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dc.contributor.authorMaloney, John
dc.contributor.authorPickering, Andrew
dc.date.accessioned2014-12-15T10:05:02Z
dc.date.issued2014
dc.description.abstractSophisticated voters assess incumbent competence by filtering out economic cycles (which they do not like) from trend growth (which they do). Naive voters on the other hand respond only to raw economic growth. This implies that voting in the aggregate should respond asymmetrically to the economic cycle. Upswings are rewarded by the naive, but punished by the sophisticated. Downswings are punished by all voters. Using an established dataset of over 400 general elections we find that the incumbent vote share (a) responds differently to trend growth than to the cycle, (b) does not respond significantly to positive variation in the economic cycle, and (c) responds significantly and negatively to negative realizations in the economic cycle. In contrast to standard formulations of the ‘grievance asymmetry’ this asymmetric vote response is found to be independent of trend growth.en_GB
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s11127-014-0205-z
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10871/16037
dc.language.isoenen_GB
dc.publisherSpringeren_GB
dc.relation.urlhttp://link.springer.com/journal/11127en_GB
dc.rights.embargoreasonPublisher's embargo requirementen_GB
dc.subjecteconomic votingen_GB
dc.subjectcompetenceen_GB
dc.subjectpolitical knowledgeen_GB
dc.subjectasymmetric votingen_GB
dc.titleVoting and the economic cycleen_GB
dc.typeArticleen_GB
dc.identifier.issn0048-5829
pubs.declined2014-12-15T09:55:21.190+0000
pubs.deleted2014-12-15T09:55:21.190+0000
dc.descriptionThe final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-014-0205-zen_GB
dc.identifier.eissn1573-7101
dc.identifier.journalPublic Choiceen_GB


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