Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorChircop, Justin
dc.contributor.authorKiosse, Paraskevi Vicky
dc.date.accessioned2015-11-12T10:32:49Z
dc.date.issued2015-10-12
dc.description.abstractWe examine the characteristics of firms that lobbied on the 2010 Exposure Draft (ED) on pensions and find that signalling influences the decision to lobby. Further, we examine preparer’s position to two important proposals in the ED. We find that preparers are less likely to agree with the abolition of the corridor when they report unrecognized actuarial losses and that firms are more likely to oppose the replacement of the expected rate of return with the discount rate when the spread between these two rates is large. These results suggest that while signalling drives firm decisions to lobby, self-interest influences how firms lobby.en_GB
dc.identifier.citationVolume 39, Issue 4, December 2015, Pages 268–280en_GB
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.accfor.2015.09.002
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10871/18624
dc.language.isoenen_GB
dc.publisherElsevieren_GB
dc.relation.urlhttp://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0155998215300090en_GB
dc.rights.embargoreasonPublisher's policyen_GB
dc.rightsCopyright © 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/en_GB
dc.subjectStandard settingen_GB
dc.subjectDefined benefit pension plansen_GB
dc.subjectCorporate lobbyingen_GB
dc.subjectIAS 19(R)en_GB
dc.subjectIASBen_GB
dc.titleWhy did preparers lobby to the IASB’s pension accounting proposals?en_GB
dc.typeArticleen_GB
dc.contributor.editorLehman, G
dc.identifier.issn0155-9982
dc.descriptionAccepteden_GB
dc.descriptionArticleen_GB
dc.identifier.journalAccounting Forumen_GB


Files in this item

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record