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dc.contributor.authorZissimos, Ben
dc.date.accessioned2015-05-11T09:08:39Z
dc.date.issued2015-04-12
dc.description.abstractThis paper shows how a world price shock can increase the likelihood that democratization must be used to resolve the threat of revolution. Initially, a ruling elite may be able to use trade policy to maintain political stability. But a world price shock can push the country into a situation where the elite face a commitment problem that only democratization can resolve. Because the world price shock may also reduce average incomes, the model provides a way to understand why the level of national income per capita and democracy may not be positively correlated. The model is also useful for understanding dictatorial regimes' rebuttal of World Bank calls to keep their export markets open in the face of the 2007–08 world food crisis.en_GB
dc.identifier.citationVol. 29 (suppl 1): S145-S154en_GB
dc.identifier.doi10.1093/wber/lhv019
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10871/17177
dc.language.isoenen_GB
dc.publisherOxford University Pressen_GB
dc.rights.embargoreasonPublisher embargo of 18 monthsen_GB
dc.subjectdemocracyen_GB
dc.subjectinstitutionsen_GB
dc.subjectprice shocksen_GB
dc.subjectsocial conflicten_GB
dc.subjecttrade policyen_GB
dc.titleWorld price shocks, income, and democratizationen_GB
dc.typeArticleen_GB
dc.identifier.issn0258-6770
dc.descriptionThis is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from OUP via the DOI in this recorden_GB
dc.descriptionThis version also published as CESifo Working Paper No. 5228en_GB
dc.identifier.eissn1564-698X
dc.identifier.journalWorld Bank Economic Reviewen_GB


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