Now showing items 21-29 of 29

  • Optimal rewards in contests 

    Cohen, Chen; Kaplan, Todd R.; Sela, Aner (Centre for Economic Policy Research, 2004-10)
    We study all-pay contests under incomplete information where the reward is a function of the contestant's type and effort. We analyze the optimal reward for the designer when the reward is either multiplicatively separable ...
  • Second-price auctions with private entry costs 

    Kaplan, Todd R.; Sela, Aner (SSRN, 2006-09)
    We study asymmetric second-price auctions under incomplete information. The bidders have potentially different, commonly-known, valuations for the object and private information about their entry costs. The seller, however, ...
  • The Self-Serving Biases and Beliefs about Rationality 

    Kaplan, Todd R.; Ruffle, Bradley J. (Western Economic Association., 2004-04)
    Most previous experiments attempting to establish the existence of the self-serving bias have confounded it with strategic behavior. We design an experiment that controls for strategic behavior (Haman effects) and isolates ...
  • The strategic use of seller information in private-value auctions 

    Kaplan, Todd R.; Zamir, Shmuel (SSRN, 2000-07)
    In the framework of a first-price private-value auction, we study the seller as a player in a game with the buyers in which he has private information about their realized valuations. We find that depending upon his ...
  • Teaching bank runs with classroom experiments 

    Kaplan, Todd R.; Miller, Timothy J.; Balkenborg, Dieter (Routledge, 2011-07)
    Once relegated to cinema or history lectures, bank runs have become a modern phenomenon that captures the interest of students. In this article, the authors explain a simple classroom experiment based on the Diamond-Dybvig ...
  • Using economic classroom experiments 

    Balkenborg, Dieter; Kaplan, Todd R. (2010-11)
    Economic classroom experiments are an excellent way to increase student interest, but getting started may be difficult.We attempt to aid the newcomer by recommending which experiments to use and describing the current ...
  • Vote or shout 

    Chakravarty, Surajeet; Kaplan, Todd R. (Walter de Gruyter, 2010-09)
    We examine an environment with n voters each with a private value over two alternatives. We compare the social surplus of two mechanisms for deciding: majority voting and shouting, that is, the voter who shouts the loudest ...
  • Which way to cooperate 

    Kaplan, Todd R.; Ruffle, Bradley J. (Wiley, 2007-06)
    Cooperation in real-world dilemmas takes many forms. We introduce a class of two-player games that permits two distinct ways to cooperate in the repeated game. One way to cooperate is to play cutoff strategies, which rely ...
  • Why banks should keep secrets 

    Kaplan, Todd R. (Springer, 2006-02)
    We show that it is sometimes efficient for a bank to commit to a policy that keeps information about its risky assets private. Our model, based upon Diamond-Dybvig (1983), has the feature that banks acquire information ...