His passions 'lay in political economy and social studies' (Piterberg 2008, 81), the diametric opposites of his mother's Yiddish 'superstition' (Bloom 2007, 332). Ruppín would outline his perspective on the Jews and their restoration to Palestine in a number of books. In *The Jews of Today* (1913) he would attempt to draw his thought together, establishing a teleology of history that connected the present era of agricultural settlement in Ottoman Palestine to the narratives of the Pentateuch. This history would be accompanied by an argument for the necessity of the strategic isolation of the Jewish race from the assimilative threat of higher civilization, European civilization being the primary danger.

The opening of the work would fairly concisely outline his major appraisal of the contemporary scene for Judaism. From this we may discern that for Ruppín, as he would later confirm, the Judaism that mattered was Ashkenazi Judaism:

The structure of Judaism, once so solid, is crumbling away before our very eyes. Conversion and intermarriage are thinning the ranks of Jews in every direction, and the loss is heavier to bear, in that the great decrease in the Jewish birth-rate makes it more and more difficult to fill the gaps in the natural way. Until lately this breaking-up process was confined to Central and Western Europe; a few years ago, it was thought it could only gain ground there, and that the six million Jews on the other side of the Vistula would be untouched by it. Since then, however, a revolution has taken place in Russia, and with it comes the glaring revelation of the ardour with which the Russian Jew throws in his lot with that of the land of his birth, and how readily the intellectual Jew, in particular, sacrifices his Judaism to plunge headlong into the vortex of Russian life. Thus here, too, we see disruption seizing on the great mass of East European Jews and threatening to undermine the last bulwark of Judaism (Ruppín 1913, 3).

Now it is not novel that a Zionist like Ruppín would object to assimilation, it being one of the central obstacles that the movement had to overcome, nor is it our place to argue any moral point vis-à-vis assimilation or Jewish emancipation in Europe. Many Zionists and numerous other politically organized Jews had perfectly valid objections to assimilation and emancipation in Europe, as freed slaves did to their similar situation in Reconstruction era America. What emancipation and assimilation offered at the end of the nineteenth century in Europe often proved to be a chimera and motivating factor in rising anti-Semitic violence, where the displacement of the contradictions of capital within the continent regularly found the Jews as their substitute target. What is important for us is that in Ruppín's thinking is that it is not the violent threat of anti-Semitism that came hand in glove with emancipation in Europe that was really a problem at all, in fact, European anti-Semitism and earlier

Judeophobia was a net positive in Ruppin's view, for it preserved the character of the race through segregation and isolation:

In the tenth century we find Jews in North Africa and Spain criticising the Talmud, the Bible, the doctrine of revealed religion [...] the great men of this period [...] are not Jewish in teaching, but draw their wisdom from the newly discovered writings of the Greek philosophers. [...] In Spain it was all over with the old tradition, indeed it was never able to recover lost ground. As soon as the Jews had laid hold of this culture—this Arabic-Spanish philosophy which was founded on the Hellenistic—the way was clear to complete assimilation. Already under the rule of Islam, conversion and intermarriage were of no rare occurrence, and when in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries Christianity triumphed in Spain, the Jews went over to it in multitudes. The fact that in the year 1492, when confronted with a choice between baptism and exile, so many chose exile, cannot be put down to strength of any religious belief: under similar pressure, the most enlightened Western Jews of to-day, who have no connection with Jewish religion as such, would probably act in exactly the same way. Just such ruthless measures were needed to stiffen the backs of the vacillators; and it is hardly too much to say that the Jews of Spain would in a very short time have been lost to Judaism if they had not been forced back into it through persecution (Ruppin 1913, 18-19).

If the implications of this were not clear enough, Ruppin goes on to explain what he believes is evidence to indicate that segregation is essential, and why only through settler colonialism in Palestine it can be successful:

The yellow badge which the Jews of the Middle Ages were forced to wear, and which every Jewish history speaks of as the greatest disgrace, was not introduced merely as a badge of dishonour; it was designed rather to make it impossible for Jews to mix unrecognized with Christians, and to deport themselves as Christians. It shows us that even in the times of their greatest degradation many Jews sought to fuse themselves with the Christian majority. We may read Jewish history in the Diaspora as one long battle between, on the one hand, the ideals of isolation and race purity, implanted into the Jewish people by Ezra and Nehemiah, and ever since the cornerstone of their religion; and on the other, the tendency to assimilate [...]. So long as the Jews live together, as in Babylon, in a large and compact body with a higher state of culture than the surrounding non-Jewish majority, assimilation is nothing more than a tiny stream that draws few into its current (Ruppin 1913, 19-20).

But segregation did not only secure racial purity via simple separation. As a social Darwinist, Ruppin believed that segregation in European ghettos served a higher purpose for the race: 'it is perhaps owing to [the] severe process of selection that the Ashkenazim are today superior in activity, intelligence, and scientific capacity to the Sephardim and the Arabian Jews, in spite of their common ancestry' (Ruppin 1913, 217). So racial separation was not only essential to the survival of the race, it would ultimately secure a more pure and stronger race too, if the society that was built was properly organized on social Darwinist lines.

Thus, to secure proper racial separation Ruppin argues that a society built upon a base of self-contained and self-sufficient agricultural social reproduction is essential:

The Farmer who lives on the produce of his field is the only thoroughly settled man, his modest needs and his independence enabling him to withstand assimilation and survive crises which work havoc with those engaged in business (Ruppin 1913, 242).

This immediately assumes that the farmer in question is either not reliant on the market, or shielded from it somehow, as Ruppin was no doubt aware of the havoc capitalism was wreaking on the agricultural economies of Central and Eastern Europe in the period. But beyond the purely economic situation, the farming community had other benefits for Ruppin:

A true love of home, a feeling of being part of the soil, only takes root in a people which has by its own toil drawn its sustenance out of the earth. A settled Jewish community can only exist where there are Jewish farmers. There only the springs of nature, which were sealed up in the Jews of the Ghetto, will begin to flow anew (Ruppin 1913, *ibid*).

Ruppin then takes account of various attempts, of varying success, at Jewish agricultural settlement. Ruppin's main objection to the seemingly most successful of these examples, those of settlement in Argentina and America, is that the concerns 'remain in close connection with their market, *i.e.*, towns' and that 'it appears [...] that many colonists, instead of working their own land, farm it out to the natives to cultivate, the land having greatly increased in value' (Ruppin 1913, 247-8).

From the combination of the need to segregate and the need to found a new society on an agricultural base that could be shielded from the market, Ruppin then speculates on where settlement would be the most successful—the obvious implication being Palestine. Eastern Europe cannot be the location for the primary reason that it is too close to European culture:

To develop a culture of their own, the Jews would have to live apart from other culture for some little time. They would not be able to persist in an individual nationality and culture against the tide of assimilation with which they would be assailed as long as they remain in the midst of nations of a superior state of culture (Ruppin 1913, 267).

Constant exposure to a proximate culture would cause the new Jewish society to imitate it, Ruppin believed, though this would hardly stop Ruppin himself from picking and choosing various technologies of settlement on which to model the settlement of Palestine. Nevertheless, constant proximity to Russia and Eastern European cultures would produce 'an inferior addition of Polish, German, or Russian cultures' (Ruppin 1913, 267).

Thus, Ruppin sees Palestine as the perfect fit for Jewish settlement because of what it offered in terms of segregation, from European culture—not too far from it for later commerce, but not too close to it for the scourge of assimilation—and from the market, both in terms of the larger European or world market and in terms of the local market too:

Palestine is sufficiently civilized and is in close enough communication with modern life to obviate difficulties of colonization such as would be encountered in a new undeveloped country; at the same time, it is not so highly civilized that the Jews might be tempted to coalesce with the non-Jewish population. With regard to culture, it offers exactly the *milieu* needed by the Jews: not too backward to deter them, not advanced enough to divert them [...]. Palestine is an agricultural country and will remain so for many decades. It, therefore, does not offer any temptations to the agricultural settler to give up agriculture in favour of some business profession (Ruppin 1913, 270-1).

Palestine offers segregation on a cultural level, it offers a guard against miscegenation at the level of "civilization" and religion, it is both underdeveloped and developed enough for successful settlement, for development along Piterberg's 'dual society' lines. Palestine is something of a locked room, in which Ruppin can undertake his experiment in settler colonialism.

In Palestine, where Ruppin settled in 1907 (Piterberg 2008, 81), he would quickly centralize power and the Zionist Organization's capital in the country under the Palestine Office. In what would amount to a version of Wakefieldism in Palestine, as per his criticism of settlement under Baron de Hirsch's Jewish Colonization Association in Argentina which had allowed land price inflation as the country developed (Ruppin 1913, 247-8), Ruppin centralized the purchase of land under what would eventually become the Jewish National Fund, stabilizing the land market (Bloom 2008, 186). Through this and the centralization of diaspora donations into the country, Ruppin would help to lay one of the foundations for successful settler colonialism: the funding of settlers via subsidy rather than investment and in the form of the JNF, through debt financing (Wolfe 2012, 168 (footnote)).

Where Ruppin's ideas surrounding segregation and social Darwinism came to the fore on the ground in Palestine was in his centralized planning of agricultural colonization. Contrary to the conventional narrative of Zionism surrounding this point in its history, and its declarative face towards the Mandatory authorities and its 'collective mother country' (Maxime Rodinson in Wolfe 2012, 132) at the time, the early stages of successful agricultural settlement in Palestine were neither acts of cooperative or even communistic utopianism, nor was there a desire, on the part of Ruppin at least, for a mass stream of settlers from Europe (E. Bloom 2008, 234, 293).

Ruppin intended to continue the process of selection he saw as underway in the oppressive life of the ghettos of Eastern Europe in the Collective Groups at the training farm of Kinereth, established in 1908 and the Kvutza at Daganiah in 1909. In both these enterprises the settlers who resided there were not volunteers, they were chosen by the Palestine Office (Ruppin 1926, 8-9) and were not self-sufficient as per the 'mixed farming system', in that they did not 'self-provision' from their own farm's profits (Ruppin 1926, 10) because the training farms did not make any profits (Bloom 2008, 214). In point of fact, contrary to the socialistic mythology concerning the birth of collective settlement in Palestine, the first groups of settlers in what would become the kibbutzim were paid employees of the Palestine Office (Bloom 2008, 242). Indeed, as Bloom states, once successful:

This model of a select group, which gains incentives and independence according to its success, was not implemented by Ruppin only in the agriculture sector, [...] but in many other fields too, as, for example, with the establishment of urban "contract groups" [...] or of "working contractors" [...]. The model of the core social unit which Ruppin planned and produced became the prototype for the bureaucratic and personal interactions and organizations of the Modern Hebrew social field. We can even trace this model in the establishment of the *Workers Bank* (Bank Hapoaalim) founded in 1921 by the Histadrut and the WZO (Bloom 2008, 242-3)(italics in original).

In keeping with the first indentured settlers at Jamestown and the prisoners who founded Australia, settlers require an activist state to direct and bankroll their enterprises. In Ruppin's instrumentalization of the Palestine Office and beyond it in 'a composite transnational network' of Zionist organizations that were relatively 'independent of colonial rivalries between Western nations' (Wolfe 2012, 145), Zionist settler colonialism had just that.

Ruppin looked to previous examples of settler colonialism as analogous examples for emulation in Palestine. Etan Bloom has shown how central the Prussian Colonization Commission for Poznań was in his thinking, but he also saw in Australia an analogue for the group system he would employ in Palestine. Ruppin cites an article in *The Times* of April 8, 1924 by Major General A.G. Wauchope as an example of the benefits of group settlement in Australia; what Ruppin includes in *The Agricultural Colonization of the Zionist Organization in Palestine* is an account by Wauchope of the ‘common good’ and the benefits of ‘group spirit’ and the savings on outlay that comes from having combined the labour of ‘20 me’ over that of having ‘20 individuals who work separately’ on individual plots (Ruppin 1926, 136). What Ruppin chooses to omit is doubly interesting, in that it reveals several things, firstly in what was omitted. The closest parallels to Zionist practice in Wauchope’s article are those concerning segregation and subsidy, as he states:

By the system of group settlement, the defects of many schemes of emigration are avoided. The settler has to face neither isolation nor loneliness; a doctor and a school are close at hand. He feels that he is not a stranger in a strange land, but is surrounded by neighbours whose ways are his ways [...]. In working his land, he has the advice of an experienced overseer; in marketing his produce he has the advantage of cooperation [...] The West Australian scheme has three outstanding merits. The settler needs little or no capital. He can bring his wife and children with him. During the two or three years in which the land must be cleared and his farm is unproductive he can earn, even though he is unskilled, a sustenance allowance of £3 a week (Wauchope 1924, 15).

Furthermore, the families of those involved in group settlement are to be provided, as we saw in the Gawler scheme, with plots of land so that a subsistence base is covered as well as future agricultural profit on the cleared land (Wauchope 1924, 15). This creates for the settler community what the native already possesses by their being as such and what they might then exploit against the settler community by seeking employment in settler enterprises. The key for Ruppin here is surely that the group settlement in Western Australia did not have to be profitable, at least initially. Likewise, his training farms at Kinereth and Daganiah did not, contrary to his declarations (Bloom 2008, 214), need to make a profit. Whilst we can only speculate as to why Ruppin would not include what is perhaps the most crucial aspects of the Western Australian settler scheme from his work —intended as it was, for an English-speaking audience— it does highlight another practice that Ruppin brought to Palestine, that would come to characterize his enterprise there. This is his

convincing the dominant Zionist political groups and delegates in the World Zionist Congress of the need to conceal information and plans and to cover up the practice of Zionism [...] [marking] the end of the naïve, visionary, ideological, literary, spiritual [and] diplomatic first phase of Zionism, and introduced into the field an imminent, coordinated gap between the Zionist *declarative dimension* and its *operative dimension* (Bloom 2008, 191)(italics in original).

Ruppin’s intention with the training farms had two dimensions. The first sought to produce the best human material through several levels of eugenic selection. This occurred at the level of immigration into the country, through medical testing and the aggressive deportation of the sick and through a system of self-selection that worked to create “psycho-social pressure” that would produce clashes of

personalities between the candidates selected for the training farm (Bloom 2008, 280, 249), in what almost amounts to a Maoist struggle session. When combined with a membership who often related to socialist figures like Marx less as philosophers and rather more as messianic folk figures, the austere life of the early settlements and Ruppin's social Darwinist controlled experiment helped to create a cultish climate of puritanical asceticism (Bloom 2008, 226). As Bloom describes it, 'the conversion of the Second Aliyah was not from the religious and Jewish traditional way of life into secular modernity, but rather into the *volkisch* weltanschauung which merged religiosity with the cult that connected the *Volk* with its original soil' (Bloom 2008, 227)(italics in original). Ruppin positively encouraged this development, as his recommendations vis-à-vis order and cleanliness indicate:

The external appearance of settlements, in the matter of orderliness and cleanliness, nearly always corresponds with the amount and quality of the training previously received by the settlers. [...] the most clean and orderly settlements are those in which the *women* also have been trained in their work. It would be too much to expect that a man or woman who in Eastern Europe had neither a sense of rusticity, nor a sense of order, nor a sense of beauty, should suddenly acquire these qualities by the simple process of being transplanted to Palestine. [...] All the more important and necessary it is therefore to show the settlers ever afresh both by instruction and by demonstration how important it is for the success of their farm that they should proceed methodically in the smallest matters. [...] one often finds an almost incomprehensible indifference towards small matters which disturb one's well-being, and neglect of outward appearance. Dirty and disorderly dwellings cannot be excused merely by the fact that they are overcrowded. [...] The settlers seem at present to put little value on outward appearance, and neglect their clothes and habitations to an extent that is justly criticized (Ruppin 1926, 123-125).

As the settler Shoshana Bluwstein would describe of the disciplining of her own body into the work required of it at the Kinereth women's farm, the puritanical asceticism of the settlers in the progenitors of the kibbutzim was very much an act of self-determination; a "conquest of self". Once this was achieved, it functioned as a kind of spiritual palliative, albeit one that threatened withdrawal symptoms, the likes of which esoterics such as Laurence Oliphant certainly would have approved:

of their own volition, the fingers persist with a living movement, rapid and unbroken, and then you breathe deeply. There is fulfilment in the labour. You live in it. And even more so—in life! So you must instruct your feet, your hands, your entire body in labour. Because you are "the subject." The heart needs also to sanctify itself in purity in anticipation of the day. If you are angry, or bad thoughts plague you and you have not slept well, your work immediately suffers. The life that depends on you, on your hands, which you must create and develop, is ruined and wasted. To work badly—that of course, is a sin. You won't even be able to do mechanical work. And then the returning wave doesn't bring satisfaction and relief, but rather the opposite. You are affected by the countercurrent, which bears you down, down (Bluwstein in Neumann 2011, 130-1).

Though Ruppin —and the mainstream narrative of Zionist settlement in the Yishuv years— would hide the realities of the training farms, he does essentially concede in *The Agricultural Colonization of the Zionist Organization in Palestine* their basic purpose, which was eugenic selection on the basis of social Darwinism and his reasons for it, though ultimately obfuscating his direct and intensive role in the process. Because settlers come from various European traditions instead of the 'experience of many generations' of 'continued intermarriage' which would have 'brought about a certain uniformity of thought and outlook' therefore: 'Our settlers coming to Palestine from different European countries, do

not bring with them traditions of any value' (Ruppin 1926, 41-2). Thus, Ruppin sees the training farms as a means to rectify this, to materially affect a negation of exile via social engineering:

No settlement will prosper if it is merely a mechanical collection of men, arbitrarily brought together by the colonizing body, if it is a union of men without a union of souls. Inevitably discord will arise among the settlers and hamper all progress. The Kvitza is the best means of averting this danger, for it provides a natural and organic selection instead of one merely mechanical. By the gradual elimination of all unsuitable elements it provides a nucleus of men with common aims and interests, thus infusing spirit and soul into the colony, and developing laws and traditions for the benefit of later comers (Ruppin 1926, 42).

Ruppin would then reveal the essential myth of cooperative socialistic settlement residing at the heart of the successful settlement of Palestine. As Bloom has shown, the primary purpose of the training farms was the production of conquest groups. Trained groups of settlers would prepare the ground via improvement or just in terms of guarding against access to it by dispossessed natives, for future permanent settlement, in a version of the American system of settlement expansion where 'capital emerges from debt on relatively de-populated lands whose stream of income are largely in the future' (Schwartz 2012, 52). Often the conquest groups would prepare ground so that wealthy prospective settlers in the diaspora could finance preparation and the building of infrastructure, to which they could settle at a later date more comfortably (Bloom 2008, 224). Ruppin's core logics for the structure of the training farms and the conquest groups that they would produce, were thus his and the group's internal ability to select the best human material for the enterprise. Indeed, this is why they had any collective element in the first place. Furthermore, their makeup facilitated their easy liquidation, as Ruppin would explain:

Once an individual colonist has definitely settled on a piece of land, he has certain rights as against the Zionist Organization. If later he proved himself unsuitable for the purposes of colonisation, it is very difficult or even impossible to remove him from that land. Group settlement renders the connection between the settlers and their land much looser. It is a matter of considerably less difficulty to dissolve the whole group or to reform it by an elimination of the unsuitable members (Ruppin 1926, 134).

Thus, the employees of the Palestine Office had limited rights and as far as Ruppin was concerned, none to the land on which they worked. He went on:

If the Kvitza possesses a nucleus of able and efficient members, it is the best possible school for discovering the abilities of the separate members and for eliminating the undesirable elements. These processes of selection and elimination are of the greatest importance to our colonisation. [...] Only by means of this hard school of labour and by mutual criticism is it possible to distinguish the capable from the incapable [...]. Of all the thousands that have passed through the Kvitza, a large part, perhaps even a majority, have dropped out. It has been a survival of the fittest. Thus, the Kvitza can with justice be called the birthplace of the Jewish agricultural labourer in Palestine (Ruppin 1926, 134-5).

Ruppin's ideology of (un)natural selection would go down to the level of sexual reproduction (Ruppin 1926, 142), as one of his inspirations, the German Stumm System, had before him (Bloom 2008, 229). This system, and Ruppin's own, were paternalistic in the extreme. They mimicked in some respects the familial conservatism of Robert Owen's socialism and the escape from radicalism on display in Herzl's depiction of the New Society's mutualism in *Altneuland*, especially in the guise of David Littwak's paternal relation to his firm and his supposedly liberated workforce. The entire edifice of the system

was in service of the dual aim of the conquest of land and labour. Through both, a new Jew was constructed in the negation of the old exilic Jew of the diaspora. What is most important to consider here is that all of these ends could be prioritized over efficiency and at the confounding of market rationality (Wolfe 2012, 152-3). The lesson of the Australians was perhaps even, over and above that of the ultimately failed colonization of Poznań, the crucial one. Prioritizing 'ethnicity over efficiency' (Wolfe 2012, 152) would be the crucial factor in the success of the settler enterprise, both in creating the "New Jew" and in developing a successful settlement model. Ruppin's immigration policy between 1912 and 1914 would reject 80% of applicants to Palestine and as the above states, the majority who entered the training farms dropped out, a net financial loss to the Zionist Organization in terms of the cost of their training. All this was acceptable from Ruppin's perspective because Palestine was never intended to be a homeland for the Jewish People per-se, it was rather to be a space for the re-birth of a racially purified core of the race. The rest, Ruppin believed, would be able to immigrate to America or elsewhere. History, however, would overtake such plans (Bloom 2008, 288).

Throughout *The Agricultural Colonization of the Zionist Organization in Palestine* Ruppin would reiterate that the purpose of the system of 'mixed' farming that was being created beyond the conquest groups was to leverage the Jewish subject from the market and market relations generally, and from the local and international economy specifically. Mixed farming would have:

many different branches [providing] the settler with work at all times of the year, and he can arrange his farm in such a way as to manage altogether or very nearly altogether without paid labour. Mixed farming, which furnishes the settler with grain, food for his animals, milk and milk products, vegetables, poultry, eggs, honey and fuel, this provides him with almost everything necessary for life. He is consequently much more independent of the market price. His wife and children can also give him substantial help in the easier kinds of work. The whole atmosphere of mixed farming is to a much greater degree agricultural than that of plantations, which are subject to strong commercial influences through their dependence on exterior markets (Ruppin 1926, 13).

All of Ruppin's ideologies and centralized planning were perhaps best expressed materially in the work of Richard Kaufmann, whom he hired through the Palestine Land Development Company to design the settlements of Nahalal and Kfar Yehezkiel. The depiction of these plans in *Agricultural Colonialization* perhaps sums up Ruppin's impact on Zionist settler colonialism and its ongoing significance into the present:

[Kaufmann] exchanged the old village, built more or less in one row, for one of circular shape, in which the dwellings of the individual settlers are grouped as regularly as possible circlewise round a centre of nucleus composed of the public and common buildings. In contrast to the previous one, this system seeks to adapt itself to the landscape and its irregularities. The public buildings are situated on the highest and most favourable point of the settlement and are, if possible, within easy reach of all the different parts of the settlement. [...] This "village forum" forms not only the economic but, comfortably for its purpose, the architectural centre of the colony. An inner circle, comprising the dwellings of artisans, teachers, doctors, etc., is built around these buildings and is itself surrounded by an outer circle composed of the actual farmhouses (Ruppin 1926, 64-5).

The image is of a perfect conquest of economics, the inner 'village forum,' functioning as the economic core of the settlement, is entirely, and I would argue, deliberately, cut off from the surrounding country

and surrounded, concentrically by an exclusively Jewish settler economy. Indeed, the entire social life of the colony is inward looking; its back faces the surrounding country. The focus of the settlement's social life is inward and at the centre in the forum, a perfect example of Ruppin's segregatory social design. Alongside this tendency towards removing privacy and instigating self-surveillance in the social body, we have its counterpart, the implicit defence against the native threat. But beyond this, an example of what Eyal Weizman refers to as "frontier architecture" (Weizman 2007), the design of the settlement brings forth histories of settler colonialism with it. It resembles the settler fort at Jamestown, an Afrikaner laager-circle or the anachronistic architectural peculiarities of Ulster:

In the countryside, the bawn, or defended farmhouse, was the characteristic structure: [...] 'The undertaker usually placed his keep-like house at one end of the corners of the bawn wall, the other three corners being defended by circular towers with candle-extinguisher roofs on them. The bawn was entered by a gate surmounted by a baroque gable [...]. The bawns create the effect of being much older than they are, for outside Ulster such defence mechanisms had long before become unnecessary [...]' (O'D Hanna in Akenson 1992, 120).

But in resembling the settlements of the Ulster-Scots, Ruppin's segregatory conquest of land and labour manifested in Kaufmann's architectural utopianism was merely a palimpsest, written over so many times that the original might appear lost. For what is this, if not walled Jerusalem fortified against an assemblage of proverbial Ammonites and Ashdodites? Here it arrives via secular social-Darwinism and is re-inscribed on the soil of Palestine, a new covenant of ethnic exclusivism written through the science of race instead of the code of the holy scriptures. Arguably such a development confirms Zionism's embedding in a covenantal framework long before the religious settlers of the Gush Emunim began their messianic violence in the West Bank. An argument that the following discussion of David Ben-Gurion's covenantalism should support.

4.6: Conclusion: Back to the Bible, Ben-Gurion: The Protestant Zionist

David Ben-Gurion's fascination with the Bible is part of a tendency in Zionism which dates back to the first proto-nationalist Jewish biblical histories, which sought to wrest from their forebears such as Issak Markus Jost and Leopold Zunz, the idea that Jews were not an alien people in Europe, or indeed anywhere outside the Holy Land. Zionist histories sought to replace this idea with a historic narrative that essentially re-capitulated those of the Bible (Sand 2010, 68-69, 72).

Where Protestants would take the text of the Bible and abandon the mediation of the institutions of Catholicism in favour of the individual, the proto-nationalist Jewish historians of the nineteenth century would conduct a similar move and through the historian seek to 'replace the rabbi as the agent of memory and inherited identity' (Sand 2010, 90). In doing this, and again in a parallel move to Protestants, the proto-nationalists and then Zionists would, instead of simply literalizing the theological in the text, instead opt to strip the theological and supernatural away and maintain the secular historical narrative as the core component on which to build from (Sand 2010, 92, 97). Thus, in

what Amnon Raz-Krakotzkin refers to as a 'return to history', Zionism, its reading of the Bible and its relationship to Judaism, has returned to 'history'. But this is a history in the Western, Christian tradition. 'It is based' he argues:

on a comprehensive adoption of the Western concept of history, and also the acceptance in principle of the Christian understanding of Jewish history, especially as it was shaped in the Protestant context. Thus, paradoxically, the exit from Europe and the wish to establish a distinctly Jewish entity in the East was a way of being integrated into the Christian West on the basis of complete identification with European self-image. Concomitantly, the 'return' to history also meant the displacement of the Jews from the various 'histories' within which they have existed onto a discrete narrative (Raz-Krakotzkin in Piterberg 2008, 246-7).

This adoption of a Christian historicism is not confined to secular Zionism, rather it has gone on to shape religious Zionism too, and indeed the very nature of the supposed split between religious and secular Zionism itself. In the terms of Said, like all hegemonic forms, it frames the antithetical:

This historical framework was developed by early Zionist secular-socialist thinkers, and was accepted, in different versions, by most of the Zionist trends, in spite of other differences. When later Zionist religious thinkers like Rabbi Kook reformulated that historical framework in religious terms, their work was not derived from »religion« as such but from the interpretation and the re-articulation of the Jewish myth in Zionist secular terms. Even though the impact of Zionist history among secular groups has diminished in recent decades, it is still the only existing framework for national identity and historical perception (Raz-Krakotzkin 2002, 316).

Carlton Hayes argued, as we have seen, that the epochal shifts from religious forms, from Judaism and paganism to Christianity, from Catholicism to Protestantism and from Protestantism into a multitude of secular religions in nationalism characterise the development of the European 'religious sense' (Hayes 1926). I would argue beyond this, a syncretism of Protestantism, settler utopianism and religious socialism produced an almost endless splintering of cultish social organizations at the fin de siècle. The sacred and the secular have constantly interwoven and synthesized to produce new regimes of faith. Zionism is merely another in a long line of social organizations that borrowed liberally from past forms. As Raz-Krakotzkin explains:

Romantic terminology, whose roots in Christian (especially Protestant) theology are obvious, clarifies the link between the theological and the colonial, inherent in the nationalization and territorialisation of Jewish memory. On one level, the Zionist ideal of »return« to the ancient past was based on a fundamental Protestant ideal. The Zionist return was to the same context that was the spiritual ideal of Protestantism – to the Holy Land of the Second Temple period, the age of Jesus Christ. The image of the ancient Jewish community was the same image attributed to the early Church in Protestant thought, and was formulated in the same terms, and according to similar cultural images. The Jewish national ideal considered as secular followed the theological imagination of Protestantism (Raz-Krakotzkin 2002, 317).

Where evangelicals like Anthony Ashley Cooper, whose dreams were ultimately predicated on the conversion of the returned Jews to Christianity before the End of Days, were profoundly unsuccessful in converting Jews to a religious Christianity, the Protestant(ish) Zionists were successful in converting Jews to what we might refer to as a Christian secularism, a profoundly Protestant teleology of history.

Perhaps the most visible sign of the wholesale adoption of this Protestant(ish) teleology of history is how restorationism had become a common-sense notion in British public life by the time of the First

World War. Whilst the Zionists did have to court British Power, the very fact that the British considered it sound policy to win the favour of the Jews by way in the way that they did is telling. Rather than, say, lobbying for emigration to the Americas, or for ameliorating the conditions of Jewish communities in place (positions supported by the majority of Jews in Europe and America at the time) the British chose to support the minority position of Zionism (Sand 2014, 175, Piterberg 2008, 254).

The composition of the War Cabinet who formulated the Balfour declaration is important. Aside from Montagu and Lord Curzon, the two most opposed to the Declaration, all were either raised in the traditions of evangelical Protestantism, within the settler empire or both. As Lewis has argued, by 1917:

few of these leading Gentile Zionists self-identified as either evangelicals or as Calvinists, but the influence of the religious culture that had nurtured them disposed them to think of the Jews as a “people,” a “race,” and “a nation” and thus inclined toward the idea of a Jewish homeland, and to the idea that Britain had a [...] role in enabling this to happen (Lewis 2010, 334).

This did not mean that they necessarily felt they were engaged, as Ashley Cooper had done, with the unfolding of prophecy, rather, that along with British exploitation and settler imperialism, ‘the authoritative assertion that Palestine was the God-given home of the Jews, to which they sooner or later would return’ had become ‘a common place bit of knowledge. Like a self-evident fact one mentions only to confirm’ (Piterberg 2008, 254). Restorationism was, we might say, merely the confirmation of a secular teleology of history, the same confirmation of an unfolding of common-sense progress that informed Israel Zangwill’s dream of an East African Zion and underwrote Herzl’s utopian vision in *Altneuland*.

The significance of occidental historicism is that it brings the apocalyptic eschatology of Christianity to earth. The Heavenly City becomes the city of man:

The bearing of the eschatological thought on the historical consciousness of the Occident is that it conquers the flux of historical time, which wastes away and devours its own creations unless it is defined by an ultimate goal. Comparable to the compass which gives us orientation in space, and thus enables us to conquer it, the eschatological compass gives us orientation in time (Löwith 1949, 19).

In this teleology of history, forever being constructed and reconstructed, Palestine had always *been* a destination for British Imperialism, since well before George Sandys slipped into the country in the seventeenth century, it had existed in the historical consciousness of the English. Its specific meaning in terms of the ends of the teleology of history would merely change. Indeed, it arguably formed more material meaning by the early twentieth century, vicariously, in the imagination of the English and through the advocacy of English evangelicals and the designs of British Imperialism than it did for the majority of European Jews. In 1917, the authorial position vis-à-vis that telos and finis, was that it would become what amounted to a British protectorate. The moral rightness of that claim was based

reflexively on the fact that Britain was in a position to make it, as a world power and through its self-understanding as such.

Yerach Gover has discussed this kind of self-referential thinking in regards to Israeli fiction writing, in which he finds that ‘the use of historical materials in the Israeli fictional text is intended to be informative as well as moralizing and to inform about history as a whole’ (Gover 1994, 31). He continues:

This allegorical mode of constituting a semblance of praxis, with its sense of movement from the past towards just this very moment of ethnic society, this living utopia, provides the foundation for the historically ‘explanatory effect’ that invariably accompanies every other pleasure in Hebrew literary fiction (Gover 1994, 30).

This mode of understanding history, which the return to (Christian) history mobilized in Zionism, Gover argues, has made for an understanding that ‘the holocaust and national histories are, in the discourses that now prevail, products of, rather than sources of evidence for, Zionism’ (Gover 1994, 30). British elites in the War Cabinet and the Zionists who sought to lobby them didn’t merely speak the same ideological language, they subscribed to the same teleology of history, to the point that the potential consequences of their decision, like the majority opposition of Judaism to Zionism, was an irrelevance. In 2004, as a similarly unaccountable and single minded “cabinet” sought to make its own history when Karl Rove, Senior advisor to George W. Bush, explained what we have come to understand as ‘divine poiesis’ in the context of American Empire, to a *New York Times* reporter:

People like you are still living in what we call the reality-based community. You believe that solutions emerge from your judicious study of discernible reality. [...] That’s not the way the world really works anymore. We’re an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And while you are studying that reality—judiciously, as you will—we’ll act again, creating other new realities, which you can study too, and that’s how things will sort out. We’re history’s actors, and you, all of you, will be left to just study what we do (Rove in Danner 2007).

Arthur Balfour would offer a similar justification for the War Cabinet’s decision in 1917, admitting that whether support for Zionism was actually a good idea or not, was in fact, irrelevant. These things were secondary matters, to be deciphered later, presumably by historians:

in Palestine we do not propose even to go through the form of consulting the wishes of the present inhabitants of the country [...]. The four great powers are committed to Zionism and Zionism, be it good or bad, right or wrong, is rooted in age long tradition, in present needs, in future hopes, of far profounder import than the desires and prejudices of the 700,000 Arabs who now inhabit that ancient land (Balfour in Said 2000, 431-2).

The skein of a messianic history, in the case of Balfour, inflected by both his upbringing in evangelicalism *and* his embedding in the secular messianic of Greater Britain as Anglo-Saxon empire, were the determinants of this common-sense faith in British support for the Zionist project. It was simply what peoples like the British did, and had *always done*.

This is the making and remaking of the world and oneself in it. Or, perhaps, after Herzl, the willing of one’s dream into reality, by the sheer force of desire (And the material force of a world power). The act

of self-determination is transcendent and exists prior to the mere extended dead matter of the material universe and the externally determinate, who do not act, but merely exist in it. This is a productive, creative, destructive force, making and remaking history and producing reality, as history's only "real" actors can do.

David Ben-Gurion's encounter with the Bible would be arguably help play a role in the discursive scene Yerach Gover surveyed in the 1990's. Ben-Gurion's biblical interpretations amounted to 'telos and experience' (Gover 1994, 30-31), the coming together of his experience as a settler colonist, his ideological identification as a Zionist and its inflection with a protestant historicism itself informed by settler colonial logics.

Appropriately, Ben-Gurion arguably only really came to the Bible and to his persistent biblical hero, Joshua, via the dispossession of the Palestinians. The ethnic cleansing of Palestine functioned as a performance of the Conquest of Canaan, the infiltration of the spies of the biblical narrative into the land and all, replayed in his role as the architect of Plan Dalet (Pappe 2011). He would refer to the operations at the time as the transcribing of the land as palimpsest, prophecy revealed in troop movements (and creative destruction/production of the new state): 'none of the Bible interpreters, Jews or Gentiles, in the middle ages or in our time, could have *interpreted* Joshua's chapters as did the adventures of the Israel Defence Forces last year' (Piterberg 2008, 201)(My italics).

Piterberg has shown that Ben-Gurion's growing acquaintance with the Bible is paralleled by the systematic destruction of native Palestine in post-Independence Israel, the raising of villages, renaming of villages after biblical archetypes, the Europeanization of the countryside via the planting of pine forests, hiding forever the ruins of much of the previous society (Piterberg 2008, 202). Coincident with this was Ben-Gurion's project to establish, alongside the sweeping away of a millennium of indigenous history, the creation of a tabula rasa for a new settler identity and for his new society. It is in this context that his encounter with the Bible should be understood, and through which it makes sense.

Ben-Gurion's approach to the text follows the standard Protestant tradition, that is:

the direct approach to the text, and the concomitant disregard for (and stripping away of) the layers of theological commentary that mediate between the reading individual and the foundational text; the assumption that it is the right of the individual subject to engage with the scriptures precisely because he is an individual subject; the emphasis laid upon the narrative parts of the Old Testament, under the assumption that the narrative is veracious, and that its occurrence is an authoritative legitimizing source for all sorts of returns, re-enactments, re-establishments, and restorations (Piterberg 2008, 273-4).

The text is to be read by the individual alone and as far as Ben-Gurion was concerned, in the land that it was composed (Piterberg 2008, 202). Like Kallen before him, the Mishnah and Talmud are to be discarded as exilic texts (Piterberg 2008, 274). The Bible therefore, was to be secularized and territorialized, to be read as a flatly historical text and, to be read, if it was to truly be *read* at all, in the

Land of Israel itself, a literary corollary to the archaeological excavations which Ben-Gurion and the new state also encouraged.

Ben-Gurion's interests were primarily concerning the Exodus as it pertained to effectively denying the exilic character of the ancient Hebrews and the Book of Joshua as it related to ethnic purity in the conquered land of Canaan via permanent separation from the native population. This Piterberg has previously discussed, but I believe there are two other acts of biblical exegesis that Ben-Gurion engaged in his "Bible Circle"³³ that have not been considered as yet, that have particular implications vis-à-vis his settler colonial identity and the protestant nature of his Zionism.

The first concerns his narration of the rebuilding of Jerusalem in Nehemiah. He comes to his discussion after establishing a genealogy of Israeli 'peoples armies' dating back to Abraham (Ben-Gurion 1972, 38). He goes on to draw analogies –or we might state, to tease out types against the presumed contemporary anti-types of prophetic exegesis– between Solomon's use of a '12,000 man' regular army for 'settlement and development projects' and the contemporary IDF (Ben-Gurion 1972, 40). From here he then takes up Kallen's 'moral equivalent of war' and our understanding of settlement as war by other means in his description of the rebuilding of Jerusalem:

The classic example in our history of the joining of work projects and defence occurred during the first return to Zion in the days of Ezra and Nehemiah. The first returnees from Babylonia found that "the wall of Jerusalem was broken down and its gates destroyed by fire" [...] and they began to build the walls of the capital and its gates under the leadership of Nehemiah [...]. But, when "Sanballat and Tobiah, the Arabians and Ammonites and Asdodites, heard that the new work on the walls of Jerusalem has made progress and that the filling of breaches had begun, they were very angry; and they all banded together to come and fight in Jerusalem." [...] Then Nehemiah gave the command to continue with the building: "The builders had their swords attached to their belts as they built. "Thus does Nehemiah narrate in his memoirs: "From that day onward, half the men under me were engaged in the actual building, while the other half stood by holding their spears, shields and bows, and wearing coats of mail [...] some building the wall and some laden with burdens; with one hand engaged in work and the other grasping his weapon [...] And they served as guards during the night and workers during the day. So neither I nor my kinsmen nor the men under me nor my bodyguard ever took off our clothes [...]" (Ben-Gurion 1972, 41-2).

There is no talk of beating swords into ploughshares here, despite what Ben-Gurion would say elsewhere about the peaceful character of his biblicised Judaism, that 'having to bear arms was an affront to [the] Bible' and essentially alien to the ancient Hebrews (Ben-Gurion 1970, 67). Here the prophetic lesson was clear, settlement and warfare were to be one and the same, the creative destruction that Ben-Gurion eulogised as an act of providential transcription on the land, re-writing Palestine as Eretz Israel, was precisely the act of settlement as warfare.

As already mentioned, Ben-Gurion's principle interest was the Book of Joshua, his interest is intrinsically tied to the exodus narrative. Of the exodus narrative, he argues that only a very small

³³ A collection of Israeli biblical scholars, archaeologists, military leaders and politicians, who in the 1950's were often interchangeable and whom Ben-Gurion surrounded himself with, at his home and at numerous conferences on biblical themes.

number of people ever left Canaan and thus a majority remained in the land, and therefore —the 600 by his calculations (Ben-Gurion 1972, 115)— could slot back in easily enough after the sojourn in Egypt. The key to this, as Piterberg has argued, is that it allows Ben-Gurion to date the origin of Hebrew monotheism to some Abrahamic primordialism, even arguing that it is what drew Abraham to Canaan in the first place, as it ensures that it is territorialized in the land and not connected at all with the exile.

Ben-Gurion then takes up chapters 23-24 in Joshua, and explicitly ties monotheism to ethnic exclusivism and contemporary settler conquest. Though he believes that the great majority of the Hebrew people remained in Canaan, Joshua and the “600” are returnees. Upon his return, Joshua proceeds to remind ‘his’ people of their previous covenant with the Lord. Ben-Gurion concludes from this that Joshua recognizes them as the people who in previous generations had been left behind in the land before the sojourn in Egypt, who he is now reunited with in Canaan. The crucial factor for Ben-Gurion, and for us, is that Joshua then gives ‘his’ people a choice: ‘But if it does not please you to worship the Lord, chose here and now whom you will worship: the gods which your forefathers worshipped on the other side of the river, or the gods of the Amorites in whose land you are living. But I and my family, we will worship the Lord’ (Ben-Gurion 1972, 207). They elect for the latter. From this, Ben-Gurion concludes:

There are things which arouse doubt within me. In one place it says that Joshua conquered all of the land, while in other places it is written that many parts remained unconquered. The whole narrative about the war also does not seem so plausible to me after having had a little experience in military matters. The most important thing in chapter 24 is the choice of God by the Jewish people. It is of this that we are proud. The Jewish people stood out more than any other people because it arrived at a belief in one God; that one superior force created everything and rules over everything (Ben-Gurion 1972, 210).

Thus the Jewish People self-determine to monotheism. Moses does not decide for them in exile, Joshua gives them the option and they collectively elect to do so. In something of a Lockean contract, Joshua then draws up ‘a statute and a covenant for them in Shechem’ (Ben-Gurion 1972, 213). This is a re-play of the revelation of the law and the Mosaic covenant, an authentic re-birth of monotheism, only this time in the Promised Land and ethnically pure. Those assembled before Joshua take active part in the decision, they elect to become a monotheistic people, amongst their merely existing paganistic neighbours. They are the true ancestors of Zionism, made in true settler colonial style, by an election to ‘draw up [their] own articles’ in the words of the Puritan John Winthrop, and separate from their surroundings. This is the most jealously guarded privilege of settler peoples. The ancient Hebrews were not the Chosen People. As in the American settler Samuel Lagdon’s exegesis on the Mosaic covenant, they *chose*.

This way of being, so fundamentally protestant and settler colonial that it features in all Protestant settler societies, from the Mayflower Compact, the Afrikaner Day of the Vow, to the Ulster Solemn

League and Covenant, functioned as the founding of Ben-Gurion's newly constructed teleology of history and suffused his thinking as a settler. The sense of ownership, derived from having *made it so*, from having earned it, thus justifying its possession in perpetuity, is one of the essential components of settler notions of self-determination and the construction of autochthony that settlers engage in. Well before he became a secular counterpart to the fundamentalist American evangelicals he would court later in life, Ben-Gurion had well established this sense of irrefutable right to possession:

If a people has a right to say 'This is my own, my native land,' it can only be because it has *created* it. The soil is nature's guerdon and man cannot make matter out of nothing. Whatever serves for man's enjoyment is nature-made. All that man does is to work with hand and brain to adapt for his own use and benefit the materials which nature provides. Fitting the land by labour to a nation's needs: tith and enrichment of the soil, paving of roads, setting up of means of communication, unearthing of hidden treasures and natural resources, building up of industry—these are the *making of a Homeland* (Ben-Gurion 1954, 4-5)(italics in original).

Those who are not seen to have made the land "theirs" are not truly *native* to it. Nativity to Ben-Gurion is *made*. Despite his biblical exegesis, this is how he, a man who until Palestinian resistance became too obvious a fact to be ignored, believed that Palestinians likely held closer genealogical ties to the ancient Hebrews than an Eastern European Ashkenazi such as himself did (Sand 2010, 185-6). This is how Ben-Gurion would ultimately square the circle. It seems, that behind all the socialist rhetoric of his personal mythos, David Ben-Gurion was at heart something of a Lockean. Labour mixed with land equals property. With the Lockean appropriation of Genesis 1:28, the justification for dispossession arrived in train with 400 years of preaccumulative strategic technologies to aid in the act and a faith that what was happening was practically preordained, neither quite by Holy writ or the cunning of reason, but certainly through the working of some form of providence.

The ultimate impact of this mode of thought on Israel's neighbours and especially on its Palestinian victims, can be indicated in the well cultivated supremacism and utter disdain for those perceived to be externally determinate, itself a practice of long settler colonial provenance:

The people of Israel [are] the only Mediterranean people to preserve its faith from antiquity, and to speak the language that its forefathers spoke three and four thousand years ago. Egypt, Babylon, Syria, and Canaan do not even know their early names, and not one of their rulers knows how to converse in the language of his forefathers. They received their religion from foreigners —willingly, or under duress. Only the faith and language of Israel lives, once again, in its ancient land (Ben-Gurion 1972, 287).

5

UNIVERSAL FREEDOM, SOVEREIGN TERROR, AND STRUCTURAL INVASION: “APOCALYPSE NOW”

"Among the thousands who cross the Plains, there are many who have never been refined by either mental or moral culture. The sum total of their religious and political faith consists in Squatter Sovereignty – the right to do as they choose, regardless of all but selfish interests. When such as these get beyond the range of Law and Civilization, a slight cause often makes them reckless and abusive; and many are the cases of violence and murder, of which the world never hears; and as the Authorities at the Forts exercise neither civil nor military jurisdiction over the Emigrants, any outrage may be committed with comparative impunity. But it is the Indians who are generally their most numerous victims. At first, they find more excitement in shooting bears and buffaloes, than they did in the States killing rabbits and deer. They grow ambitious and begin to think it would be a great achievement to kill an Indian; and, as most of them are armed with rifles and revolvers, the desire becomes strong to slay one of those whom their own savageness has converted into an enemy [...] Thus the poor Indian, by being spoken of as a brute, is cast beyond the pale of a common humanity –where the killing of him ceases to be murder, and no atrocity is considered cruel or unjust."

- John Beeson, *A Plea for the Indians*, 1857

"One operation in Hawwara has been etched in my memory. It's an Arab village, not exactly quiet, but it's no Jenin. [...] Basically what happened was, the Jews decided to go on a rampage in the [...] area. There are settlements there and all kinds of outposts. [...] They sent us to get the mess in Hawwara under control. That's the beginning. [...] We got there. The settlers had decided to attack the residents in the village, and we -we're supposed to protect them and make sure nothing happens to them. [...] They came to protest, and they started throwing stones at the village, at Hawwara, on the main road [...]. There was a group of people from outside Israel who were demonstrating in support of the Jewish settlement, and they were goading on the settlers [...] they were a group of fanatical French Jews who'd come and were taking pictures of what was going on there. [...] They had weapons and threw stones. Children were hurling stones at adults. [...] we waited for the police [...] at some point I think one of the officers tried to stop them from throwing stones so they'd leave and get out of there. It got to the point there he was afraid. We tried to stop them from bothering the Palestinians, but we also had to protect them [the settlers] and protect ourselves . . . it was crazy, absurd. And they, the settlers, didn't care."

- Anonymous soldier, interviewed by *Breaking the Silence*, 2000

This Chapter looks to explore the inner dynamics of settler dispossession of nativity more closely. By returning to the as yet irresolvable tension between the universalization of self-determining subjects coming to self-consciousness in the state, and that state's violence in the form of the state sovereign that we left in Chapter One, I will explore the displacement of this contradiction into the settler colonies. This displacement of contradiction would become a recurrent, structural move in settler colonialism. From metropole to colony, from urban centre, to frontier, and so on. In this dynamic, we will break down the concept of sovereignty into a number of interconnected, overlapping registers, the play of which has intimately informed the destruction of native sovereignty and society on the frontier. Taking the cases of America and Australia as a starting point, the Chapter will then focus on the case study of the Post-Oslo Accords Occupied West Bank as an example of the institutionalization of what has been historically an ad-hoc and chaotic process. The State of Israel and its settlers in the Occupied Territories will be shown to utilize the radical decentralization of state sovereignty as a technology of structural invasion through which they strangle, unsettle, and ultimately seek to end Palestinian social reproduction on the land, in what is less a practice of lawlessness than the savage proliferation of autochthonous apartheid legalities.

5.1: Sovereignty and Settlement

In the discussion of self-determination as it pertains to the collective or “the people” coming to self-consciousness, the “for itself” in the Hegelian teleology of reasoned progress through the motion of Spirit in History, Hegel posits a transparency or coincidence of ends between self-conscious subjectivity in the collective and its self-governance in the state. As we have charted above, here the subject recognizes an intimacy between itself, collective self-consciousness in self-determination and the externalization of this ‘freedom’ in the institutions of the state itself, in that each are reflected in the other in an apocalyptic arrival of self-determining subjectivity onto the stage of World History. The Hegelian perspective outlining as it does the intimacy between the individual subject, the collective, and the state, and a transparency between the three in the Hegelian state, is helpful in drawing together the mutual constitution of subject and state in the modern morphology of sovereignty, especially when we consider the mode of establishing political sovereignty in the abstract as set against the actual, historical process of consolidating sovereignty in settler regimes. The consolidation of the post-Enlightenment self-determining subject is paralleled in the formation of political sovereignty and collective self-determination. The collection of desires informing individual self-determination or the individual as sovereign and that of the mythology of state sovereignty are of the same order. As Joan Cocks notes of the moment of rupture between collective desire for self-government and monarchical absolutism:

attaining freedom from monarchical power [...] has seemed to people in many centuries and many regions to be synonymous with wresting the prerogatives of sovereign power for themselves. To command instead of being commanded, to possess an effectual will instead of meekly bowing to a master, to control the conditions of one's existence instead of being at the mercy of alien forces, to shine with the dignity of a sovereign self instead of living in the shadow of another's grandeur, to corral the state to serve one's own needs and interests instead of being exploited or neglected by those who monopolize state power (Cocks 2014, 36).

Where in the case of the individual self-determining subject the core of subjectivity turns on the questions of the right and the good in the rational and moral sense, and how they might be actioned and rendered productive on the stage of nature, political sovereignty takes such desire into a higher register. Here 'the dream [of sovereignty] was itself and immense material power' that would transform 'the natural world, investing industrially produced objects and built environments with collective, political desire' (Buck-Morss 2002, 6). Here, the monopoly of violent, physical power in the state is mobilized to 'determine [...] what the just and the good are' (Buck-Morss 2002, *ibid*). Most obviously in the settler colonial scenario this collective "dream(world)" is invested directly in someone else's land as secular salvation, a stage on which collective self-determination is to be performed. Beyond this, in both the colonies and the metropole, and arguably in any formation of political sovereignty, a process of settlement is itself taking place. To quote Cocks again:

attempts to gain freedom through sovereign power via, for example, ethnonational movements, political partitions, revolutionary regime change, or modern state building are also settler projects of a sort, as each of these new political orders must "settle" the society it "colonizes", by [re-]establishing the territorial boundaries within which it is to be authoritative, [re-]wiring laws within those bounds, [re-]configuring identities and habits of life for the people it declares to be "its" people, and determining who will be counted as that people's new enemies (Cocks 2014, 5).

Thus, in the very formation of modern political sovereignties we see the same compulsion to order and demarcate, to expel and displace contradiction and difference beyond the boundaries of the sovereign inside that was operative in the shaping of individual subjectivity, operating at the register of the state itself. Just as the discourse on self-determination settles bodies, so the sovereign political form settles territory.

The fullest modern example of this settlement in the European context is that of the French Revolution. This is, I believe, the ultimate cul-de-sac in a discursive tradition that traced a historical teleology from individual subject to popular sovereign subject in the state, one that would never truly transcend the context of its culmination in the Revolutionary Terror and the Thermidorian Reaction. For the 'violation and creation' that characterized the settlement of space and forceful organizing of wilful human 'matter' into a 'specific people' (Cocks 2014, 48) automatically generates an opposing counter-power and is 'destined to meet up eventually with resistance, disobedience and defiance' (Cocks 2014, 34). Beyond the reign of Terror, European intellectual traditions vis-à-vis human subjectivity and its progress in history would become trapped in a continual oscillation between, on the one hand, the supreme power of Sovereign violence, and on the other, the countervailing force of constituent power, both being the logical constitutive of the other. This still operative oscillation

imposes 'a false dichotomy of alternatives', that is, state sovereignty or de-territorialized popular self-government 'merely reproduce' one another (Martel 2012, 24-5) in a perpetual and as yet unresolved tension. Crucially however, one avenue of progression would become mythologised as the last best chance for the transcendence of this problematic. Thus, the inherent contradiction existing within the concept of political sovereignty –that 'the individuality of the historico-political "subjects" postulated by sovereignty never stops putting sovereignty itself into question (Balibar in Martel 2012, 26)– would be displaced out into the space of the settler colonies.

In the context of the Reign of Terror, despite Hegel's ultimate disavowal of what was to occur, we can see an entirely logical progression from transparency between state and subjects to the 'fury of destruction' that Hegel laments. As Matthew Cole explains, at the moment of singularity:

Self-consciousness now comes to grasp itself and its world as "simply its own will," and according to Hegel, "this is a general will...the will of all individuals as such...so that each, undivided from the whole, always does everything, and what appears as done by the whole is the direct and conscious deed of each." Thus, in absolute freedom, all particularity i.e. social factions, classes etc. are dissolved and the individual now sees itself as "the universal Subject" (Cole 2011).

Thus, the subject comes to grasp in the moment the abstract position the post-Enlightenment philosophical tradition had claimed for it, its universal productive power, poiesis, or Spirit, is the legitimacy and authority to make and remake the world and itself in it. This is the self-authorized law-making violence to produce a new 'nomos of the earth' (Schmitt in Brown 2010, 44-45). This abstract subject 'raises itself to the status of universal will', necessarily 'excluding all others from the deed' (Cole 2011). Seeing only the "I", the universal subject engages in the furious destruction of all particularity, be it counter posed contemporary radicals, the vestiges of the *ancien regime*, or the culturally syncretic dream-world that existed alongside it. In such situations a coincidence of opposites emerges. Terror and freedom go hand in hand at 'the excess where democracy and terror coincide' (Žižek 2009, 159). None are spared implication in the revolutionary scenario, one either is 'the revolution', experiencing it as oneself, or one is outside of it and experiences it as an externality. In such situations as Robespierre stated, 'innocence is the highest treason' (Robespierre in Žižek 2009, *ibid*). The abstract subject seeing no limitation to itself and thus no other in which it is itself reflected need not 'take into account the habits that qualify the functioning of a universal rule' and attains the freedom to act outside of any norm or normative system (Žižek 2009, 160), enacting the law making violence that was always inherent in sovereignty. In the first instance, this process is sovereignty's cognisance of its own finitude and the threat of anything outside of itself, whereby sovereign power recognizes the threat to its existence not just of the conventional 'reactionaries' of the revolutionary discourse, or foreign powers, but that of the people themselves, by whom modern popular sovereignty is set against itself. Sovereign terror as self-determination is power in defence of itself. As Buck-Morss states of the Revolution in France, 'the first duty of power was to maintain it: that was the function of

the terror' (Buck-Morss 2002, 13). Beyond this, in the settler colonies the finitude of sovereignty may also be represented by the bodies and social formations of 'others' whom sovereign rule and jurisdiction does not always comprehend in the legal sense, yet whose way of being in the world, whose use of land, both resemble in some respects the socially syncretic (alternative) dreamworld that sovereign regimes can be seen to settle and replace in Europe, but who can also be made to function as a specific kind of enemy who represents a limit to sovereign desire. This desire to be utterly self-determining implies a boundlessness that is contradicted by the territoriality inherent in sovereign formations, yet it exists as a central paradox in sovereignty all the same. Here the 'sovereign conceit' encompasses and in some respect seeks to frame not just the individual subject, the polis of political subjects or the state (and states) and the international, but also 'the human race as a single entity' (Cocks 2014, 4). As Byrd has argued 'The imperial planetarity that sparked scientific rationalism and inspired humanistic articulations of freedom, sovereignty and equality, touched four continents and a sea of islands in order to cohere itself' (J. A. Byrd 2011, xx), all the while drawing boundaries between inside and outside and declaring fraternity within and enemy without on multiple registers.

5.2: Sovereignty and Settler Mythology

Numerous myths abound concerning the birth of nations. These myths in the settler colonies tend to focus on virginal empty space awaiting redemption by the virile bodies of pioneering settlers, whether this be the North American "wilderness" or the "land without a people" in Palestine. These spatial and temporal imaginaries would be understood by settlers and by the populations of metropolitan "mother" states fetishistically through narratives of the deterritorialization of sovereign power and the extension of this new found "liberty", that I understand more simply as the extension of the conditions of settlement by structural invasion. The critical focus on the now well-known myths of the American errand into the wilderness and Zionist pioneering in service of "making the desert bloom" has occluded somewhat the concrete destruction of these very lifeworlds. One of the central omissions this focus on mythmaking, rather than a dual focus on both the myth and the parallel destruction of a way of being in the world makes, is quite how the myth is parasitically related to this very destruction. As we have seen, Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz has shown how in the North American example how practices of settlement physically created the pristine wilderness of mythology. It was only after the arrival of settlers and their destruction of native societies and with them, native modes of agriculture and animal husbandry, that the wilderness of the American mythical epic began to form.

Likewise, in the realm of the political a kaleidoscope of complex federated and confederated tribal organizations, sedentary and nomadic, proliferated throughout the continent. Whilst these political forms were alluded to by revolutionaries in justifying their uprising against the Crown, they have largely been forgotten in the American national epic, systematically destroyed as they were over

several centuries of treaty, warfare, and removal. Whilst in Palestine, outside simple ignorance or the more florid fringes of Zionist rhetoric and ideology, there was little denying the existence of “people” living productively on the land, what did take place in a parallel to the American scenario was the “wildernessing” of “a people” or a space of politics in Palestine.

The discounting of the existence of a people or political community by imperial powers based on the assumed absence of any cohesion or homogenous political desire and drawn in negation against the assumed political and racial homogeneity of the metropole, was a standard practice in British imperial discourse and was frequently used to deny the right to self-rule in Ireland and India (Bell 2007, 228). The wildernessing or desertification of Palestine as a space containing a people and politics was a process that encompassed the Zionist economic war on Palestinian social reproduction in the conquest of labour, beginning at the turn of the century. It continued through the two Arab Revolts, the response to which involved the kind of counter-insurgency warfare against native social reproduction, pioneered by settlers in the Americas (Dunbar-Ortiz 2014, 192) and by the British in Ireland, which all but destroyed the infrastructure of Palestinian resistance and the space of politics that made it possible. The final act in the discursive desertification of Palestine, rendering it the people-less place of the Zionist sovereign dream, occurred through Plan Dalet and the ethnic cleansing of Palestine from 1947 to 1949. The myth of a people-less space in Palestine which allowed Golda Meir to make her notorious statement denying the existence of a Palestinian people, was violently and physically as well as discursively made, in a decade’s long process of structural invasion. The point here is to note that the sovereign desire invested in land in the settler scenario cannot countenance the existence of socially reproductive native society, a glaring contradiction which muddies the pristine wilderness or “desert” of the settler imagination. The myth or dream is made real. Here, epistemic and physical violence dovetail together. Settlers build their dreams in reality, on top of native lifeworlds.

5.3: Sovereignties on the Settler Frontier

The inability to escape the trap of the sovereign-constituent power dyad has led to considerable intellectual output across the theoretical spectrum. On the one hand, the liberal tradition remains perpetually wary of the potentialities of radical revolutionary violence, favouring a neo-liberal capitalist convergence of economic interdependence in global cosmopolitanism. The left, on the other hand, variously places a messianic ‘revolution’ *just beyond* the horizon of the historical teleology. Both are arguably still deeply indebted to the prospective ‘end of history’ the Hegelian narrative describes. One of the major outlets to this stalled intellectual project in Europe has been that informed by the prodigious economic and political development in the settler colonies. From de-Tocqueville to Deleuze & Guattari, the frontier experience in various settler colonies, though particularly that of North America, has provided an outlet for the dreams of social emancipatory politics away from the calcified

hierarchies of European historic contingency. Since the dawn of European penetration into the “New world” this relative obsession has always been present. Indeed these “empty spaces” always-already existed pending an assumed European arrival. They have *always* functioned materially as a utopian space for European imaginative as well as economic and cultural release, rather than simply providing a post-hoc heuristic device to play out alternatives to the previously stagnating Eurocentric discursive tradition that would repeatedly run aground in revolution, authoritarian dictatorship and monolithic late-capitalist economic and ideological hegemony. This process would continue long after the actual arrival of the settler colonies on the stage of global politics themselves.

The question of sovereignty on the settler colonial frontier in the first instance involves the very nature of the sovereign decision. The stipulation of what is to be inside and what external to the sovereign formation. As we have seen, the colonial encounter between European and indigenous peoples was framed by reference to emerging international legal discourses and ‘their congeniality to the global expansion of European capital’ (Wolfe 2007, 132).

Here again we see sovereignty operating on a number of registers. The first is in the realm of international law and that of sovereign reason itself, the norm by which international legal scholars would ground a set of exclusions in which European powers were comprehended and included in the bounds of the international. This created a figurative territoriality of reasoned sovereigns, differentiated from and drawn in negation of external ‘others’ whom by definition were excluded from and uncomprehended by international law, yet paradoxically recognized by it inasmuch as they were subjected to it. Just as in the state form of sovereignty, sovereign reason is a space charted, here by international law, and a ‘nomos of the earth’ willed into being, removed ‘from the ordinary’ and placed ‘under its own laws’ (Brown 2010, 43). Anghie outlines the founding of law within this spatiality, as the discourse of international law develops

a set of doctrines by which the violent, the aberrant, the backward, may be designated; that designation of “difference” having been completed, doctrines that are presented as being “universally applicable” are then formulated to overcome this difference, to pacify the violent, to normalize the aberrant, advance the backward. A failure of the entity characterized as “different” to comply with the universal rules results the application of sanctions—and international law has developed an elaborate set of rules regarding sanctions and when they might apply (Anghie 2012, 23).

As with any sovereign, its authority to found the law is entirely self-referential, as there is no such higher secular authority which could found or authorise it. Likewise, despite positivistic pretension, international legal scholars were not neutral parties, their perspective was shaped by their active involvement in the colonial encounter, an encounter which shaped ‘the basic doctrines of international law’ and the very concept of sovereignty itself. Hugo Grotius, for instance, the ‘father of international law,’ was a lawyer for the Dutch East India Company (Anghie 2012, 24-5).

Thus, post-Enlightenment sovereign reason, in the hands of its sovereign subjects constituted the natural itself and the figure of 'nature law', which allowed European jurists to define both the bounds of the natural and the means through which European power could avail itself of this law and disenfranchise indigenous populations by reference to their essential nature. This amounted in the international legal discourse to the failure of indigenous peoples to achieve universal humanity, a state of being potentially applicable to all but more often than not 'frustrated in the realm of culture' in particular cases (Wolfe 2007, 128). Yet this operation often required indigenous populations be granted a kind of sovereignty, one through which they could be judged against and alongside European sovereign states and subjects, a space in which Europeans and indigenous people could be *seen* to interact. The colonial encounter on the settler frontier was productive of a new jurisdiction bound neither wholly by international or domestic legal norms and existing as a liminal space between the two which fused 'distinct jurisdictions to secure "the transfer and transformation of sovereignty"' (Evans 2009, 4). Here the question was much less the denial of whatever sovereign rights indigenous peoples could be seen to possess, but rather a matter of adjudicating between competing imperial powers. As Wolfe states:

To understand the full presumption of, say the English claim to New York, it is not enough to see it as a denial of Iroquois sovereignty, since the competing sovereignties the English were principally concerned to deny was not Iroquois but Dutch, French and Swedish. Discovery was not a passive encounter, the un-covering of an independently pre-existent realm, but the positive filling in of unappropriated space. (Wolfe 2007, 132).

Such a process might well also be traced back to domestic jurisdiction in the internal colonialism of the commons enclosure in England and that of the Celtic periphery, in which centralizing parliamentary power was not concerned much with the peasantry and sharecroppers who would be dispossessed in enclosure, rather simply the assertion of the sovereignty of the crown over the aristocracy, the use of whose land by others was irrelevant. Such a process or 'non encounter' as Wolfe terms it, was not however a permanent state of affairs; for settler sovereignty to truly flourish on the frontier, indigenous sovereignty and jurisdiction had to be recognized by settler states and subjects alike, as a medium through which the state and subjectivity had to pass through, in a process of becoming. The end point of this Lisa Ford terms 'pure settler sovereignty' (Ford 2010, 186).

What amounted to indigenous sovereignty on the early colonial frontier was the ability of indigenous peoples to defend territory against the incursion of other European powers and settlers, that is, to maintain indigenous jurisdiction in their territory. Their existence was conceived of as 'future anterior' (Motha 2002, 330), present only in its future extinguishment. The indigenous stood between international law, as objects of the discourse of discovery and dominium as non-sovereign, and domestic law as dependent 'nations' and as such not protected under domestic jurisdiction; apprehended by sovereign entities as always absent either in the present or the future tense (Wolfe

2007, 140). Settler sovereign claims to land on the other hand operated on an entirely reversed logic, as Veracini notes of the post-revolutionary period:

National [and imperial] boundaries made little difference to [settler] expansion; in Florida, Louisiana, Texas and other areas, American settlers rushed in to claim under the jurisdiction of Spain, France, Mexico, and Indian tribes, confident that American sovereignty would soon follow in their wake (Veracini 2010, 67).

So European sovereignty and its indigenous ‘counterpart’ operated according to mirrored logics, European dominion led to settler sovereignty or settler sovereignty to European dominium, always advancing and producing jurisdiction. Whereas indigenous claims to title were always transferred in the opposite direction, their claim always temporary –no matter the applicability of ‘long usage’– always eventually extinguishable by European sovereignty. This, which characterizes the liminality in which the European doctrine of discovery was applicable, saw the instantaneous (eventual) production of law or sovereign title to land in the assertion of discovery. Yet, as McNeil has noted, there is a stark difference between what Europeans claimed and what their actual power to maintain amounted to on the ground. We must distinguish between actual, *de-facto* sovereignty, whether legally recognized or not, and *de-jure* sovereignty, which although legally recognized may be lacking in any realistic sense (McNeil 2013, 42). This was a temporal and geographical space between legal and eventually factual sovereignty, of settler states and subjects, *in and between* indigenous jurisdictions, who were sometimes recognized as sovereign and sometimes not. It is in this space that settler sovereignty is truly operative in its decentralized, productive and violent capacity.

Sovereignty is a practice of ordering space (Brown 2010, 45), deciding on the inside/outside distinction –with indigenous peoples placed decidedly on the outside. It is also then in the colonial context a space of the autochthonous emergence of legalities. There are numerous arguments for the nature of the sovereign exception, the self-invested power of the sovereign to found the law in acts beyond legal jurisdiction, or the sovereign as the secular image of the divine who founds the law but is not bound by it (Martel 2012, 23-4). What this process amounts to on the frontier is not lawlessness, but rather the savage proliferation of legalities, in which the law is determinative of *and not responsive* to social situations (Evans 2009, 21). It is with such considerations of determinative law-making violence on the frontier –that which is indicative of the commonly understood practice of sovereignty– that numerous scholars such as Schmitt, Wolfe, Evans, Motha and others³⁴ have gone on to argue, that it was as much the experience on the settler colonial frontier as it was the peace of Westphalia that informed the development of modern European sovereignty and consequently the international states system. The

³⁴ See Motha, S. The Sovereign Event in a Nations Law *Law and Critique*, no.13 (2002), for the Australian context see Evans, J. *ibid*, in America Wolfe P. *ibid* & Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native *Journal of Genocide Research*, vol.8, no.4 (2006), Schmitt, C. *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty* (Chicago: 2005), Anievas, A. Nisancioglu, K. *How the West Came to Rule: The Geopolitical Origins of Capitalism* (Pluto: 2015)

relatively recent post-structural turn away from the sovereignty concept and from notions of centralized power in the state has helped to obscure the formative role of the settler colonial frontier in the shaping of European statism. Indeed, the Eurocentrism that has been levied against Foucauldian accounts of state power and the insistence that we move beyond the centralized understanding of sovereignty/sovereign power to that of a micro-dynamics of power in ‘governmentality’ seems to be founded on a failure to see the constitutive role of the colonial encounter in European state consolidation. Such scholars likewise fail to account for the decentralising and recentralising dynamic tension that is endemic in the Anglophone settler colonies if not elsewhere as well. As Cocks argues, Foucauldian critiques of the modern theory of state sovereignty have

asserted that the micro-operations of normalizing power in institutions and discursive practices dispersed throughout society [have] produced individuals with desirable proclivities, habits, and traits that minimized the need for a centralized coercive power to keep unruly subjects in line. In tandem or overlapping with technologies of “governmentality” in state and society through which whole populations were ordered for their own good and individuals remade as self-regulating, responsible private selves, normalizing power was declared to have replaced literal monarchical power and to have trumped the importance of the metaphorical monarch in the form of legal prohibitions against specific kinds of acts (Cocks 2014, 21-22).

Yet the tendency in poststructuralism to do away with all master signifiers credits the edifice of modern state sovereignty as some kind of monolithic whole as opposed to a dynamic relation between multiple registers of sovereign actors, from metropolitan powers, colonial states to micro-modalities of power within and between individual and collective settler subjects on the settler colonial frontier who are engaged in a constant process of de/re-centralization as they negotiate, penetrate, traverse and ultimately aim to replace indigenous sovereignty on the land.

What is most striking in cases of post-revolutionary Georgia and the New South Wales colony that Lisa Ford examines in *Settler Sovereignty* is how settlement relied upon indigenous sovereignty, that is, on indigenous jurisdiction vis-à-vis indigenous *and* settler violations of customary, tribal law, in ‘Indian Country’. The existence of indigenous sovereignty besides and beneath settler state and federal sovereign authority was a prerequisite of the process of structural invasion. As mentioned above, indigenous sovereign spaces are mobilized as a medium through which de-centralising and re-centralising settler sovereignty is expressed. Such a situation is possible in the “mess” of jurisdictions and sovereign claims that transpired in the pre-and post-revolutionary period in North America, where competing metropolitan European imperial sovereign claims overlapped with those of colonial states and then later, of the federal government and indigenous tribes themselves. Sovereign settler subjects enacted decentralized sovereign violence and law-making power in their negotiation, contestation and violation of various registers of sovereignty. Their productive and violent potential was realised by the ambiguity vis-à-vis state sovereignty that the situation on the ground presented, enabled in part by the extravagant sovereign claims made by European powers and settler state bodies themselves that rarely lined up with their actual ability to assert sovereign authority over the territories in question.

Indeed, when reading Patrick Wolfe's account of how Zionism had to negotiate an unusual set of circumstances with regards to limited access to land for settlement in late nineteenth and early twentieth century Palestine, one is tempted to speculate that actually what is seen in that case as unusual or exceptional is rather more common, perhaps endemic in settler colonialism. This provides a counter to the notion that the Northern American situation was one of uncomplicated free or at least easy access to land. This is not to say that the process of purchase in the Zionist case was operative in North America during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (before the removal era), rather to suggest that in the revolutionary era North American settlers had to negotiate a terrain more complicated and potentially limiting in terms of land for settlement expansion, and had to mobilize the sovereign ambiguity present on the ground until an avenue for mass dispossession presented itself. This corresponds with how Zionism had to rely on the conquest of labour and land, or in Wolfe's terms, of 'economics', (Wolfe 2012) prior to the ethnic cleansing of 1947-8.

Ford describes how in numerous situations settlers were able to mobilize indigenous sovereignty to extend and deepen settler sovereignty and, therefore, to limit indigenous social reproduction. In the years leading up to the revolution in North America an immigration explosion was paralleled with a decline in settler-indigenous trade as imperial powers sought to instrumentalise the use of indigenous violence as a means of war-making. This helped to transfigure indigenous land into 'the most important commodity in North America' (Ford 2010, 20).

By using the support for indigenous 'rights to land and jurisdiction' by the Crown during the French-Indian war 'settler speculators mobilized indigenous rights to property and sovereignty to argue that Crown title was illusory and that indigenous people could sell land to speculators without imperial intermediaries' (Ford 2010, 20). This situation arguably has parallels in the post-*tazimat* reform period in Palestine. Other settlers used the customary judicial norms operative in Indian Country –but obviously not comprehended under state or later federal jurisdiction– to enact 'indigenous justice,' that is, to engage in supposed reprisal and retribution as a norm of behaviour in indigenous territory so as to depopulate it (Ford 2010, 20). Likewise, the fact of indigenous jurisdiction and the limited nature (and will) of state and federal power to subordinate it, allowed for a situation in which many settlers could slip in and out of state and federal jurisdiction at will. As Ford notes of post-revolutionary Georgia, 'settlers could disappear from the purview of the state of Georgia without leaving its charted boundaries' (Ford 2010, 64) because 'settlers could not be taxed, mustered, arrested or sued in Indian Country before 1814' (Ford 2010, 67). The liminality of the spaces in-between state and federal sovereignty limited the capacity of constituted sovereigns to govern and allowed settler-travellers to seek 'corporate redress' of indigenous people for real, imagined and entirely constructed 'crimes' as a means for the transfer of monies, property and land from indigenous tribes and into settler hands. All

this occurred without concern for penalization at the hands of the state or federal government (Ford 2010, 69), since said actions were undertaken in indigenous jurisdictions. Settlers were able to mobilize and leverage the granting of indigenous people's rights to land and jurisdiction within them, that is, to leverage a kind of sovereignty. As Ford states:

Frontier settlers in Australia and America were seldom merely lawless. Many settlers were savvy masters of the discourses and politics of settler jurisdiction. They were eager for its bounties and wary of its gaze, crafting their contests and cooperation with indigenous people to fit the shifting parameters of colonial, state, and indigenous jurisdictional practice [...] Provocation, self-defence, and justifiable homicide lay at the heart of settlers' engagement with state jurisdiction (Ford 2010, 85).

Indigeneity was the medium through which settler subjects and sovereignty was made, whether through mobilizing assumed indigenous norms of justice in Indian Country or through the use of this same space as a means to evade the potential centralized authority over settlers invested in the state and federal/colonial government. Such a process of becoming, functioned as a normative structure on the settler frontier and defined settler being in a discursive and spatial sense. Ford's recounting of the non-comprehension of indigenous bodies and being in settler jurisdiction, where indigenous testimony was void by definition, distinctly shows how through their decentralized violence, settlers were able to inform the sovereign decision on the exception and the shape of sovereignty itself at the grassroots level:

Settler use and abuse of the laws of evidence attests to more than a reign of silence on Georgia's frontier. It shows the normative reach of syncretic settler law. Far from being silent, settlers everywhere talked constantly about their misdeeds. They told stories that legitimized their violence. Legitimization had a functional and a normative role. By convincing their neighbours that their actions were just, settler thieves and murderers ensured that local judges and jurors would not convict them in court (Ford 2010, 97).

This very tendency by settlers, to mobilize indigenous sovereignty to their advantage was met with the countervailing tendency on the part of state and federal authorities and the Colonial authority in Australia, to limit these avenues for decentralized settler activities. This situation led, in the American case, to cooperation between state and federal governments who enacted the extinguishment of all indigenous sovereignty and all indigenous rights by mutual agreement (Ford 2010, 25). Yet the entire dynamic up to this point was already simultaneously invoking and repelling state, federal and colonial power (Ford 2010, 101). As Ford states of violence against Aborigines in New South Wales, 'Tales of peril repelled colonial jurisdiction by pre-emptively justifying violence in law. However, by reporting the death in the first place, participants documented Aboriginal aggression in a manner calculated to invite a military response in defence of settlers. This activity and the circuit of 'sovereignty stories' between settlers regarding conflict with indigenous peoples, led eventually to a situation in which the mere existence of the indigenous on the land in close proximity to settler communities became itself a pre-emptive justification for violence against them (Ford 2010, 101, 104, 103, especially in the case of New South Wales, in which settler laws criminalised even indigenous assembly close to settler communities and farms in the 1820's. See p.79, 83, 103, 104). It is difficult to think of an example that

better reveals the central question of structural invasion, which is, that the threat to settler sovereignty is principally the reproductive potential of indigenous people on the land.

And yet, even in removal era North America, indigenous sovereignty was recognized and mobilized as a resource for native elimination, only this time directed from the federal government level. The history of federal treaties with indigenous tribes from the 1830's on, that is, treaties signed by reciprocally recognized sovereign agents, sees the rapid westward shift of the frontier between settler and indigenous territory, until that frontier reached the physical and figurative boundary of the Pacific Ocean. The recognition of indigenous sovereignty throughout this process was instrumental to its outcome, for 'Indians had to be recognized as enjoying sovereign agency over themselves and their territory [...] otherwise they could not freely agree to cede a territory or be held responsible for sticking to their agreements' (Cocks 2014, 66-7). An equality of assumed sovereign powers and responsibilities between two negotiating parties exerting massively unequal political, economic, and military power can prove disastrous to the weaker party in the exchange. As Cocks notes of the North American-Indigenous example:

The Anglo-American treaty system serves as a cautionary tale that familiar practices of liberty applied by Western democracies—the deliberation between conflicting viewpoints, consensual compacts, promises of peace and friendship, and the reciprocal recognition of sovereign independence of the deliberating, consenting, and peace-making parties—are sometimes not the counter to violence but the form that violence takes. [...] the reciprocal recognition of the sovereign agency of unequal parties [...] can be a strategy of choice by which the viability of the weaker party is assaulted by the stronger party, for to be recognized as a sovereign subject is also to be recognized as a subject who can consent to the forfeiture of the conditions necessary for the continuation of a desired way of life. The weaker party's consent to such a forfeiture can be won by the stronger party's tacit threat of physical coercion if consent is withheld, even if little direct violence actually occurs (Cocks 2014, 68-69).

The systematic and strategic recognition of Indigenous sovereignty in the North American treaty system ceased when the settler government decided that indigenous tribes had 'lost the attribute of sovereignty' (Cocks 2014, 68) through the repeated removals and transfers of that very system. Thus native sovereignty was recognized and utilized as the medium through which to extinguish it. In post-Oslo Palestine the settler occupier maintains *de-facto* sovereignty within all the former Mandate borders —and beyond them. The Palestinian Authority and the elected government in Gaza are granted a *de-jure* and limited —in most cases to the point of non-existence— sovereignty, which functions as a medium through which the settler state may hold the indigenous population responsible for its own repression and dispossession. Thus, the Israeli state could maintain its commitment to an equitable solution to "the conflict" that relied in part on the granting of sovereign responsibilities to the native, yet did not include granting any of the corresponding rights of national sovereigns.

This is then, not a simple process of settler states filling in empty unallocated indigenous space. Appropriation "by other means" it seems is a norm, rather than a novel exception in Zionism. Indeed, given the subject making enterprise that was settler law making violence on the frontier, where the

figure of the true citizen subject made through the medium of the indigeneity they were in the process of dispossessing, it is surprising that poststructural accounts of the decentralized and micro-politics of governmentality and shaping of subjectivity have not focused more on the settler colonial frontier. Yet even where they do, they concern themselves exclusively with the question of constituent power versus the state, leaving the question of indigeneity rarely mentioned. As Moreton-Robinson has argued, the question of how anyone came to be subjectified and racialized in the North American example 'is inextricably tied to the dispossession of the original owners and the assumption of white possession' (J. A. Byrd 2011, xxvi).

5.4: Displacement of Social Contradiction and the Utopian Imaginary: Spatial Practices

Whilst the settler colonial frontier was crucially formative in the understanding of modern sovereignty in post-Enlightenment Europe, its development in the colonies would be understood as exceptional in conventional understandings of the subject. Indeed, it is arguable that the European experience of modern sovereignty was exceptional and that in the colonies the norm, especially if we understand the core of sovereignty to be the sovereign decision regarding the state of exception; the state of emergency and the application of martial law being a commonplace in the conventional and settler colonies.³⁵ However the understanding of the settler colonial experience of sovereignty has remained that which is characterized as exceptional. Indeed, as it is often eulogised by many theorists of the political across the intellectual spectrum, it is to this that we shall now turn.

The self-constituting, autochthonous emergence of jurisdiction, legalities and sovereignty in settler collectives has been noted by Veracini, who states that 'the ability to will a collective identity and its institutions into existence' is characteristic 'in one way or another of all settler projects', citing the (in)famous words of John Winthrop:

Thus stands the case between God and us. Wee are entered into a Covenant with him for this worke [that is, constructing the 'city on the hill']. We have taken out a commission. *The Lord hath given us leave to drawe our own articles [...]* (Winthrop in Veracini 2010, 61)(italics in original).

In just two sentences Winthrop evokes the divine eminence of the sovereign decision emerging from within the collective, the notion of exclusive covenantal community and the self-reverential determinative law-making powers of the settler community claiming exclusive right to deal with the land and its occupants on its own terms. Settlers self-elect to move out into space and constitute a new polity. Veracini has popularised the notion that settlers 'bring their sovereignty with them' (Veracini

³⁵ The example of British rule in Ireland in the late 19th and early 20th centuries is instructive: 'In Ireland, from 1800-1921, the British Government brought in 105 Coercion Acts dealing with Ireland. That means that Habeas Corpus was as often suspended as in force in 19th-Century Ireland' in (Lloyd 2012, 72)

2010, 62). As shown above, I believe that it is a more complex scenario, in which, what is constituted in the colonies is a result of the liminality between international and domestic legalities. Settler sovereignty is formed in the dispossession of native title and the negation of native ways of being and indigeneity is the medium through which settler sovereignty is expressed. Settler sovereignty and ultimately much of modern sovereignty more generally, emerges in the passage, in the temporality between frontier and closure, not merely as a static artefact 'brought' from Europe.

Social contradiction in Europe is expressed internally between the conflicting interests of classes and at the ultimate end manifests itself in the collective effervescence of evangelical secular deism (Gentile 2006, 9) that sees the moment of transparency between subject and state and the eventual and as yet irresolvable oscillation between sovereignty in mobile collective association and its solidification and stagnation in the institutions of state. The settler colonial collective seeks to immunize against the violent metropolitan state sovereignty cul-de-sac by electing to move horizontally out into space instead of attempting to contest and reconfigure hierarchies in place. The election to separate and self-constitute new sovereign formations in frontier liminality is endemic to settler colonialism globally and is a recurrent process within individual settler migrations. Like a bacterium, settler polities repeat the original act by cloning or reproducing their sovereign DNA and engulf indigenous territory by separating from the main body and extending horizontally into space.

Whilst it may seem obvious that settler colonial self-understanding conceives of the project as a utopian one, it is worth noting exactly how appropriate the term is in describing the settler phenomenon. As Harvey notes of More's *Utopia*, the aim of the didactic exercise is to draw a picture of 'social harmony and stability' against the chaotic state of English contemporary political life (Harvey 2000, 99). This involves a number of separations, by way of the drawing of a moat around the utopian society, separation from the old world of course, from social contradiction in particular, but also a separation from the capitalist market itself (Harvey 2000, 100). The taking of land and labour out of normal market conditions is crucially indicative of settler colonial formations, whether it be chattel slavery in the USA, the White Australia policy or the parallel acts of labour conquest in the Cape Colony and Yishuv. All these settler polities have quite successfully attempted to subvert normal market forces in the process of immunizing against social contradiction in classically utopian form. Wolfe outlines the example in North America, where primitive accumulation functions as the originary or founding violence of capitalist social relations, which much like the unauthorized authority of sovereignty itself, must exist outside its own fundamental logic and outside the market as an absent cause. In metropolitan situations primitive accumulation represents the moment of pre-capitalist social relations in which bodies, labour and land are separated and subsistence social reproduction replaced by the

voluntary selling of labour power to capital, so that the labouring body might again successfully reproduce itself. Wolfe states of the settler colonial context:

As John Locke provided [...] private property accrued from the admixture of land and labour. To put it very simply, [in the United States] blacks provided the former and Indians the latter—the application of enslaved labour to evacuated Indian land provided the white man’s property, a primitive accumulation if ever there was one (Wolfe in Piterberg & Veracini 2015, 469).

Lorenzo Veracini and Gabriel Piterberg show how such a pattern of perpetual leveraging of land and labour outside of normal market conditions was understood at the time to be both the key to successful settlement *and* to the offsetting of social contradiction against the post-French Revolutionary scene in Europe. At opposite ends of the ideological spectrum Edward Gibbon Wakefield and Marx both perceived of settler colonialism as ‘a formation initially charged with a fundamentally non-capitalist character,’ a situation involving ‘[capitalists] with capital but no capitalism’ (Piterberg & Veracini 2015, 470). Capitalist social relations were introduced to the settler colonies by the recurrent transfers of primitive accumulation, that is, the transfer of indigenous peoples and their land and the transfer of settler or slave labour from the metropole to the colony. Such a process they describe as ‘the world turned inside out’, that is, the transfer of ‘everything’, land included, ‘except growing [social] contradiction,’ as opposed to ‘the world turned upside down,’ which characterizes the vertical transfer of political power through class contestation and revolution in Europe (Piterberg & Veracini 2015, 470). This process was crucial to the success of Zionist settlement in Palestine, where initially the import of a strictly capitalist plantation economy could not support the social reproduction of Zionist settlers —or limit that of Palestinians. It was only under Arthur Ruppin that Zionist settlement was leveraged out of and protected from the market, allowing for the eventual re-introduction of capitalist social relations in the form of speculation on land that had been cultivated by protected Zionist settlers and was to be invested in by prospective future settlers (Bloom 2008, 224). Likewise, the prospective transfer of Jewish labour from the metropolitan periphery to Palestine, as opposed to the urban centres of the European core, was initially a conceit designed to shield Europe from Jewish radicalism, both in the minds of Zionists and their supporters.

As Harvey states of More’s *Utopia*, ‘the happy perfection of the social and moral order depends upon [...] [exclusion]’ (Harvey 2000, 100), in most cases achieved by repeated bouts of the transfers of primitive accumulation. Likewise, is it worth noting the ‘play’ of utopia in spatial and temporal senses. Spatial exclusion and temporal sempiternity characterize the utopian formation, creating islands free of social contradiction in space and time, ensured by closely monitored relations internally and with the outside world and in sacred attachment to land and permanent paranoia surrounding the infiltration of the outside into space and blood. This settler obsession bears close similarity to the covenantal duties required of the Hebrew nation in the Old Testament, a pattern of symbolic behaviour that has been noted in the Protestant leaning secular-theological imaginaries in the Ulster Plantation,

the “pure settlement” colonies of New England, the Afrikaner settlements eventually incorporated into the Cape Colony and Zionist settlement in Palestine (Akenson 1992).

The spatial and temporal intertwine in the self-constituting sovereignties produced by the displacement of contradiction in Europe to the ‘no place(s)’ (utopias) of the settler colonies. Where in Europe, hierarchical movement was stalled by calcified power structures and the sovereign-constituent oscillation, in the ‘never quite there’ of the messianic imagination. In the settler colonies sovereignty and the subject is made anew and the “end of history” achieved, as was repeatedly claimed, particularly in America. Settler utopian societies exist in an eternal present, assembling a sanitised, particular history into a single place of ‘pure fantasy’, the perfect particular universal, a new world created figuratively on top of the old, and actually atop the real lifeworld’s of indigenous populations. These ‘heavens on earth’ have no future needs to be achieved therefore the only movement is spatial expansion, namely, the extension of the conditions of the end of history and the extension of social perfection free of contradiction –be this the extension of individual liberty or collective transcendent socialism. This amounts materially to the extension of the conditions of settlement through structural invasion. I call this utopian temporality “Apocalypse Now”, where the apocalyptic has been acquired by divine ‘journey to the heavens’ (Boer 2009, 18-19). This is secular-evangelical revelation, the self-conscious ‘for itself’ of the Hegelian formation. In such a situation, where the sacred and the secular become hopelessly intertwined, the ends of the universe are *known*, can be enacted. *Indeed the settler society understands them as having been so.* This functions as the utopian formation in thought, where a social order is created in which Badiou’s ‘event’, that which sets in motion procedures of truth (here the event is the self-constitution of settler sovereignty) ‘*will have been*’ (Boer 2009, 13); where the revolution *has* occurred, and all that is left is to extend the apocalyptic revelation to all the earth.

The combination of self-constituting settler colonies, breaking off from metropolitan cores and bacterially reproducing themselves as autonomous political units, and the utopian imaginary of sacred duty, spreads into indigenous space and performs acts of possession in spatial ordering and determinative law making violence.

5.5: The Visuality of Settler Sovereignty

As Schmitt first understood, sovereignty is both a spatial and visual practice, a the nomos of the earth –nomos deriving from *nemein* meaning to divide and put to pasture. It ‘is the immediate form in which the political and social order of a people becomes spatially visible’ (Brown 2010, 45). As Mondazin argued, ‘whoever monopolizes visibility conquers thought itself and determines the shape of liberty’ (Mondazin in Buck-Morss 2007, 183). These processes are not just heuristic devices with which to better understand the peculiarities of the settler colonial form, they are reflected in the practices of

settlers themselves. The settler claims and maintains possession of indigenous land in visual performances, from the ploughing of land and fencing of it off, to the emergent artefactual economy of ‘the production of surveying plats and other deeds conveying real estate transfer’ (Veracini 2010, 66). The capacity to transform landscape and establish normative social relations within it, *visibly*, is key to successful settler projects. Ford notes the ‘symbolic overkill’ of English settlers in North America, where settlers ‘trotted out Arthurian legend, buried coins, placed markers, planned fortifications, and had indigenous peoples participate in rituals of submission that they could not possibly have understood’ (Ford 2010, 16). The sacralisation of claimed territory is itself an act of sovereignty, indeed perhaps *the* act of sovereign territorial claim par-excellence, which is the taking of the ordinary and demarcating it as sacred. In a repeat of the Adamite natural sovereign, staking claim to all the objects of creation, settlers perform rituals of settlement to make ‘persons and things [...] real’ (Fitzpatrick 1992, 19). Arendt understood that despite the secular claims of modern sovereignty, it still fundamentally rested on a ‘transcendent, transmundane source’ –despite arguing against the presence of this aspect in the American case. There is “no-place” quite where this practice has become so proliferated as the Zionist project in Palestine, where the visual economy of Israeli sovereignty over Palestinian land has moved from a pure manifestation of structural invasion and engulfment to a highly intellectualised strategic practice. The performance of the “deed to land” has become institutionalized in the JNF, which ensures the non-transferability of possession by securing land for the exclusive use of Jews worldwide. This is then expressed visually in topographic erasure through the philanthropic production of parks and forests, pseudo-memorials to the erased founding violence that destroyed Palestinian society.

Taking Kimmerling’s insights into the level of frontierity (meaning the availability of land) informing the practice of settlement and its spatiality (Ram 1993, 334), I argue that frontierity informs the visual economy of settler invasion. The high level of frontierity in the American example, produced individualistic liberalism visually as well as politically, in the farmstead and the plantation manor overseeing its slave population and an institutional social apparatus based on securing it. In the Israeli case the low level of available land in the 1900-1919 period produced a visually collectivist performance of settlement via the explicitly collectivist design of training farms and the kibbutz system by Arthur Ruppin. As we have seen, Ruppin spatially constructed the training farms and kibbutzim to visualize collective association and horizontal spatial ordering to achieve spatial, social and economic exclusion from the native population and internal self-selection in the settler social body, in service of producing the best “human material” (Bloom 2008, 341). The proto-kibbutzim were corporate structures masquerading as socialist communes. Their explicit purpose was to materially and visually express development and social reproduction in a land whose visual economy in the West was one of bare subsistence in a situation of extreme scarcity and to indicate to the indigenous population the violent

defence and non-transferability of land. Through his instrumentalization of land purchasing via the Jewish National Fund, Ruppin would also enact the policy of inalienability inherent in the Zionist project vis-à-vis the land. This too would be expressed visually:

[settlers] immediately fenced off the land, breaking up traditional landmarks and field patterns, and erected highly visible watchtowers, flagpoles, and boundary markers. These acts were part of a systematic policy of rubbing salt in the Arab wounds. Zionists argued it was a necessary cruelty, as unless the Jews seized complete physical control over the land that they purchased, the Arabs might someday try to resume control of them (Akenson 1992, 169).

This of course brings us back to the key aspect of sovereignty and of the settler colonial move. Settler colonialism takes *place*. In purchasing what was not there to be sold, that is, Ottoman systems of land tenure that had adhered prior to the mandate and Zionist settlement, and in removing its visual aspect—the material remnant of the fellahin’s rights use to the land— Zionist settlers were enacting the preeminent sovereign move: putting to pasture and re-setting the visual and legal economy of the land in perpetuity. They also performed their intent to violently defend this new symbolic economy of land use. This is the activity of sovereigns.

5.6: Apocalypse Now

In the present, the above account of the proliferation of sovereign self-constitution—settlers both pulling away from the metropolitan core and yet being backed by its own sovereign power— amounts in Palestine to engulfment by a necropolitical assemblage. The process by which this occurs is that of the generalization of sovereign power, where the wild violence that always exists at the core of sovereignty but that is usually obscured by its role as the ultimate defence of the polity from the constitutive outside, proliferates here in the self-constituting sovereignties and generalization of law making power that the collective of settlers itself represents. What is remarkable, is that much liberal and leftist accounts of the generalization of sovereign violence on the settler colonial frontier have been conceived of as the last best, and possibly only future avenue of emancipatory politics, where European calcified or arborescent power has left intellectuals struggling to see a way out of the above-mentioned sovereign oscillation. Theorists such as de Tocqueville, Arendt, Hardt & Negri, Deleuze & Guattari and most recently, Occupy Wall Street activist and academic Chris Taylor, have all sought to go back to the genocidal violence of the frontier. All tellingly choose the American case to theorize an emancipatory politics based on mobility and spatial expansiveness, or in the terms of Deleuze and Guattari, of ‘rhizomatic’ movements as resistance to state sovereignty.³⁶ What is most surprising in these accounts

³⁶ See Arendt on the American Revolution and the emancipatory potential of ‘movement’ esp. in the discourse of John Adams in *On Revolution* (Penguin: 1973) p.32, Negri, A. *Insurgencies: Constituent Power and the Modern State* quoted in Young, A. *The Settler Unchained: Constituent Power and Settler Violence* *Social Text* vo.33, no.3 (September: 2015) p.10-11 See also Deleuze and Guattari *A Thousand Plateaus* 7th ed. (Bloomsbury: 2012) p.20-21 and in Young, A. *Settler Sovereignty and the Rhizomatic West*, or, *The*

is how closely they mirror the discourses they seek to critically engage with, as they regurgitate the mythology of the American frontier for a new Euro-American audience.

To cite just two examples, the first, Hannah Arendt, is unapologetically enamoured of the American Revolution and the space of politics as participation that it opened up, as never before or since in the Europhone tradition. Preeminent in her account is the argument that the American Revolutionaries ‘decommissioned’ (Arendt in Cocks 2014, 55-5) sovereign power in both its statist and popular guise by founding and authorizing their political experiment in something concrete and secular, that is, its founding in the political itself, the ‘share of the public business’ that the founding fathers sought out. The American example is counterposed against the uncaused cause of the conventional sovereign formation and their grounding on transcendent, transmundane and fundamentally ‘extra-human’ causes; those that deify a people and authorise savage violence in its becoming. What is so odd about Arendt’s account is that it obviously comprehends the problem of sovereign violence, especially in its popular frame, yet fails to account for it at all in the American context (Arendt 1998, 228). This is doubly astounding when we consider that the rhetoric of native extermination was present in even the Declaration of Independence. The body of settlers who would become the American people were deified almost from the outset in their self-understanding, especially in the more puritanical New England colonies. The American national epic is a profoundly religious one, but it was able to fuse the secular and the religious together into the political. The very secular, concrete founding of the American system in the world as opposed to somewhere beyond or above it *is* the extra-human, transmundane, absent cause through which Arendt finds the French Revolution by comparison lacking. The “errand into the wilderness,” that is, the dispersal of settlers into indigenous space and their violent replacement of indigenous bodies on the land *is* the functional equivalent of the purely mythological authority of un-decommissioned sovereign formations. America was never just a secular political experiment, much as with the Zionist project that the American Revolution profoundly influenced, the American state was to be a moral lesson and beacon to humanity and *understood itself as such*. Such a symbolic humanist formation is fundamentally partaking in the transcendent. It is understandable that Arendt is so sympathetic to this particular political narrative when we consider her prescription for ‘the political’ as a space of ‘free action’ as outlined in *The Human Condition* —the ‘elementary grammar of political action’ that she believes the American settler experience led to the discovery of. The Arendtian political form is predicated on the discourse of self-determination, that is, independence from all ‘necessity’, whether biological or social, ergo: subsistence-based reproduction. The Arendtian ‘miracle of free action’ is based on a rupture with ‘[...] automatic processes such as the cyclical maintenance of biological life, the repetition of custom, or seemingly inevitable chains of cause and

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effect' (Arendt in Cocks 2014, 42). Arendt's humanism is automatically drawn in negation against those who may have no desire to break with their relational understanding of, and existence in, the lifeworld, or rather those who see themselves as belonging to it (Tully 1993, 163), and not vice versa. The space for the 'miracle of free action' likewise implies a space away from the contradictions of European civilization, that is, the binding custom that Arendt sees as limiting and oppressive. Irrespective of whether or not this is the case, just as American democracy is predicated on free land to be occupied (a tabula rasa for democracy away from deeply embedded and monolithic European hierarchy), so Arendtian politics too requires a 'space of freedom' from which to operate, a similarly blank slate from which to 'begin something new' (Cocks 2014, 42). From the outset, it seems that Arendtian politics is, like that of many European forebears, predisposed to the abjection of indigenous ways of being.

At the other end of the theoretical spectrum Deleuze and Guattari's use of the frontier and the Indianness they see as emblematic of it in *A Thousand Plateaus* repeats the cultural appropriation of indigeneity that is a fundamental aspect of the subject formation in American settler colonialism. Their largely uncritical use of Turnerian frontier romanticism reproduces an account of the expansive deterritorialization of political action away from centralized state sovereignty 'at the expense of the indigenous peoples for whom settler colonial deterritorializations constitute a coercive expression of sovereign power, rather than an escape from it' (A. T. Young 2015, 123). Their emancipatory project stalls at its start, as the rhizomatic nature of the frontier is the foundation upon which the rest of the edifice of *A Thousand Plateaus* rests. It does so because the deterritorialization of sovereignty *cannot* be a universal emancipatory project. It is reliant on making one lifeworld a tabula rasa for the development of another. In one of their early discursive figures, the 'Indian without ancestry' one cannot help but think that this is not in fact a figure describing the actuality of indigeneity but rather a product of settler becoming. For Deleuze and Guattari the true 'Indian without ancestry' is surely not the figure of the Indian as they stand with centuries of custom and cultural rooting in the great spaces of America, but rather the settler, he who does away with his ancestry in favour of becoming the new man in the soil of the new world. The settler is he who, in the words of Arendt, 'begins something new', something that is not possible in the crowded space of historic contingency in Europe. Such a figure is then little more than a rearticulation of the 'settler becoming native', that which has been a feature of the American settler experience since at least the revolution, where settlers chose to ape indigenous political formations against the arborescent political edifice of the Crown in their revolutionary rhetoric. Such an assumption is not without justification if we consider how Deleuze and Guattari choose to appropriate the Hopi tribe as a medium through which to critique the patriarchal master signifiers of psychoanalysis, (J. A. Byrd 2011, 16) or consider how in *A Thousand Plateaus* indigeneity functions as an essentialized, parallel image of the originary 'east' in the European historicist teleology of history. Just as indigeneity functions as a medium for the expression of settler

being, so too it is a medium for white European self-expression in Deleuze and Guattari. Both examples and many more beyond them, find in the North American frontier a substance considered to be ‘outside of, and rupturing the state’, that is, an Indianness in nomadic free movement, de/re-territorializations and lines of flight from arborescent structures and institutions that all depend ‘on a paradigmatic Indianness’ that arises ‘from colonialist discourse’ and justifies ‘the appropriation of lands through removals and genocide’ (J. A. Byrd 2011, 14). Perhaps it is little surprise that settler being takes whole and replaces Indianness with its own appropriation and transfiguration of it, if we consider the fundamental “transfer to replace” dynamic of settler structural invasion.

Beyond the heuristics of European philosophy, these same dynamics are materialized in transits that echo the isopolitical bonds that once adhered between the wings of the Settler Empire in the nineteenth century and now do so in the West Bank in the twentieth and twenty first. As of 2017, some 15 per cent of the settlers in the Occupied Territories held American citizenship (Hirschhorn 2017, 24). Arriving through *Aliyah* offices in the United States, this stream of settlers, who are granted fiat naturalization under the Law of Return, began to enter the country after the Six Day War. Rising during the aftermath of the war of 1973, though declining after the Camp David peace accords with Egypt and mirroring Jaqueline Rose’s insight into the appeal of a volatile frontier, American settler numbers in the West Bank are again on the rise (Hirschhorn 2017, *ibid*). Hirschhorn appears to look to surprise readers of her recent *City on a Hilltop* with the fact that whilst the majority of these settlers have of course been raised as Zionists and are for the most part observant Jews, they are not, as we might assume, Republicans or of the right wing politically. They are staunchly Democrats, most having come of age politically in the 1960’s civil rights era and especially the anti-Vietnam war protest movement (Hirschhorn 2017, 30). Had Hirschhorn’s perspective been supplemented by a study of the history of settler colonialism, perhaps this would not have been such a novelty. What is important for us in Hirschhorn’s work is the reasons which her interviewees give for settling on the frontier:

At least half of my group had active exposure to the civil rights movement and anti-Vietnam struggle in their early years. Both their affiliations and attitudes suggested that these American-Israelis saw settlement activity as a reflection and expression of American Jewish liberalism. It is clear that this group was profoundly shaped by the politics of their time in the United States and transferred their activist tendencies to their settlement projects in the occupied territories (Hirschhorn 2017, *ibid*).

Her correspondents, in a language similar in a sense to that of Arendt, were seeking to start ‘new [communities]’, to transfer their American anti-establishment politics to Palestine (Hirschhorn 2017, 25-6). One of these projects, the settlement of Tekoa, emerged after being first excluded to the native population by being declared a closed military zone in 1974, and was later cordoned off by the NAHAL brigade as a potential site for civilian settlement in ’75. Under the cover of a series of wild-cat land seizures by the Gush Eumunim, an organization of New York settlers, the Garin Lev Zion, began squatting at Tekoa and have remained their ever since. Their squatting was

legitimated post-hoc by Ariel Sharon, then Minister of Agriculture; the state sovereign here bringing up the rear, behind the decentralized sovereignty of the settler. In their reminiscences of their early years as squatters, we come to something of the logic behind their move from Manhattan to the foot of Mount Herodian. As former New Yorker, Gerry Bernstein Freund recalled:

It was a few families in little [...] concrete dwellings with dirt paths [she laughed]. But it had a certain feeling. They were from England and America and Israel and Russia and France and they were old and they were young and they were middle-aged and they were religious, and they were not religious. And considering it was such a small group of people, that was pretty amazing [...] it was beautiful, it was absolutely beautiful (Bernstein Freund in Hirschhorn 2017, 161).

Such reminiscences echo an American frontier settlement, the austere simplicity of Thomas Lake Harris' compound at Brocton New York, or a New Age commune of the 1960's. It is something of a vision of Kallenesque pluralism. It is a reassuringly American scene, assembled on a tabula rasa and free of the native presence. This was specifically noted by the squatters themselves: 'There were no Arabs here [...] No Arab trees. Not one Arab house. For that Tekoa was very lucky, there's no Arab land here' (Hirschhorn 2017, 160). This was of course a nonsense, a Palestinian presence of upwards of 15,000 under Jordanian rule was noted as late as 1964 by American archaeologists working on a nearby site (Hirschhorn 2017, 273 (endnote)). (Extirpated)Space makes utopia possible. Perhaps the most important aspects of these settlers' Zionism is not its Jewish origins, but rather as we saw in Horace Kallen, its Americanism. It is the American imagination that ultimately informed the mode of these settlers' move into the Occupied Territories, if not quite the move itself. The settlers of Tekoa would perhaps have enamoured Arendt, for they understood their endeavour very much in the tradition of the founding of America. An American reporter would capture the self-description of one of Tekoa's settler's self-determination in 1980:

Each Tekoa family supports itself, and they pass the laws that govern them. Elie Birnbaum, a psychologist reports that he is thrilled with how democracy works at the grass roots. "I guess if the meetings when the Constitution was adopted were like ours, the Founding Fathers must have been funny to watch. Here people yell and jump and we all have our own ideas. You may fight for three hours about where to string a clothesline. Living here reminds me of what America was like two hundred years ago. Here you have the spirit of just starting, of being a pioneer" (Halsell 1980, 12).

We might speculate that while Deleuze and Guattari were beginning the writing of their work of appropriating indigeneity and using the tropes of settler colonialism to attempt to break out of the European hermeneutic cul-de-sac, Tekoa was in its incipency, an example of Arendtian direct democracy perhaps? In the American spirit of "just starting something new", a pluralistic body politic expressed itself on a tabula rasa where contradiction is cleared in advance just as the native presence is cleared and leaves only the petty details, like the positioning of a clothesline, to be decided.

What most considerations of the American frontier fail to address –outside neglecting the clearly disastrous consequences for indigenous populations– is that the mobility of repeated bacterial self-constituting polities is not simply a resistance to state sovereignty. In the larger frame, these endemic errands into the wilderness are processes by which the settler state consolidates power over territory, specifically through the scrambling and disordering of the socially reproductive capacities of indigenous populations. This is the production of disorder through the ordering processes of sovereignty. Indeed, the IDF today uses the specific discourse of rhizomatic mobility discussed and eulogised in *A Thousand Plateaus* strategically, to flatten and invade Palestinian space (Weizman 2007, 187-88). The question that must be asked of the above theorists is, would they see such activities as practices of freedom?

In Israel today such a process is less a regime of exception in which lawlessness is permitted or reconstituted by settlers as law, but rather the proliferation of hyper-legalities, especially in the post Oslo-period, in which the extension of settlement is achieved by mobile settlers and the settler army, the IDF, by way of stalling reproductive capacity in Palestinian society. The ultimate aim of this in Mbembe's terminology is the securing of life for the settler polity and the designation of death for that of the Palestinian population. But there is no subsequent loss of sovereign power by the Israeli state in the process, indeed it is state consolidation acting as sovereigns always do and deciding on what illegality it can render legal by its very nature as the entity that constitutes the law. In North America and Australia, the historic contingency and context of settlement played a formative role in such a sprawling mess of jurisdictions and competing sovereignties, and the ability of settlers to manipulate them to their advantage. In the Israeli case at present, the state has become the key mobilizer of decentralized sovereign power in the service of structural invasion.

5.7: The Contemporary Settler Frontier: Zionist “Regional Defence” in Palestine

Where the cases of North America and Australia show an ad-hoc chaos of sovereignty and jurisdiction enabling processes of structural invasion, the case of the Israeli State, the IDF and the settlers themselves in the Occupied Territories, indicates an example of how such a process can become a conscious and instrumentalized strategy of conquest. This process did not spring whole from the earth in 1967, its precursors extend back before the establishment of the state in 1948 and can be seen in practice before even the Balfour Declaration. They commence at least as early as 1916 just prior to the arrival of British Imperial power in Palestine, when ‘a group of HaShomer members, upon hearing that the British army was about to cross the Sinai desert [...] set out for [the] Upper Galilee and founded the village of Bar-Goria’ (Drory 2005, 44). Just as settlers in the Northern American example had done

before them, so Zionist settlers advanced into Ottoman territory in Palestine, awaiting the arrival of what would be, *and* what was assumed to be, temporary British sovereignty.

The settlements in the contemporary West Bank rely historically on a codified ‘regional defence doctrine’, a policy predating the founding of the state where ‘forces based in Israeli frontline communities were charged with supporting army forces during military confrontations or the invasion of foreign armies’ (Hareuveni 2014, 4). David Ben-Gurion outlined the purpose of such a doctrine when advocating for its extension after the founding of the state

We must establish a string of settlements of a new type [...] that are not based on the sacred writ of the military academy but rather, constitute mixed battalions of settlers and warriors, farmers and fighters [...] Without war we will not have settlement, and without settlement we will not have a military victory [...] (Ben-Gurion (1948) cited in Drory 2005, 47).

In his own words, settlement constitutes a space of war, war creates a space for settlement. Whether a farmer or a soldier—and Zionist settlers of this period were often self-consciously both—settlers are involved in a war against native social reproduction. Long before the ethnic cleansing of 1948, Zionist settlement in Palestine had been explicitly understood by settlers in these terms. After the failed plantation settlement of the first Aliyah, Zionist settler technocrats such as Otto Warburg, Franz Oppenheimer and Arthur Ruppin looked to the example of Prussian settlement in the Eastern Provinces under the Poznań Colonization Commission (Bloom 2008, 193). The Prussian example mirrored the problems Zionists saw on the ground in Palestine, that is, the implanting of a settler community used to a higher standard of living into a low wage agricultural economy, where the native population was able to undercut settler labour in terms of wages as well as through existing avenues for subsistence social reproduction. Essentially, the issue was that Palestinian labourers were able to support themselves prior to the arrival of Zionist settlement via subsistence agriculture, and Zionist settlement subsequently offered a supplemental opportunity that expanded the base of Palestinian social reproduction. What was required for successful Zionist settlement was the creation of a similar subsistence “back up” to ensure the social reproduction of Zionist labour and to prevent Palestinian access to the settler labour market. This process was explicitly understood by Zionists in the terms of economic warfare, indeed conflict arising from such a policy was positively encouraged as it would further the ends of an exclusively Jewish labour force and expanded territory. In the words of Yosef Aharonowitz of *Hapoel Hatziar* (The Young Worker) in 1909

the more the Arab goes on developing, such incidents [attacking Jews] will repeat themselves [...] and will assume the permanent form of national hatred and jealousy. And this thing, which frightens us so much, is the safest guarantee of the Jewish worker (Shafir 2005, 52).

David Ben-Gurion positively eulogised the effects of violence in securing ethnically pure settlement when discussing the case of Tel Aviv, a city specifically founded economically against and in spite of Arab Jaffa. He would state:

We are today [...] in a city where all labour, the heaviest and the lightest, is done by only Jewish hands. Tel Aviv is a household name [...] because, as no second city is, it is a metropolis of Jewish labour. Immigrants accept the phenomenon calmly, as a matter of course, as something that was always so. But Tel Aviv was not born fully fledged: even after the First World War there were citizens to champion the 'national' ideal, forsooth, the ideal of 'mixed' labour which is still the passionate cause of a few colonists. It took the bloody riots of May 1921 to install Jewish labour unchallengeably in Tel Aviv (Ben-Gurion 1954).

As such then, Zionist settlement developed along particular ethno-exclusivist lines, the kibbutz model exemplifying the strategy. The first proto-kibbitzim, planned by Arthur Ruppin involved several specific characteristics. They were firstly to be collective agricultural settlements designed internally to promote conflicts of character within the membership themselves so as to self-select the best 'human material' (Bloom 2008, 203). Secondly, the settlements were to be populated by ideologically competing farmer-soldiers whose responsibility it was to cultivate the territory and conserve and defend the settlement from the native. Such 'tower and stockade' settlements focused strategically on internal self-selection and the external threat of the native continue to this day as we saw of Eyal Weizman's research on community settlement in the contemporary West Bank (Weizman 2007, 126).

This strategy of settlement then, based as it is on regional defence of both territory and settler social reproduction by the farmer-soldier is central to the wider Zionist project in Palestine, so central indeed that it is a key component of the makeup of the IDF itself, the people's settler army. As Ben-Gurion stated in 1949 to the Knesset of his plans for the defence of the settler nation that would be institutionalized in the Defence Service Law

The [...] Law which is before you is intended to impart to our army two basic characteristics required for our security: a military capability and a pioneering capability. The first year of service will be devoted principally to pioneering education in the army framework; after a few weeks of preliminary military training ... the age 18 and above cohorts, native born and immigrants, young men and women, will be sent for agricultural training. This will be accompanied by intensive cultural activity [...] to cultivate in the entire youth generation a sense of service, cooperative work, mutual help, responsibility, order and discipline, familiarity with the country, life in nature, and combatant and productive service. The agricultural training that will be given to all youth, including immigrants to age 26, has two objectives: military and settlement [...]. Agricultural training will make the establishment of frontier settlements possible, for without them state security will not be firm. These border settlements will serve as the first defensive wall of the State of Israel. Not a wall of stones, but a living wall. (Ben-Gurion (1949) in Drory 2005, 82).

The provision of training in agriculture and settlement, or the strategy of "regional defence", that is, an economic and territorial war on native social reproduction, remains at the centre of the settler invasion of the West Bank to this day. Here the processes of structural invasion seen first in the American example have become strategized and institutionalized into a complex and deliberately confusing technology of necropolitical violence.

5.8: Performing Sovereignty on the Frontier: The State and Settlers in the West Bank

After the invasion of 1967 the IDF became the acting sovereign in the seized territories, explicitly assuming the powers of the Jordanian government in terms of law and order (Hareuveni 2015, 19). It is with some grim irony that this role continues to officially entail —by reference to International Law and the Israeli High Court of Justice’s proclamations— a duty to protect the population(s) of the Occupied territories (Hareuveni 2015; Hareuveni 2014; Stahl 2015). Here the human sovereignty of the individuals and communities already existing in the West Bank at the time the Israeli military assumed its role as acting sovereign becomes mobilized against Palestinians; it is, again, officially one of the reasons the IDF presence exists on the land in the first place. Once again, indigenous sovereignty is mobilized against itself in the process of structural invasion. Of course, the IDF’s de-facto role renders such obligations entirely unenforced, yet it is important in the wider picture. The Israeli state and the IDF as sovereign in this context, act as all state empowered sovereigns do, through the power to define the law, yet to remain unbound by it.

What is of particular interest in the case of the West Bank is the way in which the Israeli state has diffused its sovereign authority all the way down the hierarchical chain to be invested —officially in some cases, and effectively as a norm in the territories— even to the level of the very bodies of individual settlers themselves. Civilian Security Coordinators (CSC’s) are a manifestation of the official delegation of regional defence doctrine at the level of the individual subject. In 1971 the IDF began to delegate its sovereign authority to CSC’s, they are entirely funded and armed by the Ministry of Defence, officially “supervised” by regional IDF commanders and are directly employed by settler councils in the area of the settlements in which they operate —a jurisdiction that we shall see, has never been clearly defined (Hareuveni 2014, 5). On the ground CSC’s hold law enforcement and policing powers. These are principally the power to use force and to detain and arrest, though they are also invested with the power to muster guarding squads, to fine deserters and to supply settlement and outpost residents with army weapons ‘even if they are not members of the civilian guarding squad’ (Hareuveni 2014, 12). Crucially they are selected for employment by the councils of the settlements in and around which they operate, functioning as something akin to a local militia leader. Despite the granting of such substantial powers, CSC’s are not required to wear visibly identifying insignia —a legal requirement of those invested with policing powers inside 1948 Israel (Hareuveni 2014, 13).

Until 2009 the jurisdiction of CSC’s was largely undefined, generally being equated with the municipal boundaries of the particular settlements in question. This deliberate opacity in terms of their areas of operations allowed them to operate ‘of their own accord far outside the borders of the settlements, in

numerous cases claiming areas at their own discretion as “close to a settlement” or guarding areas argued to be defensible as state land’ —‘a function that was never officially included in their powers’ (Hareuveni 2014, 18). Thus, CSC’s are empowered to prevent access of Palestinians to their land, to generally restrict Palestinian movement where they saw fit, and to conduct searches of Palestinian individuals and homes at their own discretion. When their area of jurisdiction was finally formalised to conform to the established jurisdictional norms vis-à-vis the municipal boundaries of settlements, their area of action was actually extended, to include “outposts” illegal under Israeli law. CSC’s operate as both an example of state sovereign power abrogating the laws it founds, and of individuals empowered by delegated sovereign power to do the same. On top of this CSC’s are also extended the kind of law-making violence usually the exclusive preserve of the state in their ability to decide their own jurisdictions, to violate the laws that empowered them in the first place and to “make law” on the ground through normative practices that they were never officially empowered to undertake. Where settlers in the Americas slipped in and out of state jurisdiction to invade native space, CSC’s make the very jurisdiction and law within it on the ground by dint of their presence there.

5.9: Plural Sovereignties: A Chaos of Jurisdictions as a practice of Structural Invasion

Part of the wider processes which allow CSC’s to breed autochthonous legal regimes, and more generally allows not widespread illegality in the Occupied Territories, but rather the savage proliferation of legalities ‘becoming’, is the deliberate overlapping of jurisdictions between the state, the IDF, the Police and settler regional councils. This chaos of jurisdictions finds the powers of law and order in the Occupied Territories generally unsure of where their jurisdiction ends and where another begins and, in the process, sees jurisdiction over the activities of settlers on the ground all but non-existent. To take the example of the IDF and the settlers it is officially empowered to police, settlers needn’t hide from the jurisdiction of the IDF, since despite being the de-jure sovereign in the Occupied Territories vis-a-vis the activities of settlers, the norms of behaviour of the IDF towards settlers is one of non-interference. To reiterate, the IDF is empowered in writing to arrest, detain, and use force against settlers engaged in illegal activities, but as numerous testimonies collected by Breaking the Silence attests, they simply do not in all but the most extreme cases. Commanders and soldiers on the ground do not even believe they are empowered to enforce what the written word of the law dictates as described in the Chief Command’s and Attorney General’s *Procedure for the Enforcement of Law and Order Regarding Israeli Offenders in the OTP* (Hareuveni 2015, 58).

We tend to understand an apartheid legal practice as that which is instituted in law, however, in the Occupied Territories de-facto apartheid also operates via the circulation of norms that contradict the

word of the law. Thus, when the normative practice of the IDF and settlers in the Occupied Territories on the ground make what amounts to the law, they are the forces of law-making violence and as such act within the sovereign frame, as the power to make the law and to violate it. Perhaps one of the best examples of this in action –aside from years of violence and theft perpetrated against Palestinians that almost always goes unpunished– is an attack by settlers on an IDF installation ‘in which settlers broke into the military base where the Efrayim Brigade headquarters [was] located’ and attacked the brigade commander and vandalized military property’ (Hareuveni 2014, 42). Not only did the IDF fail to defend a civilian incursion into the symbolic and actual territory of the sovereign state’s monopoly on physical force, after the incident no arrests were made (Ravid 2011).

The *raison d’être* of a military force in any normal situation is the protection of state sovereignty. Outside of a revolutionary scenario there is not a state in the world where civilians could directly attack a military installation and suffer no immediate, direct consequences. Indeed, that this is the case merely highlights the degree to which settler colonial social relations are predicated on what Veracini has characterized as ‘the world turned inside out’ (Piterberg & Veracini 2015), a radical inversion of the logics of class contestation and revolutionary change seen in metropolitan locations. What constitutes the radical outside vis-à-vis sovereignty and constituent power in the metropole can operate as the norm on the open frontier in the settler colonial scenario. It is certainly the norm in the Occupied Territories where settlers attack members of the IDF, that representative of the state’s monopoly on violence, on a relatively regular basis (Hareuveni 2014, 41, 75, 76). I would argue that in the case of this particular frontier scenario sovereignty travels with settlers themselves, it is where they are and the IDF is more often than not, subordinate to them. Settlers do not just ‘bring their sovereignty with them’ (Veracini 2010) they embody it on the ground; wherever they are, they constitute the law.

The only population in the Occupied Territories who are policed as the IDF are legally required to police settlers is of course that of the native population, the same population that the IDF is also, as far as the word of the law goes, obliged to protect. Yet where policing, firing upon and killing of Palestinians is a commonplace, the shooting of a settler is unthinkable. In testimony to the Shangmar Commission, commander of the Judea Brigade, Col. Meir Kalifi stated that it was “‘absolutely forbidden to fire’ at settlers’, he continued ‘I am worried about even raising the possibility of shooting a Jew to the edges of [the soldiers] consciousness’ (Hareuveni 2014, 34). Policing the decentralized sovereign violence of settlers on the frontier is as nonsensical as the idea that any sovereign would police itself, thus violating its entire being. Policing settlers on the frontier is *anti-Zionism*. The Sasson Report would document as much in 2005 with regard to the proliferation of settlements illegal under Israeli law, quoting the testimony of a senior officer in the IDF: ‘By the nature of things, we first deal with terrorism, and only then (if at all), with illegal activity by settlers’ stating that the command ethos

understands that ‘the settlers are putting Zionism into action [...] so they should not be looked at through a legal prism’ (Hareuveni 2015, 43). Here, allowed to act with impunity, settlers come to resemble the sovereign self-determining subjects of the post-Enlightenment tradition, empowered through a limitless self-possession to enact and produce the law and with it their concrete reality on top of the lifeworld of Palestinians. Through da-Silva’s ‘transcendental poiesis’, the power to make and remake the world and themselves in it (da-Silva 2007, 71-72), settler norms of behaviour become de-facto law. Here, again, epistemic and physical violence operate at the same register, pure self-determination recognizing nothing outside itself produces very real and concrete consequences for those whom the sovereign subject excludes and removes from its figurative and physical territory.

All the above diffusions of sovereign power of course are decided by the state of Israel, the chaos of overlapping jurisdictions, the discursive confusion and which leads the IDF at every level to ignore its ideologically contradictory obligations towards the occupied population, the empowering of CSC’s through deliberately failing to conclusively define where they are allowed to operate and systematically failing to enforce penalization where they explicitly go beyond their remit (Hareuveni 2014, 15); all are part of a concerted strategy to produce a chaotic space in the Occupied Territories so as to deepen and extend the conditions of settlement. As the author of the Sasson report notes on the matter of illegal settlement, which frames the above avenues for structural invasion and in a language that only at first appears paradoxical, but is perhaps fitting of the ‘world turned inside out’ that characterizes the Occupied Territories:

the entity behind the construction of the outposts was the state of Israel, acting behind the governments back, illegally, but with the involvement of various government ministries, settlers, [and] local councils in the territories. They were the ones that used state funds to build those outposts, and all of this was done illegally. The illegality was institutionalised (Sasson, T. interviewed in Dotan 2016).

So, at every level we see sovereigns demarcating and ordering space, founding the law, normative and written and empowered to violate it and to produce autochthonous legal structures wherever they go. This process significantly consolidates power within the ambiguous borders of Israel itself where the war on native social reproduction in the Occupied Territories exports social contradiction between secular and religious Israelis, between right and left, wealthy and impoverished, into space beyond the formal state and mobilizes native resistance to produce a potent image of the enemy.

This is how settler states have historically cohered their multi-ethnic populations against indigenous peoples, and more broadly, against a transnational spectrum of peoples of colour. It is how race trumps class in the settler colonial scenario (Mann 2005, 79). In the process of expanding the boundaries of settlement this necropolitical assemblage engulfs, in the terminology of Henry Kissinger, by ‘constructive blurring’ (A. T. Young 2013, 127). This term captures the disordering of order to disrupt the seriality and predictability of ordinary social reproduction for Palestinians, the liminality of the

frontier providing ambiguity vis-à-vis sovereignty that settlers find instrumentally advantageous (Veracini 2010, 67). The Israeli occupation applies the alien reason of a 'mad God' to Palestinian society, unpredictable, non-linear, rhizomatic structural invasion. The designation of death from the Israeli sovereign decision which disorders and scrambles the space of the frontier, targets all the means of social reproduction, from movement via the regime of checkpoints to infrastructural bulldozing, (Mbembe 2003, 29) and even targeting genetic reproduction itself, seeping into the very DNA of Palestinians through the effects of carcinogens in munitions that periodically bombard Gaza (Naim, Signoriello and Manduca 2013). This is the result of the 'wild violence' of sovereignty when it is unleashed through democratized means in a situation where transparency between the people and the state is operative, where the settler population –exemplified in the people's army of the IDF and the paramilitary organizations of the Irgun and Stern Gang that preceded it– is engaged in the structural elimination of the native population. This essential idea of decentralized sovereignty, the sovereign freedom of an entire self-determining people, 'ought to be [...] at least as unsettling as a single individual who desires sovereign power' (Cocks 2014, 38-9), and sometimes, perhaps more so.

CONCLUSION: ZIONISM, SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE SETTLER COLONIAL PRESENT

This thesis aimed to explore how Zionism was prefigured in the Settler Empire of the eighteenth, nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and how the state of Israel can be seen to be one of its lasting legacies. In terms of the former, Zionism has been shown to have been pre-figured in the Protestant restorationist tradition, in its own, that is, “Zionist” terms, via the concepts of “the negation of exile”, and the “return to history”. Both concepts, as we saw in Chapter 2, have close parallels in the constitution of settler identity. The history of Protestantism in the Settler Empire, as we have seen, is of profound import in the development of the teleologies of history of both Britain and America and it would not be a stretch to say that Anglo-Protestantism (with perhaps the inclusion of reformed Dutch Protestantism in South Africa) was something akin to the “State religion” of the Settler Empire. Protestantism informed the reinterpretation of the Bible. It also informed the “reinterpretation” of the English and then British state, its parliament; the nature of oppositional politics in England and America, English attitudes to land tenure and the nature of self-determination and self-government in the colonies of the Settler Empire. The latter proposition of the thesis maintains that these practices, philosophies and technologies of settlement spread well beyond England and shows how many of them of them adhered, often to a far greater degree than in the original metropole, in America, Australia, South Africa and in the figure of David Ben-Gurion, even in a state that was, at least on its declarative surface, “Jewish” and “Socialist” after 1948.

One of the more curious anomalies in the history of support for Zionism and the state of Israel is American public and state support in the years between 1948 and 1967. It was profoundly ambivalent, possibly disputing the thrust of the thesis. Of course, for the most part, evangelical support remained strong, but outside the Zionist organization in America, who successfully lobbied for the recognition of

the state on the part of the Truman administration, among the gentile and Jewish public it was mostly muted. Truman himself, in keeping with the thrust of the thesis, declared ‘I am Cyrus’ upon recognition of the state. This in the spirit of a man who it was said, read the Bible cover to cover on an annual basis and considered history a succession of great men, bending it to their wills (Merkley 1998, 164-5). Several reasons account for the above anomaly, including the American Jewish community’s shielding from the effects of the holocaust and holocaust survivors themselves —this itself a product of Zionist lobbying— the very few numbers of American Jews in the period who made Aliya to Israel, the Israeli state’s admonishment at the hands of the Eisenhower administration in 1956 over the Suez crisis, and the Israeli state’s ambiguous position in the eyes of U.S. policy makers vis-à-vis anti-colonial struggle at the time.

Put simply, the conditions that adhere in the present did not in 1950’s America. What changed? Whilst I would not argue it was simply the image of Israel in the imagination of the country that made the difference, I do believe that this played a very large part, and is in keeping with the claims of the thesis. When Americans and American Jews specifically came to view the state of Israel through the lens of messianic Americanism, its history of pioneering, of manifest destiny and utopian politics, support for the state of Israel matured and became what it is today. This cohered around the spectacular victory the Six Day War and victory clutched from supposed defeat of the War of 1973. But the foundations were laid before then, in large part in the realms of popular culture. One major example of this was Leon Uris’ novel *Exodus* (1958) and the Hollywood adaptation that followed in 1960. Both book and film, made in close collaboration with the Israeli government and starring the appropriately named Paul Newman, were advertised as “1776 in Palestine” (Kaplan 2013, 885, 876). The film fused the biblical Exodus narrative, the founding of the USA, the state of Israel and the defeat of the Nazis in World War II with the consummate American past-time of the period: going to the theatre to watch a depiction of the Wild West. For American Jews it depicted Israelis, perhaps for the first time, as blond, muscular Hollywood archetypes. Israeli’s in American eyes became the “muscle Jews” of Max Nordau, strong, noble, and fighting for freedom. In keeping with what we saw in Chapter 2, the settler might have been a copy, but s/he was a better copy and one more authentic than the original. Relatedly, in the present, what is a Birthright tour other than a show for Jews of the Diaspora of how much better the copy is than the original? Functioning as version of *Altneuland* for an era of virtual reality.

Finally, we saw that the intensive technologies of settler structural invasion can be seen in comparative perspective, from America in the eighteenth century, through Australia in the nineteenth to the Occupied Territories in the twenty-first. These technologies worked *through* Nativity, to eliminate it at the level of decentralized sovereignty granted both by the state and also authorising settlers to act beyond its monopoly on legitimate violence. This, I believe is a novel contribution to the settler colonial

research paradigm, showing both that the process was active on the American and Australian frontier, in ad-hoc form, and that it has become institutionalized –if that term really captures the contents of the case study– in the intentional “mess of jurisdictions” in Palestine. Whilst the image painted in the final chapter is bleak, a centralized state, if subjected to significant outside pressure in the form of sanctions and divestment, could it would seem, quite easily sweep clear its jurisdictional mess. The state of Israel could do so by granting equality under the law to all its citizens in a binational state, the cleaving of the mess apart though, is obviously and intentionally impossible.

On the 19th of July 2018 the Knesset passed what has become referred to as the ‘Nation State Law’ or, by its official title, ‘Basic Law: Israel as the Nation State of the Jewish People.’ The law could arguably be said to “fix” the paradoxical language of the Sasson Report discussed above, in that it enshrines in the Basic Laws of the state, Israel’s de-facto constitution, the state’s commitment to ‘settlement as a national value,’ mandating that the state ‘will act to encourage and promote its establishment and consolidation’ (Wootliff 2018). Would such issues as petitions to dispute Israeli settlement building often come to light at the level of the Supreme Court, one could easily see the law cited as precedent, such hypotheticals now possible with a law legalizing what was once illegal de-jure, but sovereign prerogative all the same. In this respect the Law has closed a potential loophole for redress, but an unnecessary one, given the historic behaviour of settler states and their legal technologies regarding the native petition.³⁷ The key piece of language in the law of course was its defining of ‘The right to exercise national self-determination in the State of Israel’ as ‘unique to the Jewish people’ (Wootliff 2018). This is peculiar. The exclusive right to self-determination of Jews in Israel has been de-facto and de-jure recognized since, effectively, before the state even came into being. The Jewish National Fund ensured this, by making its land acquisitions the inalienable property of the Jewish People. The Law of Return and Citizenship Laws reinforced this. By way of negation, the military rule between 1948 and 1967, the second-class citizenship accorded to Palestinian citizens of Israel and the non-citizenship which Palestinians in the Occupied Territories exist under, de-facto confirms, as if any confirmation were needed, who has the exclusive right to self-determination in Israel. What the law does reinforce, as the Israeli state has done since its inception, is seeming to proclaim that only in the state of Israel can Jews truly self-determine. This extended a kind of Isopolitical demand. It proclaims that British, American, French, and Argentinian Jews, as Israel Zangwill and Ashley Cooper before him maintained, held such identities chimerically. They would only secure their identities if the Jews had a land of their own. The state of Israel now takes things further. Not only must Jews have a national home, but they must actually be there to fully “be” Jews at all. The Israeli government has made such steps in the past that have proven to inflame relations with the diaspora. Now too, the Nation State Law has come with

³⁷ See the example of the Haidia community in British Columbia for example in (Fitzpatrick 1992, 29-30).

some side effects. Firstly, it made a nonsense of the Israeli relationships with minority communities which it has sought to privilege against the Palestinians, such as the Druze, for the purposes of policing them. Secondly, it has, perhaps for the first time, brought the language of apartheid from the realm of leftist critique into the liberal centre, even in conventional arenas of liberal Diaspora support.

This is the case primarily because it muddies the pristine image of modern Israeli democracy, of a high tech “Start Up state”, with its pride marches in Jerusalem, its Euro-Vision winning camp, Mediterranean beaches and world class universities. How can such a state also institute a constitutional amendment amounting to something very reminiscent of apartheid? Whether these Diaspora critics will continue to struggle with their cognitive dissonance remains to be seen. Depressingly, the Nation State Law seems to have had far greater impact on the liberal centre in Britain, America, Australia and Canada, the old wings of the Settler Empire, than the recent massacres at the Gaza fence have had. When it comes to the resistance of the native, the question of self-determination from which this thesis began its genealogy, seems to have drifted little from some of its basic core premises.

In the 1920’s when visiting Palestine, Ramsay Macdonald commented on Palestinian resistance to Zionism. He could hardly conceive of it as legitimate. It could only have come from class treachery. The fellahin were being manipulated by nefarious effendis and religious leaders to enact violence against the Zionist project. When in Jaffa, he stated

the Moslem is in possession, and he looks with apprehension upon the extending streets of the new town of Jewish settlers to the north, and is ready to listen to his leaders who wish for strife and to engage in riots and pogroms (Macdonald 1922, 2).

Not only are Palestinians at the mercy of others, who direct them to violence, but ‘The other consideration is that the Arab population do not and cannot use or develop the resources of Palestine’ (Macdonald 1922, 19). It is important to note that Macdonald did in fact recognize a Palestinian grievance, yet could not reconcile this with granting the Palestinian fellahin any agency that they might determine *for themselves* to do anything about it. The historical record tells a different story. At least since 1891 Palestinian civil society had registered its protest at proto-Zionist settlement, petitioning the Ottoman authorities to curb immigration and land purchase at least a decade before Zionism proper began to infiltrate into the country (Wolfe 2012). This was not lodged in the settler tropes of native savagery, but in the political conventions of the subject peoples of the Ottoman Empire. No nefarious figure directed Palestinian society to direct a telegram to the Grand Vizier, other than the settlers, indirectly, in their activity on the ground.

Such ideas, that the native, in their external determinacy, is a violent immanent threat, lie at the core of the settler project. Indeed it is such a core aspect of the settler imagination that we find it in perhaps the founding ideological document of settler colonialism as utopianism, the American Declaration of Independence:

He [King George] has excited domestic insurrections amongst us and has endeavoured to bring on the inhabitants of our frontiers, the merciless Indian savages, whose known rule of warfare is an undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes, and conditions (Jefferson in Dunbar-Ortiz 2003).

Much of the ink spilled in the pages of liberal American journals vis-à-vis the Great March of Return and the spectacular violence in response to it by the Israeli Defence Forces, fit the pattern well established in the settler archive. The native, as externally determinate, while not entirely guilty of their own death, is nevertheless something of an unknowing pawn, instrumentalized by hidden actors. In this case, “ Hamas ” instrumentally directs Palestinians to damage the media optics of the American Embassy transfer to Jerusalem. That the protestors could have agency, that they could have motivations of their own, that they could determine to do something *because* of their circumstances, seems unthinkable. Palestinian protestors are variously ‘ mobilized ’ by Hamas (Boot 2018). Hamas are argued to have kept ‘ urging Palestinians to move towards the fence ’ even ‘ [encouraging] women to lead charges on the fence ’ and dispatching ‘ Palestinian children as young as 7 were dispatched to try to breach the fence ’ (Stephens 2018). Palestinians do not do things on their own, they are dispatched by others, they are goaded into action, they do what they are told, en masse. They are, in a phrase, externally determinate. They are made to resemble former slaves in southern U.S. states, who the working white man feared would breach the normative order of American democracy by being encouraged to vote the wrong way by some unscrupulous Democrat, or the merciless savages Thomas Jefferson saw at the beck and call of King George.

Thomas L. Friedman would argue in the *New York Times* on the 22nd of May 2018, that Hamas, had ‘ facilitated the death of roughly 60 Gazans by encouraging their March [...] on the Israeli Border fence, in pursuit of their “ return ” to their ancestral homes in what is now Israel ’ (Friedman 2018). Leaving aside for a moment the peculiar use of the word “ facilitate ” which perhaps begs the question of Friedman’s intellectual honesty, he provides all the motivating factors one would surely require for a Palestinian to protest with a will of one’s own, even without a foreknowledge of the conditions that adhere in Gaza, which he then goes on to describe.

Friedman is still able to excuse Israeli violence despite fully acknowledging the reasons for resistance to the situation that causes Gazan desperation. This includes acknowledging that Gaza is set to become unliveable by the end of the decade by way of the pollution of its water table. Indeed, he foresees that ‘ in a few years, the next protest from Gaza will not be organized by Hamas, but by mothers because typhoid and cholera will have spread through the fetid water and Gazans will all have had to stop drinking it ’ (Friedman 2018).

His excusal of Israeli violence is simple: Hamas chooses to make Israel feel strategically insecure, ‘ therefore morally secure in killing scores of Hamas followers who tried to breach the border fence ’ (Friedman 2018). He fails to see that his future scenario is already operative in the Great March of

Return, *because* he can only see Palestinians as externally determinate now or in the future. They are those who self-determine, perhaps only in the moment of death. They choose to die, Israeli snipers merely “facilitate” this for them, whether as symbolic capital for Hamas, or whomever they die *for*. Could not these protestors have taken it upon themselves outside the central organizational framework of Hamas to organize the Great March of Return, to even request that Hamas did not appear in an official capacity at the protests? The alleged basis of the protests, as a civil rights movement to put pressure on the PA in Ramallah and on the Egyptian Government, to lift their sanctions on Gaza certainly seem to indicate as much (Shehada 2018).

Friedman is just the latest in a long line of Euro-Americans who have refused to see or acknowledge the potential for self-determination of Palestinians and in natives generally. Arafat initiates the Second Intifada, as if he had the power to summon an uprising of externally determinate Palestinians with the click of his fingers. Perhaps the greatest example of this tendency in Zionist historicism is Mohammed Amin al-Husseini the Mufti of Jerusalem, who directs Palestinian automatons to revolt. Benjamin Netanyahu takes his powers of persuasion to supernatural heights, and to the level of European anti-Semitism, in suggesting that it was he who convinced Hitler to exterminate the Jews (Haaretz 2015). And thus, the history of Jewish oppression comes full circle. Now the figure of a Palestinian occupies that once held by the figure of the Jew. One that occupies both the position of the outer-determined, the abject, disposable for being so, and yet at the same time one so supernaturally capable that they can direct the levers of power from on high.

Whilst I would not like to throw out the concept of self-determination altogether, I believe it is long overdue a critical reappraisal. Self-determination as a concept is inherently faulty. There is, I believe, no such thing. Part of the inherent problem is that the concept is impossible. No one, people, state or other body self-determines. Self-determination is utterly meaningless unless recognized by another. Some kind of reciprocity is essential if the term is to have any meaning at all. As it stands historically, self-determination has meant recognition by those who have declared themselves to be self-determining, by those who claim the right to act in history, to have the authority of history behind them, at the expense of, or in spite of, others. It is a relation of power. It is a question of might and right. Whilst I would not like to undermine the use of the concept in battles for liberation from colonialism, because the struggle in Palestine straddles the history of both classical anti-colonial struggle and that of settler colonialism, there is inherently a crossover.

A reciprocal determinism might unsettle a contemporary scene that whilst on the surface appears profoundly different to the Settler Empire of the nineteenth century, carries its echoes into the present. Where once isopolitics allowed the relative free movement of a particular kind of labour alongside the free movement of capital, we now find as neoliberal capitalism increasingly cannibalises the nation

state, the spectres of the ‘rising tides of colour’ returning. The settler drive to displace contradiction does not confine itself to conventional spatiality. It reshaped urban centres through blockbusting and suburbanization, then it centrifugalized and gentrified the urban centres from which had once fled.

The settler “way of war”, that is, counter-insurgency, has become the normative practice in the second half of the twentieth century and practically the only way of war for the world’s only superpower in the twenty-first. Not only does its domesticating/extirpating dual tendency link back directly to the elimination of the native, as we have seen in the American example and elsewhere, it formed one of the first arms of Foucauldian ‘governmentality’, despite the Poststructuralist failure to look much beyond Europe. Settler colonialism was arguably the origin of the Biopolitical state. That technology of subjectification and control, pioneered in the welfare states of Australia, South Africa, and ultimately Israel, “came home” to the metropole, as members of the British Labour party dreamed it would. Today, the other side of this “COIN” has returned too, with military counter-insurgency doctrine now returning to the metropole, in the militarization of policing and the application of wartime intelligence gathering on the domestic population. The purity of the colonial frontier is now applied at home in the name of counter-terrorism, but the moral assurances that this afforded in the settler colony have become muddied, the binary is blurred when cast through the prism of metropolitan existence. The binary optics of fascism do not adhere without complaint in the metropole, at least not yet, though their echoes are frequent, and disturbing. If America is the primary operator, Israel is a subsidiary, profiting from its position in the supply chain, developing and testing the accessories to the primary American tools of COIN strategy and technology in the Occupied Territories, and selling them to the highest bidder.

Alongside this a new frontier opened in cyberspace, once a libertarian utopia and home of techno hippies displaced from the failure of 1968 and the counterrevolutionary turn in the 1970’s. By the late 1980’s and early 1990’s the internet had in many ways become a vast new wild west. Yet alongside the progressive effervescence of access to information and collaborative potentiality, separation, anonymity, loneliness and the displacement of contradictory material on the individual and collective level has led to parts of the internet becoming the perfect incubating medium for particularly virulent forms of racism, misogyny and ethno-nationalism which have now moved back “IRL”. In a new gilded age, various versions of California’s Silicon Valley birth tech billionaires who explore new versions of displacement and the defence against radicalism, whether in the desire to escape the limitations of the body itself and death, or to simply escape a planet that is being made increasingly uninhabitable. All of these displacements, these escapes, share a common theme. They do not seek to solve problems in place, but to escape them, to move or to displace. They seek to build walls, or to extirpate the savages at the gates. As the neoliberal order increasingly fails to provide for the needs of the vast majority of

humankind, ethno-nationalist entrepreneurs are emerging in Europe, America, the Philippines, Turkey and elsewhere who seem to answer the hypothetical question ‘a decent life for everyone or genocide?’ with ‘we choose genocide’ (Christman 2017), the answer settlers often made pre-emptively in previous centuries.

The ecocide that settlers brought in train to the Americas, Australia, and to Palestine, continuing there as ever with annual forest fires directly related to settler agriculture and afforestation, now girdles the planet as climate change offers humanity perhaps its first true vision of apocalypticism. Directly related to this is the “refugee crisis,” whose historic analogue is the refugees of the Second World War and the Palestinian refugees, produced in turn as they were via the strategic lobbying of the Zionist organization and then the execution on Plan Dalet. They are those whose right of return was recognised by the same international body and relic of the Settler Imperial imagination, which recognized the State of Israel, yet who remain refugees to this day, surely offering the *Ur*-model of the permanent refugee, a new type of non-citizen, peculiarly unrecognized. This is fitting perhaps when placed alongside the Gaza fence, a border that is not a border and those in Israel and the Occupied Territories. This continues in the post Oslo divisions, borders and not borders, marked by walls that should not exist. They imprison occupied peoples in permanent refugee camps, whose parallels are surely the now permanent refugee camps in Yarl’s Wood, in Calais, and at Australia’s offshored detention centres in Manus. The above are all closer to Guantanamo Bay than places of asylum. Non-prisons filled with permanent non-people, those with apparent non-rights; appropriately they are analogues of the prisons of the War on Terror, the enduring response to which from some, was that now ‘we are all Israelis’ (Lubin 2008, 671).

Perhaps now is a time to start something new, in Hanna Arendt’s phrase, but, against her settler pretensions, not at the expense of others and to attempt a philosophy of reciprocal determinism, to not displace the other, or escape contradiction but to reconcile and subulate it, because ultimately ‘empty space’ is chimeric, missions to a dead Mars notwithstanding.

‘the sharing of the world is the law of the world. The world has nothing other; it is not subject to any authority; it does not have a sovereign’

- Jean-Luc Nancy, *Being Singular Plural*

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