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Selling the Empire?: Marketing and the Demise of the British World, c.1920-1960

Abstract-

This article uses a study of the politics of marketing and advertising to consider the role that British World collaboration played in consumer politics in the UK and the Dominions between the 1920s and 1950s. We will assess how politicians and businesspeople in the Dominions responded to the Empire Marketing Board's efforts to encourage the habit of 'Buying British' in the inter-war years, as well as exploring the activities of the leading American marketing agency, J. Walter Thompson. The article concludes with a discussion of how the politics of patriotic trade was recast in the 1950s. While this was a cause which had taken on different forms in Australia, Canada and South Africa during the 1930s, in each country its advocates shared a wider concern with imperial development. And yet, changes in the advertising and marketing industries, and the growth of market research, cut across efforts to promote the consumer habit of buying imperially. By the early 1960s patriotic trade campaigns in the 'old' Dominions were nationally focused and shorn of their earlier 'Britannic' identity.

British World; Britishness; Marketing; Advertising; Consumerism

Selling the British World

In 1902 T.B. Browne, the largest advertising agency in the UK, published *Over-sea Britain* as part of a series of advice guides for exporters, focusing chiefly on the opportunities provided by the settler colonies. The books sought to demonstrate that selling in these markets was little different from doing business at home. For example, *Over-sea Britain* claimed that Australia was occupied by 'the most active, intelligent

and energetic people, imbued with English tastes and standards of comfort, and far more generally able to indulge their inclinations than the great mass of their fellow countrymen at home'.¹ Another guide in the series presented South Africa as a promising market following the cessation of the Second South African War: 'its buying centre is London....it turns instinctively to British firms for the gratification of its export markets'. In cities such as Cape Town and Johannesburg 'the European trade is very much of the same class as that of an English provincial town'.² The prominent journalist W.T. Stead was employed by T.B. Browne to further spread the message that home and empire advertising were essentially the same. According to Stead, the colonies' wide network of newspapers meant 'the would-be [British] advertiser can reach the inhabitants of the remotest Colonies in the same way in which he would appeal to his own townsmer'.³

Of course, these boosterist claims obscured the significant challenges which British exporters faced in these markets. By this time, the United States had established itself as Canada's leading source of imports, American exporters had also made significant inroads into South Africa in the decade before the Second South African War and US industrialists played a leading role in the development of Transvaal mining boom.⁴ In the immediate term, Australia provided few signs for optimism for British exporters as a result of its prolonged recession, it did not recover its 1891 GDP level until 1904.⁵ More generally, it may seem surprising that T.B. Browne paid such attention to Dominion markets, given that they accounted for only 12 percent of British imports and 16 percent of British exports between 1895 and 1899.⁶

Nonetheless, T.B. Browne's advice guides were emblematic of the growing links between Britain and its settler colonies in the late nineteenth century. Gary Magee and Andrew Thompson's *Empire and Globalisation* (2010) explores how a variety of 'British World' networks were established during this period which fostered such cultural and economic connections.⁷ The circulation of information about markets encouraged people to see the settler colonies as attractive places to invest in and migrate to, given they were perceived to share cultural norms and values with the UK. Culturally based ideas of 'trust' and knowledge underpinned these trade decisions. With the growth of cable telegraphy and Reuters' role as an 'imperial press service', newspapers of record such as *The Times* devoted increasing space to events in the settler colonies during the late nineteenth century, giving British investors a clearer understanding of the economic potential of these markets.⁸

This was also a period in which ideas of 'Greater Britonism' flourished, as reflected in T.B. Browne's references to the settler colonies as 'overseas Britains'.⁹ J.R. Seeley, a Cambridge professor, played a key role in shaping this concept. His The Expansion of England (1885) became a bestseller, eventually achieving English-language sales of 500,000 copies.¹⁰ According to Seeley, the only way in which Britain could maintain its world-status against its rivals was by enhancing political, cultural and economic ties with its settlement colonies.

Although a substantial literature has explored how British World collaboration flourished in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, there are few comparable studies which explore its decline in commercial culture thereafter. Felicity Barnes' recent exploration of a 1934 trade dispute between Lancashire grocers and Australian cotton producers is a useful reminder that understandings of Britishness in trade were fluid and contested by different civic groups seeking to promote their own interests.¹¹ The following article uses a study of the politics of the marketing and advertising industries to sketch out the role that various forms of British World collaboration played in consumer politics in the UK and the 'old' Dominions between the 1920s and 1950s.¹² As well as exploring how politicians and businesspeople in the Dominions responded to the London-based Empire Marketing Board's efforts to encourage the habit of 'Buying British' in the 1920s and 1930s, we will consider the activities of the leading American marketing agency, J. Walter Thompson. The article concludes with a discussion of how the politics of patriotic trade was recast in the 1950s. While this was a cause which had taken on different forms in Australia, Canada, and South Africa during the 1930s, in each country advocates of patriotic consumption shared a wider concern with imperial development. However, by the early 1960s patriotic trade campaigns in the old Dominions were fundamentally nationally focused, and shorn of their earlier 'Britannic' identity.¹³

While several historians have explored changing practices in the marketing and advertising industries across this period their focus is chiefly on national practices rather than exploring wider questions of transnational Britishness.¹⁴ An important exception is Erika Rappaport's recent history of the politics of tea production and consumption, which is instructive for thinking about the contested role of imperial identities within consumer networks. As Rappaport shows, tea was often sold as a 'British' and imperial product for much of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. However, from the mid-1930s onwards scepticism grew about the value of using imperial themes in tea advertising. Tea producers sought to rebrand further during the era of decolonization, developing 'national' branding. Tea's imperial history became an impediment, making it a less fashionable beverage for young consumers during the 1950s and 1960s.¹⁵ 'Britishness' was a quality which could be packaged in various guises, being desired by consumers at some times and rejected at others.

Although there have been efforts to explore how state bodies encouraged consumers to exercise a preference for particular consumer goods, such studies focus overwhelmingly on the Empire Marketing Board (EMB), a British governmentsponsored organisation active between 1926 and 1933, which encouraged consumers in the UK to purchase imperial goods.¹⁶ Felicity Barnes has explored how Dominion produce marketing boards built on consumer appeals developed by the EMB, developing their own campaigns to sell food to British shoppers.¹⁷ By contrast, little attention has been given to questions of how the EMB's campaigns were received in the Dominions and how organisations in Australia, Canada and South Africa established their own patriotic trade campaigns to appeal to domestic consumers.¹⁸

At the start of the twentieth century T.B. Browne had presented consumers in the Dominions as little different from those in Britain. The emergence of new methods of exploring consumer motivation challenged such comfortable assumptions. Nonetheless, British World networks persisted in the fields of marketing and advertising throughout the 1920s and 1930s. At this time, ideas of how best to promote imperial development through consumption variedly widely, as did understandings of what it meant to 'Buy British'. Although the London-based EMB's efforts to promote the cause of empire shopping had little success in the Dominions, the various national trade campaigns which emerged in Australia, Canada and South Africa during the 1930s still embraced a 'Britannic' rhetoric. Buying national and imperial goods was presented to consumers as a way to foster the position of their countries as strong partners in the wider Commonwealth.

Yet changes in the advertising and marketing industries and the growth of market research, as well as broader shifts in the global economy, led to new ways of thinking about the British World as an economic entity, cutting across efforts to promote the consumer habit of buying imperially. From 1945 onwards the market research industry expanded significantly. The growth of practices such as segmented marketing and motivational research discouraged businesses from making undifferentiated appeals to national markets. Earlier ideas that consumers in different countries across the British World had broadly similar interests and tastes were challenged. Instead companies sought to direct campaigns to particular socio-economic groups connected across territorial boundaries, challenging the role of British World connections in commercial culture and increasing the appeal of contiguous markets such as the European Economic Community.

Buying British?: Empire marketing and national identities in the Commonwealth

The 1920s and 1930s were the heyday of efforts to encourage consumers to 'Buy British'. This is a cause most commonly associated with the Empire Marketing Board (EMB), whose activities formed part of the wider operations of the Imperial Economic Committee (IEC). The IEC sought to promote a 'non-tariff preference' for imperial products by aiding food production through scientific research and promoting the sale of empire goods. The organisation's purpose was made clear in a 1927 memorandum produced for the Department of Overseas Trade: 'The young nations of the British race are obviously disposed by tradition and task to demand the kind of goods produced by British industry....The development of the Empire nations is a matter of men and money, of the transfer of population and capital from the 'Old Country' to the younger Britains'.¹⁹ This alluded to the notion that imperial development was largely a matter of 'men, money and markets', a term popularized by Mackenzie King and Stanley Bruce at the 1923 Imperial Conference. Advocates of such thinking claimed that flows of emigrants and investment from Britain to the Dominions would lead to the expansion of the latter nations' economies, in turn providing expanded markets for UK manufactures and cementing these countries' futures as prosperous 'British' nations.²⁰

The EMB's largest campaign in autumn 1931 featured the distribution of more than one million posters across the UK. Over 400 organisations participated in this 'Buy British' trade push, ranging from business groups like the Federation of British Industries to civic organisations such as the British Legion and Women's Institutes. The cause of imperial trade was advertised by a series of 'empire shops' in various cities, trade posters, and empire shopping weeks.²¹

The politics of 'buying British' in the UK has been explored at length elsewhere, and a detailed discussion of the various state-backed campaigns of the 1920s and 1930s is beyond the scope of this article.²² The key point to note is that the campaigns had limited success and faded in influence after the British government's introduction of imperial preference in 1932. Understandings of what it meant to 'Buy British' varied and the slogan was taken up by a variety of commercial advertisers for their own ends. Ironically, some of the companies which were at the forefront of promoting their 'British' credentials at this time relied heavily on foreign labour and raw materials such as the petrol companies Shell and BP.²³

Ideas about ethical consumption also complicated questions about what goods it was appropriate to buy. In 1931 the Co-operative Wholesale Society (CWS) launched its own 'Britain re-born' campaign to encourage consumers to 'Buy British'.²⁴ During the inter-war years the CWS increased links with suppliers in the Dominions. However, its broader supply networks hampered the British government's efforts to encourage UK consumers to substitute empire for foreign foods. In particular, the CWS had longstanding links with Danish bacon co-operatives, who continued to dominate the British market.²⁵ Denmark's bacon industry was largely controlled by co-operatives, whereas British production was dominated by small, privately-owned farms. By buying Danish bacon British consumers were supporting the ethical principles of co-operation, moreover they were aiding a 'friendly' nation. Denmark relied heavily on trade with the UK and feared that these links would be hampered by the introduction of tariffs. In 1932 a British exhibition was staged in Copenhagen by Danish importers keen to establish a preferential trade agreement with the UK.²⁶

The introduction of imperial preference meant that support for the 'Buy British' cause waned. One Empire Marketing Board correspondent noted that by March 1932 'the consuming public were under the impression that with the imposition of tariffs, there was no further need to ask for British goods'.²⁷ After the Ottawa economic conference established a system of intra-imperial tariff preferences later that year, the British government's attention shifted to pursuing trade agreements with non-Empire countries, which in turn constrained the value of imperial preference. The UK focused on securing lower tariff rates for agricultural imports via reciprocal trade treaties with Denmark and Argentina in 1933.²⁸ The Roca-Runciman pact allowed Argentina to keep almost all of its pre-Ottawa agreement share of the UK market for beef and Denmark was given a fixed share of the British market for bacon in return for a promise to buy British coal. Trade treaties were subsequently concluded with the other Scandinavian countries.²⁹

In March 1933 Sir Edward Crowe, the Comptroller of the Department of Overseas Trade and an executive member of the EMB, told an audience of British and American businessmen that 'probably the 'Buy British' campaign has "now gone far enough", as it hampered trade relations with non-imperial countries.³⁰ The Manchester Guardian concurred, claiming that 'Buy British': Has been pushed to lengths of absurdity that have become a danger to world trade. It has been a stimulating cause of anti-British movements in other countries and has made nonsense of the reciprocal trade agreements that the Government is now trying to negotiate. How can we seriously ask the Danes or the Americans to "Buy British" when we are doing our best to persuade British consumers not to buy their goods in return.³¹

The Empire Marketing Board struggled on for another six months before being disbanded.

Understandings of what constituted 'Buying British', and the role that such considerations should play in shaping consumer preferences, varied significantly within the UK. Therefore it should come as no surprise that languages of patriotic trade also differed in Australia, Canada, and South Africa. While Empire Marketing Board campaigns received a lukewarm reception (at best) in each of these countries, Dominion industrialists and politicians were still keen to assert a Britannic identity in the 1930s, albeit one that was shaped by national interests and anxieties, particularly concerning race and economic development.

Empire shopping weeks were introduced into Australia, Canada and South Africa in the 1920s. Given that their development has been the subject of recent detailed study, this article confines itself to a brief discussion of their effects.³² Even before the 1932 Ottawa economic conference, such weeks struggled to compete with alternative campaigns backed by manufacturing groups and government departments which argued that consumers should focus on assisting national industry to alleviate domestic unemployment.³³ The Ottawa agreements had little success in tightening the existing links of inter-imperial trade given the Dominion governments' concerns with using tariffs to protect their own industries from British, as well as foreign, competition.³⁴ British industrialists, and their overseas representatives, regularly protested at the application of tariffs by Dominion governments which, they claimed, hampered British exporters and did not allow for reasonable competition with local manufacturers.³⁵

A key problem empire shopping weeks faced was that they were seen as being overreliant on posters supplied by the London-based Empire Marketing Board, which were deemed inappropriate for non-UK audiences. In 1928, for example, the Australian Association of British Manufacturers noted that several shopkeepers were reluctant to display these posters out of concern that they were contrary to the spirit of the 'Buy Australia Made' cause which had been promoted by the Made-in-Australia Council, with support from the Australian Chamber of Manufactures, since 1924.³⁶

Nonetheless, these rival national products campaigns did not reject the cause of buying imperially outright. Rather, they promoted a hybrid Britannic culture, supporting both the purchase of national and empire goods, which outlived the Empire Marketing Board. In 1934 the Victorian Chamber of Manufactures (VCM) launched an All-Australian Exhibition to commemorate the one-hundredth anniversary of the founding of Melbourne and promote the 'Buy Australia Made' cause. The industrial exhibition proved a popular attraction, with 150,000 visits recorded in the first three weeks.³⁷ A souvenir catalogue which accompanied the exhibition focuses on the rapid transformation of Melbourne into an industrial metropolis of skyscrapers, which now boasted a population of one million. In welcoming readers to the exhibition F.W. Kitchen, the president of the VCM, praised 'the racial traditions and inherent industrial skill which have made British pioneers consistently successful as colonisers and nation-builders'.³⁸ The exhibition catalogue's racialised imagery starkly contrasts the modernity of British pioneers with the supposed primitivism of indigenous peoples.

Exhibition organisers presented the expansion of secondary industry as vital to the nation's advancement: 'It is apparent that increasing Australia's population must be one of her major problems....made more difficult by the determination of the people that the inhabitants shall be white in race, predominantly British in extraction'. In this view of Australian history, industry was at the forefront of the nation's economic expansion, with the workforce in manufacturing more than doubling between 1901 and 1929.³⁹ While they may have been hesitant to endorse the empire shopping movement, Australian industrialists invoked a Britannic identity, albeit one inflected by concerns with upholding a modern 'White Australia', which could be best achieved by establishing a more diversified economy.⁴⁰

[Figure 1, about here]

By the late 1930s Australian patriotic buying campaigns clearly combined national and imperial patriotisms. In 1939 the Australian Association of British Manufacturers and Made-in-Australia Council joined together in Melbourne for the first time to champion Australian and empire goods.⁴¹ In Western Australia an 'Empire and Local Products Week', which publicised imperial trade alongside the state's efforts to develop its industrial base, had emerged out of the earlier activities of the Empire Shopping Week Council by the mid-1930s.⁴² West Australian produced posters instructed women to 'shop under the Union Jack' and featured the royal coat-of-arms alongside the slogan: 'Buy British always'. Organisers regularly employed kinship rhetoric referring to Britain as a 'parent' keen to develop her family overseas.⁴³ When consumers were encouraged to buy British goods, the issue of self-interest was often invoked, and they were reminded that their state relied on the UK market, which supplied them with a highly favourable trade balance.⁴⁴

South Africa had a similar experience. A series of 'Buy Empire Goods- South African First' fairs were held in 1932-33 in major cities across the country, inspired by the EMB's efforts to promote empire shopping. However, they attracted widespread criticism due to their apparent neglect of South African manufactures and struggled to gain favourable newspaper coverage or local financial backing.⁴⁵ Nonetheless, later efforts to develop a hybrid patriotic buying culture, encouraging the purchase of both national and imperial goods had greater success. In 1936-37 a South African and British Empire Exhibition was held in Johannesburg, to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the city's founding. The organisers of this vast exhibition, spread over 100 acres, sought to attract 2 million visitors to their 'African Wembley', invoking the famous London empire exhibition of 1924-25. Yet although Britain, Canada, Australia, and several African colonies produced exhibits for the Johannesburg fair, the exhibition chiefly focused on projecting a modern image of South Africa centred on unity between Afrikaners and English-speaking whites.

The organisers of the Johannesburg empire exhibition were able to persuade the Federated Chamber of Industries to back the 1936 show. In addition, they gained the cooperation of both the coalition government parties.⁴⁶ This achievement owed much to the organisers' insistence that the exhibition would provide a unique marketplace to sell South African manufactures to overseas audiences. Moreover, the Afrikaner history of the country featured prominently in the exhibition and black participation was restricted through draconian visitor controls. With its focus on national (white) unity, the exhibition broadly reflected the concerns of Hertzog's coalition government.⁴⁷ Even though South Africa was presented as a key part of the imperial trade network, the exhibition was shaped by national concerns with projecting white authority and unity, connected with industrial modernity.

Finally, British-government assisted efforts to promote the cause of empire shopping in Canada proved to be brief and unsuccessful. After Canada's initial empire shopping week was held in 1928 with the support of the Empire Marketing Board, businesses were largely indifferent or hostile to efforts to revive the cause the following year and the campaign struggled for publicity. A British Board of Trade report produced in 1929 noted that British Trade Commissioners were reluctant to actively assist empire shopping weeks as there was a common feeling that 'the Canadian manufacturers were supplying the money while United Kingdom manufacturers were obtaining the benefit'. The Canadian Manufacturers Association (CMA) favoured replacing empire shopping campaigns with a 'Canada Products Week'.⁴⁸

And yet, while a 'Made-in-Canada' movement subsequently flourished throughout the 1930s with the support of the CMA and the Department for Trade and Commerce, both were keen to promote a Britannic identity. The former insisted that promoting trade with the UK was in Canada's self-interest due to its highly favourable trade surplus.⁴⁹ As sponsor of both the Made-in-Canada campaign and 'Canada Calling', an export drive targeted at British consumers, the Department of Trade and Commerce offered differing views of the Canadian economy to audiences in Canada and the UK. Whereas Canadian shoppers were encouraged to buy domestically-produced goods to aid home industry, British shoppers were presented with images of Canada as a land of bountiful agricultural production. Nonetheless, Canada also highlighted its role as an industrial producer to British audience, a message that had been conspicuously lacking in Empire Marketing Board publicity. In particular, Buick cars featured prominently in the 'Canada Calling' campaign. One advert used the slogan 'Remember your

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forefathers founded the empire. Support the empire' and informed British consumers that Buicks were built in Ontario.⁵⁰ The irony here was that Buick was part of the American General Motors company, and by building cars north of the border it benefitted from tariff preferences in both Canadian and imperial markets. Much like BP and Shell, Buick's questionable status as an 'imperial' company, led it to play up its role in furthering empire trade in its marketing campaigns, tapping into the assumed patriotism of the British consumer.

[Fig. 2, around here]

It should come as no surprise that politicians and industrialists in Australia and South Africa were keen to present a 'Britannic' identity during the 1930s given that they remained heavily dependent on British capital to fund development and service existing debts. They, along with Canada, benefitted from the development on the Sterling Area and the UK's increasing focus on importing from empire producers after it adopted imperial preference.⁵¹ Moreover, the preferential concessions gained from Britain were a valuable bargaining tool in their trade negotiations with other countries. Canada and Britain signed trade agreements with the USA in 1938, albeit with limited trade concessions. Australia also entered into talks with the United States and would likely have signed a similar trade agreement had war not intervened.⁵² In 1937 the Empire-Commonwealth accounted for 61 percent of Australia's export trade, and the majority of Canada (53 percent) and South Africa's exports (51 percent).⁵³

Nonetheless, in the immediate years before the Second World War scepticism grew about the value of using patriotic trade campaigns to encourage consumer enthusiasm for national and imperial products, after all imperial goods already enjoyed a preference via tariffs. As Rappaport has shown, tea producers placed less emphasis on imperial themes in their advertising at this time. An International Tea Market Expansion Board was established in 1935 to promote the beverage via uplifting slogans such as 'Tea revives you' which had a universal appeal.⁵⁴

Changing practices in the marketing and advertising industries cast further doubt on the value of patriotic trade campaigns. In opening the 1937 Empire Advertising Convention in London Lord Bledisloe, the former Governor-General of New Zealand, noted that many British companies did not give enough thought to market investigation, thereby allowing American car-makers and European fashion houses to corner several imperial markets. Bledisloe concluded: 'far more effective than an advertisement 'buy British goods' is a careful investigation *in loco* of the precise character of local demand'.⁵⁵

During the 1930s the growth of market research and investigation led advertising firms to increasingly stress the differing characteristics of imperial markets and the need for companies to adapt to them if they were to succeed.⁵⁶ The New York-based J. Walter Thompson organisation (JWT) played a key role in developing market investigation methods, establishing specialist market research organisations during this period. Both the British Market Research Bureau (founded 1933) and Ashby Research Services (Australia, 1936) emerged from the JWT organisation. Nonetheless, the development of JWT between the 1920s and 1940s also indicates the ongoing importance of British World networks within the marketing industry.

Irresistible empire?: J. Walter Thompson and the British World of commerce

In July 1928 the *J. Walter Thompson News Bulletin* devoted its attention to the prospects for expanding US trade with foreign markets. In a long article entitled 'Markets are the people who buy products- not the places in which they are sold', Clement Watson, the director of JWT's Berlin office, reflected on how modern technologies and products were apparently spurring populations across the world to adopt American modes of life: 'The newspaper, the cinema, and motor transportation are rapidly "making the whole world kin"....Particularly are the eyes of all creeds and races turning toward America as the wonder nation of the earth'.⁵⁷ At this time, JWT was undergoing a rapid international expansion. As a result of winning a marketing contract for General Motors in 1927 it was required to open an office in every country where the car-manufacturer operated.

On the face of it, the growth of American companies like JWT from the 1920s onwards appeared to offer a significant challenge to existing British World networks in the fields of marketing and advertising. At the time Watson was writing marketing in Canada was already dominated by US firms. As George French noted in 1926: 'Many of the advertising agencies of the States have Canadian offices, and probably half of the advertising being published is handled directly from agencies in the United States....Canadian advertising is largely a matter of United States origination'.⁵⁸ By contrast, for much of the early twentieth century British advertising firms had few substantial rivals in Australasia and southern Africa. Australia's first full service advertising agency, Thomas Millers, did not open until 1902.⁵⁹ In New Zealand the three main agencies, Ilotts, J. Inglis Wright and Haines, were all small concerns and it was not until the expansion of Ilotts in the 1920s that any of them developed a significant international presence.⁶⁰ Little detailed attention has been paid to how British World networks were reshaped alongside the growth of American commercial power after 1918. This contrasts with the many studies which explore the economic and cultural influence of US firms in midtwentieth century Europe.⁶¹ The following section uses a case study of JWT to explore how American advertising firms engaged with different markets in the UK and the Dominions. Whereas Clement Watson had presented JWT as a force to promote American culture, the firm in fact drew on existing cultures of Britannic loyalism and co-operation to develop an effective presence in the British World from the late 1920s onwards.

By 1929 J. Walter Thompson had established itself as one of the three largest advertising agencies in Britain in terms of turnover, and by 1950 it received more billings than any of its competitors in the UK. JWT's London office was its most significant operation outside the United States, playing a key role in the company's expansion into Europe and the Empire-Commonwealth. Most General Motors (GM) advertising was handled in London, then translated by European offices. London also acted as a training centre for American and European staff working on this account.⁶²

JWT sought to present itself as a pioneer in the practice of marketing through its 'Agency in Action' series of adverts, highlighting the global spread of its operations and mastery of communications technology such as radio and cinema. However, the adverts also focused on the particular expertise that was offered at their London headquarters at Bush House in terms of market research, copywriting, and advert production. The JWT London office was also often responsible for sourcing testimonials used for adverts in overseas markets, such as the Ponds soap campaign in Australia.⁶³ JWT's expansion within the Dominions was closely connected to the General Motors contract. The agency initially planned to direct GM operations in Europe from the London office, and control the company's expansion in Australia and South Africa from the New York headquarters.⁶⁴ However, plans for expansion in Australia were hampered by limited forward planning.

[Figure 3, about here].

In 1928 James Webb Young, head of JWT's foreign department noted that 'we know nothing about conditions in Australia and it would appear that some preliminary survey of conditions there should be made before we make a commitment'.⁶⁵ When JWT eventually set up an Australian operation in 1930 it was only the second American marketing agency to do so.⁶⁶ Company history records suggest American staff in the early years had little understanding of the requirements of the Australian car market and were too reliant on approaches developed by the New York office.⁶⁷ Plans for expansion in Australasia were hampered by the Australian branch of GM, General Motors-Holden, signing an extension of an existing advertising contract with a local agency. JWT subsequently closed its offices in Melbourne and Wellington in 1932, and Sydney was regularly threatened with closure around this time.

JWT Australia sought to develop a local identity much as the company appears to have done in other nations.⁶⁸ One *Newspaper News* advert from 1931 announced that 98 per cent of the Australian offices' staff was 'British born'.⁶⁹ Although JWT helped introduce market research methods into Australasia, it was Bill McNair, a New Zealander who had been employed at the Wellington office, and his assistant Sylvia Ashby who were the key innovators in establishing modern market investigation practices in the region. Ashby set up the first specialist market research and polling company in Australia and McNair produced the first major survey of radio advertising in the country. Both sought to challenge American methods of market investigation such as reliance on telephone surveys, and McNair produced a major study of radio advertising which focused on the unique public-commercial system in Australia.⁷⁰

If J. Walter Thompson's expansion into Australasia was tentative and reliant on local expertise, this was even more the case in southern Africa. From 1943 onwards JWT South Africa essentially became an autonomous franchise operation led by J. Hamilton Russell, and entirely owned by a South African group which paid an annual license fee to use the JWT name.⁷¹ In discussing the company's operations with company headquarters in New York, Russell noted that the London office was their main point of liaison and they also had contacts with Australia and Argentina. Although they were an autonomous operation, the South African company saw themselves as aiding the wider (London-centred) international work of JWT, with Russell noting 'we have made financial sacrifices in order to takeover accounts which London wish us to and surrender more profitable accounts which we hold locally'.⁷²

JWT's international success was based on its adaptability to varied national cultures, rather than imposing an American model on local offices it sought to go local. JWT London of necessity became an essentially Anglo-American company and was the main point of contact for many offices in the Dominions rather than New York. In giving this role to its London office, JWT built on a tradition of American firms engaging in 'inter-imperialism', taking advantage of existing networks of communication and culture to develop their business in Empire-Commonwealth markets.⁷³

The 1930s were arguably the high-point of Britannic loyalism in commercial culture, so it is unsurprising that JWT built on existing British World links. This was a time in which publications such as *Advertisers Weekly* and the *Times Imperial and Foreign Trade Supplement* divided adverts and news on trade matters into empire and foreign sections. The latter publication was at the forefront of efforts to promote an imperial mindset in advertising.⁷⁴ The *Supplement* featured an annual British Empire Products Number, which peaked in size at 128 pages in 1926. Such was JWT London's commitment to promoting inter-imperial co-operation that it participated in the 1937 Empire Advertising Convention where delegates were encouraged to adopt the trade slogan: 'British first, Empire countries second, and foreign countries third'.⁷⁵

Marketing at the end of the British World, c.1945-60

In 1950 Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa accounted for 27 percent of Britain's exports and supplied a fifth of its imports. During the same year the UK was responsible for 60 percent of New Zealand's imports, 50 percent of Australia's, and 41 percent of South African imports.⁷⁶ However, these trade links declined significantly thereafter. The creation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947 and subsequent inflation gradually undermined imperial preference as signatories were committed to establishing no new discriminatory preferences.

Moreover, it was under conditions of scarcity and tight economic controls that the Dominions and the UK drew closer together economically. The Sterling Area, of which all of the Dominions, with the exception of Canada, were members was much more tightly controlled after 1939 that it had been beforehand. Following the end of the war bulk purchasing agreements and import quotas remained in place. However, the Sterling Area declined in influence with the erosion of import controls in the 1950s, in the second half of the decade British exports to these markets grew sluggishly.⁷⁷ Efforts to boost Commonwealth trade such as the 'trade diversion' plan promoted by Canadian Prime Minister, John Diefenbaker, in 1957-58 had little success.⁷⁸ The late 1950s and

early 1960s is often seen as a key period in the decline of British World collaboration, as the UK and the old Dominions increasingly focused on alternative regional trade relations.⁷⁹

However, while we are well served with economic and political histories of the decline of British World collaboration, they have paid little attention to the marketing and advertising industries. This is an important omission as interest in the development of British World collaboration in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries did not reflect the relatively modest share of the Dominions in UK trade. Rather it relied heavily on hopes invested in the economic future of these countries and a sense that they were culturally British nations which would supply a ready market for UK goods. Conversely, after 1945 changes in marketing practices, and more particularly the growth of multinational and segmented marketing, and surveys of consumer motivation, meant that it became increasingly difficult to imagine the British World as a cohesive, meaningful, and valuable economic network of the future. This, in part, helps explain why Britannic loyalism faded away from the rhetoric of patriotic trade campaigns in Australia, Canada, and South Africa in the 1950s.

During the inter-war years William Crawford was at heart of the Empire Marketing Board's efforts to encourage consumers to 'Buy British'. However, the Crawford agency's success was founded on a wider international outlook. By the mid-1950s Crawfords had become one of the world's largest advertising agencies, with business in thirty countries handled from its UK headquarters and associate offices active in an additional forty-three nations.⁸⁰ Crawford favoured sharp and simple slogans and branding which could be repeated worldwide. This was the case with the development of a global logo for the Dutch airline, KLM in 1950. Head copywriter Godfrey Saxon Mills explained the importance of such practices in 1953: *'*The world is growing smaller. People tend to travel more. Magazines, film and radio tends to spread ideas and tastes. A product, therefore, which is destined for world sale should have a single world 'handwriting' to its presentation; not a different and unrelated presentation in different markets, but a world front'.⁸¹ KLM was not alone in seeking to develop a marketing strategy in the 1950s and early 1960s, which would give it a common brand identity across the world. This was an era where the world economy was increasingly becoming focused on trade in manufactured goods between industrialised countries rather than the north-south exchanges which had been key to the age of high imperialism.

In his 1968 survey, *The new Europeans*, Anthony Sampson referred to the significant expansion of the international company in Europe after 1950. The development of trade blocs such as the European Economic Community (EEC) and European Free Trade Association (EFTA) had encouraged the growth of 'geocentric' companies such as IBM and Shell 'which can ignore frontiers, find managers in any country, and move them round the world, and whose headquarters could be anywhere'.⁸² While, as Sampson recognised, US companies were the main driver behind the growth of this trend, UK-based multinationals also played an important role in the growth of such practices. By the 1950s, for example, Shell, which had been keen to highlight the 'Britishness' of its product during the inter-war years, was using industrial films to project a 'stateless' identity. As Sir Arthur Elton put it in 1956, Shell films 'are not directed more towards the people, say, of Great Britain, than towards the people of the Lebanon or Brazil'. By this time Shell film units were operating in Australia, Egypt and Venezuela, as well as the UK.⁸³

The decline of tariff barriers in Europe acted as a spur to the development of marketing strategies which paid less attention to national barriers, encouraging multinational companies to focus their attention on new market opportunities available there. For example, Unilever, an Anglo-Dutch conglomerate, which did more than half of its business in western Europe, embraced a regional marketing strategy. As the company chairman George Cole noted in 1963, with the growing convergence of European consumer habits and increasing exchange across national borders there was an imperative to develop common brand names, designs, and advertising strategies and make more use of intra-European advertising media.⁸⁴ Nonetheless, while several large, well-resourced firms were keen to adopt such approaches, it is important to avoid exaggerating the influence of multinational marketing strategies at this time. As late as 1971 Robert Buzzell noted that there was significant opposition to standardising aspects of advertising plans across countries within many companies: 'the prevailing view is that marketing strategy is a local problem. The best strategy for a company will differ from country'.⁸⁵

Segmented marketing has a long history. For example, Scottish whisky firms had developed particular brands with differing characteristics aimed at the settler colonies and the United States in the nineteenth century.⁸⁶ However, the practice of targeting products at particular social groups appears to have become more common in the 1950s and early 1960s, accompanied by a significant expansion in the market research industry.⁸⁷ When the Market Research Society was founded in London in 1947 it had only 23 members, however, by 1956 there were over 250 members and associates with 13 market research companies operating in the UK.⁸⁸ At this time, companies increasingly focused on advertising to particular market segments such as teenagers and affluent young professionals, using new media with a transnational reach such as TV, rather than offering broad appeals across national markets. These trends were aided by the development of co-ordinated market research operations across western Europe, which connected British exporters with the markets of the nascent European Economic

Community. Crawfords, for example, set up Contimart, a specialist market research agency focused on studying consumers across the Common Market.⁸⁹

At the same time, interest in consumer motivation flourished aided, in part, by the expansion of self-service shopping. In the UK surveys of shoppers were conducted by Alfred Bird (1957, 1960); the British Market Research Bureau, the market research wing of JWT (1950, 1963); Mass Observation (1962); Robert Millar, commissioned by the Consumers' Association (1960); and Ralph Towsey (1962).⁹⁰ Ernest Dichter's work on the psychology behind consumer motivation was controversial during the 1950s, but influenced the marketing approaches of JWT in the UK and offered new ways of segmenting markets, not simply along lines of class, age and gender, but in terms of the personality of the consumer.⁹¹

Appeals to the consumer's patriotism were now commonly seen as having limited utility, rather the varied interests of different segments of the market needed to be studied and marketing plans drawn up to target appeals to various sub-groups.⁹² For example, the South African Federated Chamber of Industries which had supported a 1955-56 'Buy South African' campaign showed little enthusiasm when subsequent attempts were made to revive the cause. As *South African Industry and Trade* noted, organisers had been 'highly critical of the indifference of industry to the selling opportunities offered by the campaign'. Advertising agencies, they claimed, had 'sabotaged' the potential value of 'Buy South African' advertising by advising their clients against including campaign slogans in their individual advertisements. However, the Chamber of Industries had little time for such complaints: 'the real trouble lay in the fact that every advertising campaign must be part of a marketing plan, and that 'Buy South African' was never a marketing plan'. Preliminary market studies were essential to any professional advertising campaign and it was doubtful whether relaunching Buy South African was realistic or desirable: 'the individual manufacturer can make and substantiate claims only for his own product'.⁹³

Patriotic trade campaigns were revived more successfully in Australia and Canada. And yet, whereas such campaigns had been used to promote a wider sense of Britannic loyalism before the Second World War, activists promoting patriotic trade in the 1950s were almost solely concerned with aiding the position of national industry and alleviating balance-of-payments problems. The gradual dismantling of import controls gave impetus to the development of national buying campaigns, which can be viewed as part of a wider effort to reduce their dependence on trade with the UK. After all, these countries had little choice but to import large quantities of British goods during the heyday of the Sterling Area, import controls, and bulk purchasing in the 1940s and early 1950s.

The Victorian Chamber of Manufactures held the first Australian Industries Fair in Melbourne in 1955 and played a prominent role in the launching of a Buy Australian campaign in 1961, shortly before the British government announced its attention to apply for EEC membership. The campaign received support from TV stations and civic organisations such as the Housewives' Association.⁹⁴ Post-war Buy Australian rhetoric occasionally made reference to the need to develop the industrial strength of their 'British' nation. For example, readers of the *Shop Assistant of Australia* were informed in 1953 that the nation's 'greatest contribution to the British Commonwealth and her Allies is to develop strength'.⁹⁵ Yet, if the extensive records kept by the Made-in-Australia Council are typical, references to the UK trade link had all but disappeared from the rhetoric of such campaigns by the late 1950s, which now focused instead on presenting Australia as an affluent, modern consumer society.⁹⁶ Manufacturers were encouraged to use the Buy Australian Made logo to help consumers identify national products and counter the growing inflow of foreign consumer goods.⁹⁷

A similar 'Made in Canada' campaign was launched by the Canadian Manufacturers Association in 1958. Unsurprisingly, given the marginal role which trade with Britain played in the Canadian economy by this time, UK trade links were barely discussed.⁹⁸ Instead, the creation of the European Economic Community and Britain's membership of the European Free Trade Area were presented as major obstacles to trade to which Canada should respond by strengthening its industrial base and seeking out new export markets.⁹⁹ From the late 1950s onwards Australian and Canadian businesspeople and politicians began to make substantial efforts to promote economic co-operation with East Asia, this resulted, in part, from Britain's closening bonds with western Europe following the creation of the European Free Trade Area in 1957.¹⁰⁰

Conclusion

At the beginning of the twentieth century it was relatively easy for people in Britain and the settler colonies to see themselves as united by common tastes and cultures. According to leading advertisers like T.B. Browne these were not really 'foreign' markets, given they shared many characteristics with the UK. If anything, these existing bonds of sentiment were reinforced by the crisis conditions of the inter-war years, when 'Buy British' rhetoric was at the height of its influence. When J. Walter Thompson developed an international organisation at this time it built on existing local cultures and British World links rather than imposing an 'Americanised' model of marketing. While the inter-war years were a period when national buying campaigns grew in influence, advocates of such campaigns also promoted a wider sense of Britannic loyalism, although their efforts to promote the purchase and national and imperial goods were shaped by wider anxieties about national development.

After the Second World War patriotic buying was recast as an insular activity, focused on national economic development, rather than the wider concerns with promoting imperial trade. At the same time, developments within the fields of advertising and market research cast doubt on the value of using patriotism to appeal to consumers. Patriotic trade campaigns in the post-war period were usually resorted to in times of uncertainty and crisis, there were few efforts to make them a regular feature of everyday consumer life of the kind which had been common in the 1930s. Businesses were now encouraged to scientifically investigate the needs and interests of particular groups of consumers and target advertising campaigns to appeal to these different sectional interest groups. In such a world, British World trade networks established by earlier generations seemed increasingly outmoded.

Figure 1- *Catalogue of the Centenary All-Australian Exhibition* (1934), front and back cover



Figure 2- Trade campaigns promoted by the Department of Trade and Commerce targeting Canadian and British consumers respectively. (Left) 'Made in Canada campaign, *Industrial Canada* pamphlet (detail)', Department of Trade and Commerce papers (hereafter DTC), RG20, file 17417, Libraries and Archives Canada (hereafter LAC), Ottawa; (Right) 'Canada Calling Liverpool' display, n.d. [1937], DTC, RG20, vol. 204, LAC.





Figure 3. Advert highlighting the varied services provided by JWT London's Bush House office, *Daily Mail Empire Advertising Convention Souvenir*, 14 June 1937, vi.

- ² T.B. Browne, In Peaceful Africa, 43, 46.
- ³ Stead, *The Art of Advertising*, 76.
- ⁴ Tuffnell, 'Business in the Borderlands', 49-50, 53.
- ⁵ Cain, 'Colonies and Capital', 228-9.
- ⁶ Thompson, Imperial Britain, 105-06.
- ⁷ The critical literature on British World networks is now well established. For good introductions see Bright and Dilley, 'After the British World', 550-9; Buckner and Francis, *Rediscovering the British World*; Darian-Smith, Grimshaw and Macintyre, *Britishness Abroad*; Potter, 'Webs, Networks and Systems'.
- ⁸ Magee and Thompson, *Empire and Globalisation*, 185-98.
- ⁹ For the politics of 'Greater Britonism' in this period see Armitage, 'Greater Britain', 429-31; Bell, *Idea of Greater Britain*, particularly ch. 9.
- ¹⁰ Thornton, Imperial Idea and its Enemies, 51.
- ¹¹ Barnes, 'Lancashire's 'War' with Australia', 709.
- ¹² The term is used here to refer to territories of the Empire-Commonwealth which achieved selfgovernment before 1947.
- ¹³ The idea of 'Britannic' identity was initially popularised by Richard Jebb in the early twentieth century and subsequently employed in a historical context by Douglas Cole. The term is used to acknowledge that imperial loyalists in the 'old' Dominions had a composite culture shaped by institutions in their own nations as well as forms of imperial co-operation. See Jebb, *The Britannic Question*, 26; Cole, 'The Problem of "Nationalism" and "Imperialism", 162-4.
- ¹⁴ Nixon, Hard Sell; Hilton, Consumerism in Twentieth Century Britain; Crawford, But Wait, There's More; Crawford, Smart and Humphery, Consumer Australia.
- ¹⁵ Rappaport, A Thirst for Empire, 8, 12, 115, 181-2, 264, 370-409.
- ¹⁶ For an introduction to the EMB's publicity activities, see Constantine, "Bringing the Empire Alive"; Barnes, 'Bringing Another Empire Alive?'; Trentmann, *Free Trade Nation*, 228-37; Moore, 'Selling Empire'.
- ¹⁷ Barnes, New Zealand's London, 176-88; Barnes, 'Lancashire's 'War' with Australia', 717-18.

¹ T.B. Browne, Over-sea Britain, 12.

- ¹⁸ There is a brief discussion of the reception of EMB propaganda in Australia in Griffiths, *Imperial Culture in Antipodean Cities*, 159-60; For efforts by the Canadian Department of Trade and Commerce to promote patriotic trade see Hill, *Canada's Salesman to the World*, 352-7.
- ¹⁹ 'The Work of the Imperial Economic Committee', n.d. [1927], DO222/2, The National Archives (hereafter TNA), London.
- ²⁰ Hancock, Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs, II, 149.
- ²¹ Stephen Tallents, 'The Buy British campaign of 1931', Tallents papers, ICS79/14/11, Institute for Commonwealth Studies, London.
- ²² For the rise and decline of 'Buy British' campaigns in the UK see Thackeray and Toye, 'What Was a British Buy?', 135-7.
- ²³ Johnson, 'British Multinationals, Culture and Empire', 142, 167; "'Buy British" Economic Term Not

Topographical', Manchester Guardian, 25 Nov. 1931, 11; 'Buy British Goods', Shell-Mex advert,

Illustrated London News, 25 July 1925, 185; Pillars of British Trade', BP advert (1926), BP archive,

ARC187604, Modern Records Centre, Warwick.

²⁴ Trentmann, Free Trade Nation, 46-50, 344.

²⁵ Higgins and Madhorst, 'Bringing Home the "Danish" Bacon', 142-3, 153-4.

- ²⁶ 'Danish Gesture of Goodwill', *Manchester Guardian*, 4 Sep. 1932, 23; 'Britisk Udstilling Industribygningen' [British Exhibition, Copenhagen handbook] (1931), BT60/26/1, TNA.
- ²⁷ EMB publicity committee minutes, 3 Mar. 1932; See also extract from the minutes of the EMB marketing committee, 26 May 1932 in memo., 6 June 1932; Lachlan Maclean, memo., 'Buy British Campaign', n.d. [5 July 1932], all CO758/94/2, TNA.

³⁰ 'The End of "Buy British"?', Manchester Guardian, 9 Mar. 1933, 8.

³¹ Ibid.

- ³² For a more detailed discussion of the progress of the shopping weeks see Thackeray, 'Buying for Britain, China, or India?', 399-405.
- ³³ In addition, to the campaigns discussed here, the New Zealand Manufacturers' Association organised their own Buy New Zealand Made weeks and fairs. See for example 'New Zealand Made Week in Dunedin', *New Zealand National Review*, 15 (June 1931), 29.

²⁸ Rooth, British Protectionism and the International Economy, chs. 4-5.

²⁹ Ibid., 101-25, 146-56.

- ³⁴ McKenzie, Redefining the Bonds of Commonwealth, 20-6.
- ³⁵ Drummond, British Economic Policy and the Empire, 96-114.
- ³⁶ Victorian Council, Federal Executive Minutes, 12 Apr. 1929 and 26 May 1930, Australian British Trade Association (hereafter ABTA) Papers, 2/3/5, Melbourne University Special Collections (hereafter MUSC).
- ³⁷ The Argus (Melbourne), 3 Nov. 1934, p. 25.
- ³⁸ Victorian Chamber of Manufactures, One Hundred Years of Progress, 7.
- ³⁹ Souvenir of the Centenary All-Australian Exhibition, 17, 19.
- ⁴⁰ Victorian Chamber of Manufactures, Australian Protection. 9-12, 19-31.
- ⁴¹ Empire Shopping Week Council Minutes, 24 May 1939, ABTA Papers, 2/5, MUSC.
- ⁴² West Australian (Perth), 14 Apr. 1934, 18, 23 May 1939, 3; Hastings Reid, 'Empire Shopping Week
 1939. Report by the Honorary Organiser', 31 May 1939, Returned Soldiers' League papers, MS6609
 288C, National Library of Australia, Canberra.
- ⁴³ West Australian (Perth), 20 May 1935, 8; 25 May 1936, 5; 23 May 1939, 3.
- ⁴⁴ Daily News (Perth), 21 May 1934, 9; H.C. Reid, 'Objects of the Campaign. Helping Australia and the Empire', West Australian (Perth), 23 May 1939, 4.
- ⁴⁵ For the problems which the campaign experienced see *British Trade in South Africa*, June 1932, 5; July 1932, 6; Dec. 1933, 9-10.
- ⁴⁶ For the initial reluctance of prominent figures within the United Party to support the exhibition see Robinson, 'Johannesburg's Empire Exhibition', 766-7.
- ⁴⁷ Robinson, 'Johannesburg's Empire Exhibition', 766-8, 782-4; See also Hughes, 'Contesting Whiteness', 164-9, 177.
- ⁴⁸ 'Empire Shopping Week in Canada' (1929), BT90/25/7, TNA.
- ⁴⁹ Industrial Canada, May 1936, 55, 59; Feb. 1937, 34.
- ⁵⁰ Canada Calling Britain Buick advert (1937), DTC, RG20, vol. 204, LAC.
- ⁵¹ Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism: Crisis and Deconstruction, 112-37.
- ⁵² For a detailed analysis of the trade agreements see Drummond and Hillmer, *Negotiating Freer Trade*.
- ⁵³ Hancock, Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs, II, 306-11.
- ⁵⁴ Rappaport, A Thirst for Empire, 264-8.
- ⁵⁵ Wilson, Empire Trade, xiv.

- ⁵⁶ See for instance A.F. Harrison, 'Home and Empire Marketing: Sales Problems Which Call For Specialised Knowledge', *Daily Mail Empire Advertising Convention Souvenir*, 14 June 1937, x; 'Can a City Be English When 60.8% are French' (Montreal), *Advertiser's Weekly*, 11 Feb. 1937, ii.
- ⁵⁷ Clement H. Watson, 'Markets Are People- Not Places. A Few Thoughts On Export', J. Walter Thompson News Bulletin, no. 135, July 1928, 3-4.
- ⁵⁸ French, Twentieth Century Advertising, 226.
- ⁵⁹ Crawford, But Wait, There's More, 11.
- ⁶⁰ Ilott, Creating Customers, 20-40.
- ⁶¹ For the debate on US influences on European consumer societies see for example Trentmann, 'Long History of Contemporary Consumer Society'; Swett, Wiesen and Zatlin, *Selling Modernity*; Fasce and Bini, 'Irresistible Empire or Innocents Abroad?'; De Grazia, *Irresistible Empire*, 4-5, 228-43.
- ⁶² West, 'From T-Square to T-Plan', 200-1; Clement Watson, 'Memorandum to Mr. Kinney. re. Foreign Department', 21 May 1928, James Webb Young Papers, International Branch Notebooks, Box 1, J. Walter Thompson Archive (hereafter JWT), Hartman Center for Advertising (hereafter HAC), Duke University, Durham, NC.
- ⁶³ Davis, 'Negotiating Local and Global Knowledge', 87-9.
- ⁶⁴ Watson, 'Memorandum to Mr. Kinney', 21 May 1928, James Webb Young papers, International Branch Notebooks, box 1, JWT, HAC.
- ⁶⁵ Memo. J.W. Young, 14 May 1928, James Webb Young Papers, International Branch Notebooks, Box 1, JWT, HAC.
- ⁶⁶ In 1929 Campbell-Eward became the first US agency to open an office in Australia, Crawford, But Wait, There's More, 61.
- ⁶⁷ William McNair, Memo., 'The Establishment of J. Walter Thompson's Offices in Australia and New Zealand' (1963); E.L. Jarvis, Memo., 'Early History of JWT in Australia'; Sidney Bernstein Interview with Tom Carruthers, Nov. 1963, all Sidney Ralph Bernstein Papers, Company History Files, Box 5, JWT, HAC.
- ⁶⁸ For example, JWT made use of national cultural stereotypes in Argentina. See Salvatore, 'Yankee Advertising in Buenos Aires'.
- ⁶⁹ Newspaper News (Sydney), Apr. 1931, 3, reproduced in Crawford, "Differences....in Dealing With the Australian Public', 328.

- ⁷⁰ McNair, Radio Advertising in Australia, iii, 248.
- ⁷¹ 'Memorandum Regarding Discussions Between Messrs. Meek, Foote and Russell', 29 Aug. 1946, Edward G. Wilson papers, box 15, JWT, HAC.
- ⁷² Russell to Sam Meek, 8 Aug. 1947, Edward G. Wilson papers, box 15, JWT, HAC.
- ⁷³ For American 'inter-imperialism' see Tuffnell, 'Anglo-American Inter-imperialism' and 'Business in the Borderlands'.
- ⁷⁴ Began publication in 1916 as the *Times Imperial and Foreign Trade Supplement*, title changed to *Times Trade and Engineering Supplement* in 1934.
- ⁷⁵ Speech by Viscount Bledisloe, *Daily Mail*, 16 June 1937, 5.
- ⁷⁶ Hopkins, 'Rethinking Decolonization', 224; In 1948 New Zealand alone supplied one-third of Britain's meat imports and over half its dairy imports. Australia and Canada supplied 98 percent of UK wheat imports at this time, Belich, *Replenishing the Earth*, 472.
- ⁷⁷ Rollings, British Business in the Formative Years, 22-3.
- ⁷⁸ Rooth, 'Diefenbaker's Trade Diversion Proposals, 1957-58', 117-19, 122.
- ⁷⁹ Ward, *Australia and the British Embrace*, 4, 24-7, 70-98, 236-55; Meaney, "In History's Page", 364, 383; Hopkins, 'Rethinking Decolonization', 228-33, 238; Igartua, *The Other Quiet Revolution*; Buckner, 'Introduction', *Canada and the End of Empire*, 1-14.
- ⁸⁰ W.S. Crawford Ltd., *Crawfords: The Complete Advertising Agency*, n.d. [c.1955], insert between 55-6,
 W.S. Crawford MSS, WSC1/1a-b, History of Advertising Trust, Raveningham.
- ⁸¹ Saxon Mills, *There Is A Tide*, 88.
- 82 Sampson, The New Europeans, 84, 86.
- ⁸³ Elton, How We Use Films in Shell, 1-2, 8.
- ⁸⁴ Unilever Limited, Unilever in a Changing Europe, 14.
- ⁸⁵ Buzzell, 'Can You Standardize Multinational Marketing?', 93, 97, 100.
- ⁸⁶ Morgan and Moss, 'Marketing of Scotch Whisky', 119, 124-6.
- ⁸⁷ For the growth of segmented marketing practice in the UK see Lunn, 'Segmenting and Constructing Markets'; for Australia see Crawford, *But Wait, There's More*, 134.
- ⁸⁸ Schwarzkopf, 'Managing the Unmanageable', 163-4; By 1956 around £3 million was being spent on market research sample surveys in the UK each year, with over 1,500 people employed in this field. British Market Research Bureau, *Readings in Market Research*, xxiii-xxv.

- ⁸⁹ Crawfords International, *How To Break Into World Markets*, 38-40; In addition to Contimart, Nielsen, JWT and the Attwood Statistics Group were providing market research services to most of the Common Market countries in 1961. Gallup, INRA and A.E.S. had market research operations across western Europe, 'Understanding and utilising market research in western Europe', Aug. 1961, Samuel Meek papers, International Office series, JWT, HAC.
- ⁹⁰ Black and Spain, 'How Self-service Happened', 163.
- ⁹¹ Sean Nixon, 'Mrs Housewife and the Ad Man', 197-9.
- ⁹² For a discussion of this point in relation to South Africa see Radel, Market Research Practice in South Africa.
- 93 'Beware- Buy South African', South African Industry and Trade, Jan. 1961, 19.
- ⁹⁴ Victoria Chamber of Manufactures, *Industry Today*, May 1961, 91; for the Buy Australian campaign see also 'Operation Boomerang', supplement to *Industry Today*, July 1961; Minute books of the Made-in-Australia Council, 1950-66, Australian Chamber of Manufactures (hereafter ACM) papers, 1/4/4/4-5, MUSC.
- ⁹⁵ 'Buy and sell Australian-made goods', *Shop Assistant of Australia*, 20 Aug. 1953, 1. See also '''Made in Aust.'' Council aims at better living', *Bendigo Advertiser*, 10 Aug. 1953, both in Minute books of the Made-in-Australia Council, 1950-66, ACM, MUSC.
- ⁹⁶ See for example 'Australian Industries Fair: an Argus souvenir', *Argus* (Melbourne), 21 Apr. 1955, 2232 and the various newspaper cuttings in Minute books of the Made-in-Australia Council, 1950-66, ACM, MUSC.
- 97 "Is it nothing to you...?", Industry Today, Oct. 1961, 379, 381.
- ⁹⁸ Canadian Manufacturers Association Buy Canadian campaign material (1960-61), DTC, MG28 I 230, vol. 97, LAC.
- ⁹⁹ R.D.L. Kinsman, 'Some important aspects of Canada's international trade' (1960), DTC, MG28 I 230, vol. 97, LAC.
- ¹⁰⁰ Singleton and Robertson, *Economic Relations between Britain and Australasia*, ch. 6; William Thomas, 'Canada's trade at the crossroads', *Canada's Business*, Nov. 1961, 30.

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