Resolving contractual disputes: arbitration vs mediation

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Resolving contractual disputes: arbitration vs mediation

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dc.contributor.author Chakravarty, Surajeet en_GB
dc.contributor.author Makris, Miltiadis en_GB
dc.date.accessioned 2010-11-04T15:15:15Z en_GB
dc.date.accessioned 2011-01-25T10:25:29Z en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2013-03-19T15:53:03Z
dc.date.issued 2005-03-31 en_GB
dc.description.abstract In this paper we analyze contracts written on potentially non-verifiable states. We first show that the contract always enters a dispute phase. We analyze two possible legal rules which can be used to resolve the disputes. Under both rules the paper derives the optimal contract. An interesting feature of the optimal contract is that for low verifiability likelihood the agent is always rewarded unless there is failure. The other result is that under both legal rules used first-best effort and more than first-besteffort level can be implemented, depending on how small the likelihood of verifiability is. en_GB
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10036/114750 en_GB
dc.language.iso en en_GB
dc.publisher University of Bristol en_GB
dc.relation.ispartofseries CMPO Working Paper Series en_GB
dc.relation.ispartofseries No. 05/117 en_GB
dc.subject contracts en_GB
dc.subject dispute resolution en_GB
dc.title Resolving contractual disputes: arbitration vs mediation en_GB
dc.type Working Paper en_GB
dc.date.available 2010-11-04T15:15:15Z en_GB
dc.date.available 2011-01-25T10:25:29Z en_US
dc.date.available 2013-03-19T15:53:03Z
dc.description Working paper published by Centre for Market and Public Organisation, University of Bristol Department of Economics en_GB


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