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dc.contributor.authorBalkenborg, Dieteren_GB
dc.contributor.authorSchlag, Karl H.en_GB
dc.date.accessioned2013-02-05T16:43:44Zen_GB
dc.date.accessioned2013-03-19T15:49:26Z
dc.date.issued2007-03en_GB
dc.description.abstractIt is well known for the common multi-population evolutionary dynamics applied to normal form games that a pure strategy combination is asymptotically stable if and only if it is a strict equilibrium point. We extend this result to sets and show the following. For certain regular selection dynamics every connected and closed asymptotically stable set of rest points containing a pure strategy combination is a strict equilibrium set and hence a Nash equilibrium component. A converse statement holds for two person games, for convex strict equilibrium sets and for the standard replicator dynamic.en_GB
dc.identifier.citationVol. 133, Issue 1, pp. 295 - 315en_GB
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jet.2005.08.008en_GB
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10036/4276en_GB
dc.language.isoenen_GB
dc.publisherElsevieren_GB
dc.relation.urlhttp://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/00220531en_GB
dc.subjectevolutionary dynamicsen_GB
dc.subjectreplicator dynamicen_GB
dc.subjectstrict equilibrium seten_GB
dc.subjectNash equilibrium componenten_GB
dc.titleOn the evolutionary selection of sets of Nash equilibriaen_GB
dc.typeArticleen_GB
dc.date.available2013-02-05T16:43:44Zen_GB
dc.date.available2013-03-19T15:49:26Z
dc.identifier.issn0022-0531en_GB
dc.descriptionAuthor's pre-print draft dated February 24, 2003. Final version published by Elsevier; available online at http://www.sciencedirect.com/en_GB
dc.identifier.journalJournal of Economic Theoryen_GB


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