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dc.contributor.authorMcKay, AM
dc.date.accessioned2018-03-01T09:27:47Z
dc.date.issued2018-04-24
dc.description.abstractDo legislators and lobbyists trade favors? This study uses uncommon data sources, computerized matching techniques, and plagiarism software to detect a rarely observed relationship between interest group lobbyists and sitting Members of Congress. Comparison of letters to a Senate committee written by lobby groups to legislative amendments introduced by committee members reveals similar and even identical language, providing compelling evidence that groups persuaded legislators to introduce amendments valued by the group. I use these matches as the dependent variable, which I predict as a function of novel data about fundraising events. Conditional logit models suggest that senators are more likely to offer in committee an amendment requested by a lobby group if the group hosts a fundraising event for the senator. The results hold while controlling for the group’s campaign contributions to the senator, ideological agreement between the senator and the group, and the group’s lobbying expenditures, annual revenue, and home-state connections.en_GB
dc.identifier.citationPublished online 24 April 2018en_GB
dc.identifier.doi10.1177/1065912918771745
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10871/31758
dc.language.isoenen_GB
dc.publisherSAGE Publicationsen_GB
dc.rightsOpen access. This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 License (http://www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/) which permits non-commercial use, reproduction and distribution of the work without further permission provided the original work is attributed as specified on the SAGE and Open Access pages (https://us.sagepub.com/en-us/nam/open-access-at-sage).
dc.subjectinterest groupsen_GB
dc.subjectlobbyingen_GB
dc.subjectcampaign contributionsen_GB
dc.subjectfundraisingen_GB
dc.subjectAffordable Care Acten_GB
dc.subjectU.S. Congressen_GB
dc.titleFundraising for favors? Linking lobbyist-hosted fundraisers to legislative benefitsen_GB
dc.typeArticleen_GB
dc.identifier.issn1065-9129
dc.descriptionThis is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from SAGE Publications via the DOI in this recorden_GB
dc.identifier.journalPolitical Research Quarterlyen_GB
dc.rights.urihttp://www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/


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Open access. This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 License (http://www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/) which permits non-commercial use, reproduction and distribution of the work without further permission provided the original work is attributed as specified on the SAGE and Open Access pages (https://us.sagepub.com/en-us/nam/open-access-at-sage).
Except where otherwise noted, this item's licence is described as Open access. This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 License (http://www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/) which permits non-commercial use, reproduction and distribution of the work without further permission provided the original work is attributed as specified on the SAGE and Open Access pages (https://us.sagepub.com/en-us/nam/open-access-at-sage).