The Islamic Doctrine of *Al-Wala’ wal Bara*’
(Loyalty and Disavowal) in Modern Salafism

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ABSTRACT

This study examines the Islamic concept of *Al-Wala’ wal Bara’* (Loyalty and Disavowal) in modern Salafism referred to here as WB. The research is divided into two parts. Part One introduces the phenomenon of modern Salafism and the concept of WB (Chapter One). It also demonstrates how the Quran, particularly its sixtieth chapter (*Surah Al-Mumtahanah*) and the concept of *Millat Ibrahim* (Religion of Abraham) play an important role in formulating the modern Salafi concept of WB (Chapter Two). Part Two discusses the realities and complexities of the concept. First, the concept in Wahhabism, whose adherents form the majority of modern Salafis, and whose tradition is believed to have influenced and shaped modern Salafism, is discussed (Chapter Three). The complexities of WB are described as the research recognizes the diversity or “spectrum” of the concept in modern Salafism, which ranges from what might be termed “very mild” to “very extreme” (Chapter Four). The research shows that one of the main reasons for this diversity is the different Salafi orientations or the backgrounds from which modern Salafis emerge. This is proven through analyzing the writings on WB by Salafis of purist, politico and *Jihadi* backgrounds – a specific categorization of modern Salafis used for the purpose of this research (Chapter Five). The analysis is conducted by mainly observing the role of WB within their intellectual systems. Through this analysis, it is concluded that a particular Salafi orientation has an effect on the style of writing and presentation of the concept by modern Salafis. This reflects the position of WB in modern Salafism as being fluid and multi-dimensional. The research then, aims to explore the centrality, breadth and complexity of the WB concept in modern Salafism, and proves that WB in modern Salafism is not static but flexible and dynamic. The significance of the research lies in the fact that understanding modern Salafi conceptions of WB is an urgent priority in the lives of Muslims today. This understanding is critical, as Muslims increasingly live as minority communities across the globe and WB has specific implications for whether (and how) Muslims can live with non-Muslims. The research concludes that the consequences of applying the modern Salafi concept of WB are serious – WB generally promotes a way of life that is insular and hostile towards non-Muslims and this, it might be argued, is at variance with more tolerant, inclusive nature of Islam.
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INTRODUCTION CHAPTER

Background

One of the issues in contemporary Islamic thought which has attracted considerable attention amongst Muslim scholars and within the Muslim community is the valid and appropriate attitude of Muslims to relationships with non-Muslims. A major source of confusion and controversy with regards to this relationship comes from the allegation that Muslims must reserve their love and loyalty for fellow Muslims and to reject and declare war on the rest of humanity.

This idea and allegation can most acutely be seen through the Islamic concept of *Al-Wala’ wal Bara’* (WB) translated as “Loyalty and Disavowal”, which appears as central in the ideology of modern Salafism. In this study, the term “modern Salafism” refers to a religious inclination or tendency towards a set of ideas and identity. These ideas and identity are subscribed to by modern Salafis who advocate strict adherence to their understanding of Islamic practices as enjoined by Prophet Muhammad (d. 632), the final prophet of Islam and subsequently practised by the early pious predecessors of Islam.

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1 *Author’s note:* I am grateful to Dr Suha Taji-Farouki, Lecturer in Modern Islam and Dr Omar Ashour, Lecturer in the Politics of the Modern Arab World, both at the Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies, University of Exeter; Professor Madawi Al-Rasheed, Professor of Anthropology of Religion, King’s College London and Dr Joas Wagemakers, Assistant Professor in the Department of Islam and Arabic at Radboud University Nijmegen, the Netherlands for commenting my research proposal and providing me with invaluable advice and insights. I am also grateful to Professor Karim Douglas Crow, Principal Research Fellow at International Institute of Advanced Islamic Studies, Malaysia who earlier on commented my initial research proposal, provided his insights and advised me the appropriate translation of WB for my research. I also thank Professor Tim Niblock, Professor of Arab Gulf Studies at the Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies for his advice, great insights and kind assistance.

2 Due to the vastness and complexity of the Arabic language, it is difficult to provide a precise translation of the terms *wala’* and *bara’*. This is primarily because many Arabic words have multiple meanings which are used differently depending on contexts and situations. I have translated the term *wala’* and *bara’* as “Loyalty and Disavowal” as it suits the context and meaning in which I am dealing. Some may translate it as “Allegiance and Disassociation”. Others may translate it as “Love and Hatred”, which is literally inaccurate but is acceptable as elements of love and hatred form the basis of the concept.

3 By identity, we mean a belief system (ideology), ideas, values and meanings that reflect moral, social and political interests and commitments of modern Salafis and constitutes their ideology of how the world and its system should work. This belief system is based on pure, undiluted teachings of the Quran, the *sunnah* (Prophetic tradition) and practices of early the Muslim generations (the *salaf*). See Chapter One for a detailed explanation on modern Salafism.

4 In this research, modern Salafis are referred to as Muslims who subscribe to the ideas and identity mentioned earlier. They advocate a return to Islamic sources by emulating and following the footsteps of early generation of Muslims. They tend to disregard the ways of Muslims who came after the third generation of Islam as they see that Islam during this period has been tainted with innovations and many Islamic practices are seen as heretical. In other words, it could be argued that modern Salafis fail to recognize many traditions of the Islamic intellectual heritage. Some may prefer to call them “neo-Salafis” as they view it is more appropriate as it distinguishes them from the *salaf al-salih* i.e. the early generations of Muslims.
known as the *salaf al-salih*.\(^5\) Following the *salaf* is the reason for their self-designation as Salafis.

In its most fundamental definition, the concept of WB prescribes the relationship Muslims are enjoined to have with God and their fellow human beings. The term *wala’* refers to the undivided loyalty Muslims should portray to God, Islam and their Muslim co-religionists over all other things\(^6\), while *bara’* refers to the disavowal of anything deemed un-Islamic by these modern Salafis. In modern Salafism, the concept of WB receives much emphasis.\(^7\) As modern Salafis seek to revive a practice of Islam that closely resemble the religion during the time of Prophet Muhammad and maintain the purity of the religion, this concept calls Muslims to portray their loyalty to Islam and to disavow anything that could possibly taint the sanctity of Islam, or pose a threat to *tawhid* (monotheism or the belief in the Oneness of God).

The centrality of the concept can be seen when modern Salafis identify WB as one of the pillars of *tawhid*. According to their belief, Muslims must believe and apply the concept of WB in their daily lives. Opposition to the concept is a violation of an essential part of the *aqidah* (creed).\(^8\) This is to say that Muslims should direct their loyalty only to God, Islam and the Muslims, as loyalty to God is directly linked to the

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5 The term *salaf al-salih* refers to the “early Muslims” who enjoy an elevated status among Muslims based on the prophetic saying, “The best century of my people is my century, then the following, then the following.” (Sahih Al-Bukhari, Book on Testimonies, no. 2652; Sahih Muslim, Book on Merits and Virtues, no. 2533; Sunan Al-Tirmizi, Book on Virtues of the Companions, no. 3859; Sunan Ibn Majah, Book on Judgements, no. 2362; and Ahmad, vol. 1, p. 434). While this *hadith* does not actually use the actual Arabic term *salaf al-salih* (the pious predecessors), it is believed that the concept of the pious predecessors very likely originates from this *hadith*. This term and concept of *salaf al-salih* and its related term, Salafi, which refers to those who followed them, began to appear frequently in Islamic discourses in the late pre-modern period. In the early fourteenth century, the theologian Taqi al-Din Ibn Taimiyyah (d.1328) commented that “[the Companions and the successors were better than us.” (Ibn Taimiyyah. *Majmu’a al-fatawa*, 5:111).

6 Salafis understanding that *wala’* is exclusively for God, the Messenger and Muslims is based on Quran 5:55.

7 The present research attempts to illustrate and prove this fact. As the research shows, the centrality of WB in modern Salafism can be seen through the actions of modern Salafis and in their statements, lectures and writings on WB which are studied and analysed for the purpose of this research.

8 Modern Salafis claim that since *aqidah* is the basis of Islamic belief, it is valid to assume that the concept of WB should be upheld as a tool in the process of refining the *aqidah* and protecting its sanctity.
pivotal concept of *tawhid*. The concept is one of the factors that could nullify the proclamation of faith (*nawaqidh al-shahadatain*) if not practised by Muslims.

In modern Salafism, professing *wala‘* is to manifest a deep sense of loyalty to the Muslims by being attached to them, loving them, maintaining bonds of brotherhood with them, assisting them, and empathizing with them. Without this, there is no meaning to a Muslim community (*ummah*). Indeed, Salafis see the Muslim *ummah* exists only by virtue of the ties that bind the hearts of its individuals together in this sense of loyalty. One the other hand, *bara‘* translates as total disassociation from all that displeases God. This includes *kufr* (disbelief), *shirk* (apostasy), *kuffar* (plural of *kafir* which means non-Muslims or disbelievers), *bid‘ah* (religious innovations), *ma‘siyyah* (disobedience to God and His commands) and even un-Islamic political systems (*al-anzimah al-taghutiyyah*) such as democracy, secularism and nationalism according to some modern Salafis. In addition, modern Salafis seek to perform *bara‘* from “infidels and infidel practices” by not befriending them (especially the Jews and Christians) and avoiding their cultures and traditions which they believe could tarnish the purity of the Islam they envision. This was justified by taking a literal understanding of the many Quranic verses such as: “Do not take the Jews and Christians as your friends/protectors…”

Fundamentally, the concept of WB in modern Salafism describes the posture Muslims should take in their relationship with non-Muslims, their cultures, systems and environments. Sometimes, modern Salafis consider cultures which one might normally view as Islamic to be “un-Islamic” since they have “deviated” from the practice of the Prophet and the *salaf al-salih*. Among others, the concept is clarified to address some areas of concern for example:

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9 Although *tawhid* is the most important foundation in Islamic belief system for all Muslims, modern Salafis tend to bypass history and claim to go to the basic principles and using the notion of *tawhid* to reject some of the traditional Islamic practices and accuse these practices as heresy; and derive new concepts such as WB and *hakimiyyah* (Islamic sovereignty).


12 Quran 5:51. See also Quran 60:4; 19:49–1; 11:54–6; 43:26–8; 10:41. See Chapter Two for discussion on how Quranic verses play an important role in the formulation of modern Salafi conception of WB.

13 These practices include Sufism and mysticism which Salafis consider as “un-Islamic”.

11
• How should Muslims perceive non-Muslims and how this perception should be formed on the basis of intent?

• What is the appropriate code of conduct Muslims should adopt in their interaction with non-Muslims and to live in a non-Islamic environment?

• Can Muslims live side by side with non-Muslims?

In putting the concept of WB into practice, modern Salafis distinguish certain activities that amount to the wrong type of loyalty and develop a framework for Muslims to adhere to. Activities which Muslims should refrain from include.14

1. Imitating non-Muslims in their dressing, language, morality and culture. Such imitation invariably invests Muslims deeper into that culture and leads them down a deviant path.15

2. Living in the lands of non-Muslims (dar al-harb) and not immediately moving to the lands of Muslims (dar al-Islam). Some Salafis argue that hijrah (migration) to Muslim lands is an obligation upon every Muslims.16 Residence in the land of non-Muslims will invariably lead Muslims to befriend and show loyalty to them.17

3. Seeking aid, assistance and comfort from the non-Muslims. This is a form of mandatory disassociation according to some Salafis.18

14 These examples are illustrative of the manifestation of WB by modern Salafis and not exhaustive. It is important to note that not all Salafis or those who consider themselves as Salafis apply these practices. There are various types and groups of modern Salafis and different groups may apply WB differently. Modern Salafis are divided in many religious, social and political issues. Their differences in viewing these issues may also affect their understanding and application of WB.

15 Muhammad Saeed Salim Al-Qahtani, Al-Wala’ Wa Al-Bara’ Fi Al-Islam Min Mafahim Aqidah Al-Salaf (Loyalty and Disavowal in Islam According to the Belief of the Salaf), Al-Maktabah Al-Taufiqiyyah, Cairo, 2003, p. 186.

16 For example, Al-Qahtani argues that living in a non-Muslim land is not permissible in Islam as Muslim will have to live under non-Islamic conditions. Thus, hijrah is necessary and obligatory. He also claims that Muslims who willingly accept the rule of non-Muslims, and live under any rule other than the shariah (Islamic law) are committing acts that will nullify their faith. This is so as loyalty and sovereignty can only given to and by God and Islam is the only way of life for Muslims. See Al-Qahtani, Al-Wala’ Wa Al-Bara’ Fi Al-Islam Min Mafahim Aqidah Al-Salaf, p. 217.


18 Al-Qahtani, Al-Wala’ Wa Al-Bara’ Fi Al-Islam Min Mafahim Aqidah Al-Salaf, pp. 112-123.
4. Observing the holidays, festivals and celebrations of non-Muslims. This includes congratulating them during those seasons or attending their functions. Salafis consider these to be expressions of love and acknowledgment for the non-Muslims.\textsuperscript{19}

5. Voting and taking part in democratic political election. Some Salafis argue these activities form a part of un-Islamic judgement which is forbidden (\textit{haram}) for Muslims to participate.\textsuperscript{20}

However, these activities which are examples of the manifestations of WB in modern Salafism are not necessarily agreed upon by all modern Salafis. Modern Salafis are not a homogenous group. They are divided into different groups and categorisations with dissimilar ideological trends and inclinations.\textsuperscript{21} Similarly, the concept of WB in modern Salafism is understood and manifested quite differently by modern Salafis. Although all Salafis recognize the importance of WB, they differ in the understanding of the concept, and practically how it should be applied and manifested. As this research shows, the concept is fluid and flexible. Importantly, the differences in the understanding and application of the concept have led to debates and disputes among modern Salafis themselves.

As a religious concept, WB is based and rooted from the primary Islamic sources which are the Quran and the Prophetic traditions (\textit{sunnah}). This study will also attempt to illustrate how Islamic religious texts, especially the Quran plays a vital role in formulating modern Salafis conception of WB (Chapter Two). However, it could be argued that the genealogy of the concept’s historical emergence\textsuperscript{22} in modern Salafism

\textsuperscript{19} Salih Al-Fawzan, \textit{Al-Wala’ wal Bara’ Fil Islam}, p. 14.

\textsuperscript{20} There are many statements and \textit{fatwas} (religious decree) issued by modern Salafis on the impermissibility of taking part in election and political activities. See for example the \textit{fatwa} “\textit{Ruling on Democracy and Elections and Participating in That System}” by Sheikh Muhammad Al-Munajjid at Islam Question and Answer available at \url{http://islamqa.info/en/ref/107166} (accessed 15 March 2010); Voting is Haram, Democracy is Kufr and Shirk by Sheikh Feiz available at \url{http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xfDthnL3WnA} (accessed 12 June 2012).

\textsuperscript{21} The different groups and categories of modern Salafis will be explained in detail in Chapter One of this thesis.

\textsuperscript{22} It should be emphasized here that historically, \textit{wala’} and \textit{bara’} as two separate concepts are not something new in Islam. In fact, as the research shows, both concepts of \textit{wala’} and \textit{bara’} has its origin in the Quran. In addition, the concept of loyalty (\textit{wala’}) to a tribal leader and members existed in pre-Islamic Arabia and in the early centuries of Islam. Early Islamic groups such as the \textit{Khawarij} or Kharjites were believed to have applied elements of \textit{wala’} and \textit{bara’} in their belief and actions. However, modern Salafis understanding and conception of the concept could be traced to the ideas of Ibn Taimiyyah. See Wagemakers, Joas, “The Transformation of a Radical Concept: Al-Wala’ wal Bara’” in The Ideology of
could be traced to the ideas of Ibn Taimiyyah whose teachings has significantly influenced modern Salafis and shaped the ideology of modern Salafism.\textsuperscript{23} It is believed that Ibn Taimiyyah has developed the idea that the dissimilarity between the Muslims and non-Muslims must be total.\textsuperscript{24} In his book entitled \textit{Iqtida’ al-Sirat al-Mustaqim} (Following the Straight Path), he explained in detail all aspects of differences that should be drawn by Muslims in their encounters with non-Muslims.\textsuperscript{25}

In today’s context, modern Salafism is usually associated with Wahhabism\textsuperscript{26} (a term which refers to the teachings and traditions of Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab\textsuperscript{27} (d. 1792)). In many a times, the term Salafism is interchangeably used with Wahhabism. As a rule, Salafism is broader than Wahhabism. While it is true that followers of Wahhabism call themselves Salafis, it is important to note that not all Salafis are Wahhabis (those who follow Wahhabism). However, it is imperative to look at Wahhabism in order to understand modern Salafism. In fact, the study of modern Salafism will not be complete without looking at Wahhabism, which considers itself to be the true Salafi movement.

Much of the ideas of modern Salafism, including the concept of WB are developed as an outgrowth of the ideas derived from Ibn Abd al-Wahhab who was greatly influenced by the teachings of Ibn Taimiyyah.\textsuperscript{28} This study also illustrates how the concept of WB is understood, applied and developed in Wahhabism from the time of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab to the current period (Chapter Three). Although it is believed that books on WB have only been written by modern Salafis in recent decades, the idea of forbidding

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Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi” in Roel Meijer (ed), \textit{Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement}, Hurst & Company, London, 2009, pp. 50-3.\textsuperscript{23} Ib. ibd, pp. 53-4.\textsuperscript{24} Thomas F. Michel, S.J., \textit{A Muslim Theologian’s Response to Christianity: Ibn Taimiyyah ’s Al-Jawab al-salih}, Caravan Book, New York, 1984, pp. 84-5.\textsuperscript{25} Ibn Taimiyyah, \textit{Iqtida’ al-Sirat al-Mustaqim Makhala’fat Ashab al-Jahim} (Walking The Straight Path, Opposing the people of Hellfire), pp. 156-303 available at \url{http://www.tawhed.was/a?a=syed5680} (accessed 23 March 2010).\textsuperscript{26} Known as Wahhabiyyah in Arabic and its adherents are labeled as Wahhabis. Historically, the Wahhabis call themselves \textit{al-Muwahhidun} which literally means “the monotheists". The Wahhabis claim to call to the way of the \textit{salaf al-salih}, the way of the Prophet Muhammad and his companions. This is the reason why they are called Salafis, i.e. people who follow the way of the pious predecessors. See Chapter Three for more explanation on Wahhabism.\textsuperscript{27} Many Salafis today point to Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab as the first figure in the modern era to push for a return to the religious practices of the \textit{salaf al-salih}. His evangelizing in eighteenth century Saudi Arabia was a call to return to what were the practices of the early generations of Muslims.\textsuperscript{28} Based on the teachings of Ibn Taimiyyah, Ibn Abdul Wahhab and subsequently the Wahhabis further developed and enhanced the concept. See Chapter One for discussion on the historical emergence of WB in modern Salafism.
\end{flushright}
wala’ to non-Muslims have already existed in the early days of Wahhabism. Early Wahhabi scholars have authored books on the concept, albeit not exactly under the name of WB like modern Salafis do. For example Sulayman Ibn Abdallah (d. 1818), the grandson of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, who was one of the most influential and learned ulema (plural of ‘alim meaning Muslim scholars) at that time, wrote a treatise entitled Al-Dalalil fi Hukm Muwalat Ahl al-Ishrak (Proofs of the Rule Regarding the Loyalty to the People of Polytheism); and Hamad bin Atiq (d. 1883) wrote a famous document entitled Sabil al-Najat wal Fikak min Muwalat al-Murtaddin wa Ahl al-Ishrak (The Path of Salvation and Freedom Against Befriending the Apostates and Polytheists).29

Due to the importance of practising WB, especially in the current period where Muslims are struggling to maintain Islam’s authenticity and legitimacy amidst an onslaught of foreign values30 and belief systems as a result of a series of conquests, colonialisations and the current wave of globalization, modern Salafis begin to propagate and author books on the subject of WB.31 Muhammad Saeed Al-Qahtani (b. 1956), a prolific Salafi author from Saudi Arabia whose ground-breaking book on WB was published in 1980, is believed to be among the first, if not the first modern Salafi to write comprehensively on WB. Subsequently, more individuals from different Salafi currents begin to write on the subject. Interestingly, as this study shows, different Salafis would present the concept in a different slant or manner (Chapter Four and Five) with each Salafi subset emphasizing a different role of the concept. The different manners of presenting WB by modern Salafis reflect the concept in modern Salafism as being fluid, dynamic and multi-dimensional.

29 These two books on WB written by early Wahhabi scholars will be discussed in Chapter Three.
30 It is argued that the effects of Westernization and rapid modernization since the beginning of the twentieth century had resulted in an acute sense of alienation and dislocation, provoking feelings of rootlessness and an identity crisis in many Muslim individuals. Perhaps as a response to this, more Muslims are turning to their religion as an anchor to preserve their self-identities in the rapidly growing world. This has resulted in the growth of an Islamic identity or affiliation within the Muslim communities in the decades beginning the twentieth century. Hence, WB is seen as an important tool by modern Salafis to deal with these challenges.
31 In countering this onslaught, modern Salafis view WB as an important tool to keep Islam free from any impurities; to preserve Islamic identity and to emulate the salaf al–salih as closely as possible for they provide the best example of how Islam should be practiced throughout all times. This is the central Salafi doctrine which can be traced back to Abu Hanifah (d. 767), founder of the Sunni Hanafi school of fiqh (jurisprudence) who counselled, “Follow the traditions and the way of the Salaf and be on your guard against innovations (bida’) for all that constitutes a departure from the norm.” (See Al-Suyuti, Sawn al-mantiq wa ’l-kalam ’an fann al-mantiq wa ’l-kalam quoted in Afsarudin, Asma, “Demarcating Fault-lines within Islam: Muslim Modernists and Hardline Islamists Engage the Shari’a” in Jorgen S. Nielen and Lisbet Christoffersen (eds) Shari’a As Discourse: Legal Traditions and the Encounter with Europe, Ashgate Publishing Limited, Surrey England, 2010, p. 29. Here the objective of following the salaf is clear: to preserve the integrity of the practices of the Prophet and to be on guard against undesirable innovation.
As mentioned, the dynamics of WB in modern Salafism is recognized when the research identifies the different roles or the different dimensions (levels) of the concept. These roles are: (1) creedal (aqidah); (2) social; (3) political; and (4) Jihadi (literally means struggle or fighting). Generally, all Salafis agree on the concept of WB at the aqidah level. This means they claim Muslims must believe and uphold the concept as it is connected to the faith. Also at the aqidah level, modern Salafis believe that WB is important to fight any religious innovations or bid’ah that has crept into the religion.\footnote{Wagemakers, Joas. “The Transformation of a Radical Concept: Al-Wala’ wal Bara’ in The Ideology of Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi”, p. 55.} However, they differ in the application of WB at the social and political level. At the social level, WB is characterized by a portrayal of non-Muslims as potential enemies, and un-Islamic practices as dangerous acts that could threaten the purity of Islam and tawhid. Examples of the social dimension of WB include giving and accepting gifts from the non-Muslims, joining them in their religious festivals, listening to music,\footnote{See Students’ Question and Answer Session at Al-Faraby Middle School, Riyadh, with His Eminence Shaykh Ibn Baz available at \url{http://alifta.com/Fatawa/fatawaDetails.aspx?BookID=14&View=Page&PageNo=1&PageID=507} (accessed 12 April 2012).} especially non-Islamic music or even celebrating mother’s day and using the non-hijri calendar which according to the Salafis constitutes \textit{al-tashabbuh bil kuffar} (imitation of the non-Muslims).\footnote{See Chapter Four for discussion on some of the social dimension of WB in modern Salafism.} For instance, the former mufti of Saudi Arabia, Abdullah Ibn Baz (d. 1999) said that it is impermissible for a Muslim to participate in the celebrations and feasts of non-Muslims.\footnote{See fatwa by Ibn Baz “Muslims Dealing with non-Muslims”, vol. 27, Book on Da’wah available at \url{http://alifta.com/Fatawa/fatawaDetails.aspx?BookID=14&View=Page&PageNo=1&PageID=5268} (accessed 12 April 2012).} Another Saudi scholar, Salih ibn Fawzan al-Fawzan (b. 1935) argued that Muslims in non-Muslim countries should perform the \textit{hijrah}\footnote{The obligation of \textit{hijrah} as claimed by Salafis is based on Quran 4: 99-100.} to the Islamic world because settling in the countries of non-Muslims will lead to forming loyalty to them.\footnote{Al-Fawzan, Salih, \textit{Al-Wala’ wal Bara’ fi al-Islam}, p. 10.} It is believed that Ibn Baz and Al-Fawzan belong to the category of modern Salafis known as “purists” or “quietest” who emphasize the social aspect of WB while avoiding its political dimension.

The political dimension of WB, however, refers to the use of the concept by modern Salafis who actively incorporate elements of politics and political systems into their belief. For example, Salafis assert that Muslims must give their loyalty only to Muslim rulers who rule according to Islamic system or the \textit{shariah} (Islamic law or
jurisprudence). Muslim rulers who rule not with the *shariah* must be disavowed, and that Muslims must abandon any un-Islamic political system such as democracy, nationalism and secularism, just like the way they are required to perform *bara‘* of the *kufr*. In its political form, WB was linked to the concept of *tawhid al-hakimiyya* (the unity of governance), relating to the judgement that a Muslim leader who does not rule by the entirety of the *shariah* is an infidel who should be overthrown, by violent means if necessary.

The political dimension of WB is also believed to produce another dimension known as the *Jihadi* dimension of WB. Salafis who apply this role of WB usually incorporate the practice of *takfir* (ex-communication of Muslims) especially to Muslim rulers who do not implement *shariah* or, who apply any non-Islamic political systems which are seen by the some Salafis as against Islamic teachings. These Salafis are known and labeled as Jihadi Salafis. It is believed that the act of *takfir* will eventually lead to the concept of *jihad* which is commonly manifested in the form of overthrowing and attacking them.

Saudi Arabia is home to Wahhabism and sometimes known as the so-called “birthplace of modern Salafism”39. However, Salafis and Salafism are not only restricted to Saudi Arabia. Modern Salafism is a globalized and de-territorialized phenomenon.40 Salafi ideas such as WB could also be found in other countries and in other Islamist currents and ideology. For example, in Egypt, the premises of the WB concept can be found as early as the 1960s through the work of Sayyid Qutub (d.1966), a leading member of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in the 1950s and 1960s, who advocated separation

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38 The Jihadi dimension of WB is, in many ways closely related to the political dimension. Hence the Jihadi role of WB could also be termed as the “politico-Jihadi” dimension. The Jihadi dimension of WB is exclusively applied by the Jihadi Salafis who assert that the use of violence understood in the form of *jihad* is legitimised and sometimes obligatory on those Muslims who have negated the “true” manifestation of WB.

39 It is observed that Saudi Salafis (the Wahhabis) form the majority of modern Salafis. One could also notice that much of the ideas and traditions of modern Salafism are found in Wahhabism such as rejecting of religious practices deemed as *bid‘ah* (by the Wahhabis) and applying a strict and literal understanding of religious sources.

40 By “globalized” and “de-territorialized” I mean modern Salafis are not exclusively found in a particular area such as the Middle East or country like Saudi Arabia, but exist everywhere in all parts of the world. For example, in recent years the world saw an increasing influence of Salafism in Europe. See Darcy M. Barrett, *Concepts of Identity and the Islamitization of Europe: The Components of Growth and Radicalization of the Global Salafi Islamic Movement in Europe and Its Implications for the West*, Regent University, 2008, p. 117.
(mufasalah) of the Muslim vanguard, which had to return to Prophet Muhammad’s way of life from the rest of the world. This is necessary in order to restore Islam’s greatness through what he terms as hakimiyyah since Qutub believe that Muslims today are living in a state of jahiliyyah (period of ignorance) that is the modern world of ignorance and unbelief. Qutub asserted that the nature of Muslim and non-Muslim relationship is always in conflict due to the fundamental differences between the two groups. He claimed that the former is based on submission to the only One God while the former submit to false gods and human beings.

Due to the different roles of WB found within the intellectual system of modern Salafis, it could be viewed that WB is not only used as a call for personal piety and separation from non-Muslims but can also be employed to accuse Muslim rulers of kufr and thus serve as a legitimization to fight them. As the research shows, the breadth of the concept highlights that WB does not exist in a religious vacuum but is shaped by local and global political circumstances.

**Significance of the Study**

Why is there a need to study WB in modern Salafism? I would like to begin answering this question by relating a personal experience which is believed to have highly inspired and subsequently led me to embark on this study. About a decade ago, several months after the incident of September 11, 2001, the Singapore government uncovered the plan of an Al-Qaeda-linked Islamist terrorist organization, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) to bomb…

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42 It is believed that Sayyid Qutub did not mentioned wala’ and bara’ in his ideas and writings. Some scholars even argue that Qutub was not even a Salafi. However, many of his ideas, especially the concept of hakimiyyah which he propagated in his writings are similar to the Salafi ideology. According to Qutub, Muslims in contemporary times are resemblance of the people during the period before the coming of Islam. They have ignored the shariah and practised many aspects of jahiliyyah.
43 The term jahiliyyah in the Arabic language means ignorance. In Islamic context, the term refers to the period before the birth of Prophet Muhammad where the Arabs were believed to be in total ignorance by associating partners with God and worshipping idols.
46 Jemaah Islamiyah is a Southeast Asian militant Islamist organization which is responsible for many terrorist attacks in Indonesia from 2001 to 2009 including the Bali incident in October 12, 2002 (described as the worst terrorist attack after September 11) which killed more than 200 people including 88 Australians. (See [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2002_Bali_bombings](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2002_Bali_bombings) - accessed 08 August 2012). JI is dedicated to the establishment of a Daulah Islamiyah Nusantara (regional Islamic state) in Southeast Asia incorporating Indonesia, Malaysia, the southern Philippines, Singapore and Brunei.
several targets in Singapore.\textsuperscript{47} Subsequently, JI members who were behind the plot were arrested and detained under the Singapore’s Internal Security Act (ISA). In line with Singapore’s unique approach to incorporate community participation in its fight against terrorism, I was among the local Muslim individuals who were consulted by the security authorities to interview several of the JI detainees, and provide an assessment of their ideological thinking and inclination.\textsuperscript{48} It was during my interaction with these JI members that I was exposed to the concept of WB. Many of the JI members whom I talked to disclosed that WB is the foundation of the group’s ideology. They also claim that JI’s teachings are based on \textit{manhaj} (methodology) of the \textit{salaf}.\textsuperscript{49} To provide religious justification and legitimacy for their actions, JI ascribes to an interpretation of WB in which they decidedly divide the world into two groups: friends who ascribe to their worldview and enemies who are opposed to them.\textsuperscript{50} Books on WB by Salafi thinkers were also translated into the Malay and Indonesian language and taught to JI members.\textsuperscript{51} A former JI member whom I interviewed clarifies:

JI leaders always emphasize the importance of the doctrine of \textit{Al-Wala’ wal Bara’} to all its members during the religious classes conducted by the \textit{amir} (leader) or any appointed leader. Members are taught to defend God, the Messenger and all believers by showing hatred and rejection of others. We are not allowed to align and associate ourselves with the non-Muslims. Muslims who work with the secular.


\textsuperscript{48} Subsequently, these Muslim individuals formed the Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG) in April 2003 (see www.rrg.sg – accessed 15 June 2011). The RRG comprises of Singaporean Muslim scholars who voluntarily provides religious guidance through counselling to the JI detainees who have been detained under Singapore’s Internal Security Act (ISA) for terrorism-related activities. I am one of RRG’s secretariat members and counsellors who have the opportunity to meet and talk to the JI detainees in Singapore.

\textsuperscript{49} In JI’s ideological and organisational manual known as the PUPJI or \textit{Pedoman Umum Perjuangan Al-Jamaah Al-Islamiyah} (General Guidelines for the Struggle of Al-Jamaah Al-Islamiyah), it is mentioned that the \textit{aqidah} of JI is that of \textit{ahl al-sunnah wal jamaah} (literally People of the Prophetic tradition and Group) and it follows the \textit{manhaj} (methodology) of the \textit{salaf al-salih}.


government are working with the *kafir*. This is forbidden in Islam and they have to leave their jobs. This is because those who reject *tawhid* should be disavowed and rejected.\(^{52}\)

Such a statement eventually surprised me who was exposed to the concept of WB for the very first time. The claim made by JI members that WB, as an Islamic doctrine requires Muslims to hate and disassociate from the *kuffar* is highly questionable, and could be argued, as in contradiction of the merciful and tolerant nature of Islam. Subsequently, after interviewing the JI members and conducting a research on JI’s ideology, it is clear that JI’s worldview is significantly influenced by Salafi ideas and that WB is an important pillar and foundation in the JI’s ideology.\(^{53}\)

The centrality of the WB concept in JI’s ideology could be clearly seen in the following chart:\(^{54}\)

Figure 1: Jemaah Islamiyah’s Pyramid-Ideology

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\(^{52}\) Interview with former JI member in Singapore, April 2004. For confidential reason and in accordance with the regulations laid out by the Internal Security Department, Ministry of Home Affairs, Singapore, names of JI interviewees will not be mentioned in this thesis.

\(^{53}\) See RRG’s website [www.rrg.sg](http://www.rrg.sg) (accessed 15 January 2011) for more on JI’s ideology. See also blog of Muhammad Haniff Hassan at [http://counterideology.multiply.com/?&show_interstitial=1&u=](http://counterideology.multiply.com/?&show_interstitial=1&u=) (accessed 15 January 2011) for articles on JI’s ideology and counter-extremism related materials.

\(^{54}\) This pyramid which illustrates the key concepts in JI’s ideology is the result of RRG’s findings and analysis from their interactions with the JI members. RRG discovered that WB is the foundation of JI’s ideology and is always emphasized in the organization. From their interactions and discussions with the detainees, it was discovered that the Salafi understanding of WB is deeply entrenched in their belief system.
The pyramid illustrates that WB forms the basis of JI’s ideology. Several Islamic concepts can be found in the JI’s pyramid ideology. From here, one could notice that WB is the foundational concept which is used to explain other concepts further up the pyramid. If the foundation is destroyed, there is a big chance the other concepts will also collapse. According to JI’s understanding of WB, Muslims must befriend and care for Muslims only. One who loves non-Muslims is equal to loving what is immoral. They believe that in the long run, non-Muslims have to be subjugated. Using WB as the foundation, JI members have to go through an array of methods or processes before their objective is met. To achieve their desired goal which is the islamization of the region, JI creates a jamaah (group) which is a community of believers that act as a vanguard. They stressed the need for individual Muslim to be in the jamaah. This according to them is a necessary precursor to the establishment of daulah Islamiyah (Islamic State). Each of the JI members needs to take the bai’ah (pledge or oath of allegiance) from JI leaders as a way to portray their loyalty to the leader, group and its doctrines. With this pledge, JI members become obligated to listen and obey to the best of their ability in matters which does not constitute a sin to God, to the amir as the leader of the group and other appointed leaders. When these conditions are not satisfied, the person concern becomes disqualified from being a member and is seen as having committed a sin by dishonouring his bai’ah. Then, they aim towards targeting the Muslim ummah (community), to seek support and garner sympathisers to their cause. The milestones towards the establishment of the Islamic state will not be completed without jihad (struggle in the way of God), the final stage where Prophet Muhammad were reported to have gone through in calling people to the fold of Islam. JI apply a constricted understanding of jihad, which they believe jihad musallah (armed jihad) is seen as inevitable and the only means to reach their objective, thus promoting an ideology of violence. Through these methods, JI aims to establish the daulah Islamiyah, an utopian state where Islamic laws are being implemented.

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55 The term jihad musallah or armed jihad is exclusively coined by JI to refer to armed aggression against the infidels or enemies of Islam. This term is only found in the PUPJI.


As a non-Salafi Muslim and the fact that WB is not exclusively taught in the Islamic institutions which I attended, this concept seems relatively new to me and most members of the Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG) who counsels the JI detainees. In reality, the concept of WB is relatively unknown outside the Salafi world. It is also believed that the concept is not a component of the subject of tawhid taught in many Islamic schools and institutions around the world with the exception of Salafi-oriented schools. It can be argued that Muslims like JI members and other modern Salafis understand WB in a distinct and exclusive manner pose a great challenge to the prospect of Muslim and non-Muslim relationship and interaction. In addition, it can be also argued that accepting the modern Salafi meaning and position of WB could have profound implications in today’s socio-political reality. This is so, especially as the world continues to witness a unidirectional move of Muslims from Muslim majority countries to countries where Muslims form a minority for political or economic reasons. In these realities, practicing WB as described in modern Salafism would be inconvenient for the Muslims to say the very least. At the very worst, it becomes the basis for Islamist movements such as Al-Qaeda and JI as seen from its ideology earlier, to incite hatred and legitimize violence against the disbelieving majority.


58 I do not consider myself a “Salafi” in the context of subscribing to the exclusive ideological trend of modern Salafis – particularly the strict adherence to their understanding of Islamic practices as enjoined by the Prophet and his companions. It can be seen that this particular inclination of modern Salafis is somewhat differentiate them from the “non-Salafi” Muslims. In the modern context, the term “Salafi” and “Salafism” are very ambiguous and complex. It is not clear among many scholars, individuals and even Salafis themselves as to who is a “Salafi” or elegible to be one. The ambiguous and complex nature of the term “Salafi” can be seen when non-Salafi Muslims also claim to be Salafis in the sense that they also follow the teachings and footsetps of the salaf al-salih. See Chapter One (Part One) for more discussion on this issue and a detailed explanation on the meaning and modern usage of the terms “Salafi” and “Salafism”.

59 I attended Madrasah Aljunied Al-Islamiah (Aljunied Islamic School), founded in 1927 which is considered the most prestigious Islamic institution in Singapore, as a full-time student (1990-1995), and obtained my Bachelors of Arts in Islamic Jurisprudence (Shariah Islamiah) from Al-Azhar University, Cairo, Egypt in 2001.

From the religious perspective, WB is important as it regulates the desired Muslim and non-Muslim relationship. It is a sacred, divine code of conduct which Islam has enjoined its followers to adhere. The concept, in its original conception requires a deep and insightful contextual knowledge as a basis of understanding its meaning and illusion. There has been very little analysis of the modern-day interpretation of WB even within the Muslim scholars and community. This is a critical topic that encompasses issues of religious and political alliances, providing support to one’s allies and enemies, innocence from accountability for the actions of others, and association and disassociation with specific peoples and deeds.

The significance of this study lies in the fact that comprehending modern Salafis’ conception of WB, its realities and complexities has become an urgent priority in the lives of Muslims today. As mentioned earlier, this understanding becomes critical as Muslims increasingly live as minority communities across the globe. As a divine code of conduct that prescribes the desired relationship between Muslim and non-Muslims, the consequences of applying the modern Salafi concepts of WB are serious – WB generally promotes a way of life that is insular and hostile towards non-Muslims and this, it might be argued, is at variance with more tolerant, inclusive nature of Islam.

It is necessary to mention that Islamic rulings and issues concerning Muslim and non-Muslim relationship as embedded in the modern Salafi concept of WB is not something new. Muslim jurists and scholars in the past have dealt with it extensively. However, there are still many questions that need urgent answers. Many Muslims today are living in new environments where the proper application of WB is of utmost importance. Increasingly, Muslims are living as minority communities in non-Muslim countries or communities. Muslim countries and governments also face new challenges and problems in a new international environment which were non-existent in the Islamic golden period. The world today interacts through a web of international regulations and organizations leaving little room for isolation. The current world we are living in saw the urgent need to secure peace and uphold justice for all individuals regardless of faith and language. All these factors and others impose a need for a clear and broader understanding of Islamic law concerning Muslim and non-Muslim relationship and, in particular the concept of WB.
As mentioned earlier, it could be argued that WB as portrayed in modern Salafism is at odd with the Islamic values of maintaining peace, respecting humanity and developing a tolerant and harmonious society. The claim made by modern Salafis that WB is a requirement of *tawhid* and abandonment of the concept by Muslims would nullify their faith is a serious one and highly questionable. Arguably, if this is the case, how do modern Salafis explain that non-Salafi Muslims and the majority Muslim do not know about the concept and they are not taught about it in the *tawhid* lessons?\(^6\)

Today, the concept of WB is seen as the driving force behind the separation of Salafi proponents and non-Salafis into two non-interacting, antagonistic spheres. If we look up Google search on the internet, this is the represented meaning in almost all the hits. In one website, it says, “The reason why Al-Wala’ wal Bara is so important in Islam is because, if it is taken into practice, it can remove all the characteristics of jahiliyyah (state of ignorance) from the Muslim ummah, it guarantees the preservation of the Ummah, and it distinguishes the believer from the disbeliever”.\(^6\) Notably, most of them refer to the Saudi scholar Muhammad Saeed Al-Qahtani’s famous book *Al-Wala’ wal Bara’ According to the Belief of the Salaf*. Such a statement is believed to attract Muslims to learn and accept Salafis conception of WB. Moreover, it shows that Salafis position on the concept is more vocal and visible on the internet, written publications and actions.

Modern Salafi concept of WB has gained popularity in contemporary times due to several reasons. First, in a very simplistic manner, the concept appears to provide solutions to the dilemmas of Muslims living in what is often perceived as hostile environments to the practice and progress of their religion. Second, an aggressive promotion of the concept on the internet means that an increasing number of Muslims is beginning to be aware of the concept-albeit a single meaning of the term. Third, the number of Muslims who understand Arabic, the language of the Quran and Quranic exegesis is small, leaving them vulnerable to the understanding and interpretation of the few. Those who are particularly taken in by the concept appear to be the internet –savvy

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\(^6\) In the traditional Islamic teaching, the subject of *tawhid* encompasses three major areas namely *Ilahiyyat* (issues related to God and His Attributes), *Nubuwwat* (issues related to Prophethood) and *Sam’iyyat or Ghawiyyat* (matters related to the unseen). These areas are the traditional tripartite in the subject of *Ilm al-Tawhid* (the study of monotheism) or also known as *Ilm al-Kalam* (literally: the study of words or speeches). The topic of WB does not come under any of these three areas.

Muslim youths, who proved to be the most vulnerable, given their shallow understanding of Islamic teachings and an overzealous drive to become instant better Muslims.

In this globalised world, many Muslims feel that their key beliefs are challenged and their identity is threatened. As a result, Muslims are searching for signposts and guidelines to practice Islam in a world seemingly at odds with Islamic principles. Modern Salafis claim that WB offers solutions to dilemmas faced by Muslims today by providing a simplistic demarcation of the realm of belief and disbelief. They assert that by adhering strictly to the believers and rejecting everything of the disbelievers, Muslim individuals can lead pure, Islamic way of life. Salafis do not form the majority of today’s Muslim world community, but is their ideology particularly WB gaining ground and popularity among the layperson? If so, what are the reasons for this?

Due to the factors mentioned above, there is a need to study and critically analyse, not only the concept in modern Salafism, but more importantly the diverse interpretation and understanding of it within the various modern Salafi currents. Are they all isolationist and rejectionist in nature? This study on WB in modern Salafism proves that within the Salafi ranks, there is no standardized adherence to a predictable, consistent set of belief. Though similar in their admiration of the pious predecessors and agreement that the adherence to their way of life and practice will revive back the “authentic” form of Islam, the various currents of modern Salafism differ in their treatment of the sources of Islamic knowledge and their responses to the conditions that are unique to their time.  

Similarly, this is also true of the concept of WB. Though all Salafis acknowledge the importance of WB, they might differ in the methods and degree of applying the concept in their day-to-day life depending on how they interpret religious texts and view social and political issues.

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**Objectives of Study**

This study generally attempts to establish the position of the WB concept in modern Salafism. It proposes that WB plays a central role in the daily lives of modern Salafis in the religious, social and political spheres. The rationale of engaging on this study lies upon the need to track the emergence, understanding and complexities of the concept in modern Salafism. The study departs from one important hypothesis that studying the concept of WB is important in the efforts to understand the social, religious and political dynamics of modern Salafism.

The central concern and focus throughout this research project is to investigate the dynamics and complexities of the concept of WB within modern Salafism. Importantly, the research aims to understand the diverse interpretation of the concept in modern Salafism; and how modern Salafis understand and apply the concept in contemporary religious, social and political settings. Although the main concern of modern Salafi discourse is *aqidah* rather than law (*fiqh*)\(^64\), this research discovers that the complexities, diversities and disputes surrounding the concept in modern Salafism, in many a times revolve around issues of social, politics and current realities. This can be seen in the way the different Salafi currents perceive and provide rulings on issues such as political obedience to Muslim rulers, ruling with other than the *shariah* and assisting non-Muslim against Muslims in time of war and conflict, and how these issues are related to the concept of WB.

The objectives of this study could be summarized as follows:

1. To develop a greater understanding of the importance and validity of WB in modern Salafism. This includes looking at the definition of the concept in modern Salafism, identifying its emergence, development and its various dimensions.

2. To explore the realities, complexities and various interpretations of the concept among the various Salafi currents.

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3. To identify the main proponents and writers of the concept among modern Salafis and assess the main literature on the subject. By identifying the main work written on WB, the extent of influence of the concept in modern Salafism, and diverse methods of presenting the concept would subsequently be determined.

4. To develop a framework that would assist in understanding the phenomenon of modern Salafism. The study departs from the premise that understanding the concept of WB in modern Salafism is one of the feasible ways to comprehend the dynamics and complexities of modern Salafism. The framework that this research develops uses the categorization of modern Salafis into purists, políticos and Jihadis; and the dimensions of WB (aqidah, social, political and Jihadi) to understand the diversity in modern Salafis understanding of the concept. Such a framework is believed to be useful in analysing other religious doctrines that exist in modern Salafism.

5. To make a novel contribution in the field of the study of modern Salafism. The study hopes to fill the gap and absence of intellectual analysis of the concept in modern Salafism. It is hoped to improve the understanding of modern Salafism and benefit students, academicians, scholars, government and security agents dealing with modern Salafi beliefs and ideas.

With regard to research contribution, it is hoped that this study would intellectually improve our understanding of WB in modern Salafism and benefit those interested in the study of modern Salafism.65 Uniquely, in this research I was investigating a practically new area of social research concerning the beliefs, values and attitudes of the different strands of modern Salafis in the current Muslim society in relation to religion, social and politics. It is my belief that the findings of this research may widen the scope of understanding and offer new or alternative interpretations especially to the community of academicians, researchers and even to the government and security agencies dealing with the ideology of modern Salafism.

65 This particular categorization of modern Salafis is taken from Wiktorowicz, Quintan, “Anatomy of the Salafi Movement” pp. 207-239. The categorization of modern Salafis into three distinct groups as mentioned by Wictorowicz is also observed by other scholars and observers. See Chapter One (Part One) for more discussion on groups and categorisations of modern Salafis.

66 More on the implications and contributions of this study will be explained in the Conclusion Chapter of this thesis.
As a person who enjoys a background of Arabic and religious education, and is trained in the field of Islamist and extremist ideology research\textsuperscript{67}, it gives me the advantage of knowing and understanding the ideology, language and context of modern Salafism very well. In addition, the opportunity and “hands-on” experience to meet, interview and counsel the detained JI members in Singapore, Salafi Muslims and conducted field research in Indonesia\textsuperscript{68}, Saudi Arabia\textsuperscript{69}, Egypt\textsuperscript{70}, Yemen\textsuperscript{71}, Pakistan\textsuperscript{72} and Iraq\textsuperscript{73} among others; and also the opportunity to meet and discuss with religious clerics, scholars, academics and security personnel, have helped me significantly to understand the world of modern Salafism and to conduct this research. My particular background has granted me easy access to the primary sources and understanding the language of these sources.

\textsuperscript{67} Since November 2004, I have been an Associate Research Fellow at the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR) at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) of the Nanyang Technological University (NTU) in Singapore. My research interests include contemporary religious extremism and de-radicalization of Islamist militants.

\textsuperscript{68} Between 2005-2006, I travelled extensively to Indonesia (Jakarta, Pekanbaru and Dumai in Sumatera, Makassar, Poso and Tentena in Sulawesi, Bali and others parts of the country) to interview former JI members and Salafi-oriented Islamists.

\textsuperscript{69} I have travelled to Saudi Arabia numerous times for research, visit and pilgrimage. In February 2010, on the invitation of the Ministry of Interior of Saudi Arabia, I visited Mohammed Ibn Naif Centre for Counselling and Care which is the Saudi rehabilitation centre for violent extremists; Naif Arab University of Security Sciences and Imam Muhammad Ibn Saud University. During the visit, I had discussion with several ulema (Muslims religious scholars) and government officials on issues of Salafism and religious extremism. For a report on the visit see \url{www.pvtr.org/pdf/Report/RSIS_SaudiReport_2010.pdf} (accessed 12 March 2012).

\textsuperscript{70} As stated earlier, I studied in Al-Azhar University, Cairo from 1997-2001. In 2007 and 2008, I visited Cairo for field research. In Cairo, I interviewed several Salafis and Islamists including Montasser Al-Zayat who is said to have link with the Islamist groups responsible for the assassination of Anwar Sadat in 1981, academicians and religious scholars including the late Grand Sheikh of Al-Azhar, Dr Sayyid Muhammad Tantawi.

\textsuperscript{71} In July 2010, I visited Yemen on the invitation of Yemen’s Ministry of Endowment and Guidance to conduct a research on radicalisation, de-radicalization and Salafism. In Yemen, I interviewed Minister of Endowment and Guidance, Judge Hammoud Al-Hittar, several Salafi clerics and government officials. For report of this visit see \url{www.pvtr.org/pdf/Report/RSIS_ICPVTR_Yemen_2011.pdf} (accessed 29 March 2012).

\textsuperscript{72} In January 2005, I conducted a field research in Pakistan to conduct a study on Salafi-oriented religious schools (madaris). I visited eight schools in total which are Jamia Montazar, Jamia Naemiah and Jamia Asirafia in Lahore, Jamia Darul Khair, Al-Jamia As-Sattariah Al-Islamiah and Jamiat Al-Uloom Al-Islamiyah in Karachi, Jamiat Muhammediyah in Islamabad and Jamia Darul Uloom Haqania in Peshawar. The full report of this visit is in my possession and is also available at ICPVTR.

in their original languages, as well as Islamism and particularly the belief and ideological trends of Salafi Muslims.

Scope and Limitations of Study

Modern Salafism can be seen as a complex and heterogeneous religious phenomenon in contemporary Islamic thought. As the title of the thesis suggests, this research is about exploring WB in the ideology of modern Salafism. Hence, it focuses on the concept exclusively, albeit there are other religious concepts such as *hijrah*, *takfir*, *jihad* and *tahkim bi al-shariah* (ruling according to Islamic law) which are connected to and have a significant relevance to WB in modern Salafism. These concepts which could probably be a research topic by itself are not discussed in great depth apart from their relevance to the modern Salafi concept of WB.

Similarly, the concept of WB in modern Salafism is a vast, dynamic and complex one. This research does not attempt to cover all issues surrounding the concept in modern Salafism. As stated earlier, the general focus of this research is to explore the centrality, breadth and complexities of the concept. In terms of the research central argument, it argues that WB in modern Salafism is not static but dynamic and modern Salafis from different backgrounds or “schools” would present the concept differently. In addition, only specific issues are discussed in the research, while specific examples of the religious, social, political and Jihadi role of WB are selected and discussed as a proof to show the validity of the research argument. Importantly, the research argues that WB in modern Salafism does not only exist in a religious vacuum, but is also shaped by the current social, local and political circumstances.

It also needs to be mentioned here that this research does not study all the books on WB written by modern Salafi thinkers. I have identified more than forty books on WB written by modern Salafis (see Appendix A). Due to the focus and the central argument that this research attempts to put forth, only selected books on WB by modern Salafi thinkers are selected, studied and analyzed. These books are selected due to their importance and significance which will be explained in the next section of this chapter. When analyzing the books on WB by modern Salafi thinkers (Chapter Five), it needs to be emphasized that the conclusion made (i.e. a particular Salafi orientation has an effect on the style of writing and presentation of the concept by modern Salafis) is not
This is primarily due to the analysis which is conducted based on selected books and also the complex nature of the concept in modern Salafism itself. As for Internet references, there are many websites (both in English and Arabic) that discuss and deals with the Salafi concept of WB. This research only refers to selected Salafi websites to grasp the meaning and different roles of WB presented by modern Salafis.

Sources of Research and Methodology

The sources for this research are mainly divided into two categories: primary and secondary. The primary sources mainly comprise books written by modern Salafi thinkers on the subject of WB. It also includes articles, interviews and statements, audio and video lectures on WB by modern Salafis which are mostly obtained from the internet. Obviously, these primary sources are vital to understand modern Salafi concept and comprehension of WB. Hence, uncovering and analyzing the works of modern Salafis allows us to appreciate a deeper understanding of the realities and complexities of WB in modern Salafism. In addition, studying and analyzing these works allows us to realize that the concept is not only being passionately discussed within modern Salafis, but has also resulted in extensive debate and dispute amongst them.

As stated earlier, this research mainly looks at the books written on the subject of WB by prominent modern Salafi figures as its primary sources. These Salafi thinkers come from different orientations and Salafi backgrounds. The books written by these Salafi thinkers which serve as primary sources for this research are listed as follows:

1. *Al-Wala’ wal Bara’ fil al-Islam min Mafaahim ‘Aqidah al-Salaf* (Loyalty and Disavowal in Islam from the Belief of the Pious Predecessors) by Muhammad Saeed bin Salim Al-Qahtani. Al-Qahtani’s book on WB is considered the most famous book written on the subject. The book is widely available and has been translated into many languages. As stated earlier, Al-Qahtani is also believed to be one of the first, if not the first modern Salafi scholar to write on the topic of WB. The reasons this book is chosen for this research are twofold: (1) it is a

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74 See end of Chapter Five for more explanation on this notion.
75 See Appendix B for some of these websites.
well-known book on the subject; (2) it is the most comprehensive book ever written by modern Salafi scholars on the subject of WB.

2. *Al-Wala’ wal Bara’: Aqidah Manqulah wa Waqi’ Mafqud* (Loyalty and Disavowal: An Inherited Doctrine and a Lost Reality) by Ayman Mohammed Rabie’ Al-Zawahiri (b. 1951). Al-Zawahiri wrote this book in 2002 several months after the incident of September 11, 2001. As the second in command in the Al-Qaeda organization during that period, Al-Zawahiri asserts a great influence within the Jihadi Salafi community. This book written by Al-Zawahiri could be seen as providing legitimacy for his violent attacks against the West especially the United States which resulted from his deep sense of hatred and enmity to them. Al-Zawahiri’s book is chosen for this research due to the uniqueness of Al-Zawahiri presenting the concept in a more *jihadi* and violent-oriented slant.

3. *Al-Wala’ wal Bara’ fi al-Islam* (Loyalty and Disavowal in Islam) by Salih Ibn Fawzan Ibn Abdullah Al-Fawzan (b. 1933). Al-Fawzan is considered one of the famous and influential purist Salafi scholars in Saudi Arabia. I chose this book for the specific purpose of understanding the religious and social aspect of WB which is most emphasized in the ideology of purist Salafis.

4. *Al-Wala’ wal bara’* (Loyalty and Disavowal) by Abdul Rahman Abdul Khaliq Al-Yusuf (b. 1939). A famous Kuwaiti Salafi from the politico background, Abdul Rahman wrote his book in 1985. His book on WB helps this research to understand the inclination and approach of politico Salafis who tend to be more

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79 Abdul Rahman’s book on WB is published by Al-Dar Al-Salafiyyah, circa 1985 and is available at [http://www.al-eman.com%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D8%AA%D8%A8/](http://www.al-eman.com%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D8%AA%D8%A8/) (accessed 31 July 2012).
critical of other Salafi strands; and who are naturally more academic and scientific in presenting religious rulings and issues.

5. *Millat Ibrahim wa da’wah al-Anbiya’ wa al-Mursalin wa asaalib al-Tughah fi tamyi’iha wa sarfi al-du’aati ‘anha* (The Religion of Abraham and The calling of The Prophets and Messengers and the Methods of Transgressing Rulers in Dissolving it and Turning the Callers Away From it)\(^{80}\) by Abu Muhammad Asim Al-Maqdisi. In the current time, Al-Maqdisi is very famous in particular for his unique political treatment of WB. Considered as one of the most important Jihadi Salafi ideologue, Al-Maqdisi has transformed WB from a piety Islamic doctrine to one that necessitates Muslims to overthrow the Muslim rulers and regimes. His political interpretation and radical understanding of the concept has influenced many Jihadi Salafis and like-minded individuals especially through his online library and personal website. It is also interesting to note that apart from his book *Millat Ibrahim*; most of Al-Maqdisi’s books and writing revolve around the same concept of WB.\(^{81}\)

6. *Al-Wala’ wal Bara’ in Surah Al-Mumtahinah* (Loyalty and Disavowal in the Chapter of *Al-Mumtahinah*) by Wasim Fathullah (b. unknown).\(^{82}\) Unlike, the books on WB mentioned above, this book by Wasim Fathullah is very unique in the sense that it provides a comprehensive discussion on the importance of the sixtieth chapter of the Quran, *Surah Al-Mumtahanah* and the historical events of its verses which have an impact on the way modern Salafi understand and treat the concept of WB.

Due to the significance of the concept in modern Salafism and for the benefit of non-Arabic readers, all the books mentioned above have been translated to the English

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\(^{81}\) See for example Al-Maqdisi’s book *Dimuqratiyyah Diinun* (Democracy is Religion), and *Al-Kawashif Al-Jaliyyah fi Kaft Ad-Dawlah Al-Sa’udiyyah* (Clear Evidence on the Apostasy of the Saudi State). Both books along with all other books written by Al-Maqdisi are published online and are available at [http://www.tawhed.ws/t](http://www.tawhed.ws/t) (accessed 01 August 2012).

language with the exception of Abdul Rahman which I personally have not come across. Some like Al-Qahtani’s book have been translated to English, Indonesian, Malay, Chinese and German. In addition, all the books and their English translation are widely available on the internet and can be easily downloaded for free.

Apart from the writings on WB by modern Salafi scholars, this research also briefly looks at some of the books written on issues surrounding the concept of WB by Salafi scholars of the past. This is especially necessary when we need to reflect how WB is manifested in the early days of Wahhabism (Chapter Three). As mentioned earlier, two books revolving the issues of WB written by early Wahhabi scholars will be referred to in this research which are Al-Dalalil fi Hukm Muwalat Ahl al-Ishrak by Sulayman ibn Abdallah and Sabil al-Najat wal Fikak min Muwalat al-Murtaddin wa Ahl al-Ishrak by Hammad Ibn Atiq.

Obviously, modern Salafi scholars and thinkers who have written on the subject of WB are not only restricted to those mentioned above. Besides these Salafis, there are many others who have also authored the subject in the form of book or at least in the form of articles and statements. For example, Abu Muhammad Al-Mas’ari, a Saudi Salafi who gained asylum in the United Kingdom in 1994 wrote a 236-page book on WB entitled “Al-Muwaalah wa Al-Mu’aadah” (Loyalty and Enmity) which was published in 2004 (third edition) by Tanzim At-Tajdid Al-Islami (Islamic Reform Organization) based in the United Kingdom. Another Salafi scholar, Mahmas bin Abdullah Al-Jal’ud also wrote the book with the same title Al-Muwaalah wa Al-Mu’aadah which was published in 1987. The books on WB mentioned earlier have been specifically chosen for this research because they constitute the most famous books written on the subject and by no ordinary Salafi figures. Apart from the comprehensiveness of some of these books like those written by Al-Qahtani and Al-Maqdisi, it is also due to the uniqueness of these writers and thinkers who are believed to have come from different modern Salafi background.

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While the books by modern Salafi scholars are important for this research, the research also depends on interviews, statements and lectures of modern Salafis who have addressed the issue of WB; as its primary sources. In particular, the research observes how this concept is addressed by the purist, politico and Jihadi Salafis. As mentioned earlier, these statements and lectures which also appear in the form of videos are mostly obtained from the internet. For example, the research refers to Ibn Baz and Al-Maqdisi’s official and personal website at www.ibnbaz.org (accessed 15 April 2011) and www.tawhed.ws (accessed 23 May 2011) respectively to grasp the purists and Jihadi Salafis definition and understanding of WB. In addition, as one of its primary sources, the research looks at the writings and lectures of non-Arabic speaking Salafis living in the West who have addressed the subject of WB. For example, the Jamaican Abdullah Faisal (b. 1963) and Abu Waleed (b. 1980) from the SalafiMedia organization, both from the UK are among those who are very vocal on the concept of WB.

Apart from writings and lectures on WB by modern Salafis, the research also briefly refer to the works of classical and medieval Muslim scholars especially in the field of *tafsir* (Quranic interpretation or exegesis) and *hadith*. For example the research refers to the exegesis of the famous Al-Qurtubi (d. 1273), Al-Tabari (d. 923) and Ibn Kathir (d. 1373) to understand the interpretation and historical context of the Quranic verses on WB which modern Salafis base on. As the so-called authority on the science of *tafsir*, their works will be consulted when we discuss modern Salafis use of Quranic verses for the validity of WB in Chapter Two. The Quranic exegesis of Al-Qurtubi and Al-Tabari are chosen as they are among the most famous classical *tafsir*, whereas Ibn Kathir is chosen as he is one of the most popular and mostly referred exegetes among

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modern Salafis. Importantly, this research also refers to the works of Muslim scholars and thinkers such as Taqi Ad-Din Ibn Taimiyah and Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab whose works have significantly shaped the ideology of modern Salafism.

As for the secondary sources, the research looks at the writings of scholars and academics who have produced works on modern Salafism and the concept of WB. There has been a great interest in the research on Salafism in recent years, especially since the incident of September 11, 2001. As Roel Meijer argues in his book Global Salafism, ‘much of the research on Salafism has been through the prism of “security studies” or books that play on the popular view that equates Salafism with violence’²⁹². Not much research has been done on the ideology of modern Salafism, let alone the concept of WB. What seems to be the interest and focus of these writings are the ideology of Jihadi Salafism rather than the ideology of modern Salafism itself.

Likewise, not much has been studied on the concept of WB. With the exception of Joas Wagemakers who extensively studies the concept in the ideology of Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi³⁹³, this concept is can be seen as understudied. Many writers would briefly touch and explain WB in their writings on the Salafi and Jihadi ideology.³⁹⁴ A comprehensive and critical study of the concept has yet to be done and this research is hoped to fill that vacuum. As stated earlier, this research is hoped to make a novel contribution in the field of modern Islamic thought especially in the subject of modern Salafi ideology.

As for the methodology, this study is a library-based research and the material studied here are mainly books, articles and materials obtained from the internet. I have also used some of the findings from interviews and field research. In this research, I attempt to discover and analyse the meanings and understanding of WB as specifically stipulated in the books and writings of modern Salafi scholars who have written and lectured on the subject. For the opinions of every individual Salafi or group on the concept, I have mainly relied on original sources by observing and analysing their writings, statements and also lectures.

As mentioned earlier, to analyse the writings of WB by modern Salafis (in Chapter Five), I have decided to use the framework developed by Quintan Wiktorowicz who divided modern Salafis into three distinct groups based on their different ideological trends and contextual interpretation i.e. purists, politicos and jihadis. I feel that this particular categorization or framework is useful for this research especially in the attempt to comprehend the diversity and complexities of both modern Salafism and the concept of WB. This is so as this categorization is mainly based on Salafis contextual interpretation especially on issues of contemporary politics which is believed to divide modern Salafis.

The Chapters

In this introduction, I have mapped the general and fundamental understanding of the concept of WB in modern Salafism. I have also attempted to highlight the significance and objectives of this research. Broadly, the research is divided into two parts. Part One (Chapters One and Two) provides an introduction to modern Salafism and the concept of WB in modern Salafism. This introductory part is important as it sets the scene before we discuss the realities, practicalities and complexities of the concept in modern Salafism in Part Two (Chapters Three, Four and Five) of the research. Part Two firstly looks at WB in Wahhabism. This is followed by observing the different positions modern Salafis had on WB and finally analyses the works of selected modern Salafis on the concept. Among the important questions that Part Two attempts to address are: how is the concept of WB originates in modern Salafism? How is it developed and

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95 These are my interviews with former JI members in Singapore and other Muslim extremists interviewed during field research in Indonesia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Iraq.
transformed since the time of its inception? What are the different positions and opinions modern Salafis had on the concept? How do the different currents in modern Salafism differ in the understanding of WB? Why do they differ? How do the different dimensions of WB affect modern Salafis’ understanding of the concept? And what are the main issues related to WB that have become a point of debates and disputes among modern Salafis?

After the introduction, the study is divided into five chapters and a conclusion. Chapter One is divided into two parts. The first part provides an introduction to the world of Salafism particularly looking at the phenomenon of modern Salafism. It begins with a brief definition of Salafism, its history and attempt to reveal its realities and complexities in the modern world. It will also look at the various factions and groups of modern Salafi as observed by many academics and commentators. In addition, the chapter briefly looks at the ideology, characteristics and components of modern Salafism. Such an introduction on Salafism is seen as important before we begin with the discussion on the Salafi concept of WB.

The second part of the chapter provides an introduction to the concept of WB. It begins with its definition, significance and development in modern Salafism. In particular, it attempts to discover the main reasons why such a concept does not only exist, but constitutes a pillar in the Salafi ideology. This part of the chapter also reveals that the modern Salafi concept of WB has three main dimensions namely the creedal, social and political. In addition, it will also show that the development and transformation of the concept in modern Salafism has resulted in another dimension which is the Jihadi dimension. The introduction of the concept as laid out in this chapter will lead to the discussion on how modern Salafis derive the concept from religious texts, especially the Quran which will be discussed in Chapter Two.

Chapter Two aims to illustrate how the sixtieth chapter of the Quran known as Surah Al-Mumtahanah (Chapter of the Women Who is Examined) and the idea of Millat Ibrahim (The Religion of Abaham) play an important part in shaping the modern Salafi concept of WB. The chapter starts with the premise that understanding Surah Al-Mumtahanah and what it entails is important to understand WB in modern Salafism. In addition, the chapter attempts to look at how this surah (chapter) is connected to other Quranic verses of wala’ and bara’ to form the typical Salafi brand of WB. Importantly, this chapter
attempts to show how modern Salafis reading of the surah’s text and their interpretation of its context has transformed these particular Quranic injunctions, which seems to warn the early Muslims of the dangers of forming alliance with their hostile enemies into the foundation of a radical ideology. It will also highlight how the Jihadi Salafis interpret verses from this surah politically and combine it with the concept of takfir against Muslim rulers. The chapter begins with an introduction and a general understanding of Surah Al-Mumtahanah. In particular, it highlights the reason behind its revelations, historical context, common themes of the surah, and the idea of Millat Ibrahim and how all these have shaped modern Salafis understanding of the concept. The chapter then moves to speak about other Quranic verses that have also contributed to the shaping of modern Salafis’ concept of WB. The chapter concludes that understanding the theological aspects of WB and how it is formulated and conceptualized by modern Salafis is an important initial step towards a greater and enhanced understanding of the realities, complexities and diversities of the concept in modern Salafism.

Chapter Three looks at the concept of WB in Wahhabism. It aims to show that modern Salafis concept of WB has strong roots in Wahhabism. The chapter illustrates that both the religious and political aspects of the concept have long existed since the early days of Wahhabism. At the political dimension, the chapter highlights how the rivalry between the Saudis and Ottomans in the late eighteenth century and the Saudi civil war in the nineteenth century have impacted the development of WB in Wahhabi religious discourse. The chapter then proceeds to showcase the main factors that have contributed to the development of the concept in the modern Wahhabism (twentieth century and beyond). Three developments of the concept in modern Saudi Arabia will be presented in Chapter Three:

1. From the start of the Wahhabi movement in eigtheenth century until today, WB has been used by the Wahhabis to fight shirk and bid’ah in the religion.

2. Official Saudi Wahhabi scholars97 (those appointed by the regime and in accordance to the state ideology) in the twentieth century, while retaining the social aspect of bara’, which relates to personal relations between Muslims and non-Muslims represented in nourishing hatred and rejecting friendship, endorsed

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97 They are also known as the establishment ulema, or ulema al-sultah (regime’s scholars).
and legitimised political wala’ to the so-called infidels, exemplified by their total silence over Saudi foreign policy, foreign military bases in the country and other manifestations of Saudi alliances with the West.98

3. Saudi scholars who opposes the Saudi rulers and their establishment scholars, in particular its foreign policy and their actions of having wala’ to the West condemn the Saudi rulers under the pretext of WB.

Chapter Three also highlights that Wahhabi scholars who oppose the Saudi rulers due to their political behavior have used the Wahhabi teachings and heritage and further developed and radicalized some of its concepts which include WB. Using the same Wahhabi teachings and tradition that the state and its establishment scholars hold dear, these Salafis condemn their rulers while some of them even go to the extent of excommunicating the leaders and thereby legitimizing attacks against them. The last part of the chapter illustrates the influence and spread of the concept, especially its penetration in the curriculum of Saudi schools and its exportation beyond Saudi borders. It also briefly describes how the Saudi educational system, particularly the concept of WB and the teachings of “hatred to the others” have been internationally criticized post September 11. The chapter concludes that the concept which started in early Wahhabism as a tool to fight apostasy and innovations in Islam has developed into an important element used by both the Saudi establishment scholars and those who oppose the kingdom to support their religious inclination and political agenda.

Chapter Four aims to explore some of the salient debates within the modern Salafi fraternity (groups and individuals) on the concept of WB and/or issues that derive under the umbrella of this concept. It attempts to show that WB in modern Salafism resides on a wide spectrum which can range from what might be termed “very soft” to its most “extreme or uncompromising” form of the concept. For the purpose of this chapter, we attempt to look at four issues closely related to WB which are oftenly debated by modern Salafis:–

1. The issue of whether WB necessitates Muslims to hate the kuffar and kufr or they are only required to hate the kufr but not the kuffar.

2. The permissibility of ruling with other than what God has revealed or the *shari`ah* and Muslim rulers’ relations with non-Muslim countries.

3. The issue of aiding non-Muslims against the Muslims.

4. The act of accepting and giving gifts to the *kuffar* and celebrating their religious festivals.

Chapter Four concludes with the observation and argument that there is no single understanding of WB in modern Salafism. Different Salafi groups and individuals provide different legal frameworks when dealing with the concept. The main reason for such division and dispute surrounding the concept is believed to be the various Salafi backgrounds from which they emerge and their different ideological trends. It is argued that this different orientation in Salafism plays a critical role in understanding the reasons behind their disputes and agreement which will be proven in Chapter Five.

Chapter Five attempts to analyse the writings on WB by selected modern Salafi thinkers who belonged to the purist, politico and Jihadi categories of modern Salafis. They are the purist Salih Bin Fawzan Al-Fawzan, politico Abdul Rahman Abdul Khaliq and Jihadi Ayman Al-Zawahiri. This chapter argues that the different Salafi orientation and background from which these Salafis emerge has an effect on the way they present the concept. For example, purist Salafis would present WB in a more traditional, socially-oriented form of it while the Jihadis would present it as one that is very hostile to the non-Muslims and that the concept requires Muslims to kill the non-Muslims. The chapter also analyses the book of a fourth Salafi figure, Muhammad Saeed Al-Qahtani, whose writing on WB as the chapter argues, has all the elements of *aqidah*, social, political and *Jihadi*. Through this analysis, it is concluded that a particular Salafi orientation has an effect on the style of writing and presentation of the concept by modern Salafis. This reflects the position of WB in modern Salafism as being fluid and multi-dimensional.

The conclusion chapter first summarizes and draws together the research findings gained throughout the thesis, and then highlights the contributions that the research would be able to make. It then describes the implications and consequences of understanding and applying the modern Salafis version of WB. The chapter will then
highlight the views of the so-called mainstream Muslim scholars or non-Salafi Muslims on WB. Finally, it provides some recommendations for future projections of research.
CHAPTER ONE: MODERN SALAFISM AND THE ISLAMIC CONCEPT OF 

\textit{AL-WALA’ WAL BARA’}

Introduction

This chapter aims to examine: (1) the realities and dynamics of modern Salafism by observing its meaning, history, ideological themes, development and divisions; (2) the definition, centrality, validity and dimensions of WB in modern Salafism. Modern Salafis have always tried to anchor their message and claim of WB in Islamic tradition, especially in that of the early Muslims and \textit{salaf al-salih}. As the term suggests, the methodology of modern Salafis is based on Salafism, an Islamic ideology which is grounded on the tradition of Prophet Muhammad and early Muslims. It is not the purpose of this research to study the notion of Salafism, its tenets and ideology. However, in order to understand WB in modern Salafism, it is logical and in fact, imperative for us to discuss briefly on Salafism, especially modern Salafism in this chapter as WB and its sources of legitimacy are anchored firmly in its ideology.

The chapter is divided into two parts. The first part provides an introduction to the world of Salafism, particularly the phenomenon of modern Salafism. It begins with a brief definition of Salafism, its history and attempt to discuss its realities and complexities in the modern world. It also observes the various groups and categories of modern Salafis as observed by several academics and commentators. The chapter highlights that a specific framework will be developed to understand and analyse the concept of WB based on these categorization of modern Salafis. In addition, the chapter briefly looks at the ideology, characteristics and components of modern Salafism. This introduction on modern Salafism serves as a starting point before we begin with the discussion on the Salafi concept of WB.

The second part of the chapter introduces the concept of WB. It begins with its definition, significance and development in modern Salafism. In particular, it attempts to discover the main reasons why WB not only exists, but forms a pillar in the Salafi ideology. This part of the chapter also highlights that the modern Salafi concept of WB has several roles or dimensions i.e \textit{aqidah}, social, political and \textit{jihadi}. The introduction of the concept as laid out in this chapter will lead to the discussion on how modern
Salafis derive the concept from religious texts, especially the Quran which will be discussed in the next chapter.

**Part One: Introduction to Modern Salafism**

*Meaning of Salafism*

Salafism (Arabic: *Salafiyah*) derives from the Arabic term ‘*salaf*’. Essentially, the linguistic meaning of ‘*salaf*’ is that ‘which has passed’ (salafa). In the Arabic language, those who preceded us from our forefathers are considered our *salaf* (plural: *aslaf*). The Quran also uses the word ‘*salaf*’ in this sense. It says:

> And We made them a people of the past (*salafan*) and an example to later ages.  

In the Islamic context, the term *salaf* refers to early Muslims who were companions of Prophet Muhammad, those who followed them and the scholars of the first three generations of Muslims. These early Muslims known as *salaf al-salihi* enjoyed a special status among Muslims based on the Prophet’s saying, “*The best century of my people are those of my century, then the following, then the following.*” Logically, their close proximity to the period of the Prophet means that they were closer to the original teachings and are therefore less corrupt. The Prophet’s companions received direct teaching from the Prophet and witnessed both the revelation and the context, while the subsequent two generations received the teachings of Islam according to the interpretation of the Companions.

However, several definitions exist for the definition of the generation of *salaf al-salihi*. Some have restricted it to the generation of the Companions (*al-sahabah*), while others

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99 Quran 43:56.
100 Hadith narrated by Sahih Al-Bukhari, Book on Testimonies, no. 2652; Sahih Muslim, Book on Merits and Virtues, no. 2533; Sunan Al-Tirmizi, Book on Virtues of the Companions, no. 3859; Sunan Ibn Majah, Book on Judgements, no. 2362; and Ahmad, vol. 1, p. 434.
101 In his commentary of this hadith, Ibn Hajar Al-‘Asqalani (d. 850) in his famous *Fath al-Bari Sharh Sahih Al-Bukhari* stated that the first generation is that of the Prophet’s companions. He added that the last of the third generation of Muslims, whose narration was accepted live circa 120AH/738CE. This was the period where innovations in the religion spread far and wide. See Al-Asqalani, Ibn Hajar, *Fath Al-Bari Sharh Sahih Al-Bukhari: Tahqiq Muhammad Fouad Ab Al-Baqi*, Dar Al-Marifah, undated, vol. 7, p. 7 or see Ziyad Abu Raja’I, *Al-Khutriyyah fi Ashab al-Nabi* (Attributes of the Companions of the Prophet) available at [http://www.almenhaj.net/dispF.php?linkid=7387](http://www.almenhaj.net/dispF.php?linkid=7387) (accessed 08 August 2012).
have included the two generations of the Companions and their Successors (al-Tabi‘in). Some have broadened the definition to include the third generation called the ‘successors of the successors’ (atba’ al-tabi‘in). But as widely accepted, salaf al-salih includes the third generation as they are believed to greatly influence and impact the subsequent development of Islamic thought and practice in the modern era. This includes the period from the early life of Muhammad to the death of the last successor to the successors, roughly between 570-855CE.

*Salafiyyah* is known to be the *manhaj* or way of the Salafis. A Salafi is a practitioner of *salafiyyah*. Linguistically, the term *salafi* is an ascription to the *salaf*. A Salafi is one who ascribes himself/herself to the way and teachings of the *salaf*. From the linguistic standpoint, if someone says, for example “*ana Britani*” (I am British), it means he comes from Britain or ascribing himself to Britain. The letter ‘i’ at the end of the word (e.g. *Britani, Salafi*) shows that the person saying the word is associating himself to the word. In the Arabic grammatical methodology, the letter ‘i’ is the Arabic letter ‘ya’, and this letter ‘ya’ is specifically known as ‘*ya al-nisbah*’ or ‘*ya al-munasabah*’ (it means ‘*ya*’ of attribution or ascription) when used to ascribe someone to something else. Hence, when a person says “I am a Salafi”, he is saying that he ascribes himself to the *salaf* or the way/teachings of the *salaf*.

It is also worth noting that the term Salafi is both a label and self-designated term. This is unlike the term “Wahhabi” in which it is being rejected by its adherents who prefer to be called Salafis or *ahl sunnah wal jamaah*. The importance of labeling oneself a Salafi is explained in the words of the prominent Saudi scholar Salih Al-Fawzan who says:

> Ascribing oneself to the *Salaf* is an ascription which is necessary and required so that a differentiation can be made between the true Salafi and the one who hides behind them. Also so that the affair does not become confusing to those who want to guide themselves by them (the Salaf). So, when the heretical groups and astray partisanships that lead astray have increased, then the People of Truth announce and

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102 See Chapter Three of this thesis for an explanation of the meaning and usage of the term “Wahhabi”.

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declare their ascription to the Salaf with a view to free themselves from those who oppose them.\textsuperscript{103}

As a community who subscribe themselves to the salaf, the Salafis consider the period of the Prophet and subsequently his Companions to be the ‘golden age of Islam’.\textsuperscript{104} In the Salafis’ definition, this ‘golden age of Islam’ consisted of the time the Prophet ruled Medina and subsequently the period ruled by the four close companions of the Prophet who were known as the khulafa’ al-rashidun (Rightly-Guided Caliphs). They were Abu Bakar (d. 634), Umar (d. 644), Uthman (d. 656) and Ali (d. 661). Some consider Umar bin Abd al-Aziz (d. 720), the Umayyad Caliph as the fifth Rightly-Guided Caliph although he was not a Companion of the Prophet.\textsuperscript{105} Salafis highly idealize these periods of time and believe that Islam during those times was perfect and fully realized. Consequently, they assert that Muslims should reclaim the golden age of Islam by following and closely imitating the Islamic practices and codes of conduct that existed during that time.

In the modern context, the term Salafi is widely used to describe individuals and groups sharing their views. These include among others the Ahl al-hadith (literally: People of the Prophetic tradition)\textsuperscript{106}, the Saudi-based Wahhabis, and the India-based Deobandi’s school and the related schools in various parts of the Muslim world. More often, it is the Saudi-based school of thought that are referred to as Salafis, as they seek to purify Islam from the impurities of shirk and bid’ah. Although the objective of emulating the salaf al-salih remained a central theme, their approach is very much characterized by Muslim thinkers and reformers such as Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn Abdul Wahhab. To some, the term "neo-Salafis" is more appropriate in order to distinguish them from the early generations of Muslims (the salaf al-salih).

\textsuperscript{106} The Ahl al-hadith term is used to denote the conservative traditionalists, especially at the time of the Mu’tazilite or Ash’arite conflict during the Abbasid era. The term is also used to refer to many Islamic movements (both historical and modern) that emphasize the use of hadith in Islam. See Roy, Olivier, The Failure of Political Islam, by Olivier Roy, translated by Carol Volk, Harvard University Press, 1994, pp.118-9.
It is difficult to place the origin of the use of the term *salafiyyah* or Salafism. What is clear is that, from a historical point of view, the term *salafiyyah* has always been associated with the general attitude of Muslims who emphasize the importance of adhering to the first century Islamic religious and political authorities. Obviously, they were those who were believed to have consistently practiced the original messages of Islam as instructed by the Quran and best exemplified by the sayings and practices of the Prophet. In the *nahj al-salafiyyah* (methodology of Salafism), the practice of Islam and understanding of its tenets and principles by the first three generations of Muslims is considered orthodoxy i.e. one that is pure and unadulterated.

Many contemporary scholars and researchers have traced the historical emergence of Salafism to the thoughts of Ibn Taimiyyah. However, we believe that Salafism and Salafi ideas have existed long before the period of Ibn Taimiyyah. For example, in the eighth century, Salafi ideas could be seen in the theological and juridical school of the so-called *Ahl al-hadith*. Adherents of this school emphasized the use of *hadith*. They are not bound by the tradition of *taqlid* (imitation) and consider themselves free to obtain guidance directly from authentic hadith of the Prophet alongside the Quran. In contrast, their methodology differs from that of *ahl al-Ray'u* (People of Opinion) who were opened to any human opinions and interpretations. While we believe that Salafism is not a new phenomenon in Islam, we consider, however that the historical emergence of “modern Salafism” could be traced to the ideas of Ibn Taimiyyah.

**Modern Salafism**

“Modern Salafism” is here generally used to denote post-Ibn Taimiyyah Salafism. Although this signals that the term refers to the ideas and thinking of the Salafis since the thirteenth century, this research focuses primarily on modern Salafi ideas, particularly the concept of WB in twentieth and twenty-first century Salafism. Adherents of Salafism throughout this period are hence referred to in this research as “Modern Salafis”. They are seen as individuals who strive for the revival of historical

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legacy of Prophet Muhammad, his Companions and the early Muslim generations through materializing the authentic past in the current times and future. In matters of religious legitimacy and understanding, these Salafis always revert to Ahmad bin Hanbal (d. 855) a prominent Sunni theologian who is also the founder of the Hanbali school of fiqh (jurisprudence). He is known among the Salafis as imam ahl al-sunnah (Leader of the People of Prophetic Tradition). Besides Ibn Hanbal, Ibn Taimiyyah, his famous student Ibn al-Qayyim Al-Jawziyyah (d. 751) and Ibn Abd al-Wahhab were among the most important figures that have shaped the manhaj of modern Salafism.

It is worth noting here that the contemporary use of the term Salafism by academicians and observers refers to two dissimilar definitions or types. The first refers to denote the ideas or the school of thought that surfaced in late nineteenth century in Egypt and Damascus as a reaction to the prevailing spread of European ideas and sought to expose the roots of modernity within Muslim civilization. This type of Salafism is closely identified with modernist reformers such as Muhammad Abduh (d. 1905). Living in mid nineteenth century Egypt, Abduh witnessed a period when Western encroachments upon the Middle East were becoming more prevalent. He believed that this impacted the Muslim societies whose blind imitation of the Western ways resulted in moral decay and stagnation across many Muslim communities.109 Together with other reformers in his time, namely Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (d. 1354), Muhammad Rashid Rida (d. 1354), Muhammad al-Shawkani (d. 1250) and Jalal al-San’ani (d. 1225), they suggested that the solution lies in reviewing the original sources of the religion.110 This include, besides the Quran and Sunnah, adherence to the practices of the salaf al-salih. These early reformers however, did not advocate that the Muslims cut themselves off completely from the Western world. In fact, they favour the reformation of Islam via a reinterpretation of the early Islamic sources vis-à-vis modern methodologies, resources and way of life.

The second type of Salafism – quite different from the modernist form of Muhammad Abduh is one that is dominantly associated with Saudi Arabia and believed to have been established by Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. This type of Salafism is widely known

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as Wahhabism.\textsuperscript{111} It is a more traditional type of Salafism and adherents of this particular form of Salafism follow a rather literal, straight-forward and sometimes an uncompromising form of Islam. These Salafis look to Ibn Taymiyyah, not the nineteenth century figures of Muhammad Abduh, Al-Afghani and Rashid Rida.\textsuperscript{112} The present research of WB in modern Salafism refers to this particular type of Salafism and not the one associated with modern reformist such as Abduh.

\textit{The Salafi-Wahhabi Connection}

The study of modern Salafism will not be complete without looking into Wahhabism (a reference given to the teachings of Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab) and its relation with Salafism.\textsuperscript{113} In current academic discourse, the term “Salafi” and “Wahhabi” are sometimes used interchangeably, many are confused while others refer to them as one. Wahhabi is a label given to those who follow the teachings of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. The Wahhabis are always referred to as Salafis, and in fact they prefer to be called as such.\textsuperscript{114} As a rule, all Wahhabis are Salafis but not all Salafis are Wahhabis. Historically, the Wahhabis called themselves \textit{al-muwahhidun} (the monotheists) referring to those who follows the \textit{tawhid}. This is so as \textit{tawhid} became the central ideology of Wahhabism. The Salafis, including the Wahhabis sometimes call themselves \textit{ahl al-sunnah wa'l jamaah} literally means "the adherents to the Prophetic tradition and the assembly"\textsuperscript{115} though historically this name was used by other Muslims like Ash’aris and the Sufis.

\textsuperscript{111} See Chapter Three for more discussion on Wahhabism.
\textsuperscript{112} It is necessary to explain here that the possible reason for modernist Salafis such as Abduh, Afghani and Rida are called Salafis is due to their reform activities or their claim of returning to the salaf and the original teachings of Islam.
\textsuperscript{113} According to Khaled Abou El-Fadl, the term Salafism did not become associated with the Wahhabi creed until the 1970s. He argued that it was in the early twentieth century that the Wahhabis referred to themselves as Salafis. See Abou El-Fadl, \textit{The Great Theft, Wrestling Islam from the Extremists}, p. 75.
\textsuperscript{114} Followers of Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab reject the label Wahhabis upon themselves because the term Wahhabi denotes following the teachings of human being, which is in this case Ibn Abd Al-Wahhab rather than the teachings of God or Islam. More importantly, they reject to be labeled Wahhabis as they see it as being associated with God. This is because al-Wahhab (the Bestower) is one of the ninety-nine names and attributes of God. To them and in fact in Islam, associating anything to God is \textit{shirk}.
\textsuperscript{115} The name \textit{Ahl Sunnah wa'l Jamaah} is a reference to those Muslims who follow the way of the Prophet Muhammad and his Companions. These adherents are called the \textit{jamaah} (the assembly or group) because they have assembled together and have not become divided among themselves. They are the largest denomination of Islam. The word \textit{Sunni} is derived from the word \textit{Sunnah} which represents the Prophet Muhammad’s manner of conduct. Some argued that \textit{Sunni} refers to those who follow “the middle path”, a more neutral position than the perceivedly more extreme viewpoints of the Shites and the Kharijites.
Ideologically, Salafism is wider than Wahhabism. Salafi thought has existed for hundreds of years and has spread throughout the Muslim world and beyond. Wahhabism only existed from the mid eighteenth century. While it is true that Wahhabism is Salafism, it is only one of Salafism’s many orientations. Salafi and Wahhabi are not two sides of the same coin. There are Salafis who are not Wahhabis. There are Wahhabis who are not Saudis. Because of their inclination towards social activism and political reform, many social analysts and political observers group them under the label of “fundamentalist” and “political Islamist” but the differences between both groups are marked enough to prove that not all Salafis are Wahhabis, and that the Wahhabis and other Islamist groups such as the Ikhwan Al-Muslimin (Muslim Brotherhood) in Egypt, are different and distinct movements. One may disagree with their religious-political aspirations, however it is inappropriate to treat them in the same manner or classify them under a single category.

Modern Salafism: Realities and Complexities

It needs to be mentioned here that the use of the term Salafism in modern times is ambiguous and in many ways confusing. This ambiguity can be realised when many Salafis themselves are not entirely clear as to what Salafism entails, assuming that it is simply to follow the Quran and Sunnah – a problematic definition since it implies that others do not. Furthermore, due to the ambiguity of the term, Salafism in an actual broader sense is claimed by all Muslims, in that the universal Islamic ideal is to imitate the Prophet and the early Muslim community. This is because the very term Salafism connotes authenticity and legitimacy. In other words, every Muslim is a Salafi as they are obliged to follow the Prophet and his Companions in practising Islam. This is fundamentally the reason why non-Salafi Muslims today reject Salafis’ exclusive claim on the term arguing that other Muslims may also claim using the term or to be called as such since they are also followers of the salaf al-salih.

While Salafis themselves have failed to provide a universally-accepted meaning of the term “Salafism”, scholars and observers have also struggled with its definition. In fact, the pivotal question of who or what group qualifies as Salafi remains in dispute. In recent years and especially after the incident of 9/11, the study on Salafism has attracted

Much attention. Many individuals began to conduct research and write on modern Salafism. Some Western writers and even the media have failed to provide an accurate description and analysis of Salafism; while some writings on Salafism have been based on assumptions. It needs to be emphasized here that Salafism is not alien to Islam. It is not a deviation of the religion. Salafism is but one of the many manifestations of Islam like Sufism and Shi’ism.

Salafism as some have claimed is not a movement or an organization with a structural hierarchy; and does not operate under the leadership of a particular figure in a highly structured organization. Neither is Salafism a school of thought like Hanbalism, Hanafism, Shafi’ism and Malikism in the Sunni schools of fiqh. Contrary to those who claim that Salafis reject the four Sunni “schools of fiqh” (mazhab), many Salafis actually believe in the authority of all the imams of the mazhab, although some of them are not keen and do not encourage others to follow the teachings of a particular mazhab. In fact, most Salafis especially the Saudi Salafis (Wahhabs) are followers of the Hanbali mazhab. One could also find that Salafis in many occasions quote and mentions the imams of the mazhabs such as Imam Al-Shafie (d. 820) and Imam Malik (d. 755) in their writings. Salafis recognize these imams as the salaf. For example, scholars such as Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn Al Qayyim whose works are always referred to by modern Salafis, and who are widely accepted as having been major proponents of Salafism often quoted and endorsed many views of Abu Hanifah (d. 767).

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118 As Salafism is a methodology and not a mazhab, Salafis can emerge from the Maliki, the Shafi’i, the Hanbali, or the Hanafi schools of jurisprudence. Many Salafis accept the teachings of all the four mazhab if their rulings are supported by clear and authenticated evidences from the Quran and Sunnah. They are not divided on the question of adherence to the four established mazhab. For example, Ibn Taymiyyah followed the Hanbali school. Some of his students (such as Ibn Kathir (d. 1373) and al-Dzahabi (d. 1348)) followed the Shafie school. Other students, (such as Ibn Abi al-Izz (d. 1390)) followed the Hanafi school. Some Salafis assert that Muslims do not need to follow a specific mazhab but they are allowed to. By saying ‘do not need to’, Salafis mean that they (those who follow the mazhab) would not be committing a sin any way. However, if a Muslim is knowledgeable in Islamic law, he is at liberty to follow any mazhab and select the opinion that suits him best, but if he is not well-versed in Islamic law, nor aware of the opinions of the scholars, then he should seek proper guidance from the learned scholar. (Interview with a Salafi imam (anonymous), Cairo, Egypt, April 2007 and Shaikh Hassan Al-Shaikh, Sanaa, Yemen, July 2010).

119 The Hanbali school of thought is known to be the strictest and most conservative school in Islamic jurisprudence. The school is notable for its literalist, constructionist and inflexible approaches. This explains why the Saudis are very strict in their approaches and practices of Islam.
In this research, I denote “modern Salafism” as a religious inclination or tendency towards a set of ideas and identity. By identity, we mean a belief system (ideology), thoughts, values and meanings that reflect moral, social and political interests and commitments of the Salafis, and constitutes their ideology of how the world and its system should work. This belief system is based on a pure, undiluted teaching of the Quran, the sunnah of the Prophet and practices of the salaf al-salih. Indeed, it is not a new doctrinal phenomenon, but one that has its origins in theological and legal debates that far preceded our time. Its basic proposition is that legitimacy, whether in the religious, social, or political realms, must be explicitly derived from religious sources and early Islamic precedents.

As a belief system that is based on original sources of the religion, it could be seen that Salafism, in reality should be embraced by all Muslims. We believe that anyone would agree with their importance. What then is the fundamental difference between a Salafi Muslim and a non-Salafi Muslim? It is not a simple question that could produce straight-forward explanations due to the ambiguity of the term “Salafism” and the complex nature of the phenomenon. Nevertheless, this section of the research hopes to provide a general, fundamental and widely-accepted definition of Salafism, what it actually entails and who are the modern Salafis referred to in this research. However, in a general sense, the significant difference between a Salafi and non-Salafi is not about mere adherence to the Quran, Sunnah and the Salaf which form the fundamental and most important ideals about the Salafi ideology – but how these objectives are to be defined and how the program is to be carried out. In other words, the difference between the Salafis and non-Salafis is not about belief and following the Quran and Sunnah. It is about interpretations, understandings of religious texts, methodology and approach. As Wagemakers observes, ‘it is the strictness and methodology with which Salafis try to live up to the standard set by the salaf and their willingness to gear their teachings and beliefs towards that goal…that distinguishes them from other Sunni Muslims’. In addition, what makes it more difficult to define Salafism and determine who the Salafis

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120 The study of Salafism and Modern Salafism is a subject on its own. In this research, we will not elaborate and lengthen the discussion on Salafism, as the focus of the research is the concept of WB in modern Salafism and not Salafism per se. This section of the thesis only aims to provide readers with an introduction to the world of modern Salafism, and to highlight the Salafis who are referred to in this research.

are is the fact that they are not a single entity. There is no one Salafi as there is no single orientation of Salafism. Modern Salafism comes in various shapes and colours.

*Modern Salafism: Factions and Categories*

Modern Salafism is not homogenous. It consists of various sub-cultures and orientation - from moderate to extreme and from quietist to political activist to jihadis (or violent-oriented). There are various types of modern Salafi groups. While most Salafis are unanimous in matters of *aqidah*, they are divided mainly in issues of jurisprudence and politics. Some scholars have identified several schools of modern Salafism while others have determined their categories. For example, Tariq Abdel Haleem outlines eight groups of modern Salafis: 123

1. **Establishment Salafis** – They are the official scholars of Saudi Arabia appointed by the Saudi government to serve as official *ulema, mufti* (a Muslim legal expert who is empowered to give rulings on religious issues) and religious guides. In Saudi Arabia, these Salafis usually sit in the Board of Senior Ulama (*Hay’at kibar al-Ulama*) and the Permanent Committee for scientific Research and Legal Opinions (*al-Lajna al-Da’ima lil Buhuth al-Ilmiyya wa al-Ifta’*).

2. **Madkhali or Jami Salafis** – Salafis who follow the religious teachings of the Yemeni Shaikh Rabi Al-Madkhali (b. 1931) and the Ethiopian Shaikh Muhammad Aman Ibn Ali Jami (b. 1930). These Salafis are similar to the Establishment Salafis in terms of ideological inclination and their subservience to the government and endorsement of secular and democratic forms of government of the Arab regimes.

3. **Albani Salafis** – Followers of the Albanian scholar from Syria, Muhammad Nasir al-Din Al-Albani (d. 1999) who emerged as the prominent scholar of *hadith* in Saudi Arabia. Like the Establishment and Madkhali Salafis, Albani


123 See Tariq Abdelhaleem, *The Counterfeit Salafis. Deviation of the Counterfeit Salafis from the Methodology of Ahlul Sunnah Wal-Jama’ah*, pp.16-39 for more on these Salafi groups.
Salafis adopt the purist and non-political method of Salafism that prefer to focus on purification of the faith and education.

4. *Scientific or Academic Salafis* – These Salafis earn their name from the highly rational methods they employ to discuss and implement their version of Salafism. Very politicized in their approach, these Salafis include the famous Abdul Rahman Abdul Khaliq (b. 1939) from Kuwait, Abdul Razak Al-Shaygi (b. 1967), Dr Sajid Al-Mutairi (b. 1964) and Dr Hamid Bin Abdallah al-Ali (b. 1960).

5. *Ikhwan Salafis* (Muslim Brotherhood) – As the name suggests, this Salafi group is heavily influenced by the teachings and political methods of the Muslim Brotherhood organization (*Ikhwan al-Muslimin*) which originated from Egypt. The prominent figure from this group of Salafis is Muhammad Qutub (b. 1919), the brother of Sayyid Qutub (d. 1966).  

6. *Sururis* – Sururi Salafis are named after clerical inspiration, Muhammad Surur Bin Nayif Zain al-Abidin (b. 1938). Sururi Salafism is a hybridization of the political ideas of Sayyid Qutub and the religious views of the Wahhabis.

7. *Qutubis* – Qutubi Salafis are closely related to the Sururis. They follow the teachings of Sayyid Qutub. Followers of this group of Salafis may follow a Salafi methodology, but many other Salafis see little common ground between the Qutubis and themselves, often linking them to the thinking of Egyptian Ikhwans.

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124 It is important to note that while many observers do not regard the Ikhwans as Salafis, they are known as Salafis however, due to the hybridization of Wahhabi/Salafi ideas. Ikhwan Salafism emerged as a result of the hybridization of the political ideals of the Muslim Brotherhood and Saudi Wahhabism. For example, Muhammad Qutub (b. 1919) and many other Egyptian Ikhwans fled to Saudi Arabia in the late 1960s after the death of Sayyid Qutub. This generation of Ikhwan would resettle in the kingdom and influence many conservative Saudi Salafis. Many of them fill the ranks of lecturers and educators in Saudi universities and schools. As a result, these individuals in many ways hybridize with the Saudi Wahhabis leaving behind a mixed-up ideology known by some as “Salafism”.

125 In the Saudi Islamist scene of the late 1960s, the followers of Muhammad Surur (b. unknown) called themselves *Al-Salafiyyun* (the Salafis) while their opponents, especially those from the Muslim Brotherhood and the Albani-inspired neo Ahl Hadith refer to them as *Sururiiyyun* (the Sururis). See Stephane Lacroix, “Biographies of Salafi Thinkers and Leaders, *Muhammad Surur Zayn al-Abidin*” in Roel Meijer, *Global Salafism*, p. 435.
8. Global Jihadis – This group of Salafis propagate rebellion and violence against their adversaries. The well-known Al-Qaeda organization is a fine example of this Salafi group.

Quintan Wiktorowicz writes that Salafis are broadly divided into three groups: the purists, the politicos and Jihadis.\textsuperscript{126} The purists, he argues, focus on purification of the faith through education and propagation, while the politicos emphasize application of the Salafi creed to the political arena and lastly the Jihadis who take a more militant approach argue that the current context calls for violence and revolution.\textsuperscript{127} Similar to the categories laid down by Wiktorowicz, Omayma Abdel Latiff also believes that there are three main currents of Salafism today which are: (1) \textit{al-salafiyyah al-ilmiyyah}, or scholarly Salafism, which is concerned with the study of the holy text and Islamic jurisprudence; (2) \textit{al-salafiyyah al-harakiyyah}, or activist Salafism, which describes both politically active Salafist groups and those groups that are not politically active but occupy a place in the public sphere through their charity work and networks of social support and religious education institutes. This current, according to Abdel Latiff also includes \textit{al-salafiyyah al-islahiyyah}, or reformist Salafism; and finally (3) \textit{al-salafiyyah al-jihadiyyah},\textsuperscript{128} which concerns itself with implementing jihad.\textsuperscript{129}

Similarly, Samir Amghar observes that Salafism in Europe is also divided into three streams. The first is “revolutionary Salafism”; it places ‘jihad’ at the heart of religious beliefs. The second is “predicative Salafism”, which bases its actions on preaching and religious teachings. The last is “political Salafism”, which organises its activities around a political logic. Each one of these currents, Amghar argues entertains a specific relationship with European societies, with Muslim societies and with the means –

\textsuperscript{126} See Quintan Wiktorowicz, \textit{Anatomy of the Salafi Movement}, pp. 207–239.
\textsuperscript{127} Wiktorowicz argues that all three factions share a common creed but offer different explanations of the contemporary world and its concomitant problems and thus propose different solutions. The splits are about contextual analysis, not belief.
\textsuperscript{128} \textit{Al-Salafiyyah al-Jihadiyyah} is a term used in current political Islamic discourse referring to the ideology of Salafis who advocates violence against their adversaries in the name of Jihad. It is a term that grew in popularity in recent years, but as Hegghammer says its precise origins remain unclear. \textit{Al-Salafiyyah Al-Jihadiyyah} is also known as “Global Jihad” or “Global Salafi Jihad”. See Hegghammer, Thomas, “Jihad-Salafis or Revolutionaries?: On Religion and Politics in the Study of Militant Islamism”, p. 251 and Al-Rasheed, Madawi, “The Local and Global in Saudi Salafi-Jihadi Discourse”, p. 301 both articles in Roel Meijer, \textit{Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement}.
including jihad – of hastening the eventuality of the Islamic state. Bernard Haykel identifies three groups for the Salafis in terms of their political engagement: (1) “Salafi Jihadis” like those in the Al-Qaeda organization who call for violent action against its adversaries and the existing political leaders; (2) “Salafi Harakis” – who advocates non-violent political activism and (3) “Scholastic Salafis” (al-salafiyyah al-ilmiiyyah) who adopt a quietist approach and a more traditional outlook, arguing that all forms of overt political organisation and action, let alone violence are forbidden.

It is important to note that these groups and categories of modern Salafis are by no means scientific. Moreover, the modern Salafi groups and factions are not limited to these only, and could probably be more or less than those mentioned. In addition, interestingly, someone could also be a Salafi and adopt the Salafi methodology without being affiliated or ascribed to any of these groups. There are also those who adopt the Salafi way in certain matters but not in others. In other words, they are Salafis at certain times and non-Salafi at other times. While we accept these categories and recognize its usefulness in the present research, it is undoubtedly not a comprehensive breakdown. Due to the complexities of modern Salafism, these categories and groups are at times overlapping. Furthermore, many of the groups or labels mentioned above are considered derisive by those who fall into those categories, and therefore, are dismissed out of hand. The categories are, at best, fluid, dynamic and only rough.

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131 In Saudi Arabia these Salafis are known as the Sahwis (The Awakening Ones) and Sururis, but their presence is also felt in Yemen and Kuwait.
132 According to Haykel this group of Salafis include the official recognised scholars of Saudi Arabia, the Jamis and Madkhalis and are also identified with the teachings of Nasir al-Din al-Albani.
134 For example, while many may see Sa’id Hawwa (d. 1989), the famous Muslim writer and preacher from Syria as a Salafi, others do not consider him as one although he draws on some ideas prevalent in the Salafi ideology like anti Sh’ism. See Itzehak Weismann, Sa’id Hawwa: The Making of a Radical Muslim Thinker in Modern Syria, Middle Eastern Studies vol. 29, October 1993 pp. 601-23. Another example is Dr Yusuf Al-Qaradawi (b. 1926). While many do not consider Al-Qaradawi as a Salafi, some observers categorise him as a “Salafi reformist” (See Nafi, Basheer, “Fatwa and War: On the Allegiance of the American Muslim Soldiers in the Aftermath of September 11”, Islamic Law and Society, Volume 11, Number 1, 2004, Brill, pp. 78 and 97) and the fact that at times Al-Qaradawi adopts the Salafi position on certain matters. For example, Al-Qaradawi believes that the acceptance of secularism by Muslims means abandonment of sharia. The call for secularism among Muslims, according to Al-Qaradawi is atheism and a rejection of Islam. He concludes that its acceptance as a basis for rule in place of sharia is clear apostasy. This is believed to be a typical Salafi position. See Andrew F. March, Are Secularism and Neutrality Attractive to Religious Minorities? Islamic Discussions of Western Secularism in the “Jurisprudence of Muslim Minorities” (Fiqh Al-Aqalliyat), Islamic Law and Society, 2009, pp 2821-54.
approximations of the personalities and issues that divide modern Salafis. However, they are significantly more nuanced than the categories currently used by Western policy makers, analysts and law enforcement agencies to discuss the Establishment Salafis, Jihadis and those in between.

These Salafi groups always refer to different religious scholars and texts for legitimacy and intellectual guidance. Their different religious interpretations have profound implications for the political, social and economic behavior of their followers. Disagreement and disputes within these groups are apparent. Can a “good” Muslim listen to music? Should a “good” Muslim refrain from buying Israeli goods and products? Is it acceptable for a “good” Muslim to fight to overthrow a Muslim government who fail to implement the shariah completely? Each Salafi subset provides its adherents with different answers and religious justifications to these and a variety of other questions. But the categorization provides nothing more than a rough topography of the Salafis terrain in order to assist observers speak in more nuanced terms about the ideological trends of modern Salafis.

In my opinion and for the specific purpose of this research, the categorization of modern Salafis into the three distinct groups of purists, politicos and Jihadis as suggested by Wiktorowicz is more convincing and viable than its categorization into eight groups as suggested by Tariq Abdel Haleem. This is so as the eight categories of Salafis are seen as not contributing much in explaining the diversity of WB in modern Salafism which is the focus of this research. The division (suggested by Tariq Abdel Haleem), although useful, is primarily based and characterized on individuals rather than ideological distinctions. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, there are inevitably elements of overlapping between those groups (such as the Ikhwan Salafis, Sururis and Qutbis in Abdel Haleem’s categorisation, which can be seen as one group or having similar ideological leanings). In contrast, the categorization of modern Salafis into three factions, as suggested by Wictorowicz, which is based on their distinct ideological trends seems to be a useful tool to analyse the concept of WB in modern Salafism. This is so as one of the main reasons for this division is the Salafis perception and attitude towards political matters. I believe that categorization of modern Salafis into the three distinct groups help to explain the diversity and differences among modern Salafis better. As such, this specific categorisation will be used as a framework to understand the dynamics of WB in modern Salafism, especially when we attempt to analyse the
writings on WB by Salafi thinkers from different backgrounds in Chapter Five. In Chapter Five, the usefulness of this framework or categorisation is tested to see how the different Salafi groups present the roles of WB in different manners.

**Characteristics of Modern Salafism**

As noted earlier, as Salafis are Muslims, therefore in many ways, their ideological beliefs in matters of creed and jurisprudential rulings are similar to that of the majority Muslims or the non-Salafi Muslims. Probably, the difference between the approach of the Salafis and others is the fact that Salafis have taken a certain number of beliefs and rulings, and based on them have created a new Islamic school of thought, which claims to represent the true salaf. Consequently, those who subscribe to a different opinion other that the Salafis have “deviated” from the way of the salaf and have become innovators in the religion.  

There are several characteristics in the modern Salafi ideology that distinguish its adherents from the rest of the Muslim community. These characteristics include:

1. **Literalist and puritanical** approaches to Islamic theology and law. Salafis base its teachings on a literal understanding of the Quran and the Prophetic tradition.

2. As the name suggests, Salafism’s basic proposition is that legitimacy, whether in the religious, social, or political realms, must be explicitly derived from early Islamic precedents. Salafis maintain that Muslims ought to return to the original textual sources of the Quran, Sunnah of the Prophet and traditions of the authentic salaf on all issues. This is done through interpreting the original

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135 See Al-Buti, Muhammad Said Ramadan, *Al-Salafiyyah: Zamanun Mubarakun La Mazhabiyyah* (Salafism: A Blessed Era Rather Than An Islamic School), Dar Al-Fikr, Dimashq, 1998. (This book is available at [http://www.wahhabiya.net/showbook-379.html](http://www.wahhabiya.net/showbook-379.html) (accessed 31 July 2012). This book is one of the famous books written on the manhaj of the salaf in the contemporary period. I would say that the book can be potentially used to tackle the issues of the modern Salafism and bring about agreement and reconciliation between Muslims especially between the Salafis and non-Salafis. In his book, Al-Buti attempts to show what is meant by the way of the salaf. He deconstructs the modern Salafis claim that the way of the Salaf is to follow the opinions of the original Salaf in matters of belief and jurisprudence. According to Al-Buti, in reality there was a great divergence among the most famous and most pious of the salaf on all these issues. So how could the Salafis in modern times come and choose some of these opinions and hold that they represent the opinions of the salaf, when the salaf themselves differed on these opinions?

136 Khaled Abou El Fadl described the Salafis including the Wahhabis as puritans. (See Abou El Fadl, Khaled, *The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam From The Extremists*, p.45). El Fadl claims that the Salafi methodology "drifted into stifling apologetics" by the mid twentieth century, a reaction against "anxiety" to "render Islam compatible with modernity," by its leaders earlier in the century.
sources of Islam in light the modern needs without being bound to the interpretive precedents of the earlier Muslim generation. In other words, other than the Quran, Sunnah and traditions of the *salaf*, Salafis ignore and are not interested in the rest of Islamic history. In their fervour to return to a “pure” interpretation of the religion, Salafis tend to reject ‘any kind of rationalist orientation in a wide variety of Islamic intellectual teachings’.

This somewhat distinguish the Salafis from other Muslim community who generally regard the Islamic intellectual heritage as an important reference in pursuing Islamic scholarship and guidance.

3. Salafis believe that religious texts such the Quran and hadith are intended to regulate most aspects of Muslim life. They approach the process of applying religious texts to contemporary matters as though it is a scientific enterprise governed by the Laws of divinity.

4. Treatment of the Quran and hadith as self-explanatory. Here, one could notice that in many instances, Salafis minimize and at times oppose the use of human intellect and logic to interpret religious texts. According to them, not only do religious texts regulate most aspect of human life, but their meanings have also been determined by God. In other words, in engaging a religious text, Salafis claim that one does not need to apply human systems of logic, but to simply understand and implement it, as if the meaning of the text is always clear and indisputable.

5. Selective in providing evidence as a proof of legitimacy. Salafis selectively pick certain scholars from the Hanbali schools such as Ibn Taimiyyah and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah and treat their opinions as immutable and beyond questioning. Moreover, Salafis read these scholars in an abusively selective

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137 See Ibid.
140 Ibid.
141 Ibid.
142 See for example Sayyid Muhammad al-Kuthairi, *al-Salafiyyah Baina ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Imamiyya* (Salafis between People of the Prophetic Tradition and Shiite), Beirut, Al-Ghadir li Al-Tiba’ah, 1997, 252-54, 473-501 on Salafis selective readings on Hanbali sources.
manner in the sense that they adopt anything they find in the writing of these scholars that conforms to their thinking and worldview while ignoring the rest.

These characteristics are not exhaustive but they are some of the key ones that distinguish them from the rest of the Muslim community. One may notice that the characteristics that generally distinguish the Salafis from the rest mostly revolve around matters of jurisprudence and legal reasoning. In many ways, the dispute and disagreement between Salafis and non-Salafis and between the various Salafi factions are always in matters of *fiqh* and increasingly in political issues especially since the last few decades. The Salafi ideology among others intends to regulate the legitimacy of Muslim practices in daily lives, thus *fiqh* become an important tool for the Salafis to draw the line between what is permitted or Islamically acceptable and what is forbidden. That is the reason why one could notice that Salafis are very obsessed with the issues of what is *halal* (permissible) and *haram* (forbidden); and what is *sunnah* and *bid’ah*.

Salafis are not only distinguished by their characteristics and approaches in matters of theology and Islamic jurisprudence. Their eminent characteristics could also be recognized to others through their physical appearance, social interaction, style and content of speaking and obviously religious practices. For example, many male Salafis could be recognized through their unique robe dress and a round cap, albeit there are those who prefer to be dressed in jeans and t-shirts. Many of them also prefer to appear in long beard and a shaved-moustache. Unsurprisingly, Salafis are known for forbidding or at least refraining from practices which are deemed by many non-Salafis as religiously permissible. These practices among others include listening to music, celebrating one’s birthday including the Prophet’s, clapping hands in applause, wearing shirts with animal or human images on it, standing up in honour of someone and watching movies. To the Salafis, for every human action there are rules that must be observed. In many a times, Salafis would always refer to the Quran and hadith to

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143 For a long time, Salafism was relatively homogeneous and traditionally most of them were quietist and apolitical. Their main concern has been apolitical and local – they sought to uproot deviant religious practices and protect the *tawhid* and purity of Islam. It could be explained here that Salafis started to become political due to several factors. One of the factors, as mentioned earlier, is the arriving of members of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) from Egypt in Saudi Arabia after fleeing from Gamal Abdel Nasser’s crackdown in Egypt in the 1960s. The members of MB brought with them a more politically oriented agenda and awareness to the predominantly purist Salafi-Saudi context. They had a long history of political engagement and enjoyed a sophisticated understanding of political events, international affairs and the world outside Saudi Arabia.
showcase that a particular act is religiously sanctioned in many aspects of life including in non-religious matters. This is because Salafis always connect life to religion.

The Modern Salafi Ideology

As we have stated earlier, the Salafi ideology as a religious tendency is obviously based on the Quran and Sunnah and emphasizes the importance of following the footsteps of the salaf. Theologically, it does not differ much from the belief of the non-Salafi Sunni Muslims. As the scholars from The Permanent Committee for Scientific Research and Legal Opinions) in Saudi Arabia put it:

*Salafiyyah* is derived from the *salaf*, who were the Companions of the Prophet, and from the *imams* (leaders) of the first three centuries, mentioned in the hadith: ‘The best of the people are those who belong to my century, then those who follow them [the second century], then those who follow them [third century] . . . Salafis are those who follow in the footsteps of the *salaf* who, in turn, follow the Book [Quran] and the Sunnah. . and act according to them.”

Similar to the description of Salafism by the official Saudi scholars, the Society for the Revival of the Prophetic Method (*Jam‘iyyah Ihya‘ Minhaj al-Sunnah*), the organization that was instrumental in spreading Salafism in the United Kingdom describes the Salafi way as follows:-

The Salafi *da‘wah* (call or missionary) is that of the Quran and the Sunnah. It is the religion of Islam - pure and free from any additions, deletions or alterations. It is to adhere to the path of the Messenger *sallallahu alaihi wa sallam* (peace be upon him) and of the true believers (*salaf al-salih*). *Al-Salaf* is a collective term

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referring to the pious pioneers in Islam and all those who follow in their footsteps in belief, actions and morals.\textsuperscript{145}

As stated earlier, Salafi ideology is built upon a clear and narrowly defined religious text and methodologically, they are literalist and scripturalist. Their ideology revolves a set of binary dichotomies: (1) \textit{tawhid} as opposed to \textit{shirk}; (2) adherence to the \textit{sunnah} of the Prophet in all matters of \textit{aqidah} and religious practices (\textit{amaliya}) as opposed to \textit{bid’ah};\textsuperscript{146} (3) respect and adherence to the traditions of the early Muslim generations, the \textit{salaf} as opposed to the rejection of the subsequent Muslim intellectual heritage.\textsuperscript{147}

Apart from these, fundamentally, the ideology of modern Salafism stresses the importance of the concept of WB. As this research shows, the concept of WB is one of the central tenets in the ideology of modern Salafism.

It is also important to note that broadly the ideology of modern Salafism consists of two main areas namely \textit{aqidah} and \textit{manhaj}. While \textit{aqidah} refers to the beliefs that Salafis hold dear, the \textit{manhaj} refers to the the methods of how this beliefs are applied. Muhammad Nasir- al-Din Al-Albani when asked about the importance and difference between these two components replies that ‘\textit{aqidah} is more specific than the \textit{manhaj}’.\textsuperscript{148}

He also emphasizes that both \textit{aqidah} and \textit{manhaj} are inseparable in order for someone to be a Salafi and believes that one cannot be a Salafi in \textit{aqidah} but apply \textit{manhaj} of the Ikhwani Salafi.\textsuperscript{149} As for \textit{manhaj}, it is the component in the ideology of modern Salafis that witness differences and diversity of opinions. Some also believe that the Salafi


\textsuperscript{146} Salafis strongly reject what they call \textit{bid’ah}, any belief and practices that are not enjoined by the Quran and the Prophet. For example, Salafis claim that Sufi practices such as \textit{tawassul} (intercession between man and God) which had accrued over the centuries since the pristine period of Islam threatens \textit{tawhid}. They believe that \textit{bid’ah} resulted from the adoption of local cultures by Islamic missionaries in their attempts to attract new converts. This blend of Islam and customs helped significantly the conversion process to Islam by making Islam accessible to wider audiences.

\textsuperscript{147} This is the irony of contemporary Salafism. Its claims of a “return to Islamic ideals” can be better described as selective rephrases of certain scholastic formulations from the Islamic heritage as normative rules for absolute implementation. While modern Salafis tend to ignore the Islamic intellectual history, they have taken on certain other scholars whom were beyond the time of the pious predecessors such as Ibn Taimiyyah and Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab.


**manhaj** could also be viewed in different forms. For example, Salih Al-Fawzan says that **manhaj** means ‘the methodology and of implementing the beliefs and laws of Islam’ and comes in three different forms i.e. the methods of dealings with religious sources (texts of the Quran, Sunnah and well-known sayings of the **ulema**), methods of **ibadah** (worship) and methods of dealing with the community or **ummah**.\(^{150}\)

**Components of Modern Salafism**

While the ideology of modern Salafism mainly comprises of its **aqidah** and **manhaj**, the components of modern Salafism can be broadly divided into three main areas namely, (1) the **aqidah**, (2) their approach in dealing with issues of rulings and **shariah** and; (3) issues of political activism.\(^{151}\) In applying these three areas, Salafis seems to revisit the notion and legality of these areas which sometimes causes disagreement and sparks controversial issues within the Salafi fraternity and the wider Muslim community. The first area of the **aqidah** usually remains an uncontroversial and seems to be unanimous among many Salafi groups, but the second and third areas at times provokes dispute and controversy.

**Aqidah**

As for **aqidah**, Salafis emphasize a particular understanding of **tawhid**. **Tawhid** literally means ‘oneness’. In Islam, it means ‘believe in the Oneness of God’. The meaning of **tawhid** is encapsulated in the proclamation of the **shahadah** where one believes that there is none worthy of worship except Allah and that Muhammad is His messenger. The importance of **tawhid** for all Muslims can be seen as it forms the first pillars of faith (**arkan al-iman**).

Undeniably, while all Muslims believe in **tawhid**, Salafis emphasize a particular understanding of **tawhid**. This particular understanding of **tawhid** is explicitly manifested in Salafis’ categorization of **tawhid** into three categories of belief and action


namely: (1) **Tawhid al-Rububiyyah** (Oneness of Lordship) – that is to denote God’s exclusive sovereignty in the universe as the sole Creator and Sustainer and to attribute any of these power to other than Him constitutes *kufr;* (2) **Tawhid al-Uluhiyyah** (Oneness of Godship) – that is to denote God’s rights to be the exclusive object of worship, failing which the person is *kafir* and that should no intermediaries between Him and man; (3) **Tawhid al-Asma’ wa al-Sifat** (Oneness of the Names and Attributes) – that is to denote God’s uniqueness with the way He is depicted in the Quran and Hadith without any debate as to their meaning, that is without *tahrif* (distortion), *ta’til* (denial) and without any attempt to explain how they are (*takyif*) or employing likeness or any metaphorical interpretation (*tamthil*).

**Approach to Islamic Law**

Another important arena in the constituents of modern Salafism is its approach to Islamic law, and in particular the position Salafis adopt *vis-à-vis* the four established schools of *fiqh*. Unlike their unity on issues of the *aqidah* and matters related to it, Salafis here are divided among themselves. The main difference pertains to the degree to which they follow, or reject the teachings of one of the four *mazhabs*. In other words, Salafis are divided in how important they view the practice of independent reasoning – known as *ijtihad* to be in religious legal spheres. For example, majority of the Saudi Salafis or the Wahhabis tend to be adherents of the Hanbali *mazhab*, whereas other Salafis are not keen in adherence or imitation to any *mazhab*, but instead prefer to interface directly with the sources of revelation (*al-amal bi al-dalil*) whenever they want to obtain an Islamic judgment. Salafis also argue that religious texts and the messages in it are explicit enough as they stand when revealed, and for the conclusion, many of them draw that it is not necessary for one to submit to the traditional methods as stipulated in the classical training. The main characteristics underpinning the Salafis approach to Islamic legitimacy or law may be summarized as follows:

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1. Limit religious legitimacy to the Quran, authentic (strong) hadith and consensus of the Companions of the Prophets as constituting the only foundation for Islamic law and for how the Muslim should live.

2. Avoid the practice of taqlid to the mazhabs since sources of Islamic texts are clear enough as they stand; and are sufficient for the authority of a legal opinion without the need for interpretation of scholars.

3. Re-opening doors of ijtihad based on one’s own reading, rather than following strictly to opinions of the mazhab.

4. Enhance the study and use of Arabic language for a correct and of course literal understanding of Islamic text.

However, the foundation on ijtihad and taqlid is not as thoroughly maintained in the Salafi methodology. In the history of Salafism these concepts (ijtihad and taqlid) have undergone some development and the absence of conclusive position on these concepts reflects uncertainties in the founding scholars themselves. For example, although Ibn Taymiyyah’s major concern was the aqidah and he increasingly issued fatwas without resorting to any interpretative precedent, he still considered himself a follower of the Hanbali school. This paradox was later adopted by Wahhabism, which officially permits individual ijtihad, but at the same time indicates its subservience to the Hanbali school, with ijtihad not being a noticeable feature in their action.

**Political Activism**

The arena of political engagement provokes the greatest controversy and mutual polemic among modern Salafis. They are far from united as to where to place politics and engagement in it among their priorities. In matters of political activism, Salafis are broadly divided into two dominating groups. The first group holds an apolitical stance – opposing any political engagement and criticizing those who embrace politics or resort to violence. This group includes the purists Salafis, official scholars of Saudi Arabia, the Jami and Madkhali Salafis. They argue that political engagement always come with a heavy price. The famous Saudi scholar, Muhammad Nasir ad-Din Al-Albani believe that politics and political engagement should be shunned together. He said that “the best
politics is to leave politics’ (*min al-siyasah tarku al-siyasah*)\(^{155}\). These Salafis claim that rather focusing on political participation, Muslims should bring change to the *ummah* through educating them to the correct faith and filtering religion from innovations. They Salafis adopt the *tarbiyah* (education) and *da’wah* (missionary) approach.

In contrast to the approach of these Salafis, the second group of Salafis (the politicos) argues that *tarbiyah* and *da’wah* alone without political participation will not change the *ummah*. As Wictorowicz observes, unlike the purist Salafis, these politico Salafis argue that they have ‘a better understanding of contemporary issues and are therefore better situated to apply the salafi creed to modern context’.\(^{156}\) Abdul Rahman Abdul Khaliq argues that politics was at the heart of religion and political engagement includes more than just governance. He supports democracy and call Muslims to it because he believes the alternative to democracy is “a tyrannical system”. He held that “Muslims forming political parties should be supported”. Abdul Rahman also supports participation in parliaments, as it helps to assure that legislation which is contradictory to Islamic law will not be passed.\(^{157}\)

In conclusion, it is possible to understand modern Salafism by observing the three essential elements. The first one is the theological element which is encapsulated by Salafis unique understanding of *tawhid*. In general, most Salafis are unanimous on the creedal doctrines that define Salafism. Second, their approach to Islamic law which is concentrated on the legality of *ijtihad* and the need for Muslims to adhere to the tradition of any particular established schools of law. On the issue of law, most Salafis view that *ijtihad* is important and that *taqlid* should be avoided by Muslims. Third, is the political element which saw the most prominent disputes and disagreement among many Salafis.

**Conclusion**

Although the subject of Salafism is very vast in the study of modern Islamic thought, this section of the chapter has attempted to capture the widely-accepted meaning of


\(^{156}\) Wictorowicz, *Anatomy of Salafi Movement*, p. 221.

Salafism and explore some of its important features and ideological trend. Importantly, it has explained the meaning of modern Salafism as entails in this research. As we have stated earlier, due to the complexities and the ambiguous nature of modern Salafism, it is nearly impossible to produce a definitive, clear and distinct (jami’ wa mani’ as known in Arabic, literally: inclusive and exclusive) definition of Salafism. Furthermore, modern Salafism is not static as it continues to evolve and even revise its ideology in an ever-changing socio-political contexts. Nevertheless, the discussion on Salafism is essential before we discuss the concept of WB in modern Salafism. We now turn to the subject of WB in modern Salafism in the following section of the chapter.

Part Two: Introduction to The Concept of WB

Definition of Al-Wala wal Bara’

The Arabic word wala’ derives from its root letters of wow, lam and yaa. These three letters form the root word wala’ which is also a past tense verb (wa-li-ya) means “to protect”. Hence, the noun of wa-li-ya is wala’ or wilayah (protection). One who protects is called a wali, (plural: awliya’) or mawla. Both the terms wali and mawla can be used for the person who provides protection (the protector) or the person who receives it.158 However, “protection” is just one of the many translations for the word wala’. Due to the vastness and complexity of the Arabic language, it is difficult to provide a precise translation for the word wala’. This is primarily because many Arabic words have multiple meanings which are used differently depending on contexts and situations. The other meanings of wala’ include loyalty, support, guardianship and friendship.159

Ibn Faris in his famous Arabic dictionary Mu’jam Maqayis Al-Lughah said that the term wala’ indicates closeness.160 It signifies love, loyalty, allegiance and guardianship. This definition of wala’ is one that can better explain the meaning and context of wala’ we are dealing with in this research. In addition, the term wala’ can also be understood as

159 As stated earlier in the Introduction, I have chosen to translate the term wala’ as Loyalty and bara’ as Disavowal as it suits the context and meaning in which I am dealing. Some may also translate it as “Allegiance and Disassociation” while others may translate it as “Love and Hatred”.
ownership. *Mawla* in the traditional Arabic custom is the slave who is owned by someone and it means the one who loves and follows someone else. Deriving from the same root word as *wala’* are *tawalli* and *muwaalah* which both shows the act of taking someone as a *wali* (protector or guardian).  

The word *bara’* comes from the past tense verb of *ba-ra-a* which means “to be free from something”. Like *wala’*, the derivations of the word *bara’* in the Arabic language carry various meanings such as severance, creation, freedom, to overcome and clear of debits or faults. The essence of all these meanings is to cut off the relationship with something or someone.  

These are the linguistic meanings of WB. However, in the Islamic context and specifically in modern Salafism, WB refers to the Muslims’ belief, actions and words that revolve around loving and supporting God, His Messenger and the believers (Muslims) i.e. *wala’*; and, on the other hand, distancing from those who oppose God, His Messenger and the Muslims – *bara’*. The basis of this definition of *wala’* emanates from the Quran 5:55: “Your Wali are (no less than) Allah, His Messenger, and the Believers, those who establish regular prayers and regular charity, and they bow down humbly (in worship)”.

On the other hand, the basis for distancing from and pronouncing *bara’* of the enemies of God is based on Quran 60:4 “There is an excellent example for you in Abraham and those who followed him. They said to their people: “We are free (bura-a-u) of you and whatever you worship besides Allah. Renounce you we do; enmity and hatred will reign between us until you believe in Allah only!”  

As for *wala’* to the Muslims, it is worth noting that the entire ummah (Muslim nation or community) exists by virtue of the ties that bind all of them together in a common sense of *wala’*. This kind of bonding enables the ummah to feel attached, loved and always maintaining bonds of brotherhood with each other, assisting and empathizing with one another. The Quran has laid foundations for such a bonding to exist in the Muslim ummah. It says: “The believers are but brothers” and “This, your community is a  

\[163\] Quran 49:10.
single community and I am your Lord, so worship me! This notion of loyalty, love and brotherhood can also be seen in the hadith of Prophet Muhammad: “The believers in their mutual love and compassion are like a single body, if one part of the body aches, the rest suffers in insomnia and fever.” Another hadith mentions: “The believer to another believer are like bricks [in a building], each part supporting the other.”

On the flip side, bara’ is seen as the opposite of wala’. In the Quranic context, bara’ in Islam is to declare oneself free or innocent of shirk i.e. the taking of others with God in the worship of Him; of disbelief (kufr); and of tyranny, wrongdoing and injustices. Muslims are warned of worshipping other than Allah. The Quran explicitly says:

Say: “O disbelievers! I do not worship what you worship. Nor do you worship what I worship. I shall never worship what you worship, and nor will you ever worship what I worship. To you be your religion, and to me, mine.”

Modern Salafis conception of bara’, however is not only restricted to declare freedom from shirk or avoiding the worship of other besides the One and only God, but it also includes the meaning of rejection or shunning all that displeases God, or anything that contradicts the shariah. Moreover, as mentioned before, it refers to the disavowal of anything that is seen as un-Islamic or has the potential of posing a threat to the sanctity of the religion. Bara’, according to modern Salafis refers not simply to what types of behavior ought to be considered Islamic or un-Islamic, but to which human beings it is religiously acceptable to know or have wala’, or friends. In short, those who reject the shahadah must be disavowed entirely, purged from any daily interaction with God-fearing Muslims.

It is also important to note modern Salafis do not treat both the concept of wala’ and bara’ as a separate entity. This is albeit the Quran mentions both terms separately. In

164 Quran 21:92.
165 Al-Bukhari, no.6011; Muslim, no.2586.
166 Al-Bukhari, no.481; Muslim, no.2585.
other words, WB in modern Salafism is a combined/fused or “2 in 1” concept – one cannot exist or at least incomplete without the other.  

Functional Emergence of WB in Modern Salafism

The concept of WB has its theological and historical roots from the primary Islamic sources of the Quran and Sunnah. However, as mentioned before, modern Salafis understanding of the concept could be traced to the ideas of Ibn Taimiyyah whose work becomes the theological reference for many modern Salafis. In fact, Ibn Taimiyyah never actually use the term wala’ and bara’, but it is clear from his writings that he is familiar with the idea behind it.

As stated in the Introduction, Ibn Taimiyyah developed the idea that the dissimilarity between the Muslims and non-Muslims must be total. In his book entitled Iqtida’ al-Sirat al-Mustaqim, he explained in detail all aspects of differences that should be drawn by Muslims in their encounters with non-Muslims. He is especially concerned about the influence of Jewish and Christian religious festivals and stresses that Muslims must avoid these if they want to remain true to Islam. Otherwise, Muslims might start showing wala’ and mawaddah (affection) to them, leading themselves away from the straight path. Although Ibn Taymiyyah quotes extensively from the Quran and Sunnah, one verse more or less sums up his argument, namely surah 5: 51, which states:

O believers, take not Jews and Christians as friends (awliya’); they are friends of each other. Whoso of you makes them his friends is one of them. God guides not the people of the evildoers.

168 As stated earlier, although WB as a fused concept could be traced to the ideas of Ibn Taimiyyah and later developed in Wahhabism, it is believed that Muhammad Saeed Al-Qahtani whose work on WB is referred to in this research, is the first modern Salafi scholar to write WB as a fused or combined concept.

169 As mentioned in the Introduction, historically, the concept of WB is not something new in Islam. The concept of loyalty to a tribal leader and members existed in pre-Islamic Arabia and in the early centuries of Islam. Early Islamic groups like the Khawarij or Kharijites were believed to have applied elements of wala’ and bara’ in their belief and actions. See Wagemakers, Joas, “The Transformation of A Radical Concept, Al-Wala’ wal Bara’ in the Ideology of Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi”, p. 52.

170 Ibid.

From the seventeenth century onwards, the practice of WB is clearly manifested in the teachings of Muhammad Ibn Abd a-Wahhab, the founder of Wahhabism who was strongly influenced by the teachings of Ibn Taimiyyah.\textsuperscript{172} Under the precept of WB and based on the teachings of Ibn Taimiyya, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab argued that it was imperative for Muslims not to befriend, ally themselves with, or imitate non-Muslims or heretical Muslims. Furthermore, this enmity and hostility towards non-Muslims are heretical and had to be visible and unequivocal.\textsuperscript{173} For example, Muslims are not allowed to be the first to greet non-Muslim, imitate them in their dressing, language, morality and culture. Similarly, Muslims are forbidden to take part in celebrations and festivals or any other social event originally invented by non-Muslims as these are sufficient to make them an infidel.\textsuperscript{174}

Ibn Abd Wahab has strengthened the concept of WB as suggested by Ibn Taimiyyah and Ahmad bin Hanbal to serve as a pillar of the \textit{aqidah}. This is very clear in his writings including his most famous one, \textit{Kitab al-Tawhid} (The Book of Monotheism) which deals with the oneness of God, and \textit{Kitab Kashf al-Shubuhat fi al-Aqidah} (The Book of Clarification of Uncertainties in Faith) which deals with heretical acts according to Wahhabism such as the intercession of prophets and saints. This book is considered a continuation of \textit{Kitab al-Tawhid} because all of his writings revolve around the subject of \textit{tawhid}. Hence, in the Wahhabi tradition, the doctrine of WB takes on an exclusive and ultimately religious approach. It designated primarily all those who do not adhere to Sunni orthodoxy, especially the Shiites.\textsuperscript{175} Ibn Abd al-Wahhab branded all Shiites as unbelievers and \textit{rafidah} (rejectionists).\textsuperscript{176} In the Wahhabi tradition, WB thus became a test of true faith, to show loyalty to God alone as an indispensable part of the Islamic religion.

The culture of WB from the time of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab has prevailed for centuries until the modern period. Today, WB in modern Salafism is not only an essential religious doctrine, but is also seen by Salafis as an important shield for Muslims against any un-
Islamic cultures and influences that could destroy the faith and *tawhid*. In addition, it becomes a tool by certain Salafi groups to denounce the religious legitimacy of Muslim scholars and reject the political leadership of Muslim rulers who are deemed by them as apostates.

*Significance of WB in Modern Salafism*

First of all, the significance of WB in modern Salafism lies in the claim that WB is (1) a fundamental issue in the religion; and (2) tied or closely-linked to the *aqidah* or *iman* (faith). As mentioned before, the concept is one of the factors that could nullify the *shahadah* if not practiced by Muslims. Salafis claim that since *aqidah* is the basis of Islamic belief, it is valid to assume that WB should be upheld as a tool in the process of refining and protecting the sanctity of the *aqidah*. The supremacy of the concept is clear. *Wala’* is a source of inspiration in understanding the uniqueness of love; and *bara’* on the other hand explains the justifications for hatred, enmity and rejection. The two are jointly linked to the affirmation of faith, and they lay emphasis on verses of the Quran such as 5:55 mentioned earlier as a validation for the Salafi belief.

For example, the centrality of WB and its close relation to the Islamic faith is explained by Muhammad Saeed Al-Qahtani in his book on WB. In his introduction, Al-Qahtani claims that concept of WB is the ‘real image for the actual practice of the faith. It has a tremendous significance in the mind of Muslims, as much as the greatness and significance of the faith’. Therefore, according to Al-Qahtani, *tawhid* or *aqidah* will not be achieved on earth until Muslims apply the concept of WB. Al-Qahtani debunks the claim that the concept is a matter of ordinary importance and asserts the opposite. To him, WB is a matter of belief and disbelief and this is based in Quranic verses 9:23-24 and 5:51. Another contemporary Salafi author states:

> Loyalty (*al-muwalat*) and enmity (*al-mu’adat*) have a strong connection with the creed of the Muslim (*aqidah al-Muslim*) and have the effect of not being ignorant (*la yankaru*) of his behavior because the Islamic peoples represent one

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177 See Muhammad Saeed Al-Qahtani, *Wala’ wal Bara’ min Mafahim Aqidah As-Salaf*, p. 17.
178 Ibid.
179 Ibid.
community (ummah), the community of Islam. There is a commitment for every individual Muslim who is a brick (labina min labinat) of this community that he does not separate from or leave the community of the Muslims (jamaah al-Muslim) and that his loyalty and devotion (wala-u-hu wa ikhlasuhu) are to God the Exalted, his messenger and his Muslim community (li jama’atti al-muslimah).\textsuperscript{180}

Second, modern Salafis assert that WB becomes more important in the current period because Muslims are no longer aware of the qualities which distinguish the Muslims from the non-Muslims. The faith of Muslims has become so weak that they have adopted patterns of behaviour that are absolutely repugnant to a sincere believer and taken the disbelievers as their friends. They argue that unlike the generations of early Muslims like the salaf al-salih, Muslims today have adopted the ways, systems and style of living of the non-Muslims. Muslims’ thought has been confused as they mixed up Islamic principles with heresies and human beings and the philosophies of jahiliyyah (ignorance). In addition, they have become engrossed in luxuries and comfort that leads them far away from the religion. It is due to these factors that the need to “revive” the concept of WB becomes pressing.\textsuperscript{181}

According to modern Salafis, the subject of WB did not attract much of the attention of classical scholars, despite the important position it holds and the clarity with which it has been explained in the Islamic sources. This is due to two main reasons. First, the generations of early Muslims enjoyed a very high level of awareness and understanding of Islam, and because of this, the practice of WB flows naturally from their action and words. Second, early Muslim society who followed the footsteps of the salaf al-salih did not experience the challenges of religious innovations. Today, WB is essential to address innovations of religious doctrines which are seen by the Salafis as a threat to the purity of Islam.\textsuperscript{182}


\textsuperscript{181} Muhammad Saeed Al-Qahtani, \textit{Al-Wala wa Bara’ min Mafahim Aqidah Al-Salaf}, Muqaddimah, pp. 7-11.

\textsuperscript{182} Ibid.
Modern Salafis argue that the belief in the concept of WB occupies a meritorious rank in Islam not only because of its connection with the *aqidah* but also due to several other reasons which are summarized as follows:

1. It is the strongest bond of faith. This is according to the hadith "The strongest bond of faith is the love for Allah's sake and the hatred for Allah's sake".184

2. It is one of the factors that enable the heart to experience the beauty of faith and absolute assurance. This is based on a hadith: "Whoever possesses the following three (qualities) will have the sweetness (delight) of faith: The one to whom Allah and His Messenger become dearer than anything else, who loves a person and he loves him only for Allah's sake, and who hates to revert to atheism (disbelief) as he hates to be thrown into the fire".185

3. It is the foundation by which all relationships and dealings in a Muslim community are built upon as described by the Prophet: "None of you will have faith till he likes for his (Muslim) brother what he likes for himself".186

4. It is a sign of those who loves for the sake of God. This is reported in a hadith which says "There will be seven categories of people who deserves God's protection in the hereafter, one of those categories is "Two men who loved each other for Allah's sake. They congregate for His Sake, and they separate for His Sake".187

5. It is the most powerful tie that links between people. The Quran says: "Say: If your fathers, your sons, your brothers, your wives, your kindred, the wealth that you have gained, the commerce in which you fear a decline, and the dwellings in which you delight are dearer to you than Allah and His Messenger, and striving hard and fighting in His Cause, then wait until Allah brings about His Decision..."
(torment). And Allah guides not the people who are Fasiqun (the rebellious and disobedient to Allah”).

6. It is by the means of WB that God grants His protection (Wilayah). This is based on Ibn Jarir’s report of the saying of Ibn Abbas: "He who loves for Allah's sake and hates for Allah's sake, he who gives Muwalat (support and help) for Allah's sake and exhibits enmity for Allah's sake, will attain Allah's Wilayah”.

7. The relationship of WB will be the one to remain on the Day of Judgment based on Quranic verse "When those who were followed, disown (declare themselves innocent of) those who followed (them), and they see the torment, then all their relations will be cut off from them”.

8. WB separates belief from disbelief. And those who loves other than God is a disbeliever. The Quran says: "And if any amongst you takes them (Jews and Christians) as awliya', then surely he is one of them".

9. WB is an integral part of iman and is necessary for its perfection. The Prophet says: “A servant's faith in Allah will never become complete until he possesses five traits: complete reliance (al-Tawakkul) in Allah, complete dependence (al-Tafwid) on Allah (what He has decreed), complete submission (al-Taslim) to all of the commandments of Allah, complete contentment (al-Rida) upon what Allah has decreed, and complete patience (al-Sabr) for the calamities that Allah brings forth; because verily that person who loves for the sake of Allah and hates for the sake of Allah and gives (to others) for the (sake of) Allah and holds back (giving to others) for the (sake of) Allah is one whose faith is complete”.

From these evidences and reasonings, one can notice that modern Salafis relate the concept of WB to the questions of whom should Muslims love and whom should they hate. WB is hence known in Salafism as the “love and hate concept”. Salafis also portray the concept as one that, when it is not practiced, will result in receiving the wrath of God. When addressing the issue of WB in their books, writings or lectures,

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188 Quran 9:24.  
189 Quran 2:166.  
190 Quran 5:51.  
191 Hadith narrated from Nafi’ from Ibn Umar mentioned in Bihar al-Anwar, vol. 74, p. 177.
Salafi scholars will always incorporate the notion of love and hate.\footnote{There are many examples to illustrate this fact. Nearly all Salafi writings and lectures on WB include the importance of loving and hating for the sake of Allah. See for example lecture on WB by Abu Abdullah Al-Britani available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hgnXwdkrDZg (accessed 11 October 2011). See also Al-Qahtani, Al-Wala’ wal Bara’ fil Islam, Part 1, p. 33 (Love and Hate and the Declaration of Faith).} This could be explained by the fact that Salafis see the concept as such and claim that love (al-mahabbah) is one of the seven conditions of tawhid.\footnote{The other six conditions of tawhid are Al-Ilm (knowledge), Al-Yaqin (Certainty), Al-Qabul (Acceptance), Al-Inqiyad (Submission), As-Sidiq (Truthfulness) and Al-Ikhlas (Sincerity).}\footnote{See Salih bin Fawzan Al-Fawzan, Al-Wala’ wal-Bara’, p. 27.} Salih Al-Fawzan categorizes people who deserve WB or those whom Muslims should love and hate into three categories:\footnote{Abdullah Faisal born 1963 is a famous radical Salafi preacher in the United Kingdom. His ten parts video recording on WB is widely available on the internet. See “Al-Wala’ wal Bara’ by Syeikh Faisal Part 1” available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PURY4GgT6i4 (accessed 01 August 2012).}

1. Those whom Muslims should love purely with no intention of being an enemy to them. These are obviously Muslims who believe in the Oneness of God, accept the tawhid and submit to Him.

2. Those whom Muslims should hate and take as enemies with no love or support and respect to them. This group refers to all the disbelievers including the Pagans, the Hypocrites and the Apostates.

3. Those whom Muslims should love particularly for their good deeds and hate for their other evil deeds. This category of people are those who are loved for their belief of Islam but hated for the sins they have committed. Thus as a sign of loving them, Muslims should find ways to advise and warn them against doing any evil acts. The people under this category could also be punished for their evil doings for the benefit of the wider Muslim community.

Another Salafi preacher, the Jamaican born Syakh Abdullah Faisal from the UK defines WB as the ‘Islamic concept of love’\footnote{See Salih bin Fawzan Al-Fawzan, Al-Wala’ wal-Bara’, p. 27.}. He states that Islam has laid the foundations and made it explicit as to who Muslims should love and hate. Faisal counsels:

The implication of al-wala’ is that a person loves for the sake of Allah. The implication of al-barâ’ is that one hates for the sake of Allah. It is the seventh and last
condition of the shahadah. Al-Wala’ means to recognize who your friends are, to love, appreciate and support them in their endeavor to establish the din (religion). Al-Bara’ means to recognize who your enemies are and to hate them and exterminate them in their endeavor to get rid of your din, al-Islam.  

Salafis claim that one needs to understand the principle known as at-talaazum in order to understand WB. Talaazum (moulding) is to mould two or more things together and cannot be separated. For example, the talaazum of iman (belief) is the actions of Muslims as the shariah meaning of iman is explained as ‘the belief in the heart, manifested by the tongue and actions by the limbs’ (al-iman qaulun wa f’ilun wa ‘itiqaadun). To separate these three elements form each other is to dismantle the whole matter. Likewise there is talaazum in WB. For wala’ the talaazum is muwaalat (alliance) and for bara’ is mu’aadat (enmity). In fact, the term Al-Muwaalat wal Mu’aadat (Alliance and Enmity) is synonymous to Al-Wala wal Bara’. Therefore, Salafis argue that it is insufficient for Muslims to profess having wala’ to fellow Muslims but also to ally with them. Similarly, as mu’aadat is the talaazum for bara’, a Muslim must not only disavow but also profess his enmity and hatred towards the non-Muslims.

According to the Salafis, there are five meanings or elements in both the concept of wala’ and bara’. These elements are deemed important and should be manifested when WB is applied. A Muslim is not considered to have profess wala’ unless he

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197 Taken from the lecture of a famous radical Salafi from London known as Abu Waleed. Abu Waleed is famous for his da’wah on inciting hatred towards the non-Muslims and his call for an Islamic state and system. The importance of the principle of talaazum in the concept WB is taken from his one-hour lecture on Al-Wala’ wal Bara’ which is available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aNNkR4umBO4 (accessed 17 November 2011).
198 A Salafi scholar Muhammad bin Abdullah Al-Mas’ari wrote a book entitled Al-Muwaalat wal Mu’aadat (Alliance and Enmity). This book was published in 2004 (third publication) and was published by Tanzim At-Tajdeed AlIslami (Islamic Reformation Organisation), a Salafi organisation based in London. The book discusses among others issues like Tawhid, al-Wala wal bara’; obligation of hijrah to Muslim lands, issues of aiding the kuffar against the Muslims, enmity and jihad towards the kuffar and many issues related to the Salafi concept of WB. The book is available from the website of Tanzim At-Tajdeed Al-Islami at www.tajdeed.net (accessed 18 November 2011) or the direct link to the e-book is http://www.tajdeed.org.uk/ar/posts/list/22.page (accessed 18 November 2011).
applies all these elements. The five meanings of *wala’* are: (1) *Al-hubb* (love) – to love God, His Messenger and the Muslims; (2) *An-nusrah* – to support all Muslim physically against their enemies; (3) *Al-ikram* – to honour Muslim and always elevate them. This is so as *karamah* (dignity) is only for the Muslims; (4) *Al-Himayah* – to protect; and 5) to respect Muslim brother and never to backbite or slander him. On the other hand, *bara’* also has five meanings which are exactly the opposite of the meanings if *wala’* mentioned above. The 5 meanings of *bara’* are: (1) *Al-Bughud* (hatred); (2) *Al-Khuzlan* that is never to support the *kuffar*; (3) *Al-Izlal* – to dishonor the kuffar; (4) *Al-Ta’zlim* – to give up the *kuffar* or to give up their ideology; and (5) To humiliate the non-Muslims and never to look up to him.

**Various Dimensions of WB in Modern Salafism**

In my observation, the concept of WB in modern Salafism is not static and fixed, but could be seen as having different roles or dimensions. These dimensions highlight the dynamism and complexity of WB. In addition, the multi-dimensional nature of WB is seen as important and useful for this research as it helps to understand the realities and dynamics of the concept in modern Salafism. Importantly, as mentioned before, it assists in the process of analysing the writings on WB by modern Salafis. As explained in the Introduction, the different roles or dimensions of WB in modern Salafism are:

1- **Creedal (aqidah) dimension**

This is the fundamental and most important dimension of WB. All Salafis are unanimous on this dimension of the concept. As stated earlier, at the *aqidah* level of the concept, all Salafis believe that WB is part of the faith and a true manifestation of the *shahadah*. They believe that the main objective behind WB is to cleanse Islam from any impurities and innovations. By having total loyalty only to Islam and disavowing all un-Islamic elements can *Tawhid* than be preserved.

2- **Social dimension**

The social dimension of WB is characterized by a portrayal of non-Muslims as potential enemies of the purity of Islamic rituals and customs. The very contact with these "enemies of God" is portrayed as being harmful to the Muslims' religion, which is why
Muslims should avoid all loyalty to them. It can be said that the social dimension of WB is the most emphasized.

The social aspect of the concept is seen by the Salafis as one that forbid Muslims to befriend the non-Muslims especially the Jews and Christians; and this is based on the Quranic verse of 5:51 mentioned earlier. Also Muslims are obliged to avoid any activity deemed by the Salafis as un-Islamic and posed a threat to the religion. Some of these activities include imitating non-Muslims in their language, dressing, names and culture. Also observing holidays and festivals of the non-Muslims as well as seeking assistance from non-Muslims. Some Salafis advocate the idea of *hijrah* to Muslim lands or from the *dar al-harb* (abode of war) to *dar al-Islam* (abode of Islam) as they believe it is the most viable solution for the dilemma faced by the Muslims. The idea of *hijrah* has however been given its exclusive interpretation and dimension by the Salafis. Basically, Salafis use the concept of *hijrah* in favour of the isolation of minority Muslims from the larger non-Muslim community.

3- **Political dimension**

The political dimension of WB refers to the use of WB by Salafis who actively incorporate elements of politics and political systems, rulers and diplomatic ties with other countries into their belief. At the political level, Salafis assert that Muslims must give their *wala*’ only to Muslim rulers who rule according to Islamic system. Muslim rulers who rule not with the *shariah* must be disavowed, and that Muslims must abandon any un-Islamic political system such as democracy, nationalism and secularism, just like the way they are required to perform *bara*’ of the *kuffar*. In other words, they are convinced that the concept of WB should not only be applied at the creedal and social level, but also to politics and diplomacy. Since diplomatic relations and friendly ties between Muslim countries and non-Muslim states are quite common, they are often highly critical of governments in the Muslim world. In its political form, WB was linked to the concept of *tawhid al-hakimiyya* (the unity of governance)\(^{200}\).

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\(^{200}\) It is important to note that the notion of *tawhid al-hakimiyyah* is rejected by some Salafis especially the purists. According to Salih Al-Fawzan, the addition of a fourth category of *tawhid* i.e. *tawhid al-hakimiyyah* is a misguidance. This is so as there are elements of politics in this particular category of *tawhid* which are always avoided by purist Salafis. For example, see *Shaykh Salih Al-Fawzan on Tawhid Al-Hakimiyyah*, Salafipublications.com available at http://www.spubs.com/sps/sp.cfm?subsecID=MNJ07&articleID=MNJ070005&articlePages=1 (accessed 12 March 2011).
relating to the judgement that a Muslim leader who does not rule by the entirety of the 
shariah was an infidel who should be overthrown, by violent means if necessary.

4- **Jihadi dimension**

The Jihadi dimension of WB is in many ways closely connected to the political 
dimension. Hence the Jihadi aspect of WB could also be termed as the “politico-Jihadi” 
dimension. This particular dimension of WB is only added and applied by the category 
of Salafis known as Jihadi Salafis.

Under the pretext of WB, Jihadi Salafis assert that the use of violence understood in the 
form of *jihad* is legitimized and sometimes obligatory on those Muslims who have 
negated the true manifestation of WB. At the political level of WB, these Salafis accuse 
incumbent Muslim political leaders as apostates for variety of reasons: (1) they ally 
themselves to the non-Muslims who they view as the enemies of Islam;\(^{201}\) (2) they ally 
themselves with the non-Muslims against Muslims;\(^{202}\) (3) they fail to fully implement 
the *shariah* law as the main constitution of the state; and (4) they agree and apply non- 
Islamic political systems such as democracy, secularism and nationalism.\(^{203}\) Due to 
these acts, Jihadi Salafis accuse Muslim leaders of violating the very concept of WB 
which is seen as violating the *aqidah*. This implies apostasy and a result, they should be 
attacked and their regime be overthrown via what they understand as an act of *jihad* for 
the cause of the religion.\(^{204}\)

As mentioned earlier, these four dimensions of WB in modern Salafism is significant as 
it highlights two things: (1) the diversity of opinions with regards to the concept among

\(^{201}\) See Ayman A-Zawahiri, *Al-Wala’ wal Bara’*: Aqidah Manqulah wa Waqi’ Mafqud, p. 23. 
\(^{202}\) The issue of forbiddance of alliance with non-Muslims against Muslims are dealt extensively in the 
 writings of several Jihadi Salafis such as Ayman Al-Zawahiri, *Al-Wala’ wal Bara’*: Aqidah Manqulah 
wa Waqi’ Mafqud, Nasr Bin Hamid al-Fahd, *Al-Tibyan fi Kufr Man A’ana al-Amrikan* (Clarification on 
the Apostasy of Those who assist the Americans); Hamoud Bin Uqla As-Shu’aiibi, *Al-Qawl al-Mukhtar 
fi Hukm al-Isti’ana bi al-Kuffar* (Chosen words on the Rulings of those who seek the assistance of the 
Infidels). These books will be discussed in depth in the following chapters of this thesis. 
\(^{203}\) For the works of Salafis on this issue, see Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi, *Millat Ibrahim* (The Religion 
of Abraham) and *Dimogratiyyah Diin* (Democracy is Religion). Both books are available at 
\(^{204}\) Jihadi Salafis practise an act known as *takfir* (ex-communication) of Muslim rulers who fail to 
implement *shariah* or, who apply non-Islamic political systems such as democracy, secularism and 
nationalism which are seen by the former as against Islamic teachings. This act of *takfir* will eventually 
lead to the concept of *jihad* which is manifested in the form of overthrowing and attacking their 
adversaries physically.
Salafis; (2) it is one of the reasons for the diversity or the different orientations of modern Salafism. This research not only attempt to show that WB is significant in the ideology of modern Salafism, but more importantly the different angles and spectrum of the concept; and how the various Salafi groups treat the concept in a variety ways. This framework will be used to analyse the writings on WB by modern Salafi thinkers (Chapter Five). The analysis is conducted by mainly observing the role of WB (i.e the dimensions of WB) within their intellectual systems. Through this analysis, it is concluded that a particular Salafi orientation has an effect on the style of writing and presentation of the concept by modern Salafis. This reflects the position of WB in modern Salafism as being fluid and multi-dimensional.

**Conclusion**

The second part of this chapter has briefly illustrated the centrality of WB in modern Salafism. The supremacy of the concept in modern Salafism is due to many factors of which the most important and obvious is its close connection to the *aqidah* as claimed by modern Salafis. Uniquely, we could also observe that the concept is conceptualized in the forms of: (1) dialectic – as it develops a contradictory antithesis and synthesis; (2) polemic – that is a form of controversial argument against a doctrine or belief and which is ultimately (3) adversarial – presented in the form of conflict, disagreement and hostility. Why is the conceptualized in this way? It is primarily because the concept is not known outside the Salafi circles. Modern Salafis create an exclusive meaning of the concept which means that practices they consider threatening to Islam may not be seen as such by other Muslims or the non-Salafis.

The unique and exclusive meaning of WB is one that is exclusively created, crafted and developed by modern Salafis. This creation is obviously based on the divine teachings of Islam specifically derived from the Quran and prophetic traditions. In order to have a comprehensive understanding of how WB is conceptualized and theologically legitimized, it is important that we look at its sources. This approach provides us with the understanding of the foundation of the concept before we move to discuss the current realities and complexities of it in modern Salafism. For this reason, we turn to the next chapter.
CHAPTER TWO: SIGNIFICANCE OF SURAH AL-MUMTAHANAH AND MILLAT IBRAHIM IN SALAFIS CONCEPTION OF AL-WALA’ WAL BARA’

Introduction

In Chapter One, we have mentioned the significance of WB in modern Salafism. We have also briefly seen how the Quran and Prophetic tradition play an important part in lending authenticity and legitimacy to the concept. Generally, verses prohibiting Muslims to form wala’ with the non-Muslims in the Quran are mentioned separately, and in different chapters (surah) or part of the chapters from those discussing issues of bara’. There is only a chapter in the Quran that discusses both issues of wala’ and bara’ together in the same chapter. It is the sixtieth chapter known as Surah Al-Mumtahanah (literally: Chapter of ‘The Woman Who is Examined’). It could be said that this particular chapter plays an important role in the theological formulation of modern Salafis conception of WB.

It is our belief that a comprehensive understanding of this surah is vital to comprehend how WB in modern Salafism is theologically legitimized and formulated. We would not be exaggerating to call this surah as the “Surah of Al-Wala’ wal Bara” due to Salafis’ intense reliance on this surah when addressing issues of WB. The surah forms the basis of Salafis understanding of the concept, while other verses on wala’ and bara’ serve to support the foundation of WB rooted from this surah. In particular, the surah exposes the characteristics of the “enemies of God and Muslims” whose alliance with them is forbidden. In addition, it is also from this surah that the concept of Millat Ibrahim (The religion of Abraham) is believed to be taken by modern Salafis to illustrate the importance of showing bara’ to non-Muslims. Modern Salafis refer to Millat Ibrahim to

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205 Millat in Arabic means a way or path but its use is mostly referred to mean “religion”. In the Quran, Prophet Ibrahim (Abraham) is a central figure and is described as a leader of humankind (Quran 2:124), a prophet and a friend of God (Quran 4:125). The Quran refers to the faith of Abraham as Millat Ibrahim due to the significance of Abraham’s journey and experiences in searching the truth from considering the star, moon and sun as gods but rejected them as mere creatures to the point he finally believe in God and totally disavow those who worship other than the One God. Millat Ibrahim is also known as Al-Hanifiyyah (Quran 10:104). In Islamic context, the one who follows the Millat Ibrahim is known as hanif (plural hunafa’). A hanif is also as known as muwahhid (one believes in tawhid). See Quran 16:120 and 123. In the Quran, the word millat is used in 15 different verses. Ten of them (2:120, 2:130, 2:135, 3:95, 4:125, 6:161, 12:37, 12:38, 16:123, 22:78) refers, either directly or indirectly, to Abraham.
show the urgency of following the footsteps of Prophet Abraham in disavowing non-Muslims.  

This chapter aims to illustrate how Surah Al-Mumtahanah and the idea of Millat Ibrahim in the surah, contribute significantly to the formulation of modern Salafi concept of WB. In addition, the chapter looks at how this surah is connected to other Quranic verses of wala’ and bara’ to form the typical Salafi brand of WB. Importantly, this chapter attempts to show how modern Salafis reading of the surah’s text and their interpretation of its context has transformed these particular Quranic injunctions, which seems to warn the early Muslims of the dangers of forming alliance with their hostile enemies into the foundation of a radical ideology. In particular, it highlights how the Jihadi Salafis interpret verses from this surah in light of the current political issues and development and combine it with the concept of takfir against Muslim rulers.

In what follows, the chapter begins with an introduction and a general understanding of Surah Al-Mumtahanah. In particular, it will highlight the reason behind its revelations, historical context and common themes of the surah. It then proceeds to explain the concept of Millat Ibrahim and other Quranic verses on WB; and how all these have shaped modern Salafis understanding of the concept. The chapter concludes that understanding the theological aspects of WB and how it is formulated and conceptualized by modern Salafis is important before we discuss the realities, complexities and diversities of the concept in modern Salafism.

**Introduction to Surah Al-Mumtahanah**

Surah Al-Mumtahanah is the sixtieth chapter of the 114 chapters of the Quran. It is from the type of surahs revealed entirely in Medina (in modern day Saudi Arabia), the place of Prophet Muhammad’s migration and where he died. The meaning of Al-Mumtahanah is “the woman who is examined”, and this meaning is somewhat mostly accepted. Some pronounce it as “Al-Mumtahinah which means “the examiner”. Hence,

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206 Modern Salafis have taken the concept of Millat Ibrahim as an important model and example of how Muslims should emulate Abraham by disavowing non-Muslims and develop a sense of hatred and enmity towards them. For more on Salafis perception of Millat Ibrahim, see Sulayman Ibn Abdillah, Al-Dala-il fi Hukm Muwalat Ahl Al-Ishrak (The Evidences for the Rulings Regarding Alliance with the Infidels and Matters Related to It), At-Tibyan Publications, undated, p. 38.

207 Due to its revelation in Medina, this surah is called surah madaniyyah (surah that is revealed in Medina) after the migration of the Prophet.
the first pronunciation would make the title a reference to the woman regarding whom the surah was revealed and the second would make it a reference to the nature of the surah itself in that it is meant to the test the people.\footnote{Al-Qurtubi, \textit{Al-Jami` li Ahkam al-Quran}, vol. 18, p. 46.} This is similar with the title of the nineth chapter, \textit{Surah Bara’ah} also being known as \textit{Al-Fadihah} (The Exposer). In any case, the classical Muslim exegete Ibn Hajar Al-Asqalani clarified that the stronger pronunciation is the first.\footnote{Ibn Hajar Al-Asqalani, Ahmad Ibn Ali \textit{Fath al-Bari bi Sharh Sahih Al-Bukhari}, Dar Ihya’ Al-Turath Al-Arabi, 1981, vol. 9, p. 263.}

\textit{Surah Al-Mumtahanah} was revealed upon Prophet Muhammad after the treaty of \textit{Hudaibiyyah}\footnote{The Treaty of Hudaybiyyah was an important event that took place during the formation of Islam. It was a pivotal treaty between Prophet Muhammad, representing the state of Medina, and the Quraish tribe of Mecca in March 628CE. It helped to decrease tension between the two cities, affirmed a ten-year peace, and authorized Muhammad's followers to return the following year in a peaceful pilgrimage, \textit{The First Pilgrimage}.} and before the conquest of Mecca. Like many other Medinan chapters, this surah serves to organize and structure the Muslim state and society by laying down the foundations that establish the religion, state and society.\footnote{Al-Zarqani, Muhammad Abd Al-Azim, \textit{Manahil al-Irfan fi Ulum Al-Quran}, Dar Ihya’ Al-Kutub Al-Arabiyyah: Isa al-Babi Al-Halabi, Cairo, 1953, vol.1, p. 191.} These foundations include matters of state development, governance, socialization and conduct of warfare. The surah encompasses a number of significant issues such as guidelines for dealing with others outside the realm of Islam, preserving the secrets of the Muslims society and characteristics of Muslims who give their allegiance to God and Islam and limits their relationship with enemies of Islam. Uniquely, one who reflects the verses of this surah will discover that the common theme connecting each of its individual parts revolves around the concept of WB; and that the surah adopts a unique style in clarifying these themes and principles.

As the surah is from the chapters that followed the movement of Islamic society in its most crucial moments i.e. fighting the symbols of unbelief, modern Salafis believe that Muslims today are in dire need of reflecting over the surah, since history repeats itself.\footnote{Wasim Fathullah, \textit{Al-Wala’ wal Bara’ in Surah Al-Mumtahinah: A Thematic Analysis of the Sixtieth Chapter of the Quran}, p. 6.} They see the surah as one which relates to the current situation of Muslims who are living amidst the infidels and disbelief. They read the circumstances behind the revelation of the surah and the message it brings as one that do not differ much from the nature of conflict that Muslims are facing today.

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The *surah* consists of 13 verses and can be divided into five parts. The first part (verses 1-3) talks about the warning of taking the enemies of God (referring to the hostile Meccans at the time of Prophet Muhammad) and loving them. It also reminds that family ties shall not profit the Muslims on the Day of Judgement. The second part (verses 4-6) instructs the Medinan Muslims on how they should behave towards the pagan Meccans by following the exemplary behavior of Prophet Abraham who disavowed the idol worshippers. This is known among the modern Salafis as *Millat Ibrahim*. The third part (verses 7-9) describes that God might bring love (*mawaddah*) between the warring parties and that He allows friendly relations with those Meccans who did not fight the Muslims for their religion and chase them out of their house. The fourth part of the *surah* instructs Muslims to examine Muslim women who flee to Medina after the treaty of Hudaibiyyah. This is so, since it was agreed in the treaty that Meccans joining the Muslims should be sent back. The *surah* commands that if a tested woman is indeed a true Muslim, then she should be accepted into the community and not be sent back to Mecca. This part of the *surah* also commands Muslims that they should sever the relation with their unbelieving women and that the latter are free to flee from Medina to Mecca. Finally, the fifth part of the *surah* (verse 13) points out again that Muslims should not take certain group of people as their friends.

A critical observation of all these parts of the *surah* reveals a common theme which is the theme of WB. Indeed the *surah* is from the *surahs* that are most uniform in terms of their subject matter, and this is because of the common theme that is present throughout the *surah*. What makes this *surah* unique is the way WB is affirmed from different angles such that its different parts and verses are all revolved around the same concept. The points in the *surah* that highlights the concept of WB as stipulated in all the five parts could be summarized as follows:213

1. The *surah* begins and ends with the same issue i.e. prohibiting *wala’* to the non-Muslims.

2. The *surah* points to the importance of having *wala’* to God, Islam and the Muslims such as it negates all other forms of *wala’* such as the family members who will not benefit Muslims in the Day of Judgement.

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213 Ibid, p. 16.
3. The surah attaches great significance to the fine example of the practicality of WB that is evident in Prophet Abraham who openly denounce bara‘ of his own people who refuse to believe in tawhid.

4. The surah provides guidelines for Muslims as which group of non-Muslims should be disavowed. The fact that the surah places as exception to the prohibition of wala‘ to non-hostile kuffar highlights the Quranic principle that regulates Muslim and non-Muslim relationship.

5. The surah confirms that Muslims will always be tested, and the purpose of this test is to ascertain their faith to God and Islam. It also points to the fact that the manifestations of WB involve not only the belief, but also one’s character which includes deeds and words. These manifestations are stipulated in the conditions of the act of bai‘ah (pledge of allegiance) which is described in the surah.

Our reading of the books by several prominent modern Salafi thinkers who have written on the subject of WB, reveals that all of them have quoted verses from this surah among others, to highlight the importance and validity of WB. In addition, the writings, statements and lectures of many Salafi scholars and thinkers who are consulted for the purpose of this research are found to contain verses from this particular surah. For example, the former mufti of Saudi Arabia, Ibn Baz uses verses 1-4 of this surah in his letter to the former mufti of Egypt, Jad al-Haq ‘Ali Jad al-Haq (d. 1996) refuting the latter’s stance on WB which he wrote in an article entitled Islam and Its Relation to Other Religions. As will be seen, the famous Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi discusses the concept of Millat Ibrahim from this surah in most of his books. Prominent modern Salafi figures such as Salih Al-Fawzan, Muhammad Saeed Al-Qahtani and Ayman Al-Zawahiri whose writings on WB will analysed in the last chapter of this thesis are found to have use verses of Surah Al-Mumtahanah extensively.

The surah begins by confirming the issue that forms the basis of WB in modern Salafism i.e. the division of people into two groups: one that believe in tawhid and another that disbelieves. The issue of wala‘ in this surah is addressed as early as, in the very first verse (ayah) of this surah which forbids Muslims to have allegiance with the

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non-Muslims and loving them. It also reveals who the “enemies of God and Muslims” are as referred to in the verse and surah. To understand how this verse has formulated Salafis conception of wala’, we need to return to the historical context in which the first verse of this surah is revealed which revolves around the story of Hatib Bin Abi Balta’ah.

The Story of Hatib Bin Abi Balta’ah

It was reported in many Quranic exegesis that the story of Hatib bin Abi Balta’ah (d. 650), a companion of Prophet Muhammad, is the reason for the revelation of Surah Al-Muntahanah. Hatib, a Muslim convert, was among those who migrated with Prophet Muhammad to Medina from Mecca in 622 as a result of the persecution and hostility of the Meccans that the Muslims faced. He had also participated in the battle of Badr, the first battle of Prophet Muhammad and Islam against the Meccans in 624. Hatib who was not belonged to the Quraish tribe of Mecca, fled to Medina and left behind his families and relatives in Mecca.

In 628, a treaty was drawn up between the Muslims in Medina under the leadership of Prophet Muhammad and the pagan Meccans. Known as the “Treaty of Hudaibiyyah”, it came after several years of hostile relations between the two parties. However, the Quraish Meccans nullified their pact with the Prophet by joining forces against his allies in Khuza’ah. This breach of treaty which was supposed to cease the attacks between

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215 The story of Hatib which is the sabab al-nuzul (reason for revelation) for verse 1 of Surah Al-Muntahanah could be found in many traditional and modern tafsir (exegesis). See for example Muhammad b. Ahmad Al-Qurtubi, Al-Jami’ li Ahkam Al-Quran, pp.50-1; Muhammad bin Jarir At-Tabari, Jam’i Al-Bayan an Ta’wil Ayi Al-Quran, pp. 285-7; Ahmad Ibn Shu’aib Ibn Ali Al-Nasa’I, Tafsir al-Nasa’I, Muassasah Al-Kutub Al-Thaqifiyyah, 1990, vol. 2, pp. 414-6; Abdullah Ibn Ahmad Ibn Mahmud Al-Nasafi, Tafsir Al-Nasafi: Madarik Al-Tanzil wa Haqaiq Al-Ta’wil (The Exegesis of Al-Nasafi: The Path of Revelation and the Realities of Interpretations) Dar Ibn Kathir, 1999, vo. 3, pp. 465-6; Sayyid Qutb, Fi Zilal Al-Quran (In the shades of the Quran), The Islamic Foundation and Islamonline.net. vol XVI, pp. 452-3 ; Ismail bin Katsir, Tafsir Ibn Katsir (Abridged), Darussalam Publishers and Distributors, September 2000, vol. 9, pp. 583-5. The story of Hatib could also be found in nearly all the authentic collections of hadith. See Sahih Al-Bukhari, book 52 Kitab Al-Jihad; Sahih Muslim book 44, Kitab Fada-il As-Sahabah (The Book of Attributes of the Companions); Abu Dawud, vo. 3 no. 47, Kitab Al-Jihad wa Al-Jasus (Book of Fighting and Spying) and Al-Tirmizi, vol. 5 no. 409. It is also mentioned by Ibn Al-Athir in Jam’ Al-Usul, vol. 8 p.385; Al-Wahidi in Al-Asbab, p. 447 and Al-Suyuthi in Al-Durr Al-Manthur, vol. 6, p. 203.

216 The term Quraish refers to a powerful merchant tribe that controlled Mecca in Arabia and the Ka’bah (the house which becomes the direction of prayers for the Muslims) during the days before the birth of Prophet Muhammad and the coming of Islam. Prophet Muhammad was born into the Banu Hashim clan of the Quraisy tribe.

217 Khuza’ah is a name of a place and also refers to a tribe (Banu Khuza’a) from Azd from Southern Arabian.
the Muslims and the Meccans, subsequently led to the Prophet’s decision to conquer Mecca in 630. It is at this point of the Islamic history that the story of Hatib begins.

Hatib who was concerned with the safety of his families and relatives in Mecca wrote secretly to the Quraish Meccans informing them of the Prophet’s plan to conquer the city. This action of Hatib, which could be obviously seen as betrayal to the Muslims, was intended to gain the trust of the Meccans whom Hatib hoped would protect his families and relatives so that they would be indebted to him. However, the Prophet got to know about this and instructed his companions Ali (d. 661), Al-Zubair (d. 656) and Al-Miqdad (d. unknown) to retrieve the letter from a woman at Rawdah Khakh. The woman who initially denied having the letter finally handed it over after being persuaded by the Prophet’s companions. The letter which was addressed from Hatib Bin Abi Balta’ah to the Meccans telling them about the Prophet’s plan was brought back to the Prophet who subsequently asked Hatib for an explanation.

Hatib who begged the Prophet not to make a hasty decision on himself explained that, unlike the Prophet’s kinsmen in Mecca, he could not protect his families as he did not belong to the Quraish tribe. He explained further that he had not done so out of disbelief nor to choose disbelief after Islam. He intended to do for the Quraish a favour so that they could protect his families and relatives. Upon hearing the clarification from Hatib, the Prophet told his companions that with regards to Hatib, he had told the truth. Umar, another companion of the Prophet, asked the Prophet’s permission to chop off Hatib’s head as a punishment for his hypocrisy and betrayal of the Muslims. However, the Prophet stopped him and said that Hatib had participated in the battle of Badr and that God perhaps had granted forgiveness to those who attended Badr no matter what they do.

The Issue of Wala’ and Salafis Debate on it

First, it is important to note that the surah’s first verse which was revealed on the story of Hatib, who gave his allegiance by revealing the secrets of the Muslims, is the basis for modern Salafis claim that Muslims are prohibited to give wala’ to the non-Muslims. Regarding the story of Hatib who would had his head chopped off if not because of his participation in the battle of Badr, clearly signifies the grave consequences of forming alliance with non-Muslims, even if it is not a conviction in one’s heart. This occurrence
of Hatib has led to debates among modern Salafis with regards to what constitutes kufr.\textsuperscript{218} Can someone be declared kafir due to his actions without considering what is actually in the heart? Why Hatib was not declared a kafir since his actions clearly shows kufr?\textsuperscript{219}

In the case of Hatib, his action of betraying the Muslims by revealing their secret to the enemies clearly indicates kufr due to his loyalty and alliance to the enemies of the Muslims. However, he was spared from being punished for a specific reason that cannot be repeated for anyone else. Here, some modern Salafis use this part of Hatib’s story to prove that external manifestation (‘amal bil jawarih) is sufficient to declare one’s infidelity regardless of what he believes in the heart (tasdiq bil qalb).\textsuperscript{220} They argue that Hatib’s apostasy is explicit from the statement of the Prophet to his Companions who wanted to execute Hatib that “perhaps God looked at those who witnessed Badr and forgave their sins”. On the other hand, other Salafis argue that kufr can only be determined if someone clearly declare and pronounce it.\textsuperscript{221} Using the same story of Hatib, they argue that the fact Hatib clarified to the Prophet that he did not commit the act out of disbelief and apostasy, but because of the security of his families, and the subsequent confirmation by the Prophet that he has mentioned the truth, clearly shows that conviction of the heart is a condition before kufr can be determined. This claim is rejected by Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi who rebuts that the Prophet’s statement “as regards to Hatib he has told the truth” serves as an affirmation of truthfulness of Hatib’s claim and not an approval of Hatib’s claim.\textsuperscript{222} Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi who was born as Isam Mohammad Taher al-Barqawi is an Islamist from Jordan and is widely-

\begin{footnotesize}
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  \item First, it is important to note here that modern Salafis debate on kufr encompasses various issues and not only limited to the issue of forming alliance with non-Muslims. In modern Salafism, particularly in Jihadi Salafism, the takfiri ideology is closely connected to the concept of WB. In the Jihadi Salafi line of thinking, Hatib’s action is considered kufr because the Jihadis view the act of assisting non-Muslims and supporting them against Muslims as one that negates the Muslim faith. Apart from the issue of forming alliance with non-Muslims, Salafis debate on kufr could also be seen in other matters such as ruling with other than what God has revealed (hukm bi ghair ma anzala Allah). Salafis debate on this particular issue and its relation to kufr and WB will be illustrated briefly in Chapter Four of this thesis. Second, it has to be mentioned that Salafis debate on kufr of those who form wala’ with the non-Muslims as discussed here is explained in brevity, and that the debate could be more complex than this. Their debate on kufr regarding the issue of wala’ mainly revolves the question of relation between the internal belief (iman) and the outer action of a Muslim.
  \item As will be seen, this position is dominantly taken by the Jihadi Salafis.
  \item This stance is especially taken by the purist Salafis and many Salafis in general.
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known as the mentor for former leader of Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi. Born in Nablus, Palestine in 1958, Al-Maqdisi is regarded one of the most prominent thinkers on the current evolution of jihadi ideology which has been widely adopted by many contemporary militant Islamist groups. According to Al-Maqdisi, Hatib told the truth in compliance of his statement to that of his conviction, not by its compliance with that present situation and reality.

Salafis who believe that Hatib’s action constitute 
kufr is due to three reasons:

1. The statement of Umar who said “Let me strike the neck of this hypocrite (referring to Hatib)”. This statement of Umar is clear evidence that assisting and supporting (muzaharah) the kuffar is kufr and one who commits it, has performed an act of apostasy (riddah). Umar has said so because he understands what he saw of Hatib’s action. He acted based on what he witnessed (and that the punishment of apostasy in Islam is death) and not the intention of Hatib.

2. The fact that no one had criticized Umar’s judgment and takfir implies that Hatib has really committed an act of kufr. This is also supported by the scenario that the Prophet seems to approve Umar’s statement. Had he not been correct on his judgment, he would have been silenced or corrected. In addition, the statement from the Prophet that Hatib had an acceptable excuse for his action further confirms Hatib’s apostasy.

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225 Muhammad Bin Abdullah Al-Mas’ari, Al-Muwaalah wal Mu’adah, Tanzim At-Tajdid Al-Islami, p. 74.

226 See Aiding the Kuffar and the Incident of Hatib posted at the website of Salafimedia.com Upon the Religion of Abraham available at http://salafimedia.com/ageedah/al-walaa-wal-baraa/item/1618-aiding-the-kuffar-and-the-incident-of-hatib-ra.html (accessed 11 March 2012). This position on Hatib’s kufr is believed to be widely held by the Jihadi Salafis. This is so, as one who observes this website (which is among the recent websites developed by Salafis) and reflects upon its contents and postings would find that it has a strong Jihadi Salafi orientation. The website glorifies Salafi figures such as Osama Bin Laden (d. 2011), Hammoud Bin Abdullah Bin Uqla Al-Shuaibi (d. 2001), Abu Qatadah Al-Filistaini (b. 1960), Abu Hamzah Al-Masri (b. 1958), Omar Bakri Muhammad (b. 1958) and many others who are all of Jihadi orientation. It also criticizes followers of Madkhali Salafism which it accuses as deviated from the “true” Salafiyah. In addition, the website has posted 13 articles on the subject of WB.
3. The manner Hatib defended himself by saying “I had not done so out of disbelief nor to choose disbelief after Islam” clearly shows that Hatib did understand that the action of assisting the non-Muslims against Muslims is an act of *kufr*, and that he ensured to mention the reality of his action before any judgment could be passed on him. In another version of *hadith*, Hatib said “I did not take this action to fool the Messenger of God or due to *nifaq* (hypocrisy). Furthermore, I had the belief that God will make His messenger victorious and complete his divine radiance”227. In another narration Hatib said “O Messenger of God, by Allah the *iman* in my heart never changed”. These narrations as the Salafis claim, show that Hatib carried the belief that assisting and supporting the *kuffar* against Muslim is *kufr* and clear apostasy. And that this action would mean showing consent to the act of *kufr* and would be *nifaq* (hypocrisy) and deceit to the Prophet. For this reasons, Hatib wanted to clarify his belief and intention to the Prophet.228

Nasir Bin Hammad Al-Fahad, a well-known Jihadi Salafi from Saudi Arabia, is among those who believe that the act of *muzaharah al-kuffar* (supporting the non-Muslims) against the Muslims like what Hatib did, constitutes *kufr*. Al-Fahad was born in Riyadh in 1968. He had a distinguished academic career graduating from the Imam University and the University of Sharia in Riyadh. In 1991, Al-Fahad earned his doctorate and was appointed dean at the Faculty of Principles of the Religion (*Usul al-Din*) in the Department of Creed and Modern Ideologies. He grew increasingly radical in his preaching and was arrested in September 1994 for his subversive teachings. When he was released in 1997, he no longer had his faculty position so he began focusing his time and energy on highlighting two major points: the apostasy of Arab regimes and the need for Muslims to wage warfare against Jews and Christians.229

In his book *Al-Tibyan fi Kufr man A’aana Al-Amrikan* (The Exposition Regarding the Disbelief of one that assists the Americans), Al-Fahad says that ‘*muzaharah al-kuffar* against the Muslims is from that which opposes the two *shahadahs*’230. He continues “…it is from the fundamentals of *tawhid* and it is the greatest of the fundamentals of *bara’*

227 Ibid.
228 Ibid.
230 The two *shahadahs* refers to the proclamation that there is no God except Allah and that Muhammad is His Messenger.
and *kufr* in the *taghut* and from the greatest fundamentals of *Millat Ibrahim* which is hatred and enmity towards the *kuffar*.\(^{231}\)

It is important to note here that while the issue of *kufr* arising from the story of Hatib becomes a point of debate among the Salafis, generally most Salafis agree this verse forms the basis and evidence for the prohibition of assisting non-Muslims against the Muslims. The point of debate that Salafis had with regards to the story of Hatib is only about the issue whether *kufr* should be determined and justified from conviction or action. However, modern Salafis in general use this verse to prove that non-Muslims should not be given *wala’* and taken as *awliya’* (“friends” according to Salafis definition), and love (*mawaddah*) as they are described as “enemies of God” as stipulated in the verse. What these “enemies of God” deserve, according to the Salafis is complete *bara’* from the Muslims.

The importance of showing *bara’* to the “enemies of God” or the *kuffar*, according to the Salafis becomes more urgent since the second verse of the *surah* says that ‘the *kuffar* desire that Muslims should disbelieve in God (*wa wadduu lau takfurun*)’. When Hatib gave the excuse that his action was not due to his unbelief but rather he had families and relatives to secure, God revealed verse 4 which says “*Neither your relatives nor your children will benefit you on the Day of Resurrection. He will judge between you, and Allah sees what you do*. Using this basis, Salafis emphasize that *wala’* to God and Islam is above others including family members. They argue that the story of Hatib clearly shows that families and relatives, whose sake God is disobeyed, will not benefit the Muslims and worse would return as a source of loss and distress for them.

**Defining the “Enemies” of God and Muslims**

The first verse of this *surah* which was revealed on the occasion of Hatib as mentioned above says:

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\text{O you who believe! Do not take my enemies}
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\[
\text{('aduwwi) and your enemies ('aduwwakum) as friends,}
\]

\[
\text{showing affection towards them while they have}
\]

disbelieved in what has come to you of the truth, and have driven out the Messenger and yourselves because you believe in Allah, your Lord, if you have come forth to strive in my Path and to seek my good pleasure. You show love to them in secret while I am aware of what you conceal and what you reveal. And whosoever of you does that, he has indeed gone astray from the straight path.232

In revealing this verse, the Quran uses the term ‘aduw (enemy) to refer to the disbelieving hostile Meccans. In fact, the use of the term “enemy” is mentioned four times in this surah; twice in verse 1 i.e. ‘aduwwi (my enemy) and ‘aduwwakum (your enemy); once in verse 2 i.e. ‘adaa’ (enemies) and in verse 4 it is mentioned as ‘adaawah (enmity). The use of these words which are stressed and repeated is significant as it sends a strong message to the Salafis that those who do not believe in tawhid are the real enemies of God, Islam and the Muslims who should be disavowed.

As described earlier, this verse was revealed due to the context of Hatib Bin Abi Balta’ah who betrayed the Prophet and the Muslims in Medina by secretly planned to inform the hostile Meccans of the Prophet’s intention to attack them. From the story of Hatib which becomes the reason for the revelation (sabab al-nuzul) of this verse and subsequently verse 8 and 9, it is obvious that the “enemy” (‘aduw) here refers to the hostile pagan Meccans. These enemies as stipulated in the verse are described as “people who have disbelieved” (wa qad kafaru), “have fought the Muslims because of their religion” (qaataluukum fid din) and “have driven the Prophet and Muslims out of their homes” (yukhrijuukum min diyaarikum) as stipulated in verse 9. The historical context of this verse shows that the enemies are no ordinary non-Muslims but those who are hostile to the Muslims. These characteristics of the “enemies” seem to suggest that the verse exclude other non-Muslims who, although do not believe in Islam and tawhid, but they do not fight the Muslims because of their religion and chase them out of their homes who should not be regarded as enemies. The exclusion of those who do fight the Muslims as enemies is subsequently confirmed by verse 8:

232 Quran 60:1.
God does not forbid you regarding those who have not fought you on account of the Religion, and have not expelled you from your homes, that you should be virtuous to them and be equitable with them; surely God loves the equitable. God forbids you only regarding those who have fought you on account of Religion, and have expelled you from your homes, and have given support in your expulsion, that you should take them for friends; and whoso takes them for friends, those are the wrong-doers.\textsuperscript{233}

It is reported in the prophetic tradition\textsuperscript{234} that this verse is revealed on the occasion of Asma’ binte Abu Bakar (d. 695), daughter of the first caliph of Islam and sister of the Prophet’s wife, Aishah (d. 678) who, during the treaty of Hudaibiyyah consulted the Prophet on whether she should accept a gift from her disbelieving mother Qutaylah (d. unknown). The Prophet advised that she should be kind to her mother and subsequently God revealed this particular verse. This particular verse meticulously confirms that Muslims could develop the notion of kindness, fairness and justice towards non-Muslims as long they are not hostile and aggressive.\textsuperscript{235}

However, modern Salafis contend that the objective of this verse (which does not forbid Muslim from being kind and just to non-Muslims) is to provide opportunities for Muslims to portray Islam to this group of people for whom guidance is hoped due to not fighting the Muslims, while maintaining the religious enmity that is mandated due to their disbelief.\textsuperscript{236} It is hope that the disbelieving relatives of Muslims will accept Islam when they are exposed to the treatment of kindness and justice that meant to bring their hearts close to Islam. Some Salafis even believe that this particular verse is abrogated with the verse of the sword (Quran 9:5) which says: “\textit{When the sacred months are over}"

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{233} Quran 60:8-9.
\item \textsuperscript{234} See \textit{Sahih Al-Bukhari} hadith 4274.
\item \textsuperscript{235} Salafis differentiate between the notion of befriending non-Muslims and be kind to them. This verse, according to some Salafis particularly the Jihadis, while does not forbid for Muslims to be kind and just to the non-Muslims does not necessarily allows friendship with them. See Ayman Al-Zawahiri, \textit{Al-Wala’ wal bara’}: Agidah Manqalaw wa Waqi’ Mafqud, p. 13. Friendship according to Zawahiri is still forbidden because of the many verses from other \textit{sura}s of the Quran that forbids Muslims from befriending the non-Muslims. However, Salafis’ opponents understand this verse as one that shows the permissibility of friendship with the non-Muslims as long as the relationship is not based upon the \textit{aqidah} – that is to say that Muslims must not embrace their religious belief.
\item \textsuperscript{236} Wasim Fathullah, \textit{Al-Wala’ wal Bara’ in Surah Al-Mumtahanah}, p. 35.
\end{itemize}
slay the idolaters wherever you find them. Arrest them, besiege them, and lie in ambush everywhere for them. If they repent and take to prayer and render the alms levy, allow them to go their way. God is forgiving and merciful.”

However Salafis who reject this claim of abrogation believe that the claim that this verse is abrogated by the verse of the sword is weak, especially since the verse does not contradict other verses that have been claimed to abrogate it and that the claim of abrogation is also not supported by a majority of the scholars of tafsir.

However, Salafis generally believe that the enmity that is being referred to in this particular verse is not merely limited to the type of enmity which involves fighting and military confrontations. Rather, it refers to complete enmity that originates from one’s heart and religious convictions at all times. They assert that it is important to note that the descriptions of “…My enemy and your enemy…” and “…showing love towards them….” should not be taken as the only aspects of prohibition, since the verse constitutes a clear prohibition from taking the non-Muslims as friends. This is based on Quran 20:117 where God describes the Iblis to be the enemy of Adam and his wife. The Quran reveals on the story of Adam:

And when We said to the Angels: “Prostrate to Adam”.
So, they prostrated except Iblis. He was one of the Jin, and he disobeyed the command of his Lord. Will you

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237 The claim that verses in Chapter 9 of the Quran (Surah Al-Tawbah or Bara’ah) abrogated this verse (Quran 60:8-9) and also other Quranic verses that talk about jihad as self-defence, patience and tolerance towards non-Muslim revealed earlier forms the basis for the idea of perpetual war between Muslims and non-Muslim as comprised in the ideology of Jihadi Salafism. This claim, however, is rejected by most Muslim scholars and other Salafi groups as there is no evidence to support it. With regards to Quran 9:5, there is no mention about it abrogating earlier verses on defensive jihad according to Al-Tabari and Ibn Kathir. In fact, Al-Qurtubi reported that some scholars, among them Al-Dahhak and Atha’, were of the view that Quran 9:5 was abrogated by other verses in the Quran (47:4). See Muhammad b. Ahmad Al-Qurtubi, Al-Jami` Lli Ahkam Al-Quran, Vol. 4, part 8, p. 47; Ismail bin Kathir, Tafsir Ibn Katsir, Dar Al-Fikr, 1980, Vol. 2, p. 338; Muhammad bin Jarir Al-Tabari, Jami` Al-Bayan ‘An Takwil Ayi Al-Quran, Vol. 6, part 10, p. 80–1; vol. 13, part 26, pp. 40–4; Abu Ishaq Asy-Syatibi, Al-Muwafaqat Fi Usul Al-Fiqh, Vol. 3, p. 97–8; Abu Hamid Al-Ghazali, Al-Mustasfa Min Ilm Al-Usul, Dar Ihya’ Al-Turath Al-Arabi, Vol. 2, p. 50; Wahbah Al-Zuhaili, Al-Tafsir Al-Munir Fi Al-Aqidah wa Al-Shariah wa Al-Manhaj, Dar Al-Fikr, Damascus, 1991, Vol. 10, pp. 110, 175–8. See also See David Bukay, Peace or Jihad? Abrogation in Islam, Middle East Quarterly, Fall 2007, pp. 3–11 available at http://www.meforum.org/1754/peace-or-jihad-abrogation-in-islam (accessed 12 March 2011) and Louay Safi, Peace and the Limits of War: Transcending Classical Conception of Jihad, chapter 4–War of Domination, available at http://insight.org/articles/2001/peace-war/index.htm (accessed 12 March 2011).

238 Wasim Fathullah, Al-Wala’ wal Bara’ in Surah Al-Mumtahanah, p 35-36. The claim by Salafis that this verse is abrogated by Quran 9:5 is based on several tafsir that mention this abrogation including Ibn Al-Arabi, Al-Jassas and Al-Tabari.

239 Wasim Fathullah, Al-Wala’ wal Bara’ in Surah Al-Mumtahanah, p. 19.
then take him and his offspring as protectors and helpers rather than Me while they are enemies to you?  
What an evil exchange for the wrongdoers!\textsuperscript{240}

Based on these two verses, Salafis claim that the term “enmity” in the Quran is far more general than military confrontations. Therefore, it is not only limited to the non-Muslims who are at war with the Muslims. This is also the case with the verse “[...] showing love towards them [...]” as the prohibition is not limited to what is described in the verse. Rather, Salafis assert that it is simply an example of how \textit{wala’} is generally manifested, and the point of mentioning it was to confirm the censure of those Muslims who showed \textit{tawalli} (act of taking as friends) of the non-Muslims. It is as if the verse is saying: ‘How can you take these enemies as \textit{awliya’}, and how can you show them your love?’\textsuperscript{241} Modern Salafis who held this position use the opinion of Ibn Kathir who Salafis always refer to on this verse. Unlike majority of classical \textit{mufassirin} who view the enemies in this verse as those polytheists who were hostile to the Muslims, Ibn Kathir generalizes the meaning and category of enemies to including not only those who are hostile to Muslims, but all non-Muslims in general, especially the Jews and Christians. This is so as he equates this verse with Quran 5:51 which deals with the Jews and Christians in similar words. This implies that Ibn Kathir define enemies as including all non-Muslims regardless of whether they are hostile to the enemies or not.\textsuperscript{242}

It is believed that the reason why most modern Salafis use this first verse of \textit{Surah Al-Mumtahanah} to show that all non-Muslims should be regarded as enemies, and not specifically the hostile ones is due to their influence of scholars like Ibn Kathir. As mentioned in the Introduction and previous chapter, modern Salafis especially the Saudi Salafis (Wahhabis) are heavily influenced by the writings of medieval scholars such as Ibn Taimiyyah, Ibn Qayyim Al-Jawziyya and Ibn Kathir among others. As will be seen in the next chapter, Saudi Salafis use the concept of WB as an important tool to ward off \textit{kufr}, \textit{shirk} and any religious innovations in their attempt to maintain the purity of Islam. The effort to maintain this purity, according to them also includes disavowing not only \textit{kufr}, but also people of \textit{kufr} who are the non-Muslims. As such, these Salafis are

\textsuperscript{240} Quran 20:116-7  
\textsuperscript{241} Ibid.  
more inclined to the opinions of scholars such as Ibn Kathir whose religious views seem to be in line and compatible with their understanding of WB.

**Wala’ and Bara’ From the Examples of Prophet Abraham**

After revealing the story of Hatib in the first part of the *surah*, the Quran moves to speak about another story, which like the story of Hatib becomes the basis for modern Salafis’ conception of WB. This story could be seen as one that provides the cure for the “disease” of forming alliances and loving the non-Muslims as stipulated in the story of Hatib. It specifically informs the Muslims of how they should deal with the group of people described earlier in the first verse of the *surah*. It is from this particular story that modern Salafis notion of *bara’* of the *kuffar* is conceptualized. It is no less than the story in the life of Prophet Abraham who disavows his own idol-worshipping community including his father who refused to believe in *tawhid*. It is from this particular story of the *surah* that Salafis claim “open disavowal from the non-Muslims is a necessity of *tawhid*” emerges. It is also from this particular story of Abraham from the Quran that Salafis concept of concept of *bara’* from the *kuffar* was conceptualized. The verses that informs us this story of Abraham goes as follow:-

> Indeed there has been an excellent example for you in Abraham and those with him when they said to their people: “Verily we are free (*bura-a-u*) from you and whatever you worship besides Allah. We have rejected you, and there has started between us and you enmity and hatred forever until you believe in Allah alone”, except the saying of Ibrahim to his father: “Verily I will ask for forgiveness for you, but I have no power to do anything for you before Allah.”

The concept of **Millat Ibrahimm** as contained in this verse refers to the sincerity and loyalty of Prophet Abraham who submits himself devotedly to the worship of Allah alone, the only One God. His sincerity towards *tawhid* is further shown by his destruction of the idols which are worshipped by his community and his disavowal of them as illustrated in this verse. The verse portrays Prophet Abraham’s disavowal of

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243 Quran 60:4.
those who worship idols including his own father. Abraham and his followers uttered the word “bura-a-u” (free from or disavow) which shows that they were free from what is being worshipped other than God. If the story of Hatib becomes the basis for wala’, this verse, however, becomes the basis for Salafis conception of bara’.

Modern Salafis use this verse to point out three important elements that are comprised in the concept of WB:

1. The obligation of announcing one’s disavowal of kufr and kuffar. The fact that Abraham said to his people that “he is free from them” (bura-a-u minkum) “and from what they worship besides Allah” (wa mimma ta’buduuna min duni Allah) signifies the obligation that a Muslim should show his bara’ from both the kuffar and their act of disbelief (kufr). This stand is generally accepted by many Salafis. While all Salafis agree that Muslims should show their bara’ from kufr, however, they differ on how bara’ from the kuffar should be manifested.

2. This verse shows that the basis of relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims must remain on enmity (’adawah) and hatred (baghda’); and that non-Muslims must be rejected and disavowed until they submit to Islam and tawhid (hatta tu’minuu billahi wahdah).

3. The verse shows that tawhid, mahabbah (love) and wala’ are not merely activities of the heart (internal) but should also be manifested by words and the outer limbs (external action). This is based on the story of Abraham who openly declares kufr and physically destroyed all the idols worship by his own people. This explains why Jihadi Salafis call for the killing and elimination of the kuffar since they do not worship Allah.

244 The story of Abraham disavowing the idols worshipped by his father and people is also mentioned in Quran 43:26 which says: “And when Abraham said to his father his people “Indeed I am free from that which you worship, except for He that created me and indeed He will guide me”. And he made it a word remaining among his descendants so that perhaps they might return to it”.

245 It is important to note here that while this verse becomes the basis for Salafis conception of bara’, there are other Quranic verses that are used to support the modern Salafis conception and claim of bara’ such as Quran 9:1 which says: “Freedom (bara-ah) from all obligations is declared from Allah and His Messenger to those of the musyrikin with who you made a treaty”.

246 Salafis’ opponents reject Salafis line of reasoning regarding the issue of bara’ by stating that while it is true Abraham said that “enmity and hatred have appeared between us”, his enmity towards the idol worshippers is of a mutual one. Abraham did not declare enmity when he first encountered the idol worshippers. Rather he called them to Islam and the worship of one God with utmost sincerity and kind words. However, when the idol worshippers rejected him and showed their hatred and enmity towards him, it was natural for him to respond in kind. This is necessary for him to safeguard his belief and ensure his security.
We have seen earlier how different Salafis use verse 1 of *Surah Al-Mumtahanah* to prove the validity and importance of not showing *wala’* to non-Muslims. Similarly, they use this verse 4 of the *surah* to highlight the obligation of *bara’* to the non-Muslims, although the verse explicitly refers to a specific group of people that Prophet Abraham disavowed i.e. the idol worshippers and they are not hostile to him. The reason for Abraham’s disavowal of the idol worshippers and his expression of enmity and hatred is merely due to their rejection of *tawhid*. To provide the validity and substance to their project of WB, modern Salafis see this verse as one that requires all Muslims to disavow, hate and develop a sense of enmity to all non-Muslims in general, and this is mainly due to the latter’s rejection of *tawhid*. For example, Ibn Baz in his definition of WB uses this verse to show that Muslims must show their enmity and hatred to non-Muslims.\(^{247}\) Similarly, prominent modern Salafi authors on WB such as Salih Al-Fawzan, Muhammad Saeed Al-Qahtani, Abdul Rahman Abdul Khalqi, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi and many others have all use this verse as an important evidence for the obligation of *bara’*. Significantly, Nasir Al-Fahad when asked whether Muslims who reside amongst the non-Muslims should call the latter to Islam, responded by saying:\(^{248}\)

> Da’wah of Islam is a tremendous virtue and it is the works of the Prophets and people of rectification. If you perform it then you have followed Islam and if you didn’t, then you must at least manifest the *din*.

Manifesting the *din* is not merely in you praying and fasting in front of them. On the contrary, you are to manifest the *bara’* towards them and their *din* and by hating them and their *din*.\(^{249}\)

Al-Fahad then continues to quote this verse (Quran 60:4) and says:-

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\(^{249}\) Ibid.
Look here at his words: “[...] from you all and that you worship [...]”. Hence he began with bara’a from them before their objects of worship. That is because there are some who declare their disavowal from their objects of worship while not declaring their disavowal from them. Look at his words: “We have disbelieved in you [...]” and not only disbelieve in their objects of worship. And [look] at his words: “[...] And there has appeared …” – meaning manifested towards them, and [look] at his words: “[…] enmity and hatred [...]”. So, he proceeded with enmity over hatred (mentioning it first). That is because there are some who hate them but they do not oppose them with enmity. Therefore whoever is mixing with them (the non-Muslims), then he must actualize this Millat Ibrahim. Otherwise, it is not allowed to reside amongst them.²⁵⁰

Al-Fahad claims that it is obligatory for Muslims who reside in non-Muslim countries to actualize the Millat Ibrahim by way of declaring bara’ from the kuffar and their religion, and to openly show them hatred and enmity.²⁵¹ As seen from the response of Al-Fahad above, modern Salafis, especially the Jihadis, use this particular verse to highlight that Muslims should hate and disavow both the kuffar and the kufr in them as the verse says “...from you all and that you worship...”. The issue of whether one should hate the kufr and not the kuffar, or hate both the kufr and kuffar has resulted in a debate between the modern Salafi groups especially between the purists and Jihadi Salafis. This debate will be discussed briefly in Chapter Four of this thesis.

Jihadi Salafis besides having the same stance of taking all non-Muslims as enemies that should be disavowed, add another angle of interpretation to this particular verse. They view that the idol worshippers as referred to in the story of Prophet Abraham to include Muslims especially rulers and governors who do not rule by God’s legislations and accept foreign and “un-Islamic” political systems such as democracy and secularism. These systems according to Jihadi Salafis are “idols” that should be disavowed. For

²⁵⁰ Ibid.
²⁵¹ Ibid.
example, Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi solely base this particular verse to show his understanding of *bara’* and his disavowal of Muslim rulers whom he equates as “idol worshippers” (*tawaghit*) for their adherence to man-made law instead of the *shariah*. In the opening of his famous book *Millat Ibrahim*, Al-Maqdisi declares:

To the transgressing rulers (*tawaghit*) of every time and place… To the transgressing rulers (*tawaghit*); the governors and the leaders and the Caesars and the Kisrahs (Persian Emperors) and the Pharaohs and the Kings… to their servants and their misguiding scholars (*‘ulama*)… to their supporters and their armies and their police and their intelligence services… and their guardians… to all of them collectively, we say: “Verily we are free from you and whatever you worship besides Allah”. Free from your retched laws, methodologies, constitutions and values… free from your repugnant governments, courts, distinguishing characteristics and media…”We have rejected you, and there has become apparent between us and you, enmity and hatred forever, until you believe in Allah alone.”

This declaration of disavowal by Al-Maqdisi is unique in the sense that the words uttered by Prophet Abraham and his people as stipulated in the Quranic verse 60:4 are nicely positioned within the words of Al-Maqdisi. Al-Maqdisi is famous for his radical treatment of the concept WB. He has taken WB from Saudi Salafi scholars and turns it into a political tool that forces Muslims rulers to submit fully to the legislations of God. In other words, Al-Maqdisi calls for the concept to be applied in a political

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255 Al-Maqdisi is believed to have spent several years studying in Saudi Arabia under many prominent Saudi Salafi scholars before he moves to Pakistan and Afghanistan. It is from here that he is exposed to the Wahhabi teachings and writings of Ibn Taimiyah and Ibn Al-Qayyim.

context; and the fact that he believes Muslim rulers should be attacked and killed due to their adherence to un-Islamic system shows his understanding of the concept has a strong Jihadi element. Most of his books and writings such as *Millat Ibrahim, Dimuqratiyah Dinun, Al-Kawashif Al-Jaliyyah fi kufr al-Dawlah As-Sa’udiyah* and *Tuhfah Al-Muwahhidin* revolve around the concept of WB. He believes that adherence to man-made laws is a form of misplaced *wala’* and accuses Muslim leaders, politicians and government officials as *kuffar* for their adherence to this laws which he equates as “idols”. Thus Muslims, according to him must emulate Prophet Abraham by disavowing and attacking these rulers through *jihad* which he and most all Jihadi Salafis believe is the highest form of showing *bara’* to the enemies of God.

The official website of Salafimedia.com whose central theme is “Upon the Religion of Abraham” posted a “Declaration of *Bara’*” which seems similar to the declaration of Al-Maqdisi in his opening of *Millat Ibrahim*, even paraphrasing the actual words of verse 4 of *Surah Al-Mumtahanah*. The declaration reads:

To the Pharaohs of this era, and to their regimes, and their agents... To the ministers, bishops, and rabbis of the *tawaghit*... To all of them we say: “We do not worship that which you worship, to you is your religion, and to us is our *din*”. We disbelieve in you and in your gods, legislations, and your constitutions and we have rejected your parliaments which you worship along with Allah and there has emerged between us and you hostility and hatred forever – until you return to *tawhid*, and apply His legislation alone and accept it with full submission.258

257 For more on how Jihadi Salafis apply WB at the political context, see Joas Wagemakers “Framing the "threat to Islam": al-*wala’* wa al-*bara’* in Salafi discourse” available at http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Framing+the+%22threat+to+Islam%22:+al-*wala’*+wa+al-*bara’*+in+Salafi... (accessed 14 February 2009).

Parts Four and Five of *Surah Al-Mumtahanah*

Part four of *Surah Al-Mumtahanah* (verses 10-12) speaks about the command for Muslims in Medina to test the belief of migrating women to Medina from Mecca who flee from their disbelieving husbands. Verses from this part of the *surah* do not directly address the issue of WB, and hence are not always used by modern Salafis when addressing the subject of WB. Nevertheless, as mentioned earlier in the chapter, all the five parts of this *surah* revolves around the common theme of WB. This part of the *surah*, although do not speaks directly on WB, could be understood as one that revolves around the concept. The fact that God commands the Muslims to test the migrating women; and forbids the Muslims to return these women to their husbands if they are proved to be believers shows the importance of *wala’* to Islam and the Muslims. The command to separate believing women from their disbelieving husbands clearly shows the urgency to separate *kufr* from *iman*. These verses due to their indirect connection with WB will not be dealt extensively in this chapter.

As we have seen, the four parts of this *surah*, especially the first, second and third deals extensively on the matters of WB. We have also seen how these parts of the *surah* and its verses are important for modern Salafis when addressing the subject of WB. The final part of the *surah* which is also the last verse of the *surah* could be seen as summarizing all that has been said in the entire *surah*. It also seems to tie the beginning of the *surah* to its end. The *surah* ends with the verse saying:

> O you believe! Do not ally (*la tatawallau*) with the people who have incurred the wrath of Allah. Surely, they have been in despair to receive any good in the Hereafter just as the disbelievers have been in despair about those in graves.\(^{259}\)

If the *surah* begins with addressing the issue of WB in regards to a specific group of non-Muslims, this last verse of the *surah* seems to emphasize WB with regards to non-Muslim in general. Ibn Kathir interpreting this verse said in his famous *tafsir* that God forbids Muslims from having *wala’* to the non-Muslims at the end of the *surah* just as he

\(^{259}\) Quran 60:13.
did in the first.\textsuperscript{260} The non-Muslims, according to Ibn Kathir include the Jews and Christians (as in Quran 5:51) and all the disbelieving people who have earned God’s wrath and curse. Ibn Kathir added in his \textit{tafsir} that how people who have incurred the wrath of God and expelled from His mercy be given \textit{wala’} from the Muslims.\textsuperscript{261}

We can see that the \textit{surah} ends with the verse that summarizes all that have been mentioned throughout the \textit{surah} regarding the concept of WB. Such a comprehensive chapter on WB has provided modern Salafis with the legitimizing tool that they need when addressing the subject of WB. However, as mentioned earlier, although verses from \textit{Surah Al-Mumtahanah} contain many important lessons with regards to WB, are not the only verses from the Quran that completely shaped Salafis’ formulation of the concept. There are many important verses scattered throughout the other chapters of the Quran which have also contributed to the formulation of Salafis concept of WB. These verses complement the verses of \textit{Surah Al-Mumtahanah} and together they are formulated to form the modern Salafis conception of WB. To the Salafis, these verses are important as they not only emphasize the urgency of the concept further, but more importantly lend legitimacy to it.

**WB in Other Parts of The Quran**

Apart from \textit{Surah Al-Mumtahanah}, the modern Salafis’ conception of WB are based mostly on: (1) verses that prohibits Muslims to take non-Muslims especially the Jews and Christians as friends or protectors; (2) verses that say God is the only \textit{wali}, and that \textit{wala’} could only be given to Him, His messenger and the believing Muslim; (3) verses stating that all Muslims are brothers to another other and that \textit{wala’} can only be given those who possess the \textit{iman}. There are many such verses,\textsuperscript{262} but we will only present some of the significant ones. Examples of these verses are:

1. Allah is the Protector (\textit{wali}) of those who have faith: from the depths of darkness He will lead them forth Into Light.\textsuperscript{263}

\textsuperscript{260}Ismail Ibn Kathir Ad-Dimashqi, \textit{Tafsir Al-Quran Al-’Azim}, vol. 8, p. 131.
\textsuperscript{261}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{263}Quran 2:257.
2. That is because Allah is the Protector (mawla) of those who believe, but those who reject Allah have no protector (mawla).  

3. Your friend (wali) can be only Allah and His Messenger and those who believe, who establish the prayer, pay the zakât, and bow down [in prayer]. And whoever takes Allah and His Messenger and those who believe for friends, know with certainty, the party of Allah, they will be victorious.

4. O you who believe! Do not take Jews and Christians as your friends and protectors (wali). They are friends and protectors of their own people. He among you who will turn to them for patronage is one of them. Verily Allah guides not a people unjust.

5. Let not believers take disbelievers as allies (awliya‘) rather than believers. And whoever of you does that has nothing with Allah, except when taking precaution against them in prudence. And Allah warns you of Himself, and to Allah is the final destination.

In all these verses, the word “wali”, “mawla” and "awliya’" (plural of wali) are used. The meaning of these words, according to many classical tafsir signifies “protector” (al-nasir). Linguistically, the term wali can also means “friend”. The general use of the term wali refers to a person whom one has a very intimate relationship with. This also

\[^\text{264}\text{ Quran 47:11.}\]
\[^\text{265}\text{ Quran 5:56.}\]
\[^\text{266}\text{ Quran 5:51.}\]
\[^\text{267}\text{ Quran 3:28.}\]
connotes helping, assisting and being in solidarity with such a person. For example, one’s parents are also known as *wali* because they are the ones who are close to their children and protect them. In *fiqh*, one of the conditions for the validity of marriage solemnization is the presence of a *wali* i.e the father or guardian of the bride. Modern Salafis, while do not rejecting the meaning of *wali* as protector, also take the term to be the synonym of ‘friend’. However, one who studies the Quran carefully would found that in the Quranic context, the word *wali* means more than just a ‘friend’. Imam Ibn Jarir al-Tabari (d. 923), an expert in the Arabic language and a prominent Quranic commentator, explains a verse in the Quran which ordains “*let not the believers take for friends or helpers the unbelievers rather than believers*” (Quran 3: 28) as follows:

In this verse, God has forbidden the true believers from taking the disbelievers as their helpers [...] That is to say, they are forbidden from considering them as their supporters, assisting them in their [non-Muslims’] religion, supporting them against the Muslims and the true believers and sharing the secrets of the Muslims with them.”

Commenting on the use of a derivative of the term *wali* the Quran, he adds, “In the Arabic language, the general meaning of the word *wali* is helper and supporter.

One of the many verses that Salafis use to support their claims on WB is Quran 5:51 mentioned earlier. In this verse God prohibits believers from taking Jews and Christians as friends. According to al-Tabari, it was not long after the Prophet’s migration to Medina that this verse was revealed. Al-Tabari says that this verse came down around the time of the battle of Badr (2 A.H. / 623 C.E.) or perhaps after the battle of Uhud (3 A.H. / 625 C.E.) In these early days the Muslim community constituted no more than a few hundred people and had already left the city of Mecca; yet the Meccans continued

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270 Ibid p. 245.
271 The difficulties in understanding this verse begin with the translation of the Arabic word *awliya’* which is commonly translated as “friends”. In the context of this verse, the word *awliya’* does not ultimately indicate “friends”, as we normally utilize the term in English, and we learn this fact from examining the circumstances for its revelation. While it is true that *awliya’* can mean “friends”, it has added meanings such as “guardians” and “protectors”. When we consult the traditional commentaries on the Quran, we are informed that this verse was revealed at a particular delicate moment in the life of the early Muslim community.
to attempt to confront them militarily, and these two battles, as well as others, were
crucial events in the history of the early Islamic community. Militarily the Meccans
were a far more powerful force than the Muslims and they had allies throughout Arabia.
Given the small numbers of the Muslims, the Prophet and pledging Muslim community
faced the real possibility of sheer extermination should they lose any of these early
conflicts.

Al-Tabari informs that within the highly charged environment some members of the
Muslim community wanted to make individual alliances with other non-Muslim tribes
in the region. Within Medina, there were Jewish tribes who constituted a powerful
presence in the town and who were on good terms with the Meccans, and to the north of
the city there were also Christian Arab tribes. Some Muslims saw the possibility of
making alliances with one or more of these groups as a way of guaranteeing their own
survival should the Meccan armies ultimately triumph. For example, a Muslim from
Medina said, "I am going to live with the Jews so I shall be safe in case another attack
comes on Medina". And another person said, "I am going to live with the Christians so I
shall be safe in case another attack comes on Medina." This was the stark reality of
Arabia at that time, it was only through the protection of one’s tribe or alliances with
other tribes or clans that one’s individual security was insured. As such, the Quran
revealed this verse reminding the believers that they should not seek the protection from
others, but should protect each other.273

As noted earlier, modern Salafis understand WB as a concept that necessitates Muslims
to sever their relationship with non-Muslims especially the Jews and Christian. This is
because the Jews and Christians are always mentioned in the Quran. The Quran
constantly reminds Muslims about the attitude of the Jews and Christians. They will
never be pleased unless all Muslims abandon their religion and follow the non-
Muslim’s way of life (Quran 2:109, 120, 4:89). They share a common hate towards
Islam and will never cease conspiring against, subvert, or try to subjugate and fight it
when there is an opportunity (Quran 2:9, 105, 217, 9:8, 5:82, 63:7–8, 3:69). They will
commit treachery and all possible means to fulfill their common hate towards Islam
(Quran 3:118–20, 2:75–7). However, Salafis disavowal of non-Muslims is not limited to
Jews and Christians only, but to all who disbelieve in tawhid. This includes people of

other faith like Buddhists, Hindus, Zoroastrians and others although they are not mentioned in the Quran.

It is important to note that Muslim scholars have divided the Jews and Christians into categories in regards to the prohibition of taking them as protectors. In giving his commentary on this verse (Quran 5:51), Shaikh Muhammad al-Ghazali (d. 1996) says there are three distinct categories of Jews and Christians who Muslims are instructed not to take as protectors:274

1. The first are those who are so extreme in their opposition to the shariah that they will accept any other system in its place, no matter how alien to their beliefs. Although they know that Islam guarantees them full religious freedom, they continue to harbor a fear of Islam and hatred towards the Muslim. This group is so blinded by hatred and jealousy, that there is no longer any hope in persuading them to see any sense or in winning their friendship.

2. The second category comprises those who live among the Muslims but their hearts are with the enemies of Islam. It is of course vital for Muslims to ensure that their ranks are not infiltrated or weakened by people who may let them down at the crucial moment, were they to engage in a defensive war with an outside enemy. This did happen in the past (Quran 5:52). In the early days of Islam, religious minorities were to be found all over Muslim lands. However, when Muslims had to fight against outside enemies, such as the Byzantines, non-Muslims were never recruited into the fighting force in order not to strain their consciences nor create any religious or moral dilemmas for them. The Muslim authorities were happy to receive their financial support, hoping that the least they could do was not side with the enemy or betray the Muslims.

3. The third group of Jews and Christians the Muslims were instructed not to take as protectors were those who ridiculed and belittled Islam and its teachings and practices, such as prayer or the call to prayer, the adhan. The Quran refers to them in the (Quran 5:57-8).

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Modern Salafis also uses verses on wala’ from the Quran to show that the nature of Muslim and non-Muslims relationship is always in conflict due to the creedal differences between both parties; the former is based on full submission (ubudiyah) to God only and the latter is based on submission (ubudiyah) to fellow humans or false gods.\(^{275}\) This fact is supported by many historical events. This includes the conspiracy between the pagan Arab and the Jews against the Prophet. Other examples include the peace agreement that they have agreed upon, the war of the crusade and colonization of Muslim land. More contemporary examples would point towards the cases of cooperation between communists, polytheist and Christians against Muslims in Russia, China, Yugoslavia, Albania, India and Kashmir in the same light.\(^{276}\)

If Quran 5:51 specifically mentions Jews and Christians, Quran 3:28 commands that Muslims should not take the disbelievers (al-kafirun) as awliya’. This verse reads:

> Let not believers take disbelievers as allies (awliya’) rather than believers. And whoever of you does that has nothing with Allah, except when taking precaution against them in prudence. And Allah warns you of Himself, and to Allah is the final destination.\(^{277}\)

Based on historical context, this verse was referring to the Jews, although it does not specifically mention the Jews. This is another verse commonly quoted by modern Salafis to show the forbidding of taking non-Muslims in general as “friends”. This verse was revealed concerning a group of Muslims who had Jewish friends. They were told by some companions of the Prophet to stay away from their Jewish friends as the latter could influence their religious beliefs to the Muslims. However, the Muslims ignored the advice of the companions and remained loyal to their Jewish friends. Al-Qurtubi also reported in his tafsir that this verse was revealed with respect to a companion, ‘Ubadah bin As-Samit Al-Ansari, who led a coalition of Jews. On the day of Al-Ahzab, ‘Ubadah said to the Prophet: “O Prophet of God, I have a fellow of five hundred Jews

\(^{275}\) Sayyid Qutb, *Fi Zilal Al-Quran*, vol. 3, pp. 1586–7. See also Sayyid Qutb’s commentary on offensive jihad in the same book at pp. 1431–52.


\(^{277}\) Quran 3:28.
and I see that they should come with me for support against the enemy”. Due to this incident of ‘Ubadah, God revealed the verse.

Using verses such as this, modern Salafis claim that giving *wala*’ to the non-Muslims and taking them as friends is forbidden. The command to disavow the non-Muslims includes any manifestation of love and compassion to strengthen the ties with them or to regard them as companions and friends because of their kinship or acquaintance. Salafis claim that the combination of love for God and alliance with His enemies is not possible as there is no association between *iman* and *kufr*; except in the situation where one needs to avoid or protect himself from harm or injury inflicted upon by the non-Muslims. In this case a Muslim may present an outer appearance that belies what he conceals inside. Known as *taqiyyah*, it is only permitted under such circumstances. This act of *taqiyyah* is permissible based on the same verse where God says “…..except when taking precaution against them in prudence...”.

Modern Salafis use of Quranic verses is not limited to those which prohibit alliance and friendship with Jews, Christians and non-Muslims in general. Some Salafis use Quran 9:23-24 to show that alliance is not allowed even with one’s parents and relatives who disbelieve and do not submit to Islam, though there are verses which enjoin Muslims to be kind and just to this kind of people such as Quran 60:8. Quran 9:23-4 says:

\[
\text{O you who believe! Do not take your fathers do not take your fathers or your brothers as allies (awliya')} \text{ if they have preferred disbelief over belief. And whoever does so among you - then it is those who are the wrongdoers. Say, [O Muhammad], "If your fathers, your sons, your brothers, your wives, your relatives, wealth which you have obtained, commerce wherein you fear decline, and dwellings with which you are pleased are more beloved to you than Allah and His Messenger and jihad in His cause, then wait until Allah executes His command.}
\]

\[\text{278 See Khalid Gharib, Al-Wala’u wa Al-Bara’ Revealed in Al-’Imran (1/2) available at } \text{http://salafiyyah-jadeedah.tripod.com/wala_wal_bara/Alee_Imran.htm} \text{ (accessed 12 March 2012). See also Ayman Al-Zawahiri, Al-Wala’ wal Bara’, Aqidah Manqulah wa Waqi’ Masfuq, p. 6.}\]
And Allah does not guide the defiantly disobedient people.\(^{279}\)

Ayman Al-Zawahiri quotes this verse in his book on WB to support his claim that infidels and any disbelievers should not be taken as friends regardless of who they are.\(^{280}\) Unsurprisingly, Al-Zawahiri picks the exegesis of Ibn Kathir, like most of the Salafis do who seems to be in line with what he desires the interpretation of the verses to be. In explaining this verse, Ibn Kathir said that Al-Bayhaqi narrated a hadith that was conveyed by Abdullah Bin Shawzab. The hadith mentions that the father of Abu Ubayda bin Al-Jarrah was praising idols to him on the day of the battle of Badr. So, Abu Ubayda began avoiding him. But when Al-Jarrah’s persistence grew, his son, Abu Ubayda attacked and slew him. It is believed that this occasion led to the revelation of this verse. Ibn Kathir further mentions that it has been firmly established in the hadith of Al-Bukhari\(^{281}\) that Prophet Muhammad said: “By him who hold my soul in his hand, none of you believes unless I am dearer to him than his father, his son, and all of mankind”.\(^{282}\)

These are some examples of the Quranic verses used by modern Salafis to lend validity to their conception of WB. There are many such verses in the Quran which is simply not feasible for us to show all of them in this chapter. As stated earlier, while Surah Al-Mumtahanah forms the basis and foundation of Salafis concept of WB, these Quranic verses serve to complement and support the foundation of WB which has been built by Surah Al-Mumtahanah.

However, it can be argued that modern Salafis’ approach and treatment of these Quranic especially the meaning of the verse “do not take the Jews and Christians” which becomes the basis for the prohibition of showing wala’, seems to generalize to include all Jews, Christians and even non-Muslims in general. As explained in the previous chapter, this is not surprising as literal interpretation and generalization are some of the unique characteristics of modern Salafis when dealing with the Quran. One who consults classical Quranic exegesis will discover that verses which called upon Muslims

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\(^{279}\) Quran 9:23-4.


\(^{281}\) Sahih Al-Bukhari (Book of Belief), Volume 1, Book 2, Number 13.

to distant themselves from the non-Muslims, be hostile or even wage unconditional \textit{jihad} against them refer to specific group of people which usually refers to the Arab pagans during the time of the Prophet, or Jews and Christians who were hostile to the Muslims.\textsuperscript{283} Some scholars were more specific by saying that the verses were revealed with respect to the people of Mecca or the tribe of Quraish who had been in a prolonged state of war against Muslims through unprovoked aggression and violence. The hostilities remained even after Muslims migrated to Medina in search of peace. Despite entering into various treaties with the Muslims in Medina, the Quraisy and other pagan Arab tribes time and again treacherously violated them. It became clear, near the end of the Prophet’s mission, that peaceful relations with those tribes were impossible, hence the instruction to denounce the treaties and wage war by Muslims.\textsuperscript{284}

\textbf{Conclusion}

Based on the discussion above, we can summarize that the importance of \textit{Surah Al-Mumtahanah} to modern Salafis is due to the uniqueness and the manner WB is presented and conceived in the \textit{surah}. In portraying the concept of WB, the uniqueness of \textit{Surah Al-Mumtahanah} lies on the method it presents the concept from how it should be implemented, followed by an example of the application of the concept and followed by further warnings to those who do not follow and apply it. The chapter begins by forbidding \textit{wala’} to the non-Muslims in a very specific situation which can be grasped from the historical incident of Hatib bin Abi Balta’ah. This is instantly followed by the

\textsuperscript{283} From several \textit{tafasir} referred to for the purpose of this study, it is clear that every passage in the Quran that prohibits the Muslims from forming alliance with the non-Muslims is intended to refer to those non-Muslims who are actively hostile towards the Muslims. It is believed that the Quran forbids taking as allies and friends those who are engaged in active hostilities towards the Muslims, and prohibits offering any secrets of war to them. What is forbidden is the relationship of \textit{wilayah} with non-Muslims (who knowingly reject Islam). But, even in that case there are exceptions. The Prophet sought protection from different leaders of Quraysh when re-entering Mecca from his trip to Taif. He finally received the protection from Mut’im the chief of Nawfal tribe. Abu Bakr Siddiq also returned to Mecca aborting his migration to Habasha when Ibn ad-Dughunnah, a non-Muslim Bedouin chief offered his protection to stay in Mecca and became his Wali. But when Abu Bakr’s crying while reading Quran outside his home became a \textit{da’wah} attraction, he told Abu Bakr that I did not give you protection to let you change the heart of my people. On that Abu Bakr let him revoke his protection, without compromising his right of \textit{da’wah}. The Prophet had kind relationship with non-Muslims all the time in weakness as well as in strength. Therefore the principle is that wisdom of time and space will determine whose help or protection a Muslim may seek or not seek.

story of Abraham which serves as an example of how WB should be applied. The surah then proceeds to show the infeasibility of mixing *iman* and *kufr* through the command for Muslims to test the *iman* of the migrating women and finally it ends with emphasizing again the issue of *wala’*.

The basis of Salafis concept of WB is further supported by other Quranic verses which prohibits alliance with non-Muslims. Together with the verses from Surah *Al-Mumtahanah*, these verses have provided a strong divine validation to the Salafis concept of WB. Modern Salafis attempt to show that the matter of WB is one that is deeply-rooted in the Quran and that violation of the concept or negligence from practicing it constitutes a grave disobedience to God and even apostasy. After observing how this concept is theologically founded, we shall turn our attention to the manifestation or practical aspect of the concept in modern Salafism. This will allow us to appreciate the realities and complexities that can be found in the modern Salafi concept of WB. We will begin with looking at the concept in the ideology of the Wahhabis who form the majority of modern Salafis; and whose beliefs and teachings have significantly shaped the ideology of modern Salafism. For this, we turn to the next chapter.
CHAPTER THREE: AL-WALA’ WAL BARA’ IN THE SALAFI-WAHHABI IDEOLOGY

Introduction

This chapter examines the concept of WB in Salafi-Wahhabi ideology or Wahhabism (Arabic: Wahhabiyyah) as it is commonly called. As described earlier in Chapter One, modern Salafism is not monolithic and has various strands. The Saudi-based Wahhabism represents one of these strands. It considers itself to be the true Salafi movement; others view it as simply Salafism of Saudi Arabia. In fact, Wahhabism is believed to be the dominant strand in modern Salafism. The majorities of the Salafis referred to in this study are Wahhabis or at least highly influenced by Wahhabi teachings. Wahhabism here refers to the teachings and traditions of Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, the Muslim theologian and reformist who called for a purification of Islamic faith and practices in seventeenth century Arabia. Theologically and methodologically, a Wahhabi (one who subscribes to Wahhabism) is a Salafi, because Wahhabis believe that the salaf al-salih are the model that Muslims should emulate.

Historically, the understanding of the modern Salafi concept of WB has its roots in Wahhabism. Whilst this research focuses on the concept of WB in modern Salafism, it is important that we look at how the concept was originally perceived and manifested in early Wahhabism in the eighteenth century and later on developed through the twentieth and early twenty-first century. As stated in Chapter One, the ideological roots of modern Salafi understandings of WB can be traced back to the traditions of Ibn Abd al-

286 While it is true that a Wahhabi is a Salafi, it is but one of Salafism’s many orientations. Salafi and Wahhabi are not two sides of the same coin. There are Salafis who are not Wahhabis. There are Wahhabis who are not Saudis. There are also Saudis who are neither Wahhabis nor Salafis.
Wahhab who was deeply influenced by the writings of Ibn Taimiyah and Ibn Al-Qayyim among others.\textsuperscript{288}

As Salafis, Wahhabis believe that WB is indeed central to being a Muslim. As the concept forms part of the Islamic faith, Wahhabis claim that any Muslim who does not show sufficient levels of \textit{wala’} to “true Muslims” (which according to them are Muslims who conform to the Wahhabi traditions) and adequate level of \textit{bara’} of non-Muslims or (or more precisely non-Wahhabi Muslims) is at risk of committing apostasy and becoming a non-Muslims. A Wahhabi scholar, for instance, described the concept of WB as being ‘one of Islam’s foundations’ and ‘of paramount importance’ and described as ‘repugnant’ those Muslims who have taken non-Muslims as friends while portraying enmity towards many Muslims.\textsuperscript{289} Hence, WB in the eyes of Wahhabi scholars becomes the guiding principle of a Muslims’ relations with the \textit{kuffar} and “infidels”.

This chapter has several objectives. First, it aims to show that the modern Salafi concept of WB has its roots in Wahhabism. As the chapter illustrates, both the religious and political roles of the concept have existed since the early days of Wahhabism. The Wahhabi tradition of WB continues to be inherited by generations that came after Ibn Abd al-Wahhab until the modern period. At the political level, this chapter highlights how the rivalry between the Saudis and Ottomans in the late eighteenth century and the Saudi civil war in the nineteenth century have impacted on the development of WB in Wahhabi religious discourse. During the rivalry and civil war, WB has played an important role in the debate among Wahhabis scholars on the issue of \textit{wala’} to the political authorities and \textit{bara’} of the”infidels”.

Second, the chapter attempts to showcase the main factors that have contributed to the development of the concept in the Wahhabi ideology in the modern period (twentieth century and beyond). Three periods in the development of the concept in modern Saudi Arabia will be presented in this chapter:


\textsuperscript{289} He is Abdul Razzaq al-Afifi, vice-chairman of Saudi Arabia’s Permanent Committee of Research and Fatwa. See his forward message to the book \textit{Al-Wala’ wal Bara’ in Islam According to the way of the Salaf} by Muhammad Saeed bin Salim Al-Qahtani which is also available at http://www.islamicemirate.com/E-Books/alWalaawalBaraa1.pdf (accessed 25 June 2010).
1. From the start of the Wahhabi movement in eighteenth century until today, WB has been used by the Wahhabis to fight shirk and bid’ah and any practices deemed un-Islamic by the Wahhabis.

2. Official Saudi Wahhabi scholars290 in the twentieth century, while retaining the social aspect of bara’, which relates to personal relations between Muslims and non-Muslims represented in nourishing hatred and rejecting friendship, endorsed and legitimised political wala’ to so-called infidels, exemplified by their total silence over Saudi foreign policy, foreign military bases in the country and other manifestations of Saudi alliances with the West.291

3. Saudi scholars who oppose the Saudi rulers and the establishment scholars, in particular their foreign policy and their actions, seen as having wala’ to the West. They condemn, then Saudi rulers under the pretext of WB.

In the discussion of WB in modern day Wahhabism, the chapter highlights that Wahhabi scholars who oppose the Saudi rulers on account of their political behaviour have used the Wahhabi teachings and heritage, and further developed and radicalized some of its concepts including WB. Using the same Wahhabi teachings and tradition that the state and its establishment scholars hold dear, these Salafis who are mostly represented by the Jihadi faction of modern Salafis, condemn their rulers while some of them even go to the extent of excommunicating the leaders and thereby legitimizing attacks against them. Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi is among those, and is believed to be the first to use the Wahhabi heritage in order to excommunicate the rulers of Saudi Arabia who have always been identified as the main protector and propagator of the Wahhabí tradition.

Finally, the chapter attempts to show how the Wahhabi ideology, particularly the concept of WB has dramatically influenced Saudi society and Muslims in general. In modern Saudi Arabia, education is perhaps one of the key strategies that Wahhabis use to propagate their version of Islam. At the local level, Wahhabi teachings which contain elements of WB are mainly taught at Saudi schools – at all levels from primary schools to higher institutions. Apart from education, media including television, radio and news

290 They are also known as the establishment ulema, or ulema al-sulta (regime’s scholars).
stations, newspapers, journals and in recent years the internet are actively used by the Wahhabis to spread, if not purely Saudi views, then views inherently sympathetic to their ideology. At the global level, the Wahhabis, especially since mid 1970s, have executed, with the assistance of petrodollar, a campaign of spreading their ideology in the form of educational religious study in both madaris (religious schools) and mosques throughout the Muslim world. The last part of the chapter illustrates the influence and spread of the concept of WB, especially its penetration into the curriculum of Saudi schools and exportation beyond Saudi borders. It also briefly describes how the Saudi educational system, particularly the concept of WB and the teachings of “hatred to the others” have been internationally criticized post September 11.

The chapter concludes that as part of the Salafi ideology, the concept of WB is essential to Wahhabism. The concept which started in early Wahhabism as a tool to fight apostasy and innovations in Islam has developed into an important element used by both the Saudi establishment scholars and those who oppose the kingdom to support their religious inclination and political agenda.

**Wahhabism: Definition, History and Concepts**

Before embarking on the discussion on the concept of WB in Wahhabism, it is essential that we clarify the ambiguity and ambivalence surrounding its terminology. As mentioned in Chapter One, followers and supporters of the Wahhabi ideology do not prefer the term Wahhabiyyah or Wahhabism. They would rather call themselves Muslims or Salafiyyun (the Salafis) in reference to the pious ancestors (salaf al-salih). Unlike “Salafi” which is both a label and self-designated term, the term “Wahhabi” is a label given to the followers of the teachings of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, whose name from which the term “Wahhabi” originates. Wahhabism simply means the way of Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab which also denotes his ideology. Hence, linguistically, a Wahhabi is one who subscribes to Wahhabism. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and

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his followers never accepted the label “Wahhabis”, rather they considered themselves to be *ahl al-sunnah wal jamaah* (the people of [prophetic] tradition and community) or *ahl al-tawhid or al-muwahhidun* (the people of monotheism).\(^{294}\)

The main reason why Wahhabis have rejected the term Wahhabism is because it provides the impression that the teachings propagated by Ibn Abd al-Wahhab is a new doctrine or belief within the Islamic faith, whereas they believe that it is merely a reflection and an extension of the teachings of the Prophet, his companions, the *salaf al-salih* and those who followed their paths throughout Islamic history. They also believe that Wahhabism is a label that was first imposed on the revivalist Salafi movement by its enemies and that for this reason people might gain the “wrong” impression of its principles and foundations, deride and ridicule its leaders and followers, and spread feelings of antipathy and antagonism towards it. Yet, this term is now the most prevalent used among Westerners and Muslims alike, including some of the movements’ own followers, especially in the scholarly circles. The main reason that those who acknowledge the mistake and inaccuracy of the term Wahhabism, yet still retain, that although Wahhabism is a Salafi movement that calls for the return to the early traditions of the companions of the Prophet and the *salaf al-salih*, there are many other Salafi movements that rose in different parts of the Islamic world.\(^{295}\) For that reason, by using the name Wahhabism, they would intend to denote the specific Saudi form of Salafism and to refer to the specific Saudi context.\(^{296}\) As Al-Rasheed states, ‘My justification for retaining the name *Wahhabiyyah* [Wahhabism] is based on the assumption that there is a body of religious knowledge that has common intellectual ancestry, without assuming that this factor gives the discourse rigidity or coherence.’\(^{297}\) Moreover, many of them have applied a famous Arab saying that ‘a known error is better than an unknown correctness’ (*khata’ shai’ ahsan min sawab majhul*).\(^{298}\) Therefore, despite the fact that the term Wahhabism is a historical as well as a linguistic error, since it refers to the father of the founder of the movement (Abd al-Wahhab) and not himself (Muhammad), this term will be retained throughout this research on the basis of the previously mentioned justifications.

\(^{294}\) Ibid, p.22.


\(^{298}\) Ibid.
Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab was born in Najd in the year 1703 (1114 of the Hijri calendar) in Uyainah, in present-day Saudi Arabia. He came from the Banu Tamim tribe of that region and is said to have lived in poverty. His father was a local judge associated with the Hanbali school of *fiqh*, which is known for its conservativeness and strict interpretations of Islam. In the eighteenth century, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab grew up in an atmosphere where there was widespread perception of deterioration in the Muslim beliefs and practices. Many Muslims had fallen into the acts considered *shirk*, and returned to the days of *jahiliyyah*. Arabian politics were also chaotic and bloody: violence and conflict prevailed at the time. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab was aware of these conditions and sought to unify the population and reform the Muslims under the banner of “true” Islam. This was in line with the many reforms and renewals by various revivalist movements that were taking place in the eighteenth century across the Islamic world.

Like Salafism, Wahhabism is not a *mazhab* of *fiqh* or any Islamic theological school of thought. It is but a form of Salafism, emerging as a social reform movement in Arabia. Its original objective was to cleanse Arabia of widespread deviationist and heretical practices, and typified by the “blind following” (*taqlid*) of *imams* among Muslims in his period. Examples of such practices which were heretical to early Wahhabism include offering prayers at tombs, and glorifying ‘holy places’ and ‘holy man’/’saints’. Such are classified as *shirk*, *kufr*, *riddah* (apostasy), and *bid’ah*. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab aggressively called people to adhere to a very strict and literal interpretation of *tawhid* and to fight *shirk*. He argues that mere proclamation of *shahadah* is insufficient for someone to be a Muslim, but must be joined with ‘pure’ Islamic behaviour and practices. Thus, Wahhabism prohibits many practices common in the traditional Islamic heritage which have been practised by many Muslims particularly Sufism.

301 Here “true” Islam means Islamic practices which are devoid of *shirk* and *bid’ah* according to Wahhabi doctrine.
302 The religious and political conditions of pre-Wahhabi Arabia can be found in the first Wahhabi chronicle written by Ibn Ghannam in his work, *Tarikh al-Najd and Unwan al-Majd fi Tarikh Najd* (Noble Notes on The History of Najd) by Ibn Bishir.
303 For more on Wahhabi ideology, see David Commins, *The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia*, pp. 104-129.
As mentioned earlier, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s followers originally called themselves *almuwahiddun* (proponents of *tawhid*), but over time prefer the more generic term *salafiyyun* which signifies adherence to the faith and practices of the Prophet, his companions, and the early Muslim generations as they believe that the *salaf al-salih* are the model that Muslims should emulate. Due to the importance of following the footsteps of the *salaf*, Wahhabism has always been a form of Salafism. It subscribes to the methodology of the *salaf* in theology and *fiqh*. In fact, Wahhabism did not spread in the modern Muslim world under its own banner, but under the banner of Salafism. As Khaled Abou El-Fadl observes, ‘the attachment of Wahhabism to Salafism was indeed needed as Salafism was a much more “credible paradigm in Islam;” making it an ideal medium for Wahhabism’. 

As a Salafi movement in orientation, Wahhabism treats the Quran and hadith as fundamental texts as understood by *salaf al-salih* and developed further by many various commentaries, including Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's. As mentioned earlier, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s book *Kitab al-Tawhid*, and the works of the earlier scholar Ibn Taimiyah and Ibn Qayyim are the major referential authority of Wahhabism.

It is essential to note here that Wahhabism cannot be separated from the Saudi state. It is due to the pact or oath of allegiance that was made between Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and Mohammed Ibn Saud, the *amir* (leader of governor) of Dir'iyyah and the founder of the

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306 In matters of jurisprudence, Wahhabism actually subscribe to the Hanbali school of thought and jurisprudence. However, many Wahhabis claim that they do not subscribe to any particular *mazhab*. Instead, they claim to follow the stronger opinion among the Salaf based on the Quran and the *Sunnah*. But one who studies their views in jurisprudence will find their origins in the Hanbali school of *fiqh*. As mentioned earlier, even Ibn Taimiyah and Ibn Qayyim, the two scholars most referred to by the Wahhabis and the contemporary Salafis, adopted the methodology of the Hanbali school.
308 Ibid.
309 Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s works on various Islamic subjects such as theology, exegesis, jurisprudence and the life of Prophet Muhammad were collected and published in twelve volumes under the title of *Ma'allafat al-shaykh al-Imam Muhammad 'Abd al-Wahhab* (Writings of al-Shaikh the leader Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab) by the Islamic University of Imam Muhammad Ibn Saud in Saudi Arabia. See Ibn Abd al-Wahhab Muhammad, *Mu'allafat al-Shaykh al-Imam Muhammad bin Abd al-Wahhab*, 5 vols, Riyadh: Jamiat al-Imam Muhammad bin Saud al-Islamiyyah, 1398H.
first Saudi state in 1744 that created the Saudi kingdom.\(^{310}\) Despite the fact that the modern state of Saudi Arabia was only founded in 1932, the kingdom has its roots and sources of legitimacy in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.\(^{311}\) The initial oath of allegiance between Ibn Saud and Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, and the subsequent alliance and relationship between the royal family and the religious forces in Arabia across the history of Saudi Arabia has proved to be significant and central in the unification of Saudi Arabia in the eighteenth century, its re-emergence twice after its collapse in 1818 and 1891 and the maintenance of political order.\(^{312}\) As Daryl Champion observes:

> It was this original ‘religio-political movement’, ‘the effective union of political/military organization and religious ideology’, which first gave the House of Saud its special religious status… this status was to be inherited by subsequent generations of Saudis according to the Arabian customs of *nasab* and *sunnah* and thus has been a foundation stone of Saudi political legitimacy since Ibn Saud began conquering central Arabia in the first decade of the twentieth century.\(^{313}\)

It is not the purpose of this chapter to provide a detailed historical account of Saudi Arabia and its formation stages. However, in order to understand the realities and development of the concept of WB in Wahhabism, it is imperative that we briefly look some of the events that occurred in the course of its early days, and up to this present day that constitute the sources and foundations that the current state of Saudi Arabia was built upon.

The history of the creation of Saudi Arabia is divided into three stages. The first stage begins with the alliance between Ibn Saud and Ibn Abd al-Wahhab made in 1744 and ends with the occupation of Najd in central Arabia by the troops of Mohammed Ali of the Ottoman Empire in 1818. This period is known as the first Saudi state. The second


stage, or second Saudi state, begins with the success of Imam Turki bin Abdullah in capturing Riyadh and expelling the remnants of the Egyptian troops from Najd in 1824 and ends with the defeat of Imam Abdul Rahman Bin Faisal over the ruler of Ha’il, Muhammad bin Rasheed in 1891. The final stage or the third Saudi state begins with the capture of Riyadh by King Abdul Aziz Al-Saud in 1902 and continues until the present day.

As will be seen, the Salafi/Wahhabi tradition of WB in its religious and political form has existed since the period of the first Saudi state. This tradition of WB is among the concepts that form the entire Wahhabi heritage. As stated earlier, it is also important to understand that the kingdom’s sources of legitimacy stem from the Wahhabi ideology that the Saudi state supported more than 260 years ago. This is essential to recognize as Tim Niblock states, ‘the claim which a regime makes to legitimacy indicates how the regime seeks to relate to the population and which parts of the population it will turn to for support’.\(^{314}\) Niblock states five possible bases of legitimacy that can apply to the Saudi case, each of which has its own strengths and limitations: ideological, traditional, personal, eudemonic and democratic/structural bases. However, the most central and well-acknowledged one is the ideological or religious base of legitimacy.\(^{316}\)

**Wahhabism and The Concept of WB**

The Wahhabi ideology emphasizes the importance of *tawhid*. *Tawhid* in Wahhabism is more than merely believing in the oneness of God, as it is for all Muslims. The main and most fundamental demands of the Wahhabi mission was the purification of Arabia from unorthodox forms of religiosity and the enforcement of the *shariah* law throughout the Arabian society in order to establish a society based on *tawhid*.\(^{317}\) This Wahhabi mission was supported in the political arena by Ibn Saud and the result was that their efforts and sources of legitimacy unified the entire Arabia supposedly “under the rule of the Quran and Sunnah”.

In line with Wahhabism’s call to purify Islam and fight *kufr* through *tawhid*, its practice is manifested in the concept of WB. It is imperative, according to Wahhabism in order

\(^{312}\) Niblock, Tim, *Saudi Arabia: Power, Legitimacy and Survival*, p. 10.
\(^{313}\) Ibid, pp. 9-13.
\(^{314}\) Ibid.
\(^{315}\) Ibid.
to establish the practices of Prophet Muhammad and in fighting any forms of heresy and unbelief. Wahhabis are convinced that the concept will protect them from bid’ah and reinforce their unity in the face of non-Muslim enemies. By practising WB in their own societies, they believe that this is the effective way to avoid any resemblance to infidels and maintain the purity of Islam. For the same reason, Wahhabis reject much of what they consider part of “infidel culture” such as entertainment and listening to music. Thus, they believe that WB is the guiding principle for Muslims’ relations with the kuffar and use it to make a strict distinction between Islam and other faiths.

Wahhabis emphasize that the roots of their concern with the community system lies in a willingness to withdraw from corrupting innovations and to live in accordance with the example of salaf al-salih and create a totally Islamic society. However, this quietist concept WB has undergone several transformations within Wahhabism itself through time. The genealogy of the concept’s transformation can be traced to the writings of Ibn Taimiyya who has exerted a strong influence on the doctrines of Wahhabism including the concept of WB.

As explained before, Ibn Taimiyyah developed the idea that the distinction between the believers and non-believers must be well-defined and strictly policed. In his book entitled Iqtida’ al-Sirat al-Mustaqim, he explained in detail that differences should be maintained between Muslims and non-Muslims in all their interaction. In particular, Ibn Taimiyyah was especially concerned about the influence of Jewish and Christian religious festivals, stressing that true Muslims must avoid these. The basis for this was the Quranic verse he quoted:

O believers, do not take the Jews and the Christians as your friends and protectors, they are friends of each other.

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318 As Ibn Taimiyyah’s teachings exert a great influence on Wahhabi thought, the idea to fight bid’ah with WB is believed to have originated from the teachings of Ibn Taimiyyah. See Wagemakers, Joas, The Transformation of a Radical Concept: Al-Wala` wal Bara’ in The Ideology of Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi”, pp. 69-70.
319 Moussalli, Ahmad, Wahhabism, Salafism and Islamism: Who is The Enemy?, p. 4.
And whoever makes them a friend then he is from amongst them. Verily God does not guide the unjust people.\(^{322}\)

As a result of his understanding of the verse, he forbade Muslims from having close contact with the Jews and Christians. He also viewed the imitation of the Jews and Christians in their dress as forms of worship, and as showing wala’ to them. This refers particularly to popular religious rituals like visiting graves and turning burial sites into mosques.\(^{323}\) Ibn Taimiyah uses elements of WB to counter these practices which he deemed heretical that has crept into the religion and contaminating it.\(^{324}\)

Under the precept of WB and based on the teachings of Ibn Taimiyah, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab argued that it was imperative for Muslims not to befriend, ally themselves with, or imitate non-Muslims or heretical Muslims. Furthermore, this enmity and hostility towards non-Muslims who are heretical had to be visible and unequivocal.\(^{325}\)

For example, Muslims are not to be the first to greet non-Muslim, imitate them in their dress, language, morality and culture. Similarly, Muslims are forbidden from taking part in celebrations and festivals or any other social event originally invented by non-Muslims as these are signs of showing wala’ to the kuffar and their traditions.\(^{326}\)

Ibn Abd al-Wahhab used the ideas suggested by Ibn Taimiyah and Ahmad bin Hanbal that will later be called WB to serve as a pillar of the aqidah. This is very clear in his writings including his most famous one, Kitab al-Tawhid which deals with the oneness of God, and Kitab Kashf al-Shubuhat (Book of Clarification of Uncertainties) which deals with “heretical” acts in the view of Wahhabism such as the intercession of prophets and saints (tawassul). This book is considered a continuation of Kitab al-Tawhid because both his writings revolve around the subject of tawhid. Hence, in the Wahhabi tradition, the doctrine of WB takes on an exclusive and ultimately religious approach. It designated primarily all those who do not adhere to Sunni orthodoxy,

\(^{322}\) Quran 5:51.

\(^{323}\) Moussalli, Ahmad, Wahhabism, Salafism and Islamism: Who is The Enemy?, pp. 4-5

\(^{324}\) See Wagemakers, Joas, “The Transformation of a Radical Concept: Al-Wala’ wal Bara’ in The Ideology of Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi”, p. 54.


especially the Shiites.\textsuperscript{327} In addition, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab branded all Shiites as unbelievers and \textit{rafidah} (rejectionists).\textsuperscript{328} In the Wahhabi tradition, WB thus became a test of true faith, to show loyalty to God alone as an indispensable part of the Islamic religion.

**WB in Early Days of Wahhabism**

Wahhabism would not have spread in Arabia had it not been for the fact that in the late eighteenth century the Al-Saud family united itself with the Wahhabi movement and rebelled against the Ottoman Empire in Arabia. As mentioned earlier, the first Saudi state ended with the Ottomans destroying the city of Dir‘iyah, the first home of the Saudi kingdom.\textsuperscript{329} During the Saudi-Ottoman rivalry, the concept of WB as a tool to fight \textit{kufir} was implemented by Wahhabi scholars, among others Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s grandson, Sulayman ibn Abdallah (d. 1818).

To understand how WB is manifested in early Wahhabism in both its social and political form, it is important to look at the work of Sulayman. An important factor that must always be recalled when examining the work of past Wahhabi scholars and jurists is the historical development of the movement. We must never lose sight of the fact that considerations of national interests, civil war, territorial occupation and power politics as well as the historical circumstances and the political reality of the period can influence the scholars’ views. As Wagemakers puts it ‘the concept of WB has developed in various ways in Wahhabi discourse since the nineteenth century. This can be partly ascribed to the civil war that caused the collapse of the second Saudi State (1824-91)’.\textsuperscript{330} According to Wagemakers, ‘the concept of WB in Wahhabi discourse is contested and the events on the nineteenth century Arabian Peninsula, particularly the Saudi civil war have influenced these contestations over the meaning of the concept’.\textsuperscript{331}

\textsuperscript{327} Kepel, Gilles and Jean-Pierre Milelli, \textit{Al-Qaeda in Its Own Words}, p. 168.


\textsuperscript{329} David Commins, \textit{The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia}, p. 33.

\textsuperscript{330} Wagemakers, Joas, \textit{The Enduring Legacy of the Second Saudi State: Quietest and Radical Wahhabi Contestations of Al-Wala’ wal Bara’}, p. 104.

\textsuperscript{331} Ibid, p. 94.
The second decade of the nineteenth century saw the collapsing of the Wahhabi mission and the end of the Saudi state at the hands of the Ottomans. The Saudis withdrew from Hijaz in 1813 and, during the 1815 truce between the Ottomans and the Saudis, some towns and chiefs of Al-Qasim district in Najd abandoned the Saudi cause in the face of the Ottoman forces. It was during the context of war and betrayal, then, that Sulayman composed his famous treatise entitled *Al-Dalail fi Hukm Muwalat Ahl al-Ishrak* (Proofs of the Rule Regarding the Loyalty to the People of Polytheism). It is asserted by Wagemakers that ‘historical events such as this produced Wahhabi writings that continue to resonate in the scholarly debate on WB today’. Sulayman’s treatise revolves around issues of allegiance to infidels, befriending the idolaters, assisting them against Muslims and offering loyalty to them. In the opening discussion of his treatise, he states that whoever ‘shows to the idolaters an agreement with their religion out of fear and a wish to placate them is an infidel just like them, even if he hates them and their religion and loves Islam and Muslims’. To Sulayman, ‘the Ottoman-Saudi military confrontation was not merely a struggle between belief and unbelief’. Therefore, he alluded in his treatise to those who were under the Saudi domain and then fell under the Ottoman’s and did not migrate or fight as ‘folk who once followed Islam’ and contended that they are ‘worse in their disbelief and more deserving of punishment in the Fire than those in the Prophet’s time who did not migrate from Mecca out of attachment to their homes and from fear of infidels’. 

As the rulers of Arabia were struggling to liberate the Arabian soil from the Ottomans, followers of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab accused the Ottoman of corrupting Islam and hence labeled them as infidels. They declared that Islam protected by the Ottomans was not the true Islam, implying that the sultan was not the legitimate leader of the ummah. The Wahhabis held that the Arabs were worthier than the Ottomons with regard to imamah or leadership. Thus the authority of the Ottoman rule was rejected and challenged. The Wahhabis also described the Ottomans as the moral equivalent of the Mongols, who

335 Ibid.
earlier had invaded Muslim territories and then converted to Islam. The Ottomans were seen by them as primary enemies of Islam as they had corrupted the religion of Islam and were pretending to be sincere and true Muslims. The Wahhabis regarded the Ottomans as polytheists (due to their strong attachment to the traditions and practices of Sufism such as visiting tombs which Wahhabis condemned as shirk) and kuffar along with all who supported them, and most others who claim to be Muslims, but did not live up to the Wahhabi expectations. Hence, early Wahhabis regarded the Ottoman caliphate as al-Dawlah al-Kufriyyah (Infidel State) and they claimed that those who support the Ottomans or ally themselves to them are infidels.

As stated earlier, during the occupation of the Ottomans, some Arabs began to switch their allegiance to them as a result of being forced to adopt the Wahhabi doctrine. This led the Wahhabi scholars at that time to address the issue of wala’. The Saudi rulers and their ulama viewed these calls for foreign invasion as grave acts of disloyalty and misplaced wala’. As a strong follower of Wahhabi’s teachings, Sulayman was especially concerned with the relationship proper between true believers and those they regarded as mushrikun and kuffar as well as the sensitive question of how to handle hypocrisy in their midst. His book demonstrates that those who side with the “infidels” in their policy are themselves infidels. He wrote:

> Know, may God bless you, that when a person shows approval of the polytheist’s religion, for fear of, or in appeasement of flattery to them to avoid their evil, that he is an unbeliever like them, even if he dislikes their religion and hates them and loves Islam and Muslims, if that were the only [error] committed. However, if he is in a protected realm, and he invites them, obeys them and shows approval of their false religion and assists them with help and money, becomes loyal to them and terminates loyalty between himself and the Muslims, and becomes a soldier of polytheism, and tomb and their

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people…., no Muslim should doubt he is an unbeliever.”

Sulayman labelled Muslims as polytheists under the pretext of WB. He also wrote another epistle entitled *Awthaq ‘Ura al-Iman* (Faith’s Surest Bonds) in which the same title of his writing was later used by Juhayman Al-Utaibi who stormed the Grand Mosque in Mecca in 1979. This particular epistle of Sulayman was dedicated to elucidating the rulings regarding proper *wala’* to Muslims and *bara’* of the non-Muslims. Another writing of Sulayman which surrounds the theme of WB is *Fi Hukum Safi ila bilad as-shirk* (On the Rule Governing Travel to The land of Idolatry).

Before the conflict between the Saudi and Ottomans, it is believed that the concept of WB had only in many cases, encompassed the religious and social dimension, such as the obligation of *hijrah* from non-Muslim to Muslim land and regulations regarding Muslim and non-Muslim relationship. Sulayman’s stand on loyalty to the polytheists and infidels, interpreted in the context of the Saudi’s struggle against the Ottomans has added a political dimension to the concept of WB. This, he argues, is obviously a grave sin and serious offence for Muslims to leave the community of believers and take the side of the unbelieving enemy. Such a Muslim, according to him, is an unbeliever and has to be treated as an apostate. This political dimension of the concept was later adopted by Juhayman Al-Utaibi and Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi in the twentieth century.

In the late nineteenth century, yet another prominent Saudi scholar advanced the concept of WB. Like Sulayman, Hamad Ibn Atiq (d. 1883) wrote a famous document entitles *Sabil al-Najat wal Fikak min Muwalat al-Murtaddin wa al-Atrak* (The Path of

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342 It is believed that Juhayman’s works and teachings had significantly influenced and shaped the worldview of Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi.
Salvation and Freedom Against Befriending the Apostates and Turks) where he pointed out that Muslims should not just refrain from giving their loyalty to non-Muslims but should also actively disavow them. Ibn Atiq’s treatise was written in reaction to the civil war that broke out between Abdallah Bin Faisal Bin Turki (d. circa 1880) and his brother Sa’ud Bin Faisal Bin Turki (d. 1875) during the second Saudi State. When their father, Faisal bin Turki who was the ruler of the second Saudi State died in 1865, Abdallah became the new ruler. However, his legitimacy as the ruler of Arabia was challenged militarily by his brother, Saud. To prevent Saud from claiming power and take over as ruler, Abdallah decided to seek military assistance from the Ottomans from the neighboring country, Iraq. As the Wahhabis regarded the Ottomans as polytheists, seeking help from the latter who are “infidels” was considered an act of disloyalty. A Wahhabi judge by the name of Muhammad Ibn Ibrahim Ibn Ajlan (d. unknown) was even ex-communicated (pronounced as kafir) by Ibn Atiq due to his support for Abdallah’s decision. It was at this point of the Saudi history that Ibn Atiq wrote his treatise which was partly built on the earlier work of Sulayman. Ibn Atiq wrote:

So his saying ‘…and there has become apparent…’ In other words, it has become clear and apparent. And consider the preceding of ‘…enmity…’ with ‘…hatred…’ because the first is more important that the second. This is because; the person may hate the polytheists (mushrikin), while not taking them as enemies, So (if this were the case, then) he would not have come with the obligation that was upon him, until he attains both the enmity and the hatred. And it is a must, as well, that the enmity and hatred are both open and apparent and clear. And known that even if the hatred is tied to the heart, then it does not benefit him until its effects are shown and its signs become clear. And that abandonment (of them). Then and that point, the enmity and hatred will become apparent.

348 Ibid; David Commins, The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia, p. 64.
According to Ibn Atiq, Muslims who do not actively show enmity and disavowal to non-Muslims are *kuffar*. As for hostility to the infidels and polytheists, Ibn Atiq argues that God has made it obligatory and emphasized its obligatory nature, and made loyalty to them illegal and was strict in it, to the extent that in the *Book of God* there is no ruling whose proofs are as numerous and clear as this one, after the obligation of *tawhid*.

Ibn Atiq connects the concept of WB to the concept of *tawhid*, which, as illustrated earlier, is the main focus of the Wahhabi mission. Moreover, as Wagemakers writes, Ibn Atiq’s work ‘shows a move away from simply condemning misplaced *wala’*… towards the necessity of showing *bara’*. According to Ibn Atiq, one should not live among the idolaters and unbelievers if one cannot declare his religion. However, for him, being able to proclaim the faith and perform the prayer does not qualify as declaring religion. One has to ‘disavow the people of unbelief, amongst whom he is staying’, and must declare ‘to them that they are unbelievers and that one is their enemy. If that does not happen, one has not declared the religion’.

Here, it can be seen that WB is no longer confined to matters of condemning misplaced *wala’* but to enforce the need to show *bara’* to the enemies of Islam. As such, it is at this juncture that WB as it is understood in the Wahhabi ideology became a fundamental part of the Islamic faith. Those who fail to practice this are no longer just deviant or errant Muslims but are considered as fallouts from the Muslim community entirely. The act of seeking help from the infidels (*isti’ana bil kuffar*) as seen from the events of the Saudi-Ottoman rivalry and the Saudi civil war in early and late nineteenth century as described earlier, was seen by the Wahhabi scholars as an expression or acts of misplaced loyalty that violate the concept of WB. As we shall see, this political interpretation of WB continues to reverberate in the thoughts and intellectual system of Salafi scholars in the twentieth and twenty-first century.

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350 Ibid.
351 Ibid.
353 Ibid.
Thus far, we observed the hallmark of WB in Wahhabi ideology - the tying in of WB to the basis of Islam (aqidah) and elevation of the importance of WB in Quranic verse 60:4 (Millat Ibrahim). As explained in Chapter Two, Quranic verse 60:4 is often used by Wahhabi scholars to highlight the importance and legitimacy of WB. They argue that Millat Ibrahim is of extreme importance because while many Muslims are familiar with the concept of having enmity towards the kuffar and their false deities, within their hearts, there seems to be a pervasive lack of awareness regarding the outward enmity and what is required to be demonstrated in terms of aggression, hostility and warfare.

**WB in Twentieth Century Wahhabism**

The context of eighteenth and nineteenth centuries differs a great deal from the context of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. What might have been usual and common in the context of the nineteenth century may prove to be increasingly problematic as the twenty-first century progresses. There have been both international developments as well as extensive educational, economic and social changes in Saudi society during the second half of the twentieth century. Although it can be argued that society ‘remains conservative’ and that it, has been little affected by nationalism and secularism, the impact of rapid social and economic changes cannot be ignored.\(^{356}\) However, this stringent and rigid form and interpretation of WB especially with regards to dealing with the ‘other’, has survived and developed even further in the context of the twentieth century.

Before embarking on the discussion of the development of the political dimension of the concept in the twentieth century Wahhabism, it is essential that we first mention the religious and social dimension of the concept in modern day Wahhabism. In the twentieth century, the concept of WB does not change much as it was before and continues to play an important role in the Wahhabi ideology. The Wahhabis use this concept not only as a tool to fight shirk and bid’ah, but also as the main guiding principle that regulates the ruling of Muslim and non-Muslim relationship. Wahhabi scholars in Saudi Arabia and also outside the country actively promote this concept in their sermons and writings.

For instance, former Mufti and the Kingdom’ scholar par excellence, Ibn Baz ordered Muslims to withhold their greetings to non-believers and cultivate hatred for them on the basis of WB.\textsuperscript{357} In fact, Ibn Baz was among the major religious power behind spreading the Wahhabi doctrine. WB, according to him is important for the purification of Islamic belief and to avoid anything that could tarnish the purity of the religion. Ibn Baz even went as far as ordering Muslims to nourish \textit{baghda’} (hatred) rather than \textit{mawaddah} (affection) in their hearts for infidels.\textsuperscript{358} For the non-Wahhabi Muslims, Ibn Baz labeled them as pagans, apostates, deviants, innovators and attacked the \textit{ulema} who were not in agreement with the Wahhabi teachings.\textsuperscript{359} He also outlawed advice to rulers and the liberalizing of political institutions.\textsuperscript{360} As a former president of the Directorships of Scholarly Research, \textit{Ifta’} (Religious Creed) \textit{Da’wah} (Missionary) and \textit{Irshad} (Guidance), Ibn Baz is on record for issuing a \textit{fatwa} declaring as un-Islamic the Palestinian people’s uprising.\textsuperscript{361} In the late 1960s, he declared any and all forms of cooperation with the \textit{kuffar} as prohibited.\textsuperscript{362}

Another Saudi scholar, Salih al-Fawzan argues that one of the ways for Muslims to practise WB is by performing \textit{hijrah} to the Islamic world because settling in the countries of the non-believers will lead to forming loyalty to them.\textsuperscript{363} \textit{Hijrah}, according to Al-Fawzan is required to flee oneself from \textit{fitnah} or temptation and \textit{shirk}.\textsuperscript{364} By performing \textit{hijrah}, Muslims can thus show their unwillingness to engage in relations with non-Muslims in any way. This is necessary for Muslims, since settling in the lands of unbelief leads to loyalty to the infidels (\textit{muwalat al-kafirin}).

The fundamental rule according to the Wahhabis is that friendship and any contact with non-Muslims is \textit{haram}. This includes, for example giving a \textit{kafir} gifts during Christmas which constitutes part of the social dimension of WB. One Wahhabi scholar writes ‘It is not permissible to give a \textit{kafir} a gift on the day of one of his festivals, because that is regarded as approving of or participating in celebration of the false festival. If the gift is something that will help in celebrating the festival, such as food, candles and the like,

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{358} Al-Rasheed, Madawi, \textit{Contesting the Saudi State: Islamic Voices from a new Generation}, p. 36.
\bibitem{359} Ahmad Moussalli, “\textit{Wahhabism, Salafism and Islamism: Who is the Enemy?” A Conflict Forum, p. 8.
\bibitem{360} Ibid.
\bibitem{361} Ibid.
\bibitem{363} Salih Bin Fawzan Al-Fawzan, \textit{Al-Wala’ wal Bara’}, p. 4.
\bibitem{364} Ibid.
\end{thebibliography}
then it is even more haram, and some of the scholars are of the view that this is kufr.\textsuperscript{365} However, he maintains that it is permissible for a Muslim to accept gifts from their Christian neighbor on the day of their festival subject to the following conditions:

1. The gift should not be meat that has been slaughtered for the festival.
2. It should not be something that may be used to help in imitating them on the day of their festival, such as candles, eggs, palm leaves etc.
3. One should explain to his/her children the belief in al-wala’ wal bara’, lest a love of this festival or a fondness for the giver be instilled in their hearts.
4. The gift should be accepted with the aim of softening her heart and calling her to Islam, not with friendship and love.\textsuperscript{366}

The Wahhabi scholars present WB as a social concept through a thorough explanation of its roots in the Quran and the meaning of the concept. As explained in Chapter Two, on the basis of numerous verses, such as Quran 5:51, 58:22, 60:1 and 60:4, the scholars concluded that wala’ entailed friendship, love and affection for non-Muslims and their religion. They concluded that Muslims should treat non-Muslims by showing them bara’ instead, i.e. to disassociate and show hatred and enmity to them. Muslims are forbidden to participate in non-Islamic celebrations, congratulate non-Muslims on the occasion of their religious holidays and greet them first when encountering them.\textsuperscript{367} Looking like the non-Muslims in dressing, behaviour or names are also forms of showing loyalty to the non-Muslims.\textsuperscript{368} Wahhabi scholars explained that all these rulings serve to keep Muslims away from anything that might stain the alleged purity of their beliefs and lead to loyalty, expressed as love, affection or friendship for supposedly un-Islamic things.

\textbf{Political Dimension of WB in Twentieth Century Wahhabism}

It is important to note that with the establishment of modern Saudi state in twentieth century, Wahhabism became a religious/ ideological discourse promoted and protected


\textsuperscript{366} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{368} Ibid; Muhammad Saeed Al-Qahtani, \textit{Al-Wala’ wal bara’ min Majähim Aqidah Al-Salaf}, Part 3, Chapter 6, p. 44. More on this social role of WB will be explained in the next chapter.
by political authority. The religious and social sphere in Saudi Arabia is controlled by
the official scholars who are appointed by the state. Official scholars of Saudi Arabia
usually occupy the highest religious position in the kingdom such as the Grand Mufti
and sit in the Board of Senior Ulema (hai’at kibar al-ulama) and the Permanent
Committee for Scientific Research and Legal Opinions (Lajnah al-da’ima lil buhuth
al’ilmiyah wal ifta’). Indeed, the state needed these scholars to control the social
sphere to ensure compliance of the people.

Under state control, there were in fact several interpretations and even contradictions
within the hegemonic Wahhabi discourse – including the concept of WB. For example,
official Wahhabi scholars in the twentieth century, while retaining the social aspect of
bara’, which relates to personal relations between Muslims and non-Muslims
represented in nourishing hatred and rejecting friendship, endorsed and even legitimised
political wala’ to so-called infidels, exemplified by their total silence over Saudi foreign
policy, foreign military bases in the country and other manifestations of Saudi alliances
with the West.369 The manner Wahhabi scholars apply the social and religious aspect of
WB, encapsulated in issues like rulings of participation in non-Islamic festivals, clearly
shows their abandonment of the political relevance of the concept recognised in the
writings of early scholars mentioned earlier.370

Official Wahhabi scholars are aware that they need to remain subservient to the Saudi
rulers because they realized that their ideas could only be implemented under the
protection of a ruler.371 Although the diplomatic and trade relations that Saudi Arabia
has with non-Muslim countries and the strong ties it enjoys with the United State seems
to clash with the idea that Muslims should stay away from ‘infidels’, Wahhabi scholars
dare not to apply their ideas on WB to politics. If they do, it will lead to heavy criticism
and could cause chaos between them and the rulers. In fact, Wahhabi scholars provided

370 Wagemakers, Joas, The Enduring Legacy of the Second Saudi State: Quittest and Radical Wahhabi
Contestations of Al-Wala’ wal Bara’, p. 97.
371 It could be explained here that concerning state and religion, Ibn Taimiyah believed that the ulema
are responsible for the protection of the divine law, and that a government is regarded as Islamic by virtue
of the support it gives to Islam and to the ulema. One can accept the rule of anyone who follows the
shariah. This understanding had an important effect on the Wahhabi ideology that accepted Al-Saud's
dynasty as a legitimate and hereditary Islamic government after taking refuge in Dir'iyyah, a territory
controlled by [the] Al-Saud family. See Talip Küçükcan, Some Reflections on the Wahhabiyyah
an unequivocal fatwa legitimizing the solicitation of help from non-Muslim forces in defense of the Saudi state.\textsuperscript{372}

The event of 1990 Gulf war is a good example to illustrate the political dimension of WB in Wahhabism and Saudi Arabia. In fact, the war has a great impact on the religio-political discourse of internal Saudi Islamist currents. One could notice the mixed reactions of Saudi scholars over the manner the Saudi Kingdom dealt with intervention in the war, especially its decision to invite foreign Western forces. While official scholars supported the kingdom’s decision and fatwa to invite American troops to Saudi soil, this move triggered an escalation of criticism by scholars belonging to the Sahwa Islamiyyah (Islamic Awakening) which resulted in their detention.\textsuperscript{373} This chapter looks at the response of the war by the establishment scholars only, while discussion on the reaction the sahwa scholars on the war will be dealt in the following chapter when we discuss the spectrum of WB in modern Salafism.

The official statement by the Council of Senior Ulema of Saudi Arabia supporting the actions taken by the Saudi rulers states the following:

The Council of Senior ‘Ulama, therefore, supports actions taken by the leader, may God lead him to success, of inviting qualified forces with equipment that bring fear and terror to those who wish to commit aggression against this country. This is his obligation dictated by necessity under the present circumstances and made inevitable by the painful facts and the rules and proofs of the shariah making it incumbent upon the leader of the Muslims to resort to the assistance of those with the ability and through whom the purpose is achieved. The Qur’an and Prophetic Sunnah show that it is necessary to be prepared and to take precautions before it is too late. . . .\textsuperscript{374}

\textsuperscript{372} The statement by the council of Senior Ulema supporting actions taken by the Saudi leader inviting qualified forces to respond to the aggression against Saudi Arabia was issued on August 14, 1990 and published in, among others, the official gazette, 3319 Umm Al-Qura 24, August 18, 1990.

\textsuperscript{373} See Chapter Four of this thesis for more on the Sahwa and their position on this issue.

\textsuperscript{374} Translation of this statement is taken from Al-Fahad, Abdul Aziz, From Exclusivism to Accommodation: Doctrinal and Legal Evolution of Wahhabism, p. 518.
We can see that the excuse these scholars gave in legitimizing a ruling which runs contrary to the Wahhabi concept of WB is necessity (dharurah or a legal doctrine allowing the prohibited). This scenario of scholars/rulers alliance in Saudi Arabia is important in the Saudi politics as the official Wahhabi religio-political discourse is dependent on its scholars. Thus, according to Madawi Rasheed ‘official Wahhabism in the twenty-first century is a discourse of consent as it propagates religious interpretations that require subservience to political authority’. Its scholars provided the state with intellectual input, especially the religious discourse which confirmed the servitude of religion to the state. Thus, official Wahhabi scholars established with clarity the position of official Wahhabism which is radical in its ruling of social matters but extremely accommodating of political decisions on the basis of convenience and necessity.

In fact, such a scenario is not something new in the modern history of Saudi Arabia. In the early formation of the kingdom of the Kingdom, King Abdul Aziz had a relationship and even sought assistance from the British. For instance, Daryl Champion states that one of the paradoxes that accompanied the King’s ‘rise to dominance’ is that he ‘had no compunction about dealing with the British, even though the Muslim world had criticised the Hashimite-British alliance.’ Moreover Al-Rasheed states that ‘the Al-Saud were more than happy to seek military and financial help from so-called infidels as early as 1915, and even to pursue a policy that was subservient to imperial powers’.

While many scholars, especially those who are under the auspices of the Saudi rulers stay away from the political aspect of WB, there are some Wahhabi scholars who are against the idea of allying with the “infidel” countries such as America. Using the concept of WB, these scholars argue that is a grave sin to support or ally oneself to the infidels. Some of them have also gone to the extent of proclaiming the Saudi rulers as kuffar – and hence practice the act of takfir on the rulers.

This political aspect of WB adopted by such scholars can be seen in two significant scenarios in the late twentieth century and early twenty-first century. One is the 1990

Gulf War, where Saudi rulers invited hundreds of thousands of American troops to Saudi Arabia to defend itself from being attacked by Iraq. Second, is the war against Afghanistan and Iraq launched by the United States in 2001 where Saudi Arabia retained its strong relations with the United States. These scholars therefore took the political relevance of WB to a new level by starting to criticise Saudi Arabia for asking help from the infidels and strengthening ties with them. The notion of \textit{isti’ana bil kuffar} is heavily debated in the political development of WB in the twentieth century.

Among these scholars who oppose the Saudi state was Hamud Bin Uqla al-Shuaibi (d. 2002), a well-known and influential Saudi scholar who is allegedly linked to the Al-Qaeda organization. His students included a number of important Saudi religious leaders, among them the current grand mufti of Saudi Arabia, Abdul Aziz bin Abdullah Al Al-Shaikh (b. 1940). Al-Shuaibi has published religious edicts supporting the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, including the destruction of the Buddhist statues, as part of \textit{jihad} against the infidels. He religiously justified Al-Qaeda's attack on the United States in September 2001 and gave religious legitimacy to the suicide attacks against Israel carried out by Palestinians.

Al-Shuaibi wrote \textit{Al-Qawl al-Mukhtar fi Hukm al-Isti’ana bi al-Kuffar} (Chosen Words on the Rulings of Those who Seek the Assistance of the Infidels). He deals extensively with the notion of \textit{isti’ana bil kuffar}, as the title suggests, and was very apparent in his judgement. After first dealing with the concept of WB in general, he quickly goes on to interpret it in a political way and refers to states, concluding that asking non-Muslims for help in fighting other Muslims is forbidden. He even states that asking a state for help in fighting other Muslims is even worse than asking individuals because states are more powerful and can thus do more damage to Islam.

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380 For biography of Al-Shuaibi see \url{http://www.tibyan.com/biography.php?id=185} (accessed 16 April 2010).


Al-Shuaibi’s position on *isti’ana bil kuffar* can also be seen in his fatwa expressing opposition to the fatwa issued by Dr Yusuf Al-Qaradawi (b.1926), a well-known Egyptian scholar, allowing American Muslim soldiers’ participation in the US-led war in Afghanistan in 2001. Using the concept of WB, Al-Shuaibi stated that it is imperative upon all Muslims to support the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and to oppose the American war against them. He asserted that any Muslim who takes the side of the unbelievers in their way against Muslims is himself an apostate and unbeliever. He further states WB is one of the fundamentals of the religion and is the foundation of faith and belief. For Al-Shuaibi, *wala’* necessitates that Muslim always loves and take sides of Muslims, whereas *bara’* necessitates severing all ties with non-Muslims, holding no love for them and maintaining a safe distance from them. He refers to Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s saying that aiding and supporting non-Muslim against Muslims is an act of apostasy (*kufr naqil ‘an millah*).

As a Salafi scholar, Al-Shuaibi understood the Quranic concept of WB as an absolute, ultimate and totally free from the human context of their application. Like other Salafis, Al-Shuaibi described WB as a foundation of the Islamic faith, thus placing it on the same level as *tawhid*. In fact, Al-Shuaibi understood WB not as two separate concepts but as one, according to which a Muslim’s allegiance and loyalty to other Muslims is contingent upon, and tied to, his disassociation from the unbelievers. For Al-Shuaibi, moreover, any act or expression that contravenes this understanding of WB is sufficient to violate the boundaries of Islam.

Another scholar who expressed the issue of *isti’ana bil kuffar* is Nasr Al-Fahad, who wrote *Al-Tibyan fi Kufr Man A’ana al-Amrikan* (Clarification on the Apostasy of Those who assists the Americans). The book is endorsed by Al-Shuaibi and two other Saudi belonging to the “Al-Shuaibi” school of thought i.e. Sulayman Al-Ulwan and Ali Al-

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Khudair. On the prohibition of assisting the infidels against other Muslims, Al-Fahad in his book pointed out that supporting America in its fight against Muslims is an act of *kufr*. He provided a long outline of what he believes as American immortality and debauchery and of the U.S “war on Islam”. Condemning the US in his book, Al-Fahad states that:

> America is indeed the head of *kufr*, atheism and the central base of corruption and moral decay – it is the land of shame, crime, vile and evil. The *shaytan* (satan) has indeed nested upon it and placed his shrine in it.  

Al-Fahad distinguishes two forms of *walaʾ* that Muslims can show to non-Muslims: *tawalli* and *muwalat*. The former involves “love for the religion of the unbelievers” (*mahabbat din al-kuffar*) and “love for their victory” (*mahabbat intisarihim*). Helping the *kuffar* against Muslim is also a form of *tawalli*, according to Al-Fahad, and amounts to “unbelief and apostasy” (*kufr wa riddah*). Hence, *tawalli* removes a person from the domain of Islam as it includes love of one’s enemy and his religion and assisting him against Muslims. *Muwalat* on the other hand, involves forms of *walaʾ* that are forbidden but do not reach the level of *kufr* and are therefore less grave sins. This category includes, among other things its social manifestation such as initiating greetings upon non-Muslims.

Al-Fahad based his arguments on the dangers of *tawalli* based on the writings of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab who claimed that acts of helping infidels against Muslims is a factor that removes a Muslim from the domain of Islam (*naqidh lil Islam*). In the Wahhabi tradition, *nawaqidh al-Islam* (factors that removes a person from the domain of Islam) among others include, polytheism, association with God, preferring another authority other than Islam and assisting infidels against Muslims which comes under the concept of WB.

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389 Ibid.
The development of WB was taken a step further by Muhammad Al-Mas’ari (b. 1948) who is very critical of Saudi Arabia’s decision to permit un-Islamic forces on Arabian soil to fight Iraq during the Gulf War of 1990. Al-Mas’ari, a Saudi who lives in exile in London since 1994, runs the Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights and is an adviser to the Islamic Human Rights Commission. Al-Mas’ari argues that WB should not be equated with issues like love and friendship or greeting non-Muslims first, but has to do with war and peace. Like Al-Shuaibi and Al-Fahad, Al-Mas’ari also published a document criticizing the Saudi State entitled Al-Adillat al-Qat’iyyah ‘ala ‘Adam Shar’iyyat al-Dawlal al-Saudiyah (Decisive Evidence for the Illegitimacy of the Saudi State). In his book, Al-Mas’ari criticizes Ibn Abd al-Wahhab himself for entering into an alliance with the Saudi family which had, in his view, deprived the Wahhabi call of its allegedly universal purpose.

Al-Mas’ari also criticizes scholars like Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi and Salih Al-Fawzan for focusing more on the social aspects of WB. He states that Al-Fawzan and others have dealt with issues of allegedly misguided wala’ in the personal sphere but did not see anything wrong in accepting hundreds of thousands of infidel American soldiers to fight Iraq and destroy it (in the 1990 Gulf War). The mistake that Al-Fawzan and others have made, according to Al-Mas’ari, is to equate the prohibition of “resembling the infidels” (tashabbuh al-kuffar) with WB. He believes that these are actually two different issues with the former being simply sinful behaviour while the second refers to grave acts of kufr in times of war and peace.

392 For more on Al-Mas’ari’s critical view on Saudi Arabia see A Saudi Oppositionist’s View: An Interview With Dr. Muhammad Al-Massari, Terrorism Monitor Volume: 1 Issue: 7, December 4, 2003 available at http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=26182&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=178&no_cache=1 (accessed 30 July 2012).
393 Wagemakers, Joas, The Enduring Legacy of the Second Saudi State: Quietest and Radical Wahhabi Contestations of Al-Wala’ wal Bara’, p. 103.
396 Ibid; Wagemakers, Joas, The Enduring Legacy of the Second Saudi State: Quietest and Radical Wahhabi Contestations of Al-Wala’ wal Bara’, p. 103.
397 Ibid.
Perhaps, the most prominent and vocal scholar who opposes the Saudi state using the concept of WB is Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi.\textsuperscript{398} Al-Maqdisi is heavily influenced by the writings of Juhayman Al-Utaibi, the leader of al-Jama’a al-Salafiyya al-Muhtasiba (JSM) who stormed the Grand Mosque of Mecca in 1979. Juhayman has used the concept of WB as a political tool against the Saudi rulers.\textsuperscript{399} However, unlike Al-Maqdisi, Juhayman did not base on it the \textit{takfir} of the Saudi and Arab regimes, a step that would prove catastrophic in the evolution of this concept in general and in the Jihad-Salafi trend in modern Salafism.\textsuperscript{400}

Juhayman revived the concept of WB from the eighteenth and nineteenth century Wahhabi scholars such as Sulayman bin Abdallah and Hamad bin Atiq. Using the concept of \textit{Millat Ibrāhīm}, Juhayman called for the true Islamic community which has to be disassociated from all forms of impiety. He also introduced the concept of \textit{Awthaq ‘Ura al-Imān} (the strongest bonds of faith),\textsuperscript{401} meaning the links that unite Muslims with each other and impose on them mutual solidarity. Both \textit{Millat Ibrāhīm} of “\textit{awthaq Awthaq ‘Ura al-Imān} converged in the principle of WB which Juhayman made the defining principle for correct Islamic behaviour.\textsuperscript{402}

However, unlike Juhayman, Al-Maqdisi connects the concept of WB not only to politics but also \textit{takfir}. This was made possible by his expansion of the meaning of the word ‘worship’ to incorporate ‘forms of worship that have nothing to do with matters usually associated with that word, such as political obedience and willingness to abide by a country’s laws. As Wagemakers writes:

\begin{quotation}
This way, Al-Maqdisi not only radically changes \textit{wala’} (loyalty), but by equating the application of and adherence to man-made laws with un-Islamic worship he also accuses
\end{quotation}

\textsuperscript{401} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{402} Ibid.
present-day Muslim politicians and leaders of *shirk* (association with God) and therefor of being *kuffar* (unbelievers).\(^{403}\)

As Al-Maqdisi himself states, while explaining the main pillars of his Jihadi Salafi orientation or thought, ‘the main priority of this current is calling people to *tawhid*’.\(^{404}\)

The second pillar, however, which according to him, ‘distinguishes this current from others is *al-wala’ wal bara*’, which is one of the most trustworthy ties of *tawhid*.\(^{405}\)

Al-Maqdisi continues to explain:

> The first duty upon *al-muwahhid* (the monotheist) is to disavow of and disbelieve in the scattered gods and the many names that are being worshipped other than God, which in the past took the form of stones and primitive idols, and in our time are the rulers and legislators and their man-made laws and legislations. While the *tawhid*, which we spoke of, entails *al-barā’* (the disavowal of) and disbelief in these man-made laws and scattered idols, one of its trustworthy ties is the subject of *al-wala’ wal bara*, which requires the disavowal of the authors of these laws and regulations and the people who are applying them.'\(^{406}\)

The third and last pillar of the Jihadi Salafism, according to Al-Maqdisi is *jihad*.\(^{407}\)

In many of his writings, Al-Maqdisi refers to *jihad* as the ‘highest rank’ of showing *bara’* and enmity by ‘striving for the demise of *al-nuzum al-taghutiyyah* (regimes that do not rule according to God’s revelation) and fighting its servants until the religion is all to God’.\(^{408}\)

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\(^{405}\) Ibid.

\(^{406}\) Ibid.

\(^{407}\) Ibid.

political behavior. In it, he criticizes the Christian and Jewish faiths and developed its theme of WB based on the *Millat Ibrahim* Quranic verses of 60:4 as discussed in Chapter Two. This Quranic verse crystalizes the theme of contemporary militant Islamists that reject any form of nationalism or individualism if it does not submit to the laws of God. The setting for this is clear as well; there will always be enmity and hatred between the believers and unbelievers.

In *Al-Kawashif al-Jaliyya fi kufr al-Dawlah al-Sa’udiyyah*, Al-Maqdisi claims that Muslim governments and their leaders were in a state of *kufr*, thus practising the act of *takfir*.\(^{409}\) He also calls Muslim youth to turn against their rulers, scholars and societies. Referring to the few Saudis who were influenced by the takfiri ideology that they encountered in Afghanistan during the Soviet-Afghan war in the 1980s, Al-Maqdisi writes in his *Al-Kawashif*:

> Here are the waves of young Saudi people, who are trained on weapons and explosives, returning after they had benefited since they came out of the walls of the Arabian Peninsula and come into contact and mixed with their brethren preachers from around the globe…. The thought of *takfir* and fighting the government and all of those who have championed, supported and been loyal to it has spread among trained young people, who returned from Afghanistan like wildfire. And here are the waves of young people returning with dozens of books exposing the *tughat* (despotic rulers) of Al-Saud.\(^{410}\)


Al-Maqdisi accused the Saudi government of straying from the path of Islam. He rejects the legitimacy of the Saudi government under the doctrine of WB, saying it "has left the religion of Islam" (qad kharajat min din al-Islam) due to: (1) loyalty to un-Islamic laws and its "loyalty to the infidel enemies of God" (muwalat a 'da' Allah min al-kuffar); (2) "strengthening of brotherly ties" (tawthiq rawabit al-ikhwa) and its "love, affection and friendship" (al-mawadda wa-l-hubb wa-l-sadaqa) with non-Muslims; and (3) in spite of its pious Wahhabi image, is no different from "the other idolatrous Arab systems" (al-anzima al-taghutiyya al-'Arabiyya al-ukhra).

It is worth mentioning here that although the vast majority of Muslim scholars including the official and mainstream scholars of Saudi Arabia agree on the fact that ruling according to God’s revelation is wajib (mandatory) upon Muslims, they disagree with Al-Maqdisi and his jihadi orientation’s logic and justification of takfir because, contrary to the Jihadi-Salafi’s opinion, they view un-Islamic rule, if not accompanied by juhud (denial of the revelation) or istihlal (the belief that man-made laws are permissible in Islam), as minor unbelief (kufr asghar) which does not expel one form Islam, rather than major unbelief (kufr akbar) which does expel one from Islam. There are serious divisions among Salafis nowadays as to whether the concept of WB can form the basis for violent engagement with non-Muslims as well as takfir of Muslim rulers, as many of the Salafi Jihadis argue. As Wagemakers writes, ‘this issue is possibly the main bone of contention with regard to kufr between apolitical Salafis and their militant counterparts of Salafism’s jihadi branch’. Haykel correctly points out that the main problem and salient point about takfir is that,

It legitimises the use of violence against the person or entity that is deemed to be non-Muslim, and one consequences of this is that armed rebellion, often termed jihad, against a nominally Muslim-led state (e.g., Saudi

411 Maqdisi, Abu Muhammad, Kashf al-Niqab ‘an Shari ‘at al-Ghab, quoted in Wagemakers, Joas, Framing the "threat to Islam": al-Wala’ wa al-Bara’ in Salafi discourse.
Arabia, Egypt) is considered not only legitimate, but a religious duty incumbent upon the individual believer.415

Towards the end of 1990s and the beginning of the new millennium, a group of young local Jihadi Salafi Saudi scholars, who would place themselves under the patronage of Al-Shuaibi, would emerge and play a pivotal role in the radicalization of some Saudi youths and their recruitment to militant Islamist groups such as Al-Qaeda.416 As evidenced by their writings, their views on the issues of jihād, WB and not ruling in accordance with God’s revelation echo the views of Al-Maqrīzī and his like-minded Jihadi Salafi scholars and ideologues.417 As explained earlier, in the aftermath of the US-led invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001, these scholars, contrary to the official and mainstream scholars of Saudi Arabia, have invoked and relied heavily on the concept of WB in order to urge Muslims to take sides in the conflict and declare any form of support for or association with non-Muslims as kufr.418 Al-Maqrīzī have even addressed a praising letter to Al-Shuaibi, just a few months before the latter’s death in January 2002, in which he expressed his joy, pride and returned hope as a result of Al-Shuaibi’s latest fatwas, views and position, which came at a time when ‘the government’s scholars distorted religion and humiliated it at the gates of the sultans’.419

418 See also Nasir Al-Fahd, At-Tibyan fi kufr man a’aana al-amrikan.
What is essential for us to understand here is that, as Hegghammer writes ‘what the Al-Shuaibi scholars did was to articulate a Wahhabi justification for global jihadi much the same way that Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi had articulated a Wahhabi socio-revolutionary discourse in the late 1980s.\textsuperscript{420} Even though not exclusively, the aforementioned scholars and ideologues of Jihadi Salafism have used and relied on the contentious and most radical elements in the heritage of the Wahhabi mission in order to justify, foster and convince their Saudi audience of their views and ideologies. Al-Maqdisi who turned the concept of WB into the core of his ideology, is an example of those who have used, relied and transformed some of the most radical statements and \textit{fatwas} of the early scholars and followers of the Wahhabi mission in order to deceive their youth targets through the literal power of the text, which hides behind it a lot of interpretations and purposes to which they chose not to give attention.\textsuperscript{421} Jihadi Salafi scholars, ideologues and supporters have been trying consistently to legitimize their declarations and claims, rally new Saudi followers and undermine the Saudi state and its official scholars by tapping into the Kingdom’s own source of legitimacy and religious heritage. By articulating their message in a Wahhabi religious discourse through the selective application of some of the early Wahhabi scholars without regard to their own specific temporal contexts, and by attacking the official religious scholar and accusing them of being \textit{sultan} (ruler’s scholars), they have ensured that their message would have a receptive audience in Saudi Arabia.

It is also important to notice that the social or religious as well as the political dimension of WB in early Wahhabism as seen from the events from the rival between the Saudis and Ottomans in the eighteenth century, and the civil war in the twentieth century has impacted and endured throughout the Wahhabi tradition for centuries. This can be seen in the writings of contemporary Wahhabi scholars such Al-Shuaibi, Al-Fahad and Al-Maqdisi. As Wagemakers states’ ‘the two trends (social and political dimension of WB) are partly a result of the enduring legacy of the second Saudi state, which continues to resonate in scholarly writings on the subject of WB, and thus shows

\textsuperscript{421} Interview with Abdul Rahman Al-Hadlaq, Director-General, Ideological Security Directorate of the Ministry of Interior of Saudi Arabia in Riyadh, 6 February 2010; Wagemakers, Joas, “The Transformation of a Radical Concept: \textit{Al-Wala’ wal Bara’} in the Ideology of Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi”, pp. 69-70.
how one Wahhabi concept has changed over time and that Wahhabism is less uniform and inflexible than is popularly believed’.  

Another important point to note here is that there is a presence of radical takfiri elements in the heritage of Wahhabi scholars. The fact of the matter is that while the Jihadi Salafi ideology and its ideologues have been ‘heavily influenced by the thought of Sayyid Qutub, who elaborated on the twin concepts of hakimiyyah and jahiliyyah to condemn the existing regimes in the Arab world and to sanction violent rebellion against them’, they have never ceased to quote from the texts and passages of the scholastic Salafism.

**WB in the Saudi Educational System**

When discussing the concept of WB in modern day Wahhabism, it necessary that we mention in this chapter, how the concept of WB is embedded and knitted into the fabric of the Saudi educational system. This is due to the fact that, as the concept is central in the Wahhabi ideology, the kingdom’s educational system ensures that Wahhabi doctrine (which includes WB) is taught to the Saudis since a very young age. In what follows, we attempt to briefly show how the concept of WB is knitted into the educational system, propagated in the kingdom and exported outside the kingdom, before we conclude the chapter. The last part of this chapter will also briefly highlight how the Saudi educational system, particularly its religious views towards the non-Muslims has been criticized since the September 11 incident, for allegedly inciting anti-Western sentiments.

Education is one of the most important avenues used by the Saudis to propagate Wahhabi teachings. The philosophy of education in Saudi Arabia is threefold: (1) education is based on the teachings of Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab; (2) spreading Islam throughout the world; and (3) teaching the history of Islamic glories. Religious education in Saudi Arabia is emphasized at all levels of education. The educational

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422 Wagemakers, Joas, *The Enduring Legacy of the Second Saudi State: Quitiest and Radical Wahhabi Contestations of Al-Wala’ wal Bara’*, p. 94.
policy in Saudi Arabia stresses the importance of creating a sense of loyalty and obedience to the rulers and established *ulema*, and the duty to spread the message of Wahhabism. Education in Saudi Arabia promotes a spirit of loyalty to Islamic law by denouncing any system or theory that conflicts with it, revive the spirit of Islamic struggle, fulfill the mission of Islam and project the unity of the Muslim nation.\(^{425}\)

The concept of WB which is rooted in the Wahhabi doctrine is widely taught in the Saudi national schools. Saudi schools religious textbooks contain elements of WB from loyalty to Islam and the Muslims to rejection of the *kufr* and all that is deemed un-Islamic as could be acutely seen through the lenses Wahhabism. Apart from these textbooks, the concept is also propagated through many other means like *fatwas*, magazines, pamphlets, internet\(^ {426}\) which includes blogs, chatrooms and forums and also lectures of the *ulema*.

In May 2006, the Center for Religious Freedom, with the Institute for Gulf Affairs released a ground-breaking report that analyzed excerpts from a dozen textbooks published by the Saudi Ministry of Education and used at that time in the Saudi public school curriculum.\(^ {427}\) The report reveals that the Saudi Ministry of Education textbooks disseminate teachings of hatred towards the non-believing community which includes Christians, Jews, people of other religions, Shiites, Sufis and non-Wahhabi Muslims.\(^ {428}\) The report also referred to the literature being distributed from Saudi *madrasas* and mosques amount to nothing less than “hate ideology.”\(^ {429}\) “The system and its underlying ideology have been accused of contributing to anti-western sentiments and of providing


\(^{429}\) Blanchard, *“The Islamic Traditions of Wahhabism and Salafiyyah”* p. 5. See also *Passing on Hatred to the Next Generation: A Study of Saudi Arabian Textbooks from the 2008 & 2009 Years* prepared by the Office of Congressman Anthony D. Weiner, June 3 2009.
fertile ground for Islamic extremism.”

The Wahhabi educational system was designed to create a sense of loyalty, obedience and the duty of spreading and defending the Wahhabi message.

Saudi Arabia also disseminated these texts internationally, including to some nineteen academics founded by Saudi Arabia and chaired by the local Saudi ambassadors in or near major foreign cities, one of which is the Islamic Saudi Academy (ISA) outside Washington D.C. The report concluded:

The Saudi public school religious curriculum continues to propagate an ideology of hate toward the “unbeliever”, that is, Christians, Jews, Shiites, Sufis, and Sunni Muslims who do not follow Wahhabi doctrine, Hindus atheists and others. This ideology is introduced in a religion textbook in the first grade and reinforced and developed in following years of the public education system, culminating in the twelfth grade, where a text instructs students that it is a religious obligation to do ‘battle’ against infidels in order to spread the faith.

In general, the main religious subjects taught in Saudi schools are Quran, Hadith, Tawhid, Tajwid (methods of Quranic recitation), Tafsir (Quranic exegesis), Sirah, (history of Prophet Muhammad) and Fiqh. Most of these subjects continue to be taught at the university level. As for the subject of tawhid, the lessons introduce the life and scholarly work of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and his role in the founding of the Al-Saud political leadership. The subject focuses on enlightening the students on the dangers of polytheism which runs through all sorts of ritual acts like visiting tombs and practice of tawassul (intercession).

For example, the topic on WB is explained in-depth in the last chapter of the tenth grade of the tawhid texts where broad boundaries of separation between Muslims and non-

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431 Ibid, p. 79.
432 Ibid.
Muslims, issues of loyalty and enmity are emphasized. Lessons on WB includes prohibition for Muslims to attend the rituals and ceremonies of non-Muslims, offer them congratulations of condolences, using Christian dates and many other examples of the social aspect of the concept which some have been mentioned earlier. WB in the school textbooks is portrayed as a fundamental component of the tawhid and that a Muslim should show loyalty only to the Muslim ummah and break off ties and relations with others. As evidence to this, the texts cite Quranic verses such as 5:51 that refers to specific events during the Meccan wars, but without historical context, so as to prove that bara’ between Muslims and non-Muslims is a universal and eternal condition set forth by God.

Under the premise of this concept, the lessons warn students of the impermissibility of a Muslim to stay among the kuffar as this will compromise his faith and that God in the Quran requires Muslim to migrate from the land of kufr to the land of Islam. In essence, what the lessons are trying to bring across is the message that Muslims should realise the importance of the concept of WB according to the understanding of the Wahhabi’s teachings, rise above themselves and feel superior with their Islamic creed. They must take account of the errors of those who are misled and the lies of those who would deceive them. They must turn at every crossing to the book of God and the sunnah of the Prophet and know the boundaries that they should not go beyond.

It is also worth noting here that the role of WB in Saudi school textbooks is emphasized most at its social and religious level. For example, the books present the conditions under which one may travel to non-Muslim countries and how one should behave in those countries so as not to show loyalty to the non-Muslims; how to avoid being immersed in the cultures and practices of non-Muslims and how to interact with them. As Wagemakers states, ‘this rulings have two things in common: (1) they serve to keep Muslims away from anything that might stain the purity of their beliefs and lead

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434 Ibid, p. 239.
to loyalty – expressed as love, affection or friendship; (2) they deal only with social issues and do not address anything political that might lead to criticism of the state.438

**The Exportation of WB Outside Saudi Borders**

The alliance of the Wahhabi movement and the Al-Saud family since the first Saudi state until the present time has enabled the Wahhabi ideology to spread not only in Saudi Arabia, but also to the rest of the Middle East and beyond. The discovery and exploitation of oil in the country, especially the sharp rise in oil prices since 1970s has enabled Saudi Arabia to aggressively invest in the promotion of Wahhabi thought around the Muslim world.

In particular, the propagation of the concept of WB has moved beyond its borders particularly in the era of the twentieth century. A research done by the Center for Religious Freedom in 2005 shows that there are five main means of dissemination of the Wahhabi doctrine internationally:439 (1) through official publications of a government ministry; (2) materials distributed by the Saudi embassy; (3) religious pronouncements and commentaries by religious authorities appointed to state positions by the Saudi crown; (4) representative of the established Wahhabi ideology of Saudi Arabia; and (5) dissemination through mosque or center supported by the Saudi crown.440

Wahhabi publication on WB has also penetrated mosques and Islamic centres in the United States. For example, the Saudi funded Islamic Centre of Washington DC is reported to distribute a document entitled “Loyalty and Disassociation in Islam” which was compiled by the Ibn Taimiyya Library in Riyadh. The documents states:

> To be disassociated from the infidels is to hate them for their religion, to leave them, never to rely on them for support, not to admire them, to be on one’s guard against

438 Ibid.
440 Ibid.
them, never to imitate them, and to always oppose them in every way according to Islamic law” [Document no. 45].

In Britain, literature on WB was also found to be distributed by mosques and Islamic centers across the country. Most of these materials hail from Saudi Arabia. A book entitled *Al-Wala’ wal ‘ada’ fi ‘Alaqat al-Muslim bi Ghayr al-Muslim* (Loyalty and Enmity Concerning Relations Between Muslims and Non-Muslims) written by a Salafi preacher Abdullah Al-Tarifi was published in London in 1990. The book states:

> It is mandatory to hate and dislike the unbelievers and polytheists, to never ask them for support against the Muslims, to never follow their example in anything, to never obey them in matters of religion, to never imitate them. Actually, it is mandatory to stay away from them and to separate from them, and to do what is necessary in terms of jihad and its likes against their fighters.

**Criticism on Saudi Educational System and Its Concept of WB**

Particularly in the aftermath of September 11, the Saudi government and its educational system became the target of widespread criticism for allegedly inciting anti-Western sentiments. The system and its underlying ideology have been accused of contributing and providing fertile ground for Islamic extremism. Many have also argued that the religious curriculum in Saudi Arabia fails to give students an adequate

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441 Ibid, p. 20.
appreciation of the varieties of Islamic interpretation, and that the method of instruction does not serve the development of critical thinking skills.

While many Saudis have responded by defending their school system, it is important to note that the former Saudi Minister of Education, Abdulla Al-Ubayd has come forward to acknowledge that the kingdom’s curriculum is contributing in fostering terrorism. In particular, the minister blamed the Salafi doctrine of WB for being instrumental in the development of the Jihadi ideology that has contributed to terrorism.\textsuperscript{447} Political Islam Online reported:

Following the arrest of more than 520 alleged terrorists in Saudi Arabia, the Saudi minister of education, Abdulla Al-Ubayd, acknowledged in an interview with Al-Jazeera that the Kingdom’s curriculum is contributing to the fostering of terrorism. In particular, the minister blamed the Salafi doctrine of \textit{Al-Wala wal Bara’} for being instrumental in the development of the Jihadi ideology that has contributed to terrorism. The minister’s blunt criticism seems to be part of an orchestrated campaign by the Kingdom to combat extremism. The minister’s statements came one day after a similar announcement by the Saudi grand Mufti, Abdel Aziz Al-Shaykh, warning Muslims not to harbour members of the straying sect [a reference to Al-Qaeda supporters]. In an extremely unusual move by a staunch defender of the faith, Al-Shaykh proclaimed that the mosques must also fulfil their duty to ward off sedition and should not remain silent or harbour transgressors.\textsuperscript{448}

The criticism of Wahhabi ideology as being associated with intolerance and violence, especially after the events of September 11 has motivated the Saudi regime to revise and

\textsuperscript{448} See \textit{The Saudi Minister of Education Declares Curriculum Have Contributed to The Hatching of Terrorists}, Political Islam Online, Briefings, July 6\textsuperscript{th} 2008.
reform the Wahhabi ideology especially its doctrines of the “other”. This includes reform in the national education system and syllabus. For example, on 21 May 2003, the Saudi government formed a committee as part of a campaign to promote ‘a moderate image of Islam and to uproot extremism from the country’. In addition, the government launched reforms in various public spheres, particularly regarding issues such as: (1) the monitoring of religious discourse; (2) the initiation of national and interfaith dialogues; and (3) the reassessment of the national system of education.

Conclusion

In this chapter, the main factors which contributed to the development and transformation of the concept of WB in the Wahhabi ideology have been discussed. The flexible fluid nature of the concept of WB points to the fact that there exists a spectrum of Wahhabi ideology. There is no single and fixed Wahhabi and Salafi ideology, there are several. At one end there is the so-called official Wahhabism which is subservient to the authorities and adopt a more pragmatic approach, while at the other end there exists a revolutionary, uncompromising type which is often associated with the Jihadi Salafi groups. As Wagemakers observes, the spectrum or flexibility of WB in Wahhabi discourse could be clearly seen in the thoughts and writings of two distinct groups i.e. the “quietest” who emphasized the social aspect of WB and the “radicals” who apply WB at the political level. In other words, the concept of WB specifically and the Wahhabi heritage in general can be both used to support and condemn the Saudi regime. The spectrum, however, is a continuum because the groups may not be distinctive form one another but may share certain tendencies and characteristics. For instance, with respect to the concept of WB, these groups are all socially conservative but they differ in their political discourses and strategies in dealing with resistance, relations with the authorities and non-Muslims. As such, sweeping assumptions that Salafi-Wahhabi ideology is solely responsible for the rise of terrorism, particularly in the aftermath of 9/11, for example, are erroneous.

The concept of WB first emerged in the Wahhabi ideology as a tool to fight *shirk* and *bid‘ah* practices of the Muslims. For the most part, it is understood primarily in theological terms as the rejection of *kufr* and as loyalty to correct belief (*aqida*). It was manifested as a sectarian polemic against the Sunni majority, and as isolation from a non-believing wider society. This social reformation tool has since evolved into the political sphere to suit the needs of the players involved: whether to justify the actions of those in power or to those who oppose them. In essence, it shows that the concept is a fluid one: for whom should Muslims reserve their loyalty and love? Though Wahhabism utilizes the concept of WB with the intent to purify Muslims’ loyalty and allegiance to God alone, it has also been used to demand the undivided loyalty to their Muslim rulers.

There are some important questions that surfaces through those who contest this Wahhabi and Salafi ideology. For example should Muslims hate the *kuffar* or the act of disbelief in them? Are Muslims entitled to place the label of *takfir* to the Muslim rulers who are considered deviant to the Islamic teachings? On the definition of *bara‘*, who deserves to be avoided or hated by Muslims? How should Muslims portray this animosity? These critical questions surrounding the concept of WB have led to a diversity of opinions and even disputes within the Wahhabis and the modern Salafis in general. The dynamic nature of the concept has enabled some of these raging debates around the concept. To facilitate better understanding of some of these debates, the next chapter will look into the spectrum of WB in modern Salafism that range from what might be termed the “very mild” to the “most extreme” of it.
CHAPTER FOUR: ANALYSING THE SPECTRUM OF AL-WALA’ WAL BARA’ IN MODERN SALAFISM

Introduction

This chapter aims to explore some of the salient debates within the modern Salafi fraternity (groups and individuals) on the concept of WB and/or issues that derive under the umbrella of this concept. While many Salafis believe in the importance of WB and herald the concept as one of the manifestations of the Islamic aqidah, they do not necessarily agree on matters that are related to the concept. In other words, modern Salafis have different understanding and application of WB. Salafis albeit having some common ground, and the fact that an individual can belong to more than one Salafi group, are diverse in many details when it comes to the ruling and application of WB.

In order to understand the complexities of this concept, it is important that we comprehend the different positions modern Salafis had on WB. In this chapter, we attempt to show that there is no single understanding of WB in modern Salafism. Different Salafi groups and individuals provide different legal framework when dealing with the concept.

As mentioned before, modern Salafis in general share a similar creed or aqidah and use the same approach and procedures when forming religious legal rulings. Nevertheless, they do hold a spectrum of views on various issues concerning religion, social and with regards to politics and current affairs. For instance, questions concerning sovereignty (hakimiyyah) in Islam and the legitimacy of ruling with other than the shariah have been a focal point in debates amongst modern Salafis and a cause for their fractions. The cause for these variations in opinions is not due to the approach or the text used, rather it is mainly due to the manner a Salafi scholar envisages, interprets, and understands a particular case. It also depends on the background and orientation of Salafism one adopts. For example, purist Salafi scholars who are under the so-called “control” of the government would support a decision made by the regime, although the decision seems to be a violation of Islamic principles and WB in the eyes of other Salafis.
The diverse views amongst Salafis and their visualisation on a particular case will inevitably result in different rulings. As with WB, the differences in opinions and rulings within the Salafis are in many cases, a *fiqhi* (jurisprudential) difference and not merely *aqidah*. Nevertheless, there are certain situations where a Salafi believes that a wrong or misdirected *wala’* or a failure to show *bara’* could lead a Muslim out of the realm of Islam.

As Salafism develops in the twentieth century, one could notice that there is an increase in the propagation of modern Salafi version of WB. More Salafi scholars begin to write, publish and lecture exclusively on the subject of WB. Salafi scholars believe that efforts to propagate WB are crucial in a period where Muslims are no longer aware of the qualities that distinguish Muslims from the non-Muslims. Salafis assert Muslims have adopted patterns of behaviours that are absolutely repugnant to a “true” Muslim. This is because they have begun to embrace the culture and practices of the non-Muslims, taking them as friends and allies, and thus fail to distinguish between what is Islamic and non-Islamic. As Salafis view such acts of the Muslims as threatening to Islam, they believe that the importance of publishing books on WB and calling Muslim to the concept at present time is therefore crucial.

While one might assume that all the arguments made by modern Salafi scholars in their writings and lectures on WB are similar, but a critical look at these writings suggest that certain issues in relation to the concept has resulted in a point of disagreement and dispute among the Salafis. As mentioned earlier, this is due to the fact that different Salafi groups and individuals have different ways of visualizing a particular issue, and this will inevitably affect the ruling and legitimacy of the issue. For the purpose of this chapter, I have identified four WB-related issues which are commonly debated among modern Salafis and will present it in this chapter. They are:

1. The issue of whether WB necessitates Muslims to hate the *kuffar* and *kufr* or they are only required to hate the *kufr* but not the *kuffar*.
2. The permissibility of ruling with other than what God has revealed or the *shariah* and Muslim rulers’ relations with non-Muslim countries.
3. The issue of aiding non-Muslims against the Muslims.
4. Accepting and giving gifts to the *kuffar* and congratulating them on their religious festivals.
In this chapter, I attempt to illustrate that modern Salafis have different views and produce diverse rulings on these issues which can be seen as matters of WB. These issues are certainly not the only ones that are mostly debated among modern Salafis. Nevertheless, one could find that there is a substantial debate on them especially on the internet forums. Many Salafis have discussed, provide their views and even issue fatwas on these issues. The reasons why these specific ones have been chosen are twofold: (1) they are among the significant and mostly debated by modern Salafis and some of it is related to the phenomenon of current affairs; (2) it is my intention to show their disagreement in the three areas of WB namely the aqidah, social and politics. The matter of hating kufr and kuffar come under the area of the aqidah, while accepting gifts from the kuffar, which is a matter of fiqh, forms the social dimension of WB, and lastly the notion of Islamic governance and diplomatic ties with foreign countries can be categorised under the area of politics.

Before presenting how the various Salafi groups and individuals view these issues, the chapter will begin with a brief background on what all Salafis agree with regards to WB. The chapter will then proceed to discuss the four issues mentioned above. The chapter concludes that the Salafi debates and their disagreement on WB has shown that WB in modern Salafism is one that resides on a wide spectrum which can range from what might be termed the “very soft” to its “most extreme” form.

**WB: What All Salafis Agree and Disagree?**

As explained in Chapter One, modern Salafism represents a diverse community. Although united in their aspiration for a return to the original teachings of Islam, modern Salafis have different ideological inclinations and they view the current social and political context differently. However, there are common characteristics that bind them together as one community. As mentioned before, all Salafis share a puritanical approach to the religion intended to disregard religious innovation by strictly returning to the teachings of the Prophet and practices of the Salaf. They believe in the supremacy of tawhid and its role in providing the principles and ways for applying religious beliefs.

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452 See Chapter One for details of the different schools of modern Salafism or Tariq Abdelhaleem, *The Counterfeit Salafis, Deviation of the Counterfeit Salafis from the Methodology of Ahlul Sunnah Wal-Jama’a*, pp.16-39.
to contemporary issues and problems. All of them also possess an impulse for reform albeit in their own methods and preferences.

Likewise for the concept of WB, all Salafis believe in its importance and call Muslims for its practice. Many Salafis in their diverse orientations and schools agree that a Muslim’s faith will not be completed until it is demonstrated with the practice of WB. The areas in the concept of WB in which all Salafi thinkers agree can be summarized as follows:

1. WB is part of the shahadah which is 'La ilaha illallah' (There is no God but Allah). This means that every Muslim must be free and immune from all that is worshiped besides God.
2. As an integral part of iman, WB is necessary for its perfection.
3. WB is to love for the sake of God and hate for the sake of God. This is the strongest bond of faith.
4. A Muslim need to possess wala’ for his Muslim brother, and declare his bara’ from the non-Muslim (but the manifestation and methods of declaring bara’ of the kuffar is a point of dispute among Salafis).
5. A Muslim’s wala’ for his fellow Muslim brothers is demonstrated in loving and helping them regardless of who they are, regardless of the language they speak and where they come from. There are no bonds of blood, race nor heritage which are stronger than those of belief.
6. Muslims must hate the infidels and renouncing their love for them (Again Salafis have different methods as to how this hate towards the kuffar should be manifested).

Despite these foundational elements of WB which are fundamentally shared among all Salafis, divisions have emerged as a result of the inherently subjective nature of applying religious rulings to new issues and challenges. Salafi scholars with diverse background and orientations struggle to find religious principles and sources to apply to specific contexts and situations. This has forced them not only to have a deep knowledge of Islamic rulings, but an understanding of a particular problem or issue as well. For example, while all Salafis believe that WB is important and is an integral part of Islamic faith, not all of them view that ruling with other than the shariah is a form of wala’ to an un-Islamic system or it is an act that can lead a Muslim to be a kafir.
Sharing the same approach to religious rulings does not mean that Salafis have the same interpretation about contemporary issues and politics.

1- **Kufr and Kuffar: To Hate or Not to Hate?**

As mentioned in Chapter One, the concept of WB in Salafism is also known as the ‘love and hate concept’. *Wala’* requires Muslims to love God and anything that pleases Him while *bara’* necessitates Muslims to disassociate (which includes hating in many cases) from anything that is worshipped besides God and contradicts Him. This includes *kufr* and *kuffar*. It is clear that every Muslim hates *kufr*, but the issue of whether *wala’* requires Muslims to hate the *kuffar* has become a subject of debate and disagreement amongst many Salafis.

It is natural for many Salafis or even Muslims in general to believe that it is incumbent upon Muslims to hate the *kuffar*. This is probably due to the fact the Quran repeatedly describes the characters and attributes of the disbelievers and warns Muslims of the dangers of these attributes and to avoid them. God has commanded that Muslims reject or make *kufr* of the *taghut* and the disbelievers are seen as the *tawaghit*.\(^\text{453}\) Salafis stress that all Muslims need to disbelieve in all types of *taghut* because that is the precondition of Islam, which should be expressed by one’s heart, tongue and limbs (i.e. actions). One could also find that Quranic verses even instruct Muslims to kill the polytheists (*mushrikin*),\(^\text{454}\) if these verses were understood literally and its interpretation were taken out of context. At certain places, the Quran says that the *kafir* may be deceived, plotted against, hated, enslaved, mocked, tortured and worse.

These are some of the reasons why Salafis generally hate the *kuffar*, albeit the word *kafir* in the Quran refers to various categories of people like polytheists, idolaters, People of the Book (Jews and Christians), pagans and even Muslims who are not grateful to God. On the notion of hating the *kuffar*, Salafis are divided into three categories. First, those who believe that all *kuffar* should be hated, killed and eliminated from the face of the earth. This position is seen as the most extreme position among the Salafis. As for the *muamalah* (interaction) with the *kuffar*, this group of Salafis do not distinguish between *kafir harbi* (*kafir* who should be fought), *kafir dzimmi* (*kafir* living

\(^{453}\) See Quran 2:256.  
\(^{454}\) See Quran 9:5.
under Muslim rule) who should be protected according to Islamic law, and a general *kafir*. The second category of Salafis views that while all the *kuffar* should be hated (and this hate is usually manifested in the heart), they should be treated justly and with kindness as long as they do not fight the Muslims. The last category believes that Muslims should not hate the *kuffar* but they should only hate the *kufr* or their rejection of Islam.

Salafis who claim that all *kuffar* should be hated and killed are seen to be very extreme in their approach and methodology. They are hostile towards the non-Muslims, possess an anti-*kafir* attitude and are usually militant. They mostly come from the Jihadi Salafi current. They assert that Muslims should not love the entire *kuffar* and ought to declare their enmity towards them. For example, Ayman Al-Zawahiri says Muslims should hate the infidels and renounce their love because God has forbid the Muslims to show their affection to those who oppose God and His Messenger.\(^455\)

The feelings of hatred, enmity and hostility towards the *kuffar* are made clear by Al-Zawahiri in his book *Al-Wala’ wal Bara’*. He claimed that all infidels, especially the Jews and Christians as well as Muslims who do not participate in *jihad* and associate themselves with the infidels must be killed. He also discouraged Muslims from befriending or engaging in peaceful coexistence with non-Muslims. To him, any expression of friendship with the disbelievers indicates a lack of faith and insufficient love for God as it is impossible to befriend someone who opposes God.\(^456\) Al-Zawahiri explains:-

> The Lord Almighty has commanded us to hate the infidels and reject their love. For they hate us and begrudge us our religion, wishing that we abandon it…There is a firm bond between loving the Lord, befriending the believers, and waging *jihad* in the path of Allah. Kindness and fair dealing with those infidels who are not hostile toward us are not the same thing as friendship, which is forbidden.\(^457\)

\(^455\) Al-Zawahiri, *Al-Wala’ wal Bara’*: Aqidah Manqulah wa Waqi’ Masqud, pp. 7-10.


\(^457\) Ibid.
According to Al-Zawahiri, the ultimate way to manifest hatred to the kuffar is through jihad. He believes that Muslims must establish their superiority to non-Muslims to engender the necessary hostility to effectively wage jihad. In the chapter entitled ‘The Commandment to Wage Jihad Against Them, Expose their Falsehood, Have No Love for Them, and Keep Away From Them’ of his book, Al-Zawahiri states that:

Not only did the Almighty and Exalted be He forbid us from befriending the infidels, but he also ordered us to wage jihad against the original infidels (those who never submitted to Islam), the apostates (Muslims who have strayed from the faith), and the hypocrites.458

As Gilles Kepel says, ‘Al-Zawahiri legitimates any "collateral damage" by jihad using the doctrine of WB. The measure of Al-Zawahiri's influence is offered by the more radical generation of those Muslim fighters operating in Iraq; they have no problems justifying the killing of fellow Muslims and innocent Iraqi civilians, because for them these people are "associating with unbelievers". In 2002, when the US invaded Iraq, Al-Zawahiri made it clear that any Muslim ally of the US was by definition an apostate: ‘Jihad against Americans, Jews and their allies among the hypocrites and apostates is mandatory on all Muslims.’459

Another Salafi preacher who shares a similar thinking and understanding of WB with Al-Zawahiri, and believes that all kuffar must be hated is that of Abu Waleed,460 a British Salafi who is a strong proponent of WB in Britain. Abu Waleed claims that it is not possible for Muslims to hate kufir but love the kuffar. He is critical of those Muslims who befriends the disbelievers and even criticizes Muslims who support and work for the government. He calls Muslims to humiliate the kafir and never to elevate him. In his lecture on WB, Abu Waleed reminds:

Al-Wala’ wal Bara’ is the backbone of tawhid. You cannot be a Muslim and believe in Allah until you hate the taghut. How can you love Allah and shaitan

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458 Ibid, p. 93.
(satan) at the same time? How can you say that ‘I have respect towards any of those tawaghit or I work for the tawaghit and I am also somebody who believes in Allah and a good servant of him (‘abid). It does not work that way.\(^{461}\)

Abu Waleed equates the kuffar as the taghut which God has commanded the Muslims to pronounce their kufr on them in the Quran. He then continues to explain that one of the five meanings of bara’ is ‘al-bughud’ (hatred). He continues:

\[\text{Al-bughud is to have hatred. You cannot say I have bara’ of the kuffar but I love him. Love and hate is for the sake of Allah and is nothing personal. Hatred of the kafir is nothing personal not because he is black or because he is white but for the sake of Allah.}\(^{462}\)

In his exclusive lecture on WB, Abu Waleed explains that one needs to understand the principle known as at-talaazum (moulding) in order to understand WB.\(^{463}\) As explained in Chapter One, talaazum is to mould two or more things together and cannot be separated. For example the talaazum of iman (belief) is the actions of Muslim as the shariah meaning of iman is ‘the belief in the heart, manifested by the tongue and actions by the limbs’ (al-iman qaulun wa f’ilun wa ‘itiqaadun). To separate these three elements form each other is to dismantle the whole matter. Likewise there is talaazum in WB. For wala’ the talaazum is muwaalat (alliance) and for bara’ is mu’aadat (enmity).

On the other hand, other Salafis have distinguished between kufr and kafir. Unlike those Salafis who call for the rejection and elimination of the kuffar, these Salafis believe that what should be hated in the name of WB is the act of kufr or the disbelief and rejection of tawhid in the hearts of the kuffar and not the kuffar as human beings themselves. A

\(^{461}\) Ibid.
\(^{462}\) Ibid.
\(^{463}\) Ibid.
famous Salafi preacher, Sheikh Khaled Yassin from the United States said during one of his lectures on WB:

And we have *bara'* against all the *kuffar*. Now, we do not hate every *kafir*. We do not want to fight every *kafir*. We do not want to kill every *kafir*. That is not our belief. But we have *bara'*, which means *bara'* against their values, *bara'* against their beliefs, rejection against their belief, rejection of their values, rejection of their *kufr*, rejection of their corruption, rejection of their rebellion, rejection of their rejection of Allah the Almighty and His Messenger (peace be upon him).

From this statement, we can notice that Khaled Yassin indicates the differences between hating the *kafir* and hating *kufr*, between the acts of disassociating and hating, and between hating and then acting in a *jihad*. Importantly, all these subtle differences are argued over by modern Salafis, as this chapter highlights. This clearly shows that there is a particularly difference between belief and action in this matter. It highlights that one can hate the *kuffar*, but that does not mean doing *jihad* (physical) against them, and for what is a legitimate action against the *kuffar*, that is a matter of *fiqh*.

Another Salafi preacher who somewhat agrees with the idea of Khaled Yasin is Sheikh Muhammad Iqbal Nadvi. As someone who holds a doctorate in Islamic Law with a specialization in Islamic Jurisprudence from Ummal Qura University and has worked as an Assistant Professor at King Saud University in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, Nadvi is very much entrenched with the ideas of Salafism. He believes that the idea of Muslims’ hatred of non-Muslims is nothing but a great misunderstanding of religion. He believes that the *kuffar* as human beings should not be hated. What should be hated is the act of

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464 Khaled Yasin is a Muslim convert of Salafi background. He is the Executive Director of the Islamic Teaching Institute (ITI): a premier organisation dedicated to the work Islamic missionary. He studied Arabic language in Medina, Saudi Arabia and Cairo, Egypt and has had many mentors and teachers who tutored him in *fiqh al-Sunnah*, *Fiqh al-Sirah*, Islamic History and the memorisation and recitation of the *Quran*. Khalid Yasin constantly tours the world delivering lectures aimed at removing distortions about Islam and Muslims, conducting *D’awah* Training Courses, and providing new Muslims with a specially designed Islamic Training Program.


466 Sheikh Muhammad Iqbal Nadvi in 2009 is the *imam* of the mosque in Calgary, Alberta Canada. He delivers lectures at local institutions, including at Mount Royal College in Calgary, Alberta, Canada.
disbelief in them. When asked about the issue of hatred on non-Muslims, Nadvi responded:

As for your second question, I think that what you said about Muslims’ hatred of non-Muslims is nothing but a great misunderstanding of the spirit of Islam and who Muslims are. As a basic principle of Islam, we, Muslims, do not hate anyone on account of their cultural, religious, or ethnic backgrounds. Islam teaches us to interact with all people and wish good for the whole mankind. However, Muslims hate kufr, or disbelief in Allah, the Almighty. Since we love all people, we hate their disobedience of Allah, the Most High. So, even when people deny the existence of Allah we do not hate them personally; however, we hate their disbelief and disobedience of Allah, Exalted be He.467

Another position taken by modern Salafis regarding this issue is that Muslim should hate the kuffar but are obliged to be kind and compassionate with them. This position is seen to be the one taken by most Salafis especially in Saudi Arabia. In Salafism, WB is a requirement of the tawhid. The proclamation of the shahadah means denial and hatred against anything that is worship besides God. However, this group of Salafis which include the Establishment Salafis or the official scholars of Saudi Arabia stress that such hatred towards the kuffar does not imply and forbids Muslim from having good and mutual relationship with them. According to them, Muslims are obliged to hate the kuffar and the act of kufr in them, and at the same time befriend them. In a fatwa on WB, former Mufti of Saudi Arabia Ibn Baz clarifies:

Al-Wala’ wal Bara’ means to love the believers and be loyal to them, and to hate the disbelievers and having enmity to them i.e. to be free from them and from their religion (wa al-bar’a minhum wa min dinihim). This is

al-Wala’ wal Bara’. But to hate and declare enmity to them does not imply that you could fight them unless they initiate the fight first. It means that you should hate them and show your enmity in your hearts. They should not be your friends but you must not hurt and do injustice to them. If they accept the peace (salam), then reply back the salam to them. Advise them and show them the path of goodness”.468

Another individual who agrees with Ibn baz is the English-educated Salafi scholar from Saudi Arabia, Dr Abdullah Al-Farsi469 who clarifies in his lecture on WB:

When you deny (worship other than Allah), that should imply that you hate anyone who worships other than Allah the Almighty. This is a requirement of Tawhid. But when we say hate, we do not mean that this hate involves killing people unjustly or doing harm to people unjustly. You hate them and you love guidance for them. You hate them and be just to them. You hate them and be gentle and good with them. Just like Allah says in the Quran which means (You will not find a group of people who have faith in Allah and the Day of Judgement and at the same time have love for those who oppose Allah and the Messenger). Then Allah says after that Allah by telling you that you should not love them is not forbidding you from being just to them and

469 Dr Abdullah al-Farsi is a Saudi Salafi scholar and a member of the Standing Committee for Scholarly Research and Issuing Edicts in Saudi Arabia (al-Lajnah al-Da’imah lil Buhuth al-‘Ilmiyyah wa al-Ifta’). Professionally, Dr. al-Farsi has a P.h.D. in Mechanical Engineering from Cleveland State University, USA and hence is well verse in English. Dr. al-Farsi has been active in the field of Islamic missionary since 1980, mostly in America and Europe and has taught many books on Aqidah in Kuwait. He has an extensive personal research on books of Tafsir, explanations of hadith and the writings of Ibn Taimiyyah. As a famous scholar, Dr. al-Farsi was known to Ibn Baz and Salih Al-Fawzan and has an honorary tazkiyah (recommendation) from Shaikh Badiuddin Shah Sindhi. He has studied many books under senior students from the Islamic University of Madinah and has been encouraged by them to teach the books of Aqidah in English. See Dr al-Farsi brief biodata at [http://qsep.com/EemanDVD/AboutShaikhalFarsi.htm](http://qsep.com/EemanDVD/AboutShaikhalFarsi.htm) (accessed 12 March 2010).
from being good to them. This is the balance of the Quran.

He then continues: “the middle course is that you hate them by your heart and by your limbs you treat them as they deserve”.

It could be noticed that Ibn Baz and Abdullah Faris have taken the so-called “soft” or “moderate” position on issues related to WB. This aspect of moderation in applying WB could be rarely seen in the writings of many contemporary Salafi scholars. Unlike many Salafis, Dr Hatim Bin Arif Bin Nasir Al-Sharif, a professor from Umm Al-Qura University in Saudi Arabia, calls for a moderate understanding of WB. In his treatise entitled “Al-Wala wal Bara’ Baina al-Ghulu wa al-Jafa’ fi Dhau-I al-Kitab wa as-Sunnah (Loyalty and Disavowal Between Extremism and Estrangement in Light of the Quran and Sunnah)” repeatedly stresses the importance of incorporating three significant Islamic values in the practice of WB which are moderation (wasatiyyah), tolerance (samahah) and kindness (rahamah). Like those who agree with him, Dr Hatim also view that the kuffar should only be hated for the belief and that Muslims have the right (haq) to uphold goodness (birr), compassion (ihsan) and justice (adl) in dealing with the non-Muslims as long as the latter do not fight the Muslims or support against killing the Muslims. According to him, ‘to uphold justice is an obligation (fardh) upon Muslims even to those whom we have the right to hate him and those kuffar who fight and kills us’. In his writing on WB, Dr Hatim has laid out some examples of moderation in practicing WB. For example he says that ‘no kafir should be forced to embrace Islam’ (la yujbar ahadun min al-kuffar al-asiyyin alya al-dukhul fil Islam) and reminds that ‘the difference of religion does not nullify the rights towards family members’ (anna ikhtilaf al-din la yulgha haqqa dzawi al-qurba).

It is worth noting here that similar to the positions taken by the Establishment Salafis and the likes mentioned above, there are those who distinguish between loving the kuffar inwardly (in the hearts) and outwardly. Muhammad Ibn Adam, the Mufti of Dar

470 Understanding Al-Wala’ wal Bara’ in Light of Laa Ilaha Illallah (There is No God but Allah) by Dr Abdullah Al-Farsi available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oDRoeQZG6-g&feature=relmfu (accessed 11 November 2011).
al-Iftaa in Leicester, United Kingdom in his *fatwa* on Muslims’ interaction with non-
Muslim explains that Muslims are allowed to express friendship and love outwardly
without having love for their religious beliefs.\(^473\) This outward love for the non-Muslims
which is known as *Mudarat* is manifested through expressing good manners and being
kind to the non-Muslims.\(^474\)

Finally, on the issue of whom Muslims should love and hate, Salih Al-Fawzan has dealt
with it in his book *Al-Wala’ wala Bara’*. In his book, Al-Fawzan categorizes people
who deserve WB or those whom Muslims should love and hate into three categories: \(^475\)

1. Those whom Muslims should love purely with no intention of being an enemy to
   them. These are obviously Muslims who believe in the Oneness of God, accept
   the *tawhid* and submit to Him.

2. Those whom Muslims should hate and take as enemies with no love or support
   and respect to them. This group refers to all the disbelievers including the
   Pagans, the Hypocrites and the Apostates.

3. Those whom Muslims should love particularly for their good deeds and hate for
   their other evil deeds. This category of people are those who are loved for their
   belief of Islam but hated for the sins they have committed. Thus as a sign of
   loving them, Muslims should find ways to advise and warn them against doing
   any evil acts. The people under this category could also be punished for their
   evil doings for the benefit of the wider Muslim community.

Al-Fawzan whose book on WB will be analysed in the next chapter belongs to the
category of Establishment Salafis or the official governmental scholar of Saudi Arabia.
This group of Salafis believes that Muslims should hate the non-Muslims, but must treat
them with kindness and justice as long as the latter do not physically attack the
Muslims. As explained in Chapter Two, this position is based on Quran 60:8-9.

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\(^473\) See Muhammad Ibn Adam, ‘The Fiqh of Muslim Non-Muslim Interaction: A Detailed Explanation’
(accessed 02 January 2012).

\(^474\) Ibid.

\(^475\) Salih bin Fawzan Al-Fawzan, *Al-Wala’ wala Bara’*, p. 15.
2- Ruling with Other Than What God Has Revealed and Relations with Non-Muslim Countries

As stated before, in the Salafi doctrine of WB, *wala’* obliges Muslim to be loyal to God and Islam while performing *bara’* to the enemies of God. Apart from physical enemies, Muslim ought to reject anything that contradicts or deemed incompatible with Islam which is considered by some Salafis as the enemies of God. This includes any system of governance that is not based on the legislation of God or *shariah.*

The notion of ruling with other than the *shariah* or with other than what God has revealed (*hukm bi ghair ma anzal Allah*) is one of the major issues debated by modern Salafis. Although the issue of *shariah* versus man-made law is not something new in Islam, as it has been debated by Muslims scholars of the past, this issue has become the crux of Salafi debate in modern times.\(^{476}\) This is probably due to the realities of the Muslim community which is confronted with the challenges and problems of governing with Islamic principles at the political level. As part of the *ummah* and in accordance with the Islamic principle of *al-amr bil ma’ruf wa an-nahyu an al-munkar* (enjoying good and forbidding evil) Salafis believe that it is their duty to correct any act that contradicts Islamic principles. They claim that those who do not rule with the *shariah* do not abide by the commands of God and become *kafir* as stipulated in the Quran.\(^{477}\) Salafis spend substantial amount of their time discussing, debating and even refuting others on this issue. Some of them go to the extent of performing *takfir* upon those who fail to govern with the *shariah*.

Obviously, the debate on ruling with other than *shariah* in modern Salafism is a long and complex one. It is beyond my intention to provide a detailed and lengthy discussion of modern Salafis’ debate on the issue in this chapter. What will be the focus here is to highlight two main Salafi camps on this particular issue. The first camp views that it is unlawful to rule with other than the *shariah* and that those who rule with other than the *shariah* are *kafir.* These Salafis view that Muslims should perform *bara’* of all un-Islamic systems and influences. The other camp believes that the act of ruling with other

\(^{476}\) Salafis have dealt with the issue of “Ruling with other than what God has revealed” in many of their writings. For example see Man-made Laws vs Shari’ah: *Ruling by Laws Other Than What Allah Has Revealed* by Dr Abdul Rahman Ibn Salih al-Mahmood translated by Nasiruddin al-Khattab, International Islamic Publishing House, undated.

\(^{477}\) This claim made by Salafis is based on Quranic verses 5:44; 5:45 and 5:47.
than the *shariah* does not lead someone to be a *kafir*, albeit he/she could be a sinner. They view that those who rule with other than the *shariah* is not a *kafir*, except in the case when he denies and rejects it.

*Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi*

Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi is an example of modern Salafi who applies *takfir* to those who do not implement *shariah* law as a political system of governance in the name of WB. Using the concept of *Millat Ibrahim* as the basis for his treatment of WB, Al-Maqdisi equates the act of governing with man-made laws with act of worshipping God and thus claiming present-day Muslim politicians and leaders of *shirk* and therefore of being *kuffar*. He blatantly rejects the idea of democracy, nation-states and secularism which according to him, not only are seen as incompatible with Islam but most importantly argues that adherents to these man-made systems are taking other than God as their lords and legislators.  

On the basis of WB, Al-Maqdisi accuses the rulers of Muslim countries who do not implement *shariah* and claims that those who follow their rules as misdirecting their *wala’* which should only be given to God and Islam. They are thus seen as *tawaghit* in the eyes of Al-Maqdisi. As mentioned in Chapter Three, Al-Maqdisi in *Al-Kawashif al-Jaliyyah fi kufr al-Dawla al-Sa’udiyyah* accused the Saudi government of straying from the path of Islam and rejects the legitimacy of the Saudi government under the doctrine of WB.  

Obviously Al-Maqdisi is not the only individual who calls for the disavowal of the Saudi government and performs *takfir* on them. Saudi scholars who take the position of opposition to the regime have also pronounced their *takfir* on Saudi rulers for the same reason Al-Maqdisi has accused the rulers, or at least for not implementing the *shariah* on a full scale. In a joint-statement that was released in 2003, a group of ten scholars including Nasir Al-Fahad and Ali bin Khudayr al-Khudayr declared *takfir* of the Saudi government and accused the regime as committing a major *kufr* which expels one  

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478 See Al-Maqdisi’s works on these issues such as *Dimuqratiyyah Dinun, Millat Ibrahim*, *Al-Kawashif Al-Jaliyyah* and *Kashf Al-Niqab* all available at his website at [http://www.tawhed.ws](http://www.tawhed.ws) (accessed 15 August 2012).

479 Others scholars in this group are Muhammad bin Fahd al-Ali al-Rashudi, Hamad bin Rais al-Rais, Muhammad bin Sulaiman as-Suq’ubi, Abdullah, bin Abdul Rahman aal-Saad, Hamad bin Abdullah al-humaydi, Ahmad bin Saleh as-Sinaani and Ahmad bin Hamoud al-Khalidi.
out of the religion. These scholars base their *takfir* of the regime on quotations from scholars whom all Salafi idolize such as Ibn Taimiyyah, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and even the former mufti of Saudi Arabia, Syaikh Muhammad bin Ibrahim who had criticized those who apply some of the *shariah* on some people but not others. As stated in Chapter Three, these scholars attacked the Saudi regime using the same Wahhabi heritage which the regime hold dear. In their statement, words from Shaikh Muhammad bin Ibrahim are used:

Verily from the greater and clear *kufr* is giving the accursed man-made laws, the position of that which the faithful spirit descended upon the heart of Muhammed, *sallallahu 'alayhi wa salam* (peace be upon him), so that he may be from the warners in the clear Arabic tongue, and judging between the nations, and referring back to it, is in contradiction of, and an obstinate rejection of Allah The Almighty saying: "(And) if you differ in anything amongst yourselves, refer it to Allah and His Messenger, *sallallahu 'alayhi wa salam*, if you believe in Allah and in the Last Day. That is better and more suitable for final determination."^480

To support their evidence on the legitimacy of pronouncing *takfir*, the scholars attempted to point out how Ibn Ibrahim has warned against such that runs contrary to the Salafi principle of WB twenty years ago. Hence in their statement against the Saudi regime, these scholars conclude:

So the obligation upon the scholars, judges, callers and people of good is to repel this great evil, and to seek reward by facing it and doing *Jihad* against it, for it is related to *tawhid*, and *iman* and *kufr*, and abstaining from ruling by the *shariah* and going to the man-made laws is disbelief in Allah, the Great, and an expulsion.

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from the religion, *walaal hawla wa la quwata illa billah* 
(tHERE IS NO CHANGE OR POWER EXCEPT THROUGH ALLAH).  

**Madkhali and Jami Salafis**

On the other hand, followers of Madkhali and Jami Salafism do not view the act of ruling with secular laws by Muslim rulers as a form of *wala’* to un-Islamic system. To them, the act of governing with other than *shariah* is not only permissible, but also the existing ruling system which has been put on place by Muslim rulers must be obeyed because they are the legitimate *walis* (protectors) of the people. They assert that being in power itself is the source or proof of legitimacy. Theologically, Madkhali Salafis consider *iman* as only the *aqidah* of the heart and that action is a complimentary condition to *iman* (*shart kamal al-iman*) rather than soundness of it (*sihhat al-iman*).  

The position of Madkhali and Jami Salafis regarding this issue is similar to the position taken by the official scholars of Saudi Arabia as explained in Chapter Three. Scholars of this category view that ruling with other that the *shariah* and having relations with the non-Muslim countries do not violate the principle of WB. According to them, these people who rule with other than the *shariah* could be sinners but there is no ground for performing *takfir* on them.  

However, there are other Salafis who disagree with the ideas of the Madkhalis and accused them of straying away from the ways of the Salaf and even call them a fake  

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481 Ibid.  
482 They are Salafis who follow the religious teachings of a Yemeni Sheikh Rabi al-Madkhali (b. 1931) and the Ethiopian Sheikh Muhammad Aman Ibn Ali Jami (d. 1995). Both Al-Madkali and Jami were educated in Saudi Arabia. The Madkhalis are also followers of Ibn Baz, Ibn Uthaymin and other Salafi scholars such as Ubaid al-Jabiri (b. 1938), Yahya an-Najmi (b. 1927) and Abdul Muhsin Al-Ubaykan (b. 1952). The ideological inclination of this group of Salafis is quite similar to that of the Establishment Salafis. According to Tariq Abdel Haleem, the Madkhalis are represented in Canada by the Quran and Sunnah Society. See *Al-Salafiyyoon: Salafis and the Salafi Da’wah* by Tariq Abdel Haleem available at [http://www.sunniforum.com/forum/showthread.php?59610-Al-Salafiyyoon-Salafis-and-the-Salafi-Dawa](http://www.sunniforum.com/forum/showthread.php?59610-Al-Salafiyyoon-Salafis-and-the-Salafi-Dawa) (accessed 08 August 2012).  
484 This position is also taken by the so-called Scientific or Academic Salafis such as Sheikh Abdul Rahman Abdul Khaliq, Abdul Raziq Al-Shaygi and Hamid Al-‘Ali. This group of Salafi are mostly based in Egypt. They accept the democratic system in a secular government not because they see it as compatible with *shariah* but because, given the current state of affairs, they believe it is the most rational way to achieve what is in the public interest. Thus, they argue that democratic mechanism is a tool for governance but they reject it on a theological basis.
Salafi movement. In his book *Exposing the Fake Salafi Movement*, Abu Osama Al-Danimarki criticizes the Madkhalis:

They look outwardly like real Salafis, however within their hearts is a dangerous and treacherous disease. They have betrayed our Muslim *Ummah* and made lies against Allah and His Messenger. Their corrupted scholars make excuses for the wicked leaders and their evil. Those who currently make covenant with the transgressing *kuffar* in our Muslim lands. They allow their non-Muslim allies military-forces, planes, tanks etc. to take off, and kill our Muslim brothers and sisters in Iraq, Afghanistan, Chechnya, Palestine etc., Allahu’ Musta’an (Allah The Helper). These Fake Salafis accuse those who fight these evil non-Islamic military-forces, of being a Kharijie (from Khawarij, i.e. a dog of Hellfire) or a Takfiri, due to him breaking this so-called “covenant” with these evil non-Islamic military forces.\(^{485}\)

As stated earlier, Salafis are divided on the issue of having relationship with the non-Muslim countries or non-Muslim international organisations. Those who oppose such a relation forbid it as a wrong *wala’*. Al-Maqdisi in *Al-Kawashif* lists the infractions to the principle of “hostility and hate forever”. He gave an example of Saudi relations with the international community such as the United Nations, UNESCO, the Red Cross and International Freemasonry.\(^{486}\)

The official scholars of Saudi Arabia and those who agree with their views do not resort to performing *takfir*. Unlike Al-Fahad and Al-Maqdisi, these scholars avoid performing *takfir* of those Muslims who rule not with the *shariah* or condemn diplomatic relations with non-Muslim countries. For example Dr Abdullah Al-Faris in his lecture *Danger of Calling a Muslim a Kafir* clarifies that such a mutual and diplomatic relationship with


the kuffar and the non-Muslim countries do not violate the Islamic principle of WB. He criticizes those who prohibit this relationship with the kuffar in the name of WB. Al-Farsi clarifies:

There are many narrations in the Sahih Bukhari and Sahih Muslim which shows the danger of calling someone a mushrik or kafir. You cannot declare a Muslim kafir because he is sinning or because he disagrees with you...Nowadays it is very easy to call someone a kafir. If someone rules a country and his country is under the United Nations, then is a kafir. Why? Because he is dealing with the United Nations which is a kafir. They want the Muslims to be secluded from everything. No, this is not wala’ and bara’...You are in a time when you have to be part of the United Nations. Otherwise the nations will attack you and you have no protection because you are under no pact. And it is easy to declare anyone a kafir now because they think you have wala’ for the kafirs you are a kafir...And when you ask them what kind of wala’ do I have? They’ll tell you something which has nothing to do with wala’...nothing to do with wala’...accepting a gift from someone who is a kafir is considered a wala’ to them. This is not wala’, having relations with a kafir country is a wala’ to them...this is not wala’. The Prophet peace be upon him had relations with Jews, with Christians and with everyone so what? So unfortunately it is not only takfir that is misused nowadays but also tabdi’ (to declare someone an innovator). This is also not easy although some people think that it is like drinking juice. They think it is jihad
to call someone an innovator. So it is very easy for them
to declare you an innovator.\footnote{From the lecture of Dr Abdullah al-Farsi entitled “The Danger of Calling Muslim to be a Kafir” available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sOWJn_U4PU0&feature=related (accessed 12 November 2011).}

3- Aiding Non-Muslims Against Muslims

One of the current political issues that are extensively debated within the Salafi community in recent times is the issue of aiding non-Muslims against the Muslims. Many Salafis are of the opinion that Muslims who assist the disbelievers against the Muslims are misdirecting their wala’ and thus have apostatized. The reason being that WB is the foundation of the faith and those who go against the doctrine is regarded as murtads (apostates). Modern Salafis are divided into two groups with regards to the permissibility of Muslims aiding non-Muslims against the Muslims. The first group supports the issue while the other opposes it. Briefly the two groups of Salafis that are divided in this issue are described below:

First Group: Those Who Support the Permissibility of Muslims Aiding Non-Muslims Against Muslims

1. Purists or Establishment Salafis of Saudi Arabia such as the Mufti of the Kingdom.
3. Sahwa Salafis (after ideological revision).
4. Reformist Salafis such as Sheikh Dr Yusuf Al-Qaradawi.

Second Group: Those Who Oppose the Permissibility of Muslims Aiding Non-Muslims Against Muslims

1. Rejectionist Salafist such as Juhayman Al-Utaibi, Hamud Uqla Al-Shuaibi, Nasr Al-Fahad and Ali Ibn Khudair Al-Khudair.
2. Jihadi Salafis such as Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi and Ayman Al-Zawahiri.
3. Sahwa Salafis (before ideological revision).
4. Scientific or Academic Salafis such as Sheikh Abdul Rahman Abdul Khaliq.
5. Independent Salafis and other Salafis who do belonged to the above categories such as Sheikh Muhammad Saeed Al-Qahtani

I will start firstly by describing the Salafi groups which view that it is permissible for Muslims to help the non-Muslim against the Muslims. The first group is the purists or Establishment Salafis comprising the Mufti and other official scholars of Saudi Arabia. As described in Chapter Three, official Wahhabi scholars in Saudi Arabia, while retaining the social aspect of *bara’*, which relates to personal relations between Muslims and non-Muslims represented in nourishing hatred and rejecting friendship, endorsed and even legitimised political *wala’* in the name of necessity (*dhururah*) to so-called infidels, exemplified by their total silence over Saudi foreign policy, foreign military bases in the country and other manifestations of Saudi alliances with the West. As evident in the Gulf War of 1990, this group of scholars approve the decision made by the Saudi kingdom to seek assistance and ally with the Americans against Iraq. Similarly, the war against Afghanistan and Iraq launched by the United States in 2002 saw the silence of these Salafi scholars when Saudi Arabia retained its strong relations with the United States.

The second group of Salafis who view the action of Muslim rulers aiding the non-Muslim against the Muslims as legitimate is the Madkhali Salafis. They view that it is permissible and even obligatory (*wajib*) to help and aid the *kuffar* against the *mujahidin* in Iraq and elsewhere. They deny the claim made by their opponents that the so-called *wala’* Muslim rulers have for the non-Muslim states against the Mujahidin is *kufr akbar*. They even go to the extent of claiming whoever calls the Muslims who aid the *kuffar* against the Muslims as Khawarij and refer to them as ‘dogs of the Hellfire’. They claim that the war in Iraq and other places is not considered as *jihaad* but instead *fitnah*.

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489 The Madkhalis and Jamis believe that those who rule not with what God has revealed are sinners but not *kufr*. According to them, it is considered a minor *kufr* as it is an action not a belief. They believe that *kufr* does not occur mostly by an action, but occurs if one fails to believe. See Tariq Abdel Halim, *The Counterfeit Salafis: Deviation of The Counterfeit Salafis from The Methodology of Ahlul SunnahWal Jama’ah*, p. 46.
The third group who support the Muslim rulers’ decision on any political activism is the Sahwa movement in Saudi Arabia. Followers of this movement who were very active in the 1990s are known as the Sahwis. This stance taken by the Sahwis came only after the key leaders of the movement revised their religio-political ideology upon their release from the Saudi prisons. Sahwa Salafism is represented by a hybridization of two ideological strains i.e. the conservative Salafi-Wahhabi ideology and the progressive political ideology of the Ikhwan al-Muslimin movement which originated from Egypt.

Key Sahwa figures include Muhammad Qutub (b. 1919), the brother of Sayyid Qutub (d. 1966), Sheikh Safar Al-Hawali (b. 1950), Salman al-Awdah (b. 1955), and Aid-Al-Qarni (b. 1960). In the 1990s, the Sahwis were very active in uniting the Muslims under the banner of Salafism. They believe that this unity is critical as the West’s marginalization of Islamic global concerns will persist until there is no longer Islam. To achieve the unity of the ummah, Al-Hawali believes that ‘it is incumbent that [Muslims] spread knowledge of the aqidah throughout the ummah, and the correct creed at all levels, in particular the aqidah of Al-Wala’ wal Bara’.

Under the pretext of WB, the Sahwa movement opposed the Saudi rulers’ decision to invite the US forces into the kingdom in 1990. Led by Al-Hawali, the Sahwis attacked the fatwa issued by the senior scholars of Saudi Arabia led by Ibn Baz, giving religio-legal sanction to the presence of non-Muslim troops on Islam's holy land during the war. In their pursuit of da’wah, the Sahwis always emphasized the need to increase the understanding of the Quranic injunctions and Prophetic statements pertaining the plots of the Jews against Muslims. Thus the Sahwis saw the move made the Saudi government will only allow the Jews to occupy the Muslim lands. It was not until 1994

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491 For more on the Sahwa, see Lacroix, Stephane and Holoch, George, *Awakening Islam: Religious Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia*.
492 According to the definition provided by Al-Rasheed, the Sahwis are ‘[a] loose and fluid sub-group within the community of the faithful who from the 1970s strove to establish a distinct identity for themselves. The mentors of the first generation of Sahwis were in fact the traditional Wahhabi ulama, assisted by a group of Arab religious scholars and educators, mainly from Egypt and Syria, who migrated – voluntarily or involuntarily – to Saudi Arabia in the 1960s. Two Arab ulama are often cited as influencing Sahwa: an Egyptian Muhammad Qutub, the brother of Sayyid Qutb; and a Syrian, Sheikh Muhammad Surur Zayn al-Abdin. Both taught in Saudi educational institutions in the 1960s.’ See Al-Rasheed, Madawi, *Contesting Islamic State: Islamic Voices from a New Generation*, p.66.
that the Saudi authorities grew exhausted trying to rein in the key leaders and many of their followers until they managed to round them up in prison.

After several years, the Saudi authorities released the key leaders of the Sahwa movement. Surprisingly, Al-Hawali, Al-Awdah, Al-Qarni and others emerged substantially different from what they were on to before they were arrested. They decided to revise their ideology and appeared less aggressive especially against their government. No longer did they support religious activism against the government. They even had official dialogues with the Saudi government and prohibited Muslims from conducting any acts of violence against the regime.

There have been many speculations as to what were the actual reasons and objectives that prompted the key Sahwa leaders to change and moderate their views and discourse upon their release from prison and to take up a new stand which become more obvious and apparent especially after September 11, when ‘the most critical voices came from former Sahwis, who “revised” their views and began to distance themselves from radicalism’. Al-Awdah and Hawali have endorsed the content of the declaration or statement called How We Can Coexist which was issued in response to an earlier American declaration called What We Are Fighting For. This declaration focused on spreading the culture of tolerance and called for dialogue and exchange.

This ideological revision (taraju’at) of the Sahwis also led them to revise their understanding of the concept WB towards a more moderate version. For example Al-Awdah wrote a treatise in 2007 entitled Between Natural and Religious Loyalties. In this treatise, Al-Awdah described the two types of wala’ that exist in Muslims i.e. the religious and the natural wala’. Awdah states that while Muslims have the religious wala’ towards God and Islam, they also have the natural wala’ – i.e. the love one had his family or friend, or even for one’s country and nation. According to Awdah, this ‘is in no way goes against the religious wala’. Al-Awdah clarifies:

The love one feel’s for a relative, spouse, friend, or even for one’s country or people, forms part of the

495 Al-Rasheed, Madawi, Contesting Islamic State: Islamic Voices from a New Generation, p. 78.  
innate, or natural wala’ - loyalty, love and closeness - a person has in general; and this in no way goes against the religious wala’. Muslims from the earliest of times would interact with others in ways that were natural or inbred and with complete liberality. This is a far cry from the behavior of some later people who act on a mixture of misconceptions and harsh understandings, and so are led either to negligence or into extremism.497

In his conclusion of the treatise, Al-Awdah advises:

The natural, tolerant character which Islam advocates is there to complete and to consolidate relationships with others. Muslims are asked to harmonize between their natural sense of wala’, or loyalty, towards their fellow citizens, their country, etc.; and their religious sense of wala’ to their creed and their call. In fact, the latter type of wala’ complements and completes the former type. The Prophet, peace be upon him, insisted: “I have only been sent to complete noble character.”498

The last group of Salafis who view that it is permissible to aid the non-Muslims against Muslims consist of the prominent scholar Dr. Yusuf Al-Qaradawi and his team of scholars and intellectuals, who collectively issue a fatwa allowing Muslim American soldiers to participate in America’s war against Afghanistan in retaliation of the September 11 attacks. This fatwa of Al-Qaradawi was later opposed by the conservative Saudi preacher Al-Shuaibi in the name of WB.

Firstly, it needs to be clarified here that while many people do not consider Al-Qaradawi as a Salafi,499 there are also those who categorise him as a scholar from a

498 Ibid.
499 Al-Qaradawi is probably considered as one of the most living controversial Islamic scholar. One could probably categorise Al-Qaradawi as a Salafi from his views on a particular religious issue. While many of his statements could reflect his position as a non-Salafi scholar, and the fact that he ever condemns the Salafis, his view on secularism and Islam could render him to be seen as a Salafi. As mentioned earlier in
“Salafi reformist background”. For example, Basheer M. Nafi in his article entitled *Fatwa and War: On the Allegiance of the American Muslim Soldiers in the Aftermath of September 11* says that the *fatwa* ‘was issued by a group of Muslim *ulama* and intellectuals with a Salafi-reformist background’ (referring to the fatwa issued by Al-Qaradawi and his group of scholars). Nafi in his article describes and analyse the contents of Al-Qaradawi’s *fatwa* and the counter-*fatwa* by Al-Shuaibi. According to him, since both the *fatwas* ‘were issued by Muslim scholars and figures influenced by the Salafi school of thought, he aims to showcase that the revival of Salafism in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries has led to the evolution of two major trends among Salafi-oriented *ulama* and intellectuals: one is reformist, more sensitive to historical change and undeterred from confronting such change with their independent, and sometimes novel, opinions (i.e. practising *ijtihad*); the other is highly conservative and unprepared to consider the conditions of the time in which they live or to depart from inherited legal doctrines.

The *fatwa* by Al-Qaradawi was issued in response to a query by an American Muslim soldier, Captain Muhammad Abdur-Rashid on whether it is permissible for all the Muslim soldiers in the American army to participate in the US war operations and its related efforts in Afghanistan and elsewhere in the Muslim countries. For Abdur Rashid and the Muslim in general, such a query is important and a *fatwa* on the matter is needed as it involves and relates to the question of *wala*’. In Salafism, the seriousness of this matter can be realized as it is an issue of *aqidah*. In the American Muslim history, this issue of whether a Muslim’s *wala*’ could be given to the country is not something new. Khaled Abou El-Fadl in his book *And God Knows The Soldiers: The Authoritative and Authoritarian in Islamic Discourse*, illustrated the story of Abdul Rauf, an American Muslim national basketball player who in 1996, refused to stand up for the American national anthem – the reason being that by standing up means showing *wala*’ to America which is a *kafir* country. In his book, Abou El Fadl analyses a statement issued by Society for Adherence to the Sunnah (SAS) which supported the

Chapter One, Al-Qaradawi believes that the acceptance of secularism by Muslims means abandonment of *shariah*. The call for secularism among Muslims, according to Al-Qaradawi is atheism and a rejection of Islam. He concludes that its acceptance as a basis for rule in place of *Sharia* is clear apostasy. This is typically a Salafi position.

501 Ibid.
502 Ibid.
action of Abdul Rauf. Some SAS argues that *wala’* cannot be owed to non-believers, and standing up in respect to anyone or anything is an act of *wala’,* and hence it is not allowable except to God, let alone non-believers. Some Salafis like those from SAS believe it is *haram* to play the national anthem song and standing when the anthem is played as a sign of respect. For example, Muhammad Salih Al-Munajjid, a scholar from Saudi Arabia who runs an extensive online fatwa portal ([www.islamqa.info](http://www.islamqa.info)) says ‘playing or listening to national anthems is *haram* […] it makes no difference whether what is played is songs or the national anthem or anything else’.

Although the *fatwa* issued by Al-Qaradawi and his team of intellectuals does not mention anything about *wala’,* it seems that the issuers of the *fatwa* do not agree that aiding non-Muslims by Muslim against Muslims is a misdirected *wala’.* In legitimizing the act of Muslim soldiers fighting in America’s war against Afghanistan, the *fatwa* uses some of the popular and recognized legal principles *usul al-fiqh* (Islamic legal theory). The first is the principle of *aqall al-dararayn* (the choosing of the less harmful of two harms). The *fatwa* argues that even if the Muslim’s soldier’s involvement in a war is likely to cause harm to other Muslims, his refusal to participate may result in the dismissal of a large number of Muslims from the American army and the branding of Muslim soldiers as unpatriotic and disloyal. This would have a negative effect on the position of the American Muslim community as a whole, which is seen as a greater harm. Secondly, the *fatwa* states that in a situation in which the Muslim has no choice but to commit a harmful act, the preferential difference differentiation between two harms, a standard rule, is predicated on the Prophetic hadith ‘*la darar wa la dirar*’ (no harm and no repayment of one harm by another). The third legal principle that the fatwa uses is intent (*niyyah*). The *fatwa* uses the principle of *niyyah* to classify an act that the *shariah* does not classify as being permissible, mandatory or forbidden, and that does not fall within the domain of religious rites, transactions or criminal law. Hence,

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506 Sheikh Muhammad Salih Al-Munajjid runs a fatwa website known as *Islam Questions and Answers.* His fatwa on various issues of *fiqh* can be found at [www.islamqa.com](http://www.islamqa.com) (accessed 12 December 2011). This website provides fatwas on variety of religious issues in 12 different languages.


508 M. Nafi, Basheer, *Fatwa and War: On the Allegiance of the American Muslim Soldiers in the Aftermath of September 11,* p. 94.

509 Ibid, p. 95.
this suggests that it is the intention, and not the nature or consequences of the act that plays the main role in determining the status of the act. The fatwa issued by Al-Qaradawi and his team caught the attention of several scholars in Saudi Arabia such as Al-Shuaibi who clearly opposed the position of Al-Qaradawi in a counter fatwa. Using the concept of WB, Al-Shuaibi stated that it is imperative upon all Muslims to support the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and to oppose the American war against them. He asserted that any Muslim who takes the side of the unbelievers in their way against Muslims is himself an apostate and unbeliever. He further states WB is one of the fundamentals of the religion and is the foundation of faith and belief. For Al-Shuaibi, wala’ necessitates that Muslim always loves and take sides of Muslims, whereas bara’ necessitates severing all ties with non-Muslims, holding no love for them and maintaining a safe distance from them. He refers to Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s saying that aiding and supporting non-Muslim against Muslims is an act of apostasy (kufr naqil ‘an milla).

As a Salafi scholar, Al-Shuaibi understood the Quranic concept of WB as an absolute, ultimate and totally free from the human context of their application. Like other Salafis, Al-Shuaibi described WB as a foundation of the Islamic faith, thus placing it on the same level as tawhid. In fact, Al-Shuaibi understood WB not as two separate concepts but as one, according to which a Muslim’s allegiance and loyalty to other Muslims is contingent upon, and tied to, his disassociation from the unbelievers. For Al-Shuaibi, moreover, any act or expression that contravenes this understanding of WB is sufficient to violate the boundaries of Islam. Al-Shuaibi belongs to the group or category of Salafis known by some as “Rejectionist”. As mentioned in Chapter Three, this group of Salafis rejects the Saudi government and believes that the Saudi royal family and other Arab regimes are the main problem. Other individuals in this Salafi category include Nasir Al-Fahad and Ali Al-Khudayr.

Another Salafi figure who criticizes those who aid the non-Muslims against Muslims is Ayman Al-Zawahiri. In his treatise Al-Wala’ wal Bara’: ‘Aqidah Mungkulah wa Waqi’

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510 Ibid. p. 96.
512 See Chapter Three for details of Al-Fahad’s book on assisting non-Muslims against Muslims.
Mafqud Al-Zawahiri quotes the Quranic verse which prohibits Muslims from taking the Jews and Christians as allies: “O you who have believed! Take not the Jews and the Christians for your friends and protectors. They are but friends and protectors to each other. And he among you that turns to them (for friendship or protection) is of them”. Al-Zawahiri says:

And if the righteous forefathers called those who opposed the alms tax apostates, even though they fasted and prayed and did not fight the Muslim majority; what then when they side with the enemies of Allah and His messenger, killing believers?! 513

Critisizing the Arab rulers who allow the American to set foot on the Arabian soil and the Muslims who side with the Americans in their war against Afghanistan after September 11, Al-Zawahiri states:

So, what would al-Tabari, Ibn Hazam, and Ibn Taimiyyah say if they were made witness to the American planes, troops, and their allies launching off from the Arabian Gulf to strike Muslims in Iraq. And what would they say if they were witness to American planes taking off from Pakistan in order to kill Muslims in Afghanistan? And what would they say if they witnessed American and western ships and planes, stocking up on fuel, provisions, and ammunitions from the Gulf States, Yemen, and Egypt, on their way to lay siege to Iraq, occupy the Arabian peninsula, and safeguard Israel’s security? 514

Another Salafi who share similar views on this issue with the scholars mentioned above is Abdul Rahman Abdul Khaliq from Kuwait. Mentioning the ruling of those who aids the kuffar against the Muslims in his book Al-Wala’ wal Bara’, he says:

513 Al-Zawahiri, Al-Wala’ wal Bara’ in Raymond Ibrahim (ed and trs), The Al-Qaeda Reader, p. 75.
514 Ibid pp. 92-93.
Whosoever allies with the *kafir*, aids him and support him against the Muslims becomes apostate (*kafir*) and is thrown out of the religion of Islam. This also include those who spy for the *kuffar* and informing them about the secrets of the Muslims.\(^{515}\)

Finally, Muhammad Bin Saeed Al-Qahtani in his book *Al-Wala’ wal Bara’ fi al-Islam Min Mafahim Aqidah al-Salaf* listed the act of allying with the disbelievers against Muslims as one of the twenty types of *wala’* that is forbidden in Islam. According to Al-Qahtani, some of these types of *wala’* include:

1. It is forbidden for Muslims to rely upon the non-believers generally for help, assistance or protection.
2. It is also a form of forbidden alliance for Muslims to collude with the non-believers, help them in their schemes, enter into pacts with them, to spy on their behalf, informing them about the Muslims or fighting in their ranks.
3. Muslims should not seek the advice of the non-believers.
4. It is forbidden for Muslims to incline towards the non-believers.
5. Muslims should not give the non-Muslims authority over the Muslims.
6. Muslims must not trust the non-believers

**4-Accepting Gifts from Kuffar and Congratulating Them on Their Festivals**

The concept of WB as claim by modern Salafis aims to regulate the social relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims. To regulate the basis of such a relationship, Salafis have distinguished certain activities that amount to the wrong type of *wala’* and developed a framework for Muslims to adhere to. These activities form the social dimension of WB. For example, some Salafis believe that Muslims should refrain from imitating non-Muslims in their dressing, language, morality and culture because such an imitation invariably invests Muslims deeper into the culture and leads them down to follow their beliefs and practices. Salafis describe the act of imitating the non-Muslims as a form of showing *wala’* and expression of love (*mahabbah*) to them. Due to these

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\(^{515}\) Abdul Rahman Abdul Khaliq, *Al-Wala’ wal Bara’*, p. 22. Abdul Rahman’s book on WB will be discussed in the next chapter.
reasons, Salafis thus place great emphasis on personal piety and call Muslims to avoid giving any type of loyalty to non-Muslims.

One of the main concerns among Salafi scholars is Muslims’ participation in the religious festivals of the non-Muslims such as Christmas and New Year’s celebration. This according to them is considered to be an expression of Christianity. Thus, they view the act of observing the holidays, festivals and celebrations that originate from the tradition and culture of non-Muslims such as Mother’s Day Celebration\textsuperscript{516} as resemblance (tashabbuh) of the kuffar and haram.\textsuperscript{517} In a Salafi website it is stated that ‘Mothers Day is a haram to celebrate because this is a celebration invited for the kuffar by a kafir. In Islam every day of the year should be for one’s mother, not just one day’.\textsuperscript{518} The reasons for the impermissibility of celebrating, according to the Salafis are bid’ah an act of tashabbuh bi al-kuffar.

The impermissibility of celebrating these festivals such as Christmas and Easter includes congratulating the non-Muslims during those seasons, attending their functions or exchanging gifts during their religious festivals. They consider these to be expressions of love and acknowledgment for the non-Muslims.

However, Salafi scholars have different opinions on the permissibility of accepting the gifts given by non-Muslims on the occasion of their religious festivals. Some scholars have prohibited it, considering such acceptance to be an indication of approval for the festival. Others have said that there is nothing wrong with accepting those gifts.

\begin{footnotes}
\item[516] See fatwa from Shaikh Muhammad bin Salih Al-Uthaymin \textit{The Ruling Concerning Celebrating Mother’s Day} available at \url{http://ummuabdulazeez.wordpress.com/2012/05/13/the-ruling-concerning-celebrating-mothers-day/} (accessed 12 May 2012). This \textit{fatwa} in Arabic is available at \url{http://www.bidah.com/articles/ufvr-celebrating-mothers-day.cfm} (accessed 12 May 2012).
\end{footnotes}
For example, Sheikh Rashid bin Hasan Al-Almai, a professor at King Khalid University says that the basic ruling regarding the gifts given by the People of the Scripture and other non-Muslims is that their gifts are lawful for a Muslim to accept.\textsuperscript{519} This according to him is based on many evidences that could be found in the Prophetic tradition. He reasoned that Prophet Muhammad accepted gifts from the ruler of Persia and King of Ayla who were non-Muslims. To him this indicates that it is permissible for Muslims to accept gifts from non-Muslims as long as the gifts themselves are not things that are unlawful. This permissibility is general, and it is not restricted by considerations of whether or not the gift is being given on one of their religious holidays. As for Muslim giving gifts to non-Muslims, Al-Almai says that it is permissible as long as it is not done with the intention of celebrating their holidays or out of love for their religious festivals.\textsuperscript{520}

Muhammad Salih Al-Munajjid while agrees that it is permissible for Muslims to accept gifts from kafirs, forbids Muslims to give gifts to a kafir on their day of festival. In his fatwa, Al-Munajjid says:

\begin{quote}
It is not permissible to give a kafir a gift on the day of one of his festivals, because that is regarded as approving of or participating in celebration of the false festival. If the gift is something that will help in celebrating the festival, such as food, candles and the like, then it is even more haram, and some of the scholars are of the view that this is kufr.\textsuperscript{521}
\end{quote}

The impermissibility of celebrating non-Muslims’ festival such as Christmas and New Year’s celebration is shared by many Salafis, even the official scholars of Saudi Arabia. In responding to the query posed to them on the ruling of celebrating the Millennium (the arriving of year 2000), the Permanent Committee for Research and Fatwa of Saudi Arabia concludes that:

\textsuperscript{520} Ibid. \\
\textsuperscript{521} Accepting A Gift From A Kafir on The Day of His Festival by Muhammad Salih Al-Munajjid available at http://islamqa.info/en/ref/85108 (accessed 08 August 2012).\end{flushleft}
It is not permissible for a Muslim who believes in Allah as their Lord, Islam as their religion, and Muhammad as their Prophet to celebrate any festival that has no basis in the *din* of Islam, and that includes the so-called new millennium. Neither are they permitted to attend such festivals or take part in them, or to help others do so in any way whatsoever, because this is sin and transgression of the limits set by Allah. Allah says:...but do not help one another in sin and transgression. And fear Allâh. Verily, Allâh is Severe in punishment.\(^{522}\)

The *fatwa* forbidding Muslims to congratulate the *kuffar* on their festivals is based on the saying of Ibn Al-Qayyim:

As for offering congratulations on the special ritualistic occasions of *kufr*, this is agreed to be *haram*, such as congratulating them (the *kuffar*) for their festivals and fasts by saying, ‘Happy or blessed festival to you’ and the like. Even if the one who says so escapes committing *kufr*, it is still *haram*. It is like congratulating someone for prostrating to the Cross; in fact it is even more sinful in the sight of Allah and more hateful than congratulating someone for drinking *khamr* (intoxicants), killing a soul, or committing adultery, and so on. Many of those who have no respect for their *din* fall into this error; they do not realize the abhorrence of their action. Anyone who congratulate a person for committing an act of disobedience, *bid’ah* (innovation in religion) or *kufr* exposes themselves to the hate and wrath of Allah.\(^{523}\)


\(^{523}\) Ibid.
Conclusion

The chapter has shown that while Salafis stress the importance of WB to be applied at all levels of a Muslim life, they differ on how the meaning of *wala’* and *bara’* should be understood in certain circumstances. While promoting the same concept in their writings, Salafis from different backgrounds and orientations have attempted to distinguish activities that constitute the ‘true’ *wala’* and the ‘supposed’ *bara’*. Many of these distinctions revolve around issues of politics, social, ideological questions, level of strictness and general contents of the concept. The chapter has illustrated that the modern Salafi concept of WB resides on a wide spectrum that could range from what might be termed the “very soft” to its “most extreme” form of the concept. As a foundational belief for all Salafis, the concept calls for Muslims to be loyal to Islam and the Muslims and at the same time disavow anything that is deemed Islamic. But Salafis differ in the types and level of loyalty that one should give and likewise what, who and when to disavow. They also differ in their understanding and application of the concept into practice.

Examples from the four issues presented in this chapter shows that differences among Salafis on element of WB has produced substantial debates and also disputes within and among different Salafi streams of thought. As modern Salafism embraces and amplifies the Islamic injunction of promoting ‘Islamicness’ at many spheres of life, WB has become the main tool to reach this objective. However, this tool is not a standard one that can be utilized by all Salafis in all circumstances, but one that could be altered and transformed depending on who or which group of Salafi uses it. Importantly, the chapter has proven that there is no single understanding of WB in modern Salafism. Different Salafi groups and individuals provide different legal framework when dealing with the concept. The most important question to ask next is: what are the reasons for these diverse opinions on WB? It is believed that the primary reason for such division and dispute on the concept is due to the various Salafi orientations and lines of thinking that they possess. This different orientation of Salafism plays a critical role in understanding the reasons behind their disputes and agreement which will be proven in the following chapter.
CHAPTER FIVE: ANALYSING THE WRITINGS OF PURISTS, POLITICOS AND JIHADI SALAFIS ON AL-WALA’ WAL BARA’

Introduction

In the first chapter, we learnt that modern Salafis could be categorized into different factions and groups. The reason for this diversity in modern Salafism is fundamentally due to the different ideological leanings modern Salafis have, such as their diverse approach to Islamic law, perception towards the ruling regimes and whether they are political or apolitical. As mentioned before, the broad category of Salafis that have been observed by some is their categorization into three distinct groups. The first group of Salafis known as purists or quietists spends most of their time emphasizing the importance of purification of the Islamic faith (tazkiyah) and educating the masses (tarbiyah) on the Salafi da’wah. They are apolitical and are dominantly subservience to their ruling regime. The second group of Salafis, however believe tazkiyah and tarbiyah alone are insufficient without incorporating elements of politics in the Salafi da’wah. These Salafis are hence called the politicos. Finally, the Jihadi Salafis who believe that rebellion and the use of violence are the most viable to change the status quo.  

This chapter aims to highlight the different approaches of presenting WB by all the three categories of Salafis mentioned above. It attempts to show that a particular Salafi background and orientation has an effect on the style of writing and presentation of the concept by modern Salafis. In other words, Salafis who belong to the purist group would present the concept in a more conservative, socially-oriented form of it, while the Jihadi Salafis would present the concept as one that is hostile towards the non-Muslims. They believe that the greatest manifestation of bara’ from the kuffar is to eliminate them through what they believe is jihad in the path of God.

Towards this objective, the writings of WB by several prominent modern Salafi thinkers belonging to the three Salafi categories will be analysed. They are Salih Bin Fawzan Al-Fawzan from the purist category, the politico Abdul Rahman Abdul Khaliq and the famous Jihadi Salafi Ayman Al-Zawahiri from the Al-Qaeda organization. Salih Al-Fawzan is one of the official scholars of Saudi Arabia who serves in the country’s Permanent Committee for Islamic Research and Religious Edicts. Abdul Rahman is a

famous Salafi figure in Kuwait while Zawahiri is the man believed to have replaced Osama Bin Laden, leader of Al-Qaeda after the latter’s death in 2011. Apparently, all of them have written on the concept of WB exclusively in the forms of books and treatises. Their writings on WB are widely available and could be accessed from the internet. Some of these writings have also been translated into English.525

Apart from these three Salafi thinkers, the chapter will also look at the writings of another well-known modern Salafi writer, Muhammad Saeed Al-Qahtani from Saudi Arabia who, as mentioned before, is believed to be one of the first, if not the first modern Salafi scholar to write a book exclusively on the subject of WB. His famous ground-breaking book on WB has been printed numerous times, widely disseminated and also translated into many languages. Al-Qahtani’s book apart from being comprehensive in its explanation of the concept seems to incorporate all elements of the purists, politicos and Jihadis.

The chapter begins with a brief description of the characteristics of purist, politico and Jihadi Salafis. This serves as a background to understand the differences between them. This will be followed by highlighting the main contents of the books by Al-Fawzanz, Abdul Rahman, Al-Zawahir and Al-Qahtani respectively before analysing them. The chapter concludes that, though it is obviously not absolute, the effect of one’s adoption of a particular Salafi orientation could result in different dimensions of presenting religious issues. This reflects that the concept of WB in modern Salafism is one that is fluid and multi-dimensional.

**Contemporary Salafi Factions: The Purists, Politicos and Jihadis**

As explained before, there is indeed a common shared ideology among modern Salafis. They believe in the same understanding of *tawhid* and the importance of emulating the ways of the *salaf as-salih*, but their doctrinal differences and subjective interpretation of religious sources lead to division between them. This division often centers on ways of dealing with the society and contemporary politics. For example, modern Salafis and Salafi groups answer quite differently contentious questions like what constitutes *kufr*, how to wage *jihad* and against whom, are incumbent Muslim rulers sinners or not.

525 See Introduction of this thesis under the section of “Sources of Research and Methodology” for details of these books.
Sometimes, there are significant friction and disputes between the various Salafi factions. It is believed that their differences in *manhaj* are due to their different orientations and backgrounds.  

**Purist Salafis**  

The first of these Salafi factions known as ‘purist’ believe that the primary objective of the Salafi *da’wah* is the purification of the *aqidah* from religious innovations and deviant practices. This has to be done through the methods of *tazkiyyah* (purification) and *tarbiyyah*. Purist Salafis are generally apolitical. They refrain from participating in government affairs and politics with the reasons to remain uncorrupted and from creating more harm than good. They believe in gaining power through propagating their religious views and argue that political participation will only lead to sin and corruption.

Purist Salafis are subservient to their government even if the government is viewed by other Salafis as corrupt. In addition, they do not support violence against the state. They justify their stance by arguing that when the Meccans repressed Prophet Muhammad and the early Muslims, the Prophet did not respond in kind i.e. using violence, but rather adopted the peaceful way to spread the message of Islam. Purists believe that their actions should not create a ‘greater evil’ such as weakening the Salafi *da’wah*. They are against declaring the government infidel because that leads to reprisal which they view as a ‘greater evil’. Thus, purists are not above attempting to influence the state, they believe it should happen only through a mass movement of “believers (*mukminun*),” and propagation, not through political action, which inevitably leads to corruption and or violence, putting the Muslim community in danger.

Purist Salafis are mostly found in Saudi Arabia. However, purist Salafism has also spread its influence to other Muslim and Arab countries in the Middle East and Europe. Famous purist Salafis include the religious establishment of the Saudi regime.

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526 For more on the different Salafi groups and their characteristics, see Chapter One of this thesis.
such as the former mufti of the country, Ibn Baz, Ibn Uthaymin, Al-Albani, Al-Fawzan and the current mufti Abdul Aziz Al Al-Shaikh.

**Politico Salafis**

The second faction is the politicos who emphasize the need for political activism as a means to protect Islam and expand its influence within the society and the state. Politico Salafis claim that they have a clearer vision of the political situation. They have a common view with other Salafi currents on the Muslim rulers and government but perceive these rulers as sinners. They are of the view that ruling with other than the *shariah* is a minor *kufr*. In terms of participation in politics, they agree to the democratic process and participation in the secular government based on ‘public interest’. They also stick to the point of *ijtihad* and *taqlid* where *fatwas* are only permissible to those who are qualified. Unlike the purists, politico Salafis hold a lot of respect to individuals such as Sayyid Qutub although they might have differences with him in many points such as what was claimed to be his views on the Attributes of God and the categorization of the society as *jahili* (ignorant). Also they see *jihad* as part of Islam, but they stand on the side of *jihad* being theoretical and unnecessary.

In some countries such as Kuwait and Algeria, Salafis form political parties and participate in democratic political elections. In fact, in the 1990s, political Salafism was the main vehicle of political contestation in Algeria. Policos criticize the purists for being too obsessed with issues of religious rituals and practices and their relative silence over political issues and affairs of the regime. They condemn the purists for being silent and not taking any action against the corrupt leaders and governments. They believe they are better equipped to address political issues and have a role to interfere in the affairs of the regime. However, politicos agree with the purist on the notion of

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530 Purist Salafis condemn the politicos for the latter’s admiration of Sayyid Qutub. The *manhaj* of Qutbi Salafism is heavily influenced by the political ideas of Sayyid Qutub and Hassan Al-Banna of the Ikhwan Al-Muslimin. Purist Salafis regard the *manhaj* of Qutbi Salafism as one that deviates from the “true” Salafiyah. They even produce books condemning its ideology such as *Baraa’ah Ulamaa il-Ummah Min Tazkiyah Ahl il-Bid’ah wal-Mudhammah* (The Innocence of the Scholars of the Ummah from the Commendation of the People of Innovation and Censure). See http://www.themadkhalis.com/md/articles/sxptl-shaykh-saalih-al-fawzaan-distinguishes-between-the-salafi-manhaj-and-the-qutbi-manhaj.cfm (accessed 03 February 2012).


using violence. Unlike the Jihadis, politicos Salafis do not believe in the use of violence for political change. They consider attacking the state physically would create more problems and the only way to gain power and bring about change is through participating in politics.533

In Saudi Arabia, the Sahwis mostly dominate this group of politico Salafis. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the most prominent of them are Salman Al-Awdah, Safar Al-Hawali and Aid Al-Qarni. Apart from Kuwait and Algeria, political Salafism is also famous in Egypt.534 In Kuwait, Salafis form political parties such as the Islamic Salafi Alliance headed by Khaled Al-Sultan Bin Essa (b. 1940). In Egypt, they establish the Hizb Al-Umma Party, while the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) is formed in Algeria.535 Other politico Salafis include the famous Abdul Rahman Abdul Khaliq (b.1939) who heads the Society for the Revival of Islamic Heritage (Jam‘iyah Ihyā‘ at-Turath Al-Islami) in Kuwait, Abdul Razak Al-Shaygi (b. 1967), Dr Sajid Al-Mutairi (b. 1964) and Dr Hamid Bin Abdallah al-Ali (b. 1960).

Politico Salafis are also known as “scientific or academic Salafis” (as-salafiyyah al-‘ilmiyyah)536 due to the highly rational methods they employ to discuss and implement their version of Salafism. They are regularly featured in Arab newspapers and televisions because they tend to be among the most vocal on social and political issues. However, like the purists and unlike the Jihadis, they do not sanction takfir. They view most Islamic rulers today as sinners but not apostates. They may openly concede that these regimes violate the strenuous demands of Islam, but they view most of their actions as minor transgressions. The fact that these rulers have not implemented shariah

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533 Ibid.
535 For political Salafism in Algeria, see Amel Boubekeur, Salafism and Radical Politics in Postconflict Algeria, Carnegie Papers, Number 11, September 2008; Jared Reene and Scott Sanfard, The fortunes of Political Salafism in Gaza and Algeria, The Institute for Middle East Studies (IMES), Capstone Paper Series, May 2010.
536 See Tariq Abdel Haleem, Deviation of the Counterfeit Salafis from the Methodology of Ahl as-Sunnah wa al-Jama‘ah, p. 29.
law is, for politico Salafis, an undeniable sin, but it is not ground for excommunicating them.

**Jihadi Salafis**

Finally the Jihadi faction of Salafis which is believed to have emerged in Afghanistan during the 1980s believes in the use of violence to change the society which they see as un-Islamic. Jihadi Salafis are political in nature but they emphasize politics as warfare. They are not hesitant to practise takfir on Muslim leaders who they believe has apostasized and also rebel against them with force. In addition, Jihadi Salafis have a strong anti-western sentiment and are very hostile to the West and all kuffar. Today, prominent Jihadi Salafi figures include individuals such as Ayman Al-Zawahiri, Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi, Abu Qatada (b. 1960), Abu Basir al-Tartusi (b. unknown), Umar Abdul Rahman (b. 1938) and the Saudi-based Nasir Al-Fahad, Hamud Al-Shuaibi, Sulaiman Al-Ulwan (b. 1969) and Ali Al-Khudair.

In short, all three Salafi factions despite being “Salafis” in their creed differ in the implementation of the Salafi methodology. All of them believe that modern governments are un-Islamic and corrupt, but they have different manners to address this issue. The purists refrain from taking part in politics as they believe it corrupts the sanctity of the religion. The politicos see the participation in politics as an important means to address pressing modern problems. Finally, the Jihadis believe in physically opposing the regimes and their opponents in order to uphold what they believe is proper.

The categorization of Salafis into these three factions will be used as a framework to analyse the writings and evaluate the differences modern Salafi thinkers have in presenting the concept of WB. This analysis is conducted by mainly observing the roles of WB within their intellectual systems. In particular, I attempt to identify which of the four dimensions of WB are present in their writings. As the chapter argues, a particular Salafi orientation or background (purists, politicos or Jihadis) although not absolute,

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537 It is believed that the Jihadi faction that first emerged in Afghanistan is the Al-Qaeda organisation formed by Osama Bin Laden during the period of Soviet-Afghan war between 1979-1989. For more on this historical fact, see Gunaratna, Rohan. *Inside Al-Qaeda: Global Network of Terror*, Columbia University Press, New York, 2002, pp.3-5; Brachman, Jarret “Global Jihadism: Theory and Practice”, p.8.
could have an effect or impact on the way WB is presented by modern Salafis. In order to understand how these factions have an effect on Salafis’ writings of the concept, we need to first study the contents of the books on WB by Salih Fawzan, Ayman Al-Zawahiri and Abdul Rahman Abdul Khaliq who are of purist, Jihadi and politico orientation respectively. This will be followed by examining the book of the fourth Salafi figure, Muhammad Saeed Al-Qahtani.

1-Salih Bin Fawzan Al-Fawzan

_Brief Profile of Al-Fawzan_

Salih Ibn Fawzan Ibn Abdullah Al-Fawzan born in 1933 is a prominent Islamic scholar and a prolific writer in Saudi Arabia. In his early days, Fawzan studied in the state school in Al-Qamariyah in 1948. In 1950, he completed his studies at the Faysaliyyah school in Buraydah and subsequently was appointed as teacher at the same school. In 1956, he graduated from the Educational Institute in Buraydah. Later, Al-Fawzan joined the famous Imam Muhammad ibn Saud Islamic University in Riyadh, initially studying at the Faculty of _Shariah_ and graduating in 1960. He later on earned his master's and doctorate from the same university, majoring in _fiqh_. Currently, he serves as a member of Saudi Arabia’s Permanent Committee for Islamic Research and _Fatwa_, member of the Council of Religious Edicts and Research, member of the Senior Board of Scholars, member of the _Fiqh_ Committee in Mecca and member of the Committee for Supervision of the _Du’aat_ (Callers of Islam).

_Al-Fawzan’s Book Al-Wala’ wal Bara Fil Islam_  

The contents of Al-Fawzan’s book on WB are divided into three parts. In the first part, he lays out the main characteristics of Muslims who take non-Muslims as their friends

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or supporters. The second part, on the other hand, he describes the outward manifestations of Muslims who possess \textit{wala’} for their Muslim brothers. Finally, Al-Fazwan explains the category of people who deserves ‘love and hatred’ of the Muslims which he categorizes into three. First, those whom Muslims should love purely with no intention of being an enemy to them; second, those whom Muslims should hate and take as enemies with no love, support and respect for them and finally those whom Muslims should love for their particular good deeds and and hate for their other evil deeds.

In his opening chapter, Al-Fawzan calls Muslim to the concept of WB by reiterating the usual Salafis’ claim that the Islamic belief system or \textit{aqidah} obligate Muslims to love the people of \textit{tawhid} and hate the people of \textit{shirk}. In other words, he asserts that the meaning of loving God and His Messenger includes loving those who loves Him and His Messenger and hating those who oppose God and His Messenger. As a typical Salafi argument on WB, Al-Fawzan writes that this obligation stems from the Quranic concept of \textit{Millat Ibrahim}\footnote{See the meaning and Salafis understanding of \textit{Millat Ibrahim} in Chapter Two.} as we have explained in Chapter Two. The opening chapter also saw Al-Fawzan’s literal use of Quranic injunctions showing that befriending the non-believers especially the Jews and Christians is prohibited (Quran: 60:4, 19:49–1, 11:54–6, 43:26–8, 10:41, 3:118–20, 8–72–3, 3:28, 4:89, 5:51).

\textit{Indications of Taking the Kuffar as Mawla (Friends or Supporters) [Mazahir Muwalah al-Kuffar]}

In this section of the book, Al-Fawzan lays out some of the main characteristics of Muslims who take the non-Muslims as their \textit{mawla} (plural of \textit{wali}). These characteristics, Al-Fawzan argues are indications of loving the non-Muslims, an act which is forbidden in the Salafi ideology. They are:

1. Imitating non-Muslims in their appearance (dress) and language.
2. Residence in their lands and not migrating to the land of Islam.
3. Travelling to the land of the \textit{kuffar} for tourism and vacation.
4. Helping them, giving them victory over the Muslims, speaking well of them and defending their honour.
5. Seeking assistance from them and making them as advisors.
6. Using their calendar instead of the Islamic calendar.
7. Observing their holidays, assisting in their celebrations and attending their festivals.
8. Speaking well of them through what they have of material wealth and being satisfied with their actions.
9. Using their names.
10. Supplicating for them and being compassionate to them.

For each of these characteristics, Al-Fawzan, apart from explaining what it entails, supports it with Quranic verses and hadith of the Prophet. Unsurprisingly, for each Quranic verse and hadith there is no quotation from any mufassir or muhaddith (a scholar who interprets the Quran and hadith respectively). He does not make any references to the Ilm al-tafsir (Science of Quranic interpretation) and sharh al-hadith (Explanations of the Prophetic Traditions) which are traditionally used by scholars to understand the meanings of Quranic verses and Prophetic traditions. Instead his explanation on the Quranic verses and hadith seems to originate from his own understanding. For example, Al-Fawzan simply says that Muslims should not imitate the kuffar in dress and language because the Prophet says in one of his well-known hadith “man tashabbaha bi-qaumin fahuwa minhum” which means “whoever imitates a people is one of them”. Without providing the interpretation of tashabbuh (imitation) as stipulated in many of the books of hadith, Al-Fawzan explains instantly after mentioning this particular hadith that “Allah forbids imitating the kuffar in their worships, traditions, and things special to them. We should not imitate them in their appearance and morals. Also, we should not speak their language, except when necessary and we should not adopt their way of dressing and eating”.

*The Outward Manifestations of Taking the Muslims as Mawla [Mazahir muwalah al-Mu’minin]*

After explaining the characteristics of Muslims taking the non-Muslims as friends, Al-Fawzan proceeds to detail the manifestations of Muslims who should show their wala’ exclusively to their Muslim brothers. In essence, these manifestations can be seen as opposite of the characteristics of Muslims taking non-Muslims as friends as detailed in his first chapter. These manifestations are:

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541 Salih Al-Fawzan, *Al-Wala’ wal Bara’ fil Islam* p. 4.
1. *Hijrah* from the lands of the *kuffar* to the lands of the Muslims.
2. Assisting the Muslims with wealth, strength and support for their needs in religion and material life.
3. Sympathize for Muslims when they are harmed and join in their happiness.
4. Advising and counseling the Muslims, praying for their good well-being and not to cheat or going behind their back.
5. Being respectful to them, not to humiliate nor speaking bad things about them.
6. Being with them in times of happiness and hardship.
7. Visiting and loving to meet them.
8. Respecting their rights.
9. Being kind to the weak among them.
10. Making supplication for them and asking forgiveness for them.

Most of these acts mentioned by Al-Fawzan could be seen as the normal good characters that all Muslims should manifest in their daily lives. While these activities seems to be the norm of an ideal Islamic society, Salafis especially the purists, regard these acts as a form of absolute *wala´* that should only be given to Muslims.

Al-Fawzan explains that the obligation to perform *bara´* from the *kuffar* does not mean that Muslims should treat the *kuffar* especially those who do not fight the Muslims nor drive the latters out of their homes with hostility. To these *kuffar*, Muslims ought to show their kindness and justice to them. This, according to him is based on the Quranic verse 60:8. However, Al-Fawzan reminds readers that while being kind and just to the non-Muslims, one should hate them in their hearts for their rejection of Islam. Al-Fawzan clarifies that in Quran 60:8, God states “…*from dealing kindly and justly with them*…” and does not mention befriend or love them. Thus, a Muslim is obliged to hate the *kuffar* while being kind to them. As described in the previous chapter, such an argument is always seen in the words of purist Salafis who believe that WB requires Muslims to be kind to non-Muslims while not having love for them at the same time.542

On the issue of being kind to *kuffar*, Al-Fawzan explains that kindness and equal treatment is different from love and close friendship. Communication and good treatment could lead to the encouragement of non-Muslims to embrace Islam – which is

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a form of da’wah. However, loving them makes them feel good about what they believe and will not makes them become Muslims, argues Al-Fawzan. He also states that the prohibition of loving the kuffar does not mean that interactions such as trading and having commerce with them are prohibited too.

**Categories of People Whom Muslims Should Hate and Love**

In his final chapter of the book, Al-Fawzan summarizes for Muslim readers three categories of people who deserve wala’ and bara’. They are:

1- Those whom Muslims should love purely with no intention of being an enemy to them. These include all believers, The Prophet, his family and companions, the Salaf, the Truthful and all those who are on the righteous path.

2- Those whom Muslims should hate and take as enemies with no love or support and respect to them. They are the kuffar, the Pagans, the Hypocrites, the Apostates and backsliders of all races and nationalities.

3- Those whom Muslims should love for their particular good deeds and hate for their evil actions. This according to Al-Fawzan is the category of people whom should be loved and hated at the same time. They are those Muslims who commit sins and do not practice Islam well. They are loved for the iman or their belief in God and Islam, but hated for their sins which obviously exclude kufr and shirk. Due to the love that Muslims have for them (the sinners), they should find ways to advise the latter and warn them against the evil or sin that they have committed. Muslim sinners, argues Al-Fawzan could be punished so that the Muslim society could learn the lesson and be protected from evil. Punishment would also serves as an opportunity for the sinners to repent. According to Al-Fawzan, Muslims should not purely hate the sinners or reject them like the Khawarij who consider people to be pagans if they commit an act of obedience to God, major or minor. Nor should the sinners be completely loved and be treated them as sincere believers as practiced by the *Murji’ah*.\(^{543}\)

\(^{543}\) Murji’ah refers to a sect in early Islam that advocated the idea of deferred judgement of peoples’ belief. Their doctrine held that only God has the authority to judge who is a true Muslim and who is not, and that Muslims should consider all other Muslims as part of the community.
Al-Fawzan concludes his book on WB by reiterating that WB is one of the major pillars of *iman*. Consequently, people in the hereafter will be with the ones whom they loved in this life. Unfortunately, the situation today has changed, argues Al-Fawzan where people love each other for the sake of the worldly life and seeking to gain benefit, even though the one that is loved is an enemy to God, His Messenger and Islam.

2-Ayman Al-Zawahiri

*Brief Profile of Al-Zawahiri*

Ayman Mohammed Rabie' Al-Zawahiri who was born in 1951 in Egypt is the current leader of the well-known militant Islamist organisation Al-Qaeda. He is believed to have replaced Osama Bin Laden who was reportedly killed in 2011. Previously, Al-Zawahiri was the leader of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), the group allegedly responsible for the assassination of former Egyptian President Anwar As-Sadat in 1981. A physician by training, Al-Zawahiri who was said to have merged EIJ into Al-Qaeda is considered to play a key role in the planning and mapping of strategies of Al-Qaeda. Though, Zawahiri is not regarded as an Islamic scholar, he nevertheless appears himself as one in many of his lectures and audio recordings. He even published books and treatises which outlines Al-Qaeda’s ideology. His writings have become the theological references by Al-Qaeda members and other militant Islamists. Two of his famous writings are *Fursan Tahta Rayah al-Nabi* (Knights under the Prophet’s Banner) which was published in 2001, and *Al-Wala’ wal Bara’: Aqidah Manqulah wa Waqi’ Mafqud* (Loyalty and Enmity: An Inherited Doctrine and a Lost Reality).

*Al-Wala’ wal Bara’: Aqidah Manqulah wa Waqi’ Mafqud*544

Al-Zawahiri’s book on WB entitled *Al-Wala’ wal Bara’: Aqidah Manqulah wa Waqi’ Mafqud* was published in December 2002, a year after the publication of his first book *Fursan tahta Rayah al-Nabi*. This book was published by the Arabic-language London daily newspaper *Al-Quds Al-Arabi*. It reaffirms the doctrinal foundations of ‘global

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Jihad’, which he has laid out in his previous book and identified its targets and goals.

Al-Zawahiri’s book is divided into two parts. The first part entitled *Arkan al-Wala’ wal Bara’* (The Pillars of Loyalty and Disavowal) sets down the Islamic grounds for the doctrine of WB. Like Al-Fawzan, Al-Zawahiri meticulously delineates the many Quranic verses, *hadith* of the Prophet and quotations of the *ulema* to support the doctrine of WB. The second part of his book known as *Suwar Min al-Inhiraf ‘an Aqidah al-Wala’ wal Bara’* (Various Deviations from the Doctrine of Loyalty and Disavowal) specifies the doctrine’s modern application, in order to mobilize the resources of religious tradition in the service of *jihad*. Here, Al-Zawahiri attempts to demonstrate how almost all of the Muslims’ woes are due to their lack of faithfully upholding the concept of WB.

In his introduction, Al-Zawahiri begins his words by painting the picture that the current world is witnessing a serious struggle between two camps at war: the infidels, tyrants who are enemies of Islam and the Muslim *ummah* and its *mujahidin* vanguard. Such an opening introduction could reflect Al-Zawahiri’s expression and feelings of hatred and hostility to the West. This expression of Al-Zawahiri is further confirmed by his sanctioning of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 where he describes the attacks as a “blessed raid” (*ghazwah mubarakah*) and undermining former U.S President George W. Bush declaration of the “War on Terror” and as Al-Zawahiri puts it, to carry out his new Crusade against Islam.

According to Al-Zawahiri, due to the events of the so-called “war” between Muslims and their infidel enemies, there is an urgent need for Muslims to understand the concept of WB. Negligence and indolence, argues Al-Zawahiri have spread in the Muslim world with regard to upholding this doctrine which forms a great pillar of the *tawhid*. Furthermore, deception has spread among the Muslim community who has obliterated this doctrine by portraying enemies as friends while casting accusations of depravity

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545 Global Jihad is a contemporary term used in academic disciplines to denote the struggle which comes in the forms of violence and aggression of militant Islamists and Jihadi Salafis against their adversaries. The term global indicates the nature of attacks by these Islamists which they target everywhere around the whole and the common ideology that all Jihadi Salafis share across the globe. See for example Madawi Al-Rasheed, “The Local and the Global in Saudi Salafi-Jihadi Discourse” in Roel Meijer (ed), Global Salafism, p. 301.


against the pious.\textsuperscript{548} Al-Zawahiri claims that deviating from the doctrine of befriending the Muslims and maintaining hostilities against the infidels is, in this age the greatest threat to \textit{tawhid} and the Islamic faith. It is due to this critical reason that he wrote the treatise as a caution and warning to the Muslim \textit{ummah} in its sacred awakening and victorious \textit{jihad}.

\textit{The Foundations of Loyalty and Disavowal (Arkan al-Wala’ wal Bara‘)}

In his first part of the book, \textit{Arkan al-Wala’ wal Bara‘}, Al-Zawahiri describes ten points which form the religious basis for the concept of WB. The contents of the first part of his book are described as follows:\textsuperscript{549}

1. The prohibition against befriending Muslims
   a- The difference between befriending and dissembling.

2. Hating the infidels and renouncing their love.
   a- God forbids Muslims from showing affection to those who oppose Him and His Messenger.
   b- God has revealed that the infidels despise the Muslims.
   c- God has revealed that the infidels shall never be content with the Muslims as long as the latter persist in their faith.
   d- Infidels wish to turn the Muslims back into a state of infidelity.
   e- The relationship between loving God, befriending the Muslims and \textit{jihad} in the path of God.
   f- Refuting a disingenuous argument.\textsuperscript{550}

3. The prohibition against taking non-Muslims as intimates and sharing the secrets of Muslims with them.

4. The prohibition against appointing infidels to dignified and important posts.

\textsuperscript{548} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{549} This table of contents is reproduced from Al-Zawahiri’s book \textit{Al-Wala’ wal Bara‘: Aqidah Manqulah wa Waqi’ Mafqud}.
\textsuperscript{550} Here Al-Zawahiri refute the claim that Quranic verse 60:8 which says “\textit{Allah does not forbid you from those who have not made war against you on account of your religion, and have not driven you forth from your homes, from showing them kindness and dealing with them justly. Surely Allah loves the doers of justice}” allows Muslims to love the infidels. He explains that kindness and justice are not considered forms of friendship. What is forbidden, according to him however is love, friendship, aid by word or deed, shared outlooks and actions, and the taking of infidels as confidants and revealing them the secrets of the Muslims. See Al-Zawahiri, \textit{Al-Wala’ wal Bara‘}, p. 13.
5. The prohibition against glorifying the infidels’ religious ceremonies and customs, encouraging the infidels and apostates in their falsehood and embellishing or praising it.
6. The prohibition against aiding the infidels against Muslims.
7. The commandment to wage jihad against the infidels, expose their falsehood, have no love for them and keep away from them.
   a- Jihad against the original infidels in obligatory if they occupy the lands of Islam.
   b- Jihad against the apostate rulers of the lands of Islam.
   c- Jihad against the hypocrites who propagate specious arguments.
8. Legally unacceptable excuses from those who befriend the infidels.\textsuperscript{551}
9. The command to befriend and aid the believers (Muslims).
10. Summary.

\textit{Illustrations of Deviations From the Doctrine of WB (Suwar Min al-Inhiraf ‘an Aqidah al-Wala’ wal Bara’)}

In this part two of his book, Al-Zawahiri describes four groups of people which according to him have deviated from the concept of WB. They are:-

1. Rulers who have fused governance without the shariah with friendship for Christians and Jews.

2. The rulers’ henchmen. They are the official ulema, journalists, media personnel, writers, thinkers, and other officials who receive their pay for aiding and embellishing falsehood, and fighting these “people of falsehood” and their distortions.

3. Supporters of an illusory reconciliation. This is the class that calls for a reconciliation with the secular governments that oppose shariah in order to resist the ummah’s enemies.

\textsuperscript{551} Al-Zawahiri here claims that God does not accept the excuses of the Muslims who claim that they befriend the infidels and enable them to victory simply because they fear the vicissitudes of time and chance, especially since if the infidels overcome the Muslims, the Muslims will stand to gain from the infidels. See Al-Zawahiri, \textit{Al-Wala` wal Bara`}, p. 19.
4. Those who are associated with the *jihad* in Afghanistan and who have befriended the Americans.

In his conclusion, Al-Zawahiri emphasizes nine points which could be summarized into the following:

1. Re-affirmation of the critical doctrine of WB that forms the pillar of Muslims’ faith. The manifestation of this doctrine stretches from befriending the Muslims only to the battling and killing of infidels.

2. The urgent need for Muslims to distinguish between those loyal to Islam, who defend it, and the enemies who attack it, and the oscillators (*muzabzabin*) who seek only to pursue their own interests by weakening the resistance of the *ummah* and diverting it from the truth.

3. The call of *jihad* in the path of God to the entire Muslim *ummah*, especially its youth against enemies of Islam. Al-Zawahiri states in his conclusion:

   We must act and act. Enough time has been lost. Let the Muslim youth not await anyone’s permission for *jihad* against the Americans, Jews and their alliance of hypocrites and apostates is an individual obligation, as we have demonstrated for the *ummah* and make plans to defend it from its foes. We must set our lands aflame beneath the feet of the raiders, they shall never depart otherwise.\(^{552}\)

In conclusion, Al-Zawahiri portrays in his book that the comprehensive nature of WB is such that once it is upheld, everything else that Jihadi Salafis yearn to see falls into place. The entire world turns to a dichotomy: Islam and the West, the good and bad. In such a situation, other doctrines that Jihad Salafis promote become more obligatory and urgent. For example, the obligation to uphold the rules of God on this earth becomes more pressing. This is so since the primary way for Muslims to distinguish themselves

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\(^{552}\) Ayman, Al-Zawahiri, *Al-Wala’ wal Bara’: Aqidah Manqulah wa Waqi’ Mafqud*, p. 29.
from the non-Muslims is the former complete adherence and practice of Sharia laws. Waging of *jihad* against the infidels (which is manifested in the form of bombings, terror strikes and assassinations by the Salafi Jihadis) becomes more logical and palatable. This is so since Muslims can never love or befriend infidels in anyway until the latter submit to Islam. All Muslims would be obliged to assist, fund and provide shelter to the so-called *Mujahidin*, since they must at all times be loyal to fellow Muslims.

### 3-Abdul Rahman Abdul Khaliq

**Brief Profile of Abdul Rahman**

Abdul Rahman Abdul Khaliq Al-Yusuf is one of the prominent Salafi scholars from Kuwait. He was born in the city of Manoufiyyah, Egypt in 1939. In 1956, Abdul Rahman left for Saudi Arabia and stayed in the country for nine years before he moved to Kuwait in 1965. In Saudi Arabia, Abdul Rahman studied Islamic Jurisprudence at the Islamic University of Medina. He then took the career of teaching in Kuwait from 1965-1990. He is also the head of *Jam'iyyat Ihya' At-Turath Al-Islami* (Revival of Islamic Heritage) based in Kuwait. It was reported that only after more than thirty years of residing in Kuwait, Abdul Rahman was granted with a Kuwaiti citizenship. However, Al-Anba’ newspaper from Kuwait recently reported that Abdul Rahman had returned to Egypt after being away from his homeland from more than three decades. His return to Egypt, according to the report is because he wishes to join in the happiness of the Egyptian society for the success of the revolution that has shifted Egypt from the dictatorship of President Mubarak to democratic rule, which according to Abdul Rahman was a great shift. In his career as a religious scholar *par excellence*, Abdul Rahman is also a prolific writer who has authored more sixty books on religious issues,

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553 Profile of Abdul Rahman Abdul Khaliq is taken from http://ar.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D8%B9%D8%A8%D8%AF_%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D8%AD%D9%85%D9%86_%D8%B9%D8%AF_%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82 (accessed 16 February 2012).


555 Ibid.
especially on the *Salafi manhaj* and fighting religious innovations.556 One of his books is *Al-Wala’ wal Bara* which we intend to discuss.

*Al-Wala’ wal Bara’ by Abdul Rahman Abdul Khaliq*

Initially, Abdul Rahman’s writing on WB appeared in the Kuwaiti Newspaper “*Al-Watan*” (The Nation) in 1978. In 1979, his article on the subject was published in a small booklet and was printed several times due to its popularity. It was only until September 1986 that Abdul Rahman published the book entitled *Al-Wala’ wal Bara’*.

Unlike Al-Fawzan and Al-Zawahiri, Abdul Rahman discusses the concept of *wala’* and *bara’* separately in two chapters. He does not provide a lengthy introduction chapter explaining the significance of the concept and what prompts him to pen on the subject like what Al-Zawahiri did. The book consists only of two chapters without any conclusion chapter or remarks.

Abdul Rahman begins his work on WB in his first chapter entitled *Al-Wala’ au Al-Wilayah* by providing a detailed explanation on both the linguistic and *shariah* meaning of the term *wala’*.557 In it, he explains the manifestations of *wala’* by stating the obligatory rights of Muslim from his Muslims brother. Here he distinguishes between the ‘obligatory rights’ (*al-huquq al-laazimah*) and ‘special rights’ (*al-huquq al-khaassah*). *Al-Huquq al-Lazimah* are the rights that should be given to all Muslims which are *al-hubb* (love), *al-mujamalah* (courtesy), and *an-nusrah* (support). *Al-Huquq al-Khassaah* are the rights that all Muslims should give to certain individuals or group of people they are: (1) Prophet Muhammad; (2) *Ulema* and educators (*ar-rabbaniyyin*); (3) parents and relatives; (4) neighbours, friends, associates and visitors; and (5) the poor, traveller in need of provisions and all those who are in need. After laying out all these rights and the group of people mentioned with an elaboration of what each right and groups means, Abdul Rahman proceeds to explain three things that nullifies a Muslim’s *wala’* (nawaqidh al-muwalah) for his Muslim brother. First, the situation where a Muslim leaves the religion of Islam. Here, Abdul Rahman warns the danger of the practice of *takfir*. Basing his argument on the Prophetic *hadith*, he stresses that any

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556 Most of Abdul Rahman’s books are available for downloading at [http://khaledabelnaser.forumr.net/t481-topic#538](http://khaledabelnaser.forumr.net/t481-topic#538) (accessed 16 February 2012). For the list of his books, see [http://www.salafi.net/list.html](http://www.salafi.net/list.html) (accessed 16 February 2012).

557 This section of the chapter summarizes the key contents of Abdul Rahman’s books.
Muslim who accuse his Muslim brother of *kufr* and knows that the latter is a Muslim (from his own confession) has apostasized – meaning becomes a *kafir*. However if a Muslim excommunicates someone wrongly or assume that the latter has apostasized becomes a sinner only and will not lead him to be a *kafir*. Second is the situation when a Muslim permits or legalizes the shedding of his Muslim brother’s blood and taking his possession and wealth. At this regard, Abdul Rahman mentions that *istihlal al-ma’siyah* (permitting disobedience to God) constitutes *kufr*. Third, when a Muslim supports the *kuffar* and assists them against the Muslim. Such an act, according to Abdul Rahman constitutes *kufr* and leads to nullification of a Muslim’s *wala’*.

Abdul Rahman subsequently explains the acts that dispraise a Muslim’s *wala’* but do not nullify it. There are, according to him – (1) *dzulm* (oppression); (2) cursing and backbiting; (3) cheating and to sell against one’s purchase, and (4) desertion (*al-hajran*), that is the act of refraining from talking to one another for more than three days. In the last section of his first chapter, Abdul Rahman explains at length two groups of Muslims who go against the “original” *wala’* (*mukhalifun li asl al-wala’*). They are: ⁵⁵⁸

1. The Hypocrites (*Al-Munafiqun*) – This group of people, according to Abdul Rahman is the most hostile of those who violate the true *wala’*. This is primarily due to the *kufr* in their hearts which are filled with hostility, enmity and hatred to the Muslims. The Quran speaks abundantly about the characteristics of this group of people.

2. The Khawarij (Kharijites) – According to Abdul Rahman, the Khawarij refers to ‘those who permit the shedding of Muslims’ blood and taking their properties, those who go against the ruler and kills him and those who call for the *bara’* and killing of Muslims who commit sins and acts of disobedience to God. Abdul Rahman provides a lengthy discussion on the Khawarij by first explaining the origins of Khawarij referring to the group of Muslims who killed the fourth caliph of Islam, Ali bin Abi Talib. After proving the historical accounts of the Khawarij, he speaks about the “neo-Khawarij” of today who submits to the ideology of the Khawarij (*al-afkar al-kharijiyyah*). This ideology, according to Abdul Rahman did not disappear but exists until today. He describes the neo-

Khawarij (*al-khawarij al-mu’asirun*) as those who read the Quran but do not practise the commands of God and even though they memorise the *hadith* they fail to understand its meaning. Here Abdul Rahman criticizes the conservative Salafis whom he describes as being extreme in many matters. He denounces these Muslims for forbidding social gathering, working in the government sector, studying in schools, using currency notes because there are pictures on them, watching the television, travelling to non-Muslim countries, learning subjects like geography, physics and chemistry and many others. Abdul Rahman describes these Muslims as worse than the hypocrites Muslim.\(^{559}\)

The second part of Abdul Rahman’s book is dedicated to the explanation of *bara’*. First, he provided the evidences of *bara’* from the Quran and hadith. He quoted Quranic verses forbidding the taking of alliance with the non-Muslims and revealed the reasons behind the first verse of *Surah Mumtahanah* which is the story of Hatib Bin Abi Balta’ah as discussed in Chapter Two. Next, he explains how this *bara’* from the ‘enemies of God’ could be manifested. He talks about four ways:\(^ {560}\)

1. The obligation and importance of holding strongly to the religion of Islam.
2. The obligation to portray one’s *bara’* from the *kuffar*.
3. The forbidding of assisting the *kuffar* against Muslims.
4. The forbidding of taking them as leaders.

According to Abdul Rahman, while it is important to have *bara’* from the *kuffar*, one should know that the *kuffar* should be treated with kindness, mercy and justice as long as they do not fight the Muslims. *Bara’* from the *kuffar* also does not close the doors of doing *da’wah* or calling them to the religion of Islam. This *da’wah* to the *kuffar*, according to Abdul Rahman should be done in a soft and compassionate way. He bases this on Quranic verse 16:125\(^ {561}\) where Muslims are encouraged to call people to the path of God with wisdom and good instruction, and to argue with people in a “[…] way that is best […].” Here he criticizes Muslims who fail to distinguish between *bara’* and *da’wah* and who believes that *bara’* from the *kuffar* means to slander and kill them. He

\(^{559}\) Ibid.
\(^{560}\) Ibid p. 18.
\(^{561}\) The verse reads “Invite to the way of your Lord with wisdom and good instruction, and argue with them in a way that is best. Indeed, your Lord is most knowing of who has strayed from His way, and He is most knowing of who is [rightly] guided”. 

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stresses that *da’wah* needs to be carried out with utmost compassion, good characters and words so as to convince and attract non-Muslims to Islam.

Abdul Rahman gives examples of practices that do not include in the meaning of *bara’* from the *kuffar*:\(^{562}\)

1. Visiting them and when they are sick.
2. Attending their funeral.
3. Giving and receiving gifts from them.
4. Congratulate them on their festivals.
5. Giving condolences to them.
6. Helping the poor and needy among them.
7. Attending to their invitation/
8. Pray and supplicate for them so that they be guided to Islam (even though they attack Muslims).

### 4-Muhammad Saeed Al-Qahtani

**Brief Profile of Al-Qahtani**

Muhammad Bin Saeed Bin Salim Al-Qahtani was born in 1956 in Seira Obeida (city of the Qahtan tribe), Saudi Arabia. He graduated with Masters in *Shariah* from Ummul Qura University in Mecca, Saudi Arabia in 1980 and obtained his doctorate from the same university in 1984. Al-Qahtani’s doctoral thesis is entitled “*Tahqiq Kitab As-Sunnah li Abdullah Bin Al-Imam Ahmad*” (Assertion of the Book of Prophetic Tradition by Abdullah Bin Al-Imam Ahmad). Upon graduation, Al-Qahtani served as an Assistant Professor in the Faculty of *Usuluddin wa Da’wah* (Theology and Missionary) at the university where he graduated. He is also the head of the Department of *Qiraat* (Science of Quranic Recitation) of the university. Besides being a scholar, Al-Qahtani is also a *Shariah* lawyer and has served Abu Bakar As-Siddiq Mosque and Al-Furqan Mosque located in Mecca, as imam and *khatib* (deliverer of sermons) for seven years. He has delivered lectures in many states in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Holland and Britain.

\(^{562}\) Ibid, pp. 23-27.
Al-Qahtani has written books and articles mainly on the subject of *shariah* and *aqidah*. His publications include the famous *Al-Wala’ wal Bara’ Fil Islam*, (Loyalty and Disavowal in Islam), *As-Sunnah li Abdillah Bin Al-Imam Ahmad*, (The Prophetic Tradition by Abdullah Bin Al-Imam Ahmad), *Sharah As-Sunnah lil Barbahari*, (Explanation of The Prophetic Tradition by Barbahari), *Tazkiah An-Nafs li Ibn Taimiyyah* (Self-Purification by Ibn Taimiyyah), *Al-Istihza’ bid Din wa ahlih, A’dat wa Alfaz Tukhalif Dinallah* (Customs and Utterances which oppose the religion of God), and *Wa Yakuunad Diinu Lillah* (And The Religion Be To God).

**Al-Qahtani’s *Al-Wala’ wal Bara* According to the Belief of the Salaf**

Al-Qahtani’s book *Al-Wala’ wal Bara’ According to the Belief of the Salaf* was originally submitted in the form of a thesis for a Master’s Degree to the Department of Aqeedah of the Ummul Qura University in Mecca, Saudi Arabia. The examining committee for Al-Qahtani’s thesis comprised of Muhammad Qutub, the supervisor and chairman; Shaykh Abdur Razzaq Afifi as a member; and Dr. Abdul Aziz Obeid as a member. Al-Qahtani was granted a Master’s Degree an excellent grade, on Saturday evening, the 4th of Sha’ban 1401H of the Islamic calendar.

In his Introduction, Al-Qahtani highlighted that the subject matter of *WB* is of paramount importance and utmost interest for two major reasons. Firstly, it is closely connected to *tawhid*. *Wala’* is understood as sincere love for God, His prophets and the Muslims. *Bara’* on the other hand, is an expression of enmity and hatred towards falsehood and its adherents. Both are evidence of the Islamic faith. Secondly, it has been written at a very crucial time when the distinctions are blurred such that some Muslims are no longer aware of those qualities which distinguish them from the non-Muslim. He alleges that their faith has become so weak that the Muslims have adopted patterns of behaviour that are absolutely repugnant to a sincere believer and taken the non-Muslims as their friends, while displaying enmity towards many of them by mocking their character and degrading them. Al-Qahtani has tried to concentrate on a...
number of concerns brought on by the current socio-political reality. The following are some of the questions he has observed being passionately discussed in his book:

- To whom should a Muslim pledge his allegiance?
- To whom should a Muslim entrust his loyalty?
- To whom should a Muslim direct his hatred?
- What is the law for pledging allegiance to non-Muslims?

Al Qahtani views the need to address these questions as a consequence of the existing lack of decency in this world as the Muslim ummah are left behind in a deplorable state of backwardness. Muslims are more oriented towards the pursuit of wealth and decadent way of life that they are contaminating and wasting away their faith and wisdom.

Al-Qahtanis's book is divided into three parts. The first part, which contains ten chapters focuses on declaration of the Muslim faith, its prerequisites, effects and what negates the faith, love and hate in Islam and disbelief in action and conviction. Al-Qahtani argues that WB is inseparable from the divinity of God as proclaimed in the shahadah. It is thus a consequential extension of the shahadah. On the strength of this argument, he ranks the status of WB as a central part of the Islamic faith in that devotion to and love of God and His Prophet, and hate towards heresy, transgression, and immorality are the desired core values Muslims should hold dear.

The second part of the book contains eight chapters. Chapter one discusses the significance of WB according to the Quran and Sunnah and the history of its literatures. Chapter two consults the nature of enmity and conflict between two ideological groups, namely the allies of God and the allies of Satan. Chapter three deals with the concept according to the Ahl As-Sunnah wal Jamaah and their position with regards to religious innovations and heretics. Chapter four portrays examples of WB from pre-Islamic nations as recorded in the Quran. Chapter five discusses the concept in the Meccan period with a particular focus on the relationships between the Muslims and their enemies. Chapter six looks at the concept in the Medinan Period. In chapter seven, Al-Qahtani describes twenty types of alliance with non-Muslims, and concluded the second part of his book by describing the position of the Shiite and Khawarij with regards to the concept of WB in chapter eight.
The final part of the book contains seven chapters and covers issues such as prerequisites of WB, rights of Muslims with one another, jihad, hijrah, abandoning heretics, severance of marriage and inheritance between Muslims and non-Muslims, prohibition of imitating the non-Muslims and assertion of Islamic identity and finally how to deal with the non-Muslims.

It could be said that Al-Qahtani’s book is the most popular and is widely available in the Muslim world. The book also exerts an overwhelming presence in cyberspace. If one were to google “al-wala’ wal bara”, six out of every ten hits makes a reference to the book by Al-Qahtani. Looking at it presence on the internet, one can conclude that the book has become the voice of authority for those who wish to understand the subject in greater depth today. IslamicWeb.com in its official website describes Al-Qahtani’s book as one that has a very significant importance. It says: “This book (Al-Qahtani’s) has been chosen by IslamicWeb.com as the best book that has been written about this important part of the Islamic Aqidah. It has been taught by many Islamic universities such as The American Open University”.565 The use of the book as a point of reference for the topic is echoed by a blogger on an online forum who called herself Umm Ayesha who said, “This is the best book regarding this topic in the English language. (a must read!)”566 The acceptance of the concept as an article of the Islamic faith as suggested by Al-Qahtani is clear in this comment by a fellow blogger Mujahidah who said, “... al-wala’ wal bara’ is an extremely important part of aqidah...... For those who deny this, they have only wronged themselves. There is a set of three books that discusses this is great detail. "Al Wala Wa’l Bara", by Muhammad Saeed Al-Qahtani.” 567 As mentioned before, the book has also been translated into several languages. To date, there are versions in English, Malay, Indonesian,568 Chinese and German.569

Like Al-Fawzan, Al-Qahtani also mentions that WB is intended for three groups of people:

565See Al Wala’ wa’l Bara’ (Love and Hate for Allah’s Sake) by Muhammad Sa’eed Al Qahtani at http://islamicweb.com/beliefs/creed/Wala_wal_Bara.htm (accessed 25 January 2011).
1. Those who merit love in its fullness – the fellowship of God’s believers;
2. Those who earn the love of his fellow believers for a specific deed or contribution, while they could also incur the wrath of the believers for another reason – these are Muslims whose good deeds are tampered by their transgressions.
3. Those who are comprehensively hated – the infidels and those whose submission of faith is to other than God.

Like Abdul Rahman, Al-Qahtani illustrates the importance and forms of *wala’* that a Muslim must show towards his Muslim brother. As for the rights of a Muslims towards one another, Al-Qahtani concedes that there are many, but assistance and affection are the most relevant to the discussion of WB. Affection according to Al-Qahtani is meant to be between the Muslims, while the non-Muslims, the corrupt and the heretical have no place in it. Second, assisting the Muslims regardless of race, colour, nationality or social class is a must and required by the faith. Muslims must help and defend his Muslim brother with wealth and life. As for helping the Muslims, this includes things such as coming actively to their defence, giving them whatever material and moral support if necessary whenever they are threatened, offering their wealth and their lives to break the power of the oppressor. Al-Qahtani asserts that alliance to non-Muslims represents a danger to the whole community and is more serious than the case of a person who abandons his belief privately within his own heart. Relying on the teachings of Muhammad Bin Abdul Wahhab, Al-Qahtani laid down twenty types of alliance that he considers to be heretical and forbidden in the eyes of Islam:

1. Contentment with the non-Muslims and with their faith. This is so as endorsement of the validity of their faith is an act of disbelief.
2. Reliance on them for help, assistance or protection.
3. Agree with them on some points of disbelief and accept their word against.
4. Seeking their love and affection.
5. Incline towards them.
6. Flattering and adulating their faith.
7. Taking them as intimate friends. Intimacy here means closeness of confidence or trust.

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570 Al-Qahtani, *Al-Wala’ wal Bara’ fil Islam Min Mafahim Aqidah a-Salaf*, Part Two, Chapter Seven, pp. 111-123.
8. Obeying their wishes and desires.
9. Siting with them who ridicule the Quran.
10. Giving them authority over the Muslims.
11. Trusting them.
12. Expressing contentment with their actions, imitating their dress or adopt the refinement associated with their faith.
13. Drawing near to them, enjoying the time with them, revealing inner feelings and showing respect to them.
14. Aiding or abetting them in their wrongdoings.
15. Seeking advice from them.
16. Honoring and giving them grand titles. This include placing hands over their hearts or removing hats upon greeting them as a gesture of affection for them;
17. Joining and living with them.
18. Colluding with them, helping them in their schemes, entering into pacts with them, spying on their behalf, informing them about the Muslims or fighting in their ranks.
19. Fleeing from the lands of Islam to the lands of disbelief.
20. Supporting their ideologies communism, nationalism and secular politics.

Having said all these actions, which according to him are acts of forbidden alliance, Al-Qahtani however, agrees with the idea of benefiting from non-Muslims. Based on the book *Ma’alim fit Tariq* by Sayyid Qutub, Al-Qahtani said that Islam permits Muslims to approach non-Muslims in order to benefit from their knowledge of chemistry, physics, medicine, manufacturing, agriculture, management and so forth, when these sorts of useful knowledge have not been acquired by Muslims. Muslims are also allowed to trade with the non-Muslims, asking them for directions, buying arms and clothing from them and to make use of their things which Muslims need.

Among the issues related to the subject of WB which Al-Qahtani discusses in his book are the obligation of *hijrah* and *jihad*. For *hijrah*, Al-Qahtani argues that living in a

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571 *Hijrah*, as argued by Al-Qahtani is the essence of *tawhid*. According to him, Muslims should abandon all else and flee to God. He acknowledges that there is both a physical and spiritual dimension to the concept. Al-Qahtani says, "A physical movement from one place to another and a spiritual migration to Allah and his Messenger. It is this second migration which constitutes the real migration, as the body simply follows the soul.". Al-Qahtani, *Al-Wala’ wal Bara’ fil Islam Min Mafahim Aqidah al-Salaf*, pp.228.
non-Muslim land is not permissible in Islam as Muslim will have to live under non-Islamic conditions. Thus, hijrah is necessary and obligatory.\textsuperscript{572} He also claims that Muslims who willingly accept the rule of non-Muslims, and live under any rule other than the shariah are committing acts that will nullify their faith.\textsuperscript{573} For jihad, Al-Qahtani asserts that it is one of the fundamental characteristics of WB. He argues that the highest expression of bara’ is jihad for the sake of God, as it is the only way to sever truth from falsehood and to sever the Party of God (hizb Allah) from the party of Satan (hizb aslshaitan).\textsuperscript{574} Looking back at the life of Prophet Muhammad, jihad became normality soon after his migration. This stands as proof of the importance of jihad and of the establishment of Islamic faith. Al-Qahtani claims that jihad is the way in which Muslim call others to Islam and was not a peculiar response to conditions in the first days of Islam, but rather an inseparable part of the call to the religion. If it were only a response to conditions of the times, it would not have been so deeply rooted in the Quran and in the Sunnah of the Prophet.\textsuperscript{575}

**Observations and Analysis**

After presenting briefly the four books written by Al-Fawzan, Al-Zawahiri, Abdul Rahman and Al-Qahtani, we will now turn our attention to the analysis of their writings. The analysis is done by observing three things: (1) what contents and dimensions of WB (social, political and Jihadi) are presented in the books; (2) style and approach taken by the writers in presenting the concept; and (3) what distinguishes their writings from one another. Undeniably, all of them agree on the importance of WB for Muslims and that it is closely connected to the Islamic faith. They also agree that Muslims are obliged to love the Muslims and hate the non-Muslims. As the previous chapter has clarified, these Salafi thinkers despite their unity on the importance of WB however, differ on the practical aspects of the concept. In what follows, we attempt to provide

\textsuperscript{572} Salafis who argue that Muslims should perform hijrah base their arguments on Quran 4: 99-100. Literally, these verses state that if a person cannot practise his religion then he should emigrate. It clearly highlights that it is an injustice for one to accept living under conditions of humiliation while being able to move to another land that offers freedom, security and the means of a dignified life. The only people excused from this judgment are those who possess neither such power nor means of deciding such matters. Thus, hijrah is permissible, in fact compulsory, if the destination allows the Muslim more means of practicing his religion than the land of origin.

\textsuperscript{573} Al-Qahtani, *Al-Wala’ wal Bara’ fil Islam min mafahim aqidah al-salaf*, pp. 223-224.

\textsuperscript{574} Ibid, p. 234.

\textsuperscript{575} Ibid.
some observations and analysis of their writings individually before we conclude the chapter.

Salih Bin Fawzan Al-Fawzan

Al-Fawzan’s book is considered to be the most simplest and shortest of all. The 18-pages book is a point by point approach written by Al-Fawzan to illustrate daily life examples of how Muslims should portray his wala’ to their fellow Muslim brothers and bara’ from the non-Muslims. For each of these examples, Fawzan does not elaborate much on their meanings but only quote a verse or two from the Quran or hadith to support his claim. One could also notice that Al-Fawzan only discusses the social dimension of WB in his book. The first two chapters are filled with examples of how a Muslim ought to express his love for his fellow Muslim brothers and hatred towards the non-Muslims. His writing seems to suggest that the main objective behind the concept of WB is to maintain the purity of Islam as outlined in the Quran, Sunnah and consensus of the Companions, and this purity is achieved through denouncing religious deviations and avoiding contacts with non-Muslims.

In his course of explaining WB, Al-Fawzan does not mention anything about the obligation of jihad which according to other Salafi thinkers like Al-Zawahiri and Al-Qahtani is the highest expression of showing bara’ to the non-believers. This is a typical purist Salafi line of thinking that always avoid any kind of overt activism and opposition, let alone the use of violence against the regime and the non-Muslim in general. Purist Salafis prefer to counsel and provide advice to leaders rather than taking the path of overt opposition and rebellion. They believe that the current time is analogous to the Meccan period during the time of the Prophet where he propagated Islam through peaceful means and focused on tarbiyah and tazkiyah. As a famous purist Salafi, Muhammad Nasir al-Din Al-Albani puts it: “History repeats itself. Everybody claims that the Prophet is their role model. Our Prophet spent the first half of his message making da’wa, and he did not start it with jihad.”

It not surprising that Al-Fawzan avoids raising issues of politics and governance in his writing. For example, he does not mention anything about the issue of takfir of Muslims.

especially leaders who fail to implement the shariah fully. This is albeit all Salafi groups including the purists believe that Muslims should uphold the shariah.\textsuperscript{577} As we have illustrated in the previous chapter, purist Salafis do not see Muslims who fail to uphold the shariah as kafirs, although they could be sinners. The use of takfir especially upon Muslims who do not comprehensively uphold the shariah and upon those who are deemed kuffar for adhering to non-Islamic systems has a high connotation of politics which purist Salafis always refrain from. To them, politics is something that is best left to the politicians and the purist Salafis do not view themselves as a political movement. They even accuse other Salafis such as those of the politics and Jihadis as straying away from the Salafi creed because they fail to follow the proper implementation of the Salafi manhaj. In this respect, the purist Salafis distinguish between the Salafi aqidah and manhaj. The aqidah comprises “the knowledge of tawhid” and is the basis of belief. Manhaj, on the other hand, is action and signifies the Prophetic model of putting beliefs into practice. According to purist Salafis, one must adhere to both the proper belief and method in order to be a Salafi Muslim.

Ayman Al-Zawahiri

Al-Zawahiri’s approach in presenting WB could be seen as one that is very hostile towards the non-Muslims. Although Al-Zawahiri covers the social elements of WB which some of them could be seen in Al-Fawzan and Abdul Rahman’s books, his book tends more towards promoting jihad as the greatest expression of WB and portraying enmity and hostility towards the kuffar. His feeling of deep hatred to the West, especially the United States is reflected in his book and could be clearly seen as early as in the first few lines of his introduction remarks. In addition, his final chapter is called “America’s Mujahidin” (Mujahidu Amrika) where he praises those who fought against the Americans in Afghanistan and oppose Muslims who ally with the US in the war and describes them as having deviated from the doctrine of WB.

\textsuperscript{577} Purist Salafis argue that takfir upon Muslim leaders is not feasible due to several reasons. First, Muslim leaders still incorporated Islamic laws into their constitutions and regards the shariah as a source of legislation. Second, although Muslim leaders are sinful for committing sins like usury and corruption, there is no evidence that they regard these activities as lawful in Islam. In other words they are not doing istihal (permitting what is Islamically forbidden) of God’s laws. Third, purist Salafis argue that one should evaluate the consequences and benefits of doing takfir against the incumbent rulers and whether takfir results in greater or lesser evil. They believe that such an act will not bring any benefit to the religion.
Just as he portrays WB as deriving logically from the essence of the *shahadah*, so too does Al-Zawahiri believe *jihad* to be the natural result and the highest form of disavowal from the *kuffar* and the regimes he views as un-Islamic. *Jihad*, according to Al-Zawahiri then serves two major purposes: (1) to denounce the political leadership of the Muslim regimes and force them to fully submit to the commands of Islam; (2) the best way to express *bara’* from the *kuffar*. This is justified based on Quran 60:4, as explained in Chapter Two, is the basis of Salafis theory on WB, as this verse not only speaks of disavowal but also of enmity and hatred between Abraham and his enemies. Thus Al-Zawahiri believes that *jihad* is the greatest way to express these feelings.

It is strongly rooted in Al-Zawahiri’s thought that the concept of WB is one that obligates Muslim to totally sever the relationship with non-Muslims. The Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) recorded one of Al-Zawahiri’s words: “As for al-wala’ wal-barā’, its meaning is, in very condensed form, a total and complete break with the West and its civilization, and perpetual jihad against it until its final defeat.” Such a statement from Zawahiri clearly shows the ideology of Jihadi Salafis who call for the killing and elimination of the *kuffar* from the earth.

As mentioned before, WB is a significant concept in the Islamist militant ideology such as Al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda members who are Jihadi in orientation use WB to portray that the world is divided into two warring camps: Muslims and the rest. According to the Jihadi Salafis, these two camps could not co-exist in peace and there is always a clash between the Muslim world and the non-Muslim world. Al-Qaeda seeks to highlight this reality by bringing in the concept of WB into their ideology. The clash and dichotomy between the two camps will be inevitable if all Muslims follow and practise the concept. Such a position taken by Al-Qaeda can be further confirmed in the writings of many other Salafis who belong to this group such as Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi and Nasir Al-Fahad.

The politico-Jihadi dimension of WB can be clearly seen when Al-Zawahiri touches affairs of ruling regime and their incumbent rulers. For example, in chapter two, Al-Zawahiri criticizes The Grand Mufti of Egypt for issuing a *fatwa* sanctioning the

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execution of Muhammad Abd Al-Salam Faraj, Abd al-Hamid Abd Al-Salam, Khalid Al-Islambouli, Hussein Abbas and Atta Tayil in 1982 for their involvement in the assassination of former Egyptian President Anwar Al-Sadat in 1981.\(^{579}\) Al-Zawahiri considers these individuals as the *mujahidin* heroes of Islam in Egypt. In addition, he also condemns the government of Egypt for signing four treaties with Israel including the popular 1979 peace treaty which permanently ended the state of war between the two countries and prevented Egypt from aiding any country that fell under Israel aggression. Al-Zawahiri also pointed the infidelity of the Saudi regime for seeking the American’s aid in the Gulf war of 1990. He claims that there was no need for an American presence as the armies of Arab and Islamic states were sufficient and able to protect and liberate Kuwait. He accuses that the US presence on the Arabian Peninsula is nothing more that the usurpation of the oil wells.\(^{580}\)

*Abdul Rahman Abdul Khaliq*

As a politico and academic Salafi as some have called, Abdul Rahman’s work on WB could be seen as one that has a slant towards explaining the concept in a scholarly and academic way. This could be seen as early as his Introduction where he discusses the linguistic and *shariah* meaning of *wala’*, quoting from the famous Arabic dictionary of *Lisan Al-Arab* and exposes the various derivations of the term in classical Arabic usage. This is in contrast with Al-Fawzani and Al-Zawahiri’s approach of not to delve deeper in the linguistic meaning of WB, but to immediately discuss the manifestation or the practicality of the concept in their books. Academic Salafis are naturally more into writing and theorizing their beliefs than the other groups that have the same or close beliefs and applications.

Unlike Al-Fawzani and Al-Zawahiri, Abdul Rahman’s conception of WB also seems to be quite compromising and lenient to the non-Muslims. While he acknowledges the importance of showing *bara’* to the *kufr*, he does not forbid the acts of praying for them, exchanging gifts and congratulating non-Muslims – acts which, according to the purist and Jihadi Salafis, are not acceptable. Such a stance towards non-Muslims could explain politicos’ inclination to politics just as they are willing to adopt un-Islamic


\(^{580}\) Ibid, pp.24-25.
systems such as democracy and taking part in election which is unlawful in the eyes of the purists.

One could also notice that Abdul Rahman is the only author who explicitly criticizes the other strands of Salafism especially the purists for being too ‘strict’ and ‘extreme’ in their manhaj. He also criticizes the Jihadis for permitting the shedding of Muslims’ blood and taking their properties, and for going against the Muslim rulers and kills them. Such a criticism from Abdul Rahman could be explained from his politico background which is very vocal in words and expression of views. Like Al-Fawzan, Abdul Rahman does not mention anything about jihad against the kuffar when discussing WB. This is particularly due to the fact that purist and politico Salafis are both against the Jihadi-Salafi’s method of resorting to violence.

**Muhammad Saeed Al-Qahtani**

It can be said that Al-Qahtani’s book is the most comprehensive of all in terms of its contents and also capturing the three dimensions of WB: social, political and Jihadi. The entire first part of his book which consists of ten chapters was dedicated to the discussion of WB in relation to the declaration of Muslim faith. Al-Qahtani begins his discussion on the concept by emphasizing the creedal (aqidah) aspect of it before he moves to describe the manifestation of the concept in a Muslim life in the second and third part of it. Apart from explaining WB as an integral part of the Islamic faith, Al-Qahtani also highlights the concept as one that requires Muslims to love the Muslims and Islam and on the other hand hate kufr and the kuffar. He states that ‘love is the source of loyalty and hate is the source of opposition; and it is by this that both the heart and hand are moved to act.

The social and political dimension of WB could be clearly seen when Al-Qahtani elaborates how WB should be applied in the daily life of Muslims. Al-Qahtani provides examples of the acts that constitute a forbidden alliance with the non-Muslims which includes taking them as friends and loving them and seeking their assistance. His politico inclination could also be seen in the fact that he uses the ideas and quotations of Sayyid Qutub whose scholarship of Islam is only accepted by politico Salafis.\(^{581}\) Other

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\(^{581}\) It is interesting to note here that Muhammad Qutub, the brother of Sayyid Qutub was one of the panel who sat in the examining committee of Al-Qahtani’s book *Al-Wala’ wal Bara’* which Al-Qahtani
Salafi strands like the purists do not consider Qutub as a Salafi. Some even go to the extent of labeling Qutub as a *kafir*. Al-Qahtani agrees with Qutub ideas of permitting Muslims to approach non-Muslims in order to benefit from their knowledge of chemistry, physics, medicine, manufacturing, agriculture, management and so forth, when these sorts of useful knowledge have not been acquired by Muslims.

Like Al-Fawzan, Al-Qahtani also discusses the obligation of *hijrah* as one of the most important manifestations of WB. He readily admits that, “*The hijrah is a vitally important aspect of Islam; it is at once the guiding principle of alliance and dissociation and the supreme example of it.*”\textsuperscript{582} Al-Qahtani argues that living in a non-Muslim land is not permissible in Islam as Muslim will have to live under non-Islamic conditions. Thus, *hijrah* is necessary and obligatory. He also claims that Muslims who willingly accept the rule of non-Muslims, and live under any rule other than the *shariah* are committing acts that will nullify their faith. This is so as loyalty and sovereignty can only given to and by God and Islam is the only way of life for Muslims. By affirming this, Al-Qahtani has also portrayed the concept as one that has a political connotation.

The Jihadi element of WB in Al-Qahtani’s book can be clearly observed in his chapter on *jihad*. His writing on *jihad* is centred into two parts. The first part focuses on armed struggle and the other on merits of martyrdom. Al-Qahtani believes that *jihad* is one of the fundamental characteristics of WB and the highest expression of *bara’* is *jihad* for the sake of God. It is, according to him, the only way to distinguish truth from falsehood and to sever the Muslims from the others. The aims of *jihad* according to Al-Qahtani are threefold: (1) the non-Muslims should be fought to assure everyone’s right to choose between truth and falsehood; (2) the non-Muslims should be fought to assure the right of Muslims to call others to Islam; and (3) the non-Muslims should be fought to establish the rule and authority of Islam on earth. Al-Qahtani asserts that the achievement of all these objectives by Muslims is the supreme liberation of humanity for it frees them from the worships of others beside Allah.

In this regard, Al-Qahtani has the same stance as Al-Zawahiri who seeks to eliminate *kufr* and the *kuffar* from this earth unless they submit to Islam. It highlights that Al-

\textsuperscript{582} Al-Qahtani, *Al-Wala’ wal Bara’ fil Islam Min Mafahim Aqidah Al-Salaf*, p. 217.
Qahtani belongs to the camp which views that armed *jihad* or war is the only kind of relationship that exist between Muslim and non-Muslims. To the proponents of such views, armed *Jihad* is a standing obligation until the end of the world and its aims is to fight the infidels wherever they may be found, in accordance with the Prophet’s utterance to “fight the polytheists until they say ‘There is no God but Allah’”. Armed *jihad* is to be carried out until all lands are liberated from non-believers and when all non-believers submit to the rule of Islam. This view of *jihad* proposes the idea of perpetual warfare between Muslims and non-Muslims that will only cease or end when all non-Muslims embrace Islam, fall under the rule of Muslim nation or enter into a peaceful agreement with Muslims.

The observation and analysis of the writings by the four Salafi thinkers could be summarized in the following table:

Table 1: Analysis of the Writings on WB by Selected Modern Salafi Thinkers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Social</th>
<th>Political</th>
<th>Jihadi</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Al-Fawzan</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Presentation of concept is straightforward and simple. Entire book is focused on social dimension of the concept.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdul Rahman</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Presentation of concept in a more academic and politically oriented manner. Criticizes purist position on the concept and Jihadis use of violence. Portrays a slightly compromising form of <em>bara’</em>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Zawahiri</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Although his writing covers all the three dimensions of WB, the Jihadi dimension is the most obvious and thoroughly emphasized throughout his book.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Qahtani</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Comprehensive presentation of concept including historical aspects of concept. Covers all dimension of WB equally.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Al-Fawzan’s approach of presenting WB in his book could be explained from his purist background which forbids dealing with political affairs and avoiding the use of violence (understood in the form of *jihad*) against the regime. Purist Salafis apply *bara’a* strictly at the social level, which does not pose any threat to the rulers without applying similar policies at the political level. As for Abdul Rahman, his political orientation is clear from the way he presented the concept in a more academic manner and his criticism of other Salafi currents for their interpretation of WB. Politico Salafis are very vocal in expressing their concerns and this could explain his criticism of other Salafi strands in his book. His detailed explanation of the characteristics of the neo-Khawarij also highlights his political orientation when discussing the concept. Like the purists, the politicos do not believe in violence, and this could explain the absence of the Jihadi element in his writing. One of the things that distinguishes Abdul Rahman’s writing from all the others is his method of categorizing *wala’a* into several rights, something which is not done by the others.

Al-Zawahiri’s inclination toward presenting the concept in a full fledged Jihadi orientation could be observed as early his opening remarks which reflects his deep hatred towards the West and especially the US. Throughout his discussion on the concept there was no trace of tolerance for the non-Muslims especially the Jews and Christians upon which Islam’s apologist insist. He lumped them all together indiscriminately and called for their killing and elimination. The same applied to those Muslims whom he views have apostasized and the hypocrites who do not heed to the call of *jihad* and for their preference to associate with the infidels. Finally, Al-Qahtani’s book could be seen as the most comprehensive of all in terms of its presentation and incorporation of all the social, political and Jihadi element. Such a comprehensive presentation of WB could be among the main reasons why Al-Qahtani’s book on WB is the most popular in the Salafi world and occupy a significance presence on the internet.

The different styles and approaches these Salafi thinkers have in presenting religious issues such as the concept of WB could have an impact on the wider Salafi community. For example, Al-Fawzan’s straightforward and apolitical approach will appeal more to the general Salafi community who are not politically inclined and reject violence. It could have the widest base of supporters. Purists’ appeal and attraction lies on its simplicity and the social message which they are conveying. Books of politico Salafis,

on the other hand, would probably appeal to the more educated and academically inclined Salafi population. Their style of writing and messages are geared towards a politically-end objective. Finally, books written by Jihadi Salafis would obviously appeal more to the so-called militant Islamists who are passionate in using violence against their adversaries. Jihadi Salafism could have the narrowest base of supporters among the Salafi community and is not a fertile ground for the masses due to the unacceptability of using violence by many Salafis.

Lastly, it is important to emphasize here that the different views purist, politico and Jihadi Salafis have on WB, as shown in this chapter, are not absolute. In other words, it is inaccurate to say, for example, that all purist Salafis will avoid raising political issues when discussing WB; or that all politico Salafis criticize the purists for being too “extreme” in their understanding of social dimension of WB; or all Jihadi Salafis view jihad as the highest expression of showing bara’ to the kuffar. The analysis conducted and conclusions made in this research are mainly based on the works of selected Salafi thinkers. As the nature of WB is very complex as dynamic modern Salafism is, it is without doubt that Salafis from the various ideological backgrounds could share similar positions or disagree on issues related to WB in other ways that have not been discussed in this research. Our conclusion is based on the unique differences in understanding this concept treated by writers from different ideological backgrounds.

Conclusion

In conclusion, after observing the contents of the books on WB by the four Salafi thinkers, the way they approach and present the concept and analyzing it, we can make several concluding observations:

1. The chapter has proven that the Salafi concept of WB is not static and fixed. This confirms the flexible nature of the concept as explained in the previous chapter – one which is fluid, multi-dimensional and resides on a continuum that can range from what might be termed the “very mild” to the “most extreme”. It connotes a wide range of meanings: an inward spiritual struggle to attain perfect faith, severance of contact with the kuffar to a political or military struggle.
2. The chapter also confirms the hypothesis that the Salafi concept of WB consist of several dimensions i.e the *aqidah* which is generally agreed by all Salafi currents, social, political and *Jihadi*. Thus, in a broader sense the concept can be both applied at the religious or social and political level. At the religious level, WB is characterized by a portrayal of non-Muslims as potential enemies of the purity of Islamic rituals and customs while at the political level, Salafis use WB by actively incorporating politics, violence, rulers and diplomatic ties with other countries into their belief.

3. The chapter proves that a particular Salafi background and orientation has an important role and significant effect on the Salafi *manhaj* and the way this *manhaj* is presented and argued. Though it is obviously not absolute, the effect of one’s adoption of a particular Salafi orientation could result in different dimensions of presenting religious issues. Their diverse ideological trends lead them to produce different rulings, different ways of presenting religious issues or at least similar rulings but in different level of severity and flexibility.

4. The flexibility of the concept could be seen in the way Salafis connect other religious concept to WB. For example, purist Salafis, though believe in *jihad*, do not connect the concept of *jihad* to WB – something that is done by the Jihadis. Likewise, politico Salafis do not agree to the purists’ idea of *hijrah* as one of the manifestations of WB. This can be seen when Abdul Rahman explicitly condemns purists for forbidding Muslims to travel to non-Muslim countries.

5. The chapter suggests that the different manners Salafis have in presenting religious issues have an impact on the wider Salafi adherents. Naturally, Salafis will look for books and scholars who belong to the same or similar Salafi orientation they adopt.

6. The chapter suggests that the categorization of modern Salafis into three distinct factions of purist, politico and Jihadi is a useful framework to analyse and explain the diversity of rulings and opinions in modern Salafism.
CONCLUSION

Modern Salafism is a complex phenomenon in contemporary Islamic thought. The complexity of modern Salafism is proven in this research in two ways: (1) the emergence of different ideological trends and inclination in modern Salafism; and (2) the diverse interpretation in matters of religion, social and politics within modern Salafis. In terms of religious legitimacy, this research has shown that using the same Islamic sources, modern Salafis produce different rulings and opinions depending on how they view the current social and political context.

Chapter One of this research has provided the background and essential understanding of modern Salafism and the concept of WB. The understanding of WB in modern Salafism is further enhanced in Chapter Two when we look at how Quranic scriptures has significantly impacted modern Salafis understanding of WB and shaped its conception. Chapter Three begins to uncover the realities of this concept by looking at how the concept originates from the teachings of Wahhabism, developed and manifested by the Wahhabis who form the majority of modern Salafis. It also shows the active propagation of modern Salafis to spread their version of WB, not only on the Arabian soil, but also to other parts of the Muslim world and beyond. The complexities of modern Salafis’ concept of WB are described in Chapter Four when we portray the spectrum of the concept in modern Salafism. By using the examples of four issues that are related to the concept, the chapter shows that the spectrum of modern Salafis understanding of the concept is one that can range from what might be termed the “very mild” to the “most extreme” of it. Finally, Chapter Six attempts to prove that one of the main reasons for the spectrum or diverse understanding of the concept is the different Salafi orientations or the backgrounds from which modern Salafis emerge. This is done through analyzing the books on WB by several modern Salafi thinkers from the various Salafi background. This analysis has shown that the various ideological trends in modern Salafism have an impact on the manner modern Salafis present the concept of WB which highlights the fluidity and multi-dimensional nature of the concept in modern Salafism.

The analysis on Salafis concept of WB as shown in this research is believed to be able to make contributions in the following arena:
First, it helps to improve our understanding of WB in modern Salafism in several ways: (1) the research proves that the understanding of WB in modern Salafism is not static, and that different Salafis view it in different ways; (2) like other Islamic concepts, the basis of WB from the Quran is taken literally and applied generally in modern Salafism. This can be seen clearly in the manner modern Salafis treat the terms “enemies” in the Quran and generalize the verse that says: “Do not take the Jews and Christians as protectors” to include all Jews, Christians and non-Muslims in general. This reflects and re-affirms the modern Salafis characteristic of literalism and generalization which they are known for when dealing with Quranic texts and Prophetic tradition. Arguably, from the perspective of tafsir methodology, the generalized view towards non-Muslims is arguably flawed because of its over-reliance on generalities (‘am) found in the Quran, over-reliance on the hadiths and the failure to observe the rule of takhsis (specification) as required and observed by Muslim exegetes; (3) the research discovers that modern Salafis’ concept of WB could be applied at four different dimensions i.e. aqidah, social, political and Jihadi. The various dimensions this concept encompasses highlight the uniqueness of the concept in modern Salafism. The research also shows how important this various dimensions of WB are to the different modern Salafi factions.

Second, until now no systematic research has been conducted on the modern Salafi concept of WB, and this study aims to fill the lacunae. This study is seen as an important preliminary effort to understand in-depth and analyse the dynamics of modern Salafism. Through this study, we are able to appreciate not only the various interpretations of the concept, but also the different ideological trends modern Salafis have. It also helps us to appreciate that, issues such as social interaction, politics and governance plays a part in the formulation of religious rulings and opinions by modern Salafis. In a similar way, this research showed that it is possible to analyse modern Salafism by studying other doctrines present in it such as jihad, hijrah and takfir. In a broader sense, it shows that the dynamics of any modern Islamist movement group cannot be understood by ignoring its religious doctrines.

Third, since a decade ago, one of the greatest challenges the current world is facing is the way to deal with and manage the security threat posed by violent and militant Islamist movements such as Al-Qaeda and the like-minded groups. Much research has exposed that one of the main strategies of these movements is the active propagation of their ideology or religious doctrines. The use of modern technologies such as the
Internet, for example has allowed the spread of radical ideologies subscribed by these Islamists beyond geographical borders. It is concluded, through research and my interviews with several Jihadi Salafis that WB constitutes an important foundation in the ideology of Jihadi Salafism, which is subscribed by most contemporary militant Islamists. In recent years, many governments and security agencies have realized and acknowledged that challenging and countering the religious doctrines of these militant Islamists is imperative in the struggle against terrorism and in managing the threat posed by these individuals. This has led them to develop several counter-ideological efforts including programs to ideologically rehabilitate the detained militant Islamists. Such a program is popularly known today as “de-radicalisation” and is apparent in countries such as Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Egypt, Algeria, Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia.

As stated earlier, challenging the religious doctrines of Jihadi Salafism especially the concept of WB is important to deal with the threat posed by militant Islamists. This is due to the fact that Jihadi Salafis use WB to identify who are their friends and foes and develop hatred and enmity on their adversaries. Importantly, the concept becomes the basis for the legitimacy to kill the non-Muslims and Muslims alike. As such, this research aims and hopes to make a major contribution in the area of countering the religious ideology of contemporary militant Islamists. It hopes to enhance the understanding of how Jihadi Salafis use and treat the concept of WB, and subsequently formulate an appropriate response to the concept.

As stated earlier, modern Salafism is not homogeneous and that modern Salafis are divided based on their distinct ideological trends and inclinations. This reality about modern Salafism and the analysis on its concept of WB could assist the governments and security agencies in their counter-terrorism work, especially in identifying would are the “Salafis” that actually pose a security threat and should be dealt with. This notion is important as we have seen that the term “Salafism” is widely misunderstood.


and worst equated with terrorism. The assumption and claim that Salafism equals to terrorism and that it could lead to acts of terrorism is simply a sweeping statement, incorrect and highlights over generalization. Roel Meijer in his recent book *Global Salafism* has pointed this fact by saying that much of the research and literature on modern Salafism has been through the prism of “security studies” or books that play on the popular view that equates Salafism with violence. The present research has, in a way proven that, not all modern Salafis are violent-oriented and that only Jihadi Salafis sanction the use of violence against their adversaries, and in many ways in the name of WB. Thus, this research is hoped to benefit those involved in counter-terrorism efforts in several ways: (1) it improves the understanding of modern Salafism especially the fact that modern Salafis are divided into several factions and groups. The research on WB has also proved that religion and ideology play an important role in the radicalization of Muslim individuals. This proves that the claim Muslims are radicalized due to social, political and economic factors and not religion is inaccurate; (2) related to point 1, it also helps to understand what are the ideological trends and inclinations these different Salafi groups and individuals have. Such an understanding will assist to formulate a more effective counter-terrorism and counter-ideological strategy; (3) it provides the knowledge and information that WB is one of the most important doctrines in the ideology of Jihadi-Salafis, and this suggest that more study and emphasis should be focused on the concept; and that an appropriate response to the concept is needed; and (4) the understanding of points 1,2 and 3 will inevitably assist in the security agencies to focus and determine who are the “Salafis” and individuals that should be arrested, focused and dealt with.

This research on WB in modern Salafism is also important in the sense that it highlights that, understanding the position and application of WB in Islam is critical because it has profound implications in today’s reality. Undeniably, the matter of WB is important in Muslim and non-Muslim relationships. This is so as it determines: (1) the way Muslims see non-Muslims or develop a perception about them; (2) the manner Muslims interact with non-Muslims, (3) Muslims’ ability to live harmoniously with non-Muslims; and (4) the way Muslims communicate with non-Muslims. Unquestionably, all this has an effect on the interaction between Muslims and non-Muslims and the image of Muslims from the perspective of the non-Muslims. The question for Islam itself – is it true that

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Islam is a religion that loves peace and harmony and is characterised by mercy and love? For example, if a Muslim believes that the basis of relations with non-Muslims is war and not peaceful co-existence, then he will inevitably develop feelings of hatred and enmity towards them.

Related to the concept WB is the notion of hijrah. As the research has shown, originally WB merely took on the meaning of rejection and isolation from all non-Muslim practices and culture. This has, among others, brought about solutions such as the concept of hijrah, which is to move away from the reaches of influence of what might render disbelief. Yet, the changing times and situations has transformed its nature to one that demands active or visible displays of animosity and hatred to non-believers in order to render a Muslim’s faith intact. More recently, this animosity has reached a new level of intensity with justifications for initiating violent attacks on non-Muslims inside and outside the battlefield zone- an understanding that totally transforms the concept of jihad in Islam.

It is mainly due to these consequences mentioned above that understanding WB in its proper perspective and context is believed to be an urgent priority in the lives of Muslims today. The concept as portrayed in modern Salafism poses great challenges to the realities of modern living. This is so especially in the context where Muslims are living as minority communities in non-Muslim countries. Practising the modern Salafis version of WB could be seen as a barrier that could hinder integration between different ethnic and religious groups, develop intolerance amongst them and could lead Muslims to leave in isolation and inconvenience. At the very worst, the concept could be the foundational basis for the very extreme Salafis to incite hatred and legitimize violence against the disbeliefing majority.

The opinion of modern Salafis who, on the basis of the verses on WB prohibit the Muslims from developing friendly relations with peoples of other religions is arguable. If we study these verses in their proper context, we shall see that all these verses pertain to those people, whether Jews, Christians or the Polytheists of Arabia, who had come into direct or hidden confrontation with Islam and the Muslims. The Quran, in effect, has directed the Muslims that in these circumstances (of confrontation and war), they must not give away their secrets (bitanah) to these people and must not make them friends, preferring them over the Muslims (min duni al-mu’minin). Obviously, the
directive given in these circumstances cannot be generalized. The position modern Salafis place on the concept of WB is also highly questionable. As a concept in Islam, is WB an *usul* (fundamental, linked to *aqidah* and non-variant) or *furu*’ (branch and subject to change depending on context or situation)? This is an important fundamental question as it helps to provide solutions to the dilemmas faced by Muslims today especially in the situation described above; and in maintaining their Islamic identity. The impact of the modern Salafi concept of WB is serious as it leads to the claim that non-Salafi Muslims who abandon the practice of WB as understood by modern Salafis have apostasized and are no longer Muslims. This is an example of the many consequences of applying modern Salafis’ concept of WB.

Due to these effects and consequences of applying modern Salafis version of WB, the so-called mainstream Muslims or non-Salafi Muslims have made attempts to challenge the modern Salafis and prove that their understanding of WB is incorrect and not appropriate especially in the context of modern living. Below are some examples of the responses given to the Salafis concept of WB:

1. In response to a query on whether it is permissible for Muslims to take part in the elections held in non-Muslims countries, the European Council for Fatwa and Research states that “Considering the issue of *Al-Wala’*, it is evident that there is nothing wrong Islamically in having some sort of such co-operation between Muslims and non-Muslim as regards worldly affairs. Besides, the Prophetic biography is abound with fine examples of how the Prophet, peace and blessings be upon him, dealt amicably with non-Muslims, both in the Meccan and Medinan societies. He shared in many pacts and alliances aiming at eliminating injustice and aggression, in addition, he shared in relieving the impact of adversities and famines.”

2. On the issue of Muslims befriending non-Muslims, Dr Muzammil Siddiqi, President of the Fiqh Council of America said that “The Quran does not say that non-Muslims cannot be Muslims’ friends, nor does it forbid Muslims to be friendly to non-Muslims. There are many non-Muslims who are good friends of Muslim individuals and the Muslim community. There are also many good

Muslims who truly and sincerely observe their faith and are very friendly to many non-Muslims at the same time.”

3. Addressing the community in one of his speeches after the July 2005 bombings in London, the famous Islamic scholar from the US, Hamzah Yusuf said that “Muslims’ understanding of Al-wala wal-barâ’ need to be changed. He said that “in some places, people are taught that al-wala’ (allegiance to anything other than Islam) nullifies faith, making a person a kafir or a disbeliever. This is true in terms of creed but it is not true in politics and social issues”. Hamzah Yusuf further criticizes the Salafis’ stance on WB and their use of Quranic verses to show the validity of WB by saying “the Quran says, “Don’t take the kafir as protectors.” There are many verses that say this that but there is one verse that says, “unless you have a reason to do so.” For instance, in non-Muslim lands, you are obliged to follow the law. If you don’t like the law then you need to move. The most common response is to say there is no place to make hijrah. Allah says the world is vast. If people don’t want to live here they should go and live in certain Muslim lands and see how long they last before this country starts looking more like “dar al-Islam”.

4. Dr Ali bin Abdul al-Shabl in his article entitled “Khutuurah al-Jahl bi Tatbiq Aqidah Al-Wala’ wal Bara’ (Mere Ignorance in Applying the Belief of Al-Wala’ wal bara’) says: “The depiction that this belief (al-Wala’ wal Bara’) means enmity towards the non-Muslim is completely against the true Islamic teachings. Hatred towards disbelief and non-believers is not the practice of the true Muslim. A non-Muslim can be accepted as having submitted to Islam by proclaiming the shahadah. One of the misunderstandings with regards to the application of this concept which I noticed, is the failure to distinguish between hating a non-Muslim and issues of good communication in matters of


590 Hamzah Yusuf Hanson is an Islamic scholar and is co-founder of Zaytuna College in Berkeley, California, United States. He is an American convert to Islam, and is one of the signatories of A Common Word Between Us and You, an open letter by Islamic scholars to Christian leaders, calling for peace and understanding.


592 Ibid.
businesses, discussions, keeping promises and so on. These are also among the teachings and obligations of Islam.”

5. Dr Saud Al-Sarhan in his article entitled “Al-Wala’ wal Bara’: A New Ideology for Islamist Movements”, criticizes modern Salafis’ understanding of WB. He states that “Extremists organisations perceive Al-Wala wal Bara’ as a pillar of the Islamic creed and it is the message of all the messengers and prophets of God. However, this is a false accusation. The pillar of tawhid is indeed the profession of shahadah that there is no God but Allah and Muhammad is His Messenger, not as al-Wala’ wal Bara’ as they proclaim. The origin of da’wah of all messengers and prophets of God is submission to the Oneness of God and not to Al-Wala’ wal Bara’. God says, “And indeed we have sent to every community a prophet bringing the message to worship Allah and refrain from evil.”

6. Dr Saeed Ismail in his book Muslims and Non-Muslims Relationship (Chapter Two; Al-Wala’ wal Bara’) explains that according to the Quran and the Sunnah, contrary to the common understanding, al-wala’ does not automatically include love, support, intercession, protection or guidance. It means to take someone as a guardian; it could be mutual or one sided. It could be accompanied with any grade of love or no specific feeling. On the other hand, al-barra’, does not automatically include hatred for a person. It could be any grade of dislike of a behavior and sometimes of the person who does it but not always. In fact, sometimes al-barra’ can be accompanied with sympathy and pity for the person who has an abhorred conduct. The essence of its meaning is to cut off the relationship with something or someone. It is also important to note that al-barra’ does not prohibit fair dealings that meet a real need of a Muslim or of a Muslim community.”

These statements, articles and fatwas clearly show that there are alternative interpretations to the modern Salafis’ concept of WB. Importantly, it shows that WB exists in Islam and that a “nuanced” or “sophisticated” understanding of the concept is critical. “Mainstream” and non-Salafi Muslims do not deny the principle that wala’ in Islam is only for God, the Prophet and fellow Muslims. This is a Quranic principle that has to be followed by all Muslims. It is essential to note that in classical Islamic literature, the idea of wala’ denotes the beauty of close servanthood to God, without giving emphasis to the idea of hatred to others. However, the Quranic injunction that Muslims should give their loyalty to God, Islam and Muslims does not mean that non-Muslims should be disavowed and subjugated. Similarly, bara’ as traditionally understood is to disavow shirk and anything that constitutes shirk, as it is the only act that will not be forgiven by God. One who reads the Quran carefully would find that this is the mostly-accepted meaning of bara’ in the Quran. On the example of Abraham and his people in (Quran 60:4), the verse should be seen as part of the entire passage of Chapter Sixty of the Quran. The Quran prohibits Muslims from making friends with those engaged in active hostility towards Muslims, not to hate every non-Muslim on earth. Abraham and his people had enmity and hatred because these non-Muslims were actively hostile towards them.

The Modern Salafi version of WB has also dominated the Islamic world and exerts an overwhelming presence in cyberspace.596 Books written by modern Salafis on WB are more and widely available than those written on the same subject by non-Salafi Muslim thinkers. Moreover, what is worrying is the wide and increasing influence of these books on the wider Muslim community, and especially the militant-minded Muslims and Islamists. For example, Al-Qahtani’s book on WB was said to have been used at the religious school in Indonesia founded by the influential leader of Jemaah Islamiyah in Indonesia, Abu Bakar Baashir.597 Members of Jemaah Islamiyah have been executed for their part in the Bali Bombings in 2002 which killed 202 people. The book, however, has not been banned in many countries and is readily available for sale on the web. In certain countries, the books are sold on the sidewalks. Religious leaders in Singapore

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596 Prior to the Internet, the voices of authority in Islam are communicated via traditional learning modes, books, public lectures and talks. To a large extent, this prevented non-mainstream Islamic thought from filtering down to the masses. The accessibility and largely uncensored nature of the internet, however, had the effect of filtering it and leading to the blurring of authoritative lines in Islam.

worry that the availability of the book in their country may signal the book as an authoritative religious source. The Jewish Community Council in Victoria, Australia is considering legal action to block the sale of the book in a local bookstore as it considers the book as one that incites hatred for disbelievers. “Of chief concern, said the council, was Al Wala’ wa’l Bara’ (Love and Hate for Allah's Sake), by Muhammad Saeed al-Qahtani. It describes all non-Muslims as "the allies of Satan" who should be "trampled underfoot".

Invariably, there is still a lot of work to be done in the area of intellectual reform. It is our belief that there is a need to expand the literature pool and research on the subject of WB in order to balance out the largely one-sided understanding of the concept. This is due to several reasons: (1) a “sophisticated” understanding of the concept will guide direction of integration and is crucial to assist Muslims to confidently lead good lives wherever they may be. In this globalised world, many Muslims feel that their key beliefs are challenged and their identity is threatened. As a result, Muslims are searching for signposts and guidelines to practice Islam in a world seemingly at odds with Islamic principles; (2) as a divine code of conduct, the consequences of applying modern Salafis version of WB are serious – arguably it promotes a life that is insular and hostile towards non-Muslims; (3) the need to reach a legitimate meaning and position of the principles of WB as it applies to contemporary Islam in light of the primary Islamic resources; and finally (4) it could be argued that the claims made by modern Salafis lack legitimate and substantial support in Islamic primary sources, historical records and essence of Islam.

Finally, by exposing the realities and complexities of WB in modern Salafism as the study has shown, it could be concluded that practising WB as prescribed in modern Salafism is controversial and problematic. Hence, the time has come for the Muslim scholars and thinkers, not only to challenge the modern Salafi version of WB, but more importantly to develop an understanding of WB based on Islamic principles and sources that would suit Muslims in all situations and would also assist them in facing the many challenges ahead.

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APPENDIX A

Books and Fatwas on Al-Wala’ wal Bara’ by Modern Salafi Thinkers

1- Al-Wala’ wal Bara’ min Mafahim Aqidah Al-Salaf by Muhammad Bin Saeed bin Salim Al-Qahtani.

2- Al-Wala’ wal Bara’ fi al-Islam by Salih Bin Fawzan Al-Fawzan.

3- Al-Wala’ wal Bara’ by Abdul Rahman Abdul Khaliq.

4- Al-Wala’ wal ‘ada’ fi ‘Alaqat al-Muslim bi Ghayr al-Muslim by Abdullah Al-Tarifi.

5- Al-Wala’ wal Bara’: Aqidah Manqulah wa Waqi’ Mafqud by Ayman Al-Zawahiri.

6- Al-Wala’ wal Bara’ in Surah Al-Muntahinah by Wasim Fathullah.

7- Al-Wala’ wal Bara’ Baina Ahl Al-Sunnah wa Mukhalifihim by Ibrahim Bin Uthman Bin Muhammad Al-Faris.

8- Haqiqah Al-Wala’ wal Bara’ fil Islam by Sayyid Saeed Abdul Ghani.


10- Al-Muwaalah wa Al-Mu’aadah by Abu Muhammad Al-Mas’ari.

11- Al-Wala’ wal Bara’ Baina Al-Ghuluw wal Jafa’ Fi Dhau’i al-Kitab wa Al-Sunnah by Hatim Nasir Al-Sharif.

12- Aqidah Al-Wala’ wal Bara’ by Mahir Al-Fahal.

13- Al-Wala’ wal Bara’ wa Wujub Nasr Al-Taliban wa Hukm Man Zahara Al-Amrikan ‘Alaitha by Hamud Bin Uqla Al-Shuaibi.

14- Bara’ah Ahlu Al-Iman min Al-Nasara Ubbad Al-Sulban by Hamd Al-Hamdi.

15- Mulakkhas Li Masa-il Muhimmah min Kitab Al-Wala’ wal Bara’ li Al-Syaikh Muhammad Bin Saeed Al-Qahtani by Sulaiman Al-Kharashi.


Books not listed in alphabetical order. This list of books on WB by modern Salafi thinkers is not exhaustive. These books are just examples of the books on WB which I have managed to identify. The number of books written by modern Salafis on WB or matters related to it is believed to be more than this list.
18- Al-Hubb fi Allah wa Al-Bughud fi Allah by Abdul Aziz Aal Abdul Latiff.

19- Al-Saif al-Battar `ala man Yuwaali al-Kuffar by Abdullah Al-Ahdal.

20- Wujub `Adawah Al-Yahud Wa Al-Mushrikin wa Ghayruhum min Al-Kuffar by Abdul Aziz bin Baz.

21- Naqad Fatwa Al-Ubayyan fi Hukm Muwalah Al-Mushrikin by Abu Muhammad Al-Najdi.

22- Al-Ibtal li Nazariyyah Al-Khalat Baina Al-Islam wa Ghayruhu min Al-Adyan by Abu Bakar Zaid.


24- Authaq ‘Ura Al-Iman Al-Hubb fi Allah wa Al-Bughud fi Allah by Juhayman bin Saif Al-Utaibi.


27- Al-Dawahi Al-Madhiyyah li Al-Firaq Al-Mahmiyyah (fi Al-Wala’ wal Bara’) by Idris Ja’far Al-Kattani.

28- Al-Wala’ wal Bara’ fil Islam by Salih Al-Suhaimi.

29- Tuhaft Al-Ikhwan bi Ma Ja-a fi Al-Muwalah wa Al-Mu’adah wa Al-Hubb wal Al-Bughud wa Al-Hajran by Hamoud Al-Tuwajiri.

30- Nasihah Al-Ulama’ fi Wujubi Al-Bara’a Min Ahli Al-Ahwa’ by Samir Bin Khalil Al-Maliki.

31- Hukm Muzaharah Al-Amrikan ‘ala Al-Muslimin by Abu Umar Al-Sayf.


33- Hazihi ‘Aqidatuna by Hamad Bin Rais Al-Rais.

34- Waqafat ma’a Al-Waqafat by Nasir Bin Hamad Al-Fahad.

35- Al-Ikhwan Fillahi: Huquq wa Wajibat by Abu Sa’ad Al-Athari.

36- Al- ‘Urwah Al-Wuthqa by Samir Bin Khalil Al-Maliki.


40- Mas-alah Intifa’ Qasdi Muwalah Al-Kuffar by Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi.

41- Naqd Fatwa Al-Ubaykan fi Hukm Muzaharah Al-Mushrikin by Abdullah Bin Ibrahim Al-Sa’udi.

42- Al-Saif Al-Battar ‘ala Man Yuwali Al-Kuffar by Abdullah Bin Abdul Bari Al-Ahdal.


46- Mukhtasar Iqtida’ Al-Sirat Al-Mustaqim by Walid Bin Idris Al-Munisi.
APPENDIX B

List of Salafis Websites on *Al-Wala’ wal Bara’* (English and Arabic)\(^{601}\)

http://www.saaid.net/arabic/ar45.htm/

http://ar.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%A1_%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A1

http://www.islamweb.net/media/index.php?id=14580&lang=A&page=article

http://www.binbاز.org.sa/mat/1764

http://islamqa.info/ar/cat/234

http://ar.islamway.com/collection/4017

http://ar.islamway.com/article/7596

http://ar.islamway.com/fatwa/8340

http://www.bdr130.net/vb/t379946.html

www.islamhouse.com/dl//ar_Loyalty_and_Enmity_in_Islam.pdf

http://www.alminbar.net/malafilmy/walaa/malaf1.htm

http://archive.org/details/walaa_baraa

http://www.tawhed.ws/c/?i=31

http://www.dorar.net/art/434


http://ar.islamway.com/collection/1896

http://www.islamhouse.com/p/262127

http://www.saaid.net/Doat/mehran/67.htm

http://www.dialogueonline.org/alwalaa-wabaraa.htm

http://quranicverse99.tripod.com/islamicways/id15.html

http://www.islamworld.net/docs/wala.html

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\(^{601}\) These websites (including the links to the audio and video lectures listed below) are some examples of the many Salafi websites on WB and are not exhaustive. Some of these websites may not be accessible anymore. One need only to type “*Al-Wala’ wal Bara’*” in Google to get more than 150,000 hits on the subject and more than 22,000 YouTube videos on the topic of WB or issues related to the subject.


List of Salafis Audio and Video Lectures on *Al-Wala’ wal Bara’* (English and Arabic)

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=svy_tBZcPFU

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vHfWKytz4tY

http://www.4shared.com/mp3/EcpEaaDV/_____-__.html

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=APgpFgHWs0c

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rD4RBawAWGg

http://www.4shared.com/music/X5jyphrZ/_____.html

http://www.4shared.com/mp3/kBxaQS95/21-__.html

http://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=UU79H8g2u_5xbq3oD7yfpIuA

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JA5dsghBfBU

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2qw_AZbON4

http://www.4shared.com/zip/LKcIRjqu/_____.html

http://www.4shared.com/folder/BCZNJKni/__online.html

http://www.4shared.com/office/RDqnn0Z9/__online.html

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OG-k8GXxpm8

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a6_BPgGb8oQ

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lnleDaV2H78

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vCovMmhYWEY
APPENDIX C

Short Biographies of Key Salafi Thinkers Whose Work on WB are Consulted for this Research.

Abdullah Al-Faisal (b. 1963). Al-Faisal is a Jamaican Muslim convert who preached in the United Kingdom until he was convicted of stirring up racial hatred and urging his followers to murder Jews, Hindus, Christians, and Americans. He studied Islam at Imam Muhammad Ibn Saud University in Riyadh for seven years. Al-Faisal was sentenced to nine years in prison, of which he served four years before being deported to Jamaica in 2007.

Abdullah Al-Farsi (b. unknown). Al-Farsi, a Saudi scholar who holds a P.h.D. in Mechanical Engineering from Cleveland State University, USA is active in the field of Islamic missionary since 1980, mostly in America and Europe. He has taught many books on aqidah in Kuwait. He is also a member of the Standing Committee for Scholarly Research and Issuing Fatwas in Saudi Arabia (al-Lajnah al-Da-imah lil Buhuth al-Ilmiyyah wa al-Ifta’).

Abdul Aziz Ibn Abdullah Ibn Baz (d. 1999). Born in Riyadh in 1910, Ibn Baz was Mufti of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia from 1993 until his death in 1999. He had also assumed a number of posts and responsibilities including President of the Permanent Committee for Research and Fatawa and Head of the Council of Senior Scholars of Saudi Arabia.

Abdul Rahman Abdul Khaliq (b. 1939). Originally from Egypt, Abdul Rahman is active in the field of the Salafi da’wah in Kuwait. He studied at the Islamic University of Medina in Saudi Arabia before he moved to Kuwait in 1965. He is the founder of Jam‘iyyat Ihya’ At-Turath Al-Islami (Society for the Revival of Islamic Heritage).

Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi (b. 1959). Born Isam Mohammad Tahir al-Barqawi, Al-Maqdisi is a Jordanian-Palestinian Salafi writer. He is best known as the teacher and mentor of Abu Mus‘ab Al-Zarqawi, the former leader of Al-Qaeda in Iraq who was reportedly killed in 2006. Al-Maqdisi is believed to be the most influential Salafi alive whose writings have greatly influenced the minds of many Jihadi Salafis.

Abu Waleed (b. 1980). Abu Waleed who was born in London is an Islamic activist and a Salafi preacher who was greatly influenced by the teachings and lectures of radical Salafis including Abdullah Al-Faisal, Abu Hamza Al-Masri and Omar Al-Bakri. Abu Waleed was known for his radical preachings and anti-Western sentiments. His lectures which mostly revolve around issue of WB are widely available on the internet.
Ayman Mohamed Rabi’ Al-Zawahiri (b. 1951). Al-Zawahiri is the former leader of Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), the group allegedly responsible for the assassination of former Egyptian President Anwar As-Sadat in 1981. He is believed to have replaced Osama Bin Laden, the leader and founder of Al-Qaeda who was reportedly killed in 2011.

Hammad Ibn Ali Ibn Atiq (d. 1883). Ibn Atiq was born in Al-Zulafi in present-day Saudi Arabia and was from the *ulema* of Najd. He was a well-known *faqih* (expert in *fiqh*) and author of many works in theology and *fiqh* including *Ibtal al-Tandid Sharh Kitab al-Tawhid* and *Sābil al-Najat Wal-Fikak*. He was appointed by Imam Abdul Rahman Ibn Hasan Al-Al-Shaikh as a *qadhi* (judge) of several cities such as Al-Kharaj and Al-Aflaj.

Hamoud Bin Uqla Al-Shuaibi (d. 2001). Al-Shuaibi was a Saudi scholar who is believed to be the mentor of many Jihadi Salafis including Nasir Al-Fahad. He has been seen as a radical element and believed to have supported the mission of Al-Qaeda. Al-Shuaibi is also vocal in his condemnation of the Saudi government particularly its diplomatic ties with the United States.

Juhayman Al-Utaibi (d. 1980). Juhayman was a religious activist and militant who led the storming of the Grand Mosque in Mecca, Saudi Arabia in 1979. He and many of his followers were beheaded by the Saudi government following the assault. Juhayman’s writings are believed to have significantly influenced Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi.

Muhammad Al-Mas’ari (b. unknown). Al-Mas’ari is an exiled Saudi physicist and political dissident who gained asylum in the United Kingdom in 1994. He runs the Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights and is an adviser to the Islamic Human Rights Commission.

Muhammad Ibn Abd Al-Wahhab (d. 1792). Born in Dir‘iyyah, Ibn Abd Al-Wahhab was a theologian and known as the founder of Wahhabism. He signed a pact with Muhammad Ibn Saud, founder of the first Saudi State. The descendants of Ibn Abd Al-Wahhab, the Al Al-Shaiikh, have historically led the *ulema* in the Saudi state, dominating the kingdom's clerical institutions.

Muhammad Ibn Al-Uthaymin (d. 2001). Born in Saudi Arabia, Ibn Uthaymin was one of the most prominent and influential Islamic scholar in Saudi Arabia during his time. He studied under well-known scholars of his time including Ibn Baz and Muhammad Al-Shanqiti. Ibn Uthaymin was known for his knowledge on *fiqh* and has authored more than fifty books on the subject.
Muhammad Nasir al-Din Al-Albani (d. 1999). Al-Albani was an influential Salafi scholar in the twentieth century who specializes in hadith and fiqh. Born in the city of Shkoder in Albania. Al-Albani studied Islam in Damascus. He taught many students books on aqidah, usul and fiqh. He also taught hadith at the Islamic University of Medina for three years and was also a member of the University Board.

Muhammad Saeed Al-Qahtani (b. 1956). Born in Seira Obeida (city of the Qahtan tribe), Saudi Arabia, Al-Qahtani graduated with Masters of Shariha from Ummul Qura University in Mecca in 1980 and obtained his doctorate from the same university in 1984. He was a Shariah lawyer and has served several mosques in Mecca as imam and khatib (deliverer of sermons) for seven years. He has delivered lectures in many states in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Holland and Britain.

Muhammad Salih Al-Munajjid (b. 1960). Al-Munajjid, born in Riyadh is an Islamic lecturer who graduated from King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals (KFUPM) in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. He runs a website where he provides fatwas and discusses religious issues. The website was launched in 1997 and presented in a question and answer format. It has been translated into 11 languages.

Nasir Al-Fahad (b. 1968). Al-Fahad who was born in Riyadh had a distinguished academic career graduating from the Imam University, the University of Shariah in Riyadh. In 1991, he earned his doctorate and was appointed dean at the Faculty of Principles of the Religion (Usul al-Din) in the Department of Creed and Modern Ideologies. In 1994, he was arrested and imprisoned for his radical and subversive teachings and and was released in 1997.

Salih Bin Fawzan Al-Fawzan (b. 1933). Al-Fawzan is prolific writer and well-known Islamic scholar in Saudi Arabia. He graduated from the Faculty of Shariah of the Imam Muhammad Ibn Saud Islamic University in Riyadh. He holds several important positions including member of Saudi Arabia’s Permanent Committee for Islamic Research and Fatwa, member of the Council of Religious Edicts and Research and member of the Senior Board of Scholars.

Sulayman Ibn Abdullah (d. 1818). Sulayman was the grandson of Ibn Abd Al-Wahhab. At the young age of thirty-two, Sulayman was executed by the Ottomans who invaded Arabian Peninsula in 1818. Apparently alarmed by the serious defections from the Wahhabi cause to the invading Ottomans whom he regarded as “unbelievers”, Sulayman wrote his influential epistle Al-Dalail fi Hukm Ahl Al-Ishrak.

Salman Al-Awdah (b. 1955). Born in Al-Basr, Saudi Arabia, Al-Awdah is a Muslim activist and scholar who studied under famous scholars including Ibn Baz and Ibn Uthaymin. In 1994, Al-Awdah was imprisoned for allegedly conducting anti-government activities. In particular, Al-Awdah was critical of Saudi’s decision to allow the US military to defend the kingdom during the Gulf War of 1990.
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Mr Mohamed Bin Ali (born 25 April 1973, Singapore) is an Associate Research Fellow at the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. His area of research includes Islamist ideology, counter-religious extremism and rehabilitation of Muslim extremists. Well-versed in Arabic language and Islamic knowledge, Mr Mohamed obtained his Bachelor of Arts in Islamic Jurisprudence from Al-Azhar University in Cairo, Egypt in 2001 and Masters of Science in International Relations at RSIS, NTU in 2007. Prior to that, he studied Islam and Arabic from Aljunied Islamic School in Singapore from 1990-1995. Since 2003, Mr Mohamed has been involved in the rehabilitation program of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) detainees in Singapore. He is a secretariat member and counsellor of the Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG), a group of voluntary Muslim clerics who provide religious counselling to JI detainees. He has made numerous presentations locally and internationally; conducted courses and published widely on issues of religious extremism and terrorist rehabilitation. Mr Mohamed has also conducted field trips in many countries including Iraq, Pakistan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Bangladesh, Indonesia and the Philippines. Mr Mohamed is also involved in community-related works. He was a former President of the Singaporean Students Welfare Assembly in Cairo, former member of the Shariah Court Appeal Board of the Islamic Religious Council of Singapore, former member of Khadijah Mosque Management Board, former member of Council for Asian Terrorism Research and counselor at the Singapore Prison Department. He has also delivered lectures and sermons in many mosques in Singapore.