Open Research Exeter (ORE) will be unavailable from 8am - 9am Tuesday 1st September 2015 for essential maintenance. Apologies in advance for the inconvenience. Exeter IT

Now showing items 1-4 of 4

  • All-pay auctions with variable rewards 

    Kaplan, Todd R.; Luski, Israel; Sela, Aner; Wettstein, David (Blackwell, 2002-12)
    We study all–pay auctions with variable rewards under incomplete information. In standard models, a reward depends on a bidder’s privately known type; however, in our model it is also a function of his bid. We show that ...
  • Auctions with private entry costs 

    Kaplan, Todd R.; Sela, Aner (Centre for Economic Policy Research, 2003-10)
    We study auctions where bidders have private information about their entry costs and the seller does not benefit from these entry costs. We consider a symmetric environment where all bidders have the same value for the ...
  • Optimal rewards in contests 

    Cohen, Chen; Kaplan, Todd R.; Sela, Aner (Centre for Economic Policy Research, 2004-10)
    We study all-pay contests under incomplete information where the reward is a function of the contestant's type and effort. We analyze the optimal reward for the designer when the reward is either multiplicatively separable ...
  • Second-price auctions with private entry costs 

    Kaplan, Todd R.; Sela, Aner (SSRN, 2006-09)
    We study asymmetric second-price auctions under incomplete information. The bidders have potentially different, commonly-known, valuations for the object and private information about their entry costs. The seller, however, ...