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dc.contributor.authorWilkinson, S
dc.date.accessioned2018-10-17T12:42:52Z
dc.date.issued2013-10-01
dc.description.abstractI examine the view, put forward by Gregory Currie and collaborators, that delusions are not beliefs because delusional subjects break constitutive norms of believing. This hinges on two different types of commitment: one about how delusional patients are (how they behave, reason etc.) and one about the constitutive norms of belief. I focus on the latter, and suggest that some of the norms that Currie cites as constitutive (namely “upstream” ones) should not be considered such. Only downstream norms should be taken to be constitutive. But some delusional patients appear to break these too, so an anti-doxastic position is still tenable, but of a different form.en_GB
dc.identifier.citationVol. 32 (3), pp. 105-119en_GB
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10871/34319
dc.language.isoenen_GB
dc.publisherUniversidad de Oviedoen_GB
dc.relation.urlhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/43047014
dc.relation.urlwww.unioviedo.es/Teorema
dc.rights© 2013 The Author
dc.subjectDelusion
dc.subjectTruth
dc.subjectChess
dc.subjectBelief
dc.subjectEmpirical evidence
dc.subjectDesire
dc.subjectNot guilty
dc.subjectRegulative ideas
dc.subjectStreams
dc.subjectPathology
dc.titleBeyond Believing Badlyen_GB
dc.typeArticleen_GB
dc.identifier.issn0210-1602
dc.descriptionThis is the final version. Available via JSTOR via the link in this recorden_GB
dc.identifier.journalTeorema: Revista Internacional de Filosofíaen_GB


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