Now showing items 1-20 of 28

  • All-pay auctions with variable rewards 

    Kaplan, Todd R.; Luski, Israel; Sela, Aner; Wettstein, David (Blackwell, 2002-12)
    We study all–pay auctions with variable rewards under incomplete information. In standard models, a reward depends on a bidder’s privately known type; however, in our model it is also a function of his bid. We show that ...
  • Asymmetric first-price auctions with uniform distributions: Analytic solutions to the general case 

    Kaplan, Todd R.; Zamir, Shmuel (Springer, 2012)
    While auction research, including asymmetric auctions, has grown significantly in recent years, there is still little analytical solutions of first-price auctions outside the symmetric case. Even in the uniform case, ...
  • Asymmetric first-price auctions with uniform distributions: analytic solutions to the general case 

    Kaplan, Todd R.; Zamir, Shmuel (SSRN, 2007-12)
    While auction research, including asymmetric auctions, has grown significantly in recent years, there is still little analytical solutions of first-price auctions outside the symmetric case. Even in the uniform case, ...
  • Auctions with private entry costs 

    Kaplan, Todd R.; Sela, Aner (Centre for Economic Policy Research, 2003-10)
    We study auctions where bidders have private information about their entry costs and the seller does not benefit from these entry costs. We consider a symmetric environment where all bidders have the same value for the ...
  • The benefits of costly voting 

    Chakravarty, Surajeet; Kaplan, Todd R.; Myles, Gareth D. (University of Exeter Business School, 2010-02)
    We present a costly voting model in which each voter has a private valuation for their preferred outcome of a vote. When there is a zero cost to voting, all voters vote and hence all values are counted equally regardless ...
  • Caps on Political Lobbying: Comment. 

    Kaplan, Todd R.; Wettstein, David (American Economic Association, 2006)
    The article focuses on spending caps, and compares those used in politics with many examples in sports economics. In 1999, the party of Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak was fined $3.2 million for exceeding Israel's campaign ...
  • Delegated job design 

    Hvide, Hans K.; Kaplan, Todd R. (SSRN, 2003)
    We develop a theory of delegation within organizations where agents are privately informed about whether they should be engaged in exploitation or in exploration activities. Excessive delegation lead agents to inefficiently ...
  • Dividing the indivisible: procedures for allocating cabinet ministries to political parties in a parliamentary system 

    Brams, Steven J.; Kaplan, Todd R. (Sage, 2004)
    Political parties in Northern Ireland recently used a divisor method of apportionment to choose, in sequence, ten cabinet ministries. If the parties have complete information about each other’s preferences, we show that ...
  • Does AHP help us make a choice? - An experimental evaluation 

    Balkenborg, Dieter; Ishizaka, Alessio; Kaplan, Todd R. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011)
    In this paper, we use experimental economics methods to test how well Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) fares as a choice support system in a real decision problem. AHP provides a ranking that we statistically compare with ...
  • Egocentric framing - one way people may fail in aswitch dilemma: evidence from excessive lane switching 

    Navon, David; Kaplan, Todd R.; Kasten, Ronen (Elsevier, 2013-11)
    To study switching behavior, an experiment mimicking the state of a driver on the road was conducted. In each trial participants were given a chance to switch lanes. Despite the fact that lane switching had no sound rational ...
  • An experiment on the causes of bank run contagions 

    Chakravarty, Surajeet; Fonseca, Miguel A.; Kaplan, Todd R. (Elsevier, 2014)
    To understand the mechanisms behind bank run contagions, we conduct bank run experiments in a modified Diamond–Dybvig setup with two banks (Left and Right). The banks׳ liquidity levels are either linked or independent. ...
  • Government policy towards multi-national corporations 

    Kaplan, Todd R.; Luski, Israel; Wettstein, David (Vanderbilt University, 2003-05-20)
    We analyze an environment with asymmetric information where a country tries to attract a multi-national corporation. The country can use both taxes and grants to meet its objective of maximizing net revenues. We show that ...
  • Here's something you never asked for, didn't know existed, and can't easily obtain: a search model of gift giving 

    Kaplan, Todd R.; Ruffle, Bradley J. (Elsevier, 2009)
    Gift giving is thought to decrease welfare. Recipients are sometimes stuck with gifts they would not have purchased because the giver does not perfectly know the recipient’s preferences and in-kind gifts cannot be costlessly ...
  • Influence of aggregation and measurement scale on ranking a compromise alternative in AHP 

    Balkenborg, Dieter; Ishizaka, Alessio; Kaplan, Todd R. (Palgrave MacMillan, 2011-04)
    Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) is one of the most popular multi-attribute decision aid methods. However, within AHP, there are several competing preference measurement scales and aggregation techniques. In this paper, ...
  • Innovative Activity with Sunk Cost 

    Kaplan, Todd R.; Luski, Israel; Wettstein, David (Elsevier, 2003-10)
    We analyze innovative activity in a general framework with time-dependent rewards and sunk costs. When firms are identical, innovation is delayed by an increase in the number of firms or a decrease in the size of the reward. ...
  • Learning unethical practices from a co-worker: the peer effect of Jose Canseco 

    Gould, Eric; Kaplan, Todd R. (MPRA, 2010-08)
    This paper examines the issue of whether workers learn productive skills from their co-workers, even if those skills are unethical. Specifically, we estimate whether Jose Canseco, a star baseball player in the late 1980’s ...
  • A note on revenue effects of asymmetry in private-value auctions 

    Kaplan, Todd R.; Zamir, Shmuel (SSRN, 2002-02)
    We formulate a way to study whether the asymmetry of buyers (in the sense of having different prior probability distributions of valuations) is helpful to the seller in private-value auctions (asked first by Cantillon ...
  • Optimal allocation without transfer payments 

    Chakravarty, Surajeet; Kaplan, Todd R. (Elsevier, 2013-01)
    Often an organization or government must allocate goods without collecting payment in return. This may pose a difficult problem either when agents receiving those goods have private information in regards to their values ...
  • Optimal allocation without transfer payments 

    Chakravarty, Surajeet; Kaplan, Todd R. (University of Exeter Business School, 2010-02)
    Often an organization or government must allocate goods without collecting payment in return. This may pose a difficult problem either when agents receiving those goods have private information in regards to their values ...
  • Optimal rewards in contests 

    Cohen, Chen; Kaplan, Todd R.; Sela, Aner (Centre for Economic Policy Research, 2004-10)
    We study all-pay contests under incomplete information where the reward is a function of the contestant's type and effort. We analyze the optimal reward for the designer when the reward is either multiplicatively separable ...