The incentive structure of impure public good provision: the case of international fisheries

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The incentive structure of impure public good provision: the case of international fisheries

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dc.contributor.author Finus, Michael en_US
dc.contributor.author Schneider, Raoul en_US
dc.contributor.author Pintassilgo, Pedro en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2011-04-20T10:23:55Z en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2013-03-19T15:49:12Z
dc.date.issued 2011 en_US
dc.description.abstract We argue that international fisheries are a prime example to study the impact of multiple characteristics on the incentive structure of impure public good provision. The degree of technical excludability is related to the pattern of fish migration, the degree of socially constructed excludability is captured by the design of international law and the degree of rivalry is reflected by the growth rate of the resource. We construct a bioeconomic model, including the high seas and exclusive economic zones in order to study the incentives to form stable fully or partially cooperative agreements. We show that the spatial allocation of property rights is crucial for the success of cooperation as long as technical excludability is sufficiently high. Moreover, we show how economic and ecological factors influence the success of cooperation. en_GB
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10036/3068 en_US
dc.language.iso en en_GB
dc.publisher University of Exeter Business School en_GB
dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics Department Discussion papers series 11/03 en_GB
dc.relation.url http://ideas.repec.org/s/exe/wpaper.html en_GB
dc.relation.url http://business-school.exeter.ac.uk/research/areas/topics/economics/outputs/publication/?id=684 en_GB
dc.subject regional fisheries management en_GB
dc.title The incentive structure of impure public good provision: the case of international fisheries en_GB
dc.type Working Paper en_GB
dc.date.available 2011-04-20T10:23:55Z en_US
dc.date.available 2013-03-19T15:49:12Z
dc.identifier.issn 1473-3307 en_US
dc.description Discussion paper en_GB


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