The Heterogeneity of Implicit Bias
Oxford University Press
This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from OUP via the link in this record.
Reason for embargo
The term 'implicit bias' has very swiftly been incorporated into philosophical discourse. Our aim in this paper is to scrutinise the phenomena that fall under the rubric of implicit bias. The term is often used in a rather broad sense, to capture a range of implicit social cognitions, and this is useful for some purposes. However, we here articulate some of the important differences between phenomena identified as instances of implicit bias. We caution against ignoring these differences: it is likely they have considerable significance, not least for the sorts of normative recommendations being made concerning how to mitigate the bad effects of implicit bias.
In: Brownstein, M., and Saul, J., Implicit Bias and Philosophy, 2016, Vol. 1, reproduced by permission of Oxford University Press.
Place of publication