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dc.contributor.authorKaplan, Todd R.en_GB
dc.contributor.authorSela, Aneren_GB
dc.contributor.departmentUniversity of Exeter; Ben-Gurion University of the Negeven_GB
dc.date.accessioned2008-05-12T12:34:20Zen_GB
dc.date.accessioned2011-01-25T10:25:58Zen_GB
dc.date.accessioned2013-03-19T15:57:01Z
dc.date.issued2003-10en_GB
dc.description.abstractWe study auctions where bidders have private information about their entry costs and the seller does not benefit from these entry costs. We consider a symmetric environment where all bidders have the same value for the object being sold, and also an asymmetric environment where bidders may have different valuations for the object. In these environments, the seller's pay-off as well as the social surplus may either increase or decrease in the number of bidders though not necessarily in the same direction. The auction designs that maximize the social surplus or the seller's pay-off are analysed.en_GB
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10036/25532en_GB
dc.language.isoenen_GB
dc.publisherCentre for Economic Policy Researchen_GB
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCEPR Discussion Paperen_GB
dc.relation.ispartofseriesNo. 4080en_GB
dc.relation.urlhttp://www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP4080.aspen_GB
dc.subjectSymmetric auctionsen_GB
dc.subjectAsymmetric auctionsen_GB
dc.subjectEntry costsen_GB
dc.titleAuctions with private entry costsen_GB
dc.typeWorking Paperen_GB
dc.date.available2008-05-12T12:34:20Zen_GB
dc.date.available2011-01-25T10:25:58Zen_GB
dc.date.available2013-03-19T15:57:01Z


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