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dc.contributor.authorFonseca, MA
dc.date.accessioned2019-09-09T10:29:51Z
dc.date.issued2019-07-17
dc.description.abstractThis paper presents experimental evidence on the action commitment game with cost-asymmetric firms in a differentiated-products Bertrand duopoly. Unlike its quantity-setting counterpart, the risk-dominant leader–follower equilibrium Pareto dominates the simultaneous-move equilibrium. This equilibrium also minimizes payoff differences between firms. Hence, one would expect the model to accurately capture behavior. The evidence partially supports the theory: low-cost firms price in the first period more often than high-cost firms, and depending on the treatment, between 40 and 57 per cent of all observations conform to equilibrium play. However, the modal timing outcome involved both firms delaying their pricing decision. This timing outcome is characterized by Nash play and some collusion. The high frequency of delaying decisions could be due to a desire to reduce strategic uncertainty.en_GB
dc.identifier.citationVol. 7 (1), pp. 59-74en_GB
dc.identifier.doi10.1177/2321022219832736
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10871/38595
dc.language.isoenen_GB
dc.publisherSAGE Publicationsen_GB
dc.rights© The Author(s) 2019en_GB
dc.subjectCommitmenten_GB
dc.subjectEndogenous timingen_GB
dc.subjectBertranden_GB
dc.subjectprice differentiationen_GB
dc.subjectexperimenten_GB
dc.titleEndogenous Price Leadership with Asymmetric Costs: Experimental Evidenceen_GB
dc.typeArticleen_GB
dc.date.available2019-09-09T10:29:51Z
dc.identifier.issn2321-0222
dc.descriptionThis is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from SAGE Publications via the DOI in this recorden_GB
dc.identifier.journalStudies in Microeconomicsen_GB
dc.rights.urihttp://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserveden_GB
rioxxterms.versionAMen_GB
rioxxterms.licenseref.startdate2019-07-17
rioxxterms.typeJournal Article/Reviewen_GB
refterms.dateFCD2019-09-09T10:27:03Z
refterms.versionFCDAM
refterms.dateFOA2019-09-09T10:29:56Z
refterms.panelCen_GB


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