

1 Measuring and Modeling Russian Newspaper Coverage 2 of Climate Change[☆]

3 Constantine Boussalis^a, Travis G. Coan^b, Marianna Poberezhskaya^{c,*}

4 ^a*Department of Political Science, Trinity College Dublin, 3 College Green, Dublin 2, Ireland*

5 ^b*Department of Politics and Exeter Q-Step Centre, University of Exeter, Amory Building,
6 Rennes Drive, Exeter, Devon EX4 4RJ, United Kingdom*

7 ^c*Department of Politics and International Relations, Nottingham Trent University, Burton
8 Street, Nottingham, NG1 4BU, United Kingdom*

9 Abstract

As a significant emitter of greenhouse gases and a country rich in fossil fuels, Russia plays a crucial role in achieving a comprehensive solution to climate-related challenges. Yet, Russia's official position on climate change has varied considerably since the beginning of global negotiations, with the country playing everything from policy leader to laggard. While there are a number of factors that shape domestic policy positions on climate change, this study offers a comprehensive investigation of newspaper coverage on climate change in Russia. How have Russian newspapers discussed the issue since the Yeltsin era? We approach this question by compiling the largest data set of Russian newspaper coverage to date, which includes 11,131 climate-related articles from 65 papers over a roughly 35 year period. After introducing a "computer assisted" approach to measure the core themes running through climate change coverage, we statistically evaluate the national- and newspaper-level factors associated with how coverage is framed, focusing attention on 23 high circulation papers over the period from 2000 to 2014. We find that national-level predictors—particularly economic conditions—are highly influential of whether climate change is covered and how the issue is framed, while paper-level factors such as the presence of energy interest and ownership structure also have notable effects. Overall, this study offers a rich data set and an array of methods to better understand the drivers of climate communication in Russia.

10 *Keywords:* climate change, newspaper coverage, Russia, text analysis

11 1. Introduction

12 As the world's fourth largest greenhouse gas (GHG) emitter, Russia remains a
13 vital piece of any comprehensive and effective plan to mitigate the harmful effects
14 of climate change (UNFCCC 2014). Although Russia played an ambiguous
15 but, nevertheless, pivotal role in the Kyoto Protocol's acceptance (Afionis and
16 Chatzopoulos 2010, Andonova 2008), its current commitment to reducing GHG

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**Corresponding author:* marianna.poberezhskaya@ntu.ac.uk. Replication data and code are provided at https://github.com/traviscoan/russian_newspaper_coverage_of_CC.git.

17
18 emissions remains unclear. Recently, Russia announced its withdrawal from the
19 second commitment period to the Kyoto Protocol (Bedritsky 2014), eliminated
20 expenses on energy efficiency from the 2015 federal budget (Davydova 2015),
21 and released a set of “intended nationally determined contributions” (INDCs)
22 that could increase GHG emissions considerably above current levels by 2030
23 (Levin and Damassa 2015). It is thus an open question as to whether Russia
24 will be a leader or laggard in the pursuit to negotiate and implement an effective
25 solution to challenges posed by anthropogenic global warming.

26 Understanding Russia’s position on climate change policy requires careful
27 consideration of the international and domestic factors that promote or impede
28 cooperation. While a diverse array of factors have been suggested in the liter-
29 ature, media coverage is seen to play a crucial role in various aspects of the
30 climate debate. First, considering the agenda-setting function of mass media
31 (McCombs and Shaw 1972) and its influence in shaping public opinion in Russia
32 (White and Oates 2003), news coverage offers a useful means to discern domestic
33 support for climate change action. Discerning public opinion is crucial, as only
34 roughly 3 in 10 Russians believe that climate change is a serious problem and
35 overall concern has decreased by roughly 10% since 2010 (Stokes et al. 2015).
36 Second, mass media also play an important role in translating state views of
37 climate change to national and international audiences, particularly in nations
38 with limited press freedom (Bell 1994, Boyce and Lewis 2009, Boykoff 2012,
39 Butler and Pidgeon 2009, Davidsen and Graham 2014, Dirikx and Gelders 2009,
40 Doulton and Brown 2009, Grundmann and Scott 2012, Lockwood 2009, Lyy-
41 timäki 2011). Having a long history of close relations with the state, Russian
42 media coverage often serves as a window into official government positions on
43 climate policy and thus inform interested parties on how to understand Russia’s
44 position at future climate change negotiations (Poberezhskaya 2015).

45 Against this backdrop, we examine the evolution of Russian media discourse
46 on global warming in the post-Soviet era. Although a number of studies ex-
47 amine climate change-related communication in Russia (Poberezhskaya 2014;
48 Tynkynen 2010; Wilson Rowe 2009; Yagodin 2010), past work is limited both
49 in terms of time period under study and the number of media outlets examined.
50 We contribute to the literature by 1) compiling the largest corpus of Russian
51 newspaper coverage on the issue of climate change, collecting 11,131 relevant
52 articles from 65 newspapers over the time period from May, 1980 to May, 2014;
53 2) introduce a computer *assisted* approach to content analysis appropriate for
54 a large corpus of documents; and 3) offer a multi-level statistical framework for
55 assessing the drivers of media coverage in Russia. To our knowledge, this study
56 offers the first large-scale analysis of Russian print media coverage of climate
57 change that statistically evaluates how both paper and national level charac-
58 teristics shape climate discourse. Overall, the evidence suggests that economic
59 conditions are more likely than political factors to explain climate coverage,
60 while paper-specific characteristics—such as energy interests, ownership struc-
61 ture, and ideology—also play a role. Our study thus questions arguments on

62 the predominant influence of political personalities over climate discourse in the
63 country and suggests a range of alternative explanations for the media approach
64 to the problem.

65 **2. Media Coverage of Climate Change in Russia: Theory and Hy-** 66 **potheses**

67 The importance of mass media in communicating climate change risks has
68 been stressed by a variety of scholars (Bell 1994; Boyce and Lewis 2009; Boykoff
69 2012; Butler and Pidgeon 2009; Carvalho and Burgess 2005; Davidsen and Gra-
70 ham 2014; Dirikx and Gelders 2009; Doulton and Brown 2009; Grundmann and
71 Scott 2012; Lockwood 2009; Lyytimäki 2011; Olausson 2009). Often the first
72 point of contact between public and climate science, the media is tasked with the
73 crucial role of interpreting the somewhat abstract and difficult to comprehend
74 scientific discourse (Beck 1992; Boykoff and Boykoff 2007; Carvalho 2007; Nelkin
75 1987; Rapley and De Meyer 2014). Olausson and Berglez (2014 p. 251) suggest
76 that scholarly investigations of media coverage of climate change issues should
77 expand inquiries of the power dynamics within national media discourses: “it
78 is vital to examine who becomes the ‘primary definer’ of the climate issues.” In
79 other words, it is crucial to identify the role of mass media in “setting the agenda”
80 (Newell 2006; Boykoff and Boykoff 2004; Carvalho and Burgess 2005) and “fram-
81 ing” the debate around the policy and science of global warming (Boykoff 2007a,
82 Boykoff and Rajan 2007, Carvalho 2007).

83 The media’s ability to define the issue of climate change does not take place
84 in a vacuum—mass media both shapes and is shaped by social, political, and
85 economic forces. Bailey et al. (2014 p. 199) note, in their comparative study of
86 Spanish and American media coverage of climate change, that “media portrayals
87 of climate (un)certainly are steeped in the historically contingent space of ideol-
88 ogy, culture, and politics, where various actors and institutions battle to shape
89 public understanding and engagement.” When studying the Russian case, one
90 observes a historical progression marked by an ambiguous relationship between
91 the media, the state, and key economic actors. Towards the end of the 1980s and
92 in the early 1990s, the media became an influential actor in the regime change
93 process through its increasingly open criticism of the old regime and growing
94 support of emerging political actors (Coyne and Leeson 2009, Mickiewicz 1999,
95 Strovskiy 2011, Voltmer 2000). During the presidency of Boris Yeltsin, the mass
96 media’s political role swung from that of active support for the ruling elite to ex-
97 treme criticism of some of its more questionable political decisions (for example,
98 the war in Chechnya, see Grabel’nikov 2001). Furthermore, Yeltsin’s presidency
99 was marked by the growth in power of the so-called “oligarchs” and their ex-
100 panding control over the media market (Lipman and McFaul 2001; Zassoursky
101 2001). The dawn of the Putin era in Russian politics further signified a move
102 towards the centralisation of the media market and the re-establishment of state
103 authority in the public discourse (Becker 2004; Zassoursky 2004). Moreover,
104 when studying media coverage of climate change, it is important to consider

105 that “oligarchs” and the state have close connections to the Russian fossil fuel
106 industry, with such “gas giants” as Gazprom owning a vast number of national
107 media outlets (Toepfl 2013). As will be discussed below, the interests of such
108 owners are expected to shape newspaper coverage of climate change.

109 *2.1. Presidency and Kremlin loyalty*

110 Richard Sakwa (2010: viii) argues that Russia is “a dual state” where “the
111 legal-normative system based on constitutional order is challenged by shadowy
112 arbitrary arrangements.” For example, it can be argued that power in the coun-
113 try is disproportionately skewed towards the president or towards key political
114 figures (for example, Putin’s personal domination over Russian politics (Hanson
115 2010)). Regarding Russia’s climate policy, it has been suggested that stagna-
116 tion in its development can be explained by Putin’s personal negative attitude
117 towards this environmental problem (Henry and Sundstrom 2012). At the same
118 time, the recent positive change in national climate affairs could be attributed to
119 Medvedev’s striving for a green economy and modernisation (Monaghan 2012).
120 Therefore, we suggest that while pro-Kremlin newspapers are expected to closely
121 follow the state’s agenda on climate change, their coverage will adjust depending
122 on whether Putin or Medvedev is in power. Where Putin’s presidency would
123 have a negative impact on the quantity of articles and qualitatively on their con-
124 tent, the discussion will steer away from the sensitive issues of domestic politics
125 and emphasize the costs of climate action. Under Medvedev’s leadership, we
126 expect to see an increase in coverage with more discussions dedicated to energy
127 efficiency, international cooperation, domestic politics as well as science.

128 *2.2. Newspaper ownership, interests and ideology*

129 As Andonova (2008) argues, we cannot oversimplify Russia’s political pro-
130 cess by narrowing it down to the changes at the executive level. Therefore, we
131 need to consider a range of other societal and newspaper-level variables that
132 may determine newspaper attention to climate change. By examining the UK
133 quality press, (Carvalho 2007 p. 223) discusses how the media representation
134 of climate change, “is strongly entangled with ideological standpoints.” In Rus-
135 sia, the ideological orientation of the newspapers has to be treated with caution
136 as the distinction between left, centre and right are often blurred and need to
137 be treated in consideration with media ownership structures and their govern-
138 mental links. That said, as demonstrated by previous research on the influence
139 of the newspapers’ political leanings on their approach to climate change cov-
140 erage (Carvalho and Burgess 2005, Carvalho 2007, Poberezhskaya 2015), we
141 can suggest that oppositional newspapers (far-right and far-left) owned by non-
142 governmental political parties will be very vocal across various topics as they can
143 use climate change as an opportunity to criticise the state. Similar expectations
144 (but to a lesser degree) could be expected from the newspapers whose majority
145 shareholders are journalists, especially those on the political left. At the same
146 time, the media outlets belonging to the political right and centre should be

147 quite reserved in their climate coverage and likely eschew economically prob-
148 lematic areas (e.g. Russia’s international obligations or fossil fuel industry). We
149 expect that avoidance will also be intensified if a newspaper is owned by business
150 interests or if it state-owned. At the same time, considering the nature of the cli-
151 mate change problem, we hypothesise that newspapers with energy interests will
152 avoid discussing the problem in the context of fossil fuels or renewable energy
153 development, and should also be less likely to discuss climate change overall.
154 It should be noted that, throughout the studied years, the Russian newspapers’
155 market has been dominated by the business led ownership structure with various
156 degrees of their relations with the state (Lehtisaari 2015).

157 *2.3. National economic performance*

158 It has been argued that during economic recessions people tend to privi-
159 lege financial stability over environmental security (e.g. Inglehart 1995, Scruggs
160 and Benegal 2012, Shum 2012). For decades this has been the case for Russia
161 where the environment has been persistently sacrificed to economic develop-
162 ment (Henry 2010). Therefore, we can assume that economic crises (e.g. high
163 inflation) should reduce newspaper attention to climate change, as the national
164 economic well-being would take precedence. However, the state of the economy
165 might also have an impact on what themes are focused on when climate change
166 is indeed discussed. We posit that poor economic performance should be posi-
167 tively associated with discussion of climate change in the context of economic
168 opportunities (e.g. Arctic development, international cooperation and energy
169 efficiency).

170 *2.4. Natural disasters*

171 There is some (but limited) evidence in the literature linking the influence
172 of extreme weather events to media coverage of climate change (Shanahan and
173 Good 2000, Boykoff and Boykoff 2007, Boykoff 2007b, Schäfer et al. 2014). How-
174 ever, impacts of natural hazards on attention to global warming seem to also
175 depend on various social, political, economic, and other country-specific factors.
176 Current understanding suggests heterogeneous effects, with cross-national vari-
177 ation in the intensity of the negative consequences of climate change on public
178 discourse (e.g. Schäfer et al. 2014, Schmidt et al. 2013). However, there is evi-
179 dence which indicates that warm temperature anomalies might impact individual
180 attitudes toward climate change (Li et al. 2011, Zaval et al. 2014). Considering
181 Russia’s growing climate vulnerability, we suggest that climate change related
182 natural hazards should increase media attention to global warming. The 2010
183 Russian heatwave, which resulted in the deaths of over 55,000 people and an es-
184 timated economic loss of \$15 billion (Barriopedro et al. 2011), was a catastrophic
185 event that led to a strengthening of ecological groups in Russia (Yanitsky 2012).
186 We therefore expect that when natural disasters occur, newspaper coverage of
187 climate change should be more likely.

188 **3. Measuring Russian Newspaper Coverage of Climate Change, 2000-**
189 **2014**

190 This study extends previous work on media coverage of climate change in
191 Russia by incorporating an extensive list of Russian newspapers over a consid-
192 erable period of time. To create the corpus, we retrieved newspaper articles
193 which contained the terms “climate change”, “global warming”, or “greenhouse
194 effect” from the Eastview Russian Central Newspapers database (UDB-COM).
195 This resulted in the identification of 11,131 relevant articles from 65 newspa-
196 pers. The temporal coverage of the corpus is large, ranging from 3 May 1980
197 to 7 May 2014. The full list of newspapers and article counts, along with an
198 illustration of temporal variation in coverage for the entire period are presented
199 in [Appendix A.1](#). Most newspapers entered the Eastview database in the late
200 1990s and early 2000s. Estimates of attention to climate change by the Russian
201 press are therefore reliable starting around 2000. It is for this reason that the
202 analysis conducted in Section 4 relies on 6,527 articles from the 23 most circu-
203 lated newspapers over the period Q1/2000-Q2/2014. Specifically, we focus the
204 study on a sample of papers with moderate to high circulation counts, ranging
205 from 85,000 (the social-political weekly magazine *Itogi*) to a maximum observed
206 count of 2,985,000 (the national popular weekly *Argumenty i fakty*). We expect
207 that newspapers with very large circulation figures are influential due to massive
208 exposure and that newspapers with average circulations are likely to have more
209 narrow audiences. However, these somewhat smaller papers (e.g. *Kommersant*)
210 are also likely to be influential since they are more likely to target “elites” and
211 opinion leaders.

212 It is also important to note the potential limitations associated with focusing
213 on newspapers to measure media coverage. As in many other countries around
214 the world, the majority of Russians get their news from television, with over 90%
215 of Russians tuning in each week ([Broadcasting Board of Governors 2014](#), [Deloitte
216 CIS Research Centre 2016](#)). Moreover, consistent with international trends in
217 media consumption, the importance of online news has increased steadily over-
218 time, particularly among younger individuals and those living in urban areas
219 (Ibid). At the same time, print media remains an important source of news in
220 general and political news in particular, with over 50% tuning to newspapers
221 and magazines for their news each week ([Deloitte CIS Research Centre 2016](#)).

222 Figure 1 displays quarterly counts of climate change related articles for the
223 23 most circulated Russian newspapers. Several features of aggregate media
224 coverage based on the corpus are worth noting. Coverage of climate change in
225 the Russian press maintained a steady increase until 2007, when we can observe a
226 significant spike in attention. This finding is somewhat unexpected, as existing
227 literature on Russian media coverage of climate change focuses on the period
228 around 2009; prior years such as 2007 have been relatively ignored. Following a
229 brief drop in coverage after 2007, there is a renewed spike in attention over the
230 2009-2010 period (Copenhagen meeting and 2010 Russian heat wave), which is
231 then followed by a steady decrease in coverage. This attention pattern, more or




Figure 1: *The number of newspaper articles that mention climate change over time.* Displays quarterly counts of climate change related articles for the US “prestige press” (*Washington Post*, *Wall Street Journal*, *New York Times*, *USA Today* and *Los Angeles Times*) [black], the *New York Times* [grey], and the 23 most prominent Russian newspapers based on circulation [orange]. US newspaper data are derived from [Boykoff et al. \(2015\)](#). See [Appendix C.1](#) for a detailed list of the most prominent Russian newspapers.

232 less, maps well with coverage rates from major American newspapers ([Boykoff](#)
 233 [et al. 2015](#)). However, as is clear from the plot, in terms of absolute coverage,
 234 Russian newspapers have devoted strikingly low attention to the issue when
 235 compared to the American press. Notably, the *New York Times* has published
 236 more climate change related articles than all prominent Russian papers
 237 for most of the 2000-2014 period.

238 *3.1. Measuring climate-related themes: computer “assisted” content analysis*

239 While aggregate trends offer some insight into climate-related coverage, the
 240 obvious next question centers on what themes are prevalent in Russian newspa-
 241 pers. Past content analyses of climate change coverage rely almost exclusively
 242 on traditional methods based on human coders ([Antilla 2008](#), [Bailey et al. 2014](#),
 243 [Olausson 2009](#), [Shrestha et al. 2014](#), [Taylor and Nathan 2002](#)). These meth-
 244 ods are, however, extremely costly—in terms of both time and effort—and thus
 245 researchers are often forced to make important trade-offs, either constraining

246 temporal coverage (c.f., [Nissani 1999](#), [Painter and Ashe 2012](#)) or focusing on
247 thoroughly reading a smaller, more manageable set of documents (c.f., [Elsasser](#)
248 [and Dunlap \(2013\)](#), [Dunlap and Jacques \(2013\)](#)).

249 Yet, if traditional content analytic methods do not scale to meet the needs
250 of scholars of climate communication, it is essential to identify approaches that
251 do. More recently, scholars have examined the “promise and pitfalls” of au-
252 tomated classification methods across a range of common tasks in the social
253 sciences ([Grimmer and Stewart 2013](#)), and for classifying news story content in
254 particular ([Ali et al. 2010](#), [Young and Soroka 2012](#)). The promise of computa-
255 tional methods is clear: they offer a reliable means to classify the primary topics
256 or themes for large corpora of text ([Mikhaylov et al. 2012](#)). The drawback of
257 computational methods, however, is that considerable effort must go into ensur-
258 ing model validity ([Quinn et al. 2010](#)). In short, important trade-offs must be
259 considered irrespective of whether an analyst chooses to employ traditional or
260 automated forms of content analysis.

261 We argue that much may be gained by combining aspects of both method-
262 ologies. Consistent with recent literature on the use of text analytic models
263 in the social sciences, our approach views computational methods as *assisting*,
264 not replacing, traditional techniques ([Grimmer and King 2011](#)). [Grimmer and](#)
265 [Stewart \(2013 p. 2\)](#) summarize this position quite well:

266 “the complexity of language implies that automated content analysis
267 methods will never replace careful and close reading of texts. Rather,
268 the methods that we profile here are best thought of as *amplifying*
269 and *augmenting* careful reading and thoughtful analysis.” (emphasis
270 in original)

271 As such, we analyze key themes in climate-related articles using an approach
272 that strikes a balance between traditional methods based on human coding and
273 recent advances in the field of natural language processing. Specifically, we
274 employ the following three-step procedure:

- 275 1. we first “augment” the corpus using an *unsupervised* algorithm to iden-
276 tify meaningful topics (or clusters) in Russian newspapers and utilize the
277 estimated topics to identify a small subset of documents that require a
278 “careful and close reading;”
- 279 2. use the results of step 1 and traditional inductive content analytic methods
280 to code a sample of documents into a set of valid, reliable, and substantively
281 meaningful themes;
- 282 3. combine the results from steps 1 and 2 to develop a computational proce-
283 dure for classifying the primary themes in the corpus, validating the model
284 using common classification performance metrics (i.e., accuracy, precision,
285 and recall).

286 The remainder of this section briefly outlines our approach—a fuller description
287 of all of the methods described in this section is available in the online appendix.

288 *3.1.1. Reducing dimensionality via unsupervised learning*

289 We begin with the observation that while reading 11,131 articles is practically
290 infeasible, carefully assessing 100 key “topics” is much more attainable. As
291 a first step, then, we need a method to reduce our overall corpus to a core
292 set of topics or themes. To achieve this objective, we utilize the well-known
293 latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA) model originally proposed in [Blei et al. \(2003\)](#).
294 Viewing each document as a finite mixture of “topics” (i.e. meaningful clusters
295 of words), the LDA models the random process responsible for “generating” a
296 particular text (see the supplemental appendix for technical details). While the
297 Bayesian methods used to produce “topics” are a bit involved (see the appendix
298 for details), the important point is that the LDA has been shown to preform
299 well in a wide range of areas, from population biology to information retrieval,
300 and thus provides a suitable method our data reduction task ([Blei 2012](#) see).

301 The results from estimating a 100 topic model are available in the appendix
302 (see [Table B.4](#)). Analyzing all 100 topics, however, is unwieldy and many top-
303 ics deal with similar overarching themes. As such, there are substantive and
304 practical benefits from further coding the topics into higher order themes that
305 conform with key aspects of climate change coverage. To do this, we first cate-
306 gorize topics into topic families or “meta-topics” using the topic keywords and,
307 more importantly, the descriptive labels derived from a careful read of the top
308 5 to 10 most probable documents. This procedure yielded a total of 23 sub-
309 stantive meta-topics which cover themes related to science, energy, economics,
310 international and domestic politics, and society. A full list of these meta-topics
311 are displayed in [Table 1](#) along with the labels and identification numbers of each
312 meta-topic’s underlying topics, a measure of how often the meta-topic is sam-
313 pled from the corpus (prevalence), and two classification accuracy scores which
314 are discussed in detail in [Section 3.1.2](#).

315 *3.1.2. Model validation*

316 A critical—if not *the* critical—step in any computer-assisted approach to
317 content classification is model validation. If the specified model is working well,
318 then the predicted primary topic or topics should correspond to the categories
319 assigned by human coders. To construct a manually annotated set of documents
320 to use for purposes of validation, we relied on the standard operating procedure
321 of “inductive” content analysis: we use a small (randomly selected) set of docu-
322 ments, classified the primary topic of each document using the 23 codes outlined
323 in [Table 1](#), discussed disagreements, and modified accordingly. More specifically,
324 we repeated this inductive process until reliability was sufficiently high (Krip-
325 pendorff’s $\alpha \geq 0.80$). After ensuring sufficient reliability, each individual coder
326 classified the primary topic of 225 documents, leaving a total of 450 manually
327 annotated for validation purposes.

328 With a human-coded test set in hand, the next question is what criteria
329 should be used to judge model validity. One approach is to draw on procedures
330 commonly used to assess supervised learning problems, which include measuring
331 some combination of classification accuracy, reliability, and precision. We rely on

Meta-Topic Label	Prevalence	F1 Score		Underlying Topic Label [ID]
		Top	Top 2	
<i>Activism</i>	0.01	0.73	0.76	Activism (Protests) [26], Earth Hour [30]
<i>Agriculture</i>	0.01	0.59	0.74	Food security [42]
<i>Arctic politics</i>	0.01	0.82	0.87	Arctic geopolitics [4]
<i>Climate impacts</i>	0.08	0.54	0.76	Water resources [27], Sea level rise [31], Archeology [35], Housing [36], Wild life [41], Sea life [69], Climate impacts (Mountains and glaciers) [73], Climate consequences (Scientific forecast) [90]
<i>Climate science</i>	0.08	0.53	0.76	Space (Celestial bodies) [19], Carbon emissions [22], Meteorology (Roshydromet) [24], Space science (Sun) [49], Climate science (Ocean and climate) [62], Climate change (General) [84], Science (Atmosphere) [93]
<i>Comparative politics</i>	0.04	0.63	0.68	Politics (Germany) [5], Politics (USA) [20], Politics (UK) [33], Politics (South America) [54], Politics (Elections) [68], IR (China) [95]
<i>Disasters/Extreme weather</i>	0.07	0.72	0.83	Nature disaster (Forest fires) [0], Weather abnormalities [39], Catastrophe (Futuristic predictions) [45], Nature disaster (Hurricanes and floods) [58], Catastrophe (Response/MCHS) [60], Winter abnormalities [66]
<i>Economy/Business</i>	0.08	0.47	0.67	Budgeting climate risk [1], Business [6], Economy general [29], Corporate responsibility [59], Economy (Sustainable development) [86]
<i>Education</i>	0.01	0.36	0.67	Education [23], Education (University competition) [52]
<i>Non-renewable energy</i>	0.02	0.61	0.81	Energy (nuclear) [48], Energy (gas) [99]
<i>Renewable energy</i>	0.01	0.50	0.78	Energy (Sustainable sources) [8]
<i>Energy efficiency</i>	0.02	0.43	0.67	Transport (Mostly aviation) [15], Transport (Cars) [17], Energy (Efficiency, Emission reduction) [82]
<i>Health</i>	0.01	0.86	1.00	Health [47]
<i>Information technology</i>	0.004	0.50	0.80	IT [78]
<i>Int'l climate agreements</i>	0.03	0.84	0.91	Climate research (Russian-Belarusian) [10], Climate politics (COPs) [28], Climate politics (Kyoto Protocol) [61]
<i>International politics</i>	0.05	0.53	0.71	UN (and Russia) [21], IR (ASIA-APEC) [34], Politics (EU) [53], IR (Summits) [64], IR (Bilateral relations) [83]
<i>International security</i>	0.05	0.5	0.71	Russian national security [50], IR (Power politics) [55], Military [65], Russian national security policy [67], IR (Security-conflicts) [94], Russian foreign policy [98]
<i>Polar science</i>	0.01	0.75	0.89	Antarctic [12], Arctic (Science) [89]
<i>Pollution</i>	0.01	0.29	0.46	Env. protection (General pollution) [57], Env. protection (Air pollution) [87]
<i>Russian cities</i>	0.01	0.25	0.33	Moscow [79]
<i>Domestic climate politics</i>	0.04	0.49	0.74	Russian legislation [2], Medvedev's politics (Russian politics) [9], Politics (Russian officials meet) [13], Russian mitigation legislature [40], Russian diplomacy [51], Russian Politics (Ministries/docs) [91]
<i>Science (other)</i>	0.02	0.67	0.73	Russian Science [71], Scientific discoveries (Genetics) [96]
<i>Society and culture</i>	0.10	0.44	0.70	Historical mysteries [3], Justice (crime) [7], Art (Film/music industry) [11], Nobel Prize [88], Sport [97], Art (Music) [25], Philosophy [43], Population growth [46], Fashion [63], USSR [70], Religion [74], Literature [75], Politics and Society [76]

Table 1: *Meta-topics and underlying topics within the newspaper corpus.* This table provides the meta-topics determined using the methodological approach outlined in Section 3.1.1. “Prevalence” offers a rough measure of the importance of a meta-topic to the corpus and is measured using the proportion of words assigned by the LDA to a particular meta-topic over the sample period. The table presents two measures of predictive accuracy using the F1 score (see Section 3.1.2 for a full description). Lastly, we present the topic labels that underlie each meta-topic.

332 this approach here. Table 1 examines classification accuracy using the harmonic
333 mean of precision and recall—i.e., the well-known and often used “F1 score”.
334 First, we compare the primary (or “top”) topic suggested by the model to the

335 primary topic identified by human coders. As demonstrated in Table 1, there
336 is considerable variation in classification accuracy across the 23 categories, with
337 the F1 score ranging from 0.84 (*Health*) to only 0.25 (*Russian Cities*). For
338 the set of issues salient for the literature on Russian coverage of the climate
339 issue, meta-topics such as *International Climate Agreements* (0.84) and *Arctic*
340 *Politics* (0.82) are classified accurately, while other themes such as *Domestic*
341 *Climate Politics* (0.49) do not perform well.

342 Yet judging an LDA model based only on the primary topic alone offers a
343 conservative assessment of model accuracy. Even a cursory glance at articles in
344 the Russian media corpus suggests that a single story will often discuss multiple
345 climate-related themes, and it is not always easy for either human or computer
346 to decide on what topic is “primary.” To offer a less conservative assessment of
347 predictive accuracy, we examine whether the model classifies the human-coded
348 primary topic as either the first or the second most probable topic for each doc-
349 ument in the sample. When doing so, the F1 scores improve considerably for
350 several important climate-related themes (see Table 1). For instance, we ob-
351 serve a sizeable increase in the F1 scores for energy-related themes, with both
352 *Non-renewable* and *Renewable Energy* registering values near 0.80. Similarly, we
353 observe a considerable increase in the F1 scores for the *Climate Science* and *Cli-*
354 *mate Impacts* themes, as well as a dramatic improvement for *Domestic climate*
355 *politics* and *International security*. Overall, while this analysis demonstrates a
356 range of validity across the 23 meta-topics, we find reasonable predictive accu-
357 racy for key climate-related themes.

358 4. Explaining coverage: the correlates of climate change reporting

359 We now turn to examining the correlates of climate change coverage. What
360 societal- and newspaper-level factors explain variation in coverage on key climate-
361 related issues in Russia? To examine this question, we focus on 23 newspapers
362 for which sufficient data was available over the 2000 to 2014. These papers rep-
363 resent a substantial percentage of the overall circulation in Russia and include
364 a representative cross-section of papers based on ownership structure, politi-
365 cal ideology, and ties to the Russian central government (see appendix table
366 A.2). The remainder of this section outlines our variables of interest, statistical
367 methodology, and presents our main empirical findings.

368 4.1. Outcome variables

369 The 23 meta-topics in Table 1 offer a detailed set of themes for measuring
370 the intensity of climate coverage. Yet, to keep the analysis manageable, we fo-
371 cus our attention on three sets of meta-topics that 1) cover salient themes that
372 are important in the Russian climate change literature (Poberezhskaya 2014;
373 Tynkkynen 2010; Wilson Rowe 2009; Yagodin 2010) and 2) exhibit reasonable
374 levels of predictive accuracy ($F1\ top\ 2 > 0.70$). First, we examine the intensity
375 of coverage for two key aspects of climate change by combining *climate science*
376 and *climate impacts* (see Table 1) into *climate science & impacts*. This variable

377 represents a core aspect of climate literacy and provides a useful means to gauge
378 coverage of climate change fundamentals. Second, we combine *international se-*
379 *curity* and *arctic politics* into *geopolitics*, which centers on discussions of climate
380 change in the context of international relations. Further, we seek to explain vari-
381 ation in how Russian newspapers have reported on climate change negotiations
382 by investigating the *international climate agreements* meta-topic. Lastly, we in-
383 vestigate the variation in newspaper attention on energy-related themes within
384 the context of climate change by combining *non-renewable energy*, *renewable*
385 *energy*, and *energy efficiency* into *energy issues*. Time-series plots of these out-
386 come variables over the period Q1/2000-Q2/2014 are illustrated in Figure C.5,
387 which can be found in Appendix C.2 of the supplemental appendix.

388 The obvious next step involves determining an operational definition for the
389 selected themes. As described in Boussalis and Coan (2016), there is no agreed
390 upon “best” strategy for generating measures from underlying topic data and the
391 appropriateness of a particular strategy is contingent on the research question of
392 interest. Given the literature on Russian climate communication, our primary
393 interest is in determining how papers frame the climate issue and whether the
394 framing changes according to national- and newspaper-level factors. In particu-
395 lar, we examine how different papers make trade-offs when discussing different
396 climate-related themes, focusing on the proportion of all words devoted to a
397 particular meta-topic in Table 1 for each paper-quarter. As such, this measure
398 allows us to examine under what context a particular paper discusses the issue
399 of climate change.

400 4.2. National and newspaper-level covariates

401 We also focus on national and newspaper-level covariates considered impor-
402 tant in the communications literature. Classifying Russian newspapers’ own-
403 ership, ideology and their relations with the state has proven to be a difficult
404 task for researchers, and as Koltsova (2006) notes due to the rapid and constant
405 changes in the Russian media market, these variables often remain a mystery
406 even to market actors. In order to eliminate as many coding inaccuracies as
407 possible, we have consulted a range of sources including: web-pages of the stud-
408 ied newspapers, publicly available databases (e.g. media-atlas.ru, mediageo.ru)
409 and relevant literature sources (e.g. Nenashev 2010, Strovskiy 2011, Zassoursky
410 2004). To account for national level variables which may influence newspaper
411 coverage of climate change, we control for consumer prices and the occurrence
412 of extreme temperature, drought and storm events. A list of the variables along
413 with their levels and descriptions are presented in Table 2.

414 4.3. Statistical methods

415 The next challenge is finding a suitable statistical model to examine variation
416 in climate coverage as a function of key covariates. We assume that decisions
417 regarding climate coverage result from a mixture of two random processes: news-
418 papers first decide whether to discuss the issue of climate change at a given point
419 in time and next decide how much coverage to devote to a particular theme.

Variable Label	Levels	Description
Ownership structure	Business	Ownership structure is dominated by the business organisations with interests outside of the media market
	State	Predominately state-owned newspapers
	Journalist collective	Predominately owned by people with main interests in the media market
Energy	Political party	Owned by oppositional political parties
	Yes	Owners have interests in energy sector
Political spectrum	No	No obvious connection with energy sector
	Left	Supports or advocates socialist/communist ideas
	Centre	Supports or advocates ideas of political and economic stability, and traditional values
Kremlin affiliation	Right	Supports or advocates ideas of capitalism and liberalism
	Pro-Kremlin	Non-state owned paper supports government in power
	Independent	No obvious support for the government in power from non-state owned paper
Inflation	$Mean = 11.78$ $SD = 5.04$	Average quarterly consumer prices (all items), percentage change on the same period of the previous year (OECD 2016).
Disasters	$Mean = 0.67$ $SD = 1.00$	Quarterly counts of extreme temperature, drought and storm events (Guha-Sapir et al. 2015).

Table 2: *National and newspaper-level variables and descriptions.* Note: The identification of the Russian political spectrum is a complex task, as notions of the political “right”, “centre” and “left” have been altered and even swapped over time (see more in Simonsen 2001). In this article we have adopted the most common interpretation of the concepts. Summary statistics and descriptions are also presented for *Inflation* and *Disasters*.

420 More specifically, we model climate coverage using a mixture of a Bernoulli
421 distribution for the decision to cover the issue *at all* and a beta distribution
422 to represent coverage *intensity* (see the appendix for technical details). While a
423 Bernoulli-beta mixture model offers a flexible approach to examining the skewed
424 and zero-inflated proportions that are typical in our data, the standard setup
425 ignores the clustering produced by examining a cross-section of newspapers over
426 time. We thus extend the standard model to include random effects for both
427 the newspaper ($n = 23$ papers) and time ($t = 58$ quarters). All of the models
428 presented below are estimated using a fully Bayesian approach (see the appendix
429 for additional details).

430 4.4. Results

431 We begin with the first step in the data generating process by examining the
432 factors that influence whether or not a paper covers climate change at all in a
433 particular quarter. Figure 2 provides estimates from a logistic regression for the
434 decision to cover the climate issue, where the outcome is equal to 1 if a paper
435 mentions climate change in a given quarter and zero otherwise. The figure plots
436 the estimated coefficients (log odds) for each variable of interest based on the
437 median posterior value, while also providing 90% credible intervals. To ease the
438 interpretation, we set the baseline category to the group expected, *a priori*, to
439 have the most overall coverage of climate change based on the past scholarship:




Figure 2: *Explaining variation of any mention of climate change.* Dots represent parameter estimates based on the posterior median; lines provide the 90% highest density intervals. The baseline represents the newspaper profile expected to cover climate change most frequently: left leaning, journalist-owned newspapers, with no direct energy interest, and not affiliated with the Kremlin. The estimated coefficient for the intercept (not shown) is 5.7 (HDI = [2.8, 8.5]).

440 left-leaning papers, owned by journalists, without a direct energy interest, and
 441 not beholden to the Kremlin (Poberezhskaya 2015). The results generally fit with
 442 expectations. The overall state of the economy—as measured by inflation—has
 443 the largest overall influence on the probability of covering the climate issue. Not
 444 surprisingly, when times are tough economically, climate change is less likely
 445 to appear in the news agenda: moving inflation from its minimum to maximum
 446 value—while fixing all other variables at constant values—leads to a 0.10 decline
 447 in the probability of covering climate change. This level of change, however,
 448 represents a considerable swing in economic conditions and, for more moderate
 449 changes (e.g., from the 1st to the 3rd quartile of inflation), inflation leads to a
 450 roughly 1% decline in discussing climate-related issues. Energy ownership also
 451 reduces the propensity of a newspaper to report on climate-related issues, with
 452 the likelihood of covering climate change again falling by roughly 1% for papers
 453 owned by an energy company. Lastly, opposition party papers are approximately
 454 2% less likely to mention climate change at all—though, this estimate is quite
 455 uncertain. We do not find a significant difference in the likelihood of climate
 456 change coverage between Putin or Medvedev presidential periods. Further, we
 457 do not find a significant conditional relationship between presidential period

458 and state-owned or Kremlin-loyal papers on the probability of covering climate
459 change (not shown).

460 Examining mentions alone, however, offers little insight into *how* climate
461 change is being covered in the Russian press. That is, if a paper decides to cover
462 the climate issue, in what context do they do so? To examine this question,
463 we use the relative measure of coverage intensity introduced in Section 4.1 and
464 the mixed effects zero-inflated beta model outlined in Section 4.3. We begin
465 with two central features of climate change communication—reporting on *cli-*
466 *mate science & impacts*. As demonstrated in Figure 3, we find support for the
467 impact of national-level variables on coverage of climate science in the Russian
468 press. Specifically, we find that if a paper covers climate change during times of
469 high inflation, the discussion is less likely to be framed around climate science
470 (log-odds = -1.03, CI = [-1.96, -0.26]). Moving inflation from one standard de-
471 viation above to one standard deviation below the mean leads to around an 8%
472 decline in the likelihood of emphasizing climate science and impacts. Conversely,
473 during periods with high instances of natural disaster, coverage is more likely
474 to emphasize scientific discussion (log-odds = 0.07, CI = [0.02, 0.13]). Here,
475 moving from no extreme weather events to 4 extreme weather events (i.e., the
476 maximum), increases the likelihood of framing discussion in terms of climate
477 science and impacts by roughly 7%. There does not seem to be a substantive
478 presidential effect on how newspapers discuss *climate science & impacts*. Fur-
479 ther, by and large, there is little evidence for newspaper-level effects. There are,
480 however, several exceptions: right-leaning (log-odds = -0.22, CI = [-0.64, 0.18])
481 and opposition party papers (log-odds = -0.40, CI = [-0.93, 0.11]) are generally
482 less likely to emphasize science, while state-owned newspapers are more likely
483 to focus on science-related issues (log-odds = 0.30, CI = [-0.10, 0.72])—though,
484 again, uncertainty remains relatively high for these estimates.

485 Next, we move beyond science to issues associated with the political econ-
486 omy of climate change in Russia. Figure 3 provides estimates for our aggregate
487 measure of *geopolitics*. As shown in the figure, both paper-level and national-
488 level factors seem to play a role in the level of climate-related discussion devoted
489 to geopolitical issues. Considering paper-level variables, energy ownership in-
490 fluences discussion of *geopolitics*, yet papers with energy interests are only less
491 than 1% more likely to cover climate change in the context of international rela-
492 tions. Oppositional party papers are also more likely to frame climate coverage
493 in the context of security concerns and international competition over the Arc-
494 tic region (log-odds = 0.52, CI = [0.07, 0.97]). To a lesser extent, right-leaning
495 and state-owned papers are more likely to cover climate change in the context
496 of *geopolitics*—though, there is still a fair level of uncertainty associated with
497 both estimates. And we continue to find evidence for the influence of economic
498 conditions; when inflation is high, papers are more likely to frame the climate
499 change debate in terms of geopolitical competition. Further, when disaggregat-
500 ing *geopolitics* into *international security* and *arctic politics* (not shown), we find
501 that security is largely responsible for driving geopolitical frames. That is, the
502 effects of energy and opposition party ownership as well as inflation are stronger




Figure 3: Coverage of specific climate-related issues. Dots represent the parameter estimates (posterior medians) from the zero-inflated beta regression model described in Section 4.3, and the lines once again represent the 90% HDI. We employ the same baseline as Figure 2 above and thus compare to a “high frequency” newspaper profile. The estimated intercepts (not shown) are as follows: climate science and impacts (-0.59, [-1.55, 0.32]), geopolitics (-4.55, [-5.68, -3.48]), energy issues (-3.46, [-4.42, -2.60]), and international agreements (-2.22, [-3.74, -0.74]).

503 when focusing on *international security* alone. There does seem to be a marginal
 504 presidential effect. Specifically, we find that during a Putin presidency, papers
 505 are less likely (log-odds = -0.15, CI = [-0.31, -0.01]) to discuss climate change in
 506 the context of *geopolitics*, however the effect is quite small: newspapers under a
 507 Putin presidency are only 0.4% less likely to frame global warming in terms of
 508 geopolitical concerns.

509 The analysis next shifts to climate change discussions in the context of *in-*
 510 *ternational climate agreements*. Again, economic hardship, as measured by in-
 511 flation, has a negative impact on newspaper attention to climate change nego-

512 tiations (log-odds = -1.60, CI = [-3.08, -0.28]). For instance, moving inflation
513 from one standard deviation below its mean to one standard deviation above, de-
514 creases discussion on global warming negotiations by roughly 4%. With respect
515 to newspaper-level variables, the results suggest that state- (log-odds = 0.47, CI
516 = [0.0001, 0.90]) and business-owned newspapers (log-odds = 0.36, CI = [0.14,
517 0.59]) are more likely to frame global warming along the lines of climate diplo-
518 macy. Substantively, government ownership is associated with an approximate
519 5% increase in discussion, while business group ownership leads to a roughly 4%
520 increase.

521 Lastly, we examine the extent to which newspapers frame climate coverage
522 in terms of *energy issues*. Not surprisingly, business-owned newspapers are more
523 likely to emphasize climate change in the context of energy issues (log-odds =
524 0.20, CI = [0.03, 0.39]). Yet, the strongest newspaper-level effects are observed
525 for state-owned (log-odds = 0.45, CI = [0.08, 0.82]) and opposition party papers
526 (log-odds = -0.40, CI = [-0.78, -0.06]). State-owned papers are approximately 2%
527 more likely to highlight energy issues when covering global warming, while op-
528 position party papers are 2% less likely to do so. When digging a bit deeper into
529 these estimates, we find that attention devoted to *renewable energy* and *energy*
530 *efficiency* play a particularly influential role. While we observe weak differences
531 across papers for *non-renewable energy*, business- and state-owned papers have
532 a strong positive influence on the likelihood of framing climate change in terms
533 of “energy solutions,” while opposition party outlets generally avoid discussion
534 of these issues. We also find a negative effect of a Putin presidency on discus-
535 sions of climate change with respect to energy issues (log-odds = -0.17, CI =
536 [-0.36, -0.002]). However, yet again, this effect is substantively small: newspa-
537 pers during a Putin presidency are 0.2% less likely to discuss climate change in
538 the context of energy.

539 5. Discussion

540 Newspaper attention to climate change has risen steadily ever since the issue
541 was identified as an international problem. A key question for both scholars
542 of climate communication and Russian politics centers on the similarities and
543 differences of Russian media coverage to other major actors in climate politics.
544 We start by considering overall trends in coverage of the issue. [Boykoff et al.](#)
545 [\(2015\)](#) demonstrates how interest by the global press increased rapidly starting
546 in late 2006 and remained high for the following few years (see also [Schmidt et al.](#)
547 [2013](#)). This increase coincided with important events such as the release of the
548 IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (AR4), the release of Al Gore’s *An Inconvenient*
549 *Truth*, and the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to Al Gore and the IPCC.
550 There is another pronounced spike in attention in late 2009 that was triggered by
551 the Copenhagen Conference (COP-15) on climate change and the “Climategate”
552 scandal that preceded it. Our data suggest that Russian newspaper attention
553 generally followed this pattern and, in particular, we find noticeable similarities
554 between Russian coverage and that of the U.S. prestige press (see Figure 1). Yet,

555 although the general trends are similar, there are several key differences. First,
556 and perhaps most importantly, our analysis confirms that Russian newspaper
557 coverage of climate change is relatively low in absolute terms (Poberezhskaya
558 2015). As demonstrated in Figure 1, a single major American newspaper (*The*
559 *New York Times*) has published more articles on climate change than 23 of
560 the most widely circulated papers in Russia. This low level of media attention
561 may offer an explanation of why, when compared to 40 developing and developed
562 nations, Russians are the *most likely* to report that “global climate change is not
563 a serious problem” (Stokes et al. 2015). Second, while it seems that international
564 media have picked up their interest in climate change in recent years and it has
565 again acquired “celebrity status” (Pepermans and Maesele 2014 p. 217; see
566 also Fischer 2015), we find that Russian newspaper coverage has been steadily
567 decreasing since 2010, with a pronounced drop starting in late 2013. This decline
568 in coverage, moreover, corresponds to an increase in media attention associated
569 with the Russian economic crisis and the onset of the security crisis in Ukraine.

570 Next, moving from trends in general attention to the correlates Russian cli-
571 mate coverage, we find that the state of the economy is crucial for predicting
572 both whether climate change makes onto the media agenda and the way in which
573 the issue is framed. When economic conditions are bad (as measured by high
574 inflation), the media tend to avoid discussion of global warming and discuss cli-
575 mate change less in the context of science and international commitments, but
576 more with respect to geopolitical concerns. In other words, instead of portraying
577 climate change as an environmental problem, during hard times, the media will
578 present climate change as just another item of discussion in the international
579 arena, outlining opportunities which could be realized with a shift in global
580 climate conditions. The influence of the economy on climate change commu-
581 nication has been identified in other countries as well. For instance, Carvalho
582 (2005 , p. 21), in her analysis of the UK media points out how “free-market
583 capitalism and neo-liberalism” restrict climate public discourse by encouraging
584 the avoidance of problematic topics (e.g. restrictions of the economic growth in
585 order to mitigate the problem). Holt and Barkemeyer (2012) also find negative
586 effects of poor national economic performance on coverage of climate change in a
587 large comparative study of 112 newspapers from 39 countries. As such, our anal-
588 ysis provides additional evidence that economic conditions plays an important
589 role in governing the well-known “issue attention cycle” (Downs 1972).

590 Previous research also suggests that Russian media coverage of climate change
591 is sensitive to political factors (Poberezhskaya 2015). Interestingly, our study
592 provides little evidence of substantive variation in climate change coverage or
593 attention to various climate change related themes between different presiden-
594 tial administrations (Putin vs. Medvedev). Further, we do not find conditional
595 presidential administration effects on how state-owned newspapers or papers
596 that are loyal to the Kremlin discuss climate change. That is, newspapers that
597 are beholden to the government do not discuss global warming differently when
598 Putin or Medvedev are serving as President. Also, non-state-owned newspapers
599 that are loyal to the Kremlin do not seem to systematically differ from the base-

600 line case in their reporting of global warming. These results contribute to the
601 on-going academic debate on the role of the personality of the state leaders in
602 shaping climate discussion in Russia (Henry and Sundstrom 2012). The weak
603 evidence found in our study could be explained by the constant powerful impact
604 of Putin’s politics regardless of whether he is the Prime Minister or President.
605 On the other hand, as Andonova (2008) states, Russian climate policy cannot
606 simply be explained by the will of the executive but rather by a combination of
607 various political processes.

608 We also find a much weaker role for natural disasters in explaining variation in
609 coverage of global warming and framing of the issue by the Russian press. Our
610 results indicate that the occurrence of climate-related natural hazards, such
611 as extreme temperature, drought and storms, are associated with an increase
612 in discussions of climate science and climate impact. However, we find little
613 evidence of a disaster effect on overall coverage rates or discussion of energy,
614 geopolitics, or international climate negotiations. Given these findings, we might
615 speculate that natural disasters bring climate change to the realm of popular
616 scientific discourse by trying to explain events, providing advice or raising the
617 alarm of the observed (or possible) negative outcomes. This correlates with
618 Wilson Rowe’s (2013) argument that while Russian climate scientists rarely act
619 as “policy entrepreneurs” but rather concentrate on educating policy-makers
620 and the public by explaining the scientific side of the problem.

621 While national-level factors are predictive, paper-level characteristics also
622 play a role, with papers varying in how they frame the issue. In terms of news-
623 papers’ political affiliation and ownership, there is some evidence to suggest
624 that the media outlets on the political right are less likely to address climate
625 change in terms of science and impact. However, when such papers do discuss
626 climate science, they typically provide a rational account of anthropogenic cli-
627 mate change with descriptions of its cause and consequences. Newspapers on
628 the extreme political left and right bring into their discussion of climate science
629 sensationalism and in some cases governmental critique:

630 The region is not yet experiencing climatic difficulties, and its prob-
631 lems are due to the irrational management of agricultural production
632 and water waste (Pravda 9/01/2004)

633 On the other hand, newspapers of the political center express a range of views
634 on the issue. Moreover, when taking a closer look at the corpus—particularly
635 among state-owned papers—there are clear instances of climate scepticism. For
636 instance:

637 Global warming will soon finish (Rossiiskaia gazeta 19/09/2007)

638 Maybe the president’s advisor, Andrey Illarionov [an infamous Rus-
639 sian climate sceptic], is right in his stubborn resistance to the Kyoto
640 Protocol? (Rossiiskaia gazeta 31/08/2005)

641 This finding also correlates with the development of the state’s climate policy,
642 which until a few years ago was dominated by sceptical discourse. Newspapers

643 with connections to the energy sector mostly tend to look at the problem from
644 the position of international security which often involves discussion of Russian
645 energy interests. For instance, when surveying climate-related articles in our
646 corpus with a high probability of containing a topic related to geopolitics, we
647 found numerous discussions of global competition for the Arctic's resources by
648 papers with energy interests:

649 Russia continues to strengthen its positions in the unavoidable divi-
650 sion of the Arctic [...] The Arctic shelf presumably contains up to
651 25 per cent of the world's hydrocarbon reserves, and in connection
652 with global warming, the possibility of their extraction becomes real.
653 (Izvestiia 24/12/2008)

654 A similar pattern was detected with oppositional and right-wing newspapers also
655 being more likely to discuss climate change in relation to international relations.
656 However, these papers differ slightly in their approach, where the media outlets
657 from the political right provide a more straightforward account of the potential
658 losses and gains in the geopolitics of climate change. In contrast, newspapers
659 belonging to the extreme left and right tend to briefly mention climate change
660 in their elaborate analyses of global politics:

661 Today Anglophone plans are implemented under the guise of a state-
662 less "globalization" and ultra-Malthusian scam called "global warm-
663 ing," pushed by former US Vice President Al Gore' (Zavtra 18/4/2007)

664 Our study also demonstrates that ownership structures impact the way Rus-
665 sian newspapers approach energy-related topics, with business-owned and state-
666 owned papers not only mentioning climate change within energy discussions
667 more often, but also paying greater attention to "energy solutions" (e.g., renew-
668 ables and energy efficiency). *Izvestiia*, for example, has pointed to American
669 excess when discussing how, "until recently uneconomical and environmentally
670 'dirty' cars were the most popular choice among American consumers" (*Izvestiia*
671 13/02/2004). Business owned papers were likely to express an interest in energy
672 conservation as well:

673 The country has a long-term commitment to provide energy for ex-
674 port. It is currently almost the only real means of Russia's political
675 influence [...] Therefore, Russia has to seriously think about a more
676 rational use of its energy resources, as well as of the use of energy-
677 saving technologies' (Kommersant 19/10/2005).

678 A similar pattern was noticed in how these types of newspapers tackle the topic of
679 international environmental agreements by strategically assessing Russia's gains
680 and losses from the process:

681 Russia needs to fit into a new global climate order. While Russia does
682 not persevere in promoting their GHG emission reduction projects, in
683 April 2009 a new US administration has claimed its global leadership

684 in the fight to preserve the environment and to development the ideas
685 of global “climate control” (Rossiiskaia gazeta 6/05/2009).

686 Our data also show how media coverage is influenced by similar considerations as
687 the Russian state’s climate policy. Interest in the issue began to “take off” after
688 policy makers began to consider mitigation efforts for their potential benefits to
689 the country (e.g. introducing renewables into the national market in order to
690 increase fossil fuel exports , reducing energy costs, attracting investments, etc.).
691 Though this approach may be seen as “green washing,” in the Russian case, it
692 offers a tangible—and even optimal—solution for attracting the interest of the
693 state. Moreover, this approach allows for increased attention without causing a
694 political confrontation among key stakeholders by demanding economic sacrifice
695 and allocating blame for over-reliance on the fossil fuel industry.

696 6. Conclusion

697 This study offers a systematic and comprehensive analysis of Russian news-
698 paper coverage and discussion of climate change since the end of the Yeltsin era.
699 Employing methods from machine learning and natural language processing, we
700 have been able to classify a large set of climate-relevant newspaper articles into
701 distinct themes related to global warming. Using a sub-sample from these data,
702 we investigate whether a set of national and newspaper-level factors help ex-
703 plain variation in Russian newspaper coverage of climate change as well as how
704 newspapers frame the issue over the period 2000-2014. Overall, our analysis
705 has helped us to understand *when* climate change is more or less likely to enter
706 Russian public discourse (the first level of the agenda-setting function of mass
707 media (McCombs and Shaw 1972), and *how* newspapers cover climate change
708 during its peaks and lows of attention (the second level of media agenda-setting
709 function (ibid)). We find that national level factors such as the state of the
710 economy are highly predictive of coverage, while paper-level indicators are less
711 consistently related to changes in the media discourse.

712 While the current study focuses on the issue of climate change, our empirical
713 findings raise broader questions on the political economy of media production in
714 Russia. First, it is clear from our analysis that economic considerations—general
715 economic conditions and energy interests—play a vital role in what the media
716 choose to present. Second, it is striking just *how little variation* one observes
717 across newspapers with very different underlying ideologies and ownership struc-
718 tures. These findings, moreover, are at odds with scholarship based on West-
719 ern countries—primarily in the US and UK—which suggests that the ideological
720 predispositions of media outlets significantly influence which issues are discussed
721 and how these issues are framed (for ideology and climate change coverage, see
722 for instance Carvalho 2007, Schmid-Petri et al. 2015), though there is evidence
723 that Dutch newspapers are also not affected by ideological disposition on the
724 issue of climate change (Dirikx and Gelders 2010). Similarly, changes at the ex-
725 ecutive level—from an arguably skeptical Putin to the environmentally-minded

726 Medvedev—did not appear to systematically alter how the media covered climate
727 change. And though speculative, the consistency of coverage across (seemingly)
728 diverse media outlets underscores the challenge of getting the issue of climate
729 change onto the political agenda and perhaps offers an observable implication
730 of wider changes in the Russian media market, which has become increasingly
731 centralised and controlled over the last decade (Lehtisaari 2015). While it is
732 difficult to know the extent to which these findings generalize to other political
733 issues, the analysis does raise questions regarding how media operate in Russia
734 and the ways in which corporate elite influence the media landscape.

735 The study does, however, have a number of limitations. First, our analysis
736 does not consider the sentiment and tone of the newspaper articles. For instance,
737 when a paper is discussing climate science, we cannot determine whether the
738 author is being skeptical or dismissive. This is an important drawback which
739 should be addressed in future work. Second, the study relies exclusively on
740 print media, while not including television, radio, and online media, which might
741 present a more complete picture of climate discourse in Russia. Lastly, due to
742 data availability, we were forced to exclude newspaper articles from the Yeltsin
743 era. We, therefore, are not able to generalize our findings on newspaper coverage
744 to the 1990s.

745 Nevertheless, our results offer a number of valuable insights into climate
746 change communication in Russia. During the Paris COP-21 meeting in Septem-
747 ber 2015, President Putin re-affirmed Russia’s pledge to contribute to the global
748 fight against climate change through further GHG reductions. Some have thought
749 that Putin could have been more ambitious in his claim since a reduction of 25-
750 30% in GHG emissions to the 1990 level will not revolutionise Russia’s energy
751 market. On the other hand, considering Russia’s ambiguous history of climate
752 change policy, any move forward should be treated as a positive development
753 where the interested parties (climatologists, environmental activists and the in-
754 ternational community) should not only understand all of the intricacies of Rus-
755 sian climate discourse but should also learn how Russian media can be utilised
756 in order to popularise climate-related discussions. In other words, focus should
757 be shifted to when climate is more likely to receive attention from the Russian
758 media and how it can be framed in order to involve various media actors re-
759 gardless of their ownership structure, energy interests and political affiliation.
760 It is our belief that this study makes a substantial contribution in this regard
761 and can also be utilised as a platform for further inquiries into Russian public
762 discourse of climate change-related topics.

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1018 **Supplemental appendix for “Measuring and Modeling**
 1019 **Russian Newspaper Coverage of Climate Change.”**

1020 **Appendix A. Text analysis**

1021 *Appendix A.1. Corpus*

1022 The corpus was compiled using newspaper articles gathered from the East-
 1023 view Russian Central Newspapers database, which may be accessed at <http://www.eastview.com/>. The Boolean search term used to identify relevant arti-
 1024 cles was as follows:
 1025

1026 "Изменение климата" OR "изменения климата" OR "изменению
 1027 климата" OR "изменением климата" OR "изменении климата"
 1028 OR "Изменения климата" OR "изменений климата" OR "изме-
 1029 нениям климата" OR "изменениями климата" OR "измени-
 1030 ях климата" OR "Глобальное потепление" OR "глобальным по-
 1031 теплением" OR "глобальному потеплению" OR "глобальным по-
 1032 теплением" OR "глобальном потеплении" OR "Парниковый эф-
 1033 фект" OR "парникового эффекта" OR "парниковому эффекту"
 1034 OR "парниковым эффектом" OR "парниковом эффекте".

1035 This search resulted in the retrieval of 11,131 articles from 65 newspapers over
 1036 the period 3 May 1980 to 7 May 2014. Table A.3 displays the number of articles
 1037 per newspaper and the time coverage of each newspaper (both in our corpus
 1038 and in the Eastview database). It should be noted that there is considerable
 1039 variation in newspaper duration within the corpus. The count of climate change
 1040 related articles over the entire period is illustrated in Figure A.4. As can be seen
 1041 in the plot, attention to climate change within our corpus begins to pick up in
 1042 1995, with pre-1995 coverage of climate change amounting to only 51 articles
 1043 (Argumenty i fakty [n=12], Izvestiia [n=33], and Krasnaia zvezda [n=6]). The
 1044 low number of pre-1995 articles should not be interpreted as a reflection of the
 1045 true coverage rate of the Russian print media during this period. As is shown
 1046 in Table A.3, the overwhelming majority of newspapers entered the Eastview
 1047 database beginning in the late 1990s and early 2000s. For this reason, our
 1048 analysis focuses on the 2000-2014 period.

Table A.3: Newspaper coverage of climate change in Russia

Newspaper	Article	Temporal Coverage	
		<i>Corpus</i>	<i>Eastview (UDB-COM)</i>
Argumenty i fakty	261	1983-2014	1983-
Argumenty nedeli	23	2011-2014	2011-
E'kho planety	148	2000-2008	2000-
E'konomika i zhizn'	46	1996-2014	1996-
E'kspert	204	1998-2014	1998-
Ezhenedel'nyi' zhurnal	10	2003-2004	2003-2004

Table A.3: (Continued)

Finansovye Izvestiia	2	2002-2002	1998-2003
Gazeta	342	2003-2010	2002-2010
InterFaks-Vremia	5	1998-1999	1997-2000
Itogi	299	1996-2013	1996-2014
Izvestiia	959	1980-2014	1980-
Kommersant. Daily	555	1997-2014	1997-
Kommersant. Den'gi	34	1999-2008	1999-
Kommersant. Vlast'	54	1998-2008	1998-
Komsomol'skaia pravda	345	1997-2014	1997-
Konservator	4	2003-2003	2002-2003
Krasnaia zvezda	270	1992-2014	1992-
Kul'tura	48	2004-2014	2003-
Literaturnaia gazeta	125	1997-2014	1997-
Moskovskaia pravda	540	1998-2014	1998-
Moskovskie novosti	180	1998-2013	1998-2007; 2011-2014
Moskovskii' komsomolets	516	1997-2014	1997-
NG. Dipkur'er	5	2000-2001	2000-2001
NG. Figury i litsa	1	2000-2000	1997-2001
NG. Polite'konomiia	5	1998-2001	1997-2001
NG. Regiony	3	1999-2001	1997-2001
NG. Sodruzhestvo	2	1998-2000	1997-2001
NG. Stsenarii	5	1997-2001	1997-2001
Nasha versiia	30	2005-2008	2005-
New Times, The	42	2007-2013	2007-
Nezavisimaia gazeta	828	1997-2014	1995-
Novaia gazeta	159	1998-2014	1997-
Novoe vremia	25	2003-2006	2003-2007
Novye izvestiia	443	1998-2014	1998-
Obshchaia gazeta	38	1997-2002	1997-2002
Ogonek	176	2003-2014	2003-
Paradox	14	2002-2004	2002-2004
Politbiuro	26	2002-2003	2002-2003
Pravda	66	2004-2014	2003-
Pravda 5	4	1997-1998	1997-1998
Pravda 5. Daily	8	1997-1998	1997-1998
Pravoslavnaia Moskva	3	2000-2008	1999-
Prezident	25	2010-2013	2010-2014
Profil'	191	1998-2014	1998-
RBK Daily	19	2012-2014	2012-
Rossii'skaia gazeta	928	1997-2014	1997-
Rossii'skie vesti	101	1997-2013	1997-
Rossia	73	2002-2010	2002-2010
Russkii' Telegraf	6	1998-1998	1998-1998
Russkii' kur'er	58	2003-2008	2003-2008
Sankt-Peterburgskie vedomosti	455	1997-2014	1997-
Segodnia	66	1997-2001	1996-2001
Slovo	49	1999-2013	1999-
Sovetskaia Rossiia	186	1999-2014	1999-
Tribuna	188	2004-2014	2004-2015
Trud	397	1997-2014	1997-
Uchitel'skaia gazeta	52	2005-2014	2005-
Vecherniaia Moskva	256	2000-2014	2000-
Vedomosti	10	2010-2014	2014-
Vedomosti (arkhiv)	403	1999-2013	1999-2013
Vek	50	1999-2002	1999-2002
Versiia	7	2004-2005	2003-2005
Vremia MN	146	1998-2003	1998-2003
Vremia novostei'	499	2001-2010	2001-2010
Zavtra	113	1998-2014	1996-




Figure A.4: *The number of climate change related newspaper articles over time.* Illustrates the temporal variation of climate change coverage for 65 Russian newspapers over the period 1980-2014. Quarterly article counts are displayed.

1050 **Appendix B. Probabilistic topic model**

1051 To reduce our text content into a manageable set of key themes, we utilize the
1052 latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA) model originally proposed in [Blei et al. \(2003\)](#)
1053 (see [Blei 2012](#) for an accessible overview). [Boussalis and Coan \(2016 p. 92\)](#)
1054 provide a useful description of the LDA’s assumed data generating process:

1055 “LDA provides a statistical framework for understanding the latent
1056 topics or themes running through a corpus by explicitly modelling the
1057 random process responsible for producing a document, assuming that
1058 each document is made up of a mixture of topics, as well as a mix-
1059 ture of words associated with each topic. For instance, the document
1060 you are reading at this moment includes a mixture of themes such as
1061 “climate scepticism” and “text analysis,” and these themes tend to
1062 use different language—the topic “climate scepticism” is likely asso-
1063 ciated with the word “denial,” whereas the topic “text analysis” is
1064 associated with the word “random.” Moreover, this process is prob-
1065 abilistic in the sense that we could have used the term “stochastic”
1066 instead of “random” in the previous sentence.”

1067 Although most individuals do not equate the process of writing with randomness,
1068 this turns out to be a useful fiction when the goal is to cluster a large body of
1069 text into a small number of themes. More formally, [Blei et al. \(2003\)](#) assume
1070 1) that words are exchangeable, each text is a combination of a specific number
1071 of topics (T_k), and topics are represented as a distribution of words (w) over a
1072 fixed vocabulary (see also [Griffiths and Steyvers 2004](#)). With these assumptions
1073 in hand, LDA assumes the following generative process:

- 1074 1. Each of the k topics are drawn from a topic distribution by

1075
$$\theta \sim \text{Dirichlet}(\alpha)$$

- 1076 2. The term distribution β for each topic is represented by

1077
$$\beta \sim \text{Dirichlet}(\eta)$$

- 1078 3. For each of the N words w_n :

1079 Randomly sample a topic $z_n \sim \text{Multinomial}(\theta)$.

1080 Choose a word w_n from $p(w_n|z_n, \beta)$.

1081 We rely on the sparse Gibbs sampler described in [Yao et al. \(2009\)](#) to infer the
1082 topic structure and the hyperparameter optimization routine utilized in [Wallach
1083 et al. \(2009a\)](#) provided the most easily interpretable set of topics. Note also that
1084 the LDA requires one to specify the number of topics *a priori*. While a range
1085 of methods have been introduced in the literature to estimate the “natural”
1086 number of topics for a corpus based on the held-out likelihood (see [Wallach
1087 et al. 2009b](#) for an overview), there remains considerable debate on the utility
1088 of data-driven approaches and [Chang et al. \(2009\)](#) present evidence suggesting
1089 models which preform better in terms of held-out likelihood, may actually infer

1090 less meaningful topics. However, for our analysis, we are using the LDA as a
1091 tool for data reduction and thus we chose the number of topics that we could
1092 read through and analyze using qualitative methods.

1093 *Appendix B.1. Full List of Topics*

1094 This table provides the results of the 100 topic LDA for the Russian newspaper corpus, as described in section X. We removed
 1095 10 “junk” topics (AlSumait et al. 2009) and four “non-applicable (NA)” topics where climate change related terminology is
 1096 used in unrelated contexts (e.g. “greenhouse” used in the context of gardening). This left us with a final set of 86 relevant
 1097 topics which cover a wide range of subjects. These topics were then grouped into higher order sets (meta-topics) based on
 1098 subject similarity. For each topic, we present the topic ID, Dirichlet statistic, topic label, meta-topic label, and the top 5
 1099 most probable (stemmed) tokens (in Russian).

Table B.4: Climate change related topics in the Russian newspaper corpus

ID	Dirichlet	Topic	Meta-Topic	Token Keys
26	0.01707	Activism (Protests)	Activism	протест антиглобалист полицейск полиц акц
30	0.02717	Earth Hour	Activism	выставк акц час москв город
42	0.02772	Food security	Agriculture	цен хозяйств сельск производств продовольствен
4	0.02755	Arctic geopolitics	Arctic politics	арктик арктическ северн росс морск
35	0.0242	Archaeology	Climate impacts	учен древн мамонт человек животн
90	0.08167	Climate consequences (scientific forecast)	Climate impacts	климат изменен потеплен глобальн климатическ
73	0.0189	Climate impacts (Mountains and glaciers)	Climate impacts	курорт турист ледник гор снег
36	0.03449	Housing	Climate impacts	дом здан строительств жил работ
31	0.0756	Sea level rise	Climate impacts	потеплен глобальн температур учен земл
69	0.02127	Sea life	Climate impacts	мор вод морск рыб акул
27	0.02722	Water resources	Climate impacts	вод рек водн ресурс проект
41	0.03265	Wild life	Climate impacts	животн вид птиц медвед бел
22	0.05471	Carbon emissions	Climate science	газ атмосфер парников углекисл выброс
84	0.1319	Climate change (General)	Climate science	изменен климат последн фактор процесс
62	0.03049	Climate science (Oceans and climate)	Climate science	океа вод европ течен северн
24	0.0193	Meteorology (Roshydromet)	Climate science	прогноз погод метеоролог росгидромет дан
93	0.03666	Science (Atmosphere)	Climate science	атмосфер сло озонов учен вод
19	0.02448	Space (Celestial bodies)	Climate science	космическ земл планет марс венер
49	0.02689	Space science (Sun)	Climate science	земл солнц солнечн планет учен
95	0.02206	IR (China)	Comparative politics	кита китайск кит кнр пекин
68	0.03608	Politics (Elections)	Comparative politics	парг выбор президент политическ политик
5	0.01914	Politics (Germany)	Comparative politics	герман немецк меркел канцлер берлин
54	0.01186	Politics (South America)	Comparative politics	стран штат куб соединен фидел
33	0.02433	Politics (UK)	Comparative politics	британск великобритан блэр лондон браун
20	0.05483	Politics (USA)	Comparative politics	сша американск президент буш обам

Table B.4: (Continued)

45	0.04216	Catastrophe (Futuristic predictions)	Disasters/Extreme Weather	земл катастроф человечеств планет будущ
60	0.04093	Catastrophe (Response/MCHS)	Disasters/Extreme Weather	област росс регион кра мчс
0	0.02266	Nature disaster (Forest fires)	Disasters/Extreme Weather	лес лесн пожар дерев площад
58	0.05216	Nature disaster (Hurricanes and floods)	Disasters/Extreme Weather	наводнен бедств землетрясен урага катастроф
39	0.06588	Weather abnormalities	Disasters/Extreme Weather	температур градус погод тепл жар
66	0.02545	Winter abnormalities	Disasters/Extreme Weather	зим мороз снег холод зимн
1	0.07459	Budgeting climate risk	Economy/Business	млн млрд доллар тыс проект
6	0.04502	Business	Economy/Business	компан бизнес рынок крупн проект
59	0.08378	Corporate responsibility	Economy/Business	должн наш возможн помощ нов
86	0.08094	Economy (Sustainable development)	Economy/Business	развит стран экономическ экономик нов
29	0.03492	Economy (General)	Economy/Business	экономик цен кризис финансов рост
23	0.0315	Education	Education	школ дет образован язык студент
52	0.00196	Education (University competition)	Education	задан участник как факультет математик
99	0.03547	Energy (Gas)	Energy (Non-renewable)	нефт газ цен добыч нефтян
48	0.01637	Energy (Nuclear)	Energy (Non-renewable)	атомн ядерн аэс энергетик реактор
8	0.03108	Energy (Sustainable sources)	Energy (Renewable)	энерг энергетик топлив источник электроэнерг
82	0.03162	Energy (Efficiency, Emission reduction)	Energy efficiency	выброс энерг газ энергетическ технолог
17	0.01763	Transport (Cars)	Energy efficiency	автомобил машин двигатель бензин нов
15	0.02056	Transport (Mostly aviation)	Energy efficiency	самолет аэропорт авиакомпан пассажир полет
47	0.03596	Health	Health	заболеван болезн здоров врач люд
78	0.02056	IT	Information technology	технолог систем создан разработк информацийон
28	0.05005	Climate politics (COPs)	IR (Environmental)	стран выброс климат конференц газ
61	0.04297	Climate politics (Kyoto Protocol)	IR (Environmental)	протокол киотск выброс росс газ
10	0.00949	Climate research (Russian-Belarusian)	IR (Environmental)	союзн сред государств беларус программ
34	0.01791	IR (ASIA-APEC)	IR (Non-security)	япон японск стран атэс ток
83	0.04451	IR (bilateral relations)	IR (Non-security)	росс отношен сотрудничеств российск вопрос
64	0.03212	IR (summits)	IR (Non-security)	восьмерк стран саммит самм встреч
53	0.03153	Politics (EU)	IR (Non-security)	европейск европ евросоюз стран франц
21	0.04276	UN (and Russia)	IR (Non-security)	оон форум международн организац конференц
55	0.04586	IR (power politics)	IR (Security)	мир стран международн миров нов
94	0.02611	IR (security-conflicts)	IR (Security)	стран президент франц ирак израил
65	0.03344	Military (weapons, tactics)	IR (Security)	воен оруж ядерн сша вооружен
98	0.02428	Russian foreign policy	IR (Security)	украин польш стран нат европ
50	0.02846	Russian national security	IR (Security)	росс российский путин москв отношен
67	0.01529	Russian national security policy	IR (Security)	безопасн российск федерац национальн обеспечен
14	0.04719	Junk	Junk	стат дан глобальн опубликова the
18	0.11096	Junk	Junk	росс стран российский наш вопрос
37	0.04236	Junk	Junk	весн апрел март месяц нов
38	0.16944	Junk	Junk	перв нов стал последн сам
44	0.02054	Junk	Junk	фильм режиссер фестивал кин театр

Table B.4: (Continued)

72	0.10996	Junk	Junk	говор вопрос наш дума как
80	0.14946	Junk	Junk	дел сам одн так люб
81	0.18603	Junk	Junk	вопрос мнен решен счита сторон
85	0.05983	Junk	Junk	глобалньн дел потеплен никак говор
92	0.03711	Junk	Junk	сообща город летн женщин сообщ
56	0.02579	Gardening	NA	растен вин дерев сорт гриб
77	0.04576	Relationship/feelings	NA	женщин жизн друг люб люд
16	0.08431	Trivia	NA	дом рук сво голов мест
32	0.01479	TV announcements	NA	программ кана телевиден зритель канал
12	0.02011	Antarctic	Polar science	антарктид озер антарктичesk учен антарктик
89	0.0198	Arctic (science)	Polar science	экспедиц северн арктик полярн полюс
87	0.0064	Environmental protection (Air pollution)	Pollution	воздух атмосферн вредн выброс веществ
57	0.05049	Environmental protection (General pollution)	Pollution	экологическ сред окружа эколог природ
79	0.04054	Moscow	Russian cities	город москв московск столиц городск
9	0.00408	Medvedev's politics (Russian politics)	Russian politics	наш росс стран нов политическ
13	0.04664	Politics (Russian officials meet)	Russian politics	росс правительств заседан председател совет
51	0.07288	Russian diplomacy	Russian politics	президент росс российск путин медвед
2	0.00542	Russian legislation	Russian politics	пункт услуг работ налогов товар
40	0.00909	Russian mitigation legislature	Russian politics	российск федерац федеральн рубл тыс
91	0.00222	Russian politics (Ministries/docs)	Russian politics	росс программ государственн заказчик год
71	0.05431	Russian science	Science (other)	наук научн учен институт исследован
96	0.02807	Scientific discoveries (Genetics)	Science (other)	учен исследован ген мозг организм
11	0.03126	Art (Film/music industry)	Society and culture	групп сша концерт сам музык
25	0.03048	Art (Music)	Society and culture	александр владимир росс никола петербург
63	0.01657	Fashion	Society and culture	одежд бел мод нос кож
3	0.03082	Historical mysteries	Society and culture	древн земл мест остров город
7	0.03976	Justice (Crime)	Society and culture	суд дел закон прав сотрудник
75	0.018	Literature	Society and culture	книг русск писател автор рома
88	0.01814	Nobel Prize	Society and culture	прем нобелевск гор лауреат награда
43	0.03377	Philosophy	Society and culture	человечеств человек век природ земл
76	0.04062	Politics and Society	Society and culture	обществ социальн власт прав стран
46	0.08575	Population growth	Society and culture	стран рост населен миров мир
74	0.02317	Religion	Society and culture	русск век культур храм церкв
97	0.01731	Sport	Society and culture	олимпийск спорт соч игр команд
70	0.02096	USSR	Society and culture	советск ссср народ войн союз

1101 **Appendix C. Statistical analysis**1102 *Appendix C.1. Newspapers included in the analysis***Table C.5:** Ownership, Interests and Ideology of 23 Prominent Russian Newspapers

Newspaper	Year	Ownership		Interests & Ideology		
		<i>Owner (Name)</i>	<i>Owner (Type)</i>	<i>Energy</i>	<i>Kremlin</i>	<i>Ideology</i>
Argumenty i fakty	1995	Unknown	Journalists	No	No	Center
Argumenty i fakty	2002	Promsvyaz'kapital	Business	No	Yes	Center
Argumenty i fakty	2014	Moscow City Government	State-owned	No	No	Center
Argumenty nedeli	2011	SVR-Media, SWR group	Journalists	No	Yes	Center
E'konomika i zhizn'	1995	Independent	Journalists	No	Yes	Center
E'kspert	1998	Unknown	Journalists	No	No	Right
E'kspert	2000	Unknown	Journalists	No	Yes	Right
E'kspert	2007	Oleg Deribaska, Expert Media Holding	Business	Yes	Yes	Right
Itogi	1997	Media Most, Gusinskiy	Business	No	No	Right
Itogi	2001	Gazprom Media Holding	Business	Yes	Yes	Right
Izvestiia	1995	Journalists collective	Journalists	No	No	Right
Izvestiia	1997	Lukoil, Oneksinnabk	Business	Yes	Yes	Right
Izvestiia	2005	Gazprom	Business	Yes	Yes	Right
Izvestiia	2008	National Media Group	Business	Yes	Yes	Right
Kommersant. Daily	1995	Vladimiri Yakovlev	Journalists	No	No	Right
Kommersant. Daily	1999	Berezovkiy & Basri Badartsikashvili	Business	No	No	Right
Kommersant. Daily	2007	Alisher Usmanov	Business	Yes	No	Right
Kommersant. Den'gi	1995	Vladimiri Yakovlev	Journalists	No	No	Right
Kommersant. Den'gi	1999	Berezovkiy & Basri Badartsikashvili	Business	No	No	Right
Kommersant. Den'gi	2007	Alisher Usmanov	Business	Yes	No	Right
Komsomol'skaia pravda	1997	Profmedia; Swedish group A-Pressen	Business	Yes	Yes	Right
Komsomol'skaia pravda	2007	Grigorii Berezkin, energy sector	Business	Yes	Yes	Center
Literaturnaia gazeta	1995	Independent	Journalists	No	Yes	Center
Moskovskaia pravda	1995	Muladjanov Shod, Editorial board	Journalists	No	No	Center
Moskovskii' komsomolets	1995	Pavel Gusev	Journalists	No	Yes	Right
Nasha versiia	2000	Sovershenno Sekretno	Journalists	No	No	Center
Nasha versiia	2007	Nikolai Zyatkov	Journalists	No	Yes	Center
Novaia gazeta	1995	Editorial Board; Aleksander Lebedev (39pc); Mikhail Gorbachyov (10pc)	Journalists	Yes	No	Right
Novye izvestiia	1998	Alliance Oil Company, Berezovski	Business	Yes	No	Right

Table C.5: (Continued)

Novye izvestiia	2003	Alliance Oil Company	Business	Yes	Yes	Center
Ogonek	1999	Berezovkiy	Business	Yes	No	Center
Ogonek	2003	Russian Media Ventures	Journalists	No	No	Center
Ogonek	2005	Telekominvest	Business	No	No	Center
Ogonek	2009	Alisher Usmanov	Business	Yes	Yes	Center
Pravda	1995	Communist party of the RF	Political Party	No	No	Far-left
Profil'	1995	Sergei Rodionov	Business	No	No	Right
Rossii'skaia gazeta	1995	Russian government	State-owned	Yes	No	Center
Sovetskaia Rossiia	1995	Independent	Journalists	No	No	Far-left
Trud	1995	Journalists	Journalists	No	No	Left
Trud	1998	Gazprom	Business	Yes	No	Left
Trud	2003	PromSvyazCapital	Business	No	No	Left
Trud	2012	Institute of Free Journalism (Sergei Tsoi, Valery Simonov, Yuri Ryazhsky)	Journalists	No	No	Left
Uchitel'skaia gazeta	1995	Independent	Journalists	No	No	Center
Vecherniaia Moskva	1995	Bank of Moscow	Business	No	Yes	Center
Vecherniaia Moskva	2011	Moscow government	State-owned	No	No	Center
Zavtra	1995	Prokhanov/Babakov (UR)	Political Party	No	No	Far-right




Figure C.5: *Temporal variation of dependent variables.* The proportion of all words devoted to the meta-topics that underlie a given dependent variable. Quarterly data from the 23 most prominent Russian newspapers over the period Q1/2000-Q2/2014 are displayed. A local polynomial line (orange) is displayed to aid interpretation. Note that y-axes are not on a common scale.

1106 As briefly outlined in Section 4.3, we estimate variation in the intensity of
 1107 news coverage employing a mixture of a Bernoulli distribution for the decision
 1108 to cover the issue *at all* and a beta distribution to represent coverage *intensity*.
 1109 Suppose y_{it} represents coverage for paper i during time period t . We assume
 1110 the following probability model:

$$\text{BernBeta}(y_{it}|p, \mu, \phi) = \begin{cases} p & \text{if } y_{it} = 0 \\ (1-p)\text{Beta}(\mu, \phi) & \text{if } y_{it} > 0 \end{cases} \quad (\text{C.1})$$

1111

1112 Note that p is the probability of *not* covering climate change in a particular
1113 period and the Beta distribution is expressed in terms of its mean (μ) and
1114 precision (ϕ) parameters:

$$Beta(\mu, \phi) = \frac{\Gamma(\phi)}{\Gamma(\mu\phi)\Gamma((1-\mu)\phi)} y^{\mu\phi-1}(1-y)^{(1-\mu)\phi-1} \quad (C.2)$$

1115

1116 where $0 \geq \mu \leq 1$, $\phi > 0$, and Γ is the gamma function. We follow the literature
1117 and parametrize $\mu = \frac{\alpha}{\alpha+\beta}$ and $\phi = \alpha+\beta$, where α and β are the shape parameters
1118 for the Beta distribution. We link the covariates described in Table 2 to p_{it} and
1119 μ using the logit link function.

1120 Given that 1) the zero-inflated Beta model is a somewhat non-standard spec-
1121 ification in the literature and 2) our data require the inclusion of random effects
1122 for repeated measures, we employ Bayesian inference. Specifically, we estimate
1123 the following model:

$$\begin{aligned}
y_{it} &\sim \text{BernBeta}(p_{it}, \mu_{it}, \phi_{it}) && \text{(likelihood)} \\
\text{logit}(p_{it}) &= \beta_{z=0}X + \alpha_{paper} + \alpha_{time} \\
\text{logit}(\mu_{it}) &= \beta_{z=1}X + \alpha_{paper} + \alpha_{time} \\
\phi &\sim U(0, 1) && \text{(priors)} \\
\beta &\sim N(0, 5) \\
\alpha_{papers} &\sim N(\mu_{papers}, \sigma_{papers}) \\
\alpha_{time} &\sim N(\mu_{time}, \sigma_{time}) \\
\mu_{papers} &\sim N(0, 1) \\
\mu_{time} &\sim N(0, 1) \\
\sigma_{papers} &\sim \text{HalfStudentT}(3, 0, 10) \\
\sigma_{time} &\sim \text{HalfStudentT}(3, 0, 10)
\end{aligned}$$

1124 We thus assume diffuse priors throughout the model—yet the results are stable
1125 to alternative assumptions regarding prior specification. All of our models are
1126 estimated via MCMC using the No-U-Turn Sampler (NUTS) implemented in
1127 Stan (<http://mc-stan.org>).