Interventions by the Roman Republic in Illyria 230 – 167 BC


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Abstract

This thesis aims to determine how and why Rome undertook a series of interventions in Illyria during the period of 230 – 167 BC. The thesis is based on a detailed examination and consideration of the ancient written sources and the subsequent historiography on the subject. The Roman interventions in Illyria during this period have traditionally been treated as a component of wider studies of Roman expansion, although Rome’s involvement in Illyria has recently been examined by Dzino in his 2010 work Illyricum in Roman Politics 229BC-AD68. This work examined the development and integration of Illyricum in Roman political discourse, in which the Roman interventions were a smaller component in the broader study. A study of the Roman interventions in Illyria during the period of 230 – 167 BC has never previously been treated on this scale, nor effectively with a synthesis of the various approaches and pieces of evidence that are now available. Over the past decade, marine archaeology has been conducted in the Adriatic and the initial reports have recently been published which provide greater contextual insight on the geopolitical situation in Illyria. Additional new approaches to the subject from the faculty of international relations have emerged, although these have proven as problematic as they have been insightful.

This thesis shall examine the new evidence and assess the latest approaches to provide the necessary context for considering the Roman interventions in Illyria. This context shall be initially considered to enable the thesis to progress to consider and analyse each Roman intervention in turn. By effectively grounding the thesis in the geopolitical context, the disparate nature of the communities that made up Illyria can be better understood. This thesis will use the material evidence available in conjunction with the written accounts of ancient historians to consider the implications of the Roman interventions and the underlying motivations for Rome in securing the Adriatic and developing their involvement in Illyria and the Greek East beyond.
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Chapter 1 – Introduction

The rise of Rome during the middle Republic, through a series of interventions, has been a particular area of interest to modern and ancient scholars alike. The ancient historian Polybius, contemporary to some of the events in question, stressed in the preface to his Histories, that Rome’s emergence as hegemon over the Mediterranean was an event without precedent and one of substantial magnitude and importance.\(^1\) The Roman interventions in Illyria are an important component in explaining Rome’s rise to pre-eminence in Polybius’ work. Polybius outlined this importance upon introducing the Illyrians into the Histories:

\[\text{‘\text{άπερ οὐ παρέγος, ἀλλὰ μετ’ ἐπιστάσεως θεωρητέον τὸις βουλομένοις ὀληθινῶς τὴν τε πρόθεαν τὴν ἡμετέραν συνθήκασαθαι καὶ τὴν αὐξήσαν καὶ κατασκευήν τῆς Ῥωμαίων δυναστείας’}\(^2\)

This thesis aims to determine how and why these interventions took place, specifically focusing on the First, Second and Third Illyrian Wars. This covers the period of 230 – 167 BC, beginning with the initial Roman intervention east of the Adriatic and culminating with the dissolution of the Illyrian kingdom with Rome’s victory in the Third Illyrian War. An intervention, as it will be considered in this thesis, can be simply defined as the interference of one entity in the affairs of another. The Romans intervened in this way by both military and diplomatic means. One the one hand, the Romans invaded territory with their armed forces and engaged in warfare, whilst on the other, the Romans negotiated with other entities and forged friendships and alliances. The three Roman interventions sparked otherwise limited Roman interest and involvement in Illyria during this period. The thesis shall employ a chronological structure to consider each of the three Illyrian Wars in turn, and utilise the evidence provided by ancient historical texts in conjunction with material evidence to aid in placing the written historical texts in context. This structure will enable the thesis to focus on the specific events, enabling a closer critique of the historical accounts for each intervention and facilitating the development of the wider implications, developments and underlying themes to emerge.

Defining Illyria is a difficult task; a consistent and agreed upon definition of the area being absent from antiquity. Throughout antiquity the terms ‘Illyria’ and ‘Illyrians’ have often been used as broad generalisations and sometimes in reference to more clearly defined ideas.

\(^1\)Polybius, Histories 1. 1.
\(^2\)Polybius, Histories 2. 2. “The history of this expedition must not be treated as unimportant; but must be carefully studied by those who wish to clearly understand the history that I have determined to narrate, and to trace the progress and consolidation of the Roman Empire” (self-translated).
The *provincia* of Illyricum was a Roman creation and distinguished for the first time the Roman parameters of what definitively could be classified as Illyria. The *provincia* of Illyricum was not however established until the 1st Century BC, after the period being considered in this thesis. The origins of the term derive from the Greek terms *Illyris* and *Illyrioi*, which refer to Greece’s North-Western non-Greek neighbours and to a group of peoples inhabiting the region who they believed shared common ancestry, culture and language. Wilkes goes further by asserting that the latter term may have originally referred specifically to one southern Illyrian Bronze Age tribe whom Greeks had first encountered and subsequently applied the term generically to people with similar language and customs. Pliny the Elder writing in the First Century AD referred to a narrowly defined group of ’Illyrians as properly called’ and it is possibly to this tribal group to whom he is referring. Consequently, ‘Illyria’ and the ‘Illyrians’ who inhabited the region, are ill defined in written sources, especially during the period being considered in this thesis. Dzino has however noted that the region is divided into three eco-geographical zones on account of its physical geography, those being the Dalmatian coast with its islands and immediate hinterland, the mountain belt of the Dinaric Alps and the Pannonian plains. The narrow Adriatic coastal belt together with the Italian coast represents a distinctive geographical unit. This forms a useful basis for defining the parameters of Illyria to be considered in this thesis. Illyria shall be considered in this thesis as an area occupying the eastern Adriatic coast and immediate hinterland. The reasons for this are borne out of the source material and the historical contacts between Rome and Illyria. Rome during the period being considered in this thesis, undertook military and diplomatic interventions with entities on the eastern Adriatic coast, the islands off that coast, and the immediate hinterland; progression into the Illyrian interior did not occur until later periods of Roman history. Dzino assigns to the early period of his study the title, the ‘Adriatic phase’ and notes the importance of the Adriatic coast and immediate hinterland to the period down to 167 BC in Roman interaction with the region. Therefore, Illyria in the thesis shall be considered the area of the eastern Adriatic coast and the immediate hinterland.

Studies of the Roman interventions in Illyria have featured as smaller components of larger works or have focused on specific phenomena such as Illyrian piracy or the development

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3Dzino, *Illyricum in Roman Politics*, p. 3.
5Pliny, *Natural History* 3. 144.
6Dzino, *Illyricum in Roman Politics*, p. 31.
7Dzino, *Illyricum in Roman Politics*, pp. 3-5.
of an eastern Adriatic provincia. This has held especially true for the historiography on subjects relating to Roman expansion and imperialism. Roman interventions in Illyria in these sources often serve as a component of Roman expansion into the wider Greek world or are placed in the context of mid-Republican Roman expansion. The essential focus on the Roman interventions in Illyria in this thesis will offer a different sort of approach. An analysis of the ancient historical texts is, naturally, not the function of archaeological research; inference drawn is subsequently based on archaeological research methodology rather than the methodology of ancient historical research. Royal, in his publication of the archaeological findings from the Illyrian Coastal Exploration Program, provides a solitary reference to Polybius and Appian each and no reference to Livy, Cassius Dio or Diodorus Siculus. This has raised the need for a greater synthesis in research between the written ancient historical sources and the archaeological data. Royal indeed notes in his report that ‘although piracy is frequently cited as a factor in the region’s historic economy, it is important to contextualize it with archaeological evidence, including shipwreck sites and the frequency of amphora types present at all sites’. On certain contextual issues that are being examined during this thesis, the archaeological data can prove informative in grounding the ancient historical texts.

Recent developments in Adriatic archaeology have enabled better inferences to be drawn, based on some of these contextual issues. This is particularly apparent regarding Adriatic trade. Marine archaeology has been an important development in studies of the Illyrian coast in the past decade; the archaeological report for the initial findings of the Illyrian Coastal Exploration Program (2007-2009) has recently been published. The area that the programme investigated was previously not well examined, Royal indeed noting in the abstract that the areas for which data had been gathered from the Albanian and Montenegrin coasts were ‘previously undiscovered’. Research of this nature is nevertheless still in its infancy and other

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11Ibid. pp. 440-1.

12Ibid.

13Ibid. p. 405.
areas of the coast are currently being investigated. Although the material published so far is limited, it nevertheless presents data from which some inferences can be drawn. This has been furthered by the greater collation of amphorae data that has been published. The work of Miše, in particular, in cataloguing data for Gnathia ware in the Adriatic has enabled more patterns and correlations to be observed from the published sites. Miše has noted that ‘current knowledge of Gnathia ware has reached a stage where we can speak of the entire production process, which covers all aspects: from moulding and decorative techniques, to firing and distribution, from identification of the different workshops to an understanding of the function of the vessels in different archaeological contexts.’ These developments in material evidence in the last decade have enhanced the interpretations that can be drawn, beyond simple speculation. Further limitations must be noted, however, for material evidence of this type. Dzino has noted that ‘archaeology does not provide a complete picture as it focuses only on artefacts which are preserved, while a range of perishable artefacts, such as, for example, textile, leather, or wood, rarely survive.’ In the case of amphorae, this limitation is particularly significant when there is a lack of correlation between the perishable contents and the surviving vessels. Although some speculation can be made on the likely contents of an amphora based on the typical function of the vessel, a gap in the evidence is nevertheless present. This thesis shall not utilise this material evidence to explain the existence of phenomena such as piracy; the ancient historical textual sources are the sole means to do this. The material evidence shall instead be utilised to provide a greater context for the written sources.

Although these important developments have added to the source material available, the key source material for the examination of the Roman interventions in Illyria remains the ancient historical texts. As mentioned earlier, the main source for the Roman interventions is Polybius’ Histories. Polybius, as a near contemporary of the events in question and an author politically connected to important events and figures throughout his Histories, provides a valuable insight into the period being considered in the thesis. Polybius however drew on important earlier Roman and Greek annalists for some of his source material; these sources tend to present Greece, and especially Rome, in an overly positive and apologetic light. These

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14 An example of this can be found in the Adrias Project being led by the University of Zadar, which is excavating areas of the Croatian coast (areas not significantly examined during the Illyrian Coastal Exploration Project. The Adrias Project currently has ongoing fieldwork and archaeological reports in progress and due for publication. For more details, see http://www.adriasproject.org/en/project/ (Last Accessed 26/8/2018).
15 M. Miše, Gnathia and Related Hellenistic Ware on the East Adriatic Coast (Oxford, 2015), p. iii.
17 For a detailed outline on Polybius’ life, see D. W. Baranowski, Polybius and Roman Imperialism (Bristol, 2011), pp. 1-3.
sources, Walbank asserts, ‘are no longer identifiable’ and have been ‘woven into a close and homogeneous fabric in which the separate threads are now indistinguishable.' It is important to critique the version of events that Polybius provides in his accounts and to consider the origins of the annalistic traditions. The accounts of Polybius, moreover, were influential for later authors. Within the ensuing century after his death, Polybius was highly regarded in Rome; Cicero asserted that Polybius was ‘a particularly fine author’, while Livy described Polybius as ‘an author who is reliable for all aspects of Roman history, especially for events that occurred in Greece’. Later authors, such as Livy, often relied on Polybius for certain sections of their historical accounts. This has raised issues in cases where discrepancies exist between Polybius and the accounts of later historians.

In constructing his *Histories*, Polybius had a wide array of personal experiences to draw upon due to him being contemporary to many events of the period and connected to some of the important figures featured in the accounts. Polybius and his family were prominent members of the Achaean League, with Polybius serving as ἵππαρχος (cavalry commander) of the Achaean League in 170/69 BC. The role of Polybius in the Achaean League features in his accounts, including his participation in an Achaean war council, a shortened version of a long speech delivered by himself and a meeting conducted with a Roman consul. Polybius here provides a fascinating insight into these events, drawing from his own involvement. Polybius’ version of these events may however overstate matters or be coloured by the author to present himself in the most admirable light. Polybius indeed asserts that his speech won over the assembly in attendance and was important in changing Achaean attitudes towards Eumenes II of Pergamum. Champion however asserts that the ‘ambiguity in these passages is suggestive of the tensions that must have arisen concerning Polybius’ own cautiously ambivalent policies towards Rome in 170-168 BC’. Polybius may subsequently have been reflecting the diverse moods of the Achaeans towards the Romans during the period of tension in the prelude to the Third Macedonian War. Whether or not the speech and reaction to it are a true reflection of Polybius’ thoughts or those of the wider Achaean council is unknown. The ambivalence of feelings alluded to by Champion in any event, led, in any event to Polybius and other Achaeans being taken hostage by Rome. The subject matter in these passages was subsequently

19 Cicero, *De Officiis* 3. 113.; Livy, *ab urbe condita* 33. 10.
politically sensitive and although Polybius could draw on his own personal experience, there would have been a strong need for the author to present events in a manner that would not attract controversy.

Speeches in Polybius’ work moreover, present further complications for studying the text. Recorded speeches in ancient historical texts are notorious for being fraught with issues of reliability and accuracy.\(^\text{23}\) Polybius, nevertheless, saw value to their inclusion in his work. For Polybius, these speeches were a tangible means of explaining the reasons for events happening or ideas changing and developing. As Walbank notes, ‘policy can only spring from discussion: consequently, speech is at the roots of political life’.\(^\text{24}\) Longley has also noted that Polybius, like Thucydides before him, saw value in recording speeches, Polybius indeed stressing in Book II, the importance of the pursuit of the truth through these speeches in the methodology of history.\(^\text{25}\) Whether or not the actual words in these recorded speeches are accurate, or even a rough reflection of what had been said, is impossible to determine. Addressing these issues in Polybius is most fruitfully done on a case-by-case basis as the speeches serve to draw attention in his work to important moments and developments thereafter in the course of his Histories. Polybius utilised speeches for his accounts of Roman affairs in the eastern Adriatic, the most prominent example for Rome’s interventions in Illyria coming from an interview conducted between a Roman ambassador and Queen Teuta in the prelude to the First Illyrian War.\(^\text{26}\) The speech marks an important moment in Polybius’ Histories, serving as an important pretext for the first Roman crossing of the Adriatic. Walbank however describes the speech of the Roman ambassador as a likely post eventum, to further the Roman justification for their intervention as a result of the perceived outrage over Illyrian actions.\(^\text{27}\) De Souza, moreover, asserts that Polybius’ account of the interview is more moralistic and rhetorical than the alternative account of Appian and notes the ‘symbolic importance’ of the scene depicted in Polybius for his wider work.\(^\text{28}\) The interview itself highlights the problems of the use of speeches in Polybius’ work, especially in this instance, as Polybius is the only source that records this interview taking place at all. Thus, although the speeches in Polybius’

\(^{23}\)For more details on the historicity of recorded speeches, see A. Mehl, Roman Historiography (Stuttgart, 2001), especially pp. 21-2.
\(^{24}\)F. W. Walbank, Polybius (London, 1972), p. 44.
\(^{26}\)Polybius, Histories 2. 8. This interview will be closely examined later in the thesis.
\(^{27}\)Walbank, A Historical Commentary on Polybius: Volume I, pp. 158-60.
\(^{28}\)P. De Souza, Piracy in the Graeco-Roman World (Cambridge, 1999), p. 79. Appian, Illyrian Wars 3. 2. 7. De Souza on account of the deficiencies in Polybius’ account, prefers the Appian version in this instance.
Histories may be an accurate reflection of what was said, the veracity of the speeches cannot be determined for certain. The speeches in Polybius’ Histories that serve as important milestones for the development of key themes in the work are more likely than others to be reconstructed in a way that promotes the symbolic importance of the speeches that Polybius has chosen to include.

Much of Polybius’ later life in Rome was spent in the company of the Cornelii Scipiones, a pre-eminent family of Republican Rome, and he served as a mentor to Scipio Aemilianus, accompanying him on the Carthaginian campaign in 149-146 BC. This further presents complications over the effects of the relationships built by Polybius in Rome, on the accounts in his Histories. Luce asserts that ‘Polybius had the opportunity to become acquainted with the nature of Roman politics and warfare first-hand and at the highest level’, enjoying ‘considerable freedom and action of movement’ in the process, despite being an internee.29 This would have given Polybius ample experience in judging the mechanics of the Roman system at first-hand and an unusual freedom for a internee to pursue his historical writing. Polybius, it must be stressed, was renowned for his work and the prodigious talent that he had shown in his accounts and Achaean politics; it is likely that he would have kept an open and inquisitive mind to the situations around him. Polybius, during his time in Rome, forged several high-profile friendships in Rome amongst other Romans and resident Greeks.30 Although Momigliano has highlighted the importance of the Scipionic circle, he has also stressed that the political life Polybius found at Rome was not too dissimilar to that which he had experienced in Greece.31 This would suggest that although Polybius’ most important connection was developed with Scipio Aemilianus and those close to him, he also developed a wider variety of connections. The important connection with Scipio is alluded to in the Histories as Polybius describes his close association with Scipio Aemilianus as being like that of father and son.32 The importance of this association on the accounts for the period being considered in this thesis is however harder to determine. As McGing has noted, it is unclear exactly when the particular sections of the Histories were written, although he notes that Carthage was continually described in existence in the work until Book 15 and therefore it is

32Polybius, Histories 31. 25. 1.
likely that accounts up until Book 15 were likely written before 146 BC. Carthage’s eventual subjugation however was much after this, in 146 BC and so it is extremely difficult to determine the exact timing of the writing of the various accounts in the Histories. For his accounts of the first half of the 2nd Century BC however, Polybius does discuss wider familial relations to Scipio, and occasionally criticises their actions. Polybius, for example, criticises Scipio’s own father-in-law, Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus on multiple occasions for his incompetence and deceit. Although Polybius’ friendship with Scipio was strong therefore, he was not averse to criticising those close to him. The personal relationship between Scipio and Polybius would also develop after the period being considered in this thesis, and as such, the significance of the connection on Polybius’ veracity is less evident for this period.

Polybius’ treatment of annalistic traditions in his Histories is also of particular importance, relying on it for some sections of his accounts, but effectively critiquing it in other parts. The evidence that Polybius had to draw on for his Histories was varied, deriving from a number of sources, including historical works now lost, official archives and eyewitness testimony. Polybius was especially cautious for an historian of his time in using these sources, conscientiously critiquing the material where he deemed it necessary in his work. Early in the Histories, Polybius is critical of Fabius Pictor and Philinus for their pro-Roman and pro-Carthaginian biases respectively, and critical of Phylarchus in opposition to Aratus, for his indiscriminate history and random statements on Greek affairs. Considering these passages with his aforementioned criticism of Timaeus, it is clear that Polybius did not take his sources at face value, but rather critically engaged with the sources that he utilised for various sections. Eckstein indeed stresses that ‘Polybius was no mere copyist – and he was aware of Fabius’ biases as he was the biases of Philinus’. Although aware of the biases contained in these accounts, Polybius was also aware of the deficiencies that he had for evidence of events prior to 220 BC. Polybius’ main body of the Histories subsequently started at this date; Polybius noting that from this date onwards, the evidence would allow him to make sound judgments and clear statements. His reliance on the annalistic traditions for earlier sections in his work can most significantly be seen in the context of this thesis, in his treatment of the First Illyrian

33B. C. McGing, Polybius’ Histories (Oxford, 2010), p. 148. The preceding books cover Roman interventions in Illyria down to 203 BC.
34Polybius, Histories 31. 6., 32. 4.
35For more details on the range of Polybius’ sources, see Walbank, A Historical Commentary on Polybius: Volume I, pp. 26-35.
36Fabius Pictor and Philinus; Polybius, Histories 1. 14-5. Phylarchus contra Aratus, Polybius, Histories 2. 56.
37Eckstein, Moral Vision in the Histories of Polybius, p. 64.
38Polybius, Histories 4. 2.
War. Walbank notes that several sections of Polybius’ account of the war ‘represent a Roman tradition, which may well be Fabius’. Bearing in mind Polybius’ critique of Fabius for his partisanship towards Rome, it is not surprising that the accounts in Polybius present Rome in a particularly positive light, defiantly standing up for the victims of Illyrian piracy. This has made the Polybian version of this conflict particularly problematic for historians to interpret. Although reliant on annalistic traditions for the period preceding 220 BC, Polybius’ critiquing of his source material in later passages is invaluable to later historians and has added to the reliability of his work on these sections.

Throughout his accounts of the Illyrian Wars, Polybius is not positive in his portrayal of the Illyrians, particularly pouring scorn on the actions of their leaders. Agron is presented as an indulger and a drunkard, his wife Teuta misogynistically as rash and impetuous, Demetrius of Pharos as careless, rash and churlish, and Genthius as brutal, intemperate and cruel. These leaders do not exhibit traditional Graeco-Roman qualities of leadership and appear as irrational figures in the accounts. By contrasting the virtues of the Romans in comparison, Polybius is able to effectively juxtapose the different sorts of leaders in his work. Champion has noted that in these sections, ‘Roman enemies exhibit impulsive behaviour, greed and treachery – qualities we have found to be constituent elements of Polybius’ barbarians’. These actions should also be placed in the context of wider Roman imperialism; acting in defiance of the stronger power of Rome is presented as imprudent action in Polybius’ work. Baranowski asserts that ‘throughout the Histories, Polybius takes the view that weaker states should cooperate prudently with Rome and avoid military conflict against the superior power’. As mentioned earlier, the issue of cooperation with Rome was an important consideration for Polybius when a member of the Achaean League. The lack of heed paid by the Illyrians in Polybius’ accounts to Roman status and power is probably set against Polybius’ own experiences in Greece. Champion has also remarked that with Agron, Teuta and Demetrius of Pharos, Polybius may employ the individual in order to underscore the characteristics of the ethnic-cultural group.

This is more difficult to ascertain due to Polybius’ concentration in his accounts of the prominent figures involved. The passing comment of Polybius at the end of the First Illyrian War, calling the Illyrians ‘the enemy of all mankind’ (or at least the enemy of Greeks and

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40 Agron Polybus, Histories 2. 4; Teuta Polybius, Histories 2. 8.; Demetrius Polybius Histories 3.16-9; Genthius Histories 29. 13.
42 Baranowski, Polybius and Roman Imperialism, p. 124.
43 Champion, Cultural Politics in Polybius’ Histories, p. 104.
Romans alike) is perhaps indicative of Polybius extending the associated behaviour to apply to the Illyrians more generally.\footnote{Polybius, \textit{Histories} 2. 12.} Polybius’ subsequent pejorative treatment of the Illyrians is evident from the use of language and strong tone; these passages will consequently be closely critiqued throughout the thesis.

Polybius’ work had important themes that underpinned his \textit{Histories} and shaped the way the author considered Roman imperial expansion. Polybius, from the outset of his work, stressed the importance of the period being covered in his \textit{Histories} for producing an ‘interconnectedness’ between the affairs of Italy, Greece and North Africa.\footnote{Polybius, \textit{Histories} 1. 4.} This underlying theme can be seen to affect his interpretation of events as Polybius sought to add particular emphasis to specific events as turning points and milestones in his work. Eckstein notes that in the context of the important event of the ‘Pact between the kings’ in 203/2 BC in Polybius’ \textit{Histories}, the author ‘liked to emphasise the power of large underlying factors and large historical patterns, as opposed to contingent events’.\footnote{A. M. Eckstein, ‘The Pact Between the Kings, Polybius 15.20.6 and Polybius’ View of the Outbreak of the Second Macedonian War’, \textit{Classical Philology} Vol. 100 No. 3 (2005), p. 241.} An earlier example is sometimes cited in the First Illyrian War, although Walbank has stressed that the events of the First Illyrian War served as an anticipation of the ‘interconnectedness’ rather than the emergence of the phenomenon; an \textit{ἐπιπλοκή} rather than a \textit{συμπλοκή}.\footnote{F. W. Walbank, ‘\textit{Symploke}: Its role in Polybius’ \textit{Histories}’ (1975) in D. Kagan (ed.), \textit{Studies in the Greek Historians} (Cambridge, 2010), p. 198.} Nevertheless, the importance of the event appears to have been magnified by Polybius as it relates to his wider underlying theme. In relation to this, Polybius set his work out into separate theatres around individual years in an Olympiad. This has facilitated the dating of key events and their interpretation. De Sanctis has, for example, noted that the norm was for foreign embassies to be heard in Rome at the beginning of the new consular year.\footnote{G. De Sanctis, \textit{Storia dei Romani Volume IV: I} (Turin, 1923), p. 387.} This has made the dating of diplomatic events such as these, and military events easier to determine due to the set times of the year that these took place. Walbank asserts that ‘it generally suited the account of diplomatic exchanges; but it also suited the description of military campaigning (…) the war decision usually followed the entry of the new consuls into office’.\footnote{Walbank, ‘\textit{Symploke}: Its role in Polybius’ \textit{Histories}’, p. 210.} This has made it easier to date the significant events in considering military and diplomatic interventions in Polybius’ \textit{Histories}. Although the structure of his work has facilitated a study of Roman interventions, the selective highlighting
of events by Polybius may be less reflective of their overall significance, and more their ability to best fit the underlying themes of his work.

The later accounts provided by Appian as part of his monograph on the Illyrian Wars, provide additional coverage of events. Polybius’ accounts were available to Appian and served as important source material, although disagreement has emerged amongst modern scholars over the manner in which Appian utilised Polybius’ accounts. Schwartz suggested in the late 19th Century that Appian used an intermediary source for the accounts of Polybius, potentially through a Roman annalist writing after Livy. Conversely, Schulten, writing in the early 20th Century, suggested that Appian used Polybius directly, closely using Polybius’ accounts of important battles and diplomatic events. Identifying any potential intermediary source remains speculative. This has been compounded by the fact that the potential full range of sources available to Appian cannot be determined. The Roman interventions in Illyria were events more distant to Appian than many of his other accounts, including those on the Roman Civil War and it remains likely that Polybius’ work was an important authority on these events for Appian. Rich has more recently noted that Schwartz’s view that Appian was a ‘mere compiler’ has been refuted by recent research. The careful comparison between passages used by Brodersen for the Syrian War, has highlighted the importance of comparing particular sections of Appian and Polybius for events. As Appian’s accounts of the Roman interventions are structured in a monograph rather than Polybius’ broader, chronological history, it is important to closely analyse the passages side-by-side to comprehend and consider any divergences between the accounts. This is particularly important when considering the period being considered in this thesis. Nissen in the mid-19th Century highlighted the limitations and problems with Appian’s accounts for the period of 200 – 167 BC, questioning the critical handling of his source material. The passages on the Roman interventions provided by Polybius and Appian will thus be carefully critiqued throughout the thesis in addressing the interventions in turn.

As with Polybius, Appian utilised the Roman interventions in Illyria for particular purposes in his work. Goldmann has provided a more positive appraisal of Appian’s work, underlining the distinction between rational and irrational motivations in the account and Appian’s ability to draw on his legal and administrative experiences.\(^{54}\) Appian served as a procurator and a barrister, claiming in the preface of his *Roman History*, to have reached the summit of positions in his native Egypt and to have plead cases in Rome before the emperors themselves.\(^{55}\) Appian could draw on his knowledge and experience in these roles in his historical writing and would have had significant practice in rhetoric. Appian in the preface to his work, also extolled the size and endurance of the Roman Empire, highlighting the importance to that success of Roman bravery, patience and hard work.\(^{56}\) These virtues, together with an emphasis on past Roman glory, would have appealed to Appian’s audience comprised predominantly of Roman aristocrats. The Roman interventions in Illyria served as an important stage to highlight these virtues and comparative vices to his audience. By contrast, the preface of Polybius, outlined at the beginning of this thesis, sought to explain the rise of Rome and the eventual dominance of the Romans in Greek affairs to Greeks and Romans alike. The Roman interventions in Illyria served as a key set-piece in this progression in Polybius’ account.

Additional source material has come from Livy’s accounts of the interventions as part of his monumental Roman history. Livy’s accounts of the first two interventions by the Romans are lost, although brief excerpts exist from the *Periochaee*, whilst his accounts of the Third Illyrian and Macedonian Wars have survived. Livy’s use of Polybius as a source has been the subject of debate amongst modern scholars since the influence of Polybius on certain sections of Livy’s work was identified by Nissen.\(^{57}\) Tränkle in analysing the relationship between the two works in the 1970s, identified three ways in which material from Polybius was adapted in Livy’s text. These were abbreviations made by Livy from Polybius, the expansion and rearrangement of the Polybian version by Livy and lastly, deliberate factual changes by Livy from Polybius.\(^{58}\) In cases where a discrepancy existed between Polybius and an alternative annalistic tradition for Livy, Tränkle has argued that Livy cast his own judgement on which was more suitable. In discussing Livy’s methods of composition, Briscoe has also noted that


\(^{56}\) Ibid.

\(^{57}\) Nissen, *Kritische Untersuchungen über die Quellen der vierten und fünften Dekade des Livius*.

Livy ‘adapted Polybius for his own literary purposes’, leaving out and re-arranging material and occasionally ‘inserting blatant falsehoods’.⁵⁹ Although Livy’s accounts of the first two Roman interventions have been lost, the dynamic between Livy’s account of the Third Illyrian War and what is contained in the Periochae, and those accounts of the other ancient historians will be important to consider in the thesis for each intervention in turn.

The composition of Livy’s monumental history has a further bearing on how his accounts of the Roman interventions need to be examined. As part of the Augustan revival in late 1st Century BC, Livy’s text sought to document events up until that point from the city’s foundation and to reaffirm Roman pride and prestige in doing so. In the preface to his work, Livy outlines his intention to ‘memorialise the accomplishments of the foremost people of the world’.⁶⁰ The political motivation behind the commissioning and composition of the text were reflected in a desire to present the Romans in a positive light through the various historical episodes. This renewed sense of patriotism and self-confidence would have struck accord with Livy’s Roman audience of the Augustan age. The political sensitivity of the environment in which Livy was writing has placed particular emphasis on his selection of material. The selection of material for his account was imbued with reasoning beyond historical judgement. Tränkle has described these factual changes made by Livy as typical ‘procedures of subtraction’.⁶¹ These procedures served as a means of reconciling differences between the annalistic traditions available to Livy and the accounts of Polybius, by omitting one version and adopting another. This further stresses the need to carefully critique these accounts in conjunction with the other ancient historical sources to address and explain discrepancies between the sources.

Although the ancient historical texts are the primary evidence to be considered in the thesis, the lack of an Illyrian voice has made the interpretation of the Graeco-Roman sources problematic. In studying a topic regarding the political subjugation of a voiceless people this issue becomes particularly prominent. Gruen has outlined such an issue, stressing ‘the denigration, even demonization of the ‘Other’ in order to declare superiority or to construct a contrasting national identity’.⁶² Wilkes at the start of his study, noted that ‘many Greek and

⁶⁰Livy, ab urbe condita Praef 1.3.
Roman writers vie with each other in expressing contempt and detestation for the Illyrians. Not only has this been based on an 'otherness' associated with Illyrians from the Greek and Roman sources but it has also stemmed from the nature of Roman and Greek contact with the region and its inhabitants. The environments in which Greeks and Romans encountered the Illyrians were largely through international relations and warfare. Livy in a passing comment on a voyage up the Adriatic notes that the fleet commanded by the Spartan king Cleonymus continued straight on to the Venetian coast out of dread for the Illyrians, Liburnians and Histrians who were savage tribes notorious for conducting piracy. Oakley has noted that Livy's stereotype is emphasised by his use of the generic term Illyrii in reference to the peoples of the eastern Adriatic. Dzino has noted that 'the sources were all written by members of the Mediterranean elite, for a specific audience in order to fulfil their expectations and fit certain literary genres of their period.' Illyrians appear in Greek and Roman histories unsurprisingly in relation to Macedonian, Greek and Roman entities and most frequently as mercenaries and pirates. Greek and Roman sources would have based such generalisations in the context of their contact with tribes of the eastern Adriatic. Nevertheless, 'the lack of indigenous narratives can be in some degree compensated with archaeological evidence'. Archaeology can provide indications of social, cultural and economic interactions without the taint of the potential bias present in the written sources. In this way, the archaeological evidence will be used to better posit the written sources in context throughout the thesis.

The efficacy of Illyrian studies has nevertheless been limited due to the politicisation of lines of enquiry and the appropriation of the material in particular periods in which historical research has been undertaken. Wilkes notes that although a greater freedom has emerged in Albania for scholars to operate in, ‘the long standing Albanian claim for a continuity of descent from the ancient Illyrians is now accompanied by arguments that Kosovo and Metohija form parts of an ancient Illyrian homeland that should naturally be joined with the rest of modern Albania’. Under the strict communist dictatorship in Albania, Illyrian archaeology was tainted with political appropriation; ‘Hoxha also emphasised the autochthonous ethnogenesis of the Albanians’ as a means to link ‘their origins to the ancient Illyrians’ through the ‘political

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63 Wilkes, The Illyrians, p. 3.
64 Livy, Ab urbe condita 10. 2.
66 Dzino, Illyricum in Roman Politics, p. 7.
67 Dzino, Illyricum in Roman Politics, p. 8.
appropriation of Illyrian archaeology and history’. During periods of Albanian history moreover, Pelasgian romanticism has been a problem in the historical discipline, where ‘the dividing line between myth and history was not easily discernible’. In modern Albania, prominent Illyrian figures from the historical period covered by this thesis are remembered through imagery based largely on modern interpretation and construction; a series of examples have been included in the Appendix. The modern busts of Illyrian leaders have been constructed with little to no historical evidence for their appearance. These busts are located in a prominent museum on the site of Genthius’ stronghold of Scodra. Likewise, the coinage shown in Fig. 8. and Fig. 9. of the Appendix are current Albanian coins in circulation bearing images of Genthius and Teuta. These images present these figures in a manner that, one would assume, the modern Albanian government would like them to be seen rather than drawing on a basis from archaeology or history. The history of the ancient Illyrians has been an effective way for modern Albanians to reconnect with past identity and heritage in the region post 20th Century, a period which saw great upheaval for the Albanian people. This increasing interest in the history of Illyria in the new millennium has had the positive effect, as mentioned earlier, of inspiring interest into the archaeological and historical past of the region. There is a continuing need however for historical research of the region to be undertaken through traditional methods of historical enquiry to ensure the historical record is as veracious as possible.

Illyrian studies have undergone important recent developments that have seen a number of significant publications that have added to the historiography. The most established examinations of Illyrian antiquities for western scholars have been the archaeological research undertaken by Evans and Wilkes. Evans was the first archaeologist to excavate the area in the 1880s, and his comprehensive findings have provided an important basis for all future work in the associated fields. Wilkes’ works on Illyria and Dalmatia have provided the most comprehensive modern works for examining the history, culture and archaeology of the region. In recent times, the work of Dzino has been particularly important in examining the

71See Appendix (Fig. 8, Fig. 9, Fig. 10., Fig. 11., Fig. 12.).
72No imagery from antiquity has survived bearing their likenesses apart from Genthius, for whom ancient coinage minted during his reign is available that bears his likeness.
development of Roman interactions with Illyria.\textsuperscript{74} Dzino’s work ‘focuses on examination of a more conventional narrative of the events that we today recognise as Roman political engagement in Illyricum’.\textsuperscript{75} Rather than focusing on Rome’s interventions in Illyria, Dzino’s work has concentrated on group identities amongst the Illyrians and the interactions between Romans and Illyrians; ‘the colonisers and the colonised’.\textsuperscript{76} The modern historiography for Illyrian studies however has prominently consisted of scholars from the eastern Adriatic. The work of scholars such as Olujić, Stipčević and Šašel Kos have augmented scholarship on the subject by carrying out research with very specific focuses; the larger corpus of such work has enabled the emergence of broader and more detailed analyses.\textsuperscript{77} Dzino has however alluded to the paucity of Anglophone historiography on Illyria, but has noted that recent publications by Šašel Kos have augmented the modern scholarship.\textsuperscript{78} Despite a lack of published secondary sources in the English language, the wider corpus of material available to scholars in a variety of languages have enabled greater analyses to made of the subject matter.

The wider contexts of Roman imperialism and expansion have long been the subject of considerable debate in the historiography. Theodor Mommsen writing in 1864, included coverage of Illyria in his wider History of Rome and his work set a trend through the subsequent scholarship of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.\textsuperscript{79} The argument initially put forward by Mommsen, asserted that Roman interests east of the Adriatic were minimal down to the end of the Second Century BC. This has been subsequently tagged with the term ‘Defensive Imperialism’, a term which is somewhat of an oxymoron. The basis of this view holds that Roman wars during the period were fought out of a reaction to the threats posed by foreign aggressors faced by the Romans. This argument was later furthered by Holleaux who outlined a perspective in 1935 which built on Mommsen’s earlier thesis, advocating that Roman wars were predominantly fought on the grounds of self-defence and fear of the threats posed by other states.\textsuperscript{80} The 19th and early 20th centuries were periods where imperialism and empires were dominant in European politics; the praise of Rome, and the drawing of

\textsuperscript{75}Dzino, Illyricum in Roman Politics, p. 17.
\textsuperscript{76}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{78}Dzino, Illyricum in Roman Politics, p. 6.
\textsuperscript{79}T. Mommsen, The History of Rome (London, 1864).
contemporary imperial comparisons to Rome, were important ideas in the discourse. Brunt has noted that historians in the heyday of British imperialism were eager to make comparisons between the British and Roman empires.\textsuperscript{81} This perspective has largely been discredited in the modern historiography, partly due to the tendency of this orthodox view to take sources at face value, and partly due to perceptions of an underlying apology for imperialism.

The orthodox view was later challenged by Harris in 1979 with his work \textit{War and Imperialism in Republican Rome}, which drew greater attention to the 'advantages which the Romans, the aristocrats above all, derived from war and from the expansion of power which resulted from successful war'.\textsuperscript{82} Harris rejected the traditional approach to take the ancient sources at face value and adopted an analytical rather than narrative framework to explain the associated historical phenomena. In doing so, his work sought to examine the underlying behaviours and motivations of various groups within Roman society towards war and imperialism. Harris’ work has inspired a number of modern scholars to study and critique Roman imperialism and, in turn, the nature and underlying purpose and motivation behind the historical accounts.\textsuperscript{83} The Roman interventions in Illyria from this perspective must be placed in the context of an aggressive and ambitious Roman Senate and a bellicose broader Roman society. Harris noted in his discussion of the origins of the First Illyrian War that a pattern was set of Rome seeking justification for engaging in aggressive foreign interventions.\textsuperscript{84} Harris’ work has effectively encouraged greater and more rigorous criticism of the source material although his work is more overarching, providing an overview of a one-dimensional Rome. Eckstein has recently criticised this approach, by suggesting that Harris’ work has centred ‘sternly on Roman action, Roman ambition, Roman expansion, Roman aggression – in short, on Roman imperialism.’\textsuperscript{85} This thesis seeks to add to the existing historiography on the subject by bringing the Illyrian perspective back into consideration, alongside that of the Romans. As mentioned earlier, the greater range of source material now available has enabled a more nuanced and specific approach to be adopted in addressing the Roman interventions in Illyria.

\textsuperscript{84}Harris, \textit{War and Imperialism in Republican Rome}. pp. 171-2.
\textsuperscript{85}A. M. Eckstein, \textit{Rome Enters the Greek East} (Chichester, 2012), p. 5.
Eckstein, himself, by contrast has recently provided 'a re-examination of the early involvement of the Republic of Rome with the eastern Mediterranean' by reconsidering the fundamentals of ‘Defensive Imperialism’ in a new light. Eckstein’s thesis, stressing the importance of a limited early Roman interest in Illyria and the eastern Adriatic has provided a sound analysis for Rome’s initial limited involvement in Illyria. Developments during the period however need to be considered as Eckstein has stressed in his work. Eckstein describes this development as a shift ‘from anarchy to hierarchy’; the replacement of the ‘Hellenistic multipolar anarchy’ with the unipolarity of Rome. Eckstein has largely modelled this on his perspective of interstate relations during the period through Realist international relations theory. This approach has considered a changing dynamic in the international structure as fundamental to the changing nature of Roman interventions in the Greek East. Eckstein has highlighted the particular importance of the ‘Pact between the Kings’ in 202 BC in this development, describing the event as constituting a ‘diplomatic revolution in the Mediterranean’. This event, coupled with the sending of embassies from several states to Rome in complaint, served in Eckstein’s view to prompt subsequent Roman interventions. Polybius’ account of the Roman decision to intervene in 201 BC is lost, although the Pact is highlighted by Polybius, who uses it as a key set-piece in his work. Polybius, in describing the event, signposted the later defeats of both entities at the hands of Rome. Eckstein is correct to highlight the changing nature of interstate relations between Rome and their counterparts in the Greek East. The events of 202 BC were, nevertheless, specifically spotlighted by Polybius in his account as a means to illuminate the main theme of ‘interconnectedness’ in his narrative. This development occurred between the Roman interventions in the Second and Third Illyrian Wars and, as shall be discussed later in the thesis, it is important to consider this context in the changing nature of Rome’s interventions in Illyria during the period being considered in the thesis.

Realist theory itself, was most prominently set out in Waltz’s 1959 work, *Man, the State and War* in which Waltz saw a system of anarchy persisting in international relations between sovereign states; a system in which ‘conflict, sometimes leading to war is bound to occur.’ In

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86 Eckstein, *Rome Enters the Greek East*, pp. 3-5.
87 Eckstein, *Rome Enters the Greek East*, p. 381.
88 Ibid. p. 181.
Realist international relations theory, states are the primary actors in an anarchic system of international politics and act out of self-maximisation and self-preservation to gain advantage in a highly competitive environment. The origins of the core ideas and principles of Realist theory have been traced back to Thucydides and the origins of the Peloponnesian War. For Thucydides, the underlying cause of the war was the growth of Athenian power and the fear this inspired in Sparta. Eckstein has asserted that ‘most modern Realist thinkers claim Thucydides as their intellectual ancestor’ and that key principles that inform contemporary Realist theory were expounded upon by Thucydides in documenting the harsh nature of interstate relations amongst Greek poleis of the time. Eckstein has argued that this state of affairs was not unique however, existing as the norm throughout much of antiquity with a dramatic change occurring with Rome’s rise to unipolarity. This challenged the view presented by Harris in his earlier work, which highlighted the exceptional century of Roman bellicosity and aggressiveness of which the period under consideration in this thesis is a part. Harris succinctly outlined this view by stating that ‘states vary widely in their willingness to exert themselves for the extension and maintenance of power’. This has been furthered by Hornblower who has argued that Roman militarism was far more marked than any Greek state, even Sparta. Although Rome was a particularly bellicose state, there is a need to consider how other states reacted to Roman aggression and how these reactions changed with the developing power structures of the Mediterranean interstate system.

Utilising Realist international relations theory to better understand the Roman interventions in Illyria is however problematic due to the Illyrian geopolitical situation and the nature of the interventions themselves. The core principles of Realist international relations theory of self-maximisation and security are applied in relation to a consistent notion of competition between states. Eckstein has asserted that ‘Rome was one state in an interstate system (…) where all states competed bitterly with each other for security via the gaining of power’. Throughout the period being considered in this thesis, Rome and the different Illyrians they engaged with, existed on an unequal footing regarding their power and influence within the international system. Moreover, defining the existence and nature of the ‘Illyrian

92Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War 1. 23.
94Ibid.
95Harris, War and Imperialism in Republican Rome, p. 2.
state’ that engaged within the interstate system raises further problems. As shall be discussed in the next chapter of the thesis, Illyria’s geographic position between the Adriatic and the Greek and Macedonian interior would be reflected geopolitically for the period being considered in this thesis. Although security concerns had an important bearing on Illyrian international relations, Roman security concerns were located elsewhere. Rome’s interventions in Illyria during this period were notably short, with limited Roman involvement in the region in their aftermath. Applying the theory to understand the Roman interventions from both Roman and Illyrian perspectives thus raises a series of problems that reduce the efficacy of the theory’s application.

Modern international relations theory has also been applied through the alternative theory of constructivism. Constructivism was formed out of perceived failures of the Realist theory model and regards the international system as a social construction formed by discursive practices. Constructivists consider individuals to be the key actors in the international system, with structures being constraints on individuals and view the world more idealistically, seeking world peace through social consciousness. Burton has recently used constructivism in his work, *Friendship and Empire*, as a means to interpret the development of Roman diplomacy in the Middle Republican period. In his work, Burton has identified the importance to Rome of informal friendship, *amicitia*, based on a moral bond of trust, *fides*, and has stressed the importance of shared ideas and linguistic constructs in the formation of international relationships. Unlike Realism, Constructivism assumes the seeking of world peace through social consciousness, which has proven much more problematic to apply to a period which engaged in warfare on such a consistent and prolonged basis. Burton indeed notes in his work that it is not a study of Roman imperialism even though considerations of this nature are unavoidable in part. Thus, whilst Burton in his application of constructivism is correct to stress the important elements of Roman diplomatic arrangements, applying the theory to ancient Rome has proven very problematic and does not provide an effective means of interpreting Roman interventions.

Furthermore, modern political terminology has often been applied to describe and define the events and associated phenomena of the Roman interventions in Illyria. Before

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100 Ibid. pp. 18-27.
raising these in the course of the study, it is important to initially define these terms as they shall be utilised throughout the thesis. Although the etymology of the term ‘imperialism’ can be traced back to the Latin term _imperium_, there is no equivalent Latin term for imperialism. Subsequently, modern scholars have sought to define the concept in different ways. The economist Schumpeter was an important contributor to theories of imperialism, seeing imperialism as antithetical to the capitalism and societal progress of his time. Schumpeter defined imperialism as ‘the objectless disposition on the part of a state to unlimited forcible expansion’. Schumpeter used the New Kingdom in Egypt as an example of ancient imperialism in practice, describing the existence of a ‘war machine’ that saw war as a necessary condition for ensuring domestic stability. Although Rome has been argued to exhibit similarly bellicose tendencies, the power-relationship between states in the Roman context has led to Schumpeter’s definition being expanded upon. Champion and Eckstein have used a definition that states that ‘imperialism is an unequal power relationship between two states in which the dominant state exercises various forms of control, often forcibly, over the weaker state’. Most recently, Harris has defined imperialism as ‘the activity by which a state or its surrogates impose its power, which it subsequently exercises and maintains, far beyond its previous boundaries, as part of a long-lasting policy of expansion’. The definition provided by Champion and Eckstein shall be adopted for this thesis as it provides a more accurate reflection on how imperialism was employed in relation to the Roman interventions in Illyria. The exercise of Roman power in Illyria was done on a basis of unequal power in accordance with this definition and the long-lasting policy of expansion as defined by Harris was not consistently applied by the Romans in the region.

Throughout the thesis, the term ‘hegemony’ shall also be utilised to describe the nature and degree of Roman supremacy over the region. Hegemony in this context, should be considered as the pre-eminence or dominance of a single entity (in this case, Rome) over all others within a defined area (in this case, Illyria, as defined at the outset of the thesis). Eckstein has been the chief proponent of the term, using it to describe Rome’s geopolitical status in a variety of regions during the period of 230-188 BC. In Illyria, Eckstein has asserted that Rome

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103Ibid. p. 24.
105Harris, _Roman Power: A Thousand Years of Empire_, pp. 36-7.
operated an ‘external hegemony’ during the late 3rd Century BC. This saw Rome operating as the hegemonic power in Illyria without directly administering the region. The threat of Roman intervention kept the region in-line and maintained Roman hegemony at a distance. Dzino has also used ‘hegemony’ to describe the Roman geopolitical position over the central Adriatic in the 2nd Century BC. These ideas in the modern scholarship reflect how Polybius viewed Rome’s growing status in the Mediterranean. Polybius saw Rome by the mid-2nd Century BC as the hegemonic power in world affairs. As such, the label of ‘hegemony’ applied to Rome by modern scholars is a useful one in defining Roman control in a region without effectively utilising direct administration.

The term ‘hegemony’ has however accrued significant modern connotations which have limited the effectiveness in applying the concept to the ancient world. In an influential modern work examining imperial power, Doyle has provided effective definitions for the concepts of ‘empire’ and ‘hegemony’. Doyle defined ‘empire’ as the effective political control exercised by one state over another subordinate state in their domestic and foreign affairs. A distinction for hegemony was also provided by Doyle, as the control over a state’s foreign affairs only, and not their domestic affairs. Eckstein has highlighted the importance of Doyle’s distinction to understanding the subtle differences between the two concepts and has furthered Doyle’s definition by stressing that a hegemonic state ‘seeks to continually control weaker states’ foreign relations but leaves their internal policies and politics alone.’ Harris has noted a modern reluctance to apply the terms ‘empire’ or ‘imperialism’, and a preference to apply euphemisms instead. Although ‘hegemony’ can be utilised as a euphemism for empire, the definitions provided by Doyle reflect the important distinction between the two concepts. This distinction shall be employed by the thesis to effectively distinguish between the two terms and their application.

It is necessary moreover, when considering the Roman interventions to address and define the key operators within the process of undertaking interventions. Rome, although possessing a mixed constitution as set down by Polybius, has typically been seen as an

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107 Dzino, Illyricum in Roman Politics, p. 63.
108 Polybius, Histories 1. 1.
110 Ibid. p. 40.
112 Harris, Roman Power: A Thousand Years of Empire, p. 36.
oligarchy, with aristocratic forces holding the levers of power.\textsuperscript{113} These aristocrats have, in turn, been traditionally seen as the driving force behind Roman imperial expansion, with ‘powerful imperatives’ for them to wage war.\textsuperscript{114} Whilst the importance of the Roman aristocracy to Roman imperial expansion has received general consensus, the way this worked in practice has received differing opinions. Mommsen was the first to outline ‘a firm, unwavering, patriotic foreign policy’ amongst the Roman elite.\textsuperscript{115} The idea of a definable Roman foreign policy was later developed by Eckstein, who stressed that this ‘usually rested in the hands of the Senate’.\textsuperscript{116} Morley has however argued that ‘the study of Roman imperialism is not the study of the explicit and univocal policy of a government or a ruler’ but was rather formed ‘between ill-defined groups connected by ties of kinship, friendship or advantage, not between parties united around beliefs or political programmes.’\textsuperscript{117} The Roman Senate in this regard, was made up of a variety of different interests where political ties between individuals were loosely constructed and for a variety of different reasons. This has made a discernible and fixed ‘foreign policy’ difficult to ascertain. Although these differences between senators were apparent, decisions carried by the senate would have set down a resolute course of action. Byrd has stressed that between the victory over Hannibal and the reforms of the Gracchi in 133 BC, ‘the Senate exercised a practically unchallenged control over the Roman state’.\textsuperscript{118} Developments over time, with new generations of senators emerging through the system, would have added to this; the changeable stance of Rome’s foreign outlooks being dependent on the makeup of the Senate. Thus, although the Senate set Rome’s course of action, the notion of a coherent programme for Roman imperial expansion was not evident amongst Roman aristocrats. Roman aristocrats were individuals with divergent opinions and particular motivations for imperial expansion, and the Senate underwent developments over time.

Rome has moreover been seen as a bellicose society, where the aristocracy had an important role as military leaders. The link between the practice of warfare in the period being considered in this thesis, and aristocratic status, was set out by Polybius. Polybius notes that


\textsuperscript{114}Harris, \textit{War and Imperialism in Republican Rome} 327-70 BC, p. 34.

\textsuperscript{115}T. Mommsen, \textit{History of Rome}, p. 74.


\textsuperscript{117}N. G. Morley, \textit{The Roman Empire: Roots of Imperialism} (New York, 2010), p. 22.

no-one can hold political office in Rome without having completed ten years of service on campaigns.\textsuperscript{119} Harris has asserted that ‘the Roman state made war every year, except in the most abnormal circumstances’.\textsuperscript{120} Although this may be due, in part, to the array of foreign entities that Rome came into contact with, the aristocracy had a vested interest and an important role in the functioning of warfare. Rosenstein has also pointed to the constancy of Roman campaigns, noting the ‘considerable advantage’ in learning lessons for the Romans from one campaign to the next, and subsequent handbooks to instruct officers of their duties.\textsuperscript{121} The perpetual nature of warfare and the development of Roman aristocratic adeptness in its practice could thus be seen to go hand-in-hand. Roman aristocrats who sought military campaigns for a variety of reasons, would in turn, develop their proclivity and proficiency in the art of campaigning through its perpetual utilisation. This would have enabled the Roman aristocrats to become well versed in the dynamics of command and battle strategy. For a Roman aristocrat, a successful military career was an essential component for climbing the political ladder. Rosenstein has also noted that military command was ‘a facet of political leadership, part of what it meant to be a Roman aristocrat and the fruit of electoral success.’\textsuperscript{122} The expectations of a Roman aristocrat were thus to be a Roman military commander on campaign; the value of an aristocrat to Rome first and foremost being seen in their success in this theatre. With this expectation in place, Roman aristocrats would likely seek out war to further their political standing.

The role of the wider Roman citizenry is also important to consider, although the driving force behind Roman imperial expansion was the Roman aristocracy. Polybius sets out the important role of the citizenry in the process of Roman intervention by noting that it is the Roman citizenry that ultimately decides on peace or war and it is the citizenry who ratify or reject treaties and alliances.\textsuperscript{123} Although possessing this ability, the citizenry rarely exercised it to its full extent. Harris asserts that ‘the effective decisions were almost always made in the Senate’ and ‘no case is known in which a senatorial decision to make war was successfully resisted by the people.’\textsuperscript{124} Rich has however argued that rather than showing their political

\textsuperscript{119}Polybius, Histories 6. 19.
\textsuperscript{120}Harris, War and Imperialism in Republican Rome 327-70BC, p. 9.
\textsuperscript{121}N. Rosenstein, Rome and the Mediterranean 290-146 BC: The Imperial Republic (Edinburgh, 2012), pp. 102-3.
\textsuperscript{123}Polybius, Histories 6. 14.
\textsuperscript{124}Harris, War and Imperialism in Republican Rome 327-70BC, p. 41.
weakness, this is reflective of the citizenry’s acquiescence for war.\textsuperscript{125} It is not clear whether the sentiment of the citizenry or their lack of political authority is the more important factor, although a combination of both is equally likely. Determining the degree of popular support for war making is hard to judge based on the limited evidence available. Plautus, a contemporary popular playwright, can be seen to indicate a strand of popular opinion due to his need to appeal to a popular audience. In a number of his plays, the prologue concludes with a bidding of farewell and a blessing on Romans wishing them well in the field of war.\textsuperscript{126} Although the evidence is limited by not directly providing a voice for the citizenry, these excerpts from the prologues of Plautus’ plays suggest that a blessing of good fortune in war was in common parlance. Polybius suggests that for the common Roman soldiers, the introduction of civic and mural crowns for acts of valour were important in lifting their spirits and providing incentives.\textsuperscript{127} This once more suggests that the Roman soldiers felt part of the Roman military process and saw their fortunes associated with the military fortunes of Rome at war, although it’s very difficult to ascertain what popular attitudes were.

The importance of Roman aristocrats in foreign affairs should not however be seen merely in their role in military endeavours; their diplomatic role and importance was also very significant. The Roman Republic had no formally trained diplomats or state infrastructure devoted to the practice, and although major decisions, such as the sending of diplomatic ultimatums, were carried out by institutions in Rome, diplomacy was carried out by Roman magistrates. Eilers has noted that Rome had no foreign office, ‘nor did foreign states have permanent representatives at Rome, even though in many cases, relations with Rome were fundamental to their ongoing prospects’.\textsuperscript{128} Before the First and Third Illyrian Wars, the Romans sent magistrates in the form of ambassadors, πρέσβεις, to conduct their diplomacy.\textsuperscript{129} Roman diplomacy with foreign entities was in its relative infancy and consequently the practice of diplomacy by Roman magistrates would have developed on an ad-hoc basis. These developments would have made diplomacy more contingent on the practicalities of the situations that the Romans encountered, rather than a practice strictly laid down in constructed

\textsuperscript{126}Plautus, Captivi Prologue Lines 64-8.; Plautus, Casina Prologue Lines 87-8.; Plautus, Asinaria Prologue Lines 14-5.
\textsuperscript{127}Polybius, Histories 6. 39.
\textsuperscript{129}First Illyrian War: Polybius, Histories 2. 8., Appian, Illyrian Wars 3. 2. 7. Third Illyrian War: Appian, Illyrian Wars 3. 2. 9.; Livy, ab urbe condita 42. 37. Polybius does not mention Roman ambassadors in this instance, although Livy uses the term legati, the Latin equivalent of the Greek πρέσβεις. For details on the equivalence of these two terms, see Eilers, Diplomats and Diplomacy in the Roman World, p. 1.
treatises. It is perhaps unsurprising in this light, that the most prominent forms of diplomatic association utilised by the Romans were flexible and relatively informal. On the election of a Roman aristocrat to the position of magistrate, the conduct of diplomatic affairs would have been an expected duty contained with the remit of the role. Thus, the expectation of Roman aristocrats to fulfil a diplomatic role on election to become a Roman magistrate served as an important consideration in their role in foreign affairs.

The economic benefits to campaigning have been considered by modern scholars in two main ways: the economic benefits to the state through national economic interests; benefits to the individual in the form of plunder and the spoils of war divided up after the conclusion of the campaign. The first of these ways has proven considerably problematic. Frank attempted to calculate the income and public expenditure of the Roman state during the first half of the 2nd Century BC although the results were largely inconclusive. Harris has noted that the survey was limited on account of the difficulty in effectively judging certain types of income that ‘cannot be worked out within useful limits’. Morley has also noted that ‘a discussion of the material motivation for Roman war-making sometimes becomes conflated with modern ideas of ‘economic imperialism’; he also stresses that ‘there is little evidence to suggest that this was a significant factor in antiquity’, citing a possible anomaly in the First Illyrian War. Modern economic systems work in different ways to the economy of ancient Rome and applying modern economic theory to ancient Rome is highly problematic. In contrast to modern economies, the Roman economic system during the period being considered in this thesis, was largely agrarian and rich industrialists were not as evident. The Romans in the First Illyrian War were probably well aware of the important trade networks in the southern Adriatic; judging, however, the potency of a desire to exploit such trade is an entirely different proposition.

The economic benefits for individuals are easier to ascertain, in the form of the spoils of war and the uneven distribution of these in the aftermath of campaigns. Harris has stressed the importance of material gains from warfare, asserting that ‘economic gain was to the Romans (and generally in the ancient world) an integral part of successful warfare and of the

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130 See P. J. Burton, Friendship and Empire: Roman Diplomacy and Imperialism in the Middle Republic (353 – 146 BC), pp. 76-114.
131 T. Frank (ed.), An Economic Survey of Rome Volume I: Rome and Italy of the Republic (Baltimore, 1933). Frank did assert that income exceeded essential spending over this period but only by a small percentage.
133 Morley, The Roman Empire: The Roots of Imperialism, p. 27.
expansion of power. Land, plunder, slaves, revenues were natural results of success; they were the assumed results of victory and power’. Polybius, in describing a siege of New Carthage in 209 BC, sets out the progress of a siege with a defined order of operations; Roman plundering began on a signal being given by the commander for the massacring of inhabitants and animals to cease. Similar accounts that feature plundering beginning upon a signal from the commander also appear in Livy. This would suggest that plundering was an important component of Roman warfare; sieges incorporated a period of plundering into the systematic taking of a settlement. Ziolkowski however notes that although some basic rules appear evident in the process, the two limits to a soldier’s spoils were his physical ability to gather plunder and the strategic and logistical considerations of the baggage train. Although an allocated time was given by Roman commanders to plundering, Roman soldiers would have had an opportunity to take advantage of their situation through plundering. The opportunity to acquire material gain through plunder was thus a facet of war that all Roman soldiers could acquire some degree of benefit from.

It is important at the outset of the thesis to, moreover, establish what is meant by certain ancient terms and concepts and to consider their importance to understanding the nature of Rome’s interventions. Fides, which can be translated as faith or trust, was a deified virtue which underpinned many of Rome’s dealings with foreign entities. Roman diplomacy was enacted under divine observation and treaties were kept in the temple of fides, located on the Capitoline hill. Diplomatic treaties and arrangements were stored in the temple under the observation and protection of the divine fides. Before the construction of the temple, a simpler shrine was present on the site; the construction of the temple highlights the importance of fides to the Romans in the 3rd Century BC. Rome in the 3rd Century BC was engaging in early contact and forging initial relations with foreign states; the temple may have been established out of a desire to gain greater favour from the divine entity or from the practical need to properly and piously store the physical copies of Rome’s diplomatic agreements. Cicero in De Officiis, described

134 Harris, War and Imperialism in Republican Rome 327-70 BC, p. 56.
135 Polybius, Histories 10. 15. Only part of the Roman force engaged in the plundering and the haul was divided up equally amongst the troops.
136 Livy, ab urbe condita 5. 21. (Vei 396 BC); Livy, ab urbe condita 27. 16. (Tarentum 209 BC); Livy, ab urbe condita 27. 16. (New Carthage 209 BC); Livy, ab urbe condita 31. 23. (Chalcis 200 BC).
138 M. J. Schermaier, ‘Bona fides in Roman contract law’ in R. Zimmermann and S. Whittaker (eds.), Good Faith in European Contract Law (Cambridge, 2000), p. 78. The construction of this temple has been dated to the mid-3rd Century BC.
fides as fundamentum... iustitiae, the foundation of justice.\textsuperscript{139} As such, the concept was integral to Roman diplomatic practice, the success or failure of which was dependent on fides. Burton has noted that ‘when a Roman pledged his fides and extended his right hand, he was aware of the enormous and awesome significance of the act – and the terrible retribution the gods could exact if he violated his oath’.\textsuperscript{140} The breaking of a diplomatic arrangement was therefore considered not only an act against the opposing party but was also impious in defying the divinely ordained pact. As shall be discussed later in the thesis, this would have important connotations for the arrangements Rome struck with various Illyrian entities.

Fides was particularly important to these arrangements, as many were informal and based on ties of friendship. Friendship, amicitia, can best be defined as a mutually beneficial voluntary arrangement based on bonds of trust and affinity, although the Romans utilised it in a flexible manner in accordance with the informality of the arrangement. Badian has highlighted the form of informal friendship as paramount to Roman strategic thinking in their early interventions in Illyria in the 3rd Century BC.\textsuperscript{141} These friendship ties enabled the Romans to build relations in the region without being tied down by more formal arrangements. In addition to Roman arrangements with amici, Rome also formed associations with socii (allies/associates); some sources also point to arrangements with affiliates designated as socii et amici. The existence of a distinction between the socii and amici was first asserted in the modern scholarship by Mommsen, who viewed the diplomatic arrangement of socii et amici, as reflecting a more formal alliance of friendship.\textsuperscript{142} This was later challenged and largely discredited by a number of historians, who have noted that no precise distinction between the two terms is evident in the sources.\textsuperscript{143} Burton has noted that there is ‘proof from inscription evidence that official documents used the same combinations of terms without necessarily implying formal technical distinctions.\textsuperscript{144} An example of this can be seen in the Appendix, showing two sections of a psephisma from Pharos.\textsuperscript{145} The inscription is believed to mention, in line 8 of fragment A (Fig. 7a.), the existence of an alliance and friendship, συμμα - [ζιαν (και

\textsuperscript{139}Cicero, De Officiis 1. 23.
\textsuperscript{140}Burton, Friendship and Empire: Roman Diplomacy and Imperialism in the Middle Republic (353 – 146 BC), p. 41.
\textsuperscript{141}E. Badian, Foreign Clientelae 264–70 BC (Madison, 1984), p. 45.
\textsuperscript{142}T. Mommsen, Römisches Staatsrecht (Leipzig, 1887), pp. 590-5.
\textsuperscript{144}Burton, Friendship and Empire: Roman Diplomacy and Imperialism in the Middle Republic (353 – 146 BC), p. 80.
\textsuperscript{145}Appendix Fig. 7a-7b. This psephisma will be examined at greater length later in the thesis, including the contents and dating of the inscription.
between Pharos and Rome, although the fragmentary nature of the line has made it difficult to ascertain the precise nature of the affiliation being referred to. Burton has argued that it is unlikely that a formal alliance existed between the states at the time, asserting that ‘even in ‘official’ contexts, the terminology of Roman diplomacy was highly fluid.’ Although the evidence presented in the psephisma is unclear and shall be discussed at greater length later in the thesis, Burton is correct to highlight the importance to Rome of utilising diplomatic terminology that was highly fluid. With such terminology being relatively ambiguous, Rome could draw inference from the arrangement to suit their diplomatic needs and potentially frame the context for intervention around whether or not the obligations, or terms of such an association, were violated.

It is also important to distinguish what the Romans considered ‘friendship’ and relationships that amounted more to a patron-client structure. Badian’s influential work, *Foreign Clientelae*, effectively defined the origins of the concept of a patron-client relationship in foreign affairs, citing its semi-mythological origin from the time of Romulus; ‘the client may be described as an inferior entrusted, by custom, or by himself to the protection of a stranger more powerful than he, and rendering certain services and observances in return for this protection.’ A patron-client structure emerged therefore out of an imbalanced friendship formed between parties of unequal status. Badian observed that *amicitia* developed into ‘a polite term for an inferior (or, conversely, a superior) i.e. a client or patron’ and for the Romans, ‘*amicitia* necessarily becomes another term for clientship’ The development of *amicitia* into a more unequal form of association between Rome and her affiliates should be seen in the context of the growing power, status and influence of Rome during the period being considered in this thesis. The growth of Rome changed the dynamic upon which friendships operated and Rome became a more dominant entity in these associations.

It is important, however, to consider *amicitia* within the diplomatic context in which it was utilised. The Greek concept of *φιλία*, friendship, predated Rome’s involvement in the Greek East and the similarity between the two concepts would have facilitated diplomacy. Although Dionysius of Halicarnassus reports an offence caused with the Tarentines in 282 BC, on account of the poor quality of Greek uttered by Rome's envoy, no similar event is reported through Roman involvement in Illyria, Greece and Macedon. The diplomatic terminology

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146 Burton, *Friendship and Empire: Roman Diplomacy and Imperialism in the Middle Republic (353 – 146 BC)*, p. 81.
149 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Roman Antiquities* 19. 5.
utilised by the Romans has often been seen to be based on original Greek concepts. Gruen has argued that Roman international relations concepts such as *fides* and *amicitia*, were synonymous with their related Greek concepts such as *Πίστις* and *φιλία*.\(^{150}\) This however has been challenged by Ager who notes the problems of such an equation of terms, citing the Rhodian attempt to mediate a settlement to the Third Macedonian War as an example where Roman and Greek understanding of the concepts differed greatly.\(^{151}\) A distinction needs to be made here regarding concepts and conceptions in the practice of diplomacy in the ancient world. Whilst the concepts shared a mutual basis of understanding in Greek and Roman culture, they were not entirely synonymous and conceptions regarding them consequently could cause tension between the different parties. The greater mutual understanding of these concepts between Greeks and Romans would have nevertheless facilitated diplomacy between them. Roman aristocrats, for whom Greek was often a second language, would have likely found negotiating with Greeks easier in practical terms than negotiating with Illyrians on account of the language barrier. Gruen notes that ‘no problem in communication arose during Roman negotiations with Pyrrhus. Nor in dealings with Greek cities across the Straits of Otranto during the First Illyrian War.’\(^{152}\) Thus, whilst occasions have been recorded in the sources of miscommunication between Romans and Greeks, a mutual understanding of the implications of diplomacy seems to have existed. The sources available do not, by contrast, provide any discernible Illyrian diplomatic concepts, limiting our ability to understand and appreciate the Illyrian perspective in these diplomatic episodes. Diplomatic engagements between Illyrian leaders and their Greek and Roman counterparts would have provided these leaders with some experience of Greek and Roman diplomatic discourse. The relations between the Illyrians, Greeks and Romans had particular geopolitical significance throughout the period being considered in this thesis and would shape the outlook of the varied disparate Illyrian leaders and communities.

\(^{150}\) E. S. Gruen, ‘Greek *Πίστις* and Roman *fides*, *Athenaeum* Vol. 60 (1982), pp. 50-68. See also Gruen, *The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome*, pp. 55-63.

\(^{151}\) S. L. Ager, ‘Roman Perspective on Greek Diplomacy’ in C. Eilers (ed.), Diplomats and Diplomacy in the Roman World (Leiden, 2009), pp. 16-17.

\(^{152}\) Gruen, *The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome*, p. 252.
Chapter 2 – The Illyrian geopolitical landscape

Introduction

Neither the region of Illyria, nor the people that inhabited the region during the period being considered in this thesis, were homogenous. Illyria instead was made up of a series of disparate communities, each with their own political structure, interests, culture and outlook. In his analysis of the native peoples of Dalmatia prior to the Roman conquest, Wilkes notes the existence of clear differences between the various areas of the region, each with its own pattern of development.\textsuperscript{153} This distinction was most discernible between the Illyrian communities in the Southern Adriatic, situated in close proximity to important trade routes to Southern Italy, Greece and the Mediterranean beyond and those of the Northern Adriatic where tribal societies persisted and trade routes were less pronounced. This chapter shall focus on the Illyrian geopolitical issues during the period being considered in the thesis and consider how the geopolitical landscape of Illyria shaped the conduct of the Roman interventions. The chapter will not seek to further our understanding of Illyrian ethnographic issues surrounding how people in the disparate Illyrian communities lived, nor seek to enhance our understanding of the geography of the region through a detailed geographical outline documenting the various Illyrian tribes. These areas have been well covered in the existing historiography and are not directly relevant to a study of the Roman interventions.\textsuperscript{154} The chapter will instead consider the implications of the geography, external contacts and political structures of Illyria on the Roman interventions to provide a more complete appreciation of how they were conducted.

These issues have been insufficiently considered in the historiography, primarily due to the limitations of the evidence available in formulating an Illyrian perspective. As Stipčević

has noted, not a single inscription has been left by the Illyrians in their own original language.\footnote{A. Stipčević, \textit{The Illyrians: History and Culture} (New Jersey, 1977), p. 68.} As a result no political document constructed by the Illyrians themselves pertaining to their governance is in existence and modern scholars have subsequently had to piece together a variety of limited evidence. The material evidence available, principally found in burial sites, coin hoards and underwater archaeological excavations, can provide a greater understanding of Illyrian political structures and cultures and external influences on these, as well as Adriatic trade and the dispersal of goods throughout different parts of Illyria. The cataloguing of the production and distribution of amphorae on the Southern Italian and Eastern Adriatic coast by Miše in 2015 has proven useful in enabling greater inference to be drawn from the archaeological data.\footnote{M. Miše, \textit{Gnathia and Related Hellenistic Ware on the East Adriatic Coast} (Oxford, 2015). \textit{Gnathia} ware are amphorae, whose design originated from Taras (Tarentum) in Southern Italy. Production of \textit{Gnathia} amphorae expanded to Apulia, then to the rest of Southern Italy and Magna Graecia.} Moreover, the recent publication of underwater archaeological findings, especially by the Illyrian Coastal Exploration Programme, has provided a greater corpus of evidence than previously available. This evidence however has certain limitations, most notably with the limited number of shipwrecks analysed and the location of the shipwrecks themselves. The recent publication of previously unavailable evidence however has made it particularly important to consider, especially in shedding greater light on Adriatic trade and transport. Utilising this evidence in conjunction with the textual evidence can help the study better assess the nature and diversity of existing trade in the Adriatic and the economic motivations behind Roman intervention; the importance of the impact on Italian traders being specifically highlighted in the Polybian account for Rome’s decision to initially intervene in the region.\footnote{Polybius, \textit{Histories} 2. 8.}

\section*{Geographical Issues}

The geography of the region of Illyria had an important role in shaping the nature of the communities, their outlooks and their economies. Dzino notes that archaeology divided the indigenous Iron-Age archaeological cultures of Illyricum into three areas; the south-east Alpine area with western Pannonia, the Adriatic Western-Balkan area, and the Central Danubian area.\footnote{Dzino, \textit{Illyricum in Roman Politics}, p. 36.} In Dzino’s work, the area of the Adriatic Western-Balkans (the region being considered in this thesis) consisted of Histrian, Iapodian, Liburnian, Central-Dalmatian, A. Stipčević, \textit{The Illyrians: History and Culture} (New Jersey, 1977), p. 68.

M. Miše, \textit{Gnathia and Related Hellenistic Ware on the East Adriatic Coast} (Oxford, 2015). \textit{Gnathia} ware are amphorae, whose design originated from Taras (Tarentum) in Southern Italy. Production of \textit{Gnathia} amphorae expanded to Apulia, then to the rest of Southern Italy and Magna Graecia.

Polybius, \textit{Histories} 2. 8.

Dzino, \textit{Illyricum in Roman Politics}, p. 36.
Central-Bosnian and Glasinac groups. Strabo has provided a geographic circuit of Illyrian tribes along the coast which includes the Iapodes, the Histrians, the Liburnians, the Delmetae, the islands off the coasts of Liburnia and Dalmatia, the Ardiaei followed by the Rhizonic Gulf and the southern Adriatic. This geographic circuit follows closely an earlier 4th Century BC *periplus* of Pseudo-Skylax. Dzino has noted that Strabo’s work has plentiful inaccuracies, especially in the geography of the Northern Adriatic and a lack of coverage for the Adriatic Greeks. Wilkes has additionally highlighted inaccuracies and misconceptions in the geography of the region from earlier in antiquity and has noted that ‘as late as the Fourth Century it was still widely believed that the Northern extremity of the Adriatic was very close to the Black Sea and the mouth of the Danube. The separation of Illyria into three distinct cultural sub-regions is more useful in considering the geographical makeup of the region as a whole. Much divergence nevertheless can be evidenced between the different tribal groups in the Northern and Southern sections of the Adriatic Western-Balkans. Wilkes has particularly stressed the important divergences of the Liburnians within the aforementioned sub-group from those Illyrian communities further South. From his study of the different peoples along the Dalmatian coast, Wilkes found that the traditional tribal system had been superseded by a monarchy in the South East that was able to supervise an organised form of naval warfare, whilst no political structure with this capability developed in Liburnia. This discrepancy is important to consider, as the limited ability of the Liburnians in the North to engage in warfare would have posed a less pronounced concern to the Romans, than existed in the Southern Adriatic.

The area of the Illyrian Western-Balkans, along the Adriatic coastline and immediate hinterland was naturally separated from parts of the interior by the Illyrian topography. The Dinaric Alps, stretch for approximately 400 miles from the Northern Adriatic to the South Eastern Adriatic, separating the Adriatic coast from the interior. Braundel has noted that although the mountain range operated as a physical obstacle to the interior, the coastal communities remained open and receptive to influences from across the Mediterranean. The importance of this geographic barrier is also reflected in Wilkes. Expounding on the Greek

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159 Ibid.
160 Strabo, *Geography* 7. 5.
161 Ps. Skylax, *Periplus* 14-34.
misconception of the geographic location of the Northern extremity of the Adriatic, Wilkes notes in his later work, *The Illyrians*, that such a misconception is indicative of a lack of regular contact between the Greek world and the ‘inland peoples between the Adriatic and the Sava’.\textsuperscript{166} Dzino has also highlighted the importance of physical geography, noting that ‘the mountainous northern part (of the Illyrian region) is covered with thick forests and abundant vegetation’ and that ‘there was no significant indigenous urbanisation’.\textsuperscript{167} By contrast Dzino asserts that the coastal regions ‘remained strongly linked with the rest of the Mediterranean world, and archaeology reveals the strong impact of Mediterranean ‘globalisation’ even before the Greek colonisation in the central Adriatic in the fourth century BC’.\textsuperscript{168} The physical geography of the Dinaric Alps ensured that coastal regions, especially in the Southern Adriatic and in proximity to the Ionian Sea, had greater contact with the wider Greek world, enabling Hellenistic influences to more easily permeate into regional cultures.

The geography of the region had a further impact on the economic opportunities available for the populace. In his geographic description of the Adriatic coast, Strabo notes that although the eastern seaboard was capable of growing certain foodstuffs and full of harbours, the Illyrians were initially ignorant of the fertility of the region primarily out of ‘the wilderness of the inhabitants and their piratical habits’.\textsuperscript{241} Whilst passing comment on the perceived habits of the local populace, Strabo here points to a tendency of the Illyrians living on the coast to look to the sea rather than the land for supplies. As shall be discussed later in the thesis, the economic opportunities provided by the Adriatic that were presented to Illyrians dwelling along the Adriatic coast were added to by lucrative opportunities for piracy, which presented a particularly attractive prospect for Illyrians to gain plunder. Wilkes notes that ‘agriculture was never developed in Dalmatia as highly as it was in neighbouring areas’\textsuperscript{169} Dell has linked Adriatic piracy to the economic prospects of the region, by arguing that Illyrian raiding was ‘caused by overpopulation and lack of suitable farmland’.\textsuperscript{170} Wilkes has noted for much of the people of Dalmatia, excluding the Ardiaei in the South, ‘external contacts were few, and there was an almost total preoccupation with food production, especially livestock.\textsuperscript{171} Strabo’s description of the fertility of the Illyrian region thus appears oversimplified, and does not take

\textsuperscript{166}Wilkes, *The Illyrians*, pp. 101-2.
\textsuperscript{167}Dzino, *Illyricum in Roman Politics*, p. 32.
\textsuperscript{168}Ibid. pp. 31-2.
\textsuperscript{171}Wilkes, *History of the Provinces of the Roman Empire: Dalmatia*, p. 190.
into account this regional discrepancy. The Adriatic nevertheless remained integral to the Illyrian coastal communities and, as shall be discussed later in the chapter, the influx of maritime trade would have made this more appealing for the acquisition of supplies and resources.

**Adriatic Greeks**

Another important geopolitical consideration in Illyria is the Greek influence along the coast, especially as a direct result of earlier colonisation of the region. Greek colonisation in the Adriatic occurred during the 7th to 4th centuries BC with sites being founded at several locations; these locations were largely confined to the central and southern Adriatic and their adjacent islands. These locations were ideal for Greeks to exploit the maritime trading opportunities of the Adriatic, and the archaeological evidence highlights the importance of trade in this region. Trade was conducted primarily on a regional basis, and this can be seen from the distribution of amphorae. In his documentation of *Gnathia* ware in the eastern Adriatic, Mise has noted that out of the sites where Issaean produced *Gnathia* ware have been found, none of these sites are outside of a 60km radius of the settlement. Wilkes notes that ‘for several centuries Greek and Illyrian communities appear to have maintained a separate existence’. The distribution of Gnathia ware however would suggest that in the later time in which Gnathia were prevalent (4th – 2nd Centuries BC), greater cultural immersion had taken place between Greeks and Illyrians in neighbouring settlements. Of particular importance as a Greek coloniser in the region was Corinth; the location of the settlement across the isthmus gave it good naval access to the Adriatic.

Wilkes notes that ‘Epidmanus and Apollonia were for centuries the principal ports for traffic between Greece, the western Balkans and the middle Danube’. The links between Greek colonies in the Adriatic and Greek settlements elsewhere held significance into the period being considered in this thesis. The psephisma in the Appendix (Fig. 7a and 7b), shows an appeal from Pharos in the Adriatic to Paros, its metropolis, in the

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172 This can best be seen from the map provided in the Appendix (Fig. 1.)
173 M. Miše, *Gnathia and Related Hellenistic Ware on the East Adriatic Coast* (Oxford, 2015), p. 41. These sites have Greek and Illyrian origins: Cape Ploća, Trogir, Resnik, Solin, Stobreč, Stari Grad, Lumbarda and Nakovana Cave. The nature of Adriatic trade will be discussed later in the thesis when considering the Illyrians and Adriatic piracy.
174 Wilkes, *The Illyrians*, p. 112.
175 The Corinthians established prominent colonies in the Southern Adriatic and Ionian seas at Corcyra, Epidamnus and Apollonia.
Aegean for aid and assistance during the period being considered in this thesis.\textsuperscript{177} Cabanes notes of the psephisma that ‘it is remarkable to see how a colony turns to its distant metropolis, Paros, for aid and assistance, a fine illustration of the solid ties between the Greek cities and their colonial settlements in the Adriatic Sea.’\textsuperscript{178}

Greek settlement in the Adriatic showed important discrepancy between the Northern Adriatic and the Southern and Central Adriatic. Wilkes notes that no Greek settlement is known to have been founded North of Epidamnus. North of the river Drin neither coast nor hinterland invited permanent settlement and, although Greeks undoubtedly lived and traded in several places, the three formally constituted colonies were all on islands, Black Corcyra, Issa and Pharos.\textsuperscript{179} In his study of the region of Dalmatia, Wilkes further observed important differences between the political structures of a variety of places. He notes that ‘in the southeast there is evidence for a more advanced political development, due largely to the closer contacts with Macedonia and Greece’ and that the only evidence of a political community in the Dalmatian region, that was ruled by the central authority of the king, could be observed in the Ardiaei.\textsuperscript{180} He furthers this by noting that among the Liburnians in the Northern Adriatic, ‘tribal society lasted in places into the Roman period’ whilst ‘elsewhere the majority of the native population remained in a tribal society up to, and in many areas long after, the Roman conquest.’\textsuperscript{181} Roman interests in the various regions of the Adriatic were affected by the differing societies, cultures, political structures and trading networks that existed along the coastline. In the North, ‘the general security of Northern Italy before the Aquileian foundation (181 BC), seems to be of key strategic importance for the Romans’\textsuperscript{182} whilst ‘Roman initial trans-Adriatic engagement was focused chiefly on the south-eastern Adriatic coast’;\textsuperscript{183} in this area, Rome secured its initially diplomatic engagements and fostered burgeoning trade networks. This has led Dzino to consider Roman operations in the Adriatic through two operational zones; the southern zone comprising of ‘the southern Adriatic coast from the border of Epirus up to the border between the Delmatae and Liburni on the river Titius (Krka) with the immediate hinterland’; the northern zone was ‘initially limited to the Histrian territory, but later included the Liburni,

\textsuperscript{177}{The dating, contents and importance of this psephisma shall be discussed later in the thesis.}
\textsuperscript{178}{P. Cabanes, ‘Greek Colonisation in the Adriatic’ in G.R. Tsetskhladze (ed.), Greek Colonisation: An account of Greek colonies and other settlements overseas: Volume II (Leiden, 2008), p. 183.}
\textsuperscript{179}{Wilkes, The Illyrians, p. 113. This can be most clearly seen on the map in the Appendix (Fig. 1).}
\textsuperscript{180}{Wilkes, History of the Provinces of the Roman Empire: Dalmatia, p. 188.}
\textsuperscript{181}{Ibid. p. 190.}
\textsuperscript{182}{Dzino, Illyricum in Roman Politics, pp. 58-9.}
\textsuperscript{183}{Ibid. p. 44.}
Cisalpine Iapodes, Carni and Taurisci.\textsuperscript{184} Although it is unclear whether or not the Romans themselves divided the eastern Adriatic into zones in this manner, the division nevertheless reflects the development of Roman interventions during the period being considered in this thesis; Rome’s greater enthusiasm to intervene in the Southern Adriatic showing correlation with this division.

Furthermore, it is important to address the geopolitical status and relationship between Illyrian and Greek communities in the region. The emergence of a Greco-Illyrian culture in the sixth and fifth centuries BC has been the subject of debate amongst modern scholars. Mano-Zissi and Parović-Pešikan have argued that a greater abundance of Greek style burial goods in the West and Central Balkans during this period reflected the development of a Greco-Illyrian culture through Illyrian craftsmen imitating Greek styles.\textsuperscript{185} Wilkes has exercised a greater degree of caution however, noting the ‘persistent conservatism of Illyrian burial traditions’ particularly regarding the contents of the tumuli burials of the Glasinac plateau.\textsuperscript{186} In addition to the Illyrian goods in these burials, there are examples of metal-ware and pottery of a high standard and jewellery in Greek styles. It remains uncertain whether these goods were designed by Illyrian craftsmen imitating Greek styles or whether they were imports from Greek craftsmen overseas. Wilkes has highlighted this speculation and noted that after the middle of the fifth century BC, Greek imports were absent from Illyrian tombs, bar a few exceptions, with a greater predominance of goods from Italy and the Adriatic after this point.\textsuperscript{187} This trend towards Italian and Adriatic goods for this period is reflected in the greater abundance of \textit{Gnathia} style vases in the region for the later period (4\textsuperscript{th} to 2\textsuperscript{nd} Centuries BC), which shall be discussed later in the chapter. Although the existence of a coherent Greco-Illyrian culture is hard to discern, the greater conglomeration of goods in Greek and later Italian styles in these tombs suggests the greater contact and exchange between these peoples.

The importance of the growing trade networks in the region for the Adriatic Greeks is reflected in the written historical accounts for the initial Roman intervention east of the Adriatic. In the accounts of both Polybius and Appian, the initial Roman intervention in the

\textsuperscript{184}Ibid. p. 62.


\textsuperscript{186}Wilkes, \textit{The Illyrians}, pp. 104-5.

\textsuperscript{187}Ibid. p. 107.
region is framed around the need to come to the aid of Greeks in the region. Eckstein has stressed that the tradition of the Romans coming to the aid of the Issaeans is too propagandistic although the threat posed to the Adriatic Greeks by Illyrian pirates was significant. Eckstein notes that Illyrian piracy was having a ‘deleterious effect on the shipping lanes’ which was exacerbated by Illyrian geopolitical advances that gave them greater potential to conduct further raids. Marasco has argued that the ability for Illyrian pirates to convince the Greek inhabitants of Epidamnus to allow them into their settlement is not suggestive of tense relations between Illyrians and Greeks in the region. Marasco however stresses that after the fall of the Epirote monarchy, the Illyrian pirates had bases and greater resources at their disposal to conduct further raiding and this caused a dramatic escalation of tensions. The importance of these events in Roman decision making will be discussed later in the thesis. The concerns of the Adriatic Greeks, over the piratical threat to their established settlements and trade networks is evident. This emphasises the important developments in the region of Greek commercialisation and the significance that maritime trade had in the region for the Greeks.

**Maritime Trade and Economy**

As mentioned earlier, Greek contact, especially Corinthian influence, was particularly important in the southern Adriatic in preceding periods. Beaumont has highlighted the particular importance of Corinthian trading interests in the region, and that these were based largely on silver and luxuries. Royal has noted ‘a shift to more luxury and economic-based items in the fourth to third centuries B.C.E. is associated with significant numbers of Corinthian amphoras, fine wares, and occasional jewellery in burials at large cities such as Apollonia.’ Trade in luxuries however was not limited to trade with mainland Greece alone. The cosmetic jug displayed in Fig. 3. of the Appendix, was a 4th Century BC import to the Eastern Adriatic from Southern Italy. This might be suggestive of wider trading networks, although the quality rather than quantity of such pieces stands out. Munn asserts that the clustering of Corinthian

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188 Polybius, *Histories* 2. 9 and 2. 5; Appian, *Illyrian Wars* 3. 2. 7.
189 Eckstein, *Rome Enters the Greek East*, p. 36.
190 Ibid.
transport amphorae in the region is indicative of ‘close commercial ties’ between Corinth, Southern Italy and Sicily but notes that there are few Italian or Sicilian imports in Corinth.\textsuperscript{194} This would suggest that although trade was prevalent between Corinth and Magna Graecia, there was a greater market for Corinthian goods in these areas rather than vice versa. The greater prosperity of a trade in luxury goods nevertheless suggests a greater affluence for inhabitants in the Southern Adriatic, with fashionable Greek styles being traded between the Greek settlements in \textit{Magna Graecia} and on the Adriatic coast. This suggests that Greek trade was well established and important in the southern Adriatic before the period being considered in this thesis.

Marine archaeological findings in the area from the 3\textsuperscript{rd} Century BC are few in number, but they enable some insight to be gained on the nature of Adriatic trade. As mentioned earlier, the Illyrian Coast Exploration Programme, which began in 2007 has conducted surveys off the coasts of Albania and Montenegro, gathering data for Southern Adriatic marine archaeology and their initial results have been recently published.\textsuperscript{195} The two shipwrecks that have been excavated from the 3\textsuperscript{rd} Century BC are off the coast of Butrint in modern southern Albania.\textsuperscript{196} The limited number and geographic location of these excavations has limited the potency of the inference that can be drawn from such findings. Butrint, located in the Northern Ionian Sea, south of the Otranto Straits, is not strictly in the Adriatic, although due to its close proximity to the Adriatic, transport in the area was likely to be entering or exiting the Adriatic Sea. The importance of Corcyra, located approximately 10km off the coast of Butrint, as a trading post for the Corinthians, is reflected in Thucydides, who notes that Corinthian vessels would put in at Coreya on voyages north.\textsuperscript{197} Royal, in his analysis of the data, has however noted that ‘the number of wrecks in the Adriatic rose significantly after the Third Century B.C.E., to a peak spanning the Second Century B.C.E to the First Century C.E. – the pattern mirrored in the Mediterranean as a whole’.\textsuperscript{198} Although the number of 3\textsuperscript{rd} Century BC excavations is limited,\textsuperscript{199}

\textsuperscript{195}These have been published by the initiator of the programme: Royal, ‘Illyrian Coastal Exploration Program (2007-2009)’, pp. 405-460. The publication includes a useful tabulation of the data for the shipwrecks examined during the course of the programme. This is included in the Appendix (Fig. 13).
\textsuperscript{196}These have been dated to the 3\textsuperscript{rd} Century BC and 280-260 BC. Both shipwrecks contained cargoes of Corinthian amphorae. The Second Century BC shipwrecks that have been examined are also located off the coast of Butrint and off the Montenegrin Coast at Budvanski Zaliv and Boka Kotorska. For more details of these excavations, see \url{https://rpmnautical.org/expeditions/} (Last Accessed, 30/8/2018)
\textsuperscript{197}Thucydides, \textit{The History of the Peloponnesian War} 1. 37. The island of Corcyra is situated directly opposite Butrint on the Adriatic coast.
it is conducive with the Mediterranean as a whole and as such, the number of shipwrecks does not appear unusual. Royal furthers his analysis of this trend in the data, by stating that the results are ‘inconsistent with the hypothesis that the inflated numbers of sunken merchantmen in the Adriatic are due to heightened piracy in the Third Century B.C.E.’ It is subsequently difficult to infer on the limited results with any degree of certainty. Although the correlation with results across the Mediterranean may indicate that trade was no more significantly disrupted than elsewhere, the limitations of the data render the findings inconclusive, especially to the effects of piracy. The Illyrian raiding tactics and their pirate vessels, with their cargo-holds and without rams, were not indicative of a strategy to sink ships. There are also practical difficulties inherent in acquiring data for earlier shipwrecks which add to the limitations of the data, not least due to the greater age and possible deterioration of the underwater remains.

A much greater quantity of evidence can however be found from recorded data of the distribution of amphorae across the eastern Adriatic region. A particularly useful example of vessels to examine can be found in Gnathia ware, for which a plentiful number of examples have been discovered from the 3rd and 2nd Centuries BC. A recent publication by Miše has, for the first time, catalogued a large number of these Gnathia vases across the Adriatic and has provided great insight into their production and distribution. Although Gnathia ware originated in Southern Italy, Gnathia have been found at several locations in the Eastern Adriatic and a production centre at Issa has also been analysed. This makes Gnathia ware especially useful for documenting connections, contact and commerce between Southern Italy and the Eastern Adriatic. The publication has analysed data collected from tombs, burial sites, sanctuaries and settlements in Southern Italy and the East Adriatic coast. The amalgamation of this data enables a greater amount of inference to be drawn from the findings. The greatest number of examples that have been published for Gnathia ware have been found at Issa. Miše inferred from this, and the inclusion of Issa in the written historical sources for the period, that in the late 3rd and 2nd centuries BC, Issa was a ‘political and economic leader’ as a result of economic growth and ‘with the support of a rising Rome, since Issa became a Roman ally after the Illyrian War in 229 BC’.

199Ibid.
200Miše, Gnathia and Related Hellenistic Ware, pp. 65-155.
201A tabulated version of the data collected by Miše can be seen in the Appendix (Fig. 5.). This provides the number of Gnathia that have been found at a plethora of published sites in the Eastern Adriatic. For more details on the production centre at Issa, see Miše, Gnathia and Related Hellenistic Ware, pp. 38-9
202Miše, Gnathia and Related Hellenistic Ware. Miše breaks the data down into oinochoai, pelikai and skyphoi.
203Miše, Gnathia and Related Hellenistic Ware, p. 62.
importance of Issa is reflected from the 38 *Gnathia* sites excavated. The existence of a production centre for Issaean *Gnathia* moreover is suggestive that Issa was an important commercial centre. The distribution of Issaean produced *Gnathia* ware however is particularly limited, with no examples having been found in the Southern Adriatic. The sites where Issaean *Gnathia* have been found are Cape Ploča, Trogir, Resnik, Solin, Stobreč, Stari Grad, Lumbarda and Nakovana Cave; each of these sites is on the Dalmatian coast or surrounding islands and within 60km of Issa. Whilst Issa was an important commercial centre, its exports were limited to a small catchment area. This would suggest that the bulk of trade was still relatively localised, with the distribution of goods small and in areas both Greek and Illyrian. This also draws additional light on the Issaean appeals that appear in some of the written sources. Appian in particular notes that Issa appealed to Rome when Agron threatened the rest of the Adriatic with his fleet; based on previous Ardiaei targets in the Southern Adriatic, this presumably would have been areas further north. If Issaean trade was regional and concentrated on the central Adriatic, the greater Ardiaean focus on areas further north in the Adriatic would have put greater pressure on Issaean regional trade.

The evidence nevertheless has limitations, especially in the geographic range of the vessels that have been found. *Gnathia* have been predominantly found in the Southern Adriatic, with some examples from the central Adriatic and Dalmatian coast. The evidence drew Miše to the conclusion that the Southern part of the Eastern Adriatic ‘indicated contact with Southern Italy and ‘western Greece…unlike the central and Northern Adriatic, where contacts with mainland Greece are scarce and are so far only documented in Pharos and Issa’. Further archaeological evidence for the central Adriatic has been undertaken at Kaštel on the Adriatic island of Lestovo. Amphorae have been found in two locations on the island, the first group dated from the Bronze Age to the Iron Age and found on the Kaštel hilltop, and the second dated from the early to late Hellenistic period and found on the south slope of the hill. Amphorae from the first group were of the Graeco-Italic type, consisting of Corinthian B and Lamboglia 2 vases; those from the second group included black gloss fragments, ‘reddish-clay’ vases, a few *Gnathia* fragments and sherds from Issaean jugs. Some correlation can be seen

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204 See Appendix (Fig. 5.).
205 Miše, *Gnathia and Related Hellenistic Ware*, p. 41.
207 Miše, *Gnathia and Related Hellenistic Ware*, p. 63.
208 Lestovo is an island off the Dalmatian coast, approximately 60km South East of Issa.
between the findings on Lestovo and those of the Southern Adriatic; Corinthian vases being prominent in the preceding period and Issaean pottery and *Gnathia* vases emerging in the Hellenistic period. Although there is a lack of evidence from the Northern Adriatic, *Gnathia* have proven informative about trade networks in the Central and Southern Adriatic; trade with Southern Italy being particularly important to a consideration of Illyrian piracy in the Third Century BC that will be covered in the next chapter. *Gnathia* were the first type of ware from Southern Italy to be widely distributed from its main area of production; the late Apulian red-figure vases which influenced *Gnathia* were rarely exported outside of Apulia.\(^{210}\) Whilst evidence for trade between Southern Italy and the East Adriatic coast can be informative, the exporting of this type of ware was still in relative infancy during the 3rd Century BC. It is in this context of greater exporting from Southern Italy to the Eastern Adriatic coast in the 3rd Century BC that Illyrian piracy needs to be considered. The impact of piracy on these burgeoning trade networks would have been greater than in previous periods.

The types of *Gnathia* that have been catalogued, *oinochoai*, *pelikai* and *skyphoi* are often used in the preservation and consumption of wine.\(^{211}\) Earlier Greek amphorae found in the region, predominantly Corinthian B and Lamboglia 2 vessels, are also indicative of a trade in perishable goods, particularly wine. Kay has noted that these vessels most likely carried wine, although olive oil is another possibility.\(^{212}\) Strabo notes that on both seaboards of the Adriatic, the olive and the vine flourished, although the Illyrians had not effectively taken advantage of it on account of ignorance and piracy; an absence of the vine in the mountainous and northern regions of Illyria is also noted.\(^{213}\) Although obviously an example of a pejorative stereotype against the Illyrian people, Strabo’s account stresses the importance of rich resources of olives and wine to both seaboards of the central and southern Adriatic. Wine consumption as a motif also features on bronze Greek coinage from a coin hoard on Pharos dated from the late 3rd Century and early 2nd Century BC.\(^{214}\) The feature of this motif on coinage may be suggestive of the importance of the industry to the local economy or culture. Kay has further highlighted the importance of the wine trade for the Adriatic and has suggested that a

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\(^{210}\) Miše, *Gnathia and Related Hellenistic Ware*, p. 15.

\(^{211}\) For more details on these different types of *Gnathia* vessels, see Miše, *Gnathia and Related Hellenistic Ware*, pp. 31-4. An example of an imported southern Italian *pelike* from the 3rd Century BC can be seen in the Appendix (Fig. 2.)


\(^{213}\) Strabo, *Geography* 7. 5.

\(^{214}\) Coins from this coin hoard are shown in the Appendix (Fig. 4.).
boom occurred in the export of Italian wine in the Adriatic in the Second and First centuries BC. This would suggest that the better securing of Southern Adriatic trade routes by the Roman Republic enabled an even greater export culture to flourish. The construction of the Via Egnatia by the end of the Second Century BC, connecting Dyrrachium to Byzantium would have enhanced trade routes across the Otranto Straits and the Balkan peninsula, suggesting a Roman desire to secure and enhance trade in the region. It is certainly not clear what sort of goods may have eventually been pirated in the Third Century BC, nor can the material evidence inform on such matters. Nevertheless, the evidence is suggestive that a promising trade in wine and the accoutrements of its consumption was present in the 3rd Century BC, accounting for a good portion of the cargo vessels that have been found. Subsequently, if the Illyrian pirates were seizing cargo, vessels used in the preservation and consumption of wine were an important component of the cargo that was extant during the period.

Furthermore, additional material evidence to inform on the nature of Adriatic trade can be found by examining the distribution of Roman coinage in the Eastern Adriatic. This is most commonly examined by looking at Adriatic coin hoards. Derow has noted a Roman bronze coin hoard at Mazin, likely dated from the 1st Century BC, although he notes that the bronze coins were valued more for their metal content than the fact that they were Roman. Evidence of Adriatic bronze coinage is not solely evident for Roman coinage. Evans noted in his archaeological study of the region that the narrative of ‘the piratic and barbarous side of Illyrian life’ did not accurately reflect his findings. Evans instead suggested that ‘the indigenous coinage existing at Rhizon, Scodra, Lissos and the isle of Pharos, and even among the mainland tribe of the Daorsi, is itself a proof that more commercial interests were developing among the aborigines of the Adriatic coast’. Royal has asserted that ‘many Illyrian towns, such as Byllis, Scodra, and Amantia, began to issue bronze coins in the third century B.C.E., another indication of economic complexity.’ This would suggest that the economic situation in the Adriatic did not change dramatically with the introduction of Roman coinage. Dzino has asserted that in contrast to the Northern Adriatic, evidence for coinage in the Southern Adriatic is more useful due to the greater number of Illyrian tribes who minted their own coins in the

217Evans, Ancient Illyria: An Archaeological Exploration, p. 43.
218Royal, ‘Illyrian Coastal Exploration Program (2007-2009)’, p. 437. See also the Appendix (Fig. 4.) for an example of a Greek bronze coinage hoard from the same period.
Whilst this coinage is informative of the greater economic power of Southern Illyrian tribes, it cannot effectively inform on Adriatic trade. Crawford has stressed the limited use of coinage in informing on Adriatic trade based on the lack of strong evidence;

‘Trade across the Adriatic between the mid-third century and the mid-first century was not conducted with coinage as an object of trade. On the other hand, there is a fair amount of evidence throughout this period for the movement of isolated pieces across the Adriatic, mostly pieces of low value; they cannot be regarded as in any sense objects of trade…the numismatic evidence is worth recalling, in order to set it beside the evidence of Polybius for trade across the Starits of Otranto, interference with which by Illyrian privateers was regarded by Polybius as provoking the Romans into fighting the First Illyrian War’.  

As such, the distribution of coinage does not present strong enough evidence to effectively inform on Adriatic trade. The variety of coin hoards across the Adriatic in the 3rd Century BC feature a variety of coinage from Greek, Roman and Illyrian sources, with the majority found in the Central and Southern Adriatic. The lack of Roman coinage during the 3rd Century BC across the Eastern Adriatic limits whatever inference can be drawn. Nevertheless, the predominance of coin hoards with Illyrian and Greek coinage in the Central and Southern Adriatic highlights the importance of commercial contacts in the region during the 3rd century BC.

**Illyria and Macedon**

Relations between Illyrians and the Kingdom of Macedon traditionally followed an inconsistent pattern, fluctuating between affability and hostility. This is reflected in the earliest reference to such relations in Thucydides' account of the Battle of Lyncestis in 423 BC. The account details the hiring of Illyrian mercenaries by the Macedonian king only for them in turn to betray the Macedonians and switch sides. The hiring of Illyrian mercenaries is well attested in antiquity, most particularly by Macedon. Eckstein describes their use as a 'strategic tool' for Macedonian rulers to employ and asserts that the Antigonids had long been in the habit of using Illyrians as mercenary troops before 231 BC. As mentioned earlier in the chapter,

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economic opportunities for Illyrians through much of antiquity had been limited. In addition to
the allure of piracy for economic gain on the coast, the trade of mercenary soldiery may have
been an appealing job opportunity for Illyrians also. The use of Illyrian mercenaries by
Macedon and the unstable nature of such relations continued into the period being considered
in this thesis, with the association of Scerdilaidas with Macedon. Polybius asserts that
Serdilaidas was moved to betray Philip V over a lack of payment and subsequently made
attacks on Macedonian territory. Illyrian and Macedonian alliances throughout antiquity
were thus short lived and tended to be founded on financial rather than cultural, social or
political reasoning. As a result, the alliances tended to be volatile; dependent on the financial
agreement holding water and the absence of a higher bidder. Dzino notes that 'the rivalry of
Macedonian and Illyrian kings made this alliance more frequently a theory rather than a
practice and never a matter of serious trouble for the Romans'. Subsequently, any fear that
the Romans may have had for traditional links between the two entities was balanced by the
volatility of such links. Illyrian and Macedonian relations and potential allegiances or hostilities
were dependent on their respective interests; interests that Rome could try and appeal to.

The existence of Illyrian and Macedonian relations during Rome’s initial interventions
in the First and Second Illyrian Wars have caused some debate over their implications on
Rome’s outlook. The evidence for these relations is particularly weak and any resulting
allegiances forged were not directed against Rome. Illyrian involvement in the battles of
Medion in 231 BC and Sellasia in 222 BC have drawn questions regarding the nature of
associations between the Illyrian rulers and the Macedonian state. Polybius notes that Agron at
Medion had been induced by a Macedonian bribe to fight the Aetolians as Demetrius II was
preoccupied. In similar fashion to earlier allegiances, the key elements were a Macedonian
payment for a mercenary force and a short-term alliance. Demetrius' role at Sellasia in 222 BC
has received greater attention in the secondary literature, however. Wilkes asserts that an
alliance of the Macedonians and Illyrians was revived at Sellasia, presumably also inferring
that an alliance had existed at Medion. Coppola has furthered this by arguing that Polybius' use
of the term σύμμαχος is demonstrative of a formal alliance existing between the two
states. Walbank agrees that Demetrius had allied himself with Macedon, but he makes a clear
distinction between the formal members of the Hellenic Alliance and those personally allied to

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223 Polybius, Histories 5. 95.
224 Dzino, Illyricum in Roman Politics 229BC-AD68, p. 45.
225 Polybius, Histories 2. 2.
226 Wilkes, The Illyrians, p. 162.
227 Coppola, Demetrio di Faro, p. 58; Polybius, Histories 2. 65.
Antigonus as king, of which Demetrius should be included. The wording from Polybius’ passage is indeed indicative of an alliance between the two entities, but more needs to be said of the term συμμαχία. The term is used generally to refer to an alliance and its literal meaning of ‘fighting together’ provides a particular military context for the allegiance. Sholten in this regard has described the arrangement as a Macedonian and Illyrian ‘ad hoc alliance’. The alliance itself was based on the personal allegiance of the two leaders and was forged out of a military need. As such, the alliance may well have been more of a temporary arrangement. Macedon at no point came to the aid of Demetrius during the Second Illyrian War, merely allowing him amnesty after his defeat. Eckstein adds to this by noting that the following year, Demetrius and Scerdilaidas raided Pylos, a Macedonian ally through its membership of the Achaean League. As such, early Illyrian and Macedonian alliances seem makeshift affairs, forged primarily for the requirements and purposes of military campaigns. Roman concerns for the potential emergence of such alliances was subsequently more prominent in the context of war; an issue that would become increasingly important with the greater Roman involvement in the eastern Adriatic in the 3rd Century BC.

These concerns regarding the formation of a Macedonian and Illyrian alliance were most pronounced during the concurrent Roman campaigns against Perseus and Genthius. Polybius describes the allegiance as a friendship and alliance between the two states and notes that the agreement came into force on the payment of three hundred talents to Genthius and an exchange of hostages. Whilst the terminology used by Polybius is indicative of a more formal alliance, the importance in the agreement of a Macedonian payment to the Illyrian king is once more reflective of the importance of the short-term military context. Appian has however stressed Roman concerns over Perseus' strong position and the further reinforcement of his position through alliances. Derow has pointed to the potential serious threat that Genthius may have posed the Romans, albeit one which never materialised. By hyping up the threat posed by the alliance of Perseus and Genthius, Appian is able to place the Romans in greater peril and in doing so further stress Rome's great success in the campaign in defeating

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230 Eckstein, Rome Enters the Greek East, p. 65.
231 Polybius, Histories 29. 3.
232 Appian, Macedonian Affairs Fragment 11.
both rulers. Once more the lack of a Macedonian payment to their Illyrian ally caused considerable tension in the allegiance between the two rulers.\textsuperscript{234} This again demonstrates the important threads which held such alliances together. During the prelude to the conflict, Rome had sought on multiple occasions to consolidate their pre-existing relations with Genthius.\textsuperscript{235} Genthius was playing his cards close to his chest, hoping to secure a preferable arrangement for himself. The Romans were perhaps acutely aware of this, and the importance of their diplomatic ties in the region, in their intervention in the Third Illyrian War.

The growing involvement of Rome in Illyrian affairs increased the geopolitical importance of the Romans to the Illyrians. In this context, Illyria operated as a geopolitically inferior or weaker entity in the process of diplomacy with Rome. Eckstein, in applying Realist international relations theory, has stressed that ‘weaker states had been seeking the protection of stronger states against dangerous local threats for centuries in the Greek world – and for that matter, in the Western Mediterranean as well’.\textsuperscript{236} In the anarchic system in place before the establishment of Roman hegemony, weaker entities such as Illyria would act out of self-maximisation, seeking the protection of stronger neighbours due to security concerns. In this regard, Illyrian leaders were more inclined to seek the protection of Rome, whose geopolitical status was on the rise. Eckstein however proceeds to question why the weaker states he examined, namely Rhodes, Pergamon, Egypt and Athens sought accommodation with Rome rather than the Macedonians or Seleucids.\textsuperscript{237} The situation in Illyria however worked differently, with Illyrian leaders caught between Rome and Macedon for their support. In this environment, Illyrian rulers could effectively bargain for the best deal possible with either rival stronger entity. Wilkes has stressed that ‘for around 20 years (after 189 BC), a king of Illyria (Pleuratus) profited from the hostility between Rome and Macedonia, but matters were to turn out very differently for his successor’.\textsuperscript{238} Although Genthius and Pleuratus employed different strategies in dealing with the Romans during this period, the growing importance of their dealings with Rome reflected the increasing geopolitical importance of Rome to Illyria. As shall be discussed later in the thesis, the establishment of Roman hegemony in the region ensured that Illyrian geopolitics were centred around Rome, whose status in the region challenged and eventually superseded tribal geopolitical structures and Macedonian influences.

\textsuperscript{234}Plutarch, \textit{Life of Aemilius Paillus} 13.
\textsuperscript{235}Livy, \textit{ab urbe condita} 42. 29. and 42. 37.
\textsuperscript{236}Eckstein, \textit{Rome Enters the Greek East}, p. 219.
\textsuperscript{237}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{238}Wilkes, \textit{The Illyrians}, p. 171.
**Illyrian Kings**

Pre-Roman Illyria was a region known for its kings and the Greek sources often refer to the existence of a ‘king of the Illyrians’. Hammond in his work on the Illyrian kingdoms in the pre-Roman period, stressed that ‘when a Greek author described a man as ‘king of the Illyrians’ or as ‘king of Illyrians’, he was using the word ‘Illyrians’ in a general sense to indicate that he ruled over some Illyrian tribes, and not in a specific sense to indicate that he ruled over one particular tribe called Illyrian’.²³⁹ At various times in history, some of these tribal kingdoms rose to pre-eminence and acquired the label amongst our sources.²⁴⁰ The kings referred to by the title are more plentiful in the ancient historical sources for the period being considered in this thesis, rather than preceding periods. This may be due to the greater historical coverage of the Illyrians during this period, or it could be due to the greater power exercised by Agron from his predecessors. Polybius notes that Agron possessed a greater land and maritime power than any previous Illyrian king.²⁴¹ In either case, the prominence of the kings of the period being considered in this thesis is noteworthy, especially in relation to previous periods where few examples emerge of especially powerful and significant kings.

For later rulers during the period covered in the thesis, the terminology used to describe their status is more complex. The most references to the aforementioned titles of ‘King of Illyria’ or ‘King of the Illyrians’ are afford to Genthius, although modern scholars are still uncertain if Genthius was a king of the Ardiaei or the Labeatae. Dzino has noted that the ‘rise of Scerdilaidas was at the same time a period of transition of power from the Ardiaei to the Labeatae.’²⁴² Gruen, on the other hand, asserts that Pleuratus ruled the Ardiaei and his successor was Genthius.²⁴³ Although the line of succession is uncertain, it is possible that Scerdilaidas, Agron’s brother, was ruler of the Labeatae in 205 BC whilst Pleuratus, his son, ruled the Ardiaei; on the death of the former, his son Pleuratus gaining control of both tribal groups. The status of Demetrius of Pharos after being established in his position by the Romans in the aftermath of the First Illyrian War has also caused debate in the scholarship. Appian


²⁴¹Polybius, *Histories* 2. 2.

²⁴²Dzino, *Illyricum in Roman Politics*, p. 53.

describes Demetrius as Agron’s leader in Pharos; Demetrius was given Corcyra also. Polybius, by contrast, affords Demetrius no royal title, merely distinguishing him by his location. It is perhaps unsurprising that Polybius afford Demetrius with no royal title, given the hostility Polybius shows towards him in his account. Dio asserts that Demetrius had become the de-facto regent of the Ardiaei on account of the infant Pinnes, through his marriage to the boy’s mother, Triteuta. With such discrepancy amongst the sources, it is perhaps unsurprising that modern scholars have preferred to use a more generic term to describe Demetrius’ status. Dzino, Dell and Gruen have all chosen to use the term ‘dynast’ to refer to Demetrius. Whilst this more generic title is largely appropriate, it nevertheless carries certain assumptions. Dell notes that a dynast had certain expectations amongst his people to engage in warfare (especially raiding as an Illyrian dynast), and the term ‘dynast’ often implies membership of a ‘dynasty’. As such, the generic term ‘ruler’ is perhaps more appropriate for Demetrius of Pharos, who was appointed by the Romans to his status (his status on Pharos under Agron, as ‘leader’, is more difficult to define), rather than inheriting it as part of a dynasty.

An important source of evidence for Illyrian kings has been coinage, although a lack of examples for Illyrian kings during the period has limited the inference that can be drawn from the evidence. The only examples of coins minted by an Illyrian king for the period being considered in this thesis are for Genthius. Wilkes has noted that among the 131 tombs of a late third and early second centuries BC cemetery of Gostilj, several coins issued during the reign of Genthius and after his deposition were found. Genthius’ coinage has featured in a number of archaeological findings from Scodra; the coins depicting him in profile with a καυσία (obverse) and usually a light Illyrian vessel (most probably a λέμβος (reverse)). Šašel Kos has noted that the vessel on the reverse of the coin could be indicative of a strong maritime power. This is certainly possible, although a maritime motif was a common feature on

244 Appian, *Illyrian Wars* 3. 2. 7.
245 Polybius, *Histories* 3. 16.
246 Ibid. Polybius highlights the ingratitude and temerity of Demetrius, who had forgotten the former kindness afforded to him by the Romans.
247 Dio Cassius, *Roman History* 12. 53 (preserved in Zonaras 8. 20.).
249 Ibid.
Illyrian coinage. The καυσία was a well-known Macedonian fishing hat, but it also had connotations by this time with the Illyrians. An Illyrian stereotype is presented in Plautus’ early 2nd Century BC comedy *Trinummus*, where a swindler enters the stage complete with an enormous καυσία; Charmides comments on his appearance noting that he has the look and countenance of an Illyrian and that his head appears like a giant mushroom on account of the enormity of the brimmed hat. Dzino notes that the ‘Illyrian look’ referred to by Plautus would have been well known to the audience. It is thus likely that the look was synonymous with Illyrians as well as Macedonians by the time Genthius inherited the throne. Genthius’ political status in Illyria however has come into question regarding the possible centralisation of his kingdom. Dzino has suggested that Genthius’ coinage may be indicative of a desire to introduce a greater centralisation to his kingdom ‘following after the model of a Macedonian kingdom.’ With the availability of coinage available, this is entirely possible; minting coins on this scale would be indicative of a stronger centralised government. Any link made however between Genthius’ style of kingship and that of Macedon is more tenuous.

The notion of Genthius’ centralisation of the Illyrian government has however raised debate in the literature. Livy asserts that Genthius was organising marauders to conduct Adriatic piracy and that Issaean envoys had come before the Senate to plead their case against Genthius. Gruen stresses that it cannot be determined how veracious the account is, or how much Rome believed it, but highlights the target of piracy being Istria. By contrast, Šašel Kos has stressed that Genthius wasn’t able to control his subjects, but asserts that it is impossible to conclude whether or not the Issaean allegations were false. Polybius asserts that upon Genthius’ ascension, the Dalmatians broke away from Genthius’ rule, albeit at a nondescript time. The context that this passage appears in Polybius is to events in 158 BC referring back to the reign of Genthius and subsequently it cannot be accurately determined when the action took place. It would nevertheless indicate a lack of central authority from Genthius, and this may explain his desire to centralise the government of his kingdom. Dzino notes that the Issaeans may have been lobbying at Rome against Genthius, on account of their hostilities with him. Once more this may well be true; the potency of envoys and their

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255 Dzino, *Illyricum in Roman Politics*, pp. 54-5.
256 Livy, *ab urbe condita* 40. 42 and 42. 26.
259 Dzino, *Illyricum in Roman Politics*, p. 56.
complaints was noted in the Second Century BC, especially in their conflicts with Macedon. The suggestion of a link between Genthius and Perseus in this context may have given more credence for Rome of their cause. Whether or not the greater centralisation of Genthius’ government can be determined from the written accounts or extant coinage is difficult to ascertain. The minting of coins nevertheless reflects operations on a grand scale, and with a lack of extant examples of coinage from earlier kings in the period, it is indicative of the greater scale of operations being conducted by Genthius during his reign.

**The rise of the Ardiaei**

It is important to also consider at this stage the importance of the emergence of the Ardiaean kingdom to the geopolitical landscape during the period being considered in this thesis and the implications of this on the subsequent Roman interventions. The importance of the emergence of the Ardiaei was first attested by Polybius, who noted that Agron had at his disposal, a greater land and maritime power than any previous Illyrian ruler.\(^{260}\) This power became manifest by the Illyrian victory over the Aetolian League in 231 BC.\(^{261}\) Wilkes has highlighted the importance of this victory over a famed league of Greek city states, asserting that it ‘caused a sensation in Greece’.\(^{262}\) Eckstein however has noted that ‘this fit a pattern going back 150 years: whenever Greek states on the Illyrians’ frontiers were beset with military and/or political weakness, the result was Illyrian expansion’.\(^{263}\) Hammond documents some of these occurrences, including Bardylis in the 4\(^{th}\) Century BC taking advantage of Macedonian and Epirotic weaknesses, and Glaukias taking advantage of Molossian weaknesses in the early 3\(^{rd}\) Century BC.\(^{264}\) Polybius’ statement, especially in regard to the land forces of the aforementioned kings alluded to by Hammond, appears hyperbolic. This may be due to the Aetolian bias in Polybius’ account. Walbank notes that Polybius’ source for this section is predominantly Greek and the ‘narrative is strongly prejudiced against Aetolia’.\(^{265}\) The original Greek source material would likely over-estimate the impact of the Ardiaean emergence on account of the shock it caused in Greece and Polybius would have likely relished the

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\(^{260}\) Polybius, *Histories* 2. 2.

\(^{261}\) Ibid.

\(^{262}\) Wilkes, *The Illyrians*, p. 158.

\(^{263}\) Eckstein, *Rome Enters the Greek East*, p. 34.


opportunity to highlight this downturn in Aetolian fortunes. Beaumont has however argued that the statement by Polybius is unequivocal and indicates that Agron was the first ruler on the eastern Adriatic coast to have an organised maritime power.\textsuperscript{266} Although the growth of an Illyrian power along the coast had some historical precursors, what was particularly important to Ardiaean power that set the kingdom apart, was their coastal position on the Adriatic and their ability to take advantage of that element. Dell has described this change as ‘a transformation of Illyrian piracy from disorganised sorties aimed at procuring foodstuffs to something like large scale raids and incipient imperialism’.\textsuperscript{267} The Ardiaean pirates were operating on a scale not previously seen. As shall be further discussed in the next chapter, instances of piracy from the evidence prior to 231 BC were sporadic, and poorly documented at best, whilst the Ardiaean raids were conducted on a greater scale.

Moreover, the emergence of the Ardiaean power in the eastern Adriatic should be seen in relation to the concurrent collapse of the Epirote monarchy. The capture of Phoenice, a key settlement in the newly formed Epirote League, encouraged greater Ardiaean activity in the region.\textsuperscript{268} Having taken Phoenice, the Illyrians targeted Epidamnus, Apollonia and Corcyra in the Ionian Gulf.\textsuperscript{269} These targets have particular strategic importance for the Southern Adriatic; control over these sites gave the Illyrians a strong power base North and South of the Otranto Straits. Moreover, these cities, as discussed earlier, were sites of prosperous trade and were vulnerable with the decline in Epirote power; an all too appealing target for Illyrian raiding. The collapse of the Epirote monarchy created a power vacuum in the region, which the Illyrians sought to take advantage of. Eckstein has asserted that this constituted an ‘Illyrian geopolitical expansion’.\textsuperscript{270} The collapse of the hegemonic in the region of Epirus, the Epirote monarchy created a geopolitical imbalance; this imbalance created an opportunity for the Ardiaei to undertake this geopolitical expansion.

Subsequent diplomatic relations between the Illyrians and the Epirotes need to be considered however, the implications of these has raised debate amongst modern scholars. Gruen has argued that these relations took the form of a ‘diplomatic revolution’ as the pirate-
raiding Ardiaei transitioned from ‘buccaneers to respectable imperialists’.\textsuperscript{271} This can be seen in the sources which indicate a shift from raiding to more conventional forms of warfare in naval battles and sieges.\textsuperscript{272} Gruen however furthers this by arguing that the Ardiaei in 229 BC were drawn by the prospect of a renewed invasion of Greece and were ‘intent on becoming a major power in Hellas’\textsuperscript{273} Gruen perhaps overstates the importance of Greek conquest for the Ardiaei. The passage of Polybius is particularly untrustworthy; Walbank notes that it is largely an annalistic version of events and the interview later in the passage bears strong hallmarks of Rome ‘fighting to avenge an outrage’.\textsuperscript{274} By elevating the importance of Greek conquest for the Ardiaei, the annalistic tradition could present Greece as greatly imperilled by the Illyrians and in need of an avenging force to protect them. The most direct and potent Ardiaean threats to Greece were conducting a year earlier, with raids as far south as the southern Peloponnesse.\textsuperscript{275} Teuta, in Polybius’ account becomes more determined to harm the Greeks upon seeing the rich spoils taken from the Ardiaean capture of Phoenice.\textsuperscript{276} The immediate subsequent actions of Ardiaean pirates however, in attacking Italian traders is suggestive of broader Ardiaean goals than those exclusively set on Greece.

**Roman Activity in the Adriatic**

In examining the initial Roman interventions in Illyria, it is important to posit these in the wider context of Roman activity in the Adriatic during the Third Century BC. In the aftermath of the Pyrrhic War, the Romans sought to consolidate their position over Magna Graecia, and, in particular, Southern Italy. It is important to consider the implications of the foundation of a Latin colony at Brundisium in 244 BC. Eckstein has noted that the foundation of the colony was indicative of ‘senatorial concern about the raiders in the Straits of Otranto’ rather than concerns over the emergence of a powerful Ardiaean state.\textsuperscript{277} Eckstein is correct to dismiss the credibility of Roman concerns over the Ardiaean state, but more needs to be stated regarding the aforementioned escalation of Ardiaean activity in the aftermath of the foundation.

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\item \textsuperscript{271}Gruen, *The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome*, p. 364.
\item \textsuperscript{272}Polybius, *Histories* 2. 9-10.; Appian, *Illyrian Wars* 3. 2. 7.
\item \textsuperscript{273}Gruen, *The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome*, p. 364.
\item \textsuperscript{274}Walbank, *A Historical Commentary on Polybius: Volume I*, pp. 158-9.
\item \textsuperscript{275}Polybius, *Histories* 2. 5.; Plutarch, *Life of Cleomenes* 10. 6.
\item \textsuperscript{276}Polybius, *Histories* 2. 8.
\item \textsuperscript{277}Ibid.
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of the colony rather than the preceding period. The importance of Brundisium as the major Roman port of embarkation to the East is well attested in antiquity, but specific mention should be made here of its immediate importance to the Roman interventions under consideration. Cassius Dio makes specific mention of Brundisium as the port from which the maltreated Italian traders sailed and Polybius notes that troops sent across in the consequent campaign sailed from Brundisium. Cassius Dio makes specific mention of Brundisium as the port from which the maltreated Italian traders sailed and Polybius notes that troops sent across in the consequent campaign sailed from Brundisium. Harris however has stressed that the foundation of the Roman colony was demonstrative of Rome's growing ambition over Italy's south eastern coastal waters whilst Fronda has maintained that the measure was primarily taken to better secure Roman control over Magna Graecia. The location of Brundisium's port overlooking the Otranto Strait, gave Brundisium strategic positioning for a short Adriatic crossing and it also served to improve trade links with the Southern Adriatic. As has been discussed, trade in the Southern Adriatic was diverse and prosperous and the foundation of Brundisium could be indicative of a greater Roman desire to become involved in this trade. The impact of attacks on Italian traders in the Southern Adriatic would have been exacerbated by the foundation of the Latin colony and the extension of the Appian Way. Brundisium offered a strong natural harbour that would have encouraged trade across the Adriatic and through the strengthened link to Rome and Campania provided by the Appian Way, reverberations in trade disruption could have extended beyond the vicinity of South Eastern Italy.

Rome’s primary concern in the Northern Adriatic in the 230s and 220s BC, on the other hand, was in dealing with the tribes of Cisalpine Gaul and in settling the ager Gallicus. The written historical accounts for these events are particularly dramatic. Polybius, in discussing the gathering together of Gallic forces in 231 BC describes a great anxiety in Rome and harkens back to the events of 390 BC and the Gallic sack of Rome. Plutarch presents an even more dramatic scene in his Life of Marcellus, where Roman panic is such that two Greeks and two Gauls are buried alive and mysterious and secret ceremonies continue in Plutarch’s day in memory of these victims. Whether or not the panic in Rome reached such a level is dubious, especially considering that a Gallic invasion did not materialised until the 220s. Nevertheless, the idea of a large Gallic army invading Italy may well have conjured up the evocative sack of

278 Dio Cassius, Roman History 12.49; Polybius, Histories 2.11.
280 The ager Gallicus, literally ‘Field of the Gauls’ was a region on the North Adriatic Italian coast, directly north of Picenum. The area was captured from the Senones Gauls in the early 3rd Century BC and settled by the Romans in 232 BC with the passage of the lex Flaminia.
281 Polybius, Histories 2. 22-3.
282 Plutarch, Life of Marcellus 3. 4.
Rome in 390 BC. The scene presented in Plutarch is reminiscent of an episode in Livy, recalling the burying alive of two unchaste vestal virgins during the Second Punic War as a means of purifying the city and restoring confidence amongst the public after the disastrous defeat at Cannae.²⁸³ Although it is difficult to determine the veracity of such events, the dramatic tone is utilised to hyperbolically present the panic and anxiety that such events may have caused for the Roman population. Rankin notes that in the campaign against the Gauls, ‘the fighting was savage, and, from a Roman point of view, the outcome cannot have seemed certain”.²⁸⁴ The mustering of a large army to deal with the Gallic threat is indicative of the primacy of this concern for the Romans.²⁸⁵ This in turn raises questions about the sending of a large army, in such a context, across the Adriatic to deal with the Illyrians. Polybius’ account features an immediate jump between the events of 231 BC (2.22) and 225 BC (2.23). The urgent enrolling of legions on both occasions would suggest that the initial army that was enrolled was disbanded sometime in the interim 6 years.²⁸⁶ Although an uncertainty over when the Gauls may have attacked must have persisted, the gap of six years would have presented an opportunity for Rome to send a large army across the Adriatic. This would have been particularly apparent with the large number of troops already enrolled in Italy in preparation for a potential campaign against the Gauls.

Rome’s settling of the ager Gallicus was a more proactive geopolitical step undertaken by the Roman Republic but was carried out for a variety of reasons other than purely out of a desire to exert greater control over the Northern Adriatic. Feig Vishnia has argued that the settlers of the ager Gallicus may have been those attacked by the Illyrian pirates in the build-up to the First Illyrian War. Feig Vishnia asserts that maritime transportation was the most preferable means of transporting the persons and cargo to the area, with Arminium and Brundisium suggested as possible harbours for the execution of the operation; the cargo and persons themselves being particularly tempting to Illyrian pirates.²⁸⁷ Although maritime transport would have potentially been easier, the location of Brundisium in Southern Italy ensured that it was counter intuitive to settling Roman citizens in the North. The tendency for ships to traverse the eastern seaboard of the Adriatic presents further difficulties in this

²⁸³Livy, ab urbe condita 22. 57. Polybius does not include this event, merely noting despair and tremendous alarm over an impending Carthaginian attack on the city. (Polybius, Histories 3. 118.).
²⁸⁵Polybius, Histories 2. 22-3.
²⁸⁶Ibid.
analysis.\textsuperscript{288} The \textit{lex Flaminia} was highly controversial at the time; the passage of the law has been seen as an early example of land reform and Polybius blamed Flaminius for instigating the conflict with the Gauls.\textsuperscript{289} Walbank has noted that the hostility in the account towards Flaminius is exaggerated and ‘seems to reflect the hostility of his (Flaminius’) senatorial opponents transmitted through Fabius Pictor’.\textsuperscript{290} The action of settling the \textit{ager Gallicus} through the \textit{lex Flaminia} was a means by which Rome could extend its geopolitical control over the Northern Adriatic. Walbank has stated that ‘certainly Flaminius is subsequently associated with a policy of expansion of Northern Italy.’\textsuperscript{291} Although a proactive step, Roman motivation was not directed at gaining greater naval control over the Northern Adriatic, but was motivated by the internal politics of land reform and to gain greater control over Northern Italy.

It is furthermore important to consider the contextual importance of the Roman campaigns against the Histrians in the 3\textsuperscript{rd} and 2\textsuperscript{nd} Centuries BC as they relate to this extension of Roman geopolitical expansion. As mentioned earlier, Dzino divides the Roman operations into two sectors, the Northern Adriatic and the Southern Adriatic, with Histria being an area located in the former.\textsuperscript{292} The campaign, as such, has been observed in the context of the Roman campaigns in Northern Italy. Sampson has recently suggested that the Histrian campaign provided an important bridge between the two theatres for the Romans with Istria serving as an important area to secure for wider Adriatic security concerns.\textsuperscript{293} Evidence for the Roman campaign against the Histrians, however, is limited and not particularly informative. Dio makes a brief reference to a campaign of subjugation in the region whilst Eutropius has provided a justification for the war in Histrian piracy directed against Roman grain ships.\textsuperscript{294} Harris has noted the similarities between Eutropius’ cause of the war and the origins of the First Illyrian War although he notes that the aggression shown by Rome in the Histrian campaign is more

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288 The notion that transport vessels would sail up the western seaboard or across the Adriatic only to re-cross the Sea is problematic. Pirate ships moreover that were carrying out significant and profitable raids off the eastern seaboard would be unlikely to traverse the Adriatic.
292 Dzino, \textit{Illyricum in Roman Politics}, p. 62. Dzino also suggests that a ‘joint action’ between Demetrius of Pharos and the Histrians led to the Second Illyrian War. Ibid. p. 52.
294 Dio Cassius, \textit{Roman History} preserved in Zonaras 8. 20; Eutropius, \textit{Abridgement of Roman History} 3. 7.
\end{footnotes}
striking. Given the lack of evidence of the campaign in other sources, Eutropius is perhaps attempting to link the two events to further the issue of Adriatic piracy. Nevertheless, a desire to better secure Adriatic shipping appears to be evident once again suggesting the issue’s importance to the Roman Republic during the period. The effect of Histrian piracy on the trade of grain in the Northern Adriatic is hard to effectively ascertain. Dell has asserted that the grain ships must have been moving North from Italy to support the Roman armies in Cisalpine Gaul and that the ships may have moved towards the eastern Adriatic shore for greater safety. Although the direction of travel is impossible to determine, this would be in line with the traditional routes of travel mentioned earlier. Dell goes on to argue that the Roman grain ships would have amounted to an ‘extremely valuable haul’ to would-be pirates. Rather than being indicative of the grain trade in the Northern Adriatic, the piracy was targeted more directly towards the functioning of the Roman army. This would have inspired a strong-armed response from the Roman Republic.

**Conclusion**

The Illyrian geopolitical landscape prior to the Roman interventions was complex and consisted of a series of disparate communities, cultures and political entities. This geopolitical incoherence derived in part from the physical geography and topography of the region, which shaped the political, economic and cultural outlooks of the various Illyrian tribes. As Dzino has noted, ‘politically the organisation of those indigenous groups (...) was deeply rooted in its kinship structure, rather than in the development of more sophisticated institutions of the polis or kingdom’. Greater diversity existed regarding the economic and cultural outlooks of the disparate Illyrian tribes. This diversity had a geographic distinction between the Northern and Southern Adriatic. Contact between Illyrian communities in the Southern Adriatic and Greek traders and settlers enabled a greater permeation of Hellenistic ideas, culture and goods into the local Illyrian communities. By contrast, the lack of Greek contact with the Northern interior

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297 Ibid. p. 36.
298 Dzino, *Illyricum in Roman Politics* pp. 37-8. Dzino additionally notes that ‘the only exception is the Illyrian kingdom, which underwent a significant social transformation in the period between the fourth and second centuries BC, influenced by the impact of the Hellenic and Hellenistic world.’
ensured that these communities remained more closely associated with the land rather than the sea, with Celtic influences rather than Hellenistic influences predominating. Wilkes has asserted that ‘apart from the larger islands of the central coast, Dalmatia offered little inducement to Greek traders and settlers.’\textsuperscript{299} Although evidence for trade conducted between Greeks and Illyrians is limited, it is perhaps unsurprising that the extant evidence for trade is overwhelmingly documented in the Southern and Central Adriatic.

This division had important implications for Rome’s subsequent interventions in Illyria. Initial Roman interest and concerns were predominantly centred on the Southern Adriatic, particularly relating to the most extensive trade routes and shortest crossing point of the Adriatic of the Otranto Straits. Roman activity in the Northern Adriatic at the onset of the period being considered in this thesis was centred on security issues relating to Northern Italy. The subsequent impact of Adriatic piracy on the trade being conducted across the Southern Adriatic had an important bearing on Rome’s initial decision to intervene in Illyria. As Eckstein has noted, the Romans acted ‘in response to serious complaints from victims of the greatly intensifying Illyrian expansion’ which occurred as a ‘result both of the energy of King Agron and (importantly) the collapse of Epirus.’\textsuperscript{300} The geopolitical expansion of first the Illyrian kingdom, and then the Romans in the region served to provide a greater geopolitical coherence as the existence of more defined hegemonic entities in the region changed the nature of Illyrian geopolitical relations. As Dzino asserts, ‘the process of Mediterranean ‘globalisation’ and Roman expansion affected the creation of indigenous political structures (…) rather than being long-term socio-political entities, most of the groups of Illyricum might be an indigenous response to Roman expansion’.\textsuperscript{301} The eventual emergence of a Roman hegemony over Illyria ensured that Illyrian geopolitics was centred around Rome, which replaced the traditional tribal geopolitical and overarching Macedonian geopolitical structures.

\textsuperscript{299}Wilkes, \textit{History of the Provinces of the Roman Empire: Dalmatia}, pp. 11-12.
\textsuperscript{300}Eckstein, \textit{Rome Enters the Greek East}, p. 37.
\textsuperscript{301}Dzino, \textit{Illyricum in Roman Politics} p. 38.
Chapter 3 – The First Illyrian War

Introduction

The First Illyrian War marked the first instance of Roman intervention east of the Adriatic. The events of the Roman intervention and the surrounding issues related to the Roman decision-making process have subsequently featured prominently in the coverage of these events in the primary and secondary literature. For Polybius and later authors influenced by his work, the remarkable nature of Roman imperial expansion needed explanation. As mentioned previously in the thesis, the Roman intervention in the First Illyrian War served as an important set-piece in the Histories of Polybius in explaining the rise of Rome and the greater ‘interconnectedness’ of Greek and Roman affairs. Walbank has asserted that ‘clearly Polybius attached great importance to the idea of συμπλοκή’, ‘interconnectedness’ and used the First Illyrian War as an important precursor to this development. The pretexts provided in the ancient historical accounts for Rome’s intervention have, however, proven problematic and raised considerable discussion and debate amongst modern scholars. This chapter shall analyse and evaluate the Roman decision to intervene in the First Illyrian War and carefully critique the pretexts provided in the ancient historical accounts. This in turn will raise issues pertaining to the Roman justification and capacity for war which shall be examined to provide a fuller consideration of the decision-making process behind the Roman interventions in Illyria.

Debate in the modern scholarship on the Roman decision to intervene has subsequently centred on the validity of the pretexts provided by the ancient sources and overarching notions of Roman imperialism. The ancient pretexts for the conflict centre around the murder of a Roman ambassador as a result of a failed Roman embassy sent to the Ardiaean Queen Teuta. Modern scholars have sought to attribute additional motivation behind the Roman intervention to further explain the Roman decision to intervene. Eckstein has considered the Roman intervention a ‘response to the violence on the Adriatic coast, unusual not in its character but in its scale’. Harris, on the other hand, has asserted that ‘Rome took almost the first opportunity to intervene there (in Illyria) once the acquisitions of the First Punic War had been

302Polybius, Histories 2. 2.
304Polybius, Histories 2. 8., Appian, Illyrian Wars 3. 2. 7., Dio Cassius, Roman History 12. 49.
305Eckstein, Rome Enters the Greek East, p. 32.
put in order. These additional motivations behind Rome’s decision to intervene were based on important contextual phenomena in which the intervention took place. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Roman interest in the Southern Adriatic was sparked by the escalation of Ardiaean aggression and, as a result of geopolitical actions taken by Rome in the Adriatic, the Romans were better positioned to launch a campaign in Illyria. These contextual issues will be considered in this chapter to provide a broad consideration of the underlying motivations of the Romans in their intervention. The pretext provided by the ancient sources, the murder of a Roman ambassador, definitively prompted the Romans to act, and served to shape the nature and scope of Rome’s subsequent initial intervention east of the Adriatic.

The Construct of Illyrian Piracy

Piracy, together with the associated practices of banditry, raiding and plundering have long traditions in the surviving historical record from antiquity. This subsection shall consider the construct of Illyrian piracy and determine the validity of the association of the Illyrians with the practice. Once established, the escalation of Ardiaean piracy at the outset of the period being considered in this thesis can be placed into proper context. The Adriatic, and the ancient Illyrians more particularly, have had a prominent association with the practice of piracy. Strabo, in his geographic study of the region, saw it necessary to comment on the perceived savage behaviour of the inhabitants of the eastern Adriatic seaboard, and the piratical habits of the Ardiaei in particular. For modern scholars, the association was most directly asserted by Holleaux, who described piracy as a ‘profitable career that had been assiduously followed by the inhabitants of the eastern shore’ of the Adriatic. This perspective has since been challenged, most notably by Wilkes and Dell, who have cited a lack of concrete evidence for long-term associations between the Illyrians and piracy. In 1967, Dell indeed asserted that the Illyrians had not been ‘historically the scourge of the Adriatic’ but rather underwent a

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307 Polybius, Histories 2. 8.; Strabo, Geography 7. 5.; Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War 1. 24; Livy, ab urbe condita 10. 2.
308 Strabo, Geography 7. 5. For more discussion on this section of Strabo’s text, see D. Dzino, ‘Strabo 7. 5. and imaginary Illyricum’, Estratto da Athenaeum, Fascicolo I (2006), pp. 173-192.
‘sudden transformation’ to become a more potent maritime power and greater threat in the region.\textsuperscript{311} The paucity of evidence for Illyrian piracy before the emergence of the maritime power of the Ardiaei in 231 BC demonstrates the important role played by the Ardiaei in shaping the association of the Illyrians with piracy. This important shift shall be examined in the next subsection to ascertain its particular importance in Rome’s decision to intervene.

Gathering evidence for ancient Illyrian piracy has proven difficult due to the limited quantity of material available and the problematic nature of many of the sources. As De Souza notes, ‘all evidence of piracy in the Graeco-Roman world is textual. Piracy is not a phenomenon which can be documented from the material remains of classical civilizations’.\textsuperscript{312} The act of piracy is predominantly treated in the Graeco-Roman sources in a pejorative manner; the label itself is applied to ‘piracy’ and ‘pirates’ by others, rather than being self-declared by the ‘pirates’ themselves. Polybius indeed asserts that the Illyrian piratical menace in the Third Century BC served as ‘an enemy to all mankind’, a notion that may have resonated with both his Greek and Roman audiences alike.\textsuperscript{313} Later authors in antiquity developed the Illyrian inclination to piracy as a useful means to explain and justify the Roman interventions and further stereotype the Illyrian ‘other’ in a derogative manner.\textsuperscript{314} Wilkes notes that ‘the stereotype of the Illyrian pirate became widespread in the Greek and Roman world and acquired a notoriety that far exceeded any actual misdeeds’.\textsuperscript{315} This has raised particular problems in assessing the presentation of Illyrian piracy in the extant sources for Rome’s initial intervention. These sources emphasised any Illyrian piratical activity as a means to better justify the Roman intervention in the First Illyrian War.

A variety of terms in modern and ancient contexts have been utilised to describe the activity of piracy, associated practices and those practicing them. Piracy, in this context and in its modern usage, refers exclusively to armed robbery at sea rather than on land. The most commonly used ancient terms to denote the practice however do not explicitly distinguish between raiding or plundering on land or at sea. The commonly utilised ancient Greek terms for a pirate are \textit{ληστής} and \textit{πειρατής}; the latter being a later arrival in the ancient Greek

\textsuperscript{312}P. De Souza, \textit{Piracy in the Graeco-Roman World}, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{313}Polybius, \textit{Histories} 2. 12.
\textsuperscript{314}See especially the examples presented in Strabo, \textit{Geography} 7.5., Florus, \textit{Epitome} 2. 25 and Appian, \textit{Illyrian Wars} 3. 1. 3.
\textsuperscript{315}Wilkes, \textit{The Illyrians}, p. 225.
lexicon. The term \( \lambda \rho \sigma \tau \eta \varsigma \) is used by earlier authors such as Homer, Herodotus and Thucydides whilst the earliest attested usage of the term \( \pi \epsilon \iota \rho \alpha \tau \varsigma \eta \varsigma \) is from a mid-third century BC Attic inscription from Rhamnous during the Chremonidean War. This would suggest that the choice of terms owes much to the convention of the time of authorship, although the choice may also be inspired by the discrepancy in the etymology of the two terms at the discretion of the author. Strabo uses derivatives of both terms as part of his Geographica in reference to different pirates. A derivative of the term \( \lambda \rho \sigma \tau \eta \varsigma \) is utilised by Strabo in his description of the Ardiaei whilst he chooses to use a derivative of \( \pi \epsilon \iota \rho \alpha \tau \varsigma \eta \varsigma \) to describe the piracy undertaken by the Cilicians; the distinction may be utilised to reflect the earlier time in which Ardiaean piracy took place. Strabo’s choice of term in the case of the Ardiaei may also be to apply greater emphasis. Considering the etymology of the term, deriving from \( \lambda \eta \varsigma \varsigma \) (booty/plunder), it is possible that Strabo has sought to add greater emphasis to the plundering aspect of their activities. The seizure of plunder by the Ardiaei is a feature in the historical accounts, and the nature of the goods seized shall be discussed later in this subsection.

Polybius also utilises the two terms, predominantly using \( \pi \epsilon \iota \rho \alpha \tau \varsigma \eta \varsigma \) and its derivatives in conjunction with a verb to greater clarify the nature of the activity. In describing the activity of the Illyrian pirates in the origins of the First Illyrian War, Polybius uses the verb \( \epsilon \sigma \upsilon \lambda \rho \lambda \varsigma \sigma \alpha \nu \), to describe their carrying off, or seizure of, goods from Italian traders. The verb also appears in Homer’s Iliad in the context of seizing or stripping away of the spoils of war. In the first of these instances, the activity occurs as part of wider espionage and raiding; the book ending with the need for Diomedes and Odysseus to ritually cleanse themselves from the dirty work they had to carry out. Plundering was considered differently in the context of war, in the form of the earning of spoils, as opposed to other contexts such as piracy. Polybius’ usage of the

316 The term \( \lambda \rho \sigma \tau \eta \varsigma \) is derived from the word for booty or plunder, \( \lambda \eta \varsigma \varsigma \). The term \( \pi \epsilon \iota \rho \alpha \tau \varsigma \eta \varsigma \) is most likely derived from the verb \( \pi \sigma \rho \alpha \rho \alpha \omicron \alpha \varsigma \), to make an attempt (on something). An alternative etymology from the verb, prasso, meaning to pass through something, is less probable. For more details see De Souza, Piracy in the Graeco-Roman World, p. 3.
317 Homer, Odyssey 17. 425, Herodotus Histories 6. 17., Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War 1. 5.
318 Rhamnous 3 IG II² 247. The inscription is a deme decree and documents an exchange of prisoners organised by Epichares. The prisoners were captured by ‘pirates’ before any arrangement could take place and subsequently brought to justice. The term \( \pi \epsilon \iota \rho \alpha \tau \varsigma \eta \varsigma \) is commonly used in later Greek texts, including Polybius (Histories 4. 3.) and Plutarch (Lucullus 2. 13.).
319 Strabo, Geography 7. 5. and 14. 3.
320 Episodes of piracy conducted by the Ardiaei are noted in the sources for the latter half of the 3rd Century BC when usage of the term \( \pi \epsilon \iota \rho \alpha \tau \varsigma \eta \varsigma \) was still in its infancy. Cilician piracy, on the other hand, is most commonly featured in the ancient sources during the 1st Century BC.
321 Polybius Histories 2. 5-6, Dio Cassius, Roman History 12. 49.
322 Polybius, Histories 2.8.
323 Homer, Iliad 10.343, 15.428.
verb to describe Illyrian pirate activity may, once again, be to emphasise the nature of their plundering and the importance of the seizure of goods from the Italian traders; activity which was considered less honourable than more conventional forms of warfare. The need, however, for Polybius to further describe the activities of the Illyrian pirates through his choice of verb suggests that the term used to describe the pirates themselves does not adequately convey their actions. With no clear indication provided by the two terms πειρατής and ληστής of the location (whether on land or at sea (unless patently obvious due to the content of the text)) and manner of the activity being conducted, Polybius perhaps sought to add this further clarification.

Polybius’ treatment and definition of Illyrian piracy needs, however, to be put in the important context of his discussion of Aetolian piracy during the period. Polybius and his family were prominent figures in the Achaean League with a natural potential for anti-Aetolian bias. Polybius uses the term πειρατής in describing the Aetolian pirates, assigning to them the cause of the Social War and drawing attention to their desire for plunder. Ormerod compares Polybius’ treatment of the Aetolians to his treatment of other foreign enemies of Rome, serving as one of Polybius’ ‘bête noires’. Whilst Polybius’ pejorative treatment of the Aetolians is frequent in his Histories, the account of the Social War’s origins is particularly important to considering Ardiaean piracy. The start of the Social War, occurring in the interbellum between the First and Second Illyrian Wars, allows Polybius to present a continual series of piratical deprivations in his work carried out by the Aetolians and Illyrians. Sacks notes that the Aetolians in Polybius’ account have a ‘desire for aggrandisement and lust for booty’. In both cases, the aggressive pursuit of plunder is an important instigator in conflicts; conflicts that would have a profound effect in Polybius’ work. Grainger notes that Polybius not only sought to further the Aetolian association with piracy, but saw in Aetolian piracy, ‘an ingenious explanation of the Aetolian stasis’. It is subsequently important to consider Polybius’ treatment of Illyrian piracy in this context; piracy of the period was treated particularly pejoratively in his account and an act associated with those for whom he denounces with disdain. By presenting piracy as an important instigator in these conflicts, Polybius, in turn, is able to provide a greater moral reasoning for those trying to deal with the piratical menace.

324Polybius, Histories 4. 4-6.
The only Greek term, however, that clearly denotes activity at sea, is καταποντιστής, literally referring to one who throws into the sea. This term however very rarely features in texts; the term featuring occasionally in the works of Isocrates, Pausanias and Demosthenes. None of these historians however utilise the term to refer to Illyrian pirates or Adriatic piracy moreover. The only author who makes more frequent use of the term is Cassius Dio, who uses the term in his account of Caesar’s Civil War when the author has a need to make it clear that he is referring to piracy at sea rather than plundering on land. In his account of the Ardiaean pirates, Dio instead chooses to use the term ληστής, which again could be used to add emphasis to the plundering of the Ardiaei. It is also possible that Dio may merely be following the traditional terminology employed by earlier sources. In the surviving historical record, the targets of the Ardiaei are nevertheless varied, ranging from individual traders to large settlements along the coast. The use of a more generic term such as ληστής subsequently, could be utilised to reflect the broader nature of these targets.

The terminology used by Latin authors follows a similar pattern to the Greek, with two terms being used predominantly, praedo and pirata. In a similar manner to the Greek term ληστής, praedo is derived from the term for booty, praeda in Latin; the term pirata derives from the other predominant Greek term, πειρατής. In the surviving Latin references to the First and Second Illyrian War, it is interesting to note that piracy is not explicitly alluded to. A more generic reference of ‘piratica’ occurs in Pliny the Elder’s Natural History, which asserts that piracy was a practice associated with the Bay of Oricum. The perceived piracy of Genthius receives a brief mention in Livy’s text, although no term for ‘pirate’ is used. Although Livy does not directly refer to Illyrian pirates in the passage, he stresses the large number of ships used to plunder the coast. The term latro has also been used by historians, although often referring to a mercenary, or a plunderer on land or at sea. The first use of the

328Isocrates, Panathenaicus 12.226. Pausanias, Description of Greece 8.52. Demosthenes, Against Aristocrates 23. 166. The term is used in Isocrates and Demosthenes in conjunction with ληστής. This allows for a clearer distinction to be made between raiding on land and raiding at sea.
329Dio Cassius, Roman History 36. 20-22.
330Dio Cassius, Roman History 12. 19.
331Polybius, Histories 2. 4., Dio Cassius, Roman History 12. 49.
333Florus, Epitome 1. 16. Livy, ab urbe condita 20. 5 and 20. 8. (Periochae).
334Pliny the Elder, Natural History 3. 63. Oricum itself, situated in the bay is about 200km south of Lissus and on the eastern shore of the Otranto Strait, the shortest crossing point from modern Apulia to Albania.
335Livy, ab urbe condita 44. 30. Livy instead states that Genthius sent eighty ships to ravage the coast ‘tenuit impetum eius fama lemborum vastantium maritimam oram. octoginta erant lembi’.
term occurs in Plautus, a contemporary comic playwright to the period covered in the thesis, although Plautus refers to brigandage on land. As such, the importance of the Latin terminology for Illyrian piracy is of lesser significance; the lack of mention in the source material and absence of clear definitions provided makes it difficult to ascertain the nature of the practice. As before with the Greek historians, Latin texts have, on occasion, also added terms to make it clearer that the activity taking place is piracy at sea rather than on land. The Latin terminology is thus used in a similar manner to the Greek and De Souza notes that ‘there are no significant controversies or academic debates over the meaning of these (the Latin) words’. The importance in both the Greek and Latin texts is rather in the manner of usage and the emphasis placed on the piratical activities.

The *liburnae* and *λέμβοι* are frequently featured in the ancient sources with relation to Illyrian piracy, although important distinctions between the two need to be considered. Tarn, writing in 1905 assumed that the *liburna* was a type of *λέμβος* and pointed to their shared earlier usage in the Adriatic. Morrison writing in 1996, supports this view by stressing that the *liburnae* was ‘a local kind of *λέμβοι*’. This has however been challenged more recently by Dzino, who notes the important discrepancies in the sources between the two types of vessels. These distinctions surround the period in which these ships appear in the sources, the areas of the Adriatic they are associated with and the nature of the ships themselves. The *liburna*, as its name suggests, was synonymous with the Liburnians of the Northern Adriatic and its design was later utilised by the Romans for their light vessel, the *liburnica*. Dzino however asserts that the Liburnians were a significant maritime power between the 6th to 4th centuries BC and were isolated and culturally distinct from other Illyrian tribes. During the period considered in this thesis, Illyrian piracy invariably is undertaken with the use of

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336 Plautus, *Poenulus* 3. 3. 50.
337 This is particularly done with the latin adjective *maritimus*. Caesar, *De Bello Civili* 3. 110. Cornelius Nepos, *Life of Thermistocles* 2. 3.
339 Polybius *Histories* 2. 4. Livy, *ab urbe condita* 44. 30.
342 D. Dzino, ‘The influence of Dalmatian Shipbuilders on the Ancient Warships and Naval Warfare: The Lembos and Liburnica’, *Diadora* Vol. 21 (2003), pp. 19-36. Dzino goes further to suggest a division of piracy theatres in the Adriatic, the Northern Adriatic where the *liburna* featured and the South-East where the *lembos* was popularly used.
343 Appian, *Illyrian Wars* 3. 1. 3.
The λέμβοι features in the sources from the 4th century BC onwards, although any connection with Illyrian piracy prior to the 3rd Century BC is tentative at best. The only reference which could be construed as referring to pirate ships is that from Aristotle, who compares the shape of a bird to the prow of a λέμβος. Given the nature of the reference and the context of the wider work, it is difficult to clearly state however that the λέμβος was being used for piracy. References of the λέμβος explicitly to Illyrian piracy begin in the historical accounts of the Ardiaei in the 3rd Century BC. Medas has stressed this importance by describing a close association, ‘stretto rapporto’, between the λέμβος and the inhabitants of the eastern Adriatic shore during the 3rd and 2nd centuries BC. Although there was an association between the use of λέμβοι and the Illyrians, references to λέμβοι are not exclusive to their use as pirate ships. Casson notes that the crews of such vessels are not exclusively pirates. Thus, although the usage of the λέμβος is not exclusively for piracy, it nevertheless was the vessel of choice for the Illyrian pirates during the period being considered in this thesis.

It is, moreover, important to consider the structure of the λέμβος as the vessel had particular attributes that can inform on the manner in which it was utilised. Dzino notes that it was unlikely that the λέμβος was originally fitted with a ram; a ship of similar type with a ram fitted being more commonly labelled as a πρίστις, ‘a beaked ship’ in the sources. Although not fitting a ram to a λέμβος reduced its ability to damage enemy vessels, it increased its usage in piracy. In describing an episode of Ardiaean piracy, Polybius states that the attack consisted of a boarding party rather than any form of ramming. Sinking a ship and risking losing the cargo and potential captives to the seabed was not an effective plundering strategy. Casson has asserted that the λέμβος was not only used as a light auxiliary naval unit, but also for ‘carrying cargo both across open water and on rivers’. The additional ability of the small vessel to carry cargo would enable prospective pirates to carry away plunder. Casson highlights this ability in his work by using an example from an Egyptian papyrus that documents the cargo

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345Polybius, *Histories* 2.4., 2.9, 2.10, 3.16., Appian, *Illyrian Wars* 3.2.7., Livy, ab urbe condita 44.30. (Livy uses the Latinised form *lembi*); Cassius Dio chooses neither term, instead using the more generic term πλοία (Dio Cassius, Roman History 12.49 preserved in Zonaras 8.19.) which usually means a small vessel of some kind.

346Aristotle, *Progression of Animals* 710.


350Polybius, *Histories* 16.2., 18.1; Livy, *ab urbe condita* 32.32. These references are describing the fleet of Philip V of Macedon. Philip’s fleet also made use of λέμβοι at various times.

351Polybius, *Histories* 2.10.

onboard a λέμβος from 259/8 BC. Although this cargo was intended to be transported over a longer distance and thus likely to be larger than anything carried by an Illyrian λέμβος being used for piracy, it gives an indication of the potential of the amount and type of cargo a λέμβος of roughly the same period could carry. Livy describes the use of the λέμβος in a military capacity by the Macedonians, noting that each λέμβος in the fleet was able to carry 2 horses and 20 captives. The use of λέμβοι in these examples demonstrates the wide range of usage of the vessel; rather than purely a pirate vessel, the λέμβος could be utilised for transporting people or cargo or used in formal forms of naval warfare. In its pirate usage, the λέμβος, even with a relatively modest cargo could still outmanoeuvre larger or less agile ships, taking advantage of a rugged coastline with many islands offering plenty of routes and means of escaping detection. Thus, as discussed earlier, the natural difficulties presented by Adriatic travel had an important impact on the reputation of the Adriatic, although it is unlikely that this accounted fully for the dangerous reputation of the sea. The natural difficulties provided a greater opportunity for Illyrian pirates, who utilised vessels that were well suited to take advantage of the piratical opportunity available.

It is considerably more difficult however to try and identify the nature of the plunder being seized by the Illyrian pirates. The ancient sources do not make the type or amount of plunder abundantly clear. Polybius states that the Ardiaean pirates attacked a number of Italian traders, robbing some, murdering others and carrying a great number off alive into captivity. The act of taking captives is reflected in Pausanias who asserts that at Methone, the Illyrians tricked the local inhabitants into trading wine with them only to carry off a number of the men and women into captivity. Polybius, again, mentions similar tactics being employed by the Illyrians after the Second Illyrian War with the capture of merchants between Leucas and Malea by Skerdilaidas in 217 BC. As such, the practice of taking captives during Illyrian raids seems a common trend and these captives would presumably be ransomed or sold into slavery. In analysing the passage in Pausanias, Wiedemann notes that ‘the victim of a pirate raid could claim back his freedom if he could prove it to the satisfaction of a Roman magistrate;
but his chances of success might be minimal in practice’.\footnote{T. Wiedermann, \textit{Greek and Roman Slavery} (London, 2003), p. 106.} Taking into account the speed of the Illyrian pirate ships in making their raids, it is relatively unlikely that many of the Italian traders who were captured may have recovered their previous status. This in turn raises a further question as to where the captives may have been taken. Braund, examining the earlier Classical Period, has argued that ‘many of the Illyrians known to have been sold as slaves into the Greek world, presumably came in via Corinthian interests in that region’.\footnote{D. C. Braund, ‘The Slave Supply in Classical Greece’ in K. Bradley and P. Cartledge (eds.), \textit{The Cambridge World History of Slavery: Volume I The Ancient Mediterranean World} (Cambridge, 2011), p. 121.} Whether or not this held true into the 3\textsuperscript{rd} Century BC is unclear, or whether Illyrians would have sold captives in the same Greek markets that had previously traded in Illyrian slaves. Westermann however has noted that the period surrounding the First and Second Punic Wars witnessed a great increase in the number of captives being taken; ‘probably this source of slaves was supplemented, in some degree, even in the West by the piracy of the Illyrian kingdom until their activities were suppressed by the Romans in 228 BC.’\footnote{W. L. Westermann, \textit{The Slave Systems of Greek and Roman Antiquity} (Philadelphia, 1955), p. 60. For an enumeration of the numbers taken see Ibid. p. 61.} Although it is unclear where the captives may have been sold, it appears that slave markets were flourishing during the 3\textsuperscript{rd} Century BC and there would have been several places where the captives could have been sold into slavery. Hunt has recently argued that ancient slavery ‘thrived especially in places and periods lacking strong states with an interest in maintaining order – especially states with naval power’.\footnote{P. Hunt, \textit{Ancient Greek and Roman Slavery} (Chichester, 2018), p. 33.} The geopolitical situation in Illyria, as discussed earlier, provided the sort of conditions necessary for the industry of slavery to flourish.

\textbf{The shift in Illyrian piracy from 231 BC}

It is in these established contexts, that the development of Illyrian piracy in the Adriatic needs to be considered to directly ascertain the importance of the shift in piracy conducted by the Ardiaei in the Third Century BC. Whilst there is a good deal of evidence in the written sources for Illyrian piracy during this period, evidence for Illyrian piracy in previous periods is comparatively sparse and more problematic. The ancient historical record has often attributed an indefinite period for Illyrian piracy.\footnote{Especially Polybius, \textit{Histories} 2. 5. and Strabo, \textit{Geography} 7. 5.} The orthodox view has taken the written historical sources at relative face value. This was most notably put forward by Holleaux, who argued for
the presence of longstanding Illyrian piratical activity in the Adriatic in their trademark λέμβοι.\textsuperscript{362} As discussed earlier, the Illyrian association with the λέμβος is apparent during the period in question, although in the context of piracy, ‘it has long been noted that this word only comes into general usage in the Polybian account of the outburst of 231 BC.\textsuperscript{363} Evidence for piracy in the written historical record before 231 BC subsequently cannot be viewed through the traditionally associated vessel in which their Adriatic piracy was conducted. Although Strabo highlights the piratical habits of the Illyrians, the only tribe he names that are particularly associated with the practice of piracy is the Ardiaei.\textsuperscript{364} As such, the traditional association of the Illyrians with piracy seems to particularly relate to the Ardiaean raids of the late 3\textsuperscript{rd} Century BC.

This view, which was most potently argued by Dell, challenged the orthodox view and maintained that evidence for Illyrian piracy prior to 231 BC was too weak and the traditional associations may, in fact, be referring to the episodes of Ardiaean piracy during this period. Dell has noted that ‘references to Illyria are only too often vague and circumstantial. This has caused a number of passages touching upon Illyrian affairs to be adduced as evidence for piracy in the early period, although these passages do not directly mention such piracy at all.’\textsuperscript{365} An example of this that has caused debate amongst modern scholars is the Syracusan intervention in the Adriatic during the 4\textsuperscript{th} Century BC.\textsuperscript{366} Holleaux has argued that an attempt to curb piratical activity in the Adriatic was undertaken by Dionysius I of Syracuse in 385 BC.\textsuperscript{367} The passage appears in Diodorus Siculus and involves an attack on Illyrian light ships, with the sinking of some of the craft and the capturing and killing of the crews.\textsuperscript{368} The only explicit reference to piracy in this passage is in relation to unrelated actions taken by the Tyrrhenians.\textsuperscript{369} This would suggest that claims that the Illyrians were undertaking piracy in the region are inconclusive. It is perhaps surprising that Diodorus would not apply the same label to the Illyrian actions as to the Tyrrhenians in the same passage and this doesn’t suggest that the Illyrians were committing acts of piracy. Diodorus however does include a reference to

\textsuperscript{362}Holleaux, ‘The Romans in Illyria’, p. 824.
\textsuperscript{363}Dell, ‘The Origin and Nature of Illyrian Piracy’, pp. 345.
\textsuperscript{364}Strabo, Geography 7. 5.
\textsuperscript{366}For more details on this debate, see P. Cabanes, ‘Greek Colonisation in the Adriatic’ in G. R. Tsetskhladze (ed.), Greek Colonisation: An Account of Greek Colonies and other Settlements Overseas: Volume Two (Leiden, 2006), p. 81.
\textsuperscript{368}Diodorus Siculus, Library of History 15. 14.
\textsuperscript{369}Ibid.
Adriatic piracy in the 4th Century BC, but this is conducted by the Apulians rather than the Illyrians. Diodorus asserts that Apulian pirate ships were in operation across the entire Italian seaboard and had made the Adriatic unsafe for merchants. As a result of the Apulian piracy, Dionysios II, the Syracusean tyrant deemed it necessary to establish two cities in Apulia to provide safe port for merchant ships. Moreover, an inscription of an Athenian decree, dated to 325/4 BC, sets out the Athenian colonisation of the Adriatic with the founding of a colony to protect against Tyrrenian pirates. Although the Adriatic is associated with these acts of piracy, the Illyrians are not mentioned; the Adriatic piracy is conducted by others.

The Liburnians were also commonly associated with piracy with an indefinite timeframe. Appian asserts that the Liburnians were second only to the Ardiaei as a nautical people and committed acts of piracy in the Adriatic in the type of vessel named after them. Livy, in a passing comment during his account of the Adriatic voyage of Cleonymus of Sparta in the late 4th Century BC, notes that the Liburnians and Histrians were savage tribes noted for their acts of piracy. These references in the ancient sources do not allude to any specific instance of Liburnian piracy, but rather appear as descriptive comments in reference to the geographic area of Liburnia. Wilkes notes that ‘like the Istri and the rest of the Illyrians, the Liburni were known to the Romans as pirates before the end of the fourth century BC’. Whilst references in the sources appear in conjunction with events pertaining to these time periods, they are not indicative of any tangible evidence of piracy. Roman campaigns against the Liburnians are not recorded until 129 BC, when Appian mentions a campaign conducted by Gaius Sempronius Tuditanus. The significance of the Liburnians as an Iron Age power however is better attested. The ancient sources attest that Liburnian maritime power stretched southward to the islands off the central Dalmatian coast and perhaps as far south as Corcyra in the Ionian Sea. Wilkes however has asserted that ‘over the centuries it would appear that the Liburnians, having once controlled the Adriatic down to Corfu, were being steadily pushed northwards’ on account of pressure applied by new Illyrian groups moving towards the

371 Ibid.
372 Inscriptiones Grecae II 1629. The decree makes particular note of the need for a ‘dockyard’ on line 220 to provide a safe anchorage from the pirates.
373 Appian, *Illyrian Wars* 3. 1. 3.
374 Livy, *ab urbe condita* 10. 2
376 Appian, *Civil Wars* 1. 19.
Adriatic. This would suggest that although evidence for specific instances of Liburnian piracy are absent from the sources, the Liburnian maritime power was formidable in the Iron Age Adriatic and would have inspired a potent maritime reputation. Dzino notes that through this period, the ‘Liburnian, coastal, urbanised areas kept maritime trade routes with Italy and Greek colonies’. In order to maintain these trade routes, especially over a wide range of Adriatic territory, this maritime power would have been important.

Another source that needs to be considered are the engravings of Picene ships found on the stele di Novilara, which have traditionally been dated to the 7th Century BC. The stele di Novilara were discovered in a necropolis in Novilara, near modern Pesano, on the Northern Adriatic coast. The engravings on the stele di Novilara depict three naval scenes. These naval scenes, depict what appears to be a light vessel with a single bank of oarsmen, a naval battle scene with warrior figures in clashing vessels and the rudder of a ship complete with the figure of solitary rower. On the surface, the design of the naval vessels is similar to the styles of other light vessels that appear later in the sources, the λέμβοι and liburnae. Bonino notes that ‘the ships of Novilara are the first primary sources, which show consistent exchange of techniques with the Ionian and Aegean seas’. Triboni notes that this hybridisation has found a general consensus amongst modern scholars, although he notes the difficulty in isolated specific aspects which distinguish the local Adriatic vessels from their Greek counterparts. Medas has also stressed that there is no way to be certain that the boats depicted in the stele di Novilara are the direct ancestors of the λέμβοι and liburnae recorded in the written sources. The evidence from the stele di Novilara is far from conclusive; uncertainty still prevails in determining the Adriatic or Greek features of the ships and their subsequent utilisation. In this regard, Medas has argued that the stele could be a memorial to an act of piracy against a Greek ship sailing to Spina, whilst Cobau has argued that it merely depicts local Picene merchants. Neither of these conclusions is satisfactory, given the naval battle context of the second image.

378 Wilkes, The Illyrians, p. 188.
380 See Appendix (Fig. 14).
and the lack of conclusive inference that can be drawn from the first image as to the ship’s utilisation. A more limited conclusion, in line with the limitations of the evidence would be more satisfactory. Triboni notes that the more popular interpretations centre around the engravings reflecting ‘the first expression of local Adriatic nautical tradition’ and a ‘cross-fertilisation between local and Greek shipbuilding techniques’. These suggest an interpretation from which a very limited amount of inference can be drawn on Adriatic maritime commerce and no effective inference can be drawn on Adriatic piracy.

The role of the Ardiaei in the development of Illyrian piracy in the Adriatic, as alluded to earlier, was very important; the events of 231 BC and beyond having a profound impact on the association of the Illyrians with the practice. This importance was first attested by Polybius, who noted that Agron had at his disposal, a greater land and maritime power than any previous Illyrian ruler. This power became manifest by the Illyrian victory over the Aetolian League in 231 BC. Wilkes has highlighted the importance of this victory over a famed league of Greek city states, asserting that it ‘caused a sensation in Greece’. Eckstein however has noted that ‘this fit a pattern going back 150 years: whenever Greek states on the Illyrians’ frontiers were beset with military and/or political weakness, the result was Illyrian expansion’. Hammond documents some of these occurrences, including Bardylis in the 4th Century BC taking advantage of Macedonian and Epirotic weaknesses, and Glaukias taking advantage of Molossian weaknesses in the early 3rd Century BC. Polybius’ statement, especially in regard to the land forces of the aforementioned kings alluded to by Hammond, appears hyperbolic. This may be due to the Aetolian bias in Polybius’ account. Walbank notes that Polybius’ source for this section is predominantly Greek and the ‘narrative is strongly prejudiced against Aetolia’. The original Greek source material would likely over-estimate the impact of the Ardiaean emergence on account of the shock it caused in Greece and Polybius would have likely relished the opportunity to highlight this downturn in Aetolian fortunes. Beaumont has however argued that the statement by Polybius is unequivocal and indicates that Agron was the

385Triboni, ‘The Ships on the Novilara Stele, Italy’, p. 400.
386Polybius, Histories 2. 2.
387Ibid.
388Wilkes, The Illyrians, p. 158.
389Eckstein, Rome Enters the Greek East, p. 34.
first ruler on the eastern Adriatic coast to have an organised maritime power.\textsuperscript{392} Although the growth of an Illyrian power along the coast had some historical precursors, what was particularly important to Ardiaean power that set the kingdom apart, was their coastal position on the Adriatic and their ability to take advantage of that element. Dell has described this change as ‘a transformation of Illyrian piracy from disorganised sorties aimed at procuring foodstuffs to something like large scale raids and incipient imperialism’.\textsuperscript{393} The Ardiaean pirates were operating on a scale not previously seen; whilst instances of piracy from the evidence prior to 231 BC were sporadic, and poorly documented at best, the Ardiaean raids were conducted on a greater scale.

Ardaiaen piracy under Teuta has additionally come under scrutiny regarding the public and private spheres of plunder in the Ardiaean kingdom. Polybius is keen to distinguish between the public and private activities of the Illyrians and does so through an interview between Teuta and two Roman ambassadors. In the interview, Teuta makes the distinction, agreeing to undertake no public enterprise against Rome but stressing that it was not customary for Illyrian rulers to intervene in the private endeavours of their subjects.\textsuperscript{394} Holleaux branded Illyrian piracy as ‘a public institution, a state industry’, although this has been successfully challenged by Gabrielsen.\textsuperscript{395} Gabrielsen sets out his argument as follows:

‘What clashed with Roman – and for that matter also with dominant Greek – perceptions was Queen Teuta’s total lack of interest in claiming the ‘industry of plunder’ as the exclusive prerogative of the state, one restricted to the public arena and rigorously guarded through governmental controls. Plunder as such was not objected to by anyone.’\textsuperscript{396}

The Illyrians, in contrast to the Romans and Greeks, viewed private plunder as a legitimate practice. This situation outlined by Teuta in the interview does not seem to have changed under her rule however. Teuta notes that the practice of the state to not place a check on private plunder was an Illyrian custom.\textsuperscript{397} As such, the principles underlying the acquisition

\textsuperscript{393}Dell, ‘The Origin and Nature of Illyrian Piracy’, pp. 358.
\textsuperscript{394}Polybius, \textit{Histories} 2. 8.
\textsuperscript{396}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{397}Polybius, \textit{Histories} 2. 8.
of plunder did not develop under Teuta. Walbank notes that the retort given to this by the Roman ambassador is in all likelihood a *post eventum* and part of the Fabian tradition.\textsuperscript{398} Although a likely later addition, the speech is useful for Polybius in positioning the Romans on the side of the victims of the piratical acts conducted by the Ardiaeans, whose conceptions of plundering differed greatly from those of the Romans and Greeks. By contrast, the account of Appian does not feature the interview and shows marked discrepancy from the Polybian version. Appian instead states that Agron was still alive when the siege of Issa was being undertaken and that an Issaean appeal to Rome prompted Rome to send an embassy which never reached its destination.\textsuperscript{399} As mentioned earlier, the version presented by Appian is less tainted by the annalistic tradition, especially from Fabius Pictor. Although both these accounts differ regarding the conduct of the interview and the source of an appeal to Rome, they both feature the contextual importance of the Illyrian piratical threat in drawing Roman attention towards the Adriatic. As stated earlier, the murder of the ambassador is a common theme in the historical accounts and prompted the Roman intervention in the region.

**The Roman decision-making process**

Roman decisions to instigate interventions were dependent on their justifications for intervening. For military interventions, as in the case of the First Illyrian War, this required a pretext to be established which outlined the reasons given in justification of the Roman course of action. A pretext in this context can simply be defined as a reason given to justify an intervention. These pretexts were important for the Romans in validating their interventions for domestic and foreign observers. Polybius alludes in his *Histories* to contemporary debate in Greece over the nature of Roman expansion and the implications of Roman rule.\textsuperscript{400} Polybius wrote his *Histories* for both Roman and Greek audiences alike, his work served as a means to answer these questions over the moral integrity of Roman actions in acquiring their ascendant status in Greece and the wider Mediterranean world. The need to justify military interventions and to be seen to act in a morally upstanding manner were important in the development of the

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\textsuperscript{398} Walbank, *A Historical Commentary on Polybius: Volume I*, p. 159.
\textsuperscript{399} Appian, *Illyrian Wars* 3. 2. 7. In this account, the Roman embassy is attacked by Illyrian λέμβοι killing an Issaean and a Roman ambassador. Agron died shortly afterwards and before the Roman intervention began in earnest.
\textsuperscript{400} Polybius, *Histories* 37. 1.
Roman concepts of *bellum iustum* (just war), *ius ad bello* (just cause for war) and *ius in bello* (just action in war). These concepts however were only effectively set out in a Roman context by Cicero in his treatise, *De Officiis* in the First Century BC, after the period being considered in this thesis. It is nevertheless important to consider the development of earlier notions of these concepts in prior periods to better consider the Roman decision-making process.

The concept of a ‘just war’ can trace its origins back to antiquity. Ancient Greek sources provide some context for the later development of the concept by the Romans, although these do not form a comprehensive or coherent outline. Herodotus noted in his *Histories* that Croesus of Lydia was the first to commit injustices against the Greeks.\(^401\) Dewald has noted Herodotus’ treatment of the Greco-Persian War featured an ‘ongoing theme of reciprocal injustices’\(^402\) Thucydides also discussed the ideas of justice in warfare, especially relating to waging a ‘just war’, in his *History of the Peloponnesian War*. Thucydides discussed throughout his accounts the justification for actions during the conflict, most notably through his ‘Melian dialogue’.\(^403\) As mentioned earlier, Thucydides is sometimes regarded as the ‘first important Realist’, and in the Peloponnesian War, he saw the ‘dramatic erosion of the customs of war’\(^404\) Thucydides’ consideration of the important elements that constituted just and moral behaviour in war, and in going to war, demonstrated the importance of such concepts to Classical Greek thought. These accounts built on the wider cultural ideas of just action in Classical Greece ‘to harm one’s enemies and help one’s friends’.\(^405\) Dover highlights that the importance of the ancient Greek term δίκαιος, which has a range of meanings, of which he mentions ‘just’, ‘fair’ and ‘honest’.\(^406\) These concepts were closely associated in ancient Greek inter-state relations and would have an important bearing on later Roman diplomacy with Greek states. The importance for Rome to exemplify these concepts in their dealings would have been important to developing strong relations in the Greek East.

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\(^401\) Herodotus, *Histories* 1. 5.  
\(^403\) Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War* 5. 84-116. In 416 BC the Athenians sent envoys to the island of Melos to secure the allegiance of the Melians, hitherto neutral. The Melians refused, championed their independence and stressed that injustices suffered by them at the hands of the Athenians would convince other states to unite against the Athenians. The argument was rejected by the Athenians who famously retorted that ‘the strong do what they can; the weak suffer what they must’.  
\(^406\) Ibid. p. 183.
The Roman process of declaring war was established by the onset of the period being considered in this thesis, although discrepancies exist regarding the details of the process in the surviving accounts. Livy outlines the fetial declaration in Book I of his monumental history of Rome, asserting that the Romans copied it from the *Aequicoli* during the reign of Ancus Marcius in the 7th Century BC.\footnote{Livy, *ab urbe condita* 1. 32.} The process outlined by Livy involved a demand of redress followed by a ceremonial throwing of a spear into enemy territory, and was instituted to ensure greater formality in the declaration of war. During the process, Jupiter was invoked by a *legatus* to witness the demand of redress and was called upon again to bear witness after thirty-three days if the Roman demands had not been met.\footnote{Ibid.} Dionysius of Halicarnassus however has asserted in his account of the Second Samnite War, that three embassies were sent out rather than one in ten day intervals (providing a total of thirty rather than thirty-three days for the redress to be demanded) and no mention is giving to the throwing of a spear.\footnote{Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Roman Antiquities* 2. 72 and 15. 9.} It is not clear which source is correct in their description of the process. The early period of Roman history contained in the early books of Livy have particularly limited evidence; Livy himself notes that for events before 390 BC and the Gallic sack of Rome, the limited amount of written evidence available presented difficulties for him in reconstructing these periods of Roman history.\footnote{Livy, *ab urbe condita* 6. 1.} Harris has noted several problems with Livy’s account and has stressed that ‘the Livian version is betrayed by certain anachronisms’.\footnote{Harris, *War and Imperialism in Republican Rome* 327-70 BC, pp. 168-9.} Wiedemann has also noted that the language in Livy’s account is of the author’s own time in the First Century BC and the chronological origin of the throwing of the spear is vaguely assigned, merely being described as a previous act not carried out in Livy’s day.\footnote{T. Wiedemann, ‘The Fetiales: A Reconsideration’, *The Classical Quarterly*, Vol. 36 No. 2 (1986), pp. 479-80.} The problems inherent in the Livian version have limited the veracity of his account of the origins of the process, although as the earliest chronological citation (from the 7th Century BC), the account provides a more well-established origin for the process. Wiedemann progresses with his analysis to stress that ‘Livy and Dionysius tell us what some people in Augustus’ time thought had happened in the Seventh Century BC’\footnote{Ibid. p. 479.} The process outlined in Dionysius of Halicarnassus’ work however, is in the context of his account of the Second Samnite War in the late 4th Century BC. It is thus possible that the changes in Dionysius’ version reflect changes that occurred in Rome through the three centuries between the citations in Livy and Dionysius. In either case, the accounts provided by the two historians
for the origins of the Roman declaration of war are limited but display certain similarities on the fetial process that provide some insight.

The importance of a development in the exercise of the fetial process in 281/0 BC has caused further debate, although this should be seen rather as a fundamental change in the wider Roman process of declaring war. At the outset of the Pyrrhic War, a prisoner-of-war was taken from Pyrrhus’ army, compelled to buy a piece of land in Rome and then the spear was thrown onto this land to mark the war declaration. The reasoning behind this amendment to the process appears to be a practical one; the sending of the fetial priests on a lengthy sea voyage was impractical and the makeshift affair in Rome made greater practical sense for the Romans in their declaration of war. Some scholars have argued that this evidence marks the shift from the participation of the fetial priests in the embassies being sent out by Rome in favour of legati.

Walbank however excludes this evidence and cites the change taking place later in the 3rd Century BC, in the aftermath of the First Punic War. The dating of the change rests on the value placed on the evidence presented by Servius Auctus in his commentary on Virgil’s Aeneid. This evidence comes from the 5th Century AD and is not as clear cut as Beard, Crawford and Goar have suggested. Harris has noted that ‘Walbank for some reason neglected the earlier evidence’. Although it is unclear why Walbank neglected the evidence, it could be due to the obscurity of the evidence in the 5th Century AD commentary or the limitations of the reference. Harris has also noted that the act of spear throwing would have been the most cherished of the fetiales as it represented ‘the most dramatic piece of magic in the whole programme.’ It is likely that the decision to continue this practice in some form or another, was due to the drama of the exercise and the reverence that it may have held. Whether the earlier date of 281/0 BC or the later date of Walbank is correct, it is apparent that the change took place sometime during the 3rd Century BC in the period preceding that which is being considered in this thesis. As such, the fetial process for declaring war in the period being considered in this thesis, had recently undergone practical amendment with the embassies to foreign entities being undertaken by legati. This change ensured that the Roman declaration of

414 Servius Auctus, On Virgil’s Aeneid 9. 52.
418 Ibid.
war was a simpler and more efficient process, enabling warfare to be conducted without the need for the lengthier deliberation of previous periods.

The use of legati as envoys in the process can be observed from the embassy sent to Teuta at the outset of the First Illyrian War, although the exact nature of this embassy is difficult to determine. Polybius asserts that Gaius and Lucius Coruncanius were appointed as ambassadors to conduct an investigation (ἐπίσκεψιν) into the matter of Ardiaean piracy.\textsuperscript{419} Appian, on the other hand, does not provide a definitive purpose for the ambassadors but notes that they were sent out in tandem with the Issaeans, after the Issaeans themselves had raised concerns to the Romans.\textsuperscript{420} Dio meanwhile asserts that the Romans sent ambassadors with the purpose to entreat (παρατούμενοι) and censure (αἰτιώμενοι) Agron on behalf of the Issaeans.\textsuperscript{421} Although the sending of ambassadors is prominently featured in all the accounts, it is not clear precisely for what reason they were sent. Polybius provides the most discernible purpose, an investigation into Ardiaean activities and although this may be implied in the other sources, it is not explicitly stated. Holleaux, and later Badian, believed that the envoys were delivering a rerum repetitio and Badian goes so far as to suggest that the Roman envoys declared war on Teuta at that time.\textsuperscript{422} Walbank has however noted that ‘normally at this time a rerum repetitio was preceded by a conditional war-motion in the Senate and the comitia.’\textsuperscript{423} As only a single embassy was sent out in all the sources and no motion was raised in either the Senate or comitia it is highly unlikely that the embassy constituted a rerum repetitio. The Romans were venturing into a region, moreover, where they had limited knowledge and experience and if the accounts of Appian and Dio are to be believed, in accordance with Issaean delegates. As such, it would be more natural for Rome to initially investigate in order to find out what was going on, rather than adopt a more gung-ho approach. Regarding the declaration of war, Gruen has highlighted the continuation of the siege of Issa by Teuta in Polybius’ account.\textsuperscript{424} This would suggest that the declaration of war occurred after news of the events reached Rome. Although the sending of envoys rather than fetial priests is evident in the accounts, there are not substantive grounds

\textsuperscript{419}Polybius, Histories 2. 8.
\textsuperscript{420}Appian, Illyrian Wars 3. 2. 7.
\textsuperscript{421}Dio Cassius, Roman History 12. 49.
\textsuperscript{424}Gruen, The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome, p. 365; Polybius, Histories 2. 11.
to consider this an example of a *rerum repetitio*, an investigation being a more likely purpose for the embassy.

The *rerum repetitio* itself has raised further debate over its underlying motivation, which should be viewed with a consideration for developments over time. The *rerum repetitio*, literally a repeating of the matters/affairs/case, was a demand for redress of suffered injuries and operated as an ultimatum in the process of the Roman declaration of war. The process however has been seen as a cynical exercise by Harris, who describes it as ‘closely akin to blackmail’ operating as ‘non-negotiable demands, and they were usually set at an unacceptable level.’[^425] This however is too simplistic; as Rich notes, ‘the complexity of the decision-making process should not obscure the fact that the senate did have a real choice.’[^426] The *rerum repetitio* was subsequently not always utilised in a cynical manner. Harris however has stressed that the terms of the *rerum repetitio* were only accepted once, by Carthage in the Mercenary War in 238 BC. Harris is correct to highlight this as an anomaly in the process; Carthage essentially had no choice but to accept the terms of the *rerum repetitio* in 238 BC on account of their engagement in the Mercenary War after the costly First Punic War. Carthage in this instance, could hardly afford a reignition of hostilities with Rome in the midst of this conflict. Burton has argued that whilst the *rerum repetitio* was often set up with harsh demands which would likely be unacceptable, it is ‘also significant that the Romans made such attempts at all – sometimes even at the risk of eroding their own military-strategic position’.[^427] The aforementioned developments in the usage of the fetial process in the 3rd Century BC had profound consequences in the 2nd Century BC. Walbank has noted that ‘from the middle of the Third Century BC, the *denuntiatio belli* had become the effective declaration of war’.[^428] Pretexts in this context became less tied to the fetial process and subsequently more susceptible to the cause of aggressive Roman military intervention.

These developments need to be placed in the context of a greater Roman capacity for conducting military campaigns. Popular Roman support for military campaigns is difficult to ascertain, although the Roman citizenry had a more vested interest in their success through their greater participation. The mid-Republican period of Roman history saw a greater of

Roman citizens called up to active service. Hopkins has provided approximate calculations for
the number of Romans under arms, with Roman legionaries accounting for 17 per cent of the
adult male population in 225 BC and 29 per cent in 213 BC at the height of the Second Punic
War.\footnote{M. K. Hopkins, \textit{Conquerors and Slaves} (Cambridge, 1978), pp. 31-5. These calculations are based on the
conclusions of P. A. Brunt, \textit{Italian Manpower 225 BC – AD 14} (Oxford, 1987).} Although pressed to a greater degree in military service, it is hard to determine what
popular Roman attitudes were to their participation in these wars. Toynbee has stressed that
‘perennial distant overseas service had naturally soon become intensely unpopular’.\footnote{A. J. Toynbee, \textit{Hannibal’s Legacy: Rome and her neighbours after Hannibal’s Exit} (Rome, 1965), p. 76.} Harris
has challenged this by arguing that ‘the Senate’s foreign policy would have been futile without
a measure of popular support’.\footnote{Harris, \textit{War and Imperialism in Republican Rome} 327-70BC, p. 47.} Given the lack of evidence from primary sources, it is difficult
to ascertain the extent of popular support for Roman military interventions. Brunt however has
asserted that ‘conscripts were not necessarily unwilling soldiers’ and notes that for wars that
were far away with no discernible interest for the Roman public, ‘the government had to rely
on sheer compulsion’.\footnote{P. A. Brunt, \textit{Italian Manpower 225 BC – AD 14} (Oxford, 1987), p. 392 and p. 396.} This would suggest that a discrepancy exists between wars which
were fought far away and those which were fought closer to home. It is natural to expect
campaigns in more inhospitable climates and conditions, which were especially fiercely fought
and separated fighting men from home and families for a prolonged period of time, to have
been more unpopular. The increase in the enrolment in Hopkins’ figures is unsurprising given
the need for Rome to muster available manpower to deal with the threat of Hannibal; fighting
a threat that posed such a direct danger to Rome would likely have spurred greater Roman
resolve to achieving victory. The Roman military campaigns in Illyria that are being considered
in this thesis were remarkably short and were not far away from mainland Italy and
subsequently would likely not have been as unpopular as campaigns which were more arduous
and further afield.

This in turn raises the important issue of the practical capability of Roman armies to
conduct warfare on a large scale. The best source of evidence for this can be found in the census
figures that provide a record of registrations. Brunt notes that the data before 225 BC is
particularly limited and even data from 225 BC onwards is subject to the ability of people to
come forward and include themselves on the register.\footnote{Brunt, \textit{Italian Manpower 225 BC – AD 14}, p. 33.} Polybius asserts that in 225 BC, the
Romans sought to gather information on available manpower ahead of the campaign against
the Gallic tribes of Northern Italy, and that Rome and her allies could muster 700,000 infantry
and 70,000 cavalry. Walbank has asserted that these figures originate in the καταγραφαί (the original registers) through Fabius Pictor and ‘are mainly reliable’; some uncertainty persists over the exclusion of Northern allies not on service and the less well sourced data for Southern Italy (Fabius Pictor omits the Greeks from Southern Italy who were exempt and the Bruttians who were used in a menial capacity). Brunt has also noted inconsistency in the breakdown of these figures, citing the exclusion of the Greeks and Bruttians from Southern Italy, as well as the Northern allies. The figures that Polybius sourced from Fabius Pictor were also utilised by other authors; Diodorus Siculus provides the same numbers as Polybius whilst Livy and subsequent writers round the total number up to 800,000 combined forces. If we are to place these figures in the context of the aforementioned percentage figures provided by Hopkins, this would suggest an increase from a standing army of around 130,000 combined infantry and cavalry troops in 225 BC to 223,000 by 213 BC. The large number of troops that Rome had levied during this period and the larger number still available to be drawn upon would have enabled the Romans to have a sizeable army to conduct campaigns. The increasing number of the troops levied during the Second Punic War however highlights the importance of the heightened security threat posed by Hannibal and the need to muster large armies in Italy to defend. This would suggest that although Rome had a large manpower pool to draw from, it did not fully engage its manpower potential. The figures nevertheless suggest an increase in the military participation of Roman and allied troops in warfare. This would have had the knock-on effect of producing soldiers who were more seasoned from such military service. The experiences of the Roman and allied soldiers who survived the intense fighting of the Punic Wars and the Gallic campaigns of 225 BC, would have made these troops battle-hardened and more experienced, enabling a more effective fighting force to emerge.

The Pretext for Intervention

Rome’s intervention in 229 BC was based on a pretext of Ardiaean aggression from their pirates in the Adriatic and through the murdering of a Roman ambassador. The murder of the Roman ambassador is a common feature in the historical accounts from antiquity although some discrepancies exist regarding the nature of the assassination. Polybius, Appian
and Cassius Dio all assert that the Roman declaration of war occurred immediately after the murder of the envoy and Polybius and Cassius Dio stress the importance that the words expressed by the envoy had in causing the aggressive reaction by the Illyrian ruler.\footnote{Polybius, \textit{Histories} 2. 8; Appian, \textit{Illyrian Wars} 3. 2. 7; Dio Cassius, \textit{Roman History} 12. 49.} Appian’s account is particularly noteworthy by his use of the preposition and demonstrative pronoun ἐπὶ τῷ δε (meaning ‘upon this’).\footnote{Appian, \textit{Illyrian Wars} 3. 2. 7} The usage of the expression in Appian’s account would suggest that the Roman intervention was made as a direct response to the murder of the ambassadors. Although Livy’s account of the First Illyrian War and its origins is now lost, a summary is provided in the \textit{periochae}. This summary simply notes, ‘\textit{Bellum Illyriis propter unum ex legatis, qui ad eos missi erant, occisum indictum est, subactique in deditionem venerunt.}’ (War was declared on the Illyrians after one of the ambassadors sent to them had been killed. Having been conquered, they surrendered).\footnote{Livy, \textit{ab urbe condita} 20 (\textit{Periochae})} The summary provided in the \textit{periochae} makes no mention of Illyrian pirates, nor any mention of the Ardiaei or any underlying Roman interest in the region; a simple factual statement is stressed in the summary which highlights the cause of the war in the murder of the Roman ambassador. Florus has provided a more obscure account of the origins of the First Illyrian War, describing the murder of both Roman ambassadors, not by sword, but rather by sacrificial axe.\footnote{Florus, \textit{Epitome} 1. 21.} Florus’ account contains a number of factual inaccuracies, most notably in naming the Illyrian Queen, Teutana, which limits its veracity. Nevertheless, it is clear that Florus sought to present the murder of the Roman ambassador(s) in a particularly dramatic and vivid manner. Damon has noted that Florus’ \textit{Epitome} is not the most useful of accounts and is anecdotal in sections.\footnote{C. Damon, ‘Constructing a Narrative’ in D. S. Potter (ed.), \textit{A Companion to the Roman Empire} (Oxford, 2010), pp. 30-1.} Den Boer likewise has highlighted the ‘ineptitude’ of Florus as an historian but has also noted the originality of some of his ideas.\footnote{W. Den Boer, \textit{Some Minor Roman Historians} (Leiden, 1972), p. 3.} Florus’ source material nevertheless remains a mystery, and it is possible that Florus’ version may be sourced in earlier annalistic traditions. Polybius’ version is drawn from annalistic traditions however, yet a marked discrepancy exists between the two accounts,\footnote{See Walbank, \textit{A Historical Commentary on Polybius: Volume I}, pp. 158-60.} if Florus’ account was sourced in the annalistic tradition, it would consequently need to be from a different tradition than Polybius.

The marked discrepancy between the accounts has raised complications with analysing the incident, although the common recording of the murder of an ambassador highlights the...
importance of the event as a pretext. Polybius asserts that the Romans sent two ambassadors, Gaius and Lucius Coruncanius with the younger of the two (the one who addressed Teuta with bold speech in the interview) being put to death by the Illyrian Queen. Appian, on the other hand, has noted that the Roman ambassador that was killed by Illyrian pirates was Coruncanius, alongside the Issaean ambassador Kleemporus. Cassius Dio has not provided a definitive number of ambassadors that were sent by Rome, although he stresses that some were imprisoned and some murdered. Although all sources feature an ambassador murder, some confusion nevertheless persists with the number of ambassadors sent and the role of Issa in the process. A further piece of evidence from antiquity that sheds light on the situation can be found in an often-overlooked passage in Pliny’s *Natural History*. Pliny mentions that three-foot tall statues were placed near the rostra in the Roman forum in customary fashion for ambassadors killed whilst in service to Rome; these statues included those of Publius Junius and Titus Coruncanius, two ambassadors slain by the Illyrian Queen Teuta. Sehlmeyer has asserted that Pliny’s source material for the passage was the *annales*, and that the statues could not have been well inscribed, given the discrepancy between this and the Polybian version. Sehlmeyer is correct to stress the problematic annalistic version of events and highlight the discrepancy. Polybius’ account however only features the murder of one ambassador, even though two were sent out from Rome.

It is unclear exactly where Pliny’s information came from for Publius Junius, although a reference to the murder of a Coruncanius is common in most of the sources. Sehlmeyer has also noted that for Pliny, the erection of these statues was meant as a means of honouring them. The placement of the statues in a prominent position in the forum was likely as a means of reminding the Roman public of the perceived injustices suffered; Pliny’s emphasis on their murder whilst in service of the Republic highlights this importance. Both Appian and Cassius Dio however have drawn attention to the importance of appeals from Issa in their accounts, although the Issaean appeal is absent from Polybius. Gelzer has argued that the lack of inclusion in Polybius is likely due to its omission from Fabius Pictor as it damaged the notion that Rome went to war as a result of an outrage. Walbank however has stressed that Issa did

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446 Polybius, *Histories* 2. 8.
447 Appian, *Illyrian Wars* 3. 2. 7
448 Dio Cassius, *Roman History* 12. 49.
449 Pliny, *Natural History* 34. 11.
451 Ibid.
not join the Romans until 229 BC. Whilst Gelzer’s proposal is possible, the idea that Issa had a strong diplomatic bond with Rome before 229 BC should be dismissed. Polybius may have elected to omit the Issaean embassy, if it actually occurred at all, as a means to reduce convolution in the passage and draw greater attention to the importance of Rome suffering a direct attack from the Illyrians; much in the same manner as the Greeks along the coast had also. This would have furthered the idea of a mutual experience for the Romans and Greeks at the hands of the Illyrians, setting out an effective precursor for the ‘interconnectedness’ between the foreign affairs of the two, who mutually suffered at the hands of the Illyrian common enemy. Derow has shed further light on the subject, by stressing the importance of the inclusion of Kleemporus in Appian’s account. Derow has noted that the name is unusual, occurring three other times in literature, one of whom was an Issaean ambassador during the time of Caesar’s pro-consulship of Illyricum. Whilst Derow is correct to highlight that the name is unusual, and a name also used for another Issaean ambassador, the evidence provided is circumstantial and is not as conclusive as Derow suggests. Gruen has offered a different interpretation which stresses that ‘Roman envoys went to Issa to deliver their complaint for an obvious reason: the Illyrian ruler happened to be there at the time, conducting a siege of the island’. This would appear a simpler and more sound argument; Gruen suggests that the ideas surrounding the Issaean appeals developed later with misinterpretations of the role of Issa in Polybius’ account. Although the role of Issa in the embassy is uncertain, a consensus exists within the surviving sources for the importance of a murdered ambassador, most likely named Coruncanius. This event can subsequently be seen as the pretext given for the Roman intervention.

Although the murder of an ambassador was a common feature in the ancient accounts, the nature of the incident as a pretext has drawn considerable debate in the secondary literature. Harris has noted that the ‘murder seems to be a fact, and even the leaders of the Senate may have believed the somewhat implausible claim, afterwards put about by the Romans, that Teuta herself was responsible.’ Harris is right to question the claim of responsibility to Teuta, describing it as ‘highly convenient’ and without much evidence. This view is shared by

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454 Polybius, Histories 2. 12.
455 P. S. Derow, ‘Kleemporous’, Phoenix Vol. 27 (1973), pp. 118-34. See also Pliny, Natural History 22. 90 and 34. 159.
457 Ibid. p. 362.
459 Ibid.
Petzold, who has raised issues regarding the characterisation of Teuta in Polybius’ account, undergoing a sudden mood swing from the cold-blooded murder of an ambassador to begging in subordination in the war’s aftermath. This shift is not effectively signposted in Polybius’ account. Teuta’s actions subsequently appear irrational and the mood swing depicted, without foundation. The scene depicting the embassy between the Illyrian Queen and the Roman envoys, together with the speeches recorded by Polybius, serve to dramatically juxtapose the behaviours of a foreign monarch with a Roman envoy. As mentioned earlier in the thesis, speeches in Polybius’ text raise considerable problems regarding their accuracy. The format of any embassy that took place and the content of the speeches recorded cannot subsequently be ascertained with any degree of certainty. Walbank has addressed the problematic scene in Polybius’ account and raised issues regarding its authenticity. Given the lack of concrete evidence for the events that took place, and the propagandistic nature of the source material, the manner in which the murder of the ambassador took place cannot be effectively determined.

Eckstein has nevertheless asserted that war was inevitable upon the murder of an ambassador in accordance with Roman custom. This appears in direct contrast to Harris, who, in reference to the embassy, asserts that ‘even without the murder, its rejection was likely to lead to war’. Gruen has also stressed that whilst the notion that ‘a member of the mission perished before returning home may well be true’, ‘the story lacked firm basis’ given the incongruity of the different versions in the surviving historical record. It is important here to distinguish between the better historically attested fact of the murder of an ambassador and the more conjectural descriptions used to describe the murder itself. The aforementioned statues in Rome described by Pliny, point to the significance of the event of murdering an ambassador. Pliny in the passage indeed stresses that it was customary for the Romans to honour the ambassadors who had unjustly been put to death (a fidenatibus in legatione interfectorum (...), iniuria caesis). Whilst the authenticity of the overly-dramatic and propagandistic depictions of the murder of an ambassador should be questioned, the simple notion of the murder itself is better historically attested. As mentioned earlier, the important moral and religious

462Eckstein, Rome Enters the Greek East, p. 41.
465Pliny, Natural History 34. 11.
underpinnings of Roman diplomacy would have made the act highly impious and provided the key pretext to Rome’s intervention.

**Conclusion**

The Roman decision to intervene in the First Illyrian War was based on the important context of the escalation of Adriatic piracy conducted by the Ardiaei. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Ardiaean aggression played an important role in drawing Roman attention to the Southern Adriatic. The piratical raids of the Ardiaei during the 3rd Century BC played a fundamental role in shaping the Illyrian association with piracy in the Adriatic; ‘relatively little is heard about the Illyrians before the second half of the third century BC, when the Ardiaean kings expanded their territory southwards along the Dalmatian coast.’

Earlier evidence for piracy is limited, documenting sporadic episodes and anecdotal phrases about the perceived habitual barbarity of this practice amongst the Illyrians. Illyrian piracy threatened burgeoning trade networks and commercial interests between Southern Italy and the South Eastern Adriatic coast. It is in the context of these trade networks that the response to Illyrian piracy was made; ‘this vibrant regional and interregional trade in the Third Century B.C.E., likely attracted Roman merchants from mainland Italy to Illyria, less than a day’s sail away.’

The Southern Adriatic was an area with important trade networks to Southern Italy, Sicily, the Greek mainland and the central Mediterranean. The economic, as well as strategic importance of controlling the Otranto Straits was an important underlying factor for Roman intervention.

The primary pretext for the Roman intervention, the murder of a Roman ambassador, is likely a factual occurrence. The manner in which the murder is depicted in the sources however has proven particularly problematic and has brought the authenticity of these passages into question. This is especially true for the surviving Polybian version; the Polybian version of events was likely engineered to fit into the wider themes of the *Histories*. Polybius’ background moreover provided him with plentiful personal experiences to draw from for his accounts, although modern scholars have noted that ‘Polybius composed the *Histories* in an intellectual environment largely favourable towards Rome, and strongly inclined to accept

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466 De Souza, *Piracy in the Graeco-Roman World*, p. 76.
imperialism’. Justifications were required for Rome’s military interventions in the form of pretexts which portrayed Rome as honourable in interstate relations. This requirement was prominent for the ancient sources and the pretexts which have been offered by them are often tainted by annalistic traditions or a need to present Rome in an overly favourable light. Although these events are depicted dramatically in the accounts, the murder itself is better historically attested. The murder of an ambassador would have prompted the Romans to act and precipitated the Roman intervention in the First Illyrian War. As Dzino has noted, ‘the First Illyrian War was caused primarily by Roman reaction to the murder of their envoys and was focused on humbling and dividing the Illyrian kingdom.’

The Roman decision-making process furthermore, underwent important developments during the Third Century BC. Reforms to the rerum repetitio and the practical manner in which the Romans declared war facilitated the Roman commencement of hostilities. The ability for legati to effectively declare war through a denuntiatio belli had profound consequences for later Roman interventions. Walbank has noted that the importance of this development had an important bearing on the course of events in Roman declarations of war in 218 BC and 200 BC. Together with the greater Roman capacity for waging war across the Mediterranean from increased sources of manpower, these provided the necessary conditions for more aggressive and expansive Roman interventions to emerge in subsequent decades. Harris’ view, that ‘Rome took almost the first opportunity to intervene there (in Illyria) once the acquisitions of the First Punic War had been put in order’ should be considered in this context. The greater practical capability of the Roman Republic to wage aggressive and expansive wars across the Mediterranean needs to be considered alongside any notion of a continued Roman proclivity for warfare in this fashion. These important developments in the Third Century BC subsequently provided the necessary practical means by which more aggressive and expansive Roman interventions could be enacted.

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470 Walbank, ‘Roman Declaration of War in the Third and Second Centuries’, p. 15.
Chapter 4 – The Second Illyrian War

Introduction

The Roman intervention in the Second Illyrian War was precipitated by the perceived transgressions of Demetrius of Pharos and served to effectively remove him from his position of power in the region. The limited objectives of the intervention were reflective of the limited Roman interest in the region from the aftermath of the First Illyrian War. In both the accounts of Polybius and Appian, the war is directed specifically against Demetrius himself and his actions are cited as the cause of the Roman interventions. Eckstein has noted that the Roman action in intervening against Demetrius put an end ‘to a decade of indifference’ in which Roman concerns in Illyria were minimal. This is reflected in the sources, as the period of the interbellum is afforded sparse coverage, with events in Illyria being reintroduced with the Roman decision to intervene. This chapter shall consider the pretext for the Roman intervention of the perceived transgressions of Demetrius, together with a consideration of the limited Roman involvement and interest in the region. The importance of the diplomatic constructs that formed the bond between Demetrius and Rome shall be considered to effectively consider the implications of the perceived transgressions. The historical accounts of the Second Illyrian War concentrate on a portrayal of Demetrius, drawing particular attention to his character flaws and pouring contempt over his actions. Although the actions of Demetrius served as the key pretext for Roman intervention, the moralising tone of these accounts has limited their effectiveness.

The nature and scope of Rome’s involvement in Illyria shall first be considered by analysing the series of Roman allegiances forged at the conclusion of the First Illyrian War and the efficacy of a range of terms that have been utilised by historians to define the associations. The concept of an ‘external hegemony’ as coined by Eckstein and outlined in the introduction to the thesis, shall be considered to assess the effectiveness of the concept in describing the limited nature of Rome’s involvement. The chapter will then progress to consider the context of a growing Macedonian threat. The Roman interventions in Illyria have often been seen in

\[472\] Polybius, Histories 3. 16; Appian, Illyrian Wars 3. 2. 8.
\[473\] Eckstein, Rome Enters the Greek East, p. 62.
the context of their hostility with Macedon in the 3rd and 2nd centuries BC; Illyria being seen as part of a larger geopolitical struggle between the Romans and Macedonians. Holleaux first outlined this view in 1935, asserting that Rome’s interventions in the First and Second Illyrian Wars were an attempt to prevent the Macedonian kings from extending their influence and power to the Adriatic.475 This has been furthered in more recent scholarship, most notably by Harris. Harris, in his discussion of Rome’s actions after the First Illyrian War, states that ‘the target of this policy, it must have been clear, was Macedon’.476 The importance of the wider geopolitical struggles with Macedon is overstated at this early stage however and owes much to hindsight of later hostilities. Eckstein has challenged this view by labelling it a ‘modern reconstruction of events’ and stresses that Polybius makes a concern of Macedon a minor issue to the Roman decision to intervene in Illyria in 219 BC.477 Bearing in mind the aforementioned theme in Polybius to show the ‘interconnectedness’ of the Roman and wider Greek political world, of which the Roman-Macedonian wars were a significant component, it is perhaps surprising that Polybius does not cite an earlier Roman-Macedonian tension. Errington has drawn attention to the importance of the events of 217 BC as a turning point in Roman-Macedonian hostilities, noting that the harbouring of Demetrius of Pharos by Philip V, was ‘not in itself a hostile act’.478 Whilst Errington is perhaps too strong with this assertion over Demetrius, he and Eckstein are nevertheless correct to question the validity of Roman hostilities with Macedon before 217 BC. Beginning in 217 BC, the Roman conflicts with Macedon were initially based on reacting and containing the threat posed by Macedon to the Adriatic. Rome’s greater interest during this initial period was focused on the more pressing threat of Hannibal in Italy; Rome sought to keep Macedon at a distance and protect its ‘external hegemony’ over the southern Adriatic.

**Roman Associations in Illyria**

Although no definitive description of Rome’s arrangements on the eastern Adriatic coast in the aftermath of the First Illyrian War is extant in the ancient historical texts, it is nevertheless important to initially consider what information can be gleamed from the

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477Eckstein, *Rome Enters the Greek East*, p. 64; Polybius, *Histories* 3. 16.
accounts. Polybius notes that during the campaign, Corcyra, Apollonia, Epidamnus, Issa, the Parthini and the Atintani all surrendered themselves to Roman protection.\footnote{Polybius, \textit{Histories} 2. 11.} Appian asserts that Pharos and Corcyra were surrendered to the Romans by Demetrius, a friendship (φιλίαν) was subsequently formed between Rome and Epidamnus and the Atintani went over to the Romans.\footnote{Appian, \textit{Illyrian Wars} 3. 2. 7.} Appian in the conclusion of hostilities however notes that Pharos, Corcyra, Issa, Epidamnus and the Atintani were subject to Rome (ὑπηκόους).\footnote{Ibid.} It is unclear from Appian’s account exactly what this status entailed, and the lack of a more definitive term with more explicit diplomatic meaning has rendered his description problematic. Appian however notes that the Romans made Apollonia and Corcyra free and later discusses the importance of the detaching of the Atintani from Rome by Demetrius of Pharos.\footnote{Appian, \textit{Illyrian Wars} 3. 2. 8.} Walbank has highlighted this passage as a clarification of the existence of free-states in the arrangement and he has stressed that it would ‘hardly be true of just these two states alone’.\footnote{Ibid.} It is not clear however exactly in what ways these states could exercise their freedom. Appian, in an early fragment from his work on \textit{Macedonian Affairs}, notes that in the late 3\textsuperscript{rd} Century BC, Greeks were giving themselves over, ἐκόμισεν, to the Romans.\footnote{Appian, \textit{Macedonian Affairs}, Fragment 1} This term conveys a range of meanings, ranging from paying heed to servitude, and this has added to the problems with Appian’s statements on the diplomatic relationships in his accounts. As such, the ancient sources provide some insight into the states that aligned with Rome in the aftermath of the First Illyrian War, although it is impossible to draw accurate inference on the precise nature of these relationships due to the limitations of the source material.

Eckstein has additionally highlighted the ‘innumerable references to relationships of amicitia or philia - i.e. friendship – among states’ in the sources.\footnote{Eckstein, \textit{Rome Enters the Greek East}, p. 44.} The informal and imprecise nature of these relations has caused greater debate amongst modern scholars regarding the precise nature of the relationship forged with Rome. Walbank has asserted that Corcyra, Apollonia and Epidamnus maintained rights to mint their own coinage, including some Corcyrean drachmae that bore the inscription: ROMA.\footnote{Walbank, \textit{A Historical Commentary on Polybius: Volume I}, p. 162.} Badian has however argued that these coins were struck by the Corcyreans at the request of Rome; an analysis that Walbank has
found convincing. This would reflect a traditional model of clientela relationship, in which the actions of the client states to Rome were effectively restricted. Petzold by contrast has suggested that the polities within the region that were associated with Rome exercise autonomy over their own affairs, conducting themselves as they had before, principally on the basis of self-maximisation. Roman power in this scenario nevertheless retained importance in the political calculations employed by these polities. This perspective is more in line with Eckstein’s concept of an ‘external hegemony’ being employed by Rome.

Hammond, by contrast, has argued that Rome exercised greater direct control over these entities in the form of a ‘Roman Protectorate’. The modern term ‘protectorate’ has been applied by scholars to describe the agreements and associations forged by Rome and a variety of entities east of the Adriatic at the conclusion of the First Illyrian War. A ‘protectorate’ as defined in international law and applied in this context refers to ‘a relatively powerful State’s promise to protect a weaker State from external aggression or internal disturbance, in return for which the protected entity yields certain powers to the protector. Typically, the legal basis for a regime of protection is a treaty by which the protecting State acquires full control over the external affairs of another State or territory, while the latter continues to have command over its internal affairs.’

The term ‘Roman Protectorate’, used to describe the collection of states aligned to Rome, after the First Illyrian War, and then renewed after the Second Illyrian War, was first coined by Holleaux in 1928. The lack of terminology used by the ancient sources to effectively describe the arrangement has been particularly problematic to interpreting the nature and implications of Rome’s diplomatic arrangement. Difficulty in applying the term ‘protectorate’ is reflected by Hammond, who describes the term as ‘euphemistic’ in defining ‘the area subjected to Rome’. Holleaux’s term nevertheless gained popularity in ensuing works, being utilised by both Hammond and Cabanes. On the other hand, Badian, and later Dzino, have seen the Roman arrangement as indicative of more of a

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489 Hammond, The Illyrian Atintani, the Epirotic Atintanes and the Roman Protectorate’, p. 23.
looser series of friendship alliances. The challenges to Holleaux’s original thesis were well founded, addressing the discrepancy between a formal arrangement in Hollaeux and the lack of a coherent and discernible arrangement of this sort in the extant sources.

Eckstein however has offered alternative terminology to describe the arrangement, a ‘sphere of influence’. A sphere of influence has been effectively defined by Keal as the exertion of a ‘predominant influence’ by a single external power which ‘limits the independence or freedom of action of states’ within a definite region. The predominant influence of the external power is hegemonic, prevailing over the influence of other comparable powers over the region. In applying the concept to the situation in Illyrian in 229/8 BC, Eckstein has stressed the lack of Roman involvement in Illyria in the aftermath of the First Illyrian War, with ‘only the loosest of hegemonies in Illyria’ exerted by the Romans. This hegemony was dependent on the lack of competitors to challenge it, and broke down with the emergence of Demetrius of Pharos as a rival in the region later in the decade. Roman hegemony over Illyria during the period being considered in this thesis, was not forcibly entrenched by permanent administration or troops on the ground with Rome, instead, operating at a distance. This notion of ‘external hegemony’ suitably fits the nature of Rome’s geopolitical influence over the region during this period. Eckstein has asserted that ‘the Romans understood that it was possible to have real amicitia between unequal partner, and so the prevalence of amicitia with foreign states need not have been an ineffective means of exercising strong influence when Rome wished.’ The informal associations which Rome signed suited the Roman need for flexibility in the arrangement in which a Roman ‘external hegemony’ could persist. For the entities along the Adriatic coast, the arrangements would have provided a notion of autonomy, reinforced by the hands-off approach of the Romans whilst affording them the protection of a stronger state from the aggressions of the Ardiaei. Gruen has noted that ‘the communities of Corcyra, Apollonia and Epidamus possessed longstanding commercial connections with the Greeks of Southern Italy and naturally welcomed Rome’s assistance against Illyrian

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495 Eckstein, Rome Enters the Greek East, p. 57.
497 Ibid.
498 Eckstein, Rome Enters the Greek East, p. 58.
499 Ibid. p. 54.
marauders. The informal bond of friendship could serve in this way as a means of drawing assistance again in future, as and when this would be required.

The status of Apollonia and Epidamnus as important ports of embarkation for Romans travelling east of the Adriatic is well attested in the sources. This would have secured a greater means of contact between Italy and the eastern Adriatic coast and would, in ensuing decades, enable the Romans to effectively and safely send their armies across the Adriatic. Badian has stressed the importance of the diplomatic arrangements in ensuring Roman command across the Otranto Strait against further piracy. Dzino has also highlighted the importance of the Otranto Strait to Rome and has stressed the Roman diplomatic arrangements being forged or renewed with the ‘separate political entities affected by the war’. The importance of the strategic objective of ensuring greater control over the Otranto Strait and greater security over the wider Adriatic can be reflected in the diplomatic arrangements. This can be seen by the map cited in the Appendix and taken from Hammond’s examination of the ‘Roman Protectorate’, which sets out the geographic boundary of the majority of the states aligned to Rome in the southern Adriatic. Although a slight discrepancy exists between Holleaux and Hammond regarding the geographic positioning of the Parthini, both agree to a rough geographic outline for the states diplomatically aligned to Rome. These states were directly across the Otranto Strait from Italy. As stated previously, these areas held the greatest strategic importance to Rome. The Roman desire to engage with these states, rather than entities in the Northern Adriatic reflected the disparate geopolitical makeup of Illyria and the importance to Rome of narrowing their involvement to these areas.

Perhaps some of our best evidence to better understand the nature of Rome’s allegiances on the coast comes from an inscription from Pharos in the form of a psephisma in two separate fragments, which can be seen in the Appendix. The psephisma documents an appeal from Pharos to its metropolis, Paros, outlining the desolation of the city of Pharos and in the process, referring back to a prior diplomatic arrangement between Pharos and Rome. The poor quality of the fragments however, especially fragment A (Fig. 7a.), has made an analysis of the

500 Gruen, The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome, p. 76.
503 Dzino, Illyricum in Roman Politics, p. 51. These ‘separate political entities’ in Dzino’s work are listed as Corcyra, Epidamnus/Dyrrachium, Apollonia, The Issaean commonwealth, the Parthini, Atintani, the parts of Agron’s kingdom ruled by Teuta for Pinnes, Demetrius of Pharos and Scerdilaidas.
504 Appendix (Fig. 6.).
505 Appendix (Fig. 7a and Fig. 7b.).
contents of the *psephisma* very difficult. The most pertinent part of the inscription appears on line 8 of fragment A. Reconstructed, it is believed to read: συμμα - [ζιαν (και φιλίαν)], potentially relating to an alliance and friendship existing between the two entities. The reading of this expression in the inscription has caused significant debate in the secondary literature. Derow has argued that ‘one substantial conclusion must emerge: that Pharos had an alliance, συμμαχίαν, with Rome from some point in the third century BC’.

Eckstein however has challenged this argument by asserting that the inscription ‘cannot bear the great political weight that has been put on it’ and that it is incongruent with the surviving written accounts. Whilst both arguments make good points, neither provides a satisfactory answer to interpreting the *psephisma*. Derow’s assertion does not take into account the limitations and complexities of the terminology and Eckstein has sought to disguise the extant terminology to fit the *psephisma* into his overall argument. As mentioned earlier in the thesis, the distinction between socii (allies/associates) and amici (friends) and with socii et amici, is hard to effectively determine. The distinction was first raised by Mommsen, who asserted that socii et amici reflected a more formal alliance of friendship; this view has largely been discredited. It is subsequently not clear whether the ‘friendship and alliance’ being alluded to in the *psephisma* is indicative of a more formal form of alliance; in all likelihood it would have operated as a form of relatively informal friendship. Eckstein has stressed that Derow’s reading of the *psephisma* would strongly support Harris’ notion of an aggressive and expansionist Rome operating in the eastern Adriatic by 228 BC. This however does not take into account the lack of Roman interest in large parts of Illyria and the lack of direct control imposed on the region by Rome. This would be supported by the more tangible, if not necessarily more formal, diplomatic arrangement being set out in the inscription.

Further questions have been raised regarding the dating of the *psephisma* and the dating of the diplomatic arrangement being referred back to in the inscription. Derow has dated the *psephisma* to the 3rd Century BC, asserting that the desolation of Pharos being referred to was from the Roman attack in 219 BC, with the diplomatic arrangement referring to 228 BC. The Roman attack of 219 BC is the most historically attested attack on the city and it is to this historical attestation that Derow has based his claim. Burton has however challenged this claim by noting that the ‘city of the Pharians’ referred to in the inscription could not have had a

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509 T. Mommsen, *Römisches Staatsrecht* (Leipzig, 1887), pp. 590-5. As discussed earlier in the thesis, the Latin terms usually operated in like manner to their Greek counterparts.
diplomatic arrangement with Rome in 228 BC by the fact that Demetrius was in control of Pharos after the First Illyrian War and had an agreement of amicitia with Rome.\textsuperscript{511} Eckstein has stressed that the dating of the psephisma remains uncertain; the inscription could be dated from any time from the early 3\textsuperscript{rd} Century BC down to around 150 BC.\textsuperscript{512} Although the event of 219 BC is well attested in the sources there is certainly no guarantee that the desolation of Pharos mentioned in the psephisma refers to this precise event. Burton is certainly correct to highlight the practical problems raised by the earlier date however given the status of Demetrius in 228 BC. Eckstein has further highlighted the epigraphical problems with the inscription, asserting that ‘iota adscript turns out to be employed with words in the dative ending in omega, suggesting an earlier date; it is not, however, employed at all with words in the dative ending with eta (and there are perhaps eleven such cases on the inscription), which suggests a later date.’\textsuperscript{513} This once more raises the limitations of drawing substantive inference from the inscription. It is also difficult to effectively posit the inscription in the wider context as there are very few dateable Greek inscriptions from Illyria. As such, the inscription is particularly problematic to use, and the dating cannot be deduced with any degree of certainty. The diplomatic arrangement alluded to in Fragment A is suggestive of a συμμαξίαν καὶ φιλίαν (friendship and alliance), but the connotations of the diplomatic phrasing make it difficult to determine exactly what this would entail.

### Roman Treaties

The terms of the Roman treaty at the conclusion of the First Illyrian War nevertheless can provide some important insight into the limited Roman strategic objectives in their intervention. Polybius outlined the terms of the treaty, noting that Teuta agreed to pay a fixed tribute to Rome, to abandon all Illyricum with the exception of a few districts, and to refrain from sailing beyond Lissus with more than two unarmed vessels.\textsuperscript{514} Appian makes no mention of the tribute, but stresses the Lissus clause in the treaty and that Pinnes could inherit Agron’s kingdom and be a ‘friend’ of Rome if he agreed to keep his hands off the newly aligned territory.

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\textsuperscript{511} Burton, \textit{Friendship and Empire: Roman Diplomacy and Imperialism in the Middle Republic (353 – 146 BC)}, p. 138.


\textsuperscript{513} Eckstein, ‘Pharos and the Question of Roman Treaties of Alliance in the Greek East in the Third Century B.C.E.’, p. 402. The most likely later date according to Eckstein would be from the mid-2\textsuperscript{nd} Century BC.

\textsuperscript{514} Polybius, \textit{Histories} 2. 12.
to Rome.\textsuperscript{515} Cassius Dio mentions no terms of the treaty, only noting that Teuta abdicated power to Pinnes.\textsuperscript{516} The absence of the tribute in Appian’s account has drawn questions over the authenticity of the treaty that he presents, particularly when compared to the more comprehensive Polybian version. Both Appian and Polybius draw emphasis to particular terms in the treaty, most notably to a clause involving Lissus and the separation of territory. Walbank has noted that the terms of the Lissus clause ‘secured the freedom of the Ionian Sea for Italian and Greek shipping’.\textsuperscript{517} As mentioned earlier in the thesis, the objectives of the Romans and Adriatic Greeks were limited in the First Illyrian War and centred around the need to secure the southern Adriatic from Illyrian piracy. The Lissus clause would have provided greater protection for shipping routes across the southern Adriatic, the Strait of Otranto and the Ionian seas. The emphasis of the clause in Polybius would also have served to further demonstrate the mutual objectives of the Romans and Greeks in the Adriatic in reducing the risk of Illyrian piracy. By containing Illyrian vessels north of Lissus, the Romans could be presented in Polybius’ account as alleviating the Illyrian piratical menace from mainland Greece. The coastal areas were most important to Rome; the separation of the coast between the various states aligned to Rome, the territory controlled by Demetrius and that of the Ardiaean kingdom, together with the limitations of the Lissus clause greatly restricted the ability of another strong Illyrian maritime power to emerge.

Incongruity nevertheless exists between the sources, with Polybius citing the payment of a tribute and Appian highlighting a potential diplomatic friendship between Pinnes and Rome. Polybius makes no mention of Pinnes in his account and Errington has argued that this suggests that ‘Polybius is not very well informed about Illyrian affairs’.\textsuperscript{518} It remains unclear as to why Polybius excluded him from his account, although it enabled Polybius to concentrate more on Teuta, whose role in the Polybian version, has been highlighted earlier in the thesis. Harris has highlighted the passage regarding a possible war indemnity, although he accepts that ‘it is hard to see how the Illyrians could have paid much of an indemnity after the campaign of 229-8’.\textsuperscript{519} Gruen has however commented on Harris’ claim, asserting that there is ‘no evidence and little likelihood’ for it.\textsuperscript{520} Harris’ statement rests on a vague mention in Polybius’ account

\textsuperscript{515}Appian, *Illyrian Wars* 3. 2. 7.
\textsuperscript{516}Dio Cassius, *Roman History* 12. 49.
\textsuperscript{517}Walbank, *A Historical Commentary on Polybius: Volume I*, p. 165.
\textsuperscript{519}Harris, *War and Imperialism in Republican Rome 327-70 BC*, p. 64.
\textsuperscript{520}Gruen, *The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome*, p. 367.
which is not noted elsewhere, a point which Harris concedes. It is unlikely that there was a war indemnity of a significant kind in any case given the precarious position of the Ardiaean kingdom in 228 BC. If a war indemnity was imposed, it would have merely reflected the greater Roman need to weaken the Ardiaean kingdom as a means of limiting their ability to conduct raids. Von Scala traditionally believed that Polybius’ source for the treaty terms was the Achaean record office. Walbank has however noted that it would be very unlikely for Polybius to have access to them and the more likely source is Fabius Pictor. Considering Polybius’ reliance on the annalistic tradition present in Fabius Pictor for other episodes of the First Illyrian War in Book II, and Polybius’ heavy reliance on annalistic traditions more generally for events predating 220 BC, it is more likely that Walbank is correct in sourcing the treaty terms in Fabius Pictor. Although incongruity exists between the sources, the treaty enabled Rome to secure its strategic objectives through their intervention. These were centred on the suppression of Illyrian piracy in the Southern Adriatic and ensuring the greater geopolitical stability in the region to safeguard against the emergence of another Illyrian maritime power in the Adriatic.

As Eckstein has argued, the primacy of these strategic interests in Roman decision-making can be observed in contemporary Roman treaties with other states. Two particularly useful examples for contextual consideration were the Treaty of Flamininus of 196 BC that ended the 2nd Macedonian War and the Treaty of Apamea of 188 BC which ended the Roman war with Antiochus III. These treaties were signed after decisive Roman military victories at Cynoscephelae in 197 BC and Magnesia in 189 BC respectively. As such, they reflect Roman strategic motivations behind their interventions as the Romans in both cases dictated the terms of the peace. By contrast the Treaty of Phoenice in 205 BC was approached as a means of compromise between Rome and Macedon and involved the dividing up of territory in Illyria between the Romans and the Macedonians. As such, the Roman treaties forged in the aftermath of Roman victory can be seen to better reflect Roman aims. In the Treaty of Flamininus of 196 BC, the Romans exacted a war indemnity from Philip V of 1,000 talents, took all his ships bar ten and took one of his sons, Demetrius, to Rome as a hostage. Polybius

521 R. Von Scala, Die Studien des Polybios (Stuttgart, 1890), p. 268.
523 Eckstein, Rome Enters the Greek East, p. 55.
525 Livy, ab urbe condita 29. 12.
526 Plutarch, Life of Flamininus 9. 4-5.
sets the indemnity at the lower rate of 200 talents and stresses that a mutual agreement of trust, πιστωσάμενοι, was agreed upon. Although a discrepancy exists between the two sources regarding the size of the war indemnity, the terms of the treaty are fairly congruent in both accounts. The terms set out in the treaty limited Philip’s ability to wage war and created a geopolitical imbalance through the taking of an important claimant to the throne as a hostage. The moral bond in Polybius’ account likely highlighted the importance of the arrangement between Philip V and Rome; an arrangement that Perseus would break in the ensuing decades. The terms of the treaty are similar to those enacted by Rome in 228 BC against the Illyrians. Prime concern in both of these treaties was afforded to a desire to weaken the enemy state, geopolitically and military by limiting their ability to wage war. The moral bond included in Polybius’ account of the Treaty of Flamininus was similar to that presented in Appian’s account of the Illyrian treaty of 228 BC. The establishment of a flexible bond with important moral underpinnings was beneficial to Rome and enabled them to control their scope of interventions in future through the framework of the diplomatic arrangement.

Similarly, the Treaty of Apamea in 188 BC showed similarities with the other two treaties. Appian outlines the terms of the treaty, noting that Antiochus III was stripped of all territory west of the Taurus mountains, banned from keeping elephants and was only allowed as many ships as the Romans would allow him, and must hand over 20 hostages to Rome at the discretion of the Roman consul. Antiochus III was also compelled to pay a war indemnity in instalments to Rome; all these clauses were in the treaty to ensure that Antiochus could then be made a ‘friend’ of Rome. Polybius shows a slight discrepancy over the war indemnity and adds further detail on the other clauses, stressing an additional war indemnity was to be paid to Eumenes II of Pergamum and that the hostages were to be aged between 18 and 45 with the process of hostage taking recycled every three years. The terms of the treaty are based on similar themes to the previous treaties signed in Illyria in 228 BC and Macedon in 196 BC. Both the Treaty of Flamininus and the Treaty of Apamea in some of the accounts feature four prominent clauses; military sanctions, hostages being taken by the Romans, a war indemnity and a bond of amicitia to be agreed upon between Rome and the respective entity. These terms weakened the foreign enemy of Rome geopolitically and militarily and reduced their ability to

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527 Polybius, Histories 18. 39.
528 Appian, Syrian Wars 7. 38-9. The war indemnity involved a payment of 500 Euboic talents upfront, a further 2,500 on the ratification of the treaty by the Roman Senate and a further 12,000 talents in annual instalments delivered to Rome.
529 Polybius, Histories 21. 45. Polybius stresses that the war indemnity paid to the Romans amounted to 10,000 talents of silver in 10 annual instalments.
wage war against Rome again. The terms of the Treaty of Apamea however were notably harsher than the previously agreed upon treaties. Grainger has noted that the results of the treaty greatly damaged the status of the Seleucid Empire, the result of which produced a situation where ‘Rome was clearly the one and only superpower in the known world’. Eckstein has likewise asserted that ‘the Roman Republic managed by 188 BC to create what political scientists call a ‘unipolar’ system in the Mediterranean’. Although it is difficult to completely ascribe this status to Rome in 188 BC, the Treaty of Apamea did nevertheless reflect a greater underlying Roman motivation to shape the region of Asia Minor in its own interests. Antiochus III was forced to hand over large amounts of territory, which was duly awarded to Rome’s Pergamene allies. The treaty marked an important shift in the tone and the scale of the terms from those previously, although the key themes of weakening the opposing state geopolitically and militarily were nevertheless present.

**Demetrius of Pharos**

Rome’s intervention in the Second Illyrian War was prompted by the actions of Demetrius of Pharos, although the timing of Rome’s intervention has posed important questions regarding the nature of the pretext to intervene. The ancient historical accounts focus specifically on Demetrius’ role in the prelude to the Roman intervention, emphasising an act of betrayal by Demetrius in violating the treaty from the First Illyrian War. Appian alludes to Demetrius' faithless spirit in his dealings with Rome and suggests that the Romans were initially wary of Demetrius at the time of the settlement for the First Illyrian War, asserting that the Romans had a mistrust, ἀπιστίαν, of Demetrius. The choice of term here by Appian is particularly poignant, being the antonym of the important Greek concept of πίστις, a concept that operated in a similar manner to Roman fides in underpinning diplomatic associations. Appian’s inclusion of an earlier Roman mistrust is an addition made in hindsight, likely as a means to present Rome as duly aware and suspicious at an earlier stage than in reality. Polybius likewise stressed the betrayal in his account, pointing to the ingratitude and temerity of Demetrius in his actions in disdaining the kindness afforded him by Rome. Polybius’

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532 Appian, *Illyrian Wars* 3. 2. 7.
533 Polybius, *Histories* 3. 16.
emphasis on the service or kindness afforded to Demetrius by Rome, stresses the importance of their previous relationship. Walbank has however noted that the portrayal in Polybius’ account of ‘an aggressive and reckless Demetrius’ is likely an annalistic tradition.\textsuperscript{534} The source of the annalistic tradition in Polybius’ account is assumed by Gelzer to be Fabius Pictor,\textsuperscript{535} although it is uncertain from which annalist the picture of Demetrius shown comes from. Although the source of the tradition is uncertain, the Polybian portrayal of Demetrius is reflected in a variety of sources. Cassius Dio also draws attention to the previous relationship between Demetrius and Rome, asserting that Demetrius abused their previous friendship (φιλίᾳ).\textsuperscript{536} It is perhaps not surprising that the sources draw so much attention to the importance of Demetrius of Pharos as it provided an effective pretext for the Second Illyrian War. The language and tone used in the sources served to highlight the important moral elements of the diplomatic tie that existed between the two entities. Whilst the sources present a hyperbolic image of Demetrius, the important element of fides was crucial to Rome’s diplomatic tie with Demetrius; the breaking of this bond would have been seen as an impious act to Rome. Badian has highlighted the example of Demetrius of Pharos as ‘the ungrateful client’; the Roman intervention was a demonstration of ‘the importance of remembering Rome’s beneficia. The nature of political clientela was becoming clear: the client must not forget his station and the benefits he had received from Rome’.\textsuperscript{537} Gruen has however stressed that ‘the contamination of hindsight and apologia taint the evidence’ and asserted that ‘Demetrius could hardly have banked on Macedonian support in 220 BC’.\textsuperscript{538} The explanation for the irrational action by Demetrius has been explained by his character flaws in the sources. Gruen is correct to highlight the questions of authenticity that this raises to the accounts. For Polybius’ audience and the audiences of later historians, the notion of reckless action against Rome would have been considered impious given the status of Rome in the Mediterranean from the late 2nd Century BC onwards.

The delay of the Romans in intervening against Demetrius has however made an analysis of the pretext problematic. The actions of Demetrius that could be construed to violate the treaty occurred over the course of the period 222 BC to 219 BC, with no singular action

\textsuperscript{534}Walbank, \textit{A Historical Commentary on Polybius: Volume I}, p. 324.
\textsuperscript{535}Gelzer, ‘Römische Politik bei Fabius Pictor’, p. 147.
\textsuperscript{536}Dio Cassius, \textit{Roman History} 12. 53.
\textsuperscript{537}Badian, \textit{Foreign Clientelae 264-70 BC}, p. 47.
\textsuperscript{538}Gruen, \textit{The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome}, p. 370.
being especially highlighted in the sources. Dzino has suggested that ‘it is possible that Roman laissez faire trans-Adriatic policy in this period was understood as a signal to Demetrius that he could extend his influence, and later when his power grew it might have appeared to him that Rome was incapable of reacting to his provocations.’ It is quite possible that the lack of a Roman response to the events from 222 BC onwards prompted Demetrius to continue his actions. Polybius indeed notes that Demetrius had observed that Rome had its hands full against the Gauls in Northern Italy and had taken advantage of the situation. Polybius may have emphasised this to draw even greater attention to Demetrius’ betrayal, citing the betrayal in an early opportunity presented to Demetrius. Demetrius was held in particularly low regard by Polybius, who blamed him for influencing Philip V to turn westwards and combat Rome. This may subsequently be considered as part of the broader Polybian hostility against Demetrius. The Romans were engaged in an arduous campaign in the 220s against the Gauls of Northern Italy and the Istrians by the end of the decade, which will have limited Rome’s ability to intervene. Walbank has stressed the importance of this, and the wider tensions between Carthage and Rome, stating that ‘the Romans only crossed over to close the back door because they feared what stood outside’. Walbank may be judging the episode with too much hindsight, although Roman priorities were not in Illyria for the period 222 – 219 BC but elsewhere. The Roman pretext as such, should be seen in the accumulative nature of the treaty violations. Rome needed to act against the breaking of the treaty and the fides which underpinned it, but only did so when it was capable of acting and when it was prudent to do so.

Many of the treaty terms from the aftermath of the First Illyrian War contained clauses which sought to restrict Illyrian piracy, especially in the Southern Adriatic. These treaties however were signed by Teuta on behalf of Pinnes in both the accounts of Appian and Polybius, and not directly with Demetrius. Some historians have sought to stress that Demetrius may not have considered the treaty binding on him, and subsequently conducted piracy. This has

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539 These actions were his involvement in the Battle of Sellasia in 222 BC, his piratical involvement in both the Istrian War of 221/0 BC and in the Cyclades in 220 BC and his actions against the Roman aligned Parthini and Atintanes.
540 Dzino, Illyricum in Roman Politics 229 BC – AD 68, p. 52.
541 Polybius, Histories 3. 16.
542 Polybius, Histories 5.102 and 7. 13.
544 See also Gruen, The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome, pp. 368-73 and Eckstein, Rome Enters the Greek East, pp. 62-72.
545 Polybius, Histories 2. 12; Appian, Illyrian Wars 3. 2. 7.
been challenged by Eckstein who stresses that Demetrius was the regent of the Ardiaei when undertaking Adriatic piracy and was thus subject to the terms of the treaty. Cassius Dio notes that Demetrius of Pharos had married Pinnes’ mother Triteuta in the interbellum and, in the process, had established himself as regent for the Ardiaei. Moreover Scerdilaidas, his associate in the piratical raids, was Agron’s brother and thus part of the Ardiaean royal family. Whether the treaty directly applied to Demetrius or not remains somewhat unclear. He may well have believed that the treaty didn’t, providing some context for his impulsive actions although crucially the treaty was believed to be in force by the Romans and provided the key justification for the subsequent intervention. Polybius in explaining the origins of the conflict, notably stresses how Demetrius’ actions were in direct contradiction to the aforementioned treaty. If it is to be accepted that the Romans still saw the treaty as valid, then by breaking it Demetrius of Pharos had openly challenged and defied Rome and subsequently precipitated a Roman war against him.

Further questions concerning the violation of the treaty by Demetrius have been raised over Demetrius’ involvement in the Battle of Selassia in 222 BC. Gruen has suggested that, by his participation in the battle, Demetrius in all likelihood sailed beyond Lissus in 222 BC, breaking the treaty in the process yet attracting no response from Rome. The most logical route taken by Demetrius and his forces would be by sea, making a landing at Argos. With a contingent of 1600 troops and the baggage needed to support these troops, maritime transportation would be quicker and more practical. Whilst this is the most probable route taken, the manner of travel for Demetrius and his forces to Sellasia remains uncertain. Polybius, in his account of the battle, asserts that Antigonus wintered at Argos and from there advanced with his army and allies into Laconia. This could be suggestive of an Illyrian advance over land rather than by sea given the troop dispositions alluded to by Polybius during the whole campaign. If this were the case, Demetrius’ actions would not be in violation of the treaty. Gruen however notes that such an action would involve an arduous overland journey.

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547 Eckstein, Rome Enters the Greek East, p. 61.
548 Dio Cassius, Roman History 12. 53.
549 Polybius, Histories 4. 16.; Livy, ab urbe condita 31. 28.
550 Polybius, Histories 3. 16.
552 Polybius, Histories 2. 65.
553 Ibid.
554 Ibid.
555 Argos due to its close proximity to the Isthmus of Corinth and positioning on the Eastern side of the Peloponnese would be less practical than Gruen suggests to reach by sea. The use of the term σύμμαχος by Polybius could refer to a formal ally or rather to a more generic form of military assistance being provided.
and should be considered a ‘most doubtful proposition’. In all likelihood therefore, Demetrius’ actions in participating in the Battle of Sellasia were in violation of the treaty. This however raises a further question as to why Rome did not launch an immediate military intervention against Demetrius. Some contextual reasoning can be seen in Rome’s operations in the Northern Adriatic. The Romans had been engaged in a bitterly fought war with the tribes of Cisalpine Gaul; a decisive victory was not achieved until 222 BC which freed the Romans up to tackle any threat posed by Demetrius. The additional delay might be on account of the outbreak of Istrian piracy in the Northern Adriatic in the following year. As mentioned earlier, the North Eastern Italian coast, before the establishment of Aquileia, was exposed to potential threats from the Northern Adriatic. With priorities being located elsewhere, a Roman military intervention against Demetrius of Pharos may have been delayed; upon victory in the First Histrian War, Rome swiftly moved against Demetrius.

Moreover, Demetrius’ involvement in piratical raiding during the Histrian War was an important factor in provoking the Roman intervention in the Second Illyrian War. Dzino has argued that a joint piratical action between Demetrius of Phars and the Histri in 221 BC ‘finally made the Romans act’ and intervene against Demetrius in 219. The build-up of Demetrius’ depredations could not have gone unnoticed at Rome; the close proximity of the Histrian and Second Illyrian wars that Dzino alludes to, suggests the important link between the two events. Whilst Dzino is right to highlight the importance of the action in leading to the Second Illyrian War, the idea that the event ‘finally made the Romans act’ is overstated. In the two years between these events, the written sources record that Demetrius attacked or undermined places diplomatically aligned to Rome and in the Polybian version, sailed beyond Lissus with more than two pinnaces. The variety of violations of the treaty across the period 222–219 BC needs to be noted here; the Roman intervention should be sourced in the amalgamation of these violations rather than a single violation which directly prompted Roman intervention. The timing of additional piracy conducted by Demetrius in the Polybian version, the piratical raid of the Cyclades after sailing past Lissus, is however more problematic.

556Ibid. p. 370.
557Dzino, Illyricum in Roman Politics, pp. 57-60.
558Dzino, Illyricum in Roman Politics, p. 52.
559Polybius, Histories 3. 16.; Dio Cassius, Roman History 12. 53.; Appian, Illyrian Wars 3. 2. 8. Appian suggests that the Romans acted in retaliation to piratical activity conducted by Demetrius and the Histri, he also mentions the detachment of the Atintani from Rome. Cassius Dio’s account focuses on Demetrius’ actions against neighbouring tribes and those allied to Rome. These passages will be critiqued in greater depth later in the chapter.
Walbank notes that the event occurred before, rather than after his attack on the Adriatic states aligned to Rome and may be ‘strongly coloured by the propaganda of its Roman source’. By stressing this attack on these states, Polybius is able to dramatically present an act of betrayal. Hammond moreover has noted that by flouting the treaty and with affiliations with Macedon, Epirus and Acarnania’, Demetrius would control the Straits of Otranto and the Ionian Gulf, greatly jeopardising Rome’ position ahead of the Second Punic War’. Hammond’s highlighting of Demetrius’ affiliation with Macedon is too strong and likely due to hindsight of the war’s aftermath. By detaching members of the ‘protectorate’ however, Demetrius was undermining the economic and strategic reasoning behind Rome’s intervention in the First War. Although the violations of the treaty as a collective whole are the core reasoning behind Rome’s intervention in the Second Illyrian War, this particular violation had the greatest importance therein. The violation appears last in our sources and posed the greatest threat to Roman interests in the region.

**The Rising Macedonian Threat**

It is important to consider how the development of the threat to Rome posed by Macedon affected Rome’s interventions in the eastern Adriatic. Under the reigns of Antigonus Doson and Philip V, Macedonian domestic fortunes flourished as Macedon gained a greater control over Greece through victories in the Cleomenean and Social Wars. Eckstein notes that, building on the hegemony over Greece established by Antigonus Doson, Philip ‘unexpectedly proved himself an outstanding military commander’. Errington has challenged this however by arguing that Philip V had been 'labouring under beginner’s difficulties' in his preoccupation with the Social War until 217 BC. Whilst Errington is correct to note that the Social War was Philip's priority, the campaign rather demonstrated his capability as a military commander, an important attribute for any Hellenistic ruler, especially given Philip's inexperience and youth. Whilst holding a prominent position and a growing military reputation, Philip

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560 Walbank, _A Historical Commentary on Polybius: Volume I_, p. 325.
562 ‘Demetrius’ link to Macedon is cited to their mutual participation in the Battle of Sellasia, which is not conclusive enough evidence for a strong affiliation.
563 Eckstein, _Rome Enters the Greek East_, p. 78.
nevertheless needed to gain the support of all the members of the Symmachy in order to go to war.\textsuperscript{565} The growth of Philip's military reputation may have helped him gain greater support to push through his desires for greater military campaigns. Polybius in an aside from his main narrative hints at Philip's tremendous popularity in his early reign. Polybius asserts that Thessaly, Macedonia and all subject dominions were more favourable to him than any previous ruler; Polybius in light of this described him as the 'darling of all the Greeks'.\textsuperscript{566} Given this popularity and the youthful exuberance that followed his ascension, Philip may have been able to carry the support of many Greek states, putting him in a particularly powerful position. Philip subsequently had a strong power base in Greece and so long as he kept his Greek allies in line, had the potential to expand his position still further on the peninsula. This threatened the geopolitical status quo in Illyria in which Rome operated an ‘external hegemony’. The growing reputation of a young and inexperienced leader proving himself through successful military campaigns may have had an effect on Roman perceptions of Macedonian power beyond Illyria. The array of states who were included in the Hellenic Symmachy would have increased the power and influence of Philip in the region. Any effect of this nature would have furthered the need of Rome to use caution in their eastern Adriatic affairs, maintaining their effective ‘external hegemony’ over Illyrian affairs.

It is important here to consider this change in the geopolitical landscape of the region, and its subsequent implications for the course of the Roman interventions through Realist international relations theory. The shift in the geopolitical dynamic from a state of ‘external hegemony’ to the competition for power and influence between Rome and Macedon would lead to an inevitable conflict within the core principles of the theory. Eckstein notes that in ‘confronting such competitors, it was natural that serious and unregulated conflicts of interest would arise between communities.’\textsuperscript{567} Although claiming the inevitability of a war between the two entities is too strong and owes too much to hindsight, the geopolitical imbalance had important connotations for the outlook of Illyrian leaders. Illyria was caught in between these two great powers, and in operating out of self-interest, could effectively secure preferential arrangements due to their strategic importance. Eckstein proceeds to stress ‘a tendency for weaker states to call upon strong states to protect them in local quarrels and conflicts’.\textsuperscript{568} In

\textsuperscript{565}J. D. Grainger, \textit{The League of the Aitolians} (Leiden, 1999), p. 275. Walbank lists the members of the Symmachy as follows: the 'Achaeans, Macedonians, Thessalians, Epirotes, Arcarnians, Boeotians, Phocians, Euboeans and perhaps the Opuntian Locrians'. F. W. Walbank, \textit{Philip V of Macedon} (Cambridge, 1940), p. 16.

\textsuperscript{566}Polybius, \textit{Histories} 7. 11.


\textsuperscript{568}Ibid.
light of growing hostilities between Rome and Macedon, Illyrian leaders would naturally seek greater protection from these stronger states. This however does not adequately consider the opportunities afforded to the Illyrians by this dynamic. As shall be discussed in the next chapter, Illyrian leaders took advantage of the geopolitical instability in the region to carve out preferential arrangements.

The importance of the Peace of Naupactus is highlighted in the ancient sources but has caused greater debate in the secondary literature. Polybius highlights the importance of the event through a lengthy speech by Agelaus of Naupactus. The speech itself famously alludes to storm clouds looming over the West, an inevitable invasion of Greece by the winner of the Hannibalic War and a notion of Macedonian prospects for a universal empire. Given the strong statements in its contents, the authenticity of the speech has been brought into question. Champion has argued that, like many reported speeches provided by ancient historians, the authenticity of the speech is dubious, its nature rhetorical, and the choice of its inclusion a political one of the author. Walbank by contrast has not questioned the speech’s authenticity, instead arguing that Agelaus in the speech ‘advised Philip to adopt a policy of defensive alertness; the clear implication was that he should not plunge into a war against Rome.’

Although the authenticity of the speech is unclear, Polybius’ inclusion of such a long speech in his Histories is likely on account of its aforementioned importance in explaining the key theme of ‘interconnectedness’ in his work. Eckstein indeed notes that the speech is integral to the entire structure of Polybius' Histories; Polybius probably wanted to mark the pivotal moment in his text with a significant and controversial speech in his historical account. Whilst ascribing a singular event to a gradually developing concept is challenging, Polybius probably did so to suit his purposes in writing his history. The event nevertheless serves as the first historical attestation for the beginnings of Roman and Macedonian hostilities and as such marked an important shift in the development of Rome’s interventions east of the Adriatic.

The importance of the speech has also been challenged as it relates to the wider context of Macedonian interests east of the Adriatic. Gruen has challenged the logic of Philip’s decision to turn his attention westwards in 217 BC, noting that Philip would not have envisioned a move

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569 Polybius, Histories 5. 104.
570 Ibid.
573 Eckstein, Rome Enters the Greek East, p. 80.
against Rome whilst his own kingdom was under assault. Polybius notes that Scerdilaidas had made raids over the Macedonian border and stresses that Philip moved to counteract the Illyria threat to the North as a prelude to his movement West. Whilst Polybius highlights Philip's lofty ambitions he nevertheless concedes this point. Philip's most pressing concern in 217 BC was securing the Northern border to his kingdom before embarking on a major campaign in the West. Polybius rectifies this discrepancy by noting that whilst dealing with Scerdilaidas, Philip's nights were filled with dreams solely of world domination. The tone of the scene enables Polybius to vividly comment on the character of Philip, although the scene is used purely for dramatic effect. Whether or not Philip intended to attack Italy after dealing with Scerdilaidas is also unclear. Walbank believes that his likely plan was to cross over to Italy after gaining a foothold on the Adriatic coast, although he stresses that we don’t know where Philip built his fleet. Badian however stresses that Philip’s intentions were limited to the conflict with Scerdilaidas; his intentions on an Italian invasion being a later reinterpretation in the light of his attack in 214 BC on Apollonia. Although Philip’s intentions after dealing with Scerdilaidas cannot be known for certain, it does appear that the initial primacy of Philip’s concern was for the security of his northern border.

Philip’s proposed treaty with Hannibal further impacted on Rome’s interventions east of the Adriatic by exacerbating Roman-Macedonian hostilities. Polybius has provided a full text of the treaty in his Histories emphasising the importance of the document in the development of Rome's outlook east of the Adriatic. Rosenstein asserts that the ‘treaty of alliance between the two powers at least on its face envisioned military cooperation. It is not likely that either side really expected support to materialise’. With the separation of the Macedonians in Greece and Carthaginians in Italy, this is likely to have been the case. The implications however of the convergence of Rome’s enemies would have served to heighten Roman anxieties. Polybius’ inclusion of the text of the treaty in his work is interesting, and probably served to further emphasise this point. Polybius’ text did not include any mention of a possible invasion of Italy by Philip but served to highlight that Rome’s enemies were assailing against them. Walbank notes on the treaty that Polybius probably used official Roman records,

575 Polybius, Histories 5. 108.
576 Ibid.
579 Polybius, Histories 7. 9.
580 Rosenstein, Rome and the Mediterranean 290-146 BC: The Imperial Republic, p. 145.
pointing to the existence of record collections in Achaea, Aegium and probably at towns like Argos and Polybius’ own hometown of Megalopolis. Although the origins of the text contained in Polybius’ account can’t be determined for certain, the nature of its inclusion and the style of the text, with its matter-of-fact undramatised style, would indicate that it was an insertion into the work, most likely being derived from some official record. The treaty moreover, outlines the conditions of a Roman defeat; the Romans would be compelled to release captive friends of Demetrius of Pharos and to relinquish any claim to the territories of Corcyra, Apollonia, Epidamnus, Pharos and Dimale nor hold any sway over the Parthini or Atintani. The particular inclusion of many Adriatic territories in the agreement is testament to their importance in the negotiations. The locations themselves included territories previously held by Demetrius, and territories that were aligned to Rome in the aftermath of the First Illyrian War. As such, the terms of the treaty were not only designed to restore Demetrius to his previous position, but to directly damage Roman interests in the Adriatic. Although these interests were threatened, the primary importance for Rome remained dealing with Hannibal in Italy; this would have been compounded by the disastrous defeat of the Romans at Cannae a year previously. After Cannae, Philip may well have been convinced of the likelihood of a Carthaginian victory in the war and may have sought a favourable position in the consequent settlement. In either case, Philip had in the treaty determined the focus of his interests on the Greek peninsula and the Adriatic moreover; by aligning himself with Rome’s sworn enemy in doing so, it had important ramifications on Rome’s handling of her eastern Adriatic interests.

The terms of the alliance between Macedon and Carthage for the Romans in 215 BC ensured that Roman aims in the First Macedonian War were limited and largely restricted to keeping Philip occupied east of the Adriatic. To this end, Rome formed an alliance with the Aetolian League in 211 BC becoming friends and allies.

The terms of the treaty outline the Roman and Aetolian roles in the war against Philip. Livy asserts that the Aetolian League was to confront Philip on land and gain any territory won as far as Corcyra whilst the Romans provided naval support of no less than twenty five quinquiremes. In examining the terms of the treaty, Eckstein notes the lack of territorial gain for Rome in the terms of the allegiance in contrast to the more explicit benefits afforded to the Aetolian League. Harris, whilst agreeing

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585 Eckstein, *Rome Enters the Greek East*, p. 89.
with the potential reasoning for the treaty of keeping Philip occupied in Greece, suggests an additional reasoning ‘to establish the beginning of Roman power in Greece, though this was done in an inept and intermittent fashion.’ This however doesn’t take into enough consideration the importance of Hannibal’s activity in Italy; with Rome under serious and continued threat from the Carthaginian presence, the Romans were hardly likely to be planning schemes of imperial expansion. This is furthered by considering the lack of territorial gain for the Romans in the terms of the treaty. The primary concern of the treaty should subsequently be cited in the pressing need to keep Philip contained across the Adriatic. Through the forming of an allegiance with the Aetolian League, the Romans gained an ally openly hostile to Macedon who could place more direct pressure on Philip. For modern scholars, an analysis of the implications of the treaty have often been influenced by its inclusion as an example in Machiavelli. Machiavelli highlighted the benefits for the Romans in aligning with a weaker entity on the peninsula to Macedon, ensuring greater geopolitical instability that they could later exploit. Whilst Machiavelli’s view highlights the importance of Rome’s diplomatic ties in Greece, the significance of this would not be realised until a later period than 211 BC. The Roman-Aetolian treaty subsequently served to limit the scope of Roman interventions east of the Adriatic, allowing Rome to focus on its primary concerns in Italy.

The likelihood of a possible Macedonian invasion of Italy has caused further debate amongst scholars on grounds of practicality. Macedonian naval attempts on the Adriatic were particularly unsuccessful with a hundred strong Macedonian fleet retreating against a Roman counterattack with a fleet a tenth the size. Harris has noted that such deficiencies in the Macedonian fleet could hardly have filled the Romans with much dread. This however negates the lack of intelligence either side possessed of the opposing forces. Philip's fleet whilst considerably larger, was inexperienced and consisted of quickly amassed Illyrian λέμβοι. Philip consequently would likely not have full confidence in the ability of his fleet. Walbank notes that due to financial pressures on the Macedonian state, a fleet of such size had not been previously possible and that such a fleet could quickly transport around 5000 men. As mentioned earlier, λέμβοι were light vessels used for a variety of purposes, although most notably for quick effective raiding. Philip indeed had gathered the fleet together to deal with

588 Polybius, Histories 5. 110.
589 Harris, War and Imperialism in Republican Rome, pp. 205-6. The Roman ten ships had been sent as a detachment from the main Roman fleet stationed at Lilybaeum.
590 Walbank, Philip V of Macedon, p. 69.
inshore operations against Scerdilaidas in 217 BC, operations that his fleet of λέμβοι were better suited for. Philip’s subsequent successes in taking Lissus and pushing Scerdilaidas out of Dassaretis need to be considered. These success were followed by the Parthini and Atintani tribes falling to him, including the town of Dimale which Rome had successfully besieged during the Second Illyrian War. Waterfield has described the holding of Lissus by the Macedonians as an 'overt threat to Roman interests in the region, and a possible threat even to Italy'. Livy indeed notes that the Rome’s increased their fleet at Brundisium with the purpose to protect the coast of Italy and gather information on the Macedonian conflict. Dzino sources the Roman decision to reinforce their Adriatic fleet in the Adriatic to support Scerdilaidas and in light of Philip’s actions. Although it is unclear which of the reasons cited by Dzino carried the greater weight, the move was a reactive one by Rome, intended to protect Rome’s status in the Adriatic and establish what steps to take next through the gathering of information. Although in the eventual Peace of Phoenice in 205 BC, Philip gained control over the Atintani, formerly a member of the ‘Roman Protectorate’, Rome had secured a peace with Philip which enabled it to concentrate on the conflict with Hannibal. This was especially pressing given the turning of the tide in the campaign, with the war being directed to North Africa.

Rome's strategy in the First Macedonian War has also raised debate regarding the status of Roman associations east of the Adriatic. In a fragment from Appian's coverage of Roman affairs with Macedon, Corcyra is described as a state allied to Rome in the form of a military alliance, συμμαχία, against Philip V who was in the process of attacking the city. Gruen has argued that collaboration of this sort was equivalent to Roman 'friendship' in line with previous Roman associations along the coast. This has been challenged however by Derow who has stressed that this indicates a more formal alliance between the two states and asserts that the terms συμμαχία and 'friendship' are not analogous. Derow is surely correct to stress that these are not equivalent terms, but it is important to place the usage in the appropriate context. As mentioned earlier, the term συμμαχία could refer to a more formal alliance or a more general form of military assistance. Given the nature of the context in the midst of the mutual war being waged with Macedon, the latter definition must also be considered a possibility, albeit a less

595 Livy, *ab urbe condita* 29. 12.
597 Gruen, *The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome*, p. 56.
likely one. Derow later remarks that the treaty between Philip and Hannibal in 215 BC was designed to break Roman associations with Corcyra, Apollonia, Epidmanus, Pharos, Dimale, the Parthini and the Atintani although the absence of Issa has not been explained. The areas outlined in the treaty were those threatened directly by Philip in Southern Illyria and those which particularly pertained to Demetrius' targets for reacquisition. Pharos is the only location outside the Southern Adriatic listed and this, as established earlier, was previously the personal possession of Demetrius of Pharos. As such, Issa may not have been included as it did not fulfil either criteria sufficiently. This demonstrates the importance of the immediate context of the First Macedonian War on the Roman associations. The evidence is more supportive of Derow's view here which stresses the importance of the terms and a more formal form of alliance being formed. With Rome preoccupied in Italy, a form of allegiance with stronger military ties on the Adriatic would have been beneficial to Rome in achieving their main aim during the conflict of keeping Macedon tied down east of the Adriatic.

**Conclusion**

Rome’s intervention in the Second Illyrian War reflected the continued strategic importance for the Romans to maintain their ‘external hegemony’ over the Illyrian region. The War itself was directed specifically against Demetrius of Pharos and, as Eckstein has noted, the ‘expedition of 219 BC had little impact beyond the removal of Demetrius’.

The pretext for the Second Illyrian War was complex, with a range of treaty violations committed by Demetrius across a broad span of time. It is subsequently very difficult to effectively determine the significance of each individual treaty violation in acting as a catalyst for Roman intervention. It is nevertheless important to stress that in the accounts of Polybius and Appian, Demetrius had violated the sacred *fides* that underpinned his relationship with Rome. These accounts are too moralistic and character-driven, seeking to apportion the cause of the war solely in Demetrius’ perceived ingratitude and irrational behaviour. Errington however has suggested that the steady progression of treaty violations created a sense of suspicion, mistrust and hostility that built up to become the essential pretext for the conflict. With no single

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599 Ibid. p. 275.
600 Eckstein, *Rome Enters the Greek East*, p. 75.
discernible event in the extant sources that could constitute a pretext, this serves to effectively explain the complexities of the treaty violations and the delay in Roman action being taken.

The initial settlement established in the aftermath of the First Illyrian War in 228 BC created a series of diplomatic associations across the Adriatic that can best be described as constituting a Roman ‘sphere of influence’. These relations were essentially loosely formed amicitiae, forged in many cases as a result of the deditio of several states to Rome during the military intervention itself. These affiliates to Rome nevertheless exercised ‘some degree of freedom of political action and self-determination even after their amicitia with the Republic had been established’. Rather than exercising direct control over these states, or impose any form of imperial administration, Rome gradually established itself through these relationships as a hegemonic entity in the eastern Adriatic. This hegemony was in line with the definition outlined by Doyle in comparison to imperial power. Rome expected the mutual bond of fides to maintain the diplomatic association between the entities in foreign affairs but Rome took no action in intervening in the domestic affairs of their affiliates. These associations served to demonstrate the limited nature of Roman strategic objectives in the region by upholding their ‘external hegemony’. These were largely centred on the South-Eastern Adriatic coast and the islands of the Adriatic. The flexible relations that Rome had established with these states, together with the limitations imposed on the Ardiaean kingdom through the post-war peace treaty, enabled Rome to achieve its strategic aims. These aims were to suppress Illyrian piracy in the Adriatic and to ensure the greater security of the Southern Adriatic trade routes, most notably across the narrowest section of the Otranto Straits. These aims were congruent with the core motivations of the Adriatic Greeks, who sought Roman protection in the aftermath of First Illyrian War from the threat posed by Ardiaean aggression.

Roman hostilities with Macedon posed a greater threat than previously on Roman interests in the eastern Adriatic, and south eastern Illyria in particular. The geopolitical expansion of the Macedonians into the region threatened the established Roman ‘external hegemony’ and the precisely defined Roman interests, focused on the strategic control of the Otranto.” Whilst Illyria features less in the surviving source material, this is nevertheless reflective of Rome’s limited interests in the region. Rome sought a more peaceful region on the eastern Adriatic coast which provided an effective check on any Macedonian aggression.

605 Dzino, *Illyricum in Roman Politics*, p. 60.
westwards. The historical attestation of tensions between Macedon and Rome prior to 217 BC is intangible and owes much to later hindsight. From 217 BC down to the final Roman victory in 202 BC, the war with Hannibal remained Rome’s number one priority; in the war’s aftermath Rome was better able to foster diplomatic ties in Greece which would eventually lead to conflict with Macedon. In securing these alliances, Rome ‘overturned a long-standing, delicate balance of power in the region, a change that would ultimately result in Philip V’s defeat, witness the establishment of a new, more stable balance of power in Greece and neutralise the Macedonian threat for the next twenty years.’ The quintessential elements of trust, faithfulness, loyalty and confidence that were wrapped up in the Roman concept of fides, still underpinned these alliances, and would be an important foundation for Roman hegemony over Greece.

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Chapter 5 – The Third Illyrian War

Introduction

Rome’s intervention in the Third Illyrian War and concurrent intervention in the Third Macedonian War cemented Rome as the sole influential superpower in the eastern Adriatic. The post-war settlement of the region saw the dramatic eradication of the two kingdoms of Illyria and Macedon, the establishment of a series of republican governments and the sacking of several towns and enslavement of their inhabitants. This represented greater Roman aggression in the aftermath of the campaigns although the ‘external hegemony’ was maintained as Rome did not directly administer the region. For Polybius, the events of 168/7 BC served as his initial choice of date to close his accounts; the date marked the conclusion of the global ‘interconnectedness’ and Rome’s rise to power with the eradication of the Macedonian kingdom. In similar fashion to previous events, Polybius utilised the Third Macedonian and Illyrian Wars as a set-piece within his work to dramatically demonstrate the power, authority and influence of Rome over the ‘inter-connected’ world. Eckstein has described this broader development in the Second Century BC as the emergence of a ‘Roman unipolarity’ that emerged from the previous multi-polar interstate system. This chapter shall initially examine the important developments in the diplomatic arrangements between Rome, Illyria and the Greek East as well as the prelude to the Third Illyrian War. The post-war settlement of the region will also be examined as a means to consider these developments and place them in the context of the previous Roman post-war treaties examined in the previous chapter.

The pretext for the Roman intervention in the Third Illyrian War can be cited in the alliance forged between Genthius and Perseus. This dragged Illyria into the broader conflict between Rome and Macedon and compelled the Romans to intervene in the direct context of the Third Macedonian War. The alliance between Perseus and Genthius had important connotations for the Illyrian geopolitical landscape, which would be fundamentally altered by the Roman victory in these concurrent campaigns. Although there is a scholarly consensus regarding the origins of the Third Illyrian War, Roman motivations behind their intervention in the Third Macedonian War has been the source of some debate. This debate has emerged on

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607 Polybius, Histories 1. 1.
608 Eckstein, Rome Enters the Greek East, p. 342.
account of an unsatisfactory pretext provided by Polybius to explain the Roman motivation for war. This pretext asserts that Philip V intended war with Rome and had planned it before his death in 179 BC. Perseus served as Philip’s agent in the affair, following the death of his father.\textsuperscript{609} Harris has highlighted the inadequacy of this pretext and stresses that ‘it simply does not explain what needs explaining – namely the Roman decision to begin war’.\textsuperscript{610} Gruen has however directly criticised Harris’ perspective by asserting that it ‘overlooks all the diplomatic preliminaries and the lengthy delays before Rome committed herself to war.’\textsuperscript{611} Both these sources are correct to dismiss the premise put forward by the pretext and reject the notion that Perseus sought war. The Roman motivation behind their intervention is harder to determine and no singular pretext suffices to explain Rome’s intervention. The origins of the conflict however reveal Roman concerns over a geopolitical imbalance which led to a greater desire to affirm their geopolitical dominance over the eastern Adriatic. The Roman decision to intervene in the Third Macedonian War had important connotations for the Roman interventions being considered in this thesis. Wars were waged against the Macedonians and Illyrians simultaneously and both kingdoms overthrown in their aftermath.

**Roman Diplomacy with Greek States**

An important component in the expanding role of Rome east of the Adriatic was Rome's growing diplomatic role in the affairs of Greek states. The Treaty of Phoenice in 205 BC which ended the First Macedonian War featured many Greek states as associated members to the two parties, Rome and Macedon.\textsuperscript{612} Harris has argued that the Romans through their plethora of diplomatic associations in the treaty were muscling their way into Greek affairs and creating the necessary conditions that eventually led to appeals to them for military help.\textsuperscript{613} Eckstein however has noted that the inclusion in the list of the Ilians and Athenians was peculiar given the fact that they didn't fight in the campaign and describes the states more generically as

\textsuperscript{609}Polybius, *Histories* 22. 18. This pretext also appears in Livy, *Ab urbe Condita* 42. 52.
\textsuperscript{610}Harris, *War and Imperialism in Republican Rome*, pp. 227-33.
\textsuperscript{611}Gruen, *The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome*, p. 418.
\textsuperscript{612}Livy, *Ab urbe condita* 29. 12. Livy includes in the peace treaty: Prusias, king of Bithynia, the Achaeans, the Boeotians, The Thessalians, The Arcanians and the Epirots for Macedon; The Ilians, Attalus of Pergamum, Pleuratus (son of Scerdilaidas), Nabis tyrant of the Lacademonians, the Eleans, The Messenians and the Athenians for Rome.
\textsuperscript{613}Harris, *War and Imperialism in Republican Rome*, pp. 207-8.
supporters of one side or another. Livy in the passage utilises the term *foederi adscripti* to describe these states, referring to them being drawn up in league, treaty or alliance. Whilst the terminology may be indicative of states united by alliance, it is more likely that the term refers to a less permanent arrangement. Rather than use the terms *socii* or *amicii* to describe these states, Livy chooses to depict the allegiance as one drawn up, possibly for the expressed purposes of the treaty. Harris in his suggestion that the arrangements were for the purpose of providing future military help is too conjectural given the situation in 205 BC. Whilst diplomatic associations with Greek states was key to that conflict, the informal nature of the description of the ties in Livy’s account, would suggest the importance of later developments. The inclusion of a plethora of states in the treaty on both sides is nevertheless suggestive of greater Roman involvement in the diplomatic affairs of Greece with the outlining of certain affiliations with Greek states. These affiliations may have been informal at this stage, but they nevertheless carried important resonances.

Rome would build upon these outlined affiliations in the aftermath of the treaty, forging stronger diplomatic relationships which would help precipitate the Second Macedonian War. Eckstein has noted a particular case regarding Rome's diplomacy with Pergamum through Rome's seeking of the *Magna Mater deorum Idaea*. Graciously at Rome's request in 204 BC, Attalus had managed to convince the priests of the Pessinus temple to give the Black Stone to Rome in accordance with a prophecy foretold in the Sibylline Books. Eckstein notes that this event strengthened the bond between the two states as the Romans of the period were very religious and especially so in a time of crisis. Recent Roman diplomatic arrangements had not been particularly successful with other states. Demetrios of Pharos had been an unreliable associate for Rome on the Adriatic coast and Roman diplomacy with Carthage had led to the reputation of the *Punica fides*, the Carthaginian faith noted for its perfidy. Gruen notes this importance by stating that 'the good faith of the Romans, their commitment to the defence and support of allies and friends who depended on their *pistis* or *fides*, stands as a prevailing motif in the history, or rather historiography, of Roman expansion in the Mediterranean.

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617 Livy, *Ab urbe condita* 29. 11. The oracle foretold that upon the Cybele arriving in Rome, a foreign intruder would be removed. With Hannibal being compelled to return to Carthage the following year, this was attributed to the prophecy coming true.
619 Gruen, *Rethinking the Other in Antiquity*, p. 115.
representing the states of Pergamum and Rhodes appealing for action to be taken against Philip built upon the earlier associations. These appeals have subsequently been considered as a pretext for Roman intervention. Gruen asserts that the action turned Roman thought towards war whilst Warrior has argued that the appeals could have sought mere arbitration rather than outright military intervention. Warrior’s argument however negates the importance of Rome’s declaration of war against Philip during his siege of Athens. It is difficult to imagine that Philip was ever likely to accept the terms of the Roman ultimatum. As mentioned earlier, usage of the rerum repetitio had been superseded by the usage of denuntiatio belli in the process of Rome’s declaration of war. Polybius notes in the passage that the ultimatum was presented to Philip by means of an envoy in accordance with the new process. The greater ease by which the Romans could declare war on foreign entities served to facilitate more aggressive Roman interventions.

The underlying motivation of supporting her allies was, nevertheless, crucial to Roman intervention. The series of embassies sent to Rome in 201 BC from Egypt, Rhodes, Pergamum and Athens provided the important pretext in forming Rome’s decision to intervene in the conflict. Livy’s account draws particular attention to the good standing these states had with Rome on account of their good faith. This is reflected in Harris, who notes that Roman fides was at stake, particularly in the case of Attalus. Rome was in the process of developing important diplomatic ties in Greece and in order to maintain the faith and confidence that underpinned those ties, Rome would have sought to honour the terms that underpinned them. Livy also provides a speech in the comitia from Sulpucius Galba which convinced the Senate of the need to go to war after the decision was initially rejected. The authenticity of the speech has been questioned, however. Harris has argued that the speech ‘has no claim whatsoever to authenticity, though it may of course accidently happen to reproduce the arguments Sulpucius really used’. This has been challenged however by historians noting that the speech may have been originally attested in Polybius. This however is difficult to ascertain given the nature of the section of Polybius being lost. The speech that is presented in Livy is nevertheless not veracious enough and too dramatic in tone and content. The initial rejection by the Senate was based on the exhaustive war that Rome had just emerged victorious in over Hannibal. Harris notes that the Second Macedonian War was ‘never popular’ whilst Eckstein has noted the

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624 Livy, *ab urbe condita* 31. 2.
importance of the war-weariness of the Roman population and the uncertainty over whether
the war was truly necessary. The underlying importance of the diplomatic ties to Rome is
once more asserted in the prelude to the war. In the process of sending the ultimatum to Philip
V at Athens, the Romans sought to consolidate its status amongst its allies, especially on the
Adriatic coast. The support of such allies was very important for Rome ahead their campaign
against Philip V to secure an effective landing place for crossing over to Greece and a base of
operations from which to conduct the campaign. Eckstein asserts that for Rome, the Greek
allies had proven particularly useful since 214 BC in their campaigns against Philip V. The
decision to try and gain the support of the Greek Leagues is further suggestive of this; although
an unsuccessful endeavour, it demonstrates the significance Rome placed on their Greek allies
in the conflict and the value they saw in gaining the support of as many prominent entities as
possible.

Rome's greater diplomatic role in affairs east of the Adriatic can also been seen from
the settlement at the conclusion of the war and the actions of Titus Flamininus. Polybius notes
that having been subsequently invited to the Isthmian Games, Flamininus declared the
'Freedom of the Greeks', freeing several Greek cities from garrison, tribute and foreign
oppression. The decision made by Flamininus and the implications of the proclamation have
however been questioned. Champion has argued that the episode was an example of Roman
'propagandist diplomacy'. Dimitirev has, in turn, observed that the slogan of the 'Freedom of
the Greeks' was associated with the treaty concluding the Second Macedonian War and was
likely a senatorial suggestion but refined by Flamininus to suit Roman interests. The
diplomacy as such appears to be part of a more deliberate and well formulated attempt by Rome
to curry the favour of the Greek states. The Romans had first been accepted to the Isthmian
Games in the aftermath of the First Illyrian War, when Corinth had granted the status to the
Romans, after the Romans had sent envoys in the aftermath of the conflict. The speech by
Flamininus in 196 BC however is demonstrative of the development of Rome’s growing status
in Greek affairs. The consequent Greek response to the speech depicted by Polybius, however
appears hyperbolic, as he describes the Greeks almost crushing Flamininus to death as a result

627 Harris, _War and Imperialism in Republican Rome 327-70 BC_, p. 218; Eckstein, _Rome Enters the Greek East_, p. 269.
628 Livy, _ab urbe condita_ 31. 28. These allies included Pleuratus of Illyria, Amyntander of the Athamanes and
Bato of the Dardani. Subsequent ambassadors were sent to Rhodes and Pergamum with instructions and for the
war and to both Greek Leagues (in spite of their allegiances to Philip V) to try and gain their support.
629 Eckstein, _Rome Enters the Greek East_, p. 276.
630 Polybius, _Histories_ 18. 46. The freed peoples listed by Poybius are as follows: The Corinthians,
Phocians, Locrians, Euboeans, Phiotic Achaeans, Magnesians, Thessalians and the Perrhaebians.
633 Polybius, _Histories_ 2. 12.
of their overjoyed reaction to the proclamation.\footnote{Polybius, Histories 18. 46.} It is hard to thus ascertain the authentic Greek reaction to Roman diplomacy although Rome's aim in the diplomatic action was to assert itself as the mediator of Greek affairs. Freedom was an important concept for the Greek states and in alluding to such a concept, Rome was able to better its reputation amongst several Greek states. Polybius indeed employed similar language in the earlier instance cited, when Rome had emerged victorious in the First Illyrian War.\footnote{Polybius, Histories 2. 12.}

Whilst this was indicative of a greater Roman involvement east of the Adriatic, Rome nevertheless did not subjugate the region. Eckstein has argued that Flamininus in 196 BC could have moved to create a more permanent provincia east of the Adriatic, in line with the creation of two provinciae in Spain the previous year.\footnote{Eckstein, Rome Enters the Greek East, p. 285.} It is important however to put this in the context of the development of Roman diplomatic ties with the Greek states and the origins of the Second Macedonian War itself. The war, as mentioned earlier, had not been particularly popular in Rome and subsequently Flamininus may have understood the fragile nature of public opinion in Rome, especially considering the war-weariness of the Roman public. It is more likely however the case that Flamininus sought to curry the greater favour of the Greeks. Badian notes that Flamininus was a known ‘sentimental philhellene’ with a passion for Greek culture.\footnote{E. Badian, Titus Quinctius Flamininus: Philhellenism and Realpolitik (Cincinnati, 1970), p. 57.} He also likely realised the unpopularity of making a conciliatory gesture of liberation. Badian also notes that ‘the Greeks regarded it as (…) natural that the Romans should protect their freedom without expecting anything in particular in return.’\footnote{Ibid. p. 20.} The Romans were eager to maintain their important diplomatic ties in Greece and by appealing to the important concept of freedom in a Greek context, Flamininus was able to strengthen these ties. This was especially important in the context of Rome’s lack of administration in the region. In order to ensure that Greece was diplomatically attuned to Roman interests without their direct administration of the region, the Romans needed these strong diplomatic ties. In doing so, Rome was able to maintain the ‘external-hegemony’ alluded to earlier in the thesis.

**Roman Diplomacy in Illyria**

Rome's diplomatic ties in Illyria would be maintained and subsequently enhanced throughout the early Second Century BC during the reign of Pleuratus III, whose reign witnessed greater cohesion between the two entities. Pleuratus had been an associated member
to Rome in the Treaty of Phoenice as mentioned earlier and through the development of this relationship Pleuratus seems to have benefitted as a result of his tie to Rome. Livy notes that at the end of Roman hostilities with Philip, Pleuratus was rewarded with the territory of the Parthini and the town of Lychnidus on Lake Ohrid at the expense of Macedon. Dzino notes that by gaining this territory, Pleuratus was ‘becoming himself a significant political power in the region, strengthened by open Roman support’. This was an important step for Rome; the granting of territory to Demetrius of Pharos on the coast had not gone well for Rome in 228 BC, and Rome may have been hesitant to entrust another entity in the region with a similar reward. Pleuratus, along with Scerdilaidas had however acquired a more longstanding Roman faith; Eckstein indeed describes Scerdilaidas as a ‘long-term Roman amicus’. Dzino has suggested that ‘it is possible that the efforts of Scerdilaidas and Pleuratus strengthened the central power in Illyria to some degree. However, the dynasts in the region still maintained a significant level of independence.’ Although the idea that Scerdilaidas and Pleuratus strengthened the central power in Illyria to some degree is possible, it cannot be determined for certain and lacks foundation from the sources. Dzino is correct to say however that these dynasts maintained a significant level of independence. These were dynasts rather than the term ‘ruler’ which this thesis determined was more applicable for Demetrius of Pharos earlier; the basis of power for Pleuratus and Scerdilaidas was their familial ties to the Ardiaei; the basis for the enhancement of their power, was Roman support. This Roman support was predicated on a lack of Roman interest in Illyria, especially compared to the Greek East. Pleuratus in particular, offered Rome an ally who kept affairs in the region quiet (as noted by the lack of coverage for his reign in the written sources) and secured Roman interests on the eastern Adriatic coast. This enabled Rome to continue to exercise its ‘external-hegemony’ in the region.

Pleuratus’ reputation as a loyal Roman ally is furthered in the historical accounts, reflecting the important trust that the Romans placed in him. Livy asserts that during the Roman campaign against Antiochus III, Pleuratus was permitted to sail into the Corinthian gulf with sixty λέμβοι and attack the Aetolian coast. This once more is indicative of an important

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639Livy, *Ab urbe condita* 33. 34.  
640Dzino, *Illyricum in Roman Politics*, p. 54.  
641Eckstein, *Rome Enters the Greek East*, p. 278.  
642Dzino, *Illyricum in Roman Politics*, p. 54.  
643Livy, *Ab urbe condita* 38. 7. After the First and Second Macedonian Wars, Macedon had been reduced in size and operated as a Roman ally during the conflict with Antiochus. The Aetolian League had promptly sided with Antiochus III.
development in the trust that Rome placed in Pleuratus. A sizeable fleet of Illyrian λέμβοι under
the command of an Illyrian dynast would likely have conjured up memories for the Romans of
events from the 3rd Century BC; the Roman permission to Pleuratus to do so in aid of the
campaign was indicative of this greater level of trust. Briscoe has noted that Pleuratus was ‘no
doubt, acting on Roman instructions.’ It is uncertain whether Pleuratus was following
Roman instructions as part of the course of their diplomatic relationship or whether merely as
part of the military campaign against Antiochus. Entrusting Pleuratus with the fleet in the
campaign nevertheless demonstrates the faith that Rome placed in the bond with Pleuratus and
the readiness of Pleuratus to aid their cause. Although there is no record of Pleuratus gaining
any further territory or mention in the subsequent treaty of Apamea in 188 BC, the use of his fleet
during this action demonstrates his growing power and influence along the Adriatic coast.

With sixty λέμβοι at his disposal, Pleuratus had a considerable fleet for an Illyrian king and this
would have not only helped him conduct further naval actions along the coast but also helped
him become an important Roman ally in supporting Roman power and influence across the
Southern Adriatic. Although the primary goal of Rome through these negotiations was to limit
the power and influence of greater foreign powers, Pleuratus nevertheless profited from his
long-term allegiance to Rome. Wilkes indeed asserts that the territory awarded to Pleuratus
gave him control over the strategic route to Macedonia from the West, although this owed more
to a desire to deny control for Macedon than a signal of their regard to Pleuratus. Taken
together however, they are indicative of Rome’s desire to ensure Adriatic security and their
preference to operate in Illyria at a distance through a trustworthy ally.

Pleuratus’ status however was noted by contemporaries as being largely dependent on
Roman support rather than on the back of his own merits. Polybius in his record of a speech
by Eumenes II of Pergamum notes that Eumenes was of the opinion that Pleuratus had been
raised up by the Romans to the position of first amongst all Illyrian kings, but he had
accomplished nothing to do so beyond remaining loyal to Rome. Gruen however notes that
the importance Rome placed on their allegiance with Pleuratus was ‘virtually none’, and that
Eumenes’ speech echoed the thoughts of Scipio earlier in Book 21 of Polybius. Gruen has
further noted that although the authenticity of the speech has been brought into question, the
setting and circumstances are authentic and the tone and language should not be pressed as

646 Ibid.
there is no compelling reason for a Polybian invention. It is possible that Polybius may have used the speech to signpost the later relationship of Eumenes II and Rome throughout the Second Century BC, although the speech primarily serves to illustrate the gains of Pergamon in the Treaty of Apamea. Eckstein has noted that this marked the first instance that a reigning Hellenistic King was permitted to come before the Senate. By contrast, Pleuratus was afforded no visit and, as mentioned earlier, received not territorial gains in the post-war treaty. Whilst on the surface Pleuratus as a Roman ally was insignificant, attested by the limited mentions in the sources and the lack of territorial gain from the war, he nevertheless fulfilled the role that Rome sought in the region. This dependency on Rome for his position of power was an important element to Pleuratus and wider Illyrian rule in the early Second Century BC. With the growing diplomatic influence of Rome across the eastern Adriatic and the diminished status of Macedon following the Treaty of Flamininus in 196 BC, it was in the interests of Illyrian dynasts to work with, rather than work against, Rome.

The implications of Pleuratus’ rule had important consequences for Rome’s dealing with Genthius, whose support Rome sought to maintain. The lack of Roman interest or attention in the region created a lull in Roman-Illyrian relations upon Genthius accession. The strong Roman diplomatic tie in the region owed much to Pleuratus’ loyalty and Livy notes that Genthius was to decide on supporting the Roman or Macedonian side for the prospective war based on impulse rather than reasoning. Livy here is perhaps too strong in his assertion that Genthius would act on impulse and it probably owes to an anti-Illyrian bias. As stated earlier, Genthius was more likely being pragmatic and keeping his options open. As shall be discussed later in the chapter, the geopolitical imbalance between Perseus and Rome in the region provided Genthius with the opportunity to side with either entity based on his own self-interest. Livy later asserts that Lucius Decius was sent to Genthius in 172 BC to ascertain whether their alliance still had any standing and to try and encourage him to side with the Romans during a prospective war against Perseus. Dzino notes that, compared to the piracy carried out by Genthius and mentioned in the previous chapter, it was ‘Genthius’ neutrality in the conflict between Perseus and Rome that was a much more serious problem in the eyes of the Romans. Dzino indeed states that this is the reason for the earlier reference in Livy, being

650 Eckstein, Rome Enters the Greek East, p. 345.
651 Livy, ab urbe condita 42. 29.
652 Livy, ab urbe condita 42. 37.
653 Dzino, Illyricum in Roman Politics, p. 56.
a part of the ‘Roman tradition’ citing Roman suspicion in Genthius prior to Perseus’ approach. In lieu of the hindsight available to Livy, it is quite possible that Livy sought to source the uncertainty of Genthius earlier and use it to pour scorn on his lack of support for Rome. Nevertheless, the lack of Roman interest in Illyria and the geopolitical imbalance created a situation where Genthius was able to operate with greater flexibility.

The Prelude to the Third Illyrian War

The Third Illyrian War had an unclear pretext from the ancient sources and should be seen as part of the wider Roman conflict with Perseus. The most detailed account of the prelude to the Third Illyrian War has come from Livy, with much of the Polybian version lost. Livy develops Rome’s suspicion of Genthius through a series of failed diplomatic exchanges in his account and an Issaean appeal to Rome over alleged Illyrian piracy in the Adriatic. Gruen has stressed the lack of importance of Illyria for Rome in the 2nd Century BC, but has argued that if any action taken by Genthius inspired greater Roman concern, it was potential Adriatic piracy. Livy’s account bears important hallmarks to the Illyrian piracy of the 3rd Century BC; the inclusion in Livy’s account of the Issaean appeal may well have resonated in this way with his audience. Gruen is surely correct to highlight the potential Roman concern over this threat, although Livy’s account is problematic. The series of diplomatic exchanges is not featured in detail elsewhere in the accounts of other historians and the only mention of alleged piracy conducted by Genthius appears in the Livian version. As such, it is difficult to determine the veracity of Livy’s account. Briscoe notes that rather than the passages originating from the lost Polybian version, they have an annalistic origin, and this may help explain their inclusion. Although the now lost section of Polybius was available to Livy, Livy’s choice to draw on the annalistic tradition is noteworthy. By drawing attention to the Issaean appeal, the tradition presented Rome in an upstanding light, coming to aid of the Issaeans. The threat of Adriatic piracy was more tangible to the Romans, as Gruen noted, and would have been a useful pretext in the annalistic tradition. The importance of the alliance with Perseus, however,

654Ibid.
655Livy, ab urbe condita 40. 42 and 42. 26-48.
overshadows this in importance, featuring in multiple accounts with the Third Macedonian War serving as the key context for Rome’s intervention in the Third Illyrian War.

Livy notes that the report of piracy conducted by Genthius was given to the Senate by the praetor, Lucius Duronius who accused him of all the contemporary piracies in the Adriatic.\(^{658}\) The lack of an efficient Roman response to dealing with allegations of piracy of this extent has raised considerable debate amongst modern scholars. Dzino has stated ‘the accusations had no immediate consequences for Genthius, so we can assume that the Senate did not blame him directly’.\(^{659}\) ‘The delegation that was sent to Genthius in 172 BC had an ulterior motive in either case, to sound out the support of Genthius who was still technically bound by the ties of amicitia to Rome ahead of a likely war in Macedonia. Ormerod however highlights the preceding period of rule under Pleuratos, a period of greater amity between the kingdom and Rome.\(^{660}\) Gruen moreover has suggested that the ‘area under Genthius’ authority, far from being a matter of priority, had faded almost altogether from Roman attention.\(^{661}\) These two arguments provide important context for the lack of decisive action. Rome had enjoyed a period of amity under Pleuratos, where Illyria had become less of an issue; Rome likely sought a continuation of this situation under the new ruler. Dzino asserts that ‘the Roman mission to Genthius in 172 BC should be seen as the Roman concern for piracy, rather than proof of his anti-Roman stand’.\(^{662}\) Although a concern for Illyrian piracy in the Adriatic was understandable given its past history, this does not adequately explain the lack of decisive action and the conduct of Roman investigation into the Illyrian ruler’s activities. The amity with Pleuratos had proven advantageous to Rome in providing passive loyalty in a region of limited interest. In preparation for a Roman intervention in Macedonia, the maintenance of a strategically important alliance for Rome would have been of tremendous benefit.

The importance of the alliance in the prelude to Rome’s intervention can be seen in other sources. Appian asserts that Genthius’ first action was to sign an alliance with Perseus, and from there he subsequently attacked Roman Illyria and imprisoned envoys that had been sent to him.\(^{663}\) An attack on Roman envoys, once more, perhaps harkened back in Appian’s account to the Roman interventions of the 3\(^{rd}\) Century BC. As mentioned earlier, Appian sought

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658Livy, *Ab urbe condita* 40. 42.
659Dzino, *Illyricum in Roman Politics*, p. 75. The Romans did not send a delegation to Genthius until 172 BC.
660Livy, *ab urbe condita*, 42. 37.
663Dzino, *Illyricum in Roman Politics*, p. 75
664Appian, *Illyrian Wars* 3. 2. 9.
to present the virtues and vices of leaders throughout his work and this passage serves to highlight Genthius’ character and conduct. Although the timing of this attack is unclear, the Romans may not have been aware of the alliance until their envoys were attacked. Attacking envoys displayed unstatesmanlike behaviour and the inclusion of the passage in Appian’s attack furthers his characterisation of Illyrian leaders during the period being considered in this thesis. Although the imprisoning of Roman envoys would have been an act that would directly lead to war, by first allying himself with Perseus, Genthius would have established himself as an enemy of Rome at an earlier stage. Florus only mentions the war briefly, considering it part of the wider Macedonian campaign. As mentioned earlier, the Polybian account of the war has not survived, although it served as a source for both Livy and Appian. Polybius does however mention the diplomatic exchanges between Perseus and Genthius and denigrates Genthius’ character in an aside. Judging by the manner in which Polybius treated Genthius’ character in the surviving sections, it would be unlikely that Polybius would have placed the blame elsewhere. The diplomatic exchanges between Perseus and Genthius in Polybius’ account and the diplomatic exchanges in Livy nevertheless illustrate the importance of Genthius’ stance of neutrality in the prelude to the war. Dzino has noted that this neutrality was a considerable problem for the Romans. Suspicions of Genthius, as mentioned earlier, are discussed in the sources although the continued sending of diplomatic missions to him would indicate that at the very least Rome held out hope of rekindling affiliation with Genthius. The alliance formed with Perseus would have made Genthius’ intentions abundantly clear and served as the key pretext to the commencement of hostilities. Subsequently, the Third Illyrian War should be considered in the context of the Third Macedonian War; the pretext for the Roman intervention being entwined in the wider conflict. The nature of this pretext however was not as evident as those that had been provided for the Roman interventions in the 3rd Century BC. The combined actions of Genthius and Perseus through their alliance, endangered Rome’s status of ‘external-hegemony’ in the region. Rome likely saw the more proactive step of eradicating the Illyrian kingdom in line with the Antigonid kingdom in Macedon as necessary to ensuring the geopolitical landscape of the region was suited to its interest.

664 Florus, Epitome 1. 29.
666 Livy, Ab urbe condita 43.19-23.
667 Dzino, Illyricum in Roman Politics 229 BC – AD 68. p. 56.
The Pretext of the Third Macedonian War

As mentioned earlier, the Third Illyrian War served as a component in the broader Roman conflict with Perseus. The origins of the conflict with Perseus had an important bearing on the geopolitical landscape of the eastern Adriatic and the changing nature of Rome’s outlook in the region. The primary pretext provided in the sources is that of a pre-planned war by Philip V prior to his death in 179 BC and the continuation of the policy by Perseus. Harris has stressed that ‘some allowances must be made for the historian (Polybius) since his main discussion is lost (...) none the less his theory is most inadequate’ Luce has asserted that Livy’s account of the outbreak of the Third Macedonian War in Book XLII has been ‘universally deplored and condemned’. Although the main discussion is lost from the Polybian version, the appearance of the same pretext in Livy is important to note. Polybius’ work would have been available to Livy and the decision taken by Livy to include the same pretext for the conflict would suggest that the lost sections of Polybius built on this theme. Livy’s reasoning behind his choice of Polybius’ pretext remains unknown, although the citing of the pretext in both sources distanced the origins of the war from the events of the late 170s BC. Harris has suggested that Polybius ‘failed to apply his science of causes adequately to a war whose history he knew intimately’ due to ‘his personal involvement in political events’. Polybius had been taken to Rome as a hostage in the aftermath of the campaign and his personal experiences of the war may have clouded his judgement. Harris proceeds to state that ‘Perseus had not behaved at all belligerently towards Rome, as Polybius knew’ and suggest that Polybius could not bring himself to suggest that the Roman Senate ‘had purposefully destroyed the equilibrium’. It is quite possible that Polybius felt incapable of apportioning blame to Rome or Perseus, but this needs to placed in the context of the composition of Polybius’ work. Polybius was writing at a time when these events were in the recent past and apportioning blame to either party would potentially neither appeased his Roman or Greek audiences.

Subsequently, modern scholars have attempted to posit the underlying motivations behind Rome’s intervention elsewhere. Bickermann has suggested that Rome may have held

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668 Polybius, Histories 22. 18.; Livy, Ab urbe Condita 42. 52.
669 Harris, War and Imperialism in Republican Rome 327-70 BC, p. 227
671 Harris, War and Imperialism in Republican Rome 327-70 BC, p. 227
anxiety over a potential Macedonian-Syrian alliance.⁶⁷³ Bickermann here built on the previous work of Mommsen, who stressed the continuation of Roman concerns over Macedon throughout this period.⁶⁷⁴ This however negates the fact that Antiochus IV had made an alliance with Perseus’ bitter enemy, Eumenes II of Pergamum.⁶⁷⁵ Perseus previous connection to Syria via his marriage to Laodice, the daughter of Seleucus IV did not have the same political value upon Antiochus IV taking the throne. Harris has highlighted Polybius’ account of Antiochus’ invasion of Egypt and has stressed that Polybius did not agree that Quintus Marcius Philippus had hopes of preventing Antiochus from capturing Alexandria.⁶⁷⁶ The notion that Rome held anxiety over a potential Syrian-Macedonian alliance is thus too problematic and not validated in the ancient sources. The potential threat of a Syrian-Macedonian alliance would also have been minimal compared to the previous ‘Pact between the Kings’ in the late 3rd Century BC. Syrian power in the aftermath of Rome’s victory at Magnesia in 190 BC had greatly weakened and, in any case, Syrian attentions were focused on Egypt rather than Italy or the Greek peninsula. It is thus unlikely that Roman harboured substantial concerns over a potential Syrian-Macedonian alliance.

A potential fear of a direct attack on Italy by Perseus should also be dismissed. This stems from Eumenes II’s appeal to Rome where a potential invasion of Italy was insinuated by Eumenes.⁶⁷⁷ Harris has doubted that the original source for the passage in Livy was Polybius and it may stem from an annalistic tradition.⁶⁷⁸ The speech serves an important purpose in Livy’s account in documenting the actions of Perseus and providing additional reasoning behind the Roman intervention. The speech dramatically serves to denigrate Perseus’ character and provide the Romans with greater moral impetus to intervene. Gruen and Harris, however, have both asserted that Perseus had no navy and no logistical means of launching an invasion of Italy.⁶⁷⁹ Walbank has also noted that ‘for all their exaggeration, Eumenes’s complaints to the Senate on the eve of the Third Macedonian War give some indication of the fruits of Philip’s consolidation’.⁶⁸⁰ In the figures he provides for the Macedonian armed forces, no naval forces are listed. There was a natural incentive for Eumenes to overstate the threat to Rome posed by

⁶⁷⁵Appian, Syrian Wars 45.
⁶⁷⁷Livy, Ab Urbe Condita 42. 13.
⁶⁸⁰F. W. Walbank, Philip V of Macedon (Cambridge, 1940), p. 256.
Macedon in encouraging the Romans to go to war, although it is not clear whether the Romans truly believed in the possibility of an Italian invasion, in spite of the logistical issues. The figures provided by Walbank include 30,000 infantry, 5,000 cavalry and enough grain to feed an army for ten years.\textsuperscript{681} If Rome had concerns over Perseus, they would surely have been by his capability of campaigning with his army on the Greek peninsula rather than directly at Italy via a naval invasion.

Perseus presented an additional threat by disrupting the geopolitical balance amongst the Greek states. Polybius asserts that upon taking the throne and renewing his father’s alliance with Rome, Perseus immediately began to intrigue in Greece.\textsuperscript{682} The sudden shift in Polybius’ account from Perseus’ diplomacy with Rome to intriguing in Greece is used by Polybius to cast the Macedonian king in a negative light from the outset of his reign and enables Polybius to highlight the duplicitous nature of his international relations. Indeed, in the same passage, Polybius progresses to discuss the character and habits of the new Macedonian king.\textsuperscript{683} Polybius nevertheless lived through these times in Greece and was able to draw on his own experiences. Later in the \textit{Histories}, Polybius alludes to the various discussions amongst Greeks regarding the relative merits of Roman expansion in the region in the aftermath of the Third Macedonian War.\textsuperscript{684} Greeks would no doubt have similarly discussed the various advantages of siding with the Macedonians or Romans during the preceding period. Harris has noted that Perseus’ appeal to the ‘anti-Roman left’ in the Greek States had become ‘particularly tiresome’ for the Romans, and that it ‘created a possibility that these states might abruptly change their policies in directions unfavourable to Rome’.\textsuperscript{685} This reflects Eumenes’ speech recorded in Livy, that suggested that an increase in Perseus’ popularity in the Greek East ensured a counter Roman decline.\textsuperscript{686} Gruen however has argued that ‘it was precisely Rome’s withdrawal from Hellenic affairs that gave an opening to Perseus and the opportunity to resuscitate Macedonia as a patron of Hellas. The Greeks (…) found the Antigonid a more promising hegemon’\textsuperscript{687} By continuing to operate in affairs east of the Adriatic from a distance, Rome presented an opportunity for Perseus to position himself as an alternative hegemon in the region. This would

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{\textit{681}}Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{\textit{682}}Polybius, \textit{Histories} 25. 3.
\item \textsuperscript{\textit{683}}Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{\textit{684}}Polybius, \textit{Histories} 37. 1.
\item \textsuperscript{\textit{685}}Harris, \textit{War and Imperialism in Republican Rome} 327-70 BC, p. 231.
\item \textsuperscript{\textit{686}}Livy, \textit{Ab Urbe Condita} 42. 12. See also Gruen, \textit{The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome}, p. 417.
\item \textsuperscript{\textit{687}}Gruen, \textit{The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome}, p. 418.
\end{itemize}
have been concerning for the Romans as the geopolitical imbalance would have threatened their ‘external-hegemony’.

**Roman Settlement of the Region**

The Roman post-war settlements in the concurrent Third Illyrian and Third Macedonian wars demonstrated a greater Roman aggression towards the region and the continuation of Rome’s ‘external-hegemony’. Rome in 167 BC eradicated the kingdoms of both the Illyrians and the Macedonians and shaped the geopolitical balance of power east of the Adriatic. The most dramatic way in which this was affected was through both kings being imprisoned by the Romans and marched through Rome in triumphal procession. The ritualistic act of submission for the king and his entourage denoted a clear departure from the previous post-war settlements in Illyria. Rather than establishing a means by which the defeated entity remained in power, albeit tied to Rome by treaty, the Romans transparently removed the vestiges of the established regimes. The triumphs themselves were indicative of the important development in Rome’s underlying motivations in intervening. The triumph awarded to Paullus over Macedonia was well renowned for its splendour and opulence and the spoils returned to Rome demonstrated the tangible rewards in conducting military campaigns. Livy notes that the procession featured 120 million sesterces captured from the Macedonian treasury and that an equally large amount had been lost by Perseus in flight. Beard, citing the triumph in question, has asserted that the depiction in the surviving record 'conjured Roman victory over eastern cities and dynasties, prompting readers to think of the triumph as a model of imperial expansion'. Scenes of such abundant and palpable Roman success could naturally have served as a form of Roman propaganda with a clear message of Roman dominance over their foreign rivals. Gruen also notes that 'the repute of the generals soared at such demonstrations; the more so when they utilised the cash to finance lavish games, make dedications at shrines, build public monuments and bestow handsome gifts'. Although Livy notes that Anicius' triumph over Genthius was appropriately less lavish than the triumph of Paullus over Perseus, the triumph featured an abundant spectacle with much booty including the royal furniture, military standards and pecuniary spoils. As the Third Illyrian War served as a subsidiary campaign to the Third Macedonian War, being led by a praetor rather than a consul, Livy's

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688Livy, *ab urbe condita* 45. 43; 45. 40.
689Livy, *ab urbe condita* 45. 40.
690Beard, *The Roman Triumph*, p. 162.
692Livy *ab urbe condita* 45. 43. Livy notes that Anicius bore twenty-seven pounds of gold, nineteen pounds of silver, thirteen thousand denarii and one hundred and twenty thousand Illyrian silver pieces during his triumph.
claim is hardly surprising. The rich spoils and captive royal household were a transparent display of power, authority and superiority of the Romans over their defeated Illyrian adversaries. As such, the Roman triumphs over Illyria and Macedon were indicative of a change in Rome’s dealings with foreign states and a clear development beyond the stability sought in previous post-war settlements.

The spoils taken from these wars also reflected an important shift in the economic benefits that Rome accrued from intervening in the region. The plunder taken from the campaigns was divided up in the Roman triumphs. Rosenstein has stressed that the plunder taken directly in the field was separate from that which a Roman commander would deposit in the treasury; on the occasion of a triumph, this would have been distributed to the men, in small but not insignificant quantities. Livy reports that in the triumph of Anicius over Genthius, forty-five denarii were given to each soldier, double to each centurion and three times to each member of the cavalry, whilst large amounts of gold and silver together with twenty million sesterces were deposited in the treasury. Livy notes that although the plunder and spectacle of the triumph were noteworthy in their own right, they paled in comparison to the earlier triumph of Paullus over Perseus. Plutarch in the aftermath of Paullus’ campaign however has stressed that the distribution of the large quantity of spoils was so uneven that it caused unrest amongst Paullus’ troops. The spoils of war were thus unevenly distributed amongst the different ranks, with the bulk being taken back to the Roman treasury and the lion’s share of the rest being taken by the commander himself. Livy stresses in his account that the spoils taken by Paullus from Perseus far exceeded any taken previously and the figures he provides for the provision for the troops exceeded the provisions given to the soldiers from the Illyrian campaign. Although the dividing up of the spoils was unequal and caused unrest amongst the troops, all soldiers, nevertheless, got a share of the spoils and were thus likely drawn to the material gains that could be acquired from the campaign. The unrest itself, moreover, reflected the importance of the spoils that could be gained from such a campaign and the desire of the Roman soldiers to get their share. In the aftermath of this campaign, Livy also asserts that the Romans despoiled seventy Epirote towns, enslaving 150,000 persons in the process.

Rosenstein, Rome and the Mediterranean 290-146 BC: The Imperial Republic, p. 110.
Livy, ab urbe condita 45. 43.
Ibid.
Plutarch, Life of Aemilius Paullus 29
Livy asserts that 120 million sesterces of gold and silver was deposited in the treasury, with 100 denarii awarded to each soldier, twice that number to each centurion and three times the amount for each member of the cavalry.
Livy, ab urbe condita 45. 34. The spoils were divided between the infantry and cavalry. Each infantryman received 200 denarii and each cavalaryman 400 denarii.
Although it is unclear how the Epirote slaves were divided up between the various ranks, the Romans in the campaign evidently gained a great deal of plunder and a number of spoils.

In the Roman post-war political setup for Illyria and Macedon, Rome geopolitically shaped the region without taking on unwanted administrative responsibilities. Livy notes that Macedon was divided into four separate republics, with capitals at Amphipolis, Thessalonica, Pella and Pelagonia and restrictions were placed on associations between the republics and also on their economies.\textsuperscript{699} The economic limitations on the various regions were probably enacted in light of the substantial spoils taken from the war with Perseus. This has demonstrated the profits which the region was able to generate. In taking these measures, the Romans were able to restrict the ability for a powerful Macedonian state to emerge in the aftermath of the war. Frank has also noted that in establishing the republican system in the region, Paullus drew on his Roman experience and created strong senates and comparably weak assemblies.\textsuperscript{700} By creating powerful elites in the republican governments, Rome would have been able to establish an effective means of governance for the region that Rome could more readily rely on. Eckstein has suggested that the establishment of a provincia was considered but ultimately rejected on the grounds of limited Roman manpower and the inability of the Republic to effectively guard over a large barbarian border.\textsuperscript{701} Although it is difficult to determine whether or not the establishment of a provincia was seriously considered, the problematic nature of doing so, as Eckstein has highlighted, would not have rendered the exercise worthwhile. As has been discussed earlier, Illyria was largely a divided region before and during periods of Roman intervention and the Romans likely saw administering a region that was so diverse problematic. By limiting the territory of each area of Macedonia and Illyria, the Romans created a divided eastern Adriatic with each state acting as a counterbalance to one another. This ensured that no singular power east of the Adriatic could emerge to rival Roman hegemony in the region. Roman hegemony was established not by direct administration but by diplomacy, building on the diplomatic ties Rome had continued to build across the wider Greek world. The threat of force, as had been shown in their victories at Pydna and Scodra was the means by which Roman hegemony could be enforced.

\textsuperscript{699}Livy \textit{ab urbe condita} 45. 29.
The Romans took more aggressive action in their post-war settlements by ravaging territory east of the Adriatic in the aftermath of their intervention and took a large quantity of additional spoils and slaves in a demonstration of Roman military power. Some discrepancy exists amongst the ancient sources however regarding the precise details of the settlements ravaged by the Roman army. Livy notes that the Romans gathered gold and silver from seventy Epirote towns that had gone over to Perseus, then proceeded to plunder the cities and destroy their walls. Appian likewise describes the despoiling of seventy towns by the Roman army in similar fashion although these seventy towns represented all the towns subject to Genthius with no reference to geographic location. Waterfield has added that the countryside was ravaged and settlements were captured and looted on the grounds of continued resistance. The key element in both the accounts of Appian and Livy is the previous loyalty of the towns to Genthius. The Romans in targeting these towns specifically, sought to demonstrate their power and influence in the region and deter states from resisting Rome’s hegemony. By selecting these towns, the Roman interventions were directed especially against those areas hostile to Rome rather than to the region as a whole. In the context of the benefits afforded to Roman allies earlier in the Treaty of Apamea, Rome through their interventions in the 2nd Century BC sought to make a clear distinction between those states that they were aligned to, and those they were hostile to. By presenting the rewards and punishments of resisting the Roman army, Rome would have been able to effectively demonstrate the value of establishing and maintaining diplomatic relations with Rome and thereby encourage more states to side with Rome.

The arrangement of Illyria after the campaigns further demonstrated Rome's desire to establish an effective hegemony from afar. The intention of Rome in the aftermath of the campaign was to secure the region with minimal administration and a limited allocation of resources. Livy asserts that the region was divided into three parts, carefully divided in accordance with traditional tribal areas and the geography of the region. These particular regions represented different areas of tribal strength, from the Illyrian tribal kingdoms of the 3rd and 2nd Centuries BC and the coastal region which included many Greek settlements. This is demonstrative of Rome dividing the region up into areas of differing Roman interest. As

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702 Livy ab urbe condita 45. 34.  
703 Appian, Illyrian Wars 3. 2. 9.  
704 Waterfield, Taken at the Flood: The Roman Conquest of Greece, pp. 190-1.  
705 Livy ab urbe condita 45. 26. The first area was centred on the coastal regions surrounding Lissus, the second was Genthius’ own tribal region of the Labeatae and the third encompassed the Olciniatae, Acruviaetae and the Rhizonitae.
mentioned earlier in the thesis, Roman interests were most pronounced in the South-East and along the Adriatic coast, and by separating these off as a separate region, Rome could better manage their interests. The Romans however made certain distinctions in terms of tribute between states that had remained loyal and those who had sided with Genthius. The Romans had demonstrated through this action the value of cooperation with Rome and by ensuring that all states paid considerably less tribute than previously, the Romans likely sought to attain a generally favourable Illyrian outlook on Rome. This would once again ensure that Illyria would remain secure with no singular tribe or state gaining too much power or threatening the Roman crafted settlement of the region.

The underlying significance of the events of 168/7 BC has however been the source of debate in considering the wider implications of the Roman post-war settlement on the development of Roman imperial expansion. Polybius initially considered the events in his Histories to be the apogee of the development of the two underlying themes in his account, the rise of Rome and the greater ‘interconnectedness’ of world affairs. This, as Polybius asserts in his preface, was achieved over a span of 53 years, from the Second Punic War to the climax of the Third Macedonian War. Eckstein notes that ‘Polybius believed that the Third Macedonian War changed everything’ in establishing Roman pre-eminence, eradicating Macedon and fundamentally shifting the nature of Mediterranean geopolitics and inter-state relations. Polybius’ decision to extend his work down to 146 BC may be reflective of the importance of the start date rather than the end date of his work. Polybius’ Histories through this extension take on an additional important dimension in considering the rivalry between Rome and Carthage in Rome’s rise to power. For Sallust, writing a century later, the importance of the removal of the Carthaginian rival, led to greater complacency in Rome and greater internal strife with the absence of a foreign rival to unite the Roman people around a common cause. The importance of the Punic wars in Rome’s rise to ascendancy have been well attested by modern scholars. Clark has gone one step further however in stressing 146 BC as a dramatic turning point in Rome’s imperial expansion. The development, as has been

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706 Ibid. Livy notes that the Issaeans, the Taulantii, the Pirustae of Dassaretia, the Daorsi and the cities of Rhizon and Oltcinium were all exempt from tribute as they had revolted to join the Romans during the war. Traditional strongholds of Genthius' tribe, Scodra (his capital), Dassara and Selepeita were to pay half the tribute of their previous arrangement with the Illyrian king.
707 Polybius, Histories 1. 1.
708 Eckstein, Rome Enters the Greek East, p. 380.
709 Sallust, War with Catiline 10.1-6.
711 Clark, Triumph in Defeat: Military Loss and the Roman Republic, p. 141.
demonstrated over the course of this thesis however was more gradual and dependent on Rome’s changing interests, priorities and geopolitical status. Whilst events such as those in 167 BC and 146 BC highlight this development, they should be considered as apogees of developments in the preceding periods.

Although the Roman actions in 168/7 BC can be considered an important development in Rome’s involvement in the eastern Adriatic, the nature of a wider shift in Rome’s outlook and attitude to imperial expansion has been the subject of further debate. The notion of this shift first developed in antiquity. Although Polybius originally viewed this shift as taking place with the conclusion of the Third Macedonian War in 168/7 BC, his later decision to extend his account down to 146 BC reflected the importance of these later events. For the Roman historian Sallust writing in the First Century BC, the later events were most important, and he postulated during an aside to his account of the Catilinarian conspiracy, that events in the previous century had changed Rome's outlook internally and externally:

'But when our country had grown strong through toil and the practice of justice, when great kings had been vanquished in war, savage tribes and mighty peoples subdued by force of arms, when Carthage, the rival of Rome's dominion had perished root and branch, and all seas and lands laid open, then Fortune began to be savage and to throw all into confusion (...) a craving first for money, then for power, increased; these were, as it were, the root of all evils.' 712

For Sallust, Rome's outlook on the Mediterranean world and the problems of the Late Republic could be sourced to Rome’s interventions of the mid-Second Century BC. Whilst the Third Punic War was most notable in this development for Sallust, the earlier Macedonian and Illyrian interventions in 168/7 BC were an important component in the development. Clark has furthered this in the modern scholarship by citing the destructions of the cities of Corinth and Carthage as a tangible record of Rome's changing outlook on the Mediterranean world. In this regard, she asserts that Roman actions brought an effective cessation to hostilities and solved the increasing problems from 'decades of prior Roman victories which failed to produce a success that could last'. 713 Although Clark is correct to highlight the dramatic destruction of Carthage and Corinth in 146 BC, the earlier events in Macedon and Illyria were also important developments in this shift.

The notion of ‘producing a success that could last’ is also problematic. Rome did not choose to directly administer the regions of Macedonia and Illyria in 167 BC, an action which would have enabled the Romans to build upon their military successes of that year. Roman interests in Illyria were still limited to the coastal areas, especially in the South-Eastern Adriatic. Dzino has noted that ‘Roman interests were precisely defined, focusing only on the eastern parts of the Illyrian kingdom which impacted the strategic control of the Otranto. The Romans were not interested in the hinterland of the Adriatic.’ Rome would not build upon their military successes until the construction and development of a provincia of Illyricum in the subsequent centuries. Eckstein has highlighted the importance of Rome's geopolitical positioning in the Mediterranean in reflecting a fundamental change in the manner in which Rome dealt with foreign states. Eckstein notes that by 188 BC and the Treaty of Apamea, Rome had achieved a status of 'unipolarity'; a position of being the sole military and diplomatic superpower. This development is important to consider and would have had a bearing on Roman dealings with foreign states. Polybius indeed outlined in his Histories, that Rome had become the μίαν ἄρχην, the sole dominant power, in the Mediterranean by the mid-2nd Century BC. Eckstein’s citing of the shift in 188 BC did not correlate with the situation in Illyria as Illyria was geopolitically divided between the two competing powers of Rome and Macedon, a state which would continue until the events of 168/7 BC. At this point, Rome became the sole superpower in the region. Illyria, which had once represented a disparate series of tribal communities, had achieved a greater geopolitical coherence, albeit under Roman hegemony. This greater coherence would in turn become defined and solidified by the establishment and development of the provincia of Illyricum in subsequent periods which saw a shift from Rome’s ‘external-hegemony’ to Roman direct administration.

**Conclusion**

The Roman military interventions in 168/7 BC against Genthius and Perseus reflected the apogee of an important shift in the nature of Roman interventions. The removal of Illyrian and Macedonian political structures, together with the despoiling of several towns, represented a greater Roman aggression in securing their post-war settlement. Through these actions the Roman commander Paullus, ‘achieved the double goal of rewarding his hard-working soldiery

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714 Dzino, *Illyricum in Roman Politics*, p. 60.
and of avenging those perceived to have been the most egregious traitors to the Roman cause during the war’. Rome presented two drastically different alternatives of being affable to Rome or hostile in a dramatic display of their military might. It is important not to overstate the importance of these specific events however as Polybius sought to in explaining the development of the key themes in his Histories. Similar events cited in the later destruction of Corinth and Carthage present dramatic and poignant displays of Roman might but underlying developments throughout the late 3rd Century BC and early 2nd Century BC should be considered also. Rome did not agree a peace treaty to the Second Illyrian War, nor did she have any desire to in the Third Illyrian War. The events of 167 BC should subsequently be seen as the apogee of these developments. Nevertheless, Eckstein has noted that ‘on the plane of the general balance of power, the disappearance of the Macedonian monarchy, one of the great counterweights to Rome, fundamentally altered even more in Rome’s favour the balance of power within the Mediterranean.’ The eradication of the Macedonian kingdom and the later eradication of the Republic of Carthage demonstrated Rome’s new position atop the Mediterranean inter-state hierarchy and would in turn develop aggressive Roman imperial expansion still further in the ensuing decades.

The greater aggression by Rome in their interventions in the Third Illyrian and Third Macedonian wars was nevertheless employed as a means to consolidate Rome’s ‘external hegemony’ over the region. The threat posed to the geopolitical balance by the alliance of Genthius and Perseus prompted Rome to intervene and to take punitive actions against those states that opposed them in the aftermath. These measures were taken to ensure Rome’s ‘external-hegemony was maintained’ and to demonstrate the value of securing an association with Rome. The Roman post-war settlements enabled the Romans to better define the scope of their limited interests in the region. By affirming Rome’s ‘external hegemony’ the war served to a greater geopolitical balance to the region with Rome able to exercise its status from afar. As Wilkes notes, ‘after the settlement, Anicius withdrew all his forces from the strongholds’ and ‘the Senate dealt with each situation as it arose and once Roman interests were secure, matters were allowed to drift.’ The division of the republics that were established was based on the geopolitical divisions outlined earlier in the thesis but represented a greater Illyrian coherence than the disparate series of tribal communities that existed in Illyria before the

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718 Eckstein, Rome Enters the Greek East, pp. 381.
719 Wilkes, History of the Provinces of the Roman Empire: Dalmatia, pp. 27-8.
Roman interventions. The disparate outlooks that once predominated in Illyria had been effectively displaced by the position of Rome at the centre of Illyrian geopolitics.
Chapter 7 – Conclusion

The period of 230 BC to 167 BC featured a series of interventions by the Roman Republic in Illyria that saw the development of Rome’s status in the region to become the hegemonic entity in Illyria. This was achieved through a number of successful military campaigns and diplomatic agreements that developed Roman interests territorially, militarily and diplomatically in Illyria. Roman interests in Illyria at the outset of the period were largely minimal and focused on areas in the Southern Adriatic. The Roman military interventions in the 3rd Century BC had limited strategic aims and were directed against the aggressions of the Ardiaei and Demetrius of Pharos. These campaigns were short and one-sided, with the Illyrian threats effectively and efficiently dealt with by the Romans. In the aftermath of the interventions however, Rome did not establish any permanent settlement but swiftly removed their forces back across the Adriatic. As Eckstein has noted during this initial period 'the Senate did not yet perceive of maritime Illyris as a permanent strategic asset, or the Greek East in general as a permanent area of strategic involvement.'

In ensuring a limited involvement in Illyria, Rome nevertheless embarked on forging a series of diplomatic associations with what would reflect a ‘sphere of influence’ along the south-eastern Adriatic coast and prominent islands in the Adriatic. These diplomatic associations, largely involving ties of friendship, served to provide Rome with the diplomatic flexibility it needed to operate in a region in which its residual interests were minimal yet maintain the significance of the bond through the important moral underpinning of fides. Trust was essential to the construction and maintenance of these relationships; ‘in the absence of any formal constraints (such as juridical law), friendship relies on a culturally shared notion of a compact of trust for its practice and efficacy.’ In maintaining the limited nature of its interventions during the initial period, Rome placed a greater trust in individuals in Illyria to varying degrees of success. Illyrian issues were, throughout the initial period of the 3rd Century BC, minor considerations for the Romans. Roman conflicts with Carthage, Macedon and the Gallic tribes of Cisalpine Gaul predominated the concerns of Roman decision-making, reducing the scope of Rome’s initial interventions in Illyria.

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720 Eckstein, Rome Enters the Greek East, p. 76.
The subsequent period primarily concerned with events of the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Century BC featured important developments in Rome’s interventions in Illyria that saw Rome shape the geopolitical landscape in a more proactive manner in accordance with its interests. This was initially achieved through a greater Roman diplomatic involvement in the affairs of the Greek East, which began in the prelude to the Second Macedonian War. Eckstein has described the events of the period 203-200 BC as bearing witness to a ‘diplomatic revolution’ in Mediterranean inter-state relations.\textsuperscript{722} The events of this period were highlighted by Polybius as fundamental in the establishment of a greater ‘interconnectedness’ of world affairs, with the affairs of Italy, Illyria, Greece, Asia and North Africa becoming intertwined.\textsuperscript{723} This phenomenon was crucial to Polybius’ work and shaped the way in which he presented the events of the period that was covered in his \textit{Histories}. Rome’s diplomatic involvement in the affairs of the wider Greek world developed in the early 2\textsuperscript{nd} Century BC in line with a series of successful campaigns by Rome in the Greek East.\textsuperscript{724} The greater status of Rome through these two developments had important connotations for Roman interventions in the mid-2\textsuperscript{nd} Century BC, which saw Rome adopt a more aggressive approach to affirming its hegemonic status. This culminated in the apogee of the development in the Third Illyrian and Macedonian wars and their aftermath which fundamentally altered the geopolitical landscape of Illyria and the wider eastern Adriatic. Rome’s rise to become the hegemonic power in the Mediterranean served as Polybius’ second theme in his \textit{Histories} and provided the important milieu for considerations of Roman interventions in Illyria during the period considered in this thesis.\textsuperscript{725} The growth of Roman power in the mid-Republic greatly affected Roman interventions during the period in changing the underlying dynamics of Roman international relations; a development that would continue into subsequent decades.

\textbf{Contextual Issues}

The Roman interventions in Illyria occurred within a range of important contexts which had particular implications for the interventions and the manner in which they have been perceived. The importance of the Adriatic to Roman decision-making in the interventions

\textsuperscript{722}Eckstein, \textit{Rome Enters the Greek East}, p. 181.
\textsuperscript{723}Polybius, \textit{Histories} 15. 20.
\textsuperscript{724}As discussed in the thesis, the Second Macedonian War and the War against Antiochus both resulted in favourable peace treaties for Rome that bolstered Rome’s geopolitical status in the wider Greek world.
\textsuperscript{725}Polybius, \textit{Histories} 1. 1.
should not be understated as the stretch of water between Italy and Illyria formed the barrier and the connection between Rome and prospective interventions in Illyria. At the outset of the period considered in this thesis, Adriatic commerce was developing in the quantity and quality of the goods being traded. The majority of the evidence suggests that the bulk of important trade networks were located in the Southern Adriatic, where contact to wider Mediterranean trading networks was evident. Although the evidence has naturally been limited by the availability of the surviving material evidence, enough evidence has been published from which effective inference can be drawn. Regional discrepancy has been observed from the published data as in ‘the period from the 4th to the 1st century BC’, the ‘region was not unified. (…) The differences were mainly in the different political and economic circumstances experienced by the Greek colonists and indigenous communities.’

It was across this regionally diverse Adriatic that Rome intervened in Illyria. Illyrian piracy was predominantly focused on the Southern Adriatic where prosperous and vulnerable cities were located along the Epirote coast and where merchants operated across the wide trade networks. Roman initial interests in the region were centred around the Southern Adriatic and the Otranto Straits more particularly. This area had suffered most from Adriatic piracy, had strong trade networks and most importantly, offered the shortest crossing east from Italy. The Southern Adriatic was subsequently an area of specific strategic importance to Rome and this was reflected through the Roman interventions into the area during the 3rd and 2nd centuries BC.

Illyria at the outset of the period considered in the thesis consisted of an incoherent and disparate series of tribal communities which each had its own outlook, culture, political system, economy and interests. As Dzino notes, ‘Illyricum never existed as an ecological or geographical region, a unified polity, and indeed there never were any Illyrians inhabiting it. It was the creation of Rome and the consequence of the projection of Roman power over a heterogenous space’. Developments prior to the start of the period considered in this thesis, created a noticeable correlation between communities in certain areas. Those along the Southern Adriatic coast and the adjacent islands received contact from Hellenic and Hellenistic influences from Greek settlers and traders. The Northern Adriatic and Illyrian interior, devoid of these significant contacts, retained traditional Celtic influences from the mainland. These developments created a greater Illyrian coherence as the cultural identity of particular areas of the region began to take shape. Greater political coherence in turn was achieved through the

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726 Miše, Gnathia and Related Hellenistic Ware, p. 64.
727 Dzino, Illyricum in Roman Politics 229 BC – AD 68, p. 20.
greater scope of the power and influence of a succession of Illyrian rulers. Wilkes has stressed that an impression began to emerge from the Third Century BC of ‘a new and more lasting political order among the Illyrians, not only among the Dardanians’. Through the geopolitical hegemony developed by the Romans until the end of the period considered in this thesis and the eventual establishment of a Roman provincia in the subsequent period, greater Illyrian geopolitical coherence was achieved with Rome at the centre.

An underlying factor for the Roman interventions mentioned in the ancient sources was Illyrian piracy in the Adriatic. This provided the key context for the initial Roman interventions and shaped the nature of these interventions to be focused on eradicating the piracy. Although, as this thesis has shown, it is highly problematic to ascribe Illyrian piracy as a widespread and perennial problem in the Adriatic, the bulk of the evidence provided by the written sources has highlighted the prevalence of the practice carried out by the Ardiaei. As de Souza has noted ‘relatively little is heard about the Illyrians before the second half of the third century BC, when the Ardiaean kings expanded their territory southwards along the Dalmatian coast’. The Ardiaei threatened the Adriatic like no Illyrians had done before with the array of land and sea forces at their disposal. The greater potency of this threat to settlements along the coast and traders traversing the Adriatic, drew Rome’s attention and the subsequent murder of an ambassador compelled Rome to act decisively. Rome reacted strongly to the Illyrian piratical threat in the 3rd Century BC by engaging in two substantial campaigns, the first against the Ardiaei and the second against Demetrius within the ensuing decade. Rome in both of these campaigns acted with ruthless efficiency, quickly suppressing the threats posed before returning back to Italy; ‘no military or naval forces were left behind; no administration was imposed’. Roman interventions against Illyrian piracy in the Adriatic were thus limited in nature with the aim of suppressing the piracy.

**Presentation in the Sources**

The way in which the Roman interventions in Illyria have been understood and appreciated has been shaped by the way they have been presented in sources both ancient and modern. In the ancient sources, there was a continual need to provide effective justification for
Rome’s actions in intervening to both domestic and foreign audiences. The justifications are a key feature of the surviving ancient historical texts, which have sought to provide just and honourable reasons for the Roman interventions. Harris notes this importance to Rome by asserting that ‘when a pretext was found, the second century Senate no doubt believed that the ensuing war was a bellum iustum’.732 The importance of issuing pretexts, together with diplomatic ultimatums through the processes of rerum repetitio and denuntiatio belli were crucial for the Roman Senate and aristocracy moreover to present itself to its own people as just and honourable in its actions. Foreign observers would need to be convinced by the efficacy of the pretext provided and in Roman compliance with their already established diplomatic arrangements. Presenting itself in this way, as a just and moral agent in inter-state relations, furthered the diplomatic standing of Rome and enhanced their reputation to other states. Ancient historians sought pretexts, moreover, as a means to more effectively explain Roman interventions. Derow alluded to a contradiction on this matter in Polybius, that ‘manifests itself through Polybius’ work, particularly in the form of inconsistency between his general statements about Rome’s expansion and his detailed analyses of the causes of wars’.733 Polybius had a set narrative that he subscribed to about the nature of Roman expansion and the justifications provided for Roman interventions in his account had to fit this narrative. Roman annalistic traditions were important sources for Polybius and he relied on them especially for the period preceding 220 BC, where his corroborative evidence was weaker. The annalistic traditions that provided him with information for Rome’s interventions in the Illyrian Wars have been especially problematic for subsequent scholars and the moral justifications provided for them have resulted in considerable debate. The efficacy of these justifications are mixed, and the limitations of the extant sources has weakened the inference that can be drawn from the surviving historical record.

The ancient historians have, moreover, sought to highlight particular themes within their work and the Roman interventions in Illyria have been presented within this framework. Polybius wrote his history to demonstrate the remarkable rise of Rome and structured his work through the inclusion of specific set-pieces to demonstrate the development of an ‘interconnectedness’ between the affairs of Italy, Greece and North Africa. The presentation of the events in this way would shape subsequent historiography and influence subsequent historians, notably Livy and Appian, for whom Polybius was a key source for the period

considered in this thesis. Both of these historians sought to show Rome in a positive light to appease their Roman audiences and to highlight the vices and virtues of individual characters to serve as examples. All of these sources are Greco-Roman and present the events as part of Rome’s story rather than that of Illyria. Wilkes has stressed that the surviving record for the Illyrians derives exclusively from ‘external sources’ and that Greeks and Romans alike compete in expressing their contempt and detestation for them.\(^{734}\) The lack of an Illyrian perspective cannot be rectified, although the thesis has approached the subject from a more nuanced perspective. Considering the greater array of archaeological sources available and considering events with Illyria as a focus has provided a greater balance to considerations of the Roman interventions.

Modern scholars have, in turn, shaped the way in which the Roman interventions in Illyria have been considered. Recent coverage of these events has predominantly presented these interventions within broader works on Roman imperial expansion and imperialism.\(^ {735}\) As Eckstein has asserted, ‘the two wars (of the 3\textsuperscript{rd} Century BC) in maritime Illyris hold interest for the history of Roman expansion because they are the first Roman military interventions east of the Adriatic.’\(^ {736}\) The interventions in Illyria have served predominantly as a stepping-stone to bigger and more important phenomena for Rome and the Hellenistic world. By focusing on Illyria, and bringing in outside context where relevant, this thesis has tried to address this. Examinations of the interventions in Illyria for modern scholars developed from considering the thesis set out by Mommsen and then Holleaux which advocated that these wars were fought for self-defence and out of fear from external threats.\(^ {737}\) Subsequent historians have sought to defend or challenge this thesis, drawing upon the Roman interventions in Illyria as examples in their arguments. In a region where Roman interests were initially minimal and limited in geographic scope, Rome initially intervened in Illyria in reaction to the external threat posed by Adriatic piracy and sought to protect their limited interests. Roman interests in the region progressed over the course of the period, alongside their greater involvement in Greek affairs. Although these Roman interests developed, their strategic aim of ensuring a geopolitical

\(^{734}\) Wilkes, \textit{Illyrians}, p. 3.


\(^{736}\) Eckstein, \textit{Rome Enters the Greek East}, p. 74.

landscape in Illyria that enabled them to exercise an ‘external hegemony’ with no strong rival to their hegemony in the region persisted.

**The Roman Interventions**

The Roman interventions in Illyria during the period considered in this thesis were limited in scope and served to protect the limited Roman interests in the region. The pretext for the First Illyrian War can be attributed to the murder of a Roman ambassador, an event which is commonly featured in the extant sources. Harris has noted that ‘the murder seems to be a fact, and even the leaders of the Senate may have believed the somewhat implausible claim, afterwards put about by the Romans, that Teuta herself was responsible.’ This claim, made by Polybius, was likely based on an annalistic tradition found in Fabius Pictor and is particularly untrustworthy. Although the Polybian version, complete with its inclusion of an interview with Teuta, is particularly problematic, the murder of an ambassador is well attested in the historical record and served as the direct catalyst for the Roman intervention. The underlying motivation of Rome was to suppress the Ardiaean piracy in the Adriatic that had escalated in the late 3rd Century BC. This provides the effective context for Rome’s intervention; ‘the sudden transformation of Illyria from an area traditionally practising small-scale piracy for food into a serious maritime power makes the Roman reaction all the more understandable’. The Roman treaty and the concurrent establishment of diplomatic relations with a series of entities to establish a ‘sphere of influence’ provide the strategic motivations for the Roman intervention. Rome moved to better secure the South-Eastern Adriatic, the area with the most direct security risk to Rome and where trade and piracy had been most prevalent. Rome reacted to the underlying threat posed to the Adriatic by the Ardiaei and efficiently dealt with the threat. No direct administration was forged, but through the ‘sphere of influence’, Rome began to exercise an ‘external-hegemony’ over a part of Illyria.

The diplomatic ties that bound these entities to Rome were informal bonds of ‘friendship’. A tie of friendship, by its very nature as ‘an informal and extra-institutional human relationship secured by bonds of personal trust and affection between partners’ depended on

738 Polybius, *Histories* 2. 8; Appian, *Illyrian Wars* 3. 2. 7; Dio Cassius, *Roman History* 12. 49.
the way the tie was construed. As a flexible and informal arrangement, Rome utilised its ‘friendships’ throughout the Mediterranean world to adapt to suit its own interests. Friendships worked particularly effectively for Rome in Illyria and the wider Greek East. As this was a region where Roman interests and involvement were minimal at the outset of the period being considered in this thesis, the ties of ‘friendship’ allowed Rome to gradually become more embroiled in affairs east of the Adriatic as it saw fit. The important moral bond of fides, that underpinned all Roman international relations, was particularly pertinent in a diplomatic tie that was so informal. In order for the tie of friendship to maintain its value and significance, the underlying moral bond had to remain strong. A breaking of the diplomatic trust that provided the foundations for friendship resulted in the breakdown of the affiliation.

Whilst these diplomatic ties were initially predicated on mutual bonds, the growing power and status of Rome in the wider Greek East caused important changes in the dynamics of the diplomatic ties. Braund has asserted that friendship served as ‘a concept capable of many different interpretations and emphases: for example, friendship might be a relationship between powers of roughly comparable strength, but it could easily be a relationship between dominator and dominated.’ Rome’s growing geopolitical standing east of the Adriatic caused this dynamic to change, with foreign states increasingly seeking out an affiliation with Rome rather than vice versa. The growing prominence of Rome in Greek affairs, which eventually culminated, by the end of the period considered in this thesis, in Roman hegemonic power in the Greek East, changed the dynamic upon which friendship operated. Badian has stressed that the term amicus could refer to a friend on equal footing or politely refer to an unequal friendship that operated in a similar fashion to that of a patron and client. Friendship in this way operated flexibly, adjusting to suit the statuses of the entities involved. Rome’s growing power nevertheless ensured that a greater number of states actively sought affiliation with Rome.

Rome’s intervention in the Second Illyrian War was largely predicated on the breakdown of fides in Rome’s diplomatic relationship with Demetrius of Pharos; the military intervention was made to effectively remove him from power. Demetrius’ actions in violating the treaty from the First Illyrian War are attested in a variety of sources. The language and tone utilised in these sources is suggestive of the importance of breaking the bond of fides

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742 Burton, *Friendship and Empire: Roman Diplomacy and Imperialism in the Middle Republic (353 – 146 BC)*, p. 28.
had to Roman diplomatic relations. No single individual violation of the treaty is given special preference in regard to the formulation of an effective pretext in the sources, and the delay in the Roman intervention has proven particularly problematic for analysing the war. Walbank’s note however on the timing of the various violations has provided some potential clarity on the subject. Walbank has stressed that the act of detaching the Atintani from Rome was the last in a chronological series of violations by Demetrius against Rome.\footnote{Walbank, A Historical Commentary on Polybius: Volume I, pp. 324-7.} Although the significance of this event in prompting the Roman intervention is unclear, the action served as a more direct attack on Roman interests. In being the last of a series of violations, it is possible that this violation was the most important, although nothing definitive can be determined. Rome’s intervention therefore was made against Demetrius for his series of treaty violations which undermined the fides of his diplomatic relationship with Rome. The war itself had the strategic aim of removing Demetrius from power; to this end the Roman Senate organised the ‘sending a fleet and an army in 219 BC to bring the Illyrians to heel’.\footnote{Rosenstein, Rome and the Mediterranean 290-146 BC: The Imperial Republic, p. 74.} No treaty was signed at the end of the conflict and no discernible change to the dynamic of Roman intervention in the region occurred after Demetrius was removed from power. Rome continued after the war to implement an ’external hegemony’ over the region.

A definitive pretext for Rome’s intervention in the Third Illyrian War is difficult to source in the extant sources but the Roman decision to intervene was a consequence of Genthius’ alliance with Perseus. The alliance threatened the geopolitical balance in the region of Rome’s ‘external hegemony’ and Rome intervened to affirm its hegemonic status in the region. Dzino has noted that ‘the decision of Genthius was disastrous in hindsight – the Roman army commanded by Lucius Anicius Gallus defeated him even before news of the beginning of the war reached Rome.’\footnote{Dzino, Illyricum in Roman Politics 229 BC – AD 68, p. 57. Livy, ab urbe condita 44. 30-2.; Florus, Epitome 1. 29.} The dramatic Roman victories in the Third Illyrian and Third Macedonian Wars marked an important geopolitical shift in the region, by eradicating the two kingdoms, leaving Rome as the sole hegemonic power east of the Adriatic. Roman actions in the aftermath of the war in sacking Epirote towns and enslaving large numbers of their inhabitants, reflected this greater aggression of Rome in conducting its Illyrian interventions. This aggression ensured that Rome’s external hegemony persisted. Whilst the Romans did not directly administer the region, the Roman army was a short sail away across the Adriatic and was prepared to intervene to uphold this geopolitical status. Subsequent periods would witness
the emergence of a *provincia* of Illyricum and the growing importance of Illyria as a part of the Roman Empire.
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Appendix

Fig. 1. Map of the Adriatic showing sites of Greek colonisation. Map taken from P. Cabanes, ‘Greek Colonisation in the Adriatic’ in G. R. Tsetskhladze (ed.), Greek Colonisation: An Account of Greek Colonies and Settlements Overseas: Volume II (Leiden, 2008), p. 156.
Fig. 2. Gnathian style jug (pelike). Vessel on display at the Archaeological Museum of Split. Import from Southern Italy. Dated from the beginning of the 3rd Century BC. Photograph taken at the Archaeological Museum of Split 20/8/2014.
Fig. 3. Cosmetic Vessel (*lekama*) depicting a female head in profile. Vessel on display at the Archaeological Museum of Split. Import from Southern Italy (*Magna Graecia*). Dated from the 4th Century BC. Photograph taken at the Archaeological Museum of Split 20/8/2014.
Fig. 4. Hoard of bronze coins from Pharos, excavated in 1900 near the village of Vrbanj. Coins on display at the Archaeological Museum of Split. The coins depict a young man’s head in profile (obverse) and a wine cup (kantharos) together with the abbreviated Greek letters ΦΑ, short for ΦΑΡΙΟΝ (reverse). Dated End of the 3rd Century/Beginning of the 2nd Century BC. Photograph taken at the Archaeological Museum of Split 20/8/2014.
**Fig. 5.** Table showing the numerical data for *Gnathia* found at Eastern Adriatic locations (published sites only). Data taken from M. Miše, *Gnathia and Related Hellenistic Ware on the East Adriatic Coast* (Oxford, 2015), p. 19.

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**Fig. 7a.** Fragment A of an inscription of a Psephisma of an appeal from Pharos to Paros. On display at the Muzej Staroga Grada. Most probably dated from the 2nd Century BC. Photograph taken at the Muzej Staroga Grada 19/8/2014.
Fig. 7b. Fragment B of an inscription of a Psephisma of an appeal from Pharos to Paros. On display at the Muzej Staroga Grada. Most probably dated from the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Century BC. Photograph taken at the Muzej Staroga Grada 19/8/2014.
**Fig. 8.** Modern Albanian 100 Leke coin minted in 2000, showing Teuta complete with Athena styled Classical Greek panoply (obverse) and denomination complete with laurel wreath (reverse).

**Fig. 9.** Modern Albanian 50 Leke coin minted in 2000, showing Genthius on horseback (obverse) and denomination complete with laurel wreath (reverse).
Fig. 10. Modern bust of Agron. On display at the Rozafa Castle Museum (on the site of ancient Scodra), Skhoder. Photograph taken 13/8/2014
Fig. 11. Modern bust of Teuta. On display at the Rozafa Castle Museum (on the site of ancient Scodra), Skhoder. Photograph taken 13/8/2014
**Fig. 12.** Modern bust of Genthius. On display at the Rozafa Castle Museum (on the site of ancient Scodra), Skhoder. Photograph taken 13/8/2014
**Fig. 13.** Table showing the shipwreck totals for the Mediterranean and Adriatic across several centuries. Data gathered by the Illyrian Coastal Exploration Programme and published in J. G. Royal, ‘Illyrian Coastal Exploration Program (2007-2009): The Roman and Late Roman finds and their contexts’, *American Journal of Archaeology*, Vol. 116 No. 3 (2012), p. 442.

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*Numbers represent shipwreck sites; when an estimated date span ranges more than a century, the site is assigned 0.5 to each century. Site totals derived from Orlić and Jurišić 1987; Parker 1992; Jurišić 2000; Radić 2003; Tusa 2005; T. Gatton, pers. comm. 2011; see also the Oxford Roman Economy Project Shipwreck Database (http://oxrep.classics.ox.ac.uk/oxrepdb/); RPM Nautical Foundation Database of Shipwreck Discoveries in the Mediterranean (www.rpmnautical.org).*
Fig. 14. The engravings on the stele di Novilara Dated from the 7th Century BC. ‘Scale Approximately 1:6’. Taken from M. Bonino, ‘The Picene ships of the 7th century BC engraved at Novilara (Pesaro, Italy)’, *International Journal of Nautical Archaeology and Underwater Exploration* (1975), Vol. 4 No. 1, p. 12.