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dc.contributor.authorCobo-Reyes, R
dc.contributor.authorKatz, G
dc.contributor.authorMarkussen, T
dc.contributor.authorMeraglia, S
dc.date.accessioned2021-08-31T08:10:54Z
dc.date.issued2021-10-27
dc.description.abstractWe experimentally analyze the effect of endogenous group formation on the type of sanctioning institutions emerging in a society. We allocate subjects to one of two groups. Subjects play a repeated public goods game and vote on the sanctioning system (formal or informal) to be implemented in their group. We compare this environment to one in which subjects are allowed to (i) vote on the sanctioning system and (ii) move between groups. We find that the possibility of moving between groups leads to a larger proportion of subjects voting for formal sanctions. This result is mainly driven by subjects in groups with relatively high initial levels of contribution to the public good, who are more likely to vote for informal sanctions when groups are closed than when they are open.en_GB
dc.identifier.citationPublished online 27 October 2021en_GB
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s00355-021-01363-6
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10871/126930
dc.language.isoenen_GB
dc.publisherSpringeren_GB
dc.rights.embargoreasonUnder embargo until 27 October 2022 in compliance with publisher policyen_GB
dc.rights© The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature 2021
dc.subjectSanctionsen_GB
dc.subjectCooperationen_GB
dc.subjectGroup Formationen_GB
dc.subjectVotingen_GB
dc.subjectExperimenten_GB
dc.titleVoting on sanctioning institutions in open and closed communities: experimental evidenceen_GB
dc.typeArticleen_GB
dc.date.available2021-08-31T08:10:54Z
dc.identifier.issn0176-1714
dc.descriptionThis is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Springer via the DOI in this recorden_GB
dc.identifier.journalSocial Choice and Welfareen_GB
dc.rights.urihttp://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserveden_GB
dcterms.dateAccepted2021-08-28
rioxxterms.versionAMen_GB
rioxxterms.licenseref.startdate2021-08-29
rioxxterms.typeJournal Article/Reviewen_GB
refterms.dateFCD2021-08-29T13:35:46Z
refterms.versionFCDAM
refterms.panelCen_GB


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