

Abstract

If settler colonies are driven by the impulse of destroying to replace, what was destroyed and how was it replaced in Algeria? This article shows how an Islamic state of being was replaced by the being of the state in the 1830s and the '40s; a transformation largely achieved through complementary strategies of spectacular and slow violence, ranging from annihilatory massacres to the seizure of the productive capacity of peoples and their lands. By listening attentively to indigenous writers such as Hamdan Khodja and Ahmed Bey, alongside the banal details of the making of empire found in archival documents, a new picture of the development of 'Algeria' emerges, along with its significance in world history.

Keywords: Algeria, Settler Colonialism, the state, Indigeneity, Massacre, Slow violence, Genocide, Ahmed Bey, Hamdan Khodja

The Destruction of the Islamic State of Being,

Its Replacement in the Being of the State:

ALGERIA 1830-47

William Gallois¹

Bit by bit, try to persuade the Arabs to accept our money.²

Maréchal Bugeaud

Introduction

The state, specifically the modern nation state, was not conceived in one place. Nonetheless, if we wish to understand how it came into being, the laboratory of the early Algerian colony is a good place to look.³

This essay argues that while one form of state was destroyed in Algeria over the period 1830-47 – between the Conquest and the push south to the Sahara – it was replaced by a new form of life of world historical significance. Indeed, this act of destruction and that which was destroyed were also of global importance. The new state was founded on two understandings and praxes of violence: first, the spectacular violence of immediacy which was designed to destroy people, communities, cultures and livelihoods; second, a programme of ‘slow violence’ designed to capture

people and space for all time. The new state retained not simply a Weberian desire to monopolise violence within its borders, but was itself forged in and of that violence. While this violence was structural, its structuring was programmatic; orchestrated by soldier-politicians who had overseen warring in Europe across the Revolutionary and Napoleonic periods. As Nutt notes, this positive emergence of the state in Europe depended on the negative elimination of others in the settler colonial world.⁴ Indeed, the intellectual roots of the state in the work of Hobbes, Locke and Kant depend upon this transaction, for, as Kant remarked, 'The white race possesses all motivating forces and talents in itself.'⁵

The notion that France ushered in the modern world lies central to History.⁶ The Revolution's upending of the old order and invention of the modern citizen meshed with the Enlightenment's assertion of man's control and understanding of the world, presaging Napoleon's military export of these values. Edward Said's account of Orientalism as the dominant expression of interwoven European cultural and political power in the Middle East began with those wars (in Egypt), just as Hegel had in his assertion that the end state of political organisation had been reached once Napoleon had defeated the Prussians at Jena.⁷

Curiously, we pay more attention to these historical failures than we do to the world historical success of France in Algeria. Napoleon, after all, was expelled from Egypt, just as he was from Prussia. He may have inaugurated the End of History, but he was succeeded by autocrats who staved off democratic destiny for many decades.

What, then, was forged in the French extension of its body politic into North Africa in the 1830s and '40s? In what sense did the making of the modern state depend on the space and time which were opened up by the destruction of people and forms of life which encumbered that project? Why has that which was destroyed been forgotten? What was lost in its obliteration, and what can its memorialists show us about the new forms of life which came into the world in Algeria?

This paper begins by considering how contemporary literatures on settler colonialism offer novel ways of assessing the Algerian colony, before asking how close readings of indigenous historical writers from the nineteenth century complement the critique of writers such as Patrick Wolfe, Dirk Moses, Rafael Lemkin and Lorenzo Veracini, as well as looking at their descriptions of the social order which was assailed. It then goes on to detail how forms of slow and structural violence were implemented across the period 1830-47, drawing on Ann Laura Stoler's method of reading 'along the archival grain' to show how hitherto neglected colonial letters and reports describe a systematic project of state-building through spatially and temporally conceived forms of violence.⁸

The Algerian settler colony

'Settler colonialism destroys to replace'⁹, Patrick Wolfe remarked, yet we know too little of that which was destroyed in Algeria or the relationship between destruction and replacement, while the Algerian case scarcely features in the canon of comparative studies of settler colonialism. Wolfe goes on to quote Theodor Herzl's remark that "If I wish to substitute a new building for an old one, I must demolish before I construct", and just as the example of Zionism paired such idealistic dreams with a practical programme of substitution, the French invasion of Algeria was founded on analogous notions of a new house being built atop the ruins of the old. What, though, was destroyed? What was replaced?

Dirk Moses notes that the syncopation of processes in which the 'elimination of the native' was discussed, countenanced and realized, occurred at precisely the same historical moment in Australia, America and Algeria, yet there has been much less historical interest in the eliminatory or genocidal qualities of the cultural encounter in Algeria as compared with Anglophone settler colonies.¹⁰ Like Moses, Patrick Wolfe's identification of distinct forms of destruction lying at the heart of settler colonial praxis also drew on the work of Raphael Lemkin, and his identification of the

plurality and interdependence of forms of annihilation when he coined the term 'genocide'.¹¹ 'The logic of elimination', Wolfe writes, 'not only refers to the summary liquidation of Indigenous people, though it includes that', for it also includes those forms of slow and structural violence which induce 'the dissolution of native societies'.¹² Such social goals are predicated on the distinctness of settler colonies in that 'settler colonizers come to stay: invasion is a structure not an event.'¹³

This sense of the structural violence of the Algerian case was famously explored in a twentieth-century context by Frantz Fanon¹⁴, while Abdelmajid Hannoum's work extends such analysis to the nineteenth century (from 1847 onwards), arguing that the Algerian experience reveals that 'the discourse of modernity itself inflicts and creates the conditions of violence'.¹⁵ Unlike Hannoum, however, this essay has little interest in the textuality of violence or the means by which it was countenanced in cultural production (the chief sources for Hannoum's project), for, by 1847¹⁶, much of the programme of violent displacement had been accomplished in Algeria. At times it had been theorised on the published page, but it is the private records of the fabric of local encounters and exchanges between metropolitan and colonial power which reveal the empirical and programmatic extent of the destruction of indigenous cultures.¹⁷ To a unique degree amongst settler colonies, Algeria was settled by soldiers and militarily defined as a polity.

What the reports, letters and marginalia of the archival record reveal is that Hannoum's description of modernity as being a French export to Algeria¹⁸ misses the degree to which modernity was made in the colony, or in interchanges between the two places.¹⁹ Similarly, modernity did not create new forms of violence; rather, novel forms of violence were constitutive of the stitching of modernity.²⁰ Murray-Miller's notion that modernity was instead constructed across the Mediterranean rings truer, whilst a great deal of work remains to be done on detailing and unpicking the continuities in the politics, ideology and, most importantly, practice of violence in French warring at home during the Revolution, abroad in wars such as those fought on the Iberian peninsula, and further afield in colonies such as Algeria and Nouvelle Calédonie.²¹

Mark Levene's claim that the massacres of the Vendée in 1790s were not only the archetypal modern genocide, but also integral to a new form of nation-building, points to the interlocking and productive character of new forms of ideology and violence at this time (alongside Schama's stress on the relationship between violence and new understandings of citizenship).²² Similarly, David Bell's contention that the Napoleonic campaigns marked the advent of 'total war' again established French primacy in the marriage of novel forms of conflict with fundamentally new relationships of power between nations and citizens.²³ It was in such environments that the architects of the Algerian policy were schooled in the creative capacity of modes of violence which targeted societies and the environments which supported them; comprehending the political efficacy of strangling indigenous forms of life and the dreams which could be built in such spaces.

'A new Peru'

Contemporaneous French sources can *never* be relied on to describe *how* their Conquest affected Algerians²⁴, for while they provided many answers to this question, they did not know what they were destroying. They had not been in and of the place. Those who had, such as the indigenous writers Hamdan Khodja and Ahmed, Bey of Constantine, are the guides to whom we should turn to learn what was obliterated, how it was replaced and what effects it had on local peoples. Listened to attentively, we learn that in imposing a new form of governance upon an evolving Algerian space – the nation state – colonists destroyed an existing polity and society. In a sense, the historical underestimation of the scale of this loss of ways of life has come about precisely because the French programme of destruction in Algeria was not as completely annihilatory as, say, the settler colonial experience in America or Australia. Algerians remained a numeric majority in their own land throughout the colonial period and from the last decades of the nineteenth century onwards they were able to reconstitute indigenous societies from subaltern positions. Nonetheless, in the 1830s and '40s, Khodja and Ahmed Bey were not to know that their people would ultimately live more like

the black majority of apartheid South Africa than the Cheyenne Native Americans or the Aboriginal Australians of Tasmania.

Indigenous actors well understood that a project of destruction for replacement was being enjoined, and that destruction itself was a form of replacement. Having written a seminal text on what he saw as the true character of militarized governance in Algeria – entitled *The Mirror*²⁵ so as to suggest the forms of self-deception which underwrote a project of annihilation grounded in the idea of goodness – Hamdan Khodja, a leading landowner, merchant and functionary, felt bound to respond to French critics who continued to claim that the Conquest was a model of liberal imperialism.²⁶ Writing in July 1834, just four years after the arrival of French troops, Khodja maintained that after a single month of exploring the idea of working with local elites under Governor General Bourmont, the arrival of Clauzel in August 1830 marked the end of any concept of shared forms of governance. Instead, Clauzel's tenure inaugurated the making of 'a new Peru', with Khodja predicting a future for Algeria in which a lust for booty would combine with the Columbian destruction of local ecologies and the introduction of new diseases, resulting in demographic decline and the economic capture of indigenous peoples.²⁷ 'Everyone sought quickly to enrich themselves', he wrote, in a 'system of extermination and ruination' ('une système d'extermination et de spoliation').²⁸

This systematic quality of extermination and economic destruction was critical because it countered the notion that massacres (such as that of the El Ouffia in 1832) and other observable instances of atrocities were not aberrant, but formative of a culture of governance. The trope of the 'isolated incident' would often be used by the French in debates at home and amongst Europeans – as in the Dahra massacre of 1845 – but Khodja described a radically new form of life emerging in Algeria which was built not upon accidents, but upon systems and strategy. These were Wolfe's 'processes', not simply 'events'.

This stress on the revolutionary qualities of processive violence was also emphasised by Ahmed, Bey of Constantine, whose appeals to the French, the British and the Ottomans revealed a determination to describe the replacement effects of the intertwining of immediate and structural forms of destruction. As he (and 2246 co-signatories, representing the 'notables of Constantine, the heads of the great families, thinkers, teachers and professors, the 'Ulema and the Bedouin chiefs and their notables') wrote to the British Parliament in 1834, contrasting the British role in the global anti-slavery movement with the enslavement of Algerians:

We write to inform your honourable Parliament that the French entered Algiers after signing, aided by your consul's work as an intermediary, a well-defined treaty. However, the French have not respected the terms of this treaty. On the contrary, they have followed a quite different path in choosing to expel people from this land without cause, in separating husbands from their wives and families whilst seizing their possessions, in subverting religion, in taking control of the *habous* [*waqf*²⁹] that Muslims established for the poor, in taking over mosques in order to live in them or to rent them to traders. Furthermore, they have unjustly destroyed houses, killed and massacred without cause, unfairly imprisoned others, desecrated graves, and impoverished all the inhabitants of Algiers. As for the Bedouins who inhabit neighbouring areas, they were massacred in spite of their having made peace with the French and their women and children were killed pitilessly. In the history of oppression, we have never comes across such extreme examples of injustice.³⁰

This catalogue of forms of destruction described the varieties of immediate and slow violence which characterised the French occupation from its inception. As the Bey went on to write, 'it is quite clear that their intention is to destroy Islamic law, to spill blood, to change the religion of the place, and to avenge themselves against the living as much as the dead [*de se venger des vivants comme des morts*].³¹ Thus, as Khodja had also underscored, while individual massacres mattered, it was critical

to see that the *progressive* project of destruction was grounded in forms of slow and structural violence which sought to annihilate the culture of the living as much as that of the dead.

The point of origin of almost all writing on the early Algerian colony has tended to be its creative capacity and the narrative of its testing coming-into-being³², whereas a study which begins with Ahmed Bey or Hamdan Khodja starts from a position of prizing the narrative importance of that which was destroyed as much as that was built upon its ruins and ashes. Crucially, Ahmed Bey described the interlocking of spectacular, immediate violence with forms of slower, more structural assaults on indigenous life: the destruction of houses, the seizure of land and the dismantling of the lived culture of justice embodied in *waqf* institutions. The concept of destroying to replace is most plain in his account of the confiscation of mosques in order to rent them to traders, for as a pillar of life was removed, it was replaced by a form of economic profiteering and control which underwrote the costs of occupation and acted to dismantle the autonomy of indigenous economic actors. And given that forms of autonomy were attacked in Algeria, it was unsurprising that much of the fiercest resistance the French faced came from those Kabyles whose self-identity was predicated on the notion that they were 'free men' (*Amazigh* or *Imazighen*).³³

That which was destroyed also merits being described as a state, though it was not of course drawn along the same lines as the modern European nation state. Instead, the Algerian³⁴ state was spatially complex in the sense that it accommodated local power and governance within an overarching imperial frame, underwritten by shared religious sensibilities and culture (temporally assured by God). Nowhere was this more obvious than in the figure of Ahmed Bey, a *kouloughli* creole, born of a Turkish father and a Maghrebi mother, whose later years were dominated by his appeals to Istanbul on behalf of his co-religionists in Constantine, whom he governed and to whom he belonged. This state was grounded in the institution of the *waqf*, with its many practical manifestations of enacted justice in forms of social security, public health and other civic goods.³⁵ *This* is what the French destroyed, we learn from indigenous writers, and colonists did not replace it

with equivalent provision of public services, for the early European nation state assumed few such collective responsibilities. Ideas of social citizenship would only become preoccupations in European culture later in the nineteenth century and the twentieth century, so their destruction in Algeria passed almost without notice for the French, for whom such ways of life were invisible in spite of their being quite discernible to local actors.

While there has been a considerable focus on the confiscation of land by colonists, especially after 1847³⁶, less is known about the destruction of the productive capacity of indigenous peoples, which served as a prelude to such land seizures. Equally, the army's determination to destroy the economic autonomy of local peoples – through strategies of surveillance and market control – has been understated.³⁷ Building on the work of Mahfoud Bennoune, Yves Gallisot, Samir Amin and Abdellatif Benachenhou, as precursors to the work of Settler Colonial Studies, this essay stresses the role played by the army in building this new world.³⁸

Bennoune, in particular, argued that the Conquest of Algeria was essentially driven by economic motives, including a desire for raw materials and markets for finished goods³⁹, the extension of the monopolization of western Mediterranean trade which had already begun before 1830, along with royalist hostility to the fact that the Regency had made interest-free loans to France in the Revolutionary period.⁴⁰ Critically, adopting a language quite familiar from settler colonial studies, Bennoune contended that:

Besides the military and political ramifications of this conquest, the introduction of capitalism, in its colonial form, involved the destruction of the pre-1830 socio-economic structures and patterns. This destruction was accompanied by a coercive pauperization and proletarianisation of the rural population and the development of a colonial agrarian capitalism.⁴¹

As we shall see, this description of 'colonial agrarian capitalism' as that which replaced 'the destruction of the pre-1830 socio-economic structures and patterns' captures only part of the radical transformation of the world inflicted upon the peoples of Algeria.

A state of being

Put most simply, in Algeria a state of being was replaced by the being of the state. Where lives had been experienced, they were now subordinated to the needs of the nascent state; a polity, which, as Ahmed Bey had observed, sought vengeance against the living as well as the dead. The Bey's inventory of the ways in which the world of indigenous peoples had rapidly changed and been diminished described a shift from what he saw as organic forms of life to the hegemony of inorganic state control. This authority assumed a power which was not man's to take, 'subverting religion' and the order of things. It substituted obedience towards God with submission to the abstraction of the state, in which a form of citizenship replaced the gift of life. This new form of political recognition was of course alienated for it required Muslims and Jews to renounce their allegiance to their faiths if they wished to replace such fealty with the gift of citizenship. Algerians thus became unhumans; their collective state of timelessness being replaced by the immanent prerogatives of the futurity of the state. Lives of present moral duty were supplanted by obligations to the state and its capacity to act beyond morality in the name of an unfolding world.

This is not to claim that lives before the Conquest had always been benign, nor that political power had always acted benevolently, yet a series of critical temporal and spatial shifts changed life in the early colony. A stasis of being was predicated on a perpetual present (assured by cosmic justice), quite different to the futurity of the temporal hierarchy of the man-made state, in which inhuman behaviour in the present could and should be excused by the progressive beneficence of an ideal of a better world to come. This should not be mistaken for the Orientalist description of the retarded and stagnant character of Muslim societies, for the state of being prized depth and

accessing truths through reflective tradition, rather than the reimagination of the world.⁴² Indeed, the Arabic concept of timelessness – *khalid* – can only really be understood as ‘eternity’ or ‘immortality’, substituting the sense of lack in ‘timeless’ or ‘intemporel’ with a sense of the temporal richness of being.

If the temporal character of the world became more variegated, spatially life became more restricted. Contrary to the beliefs of Europeans, who saw primitive peoples in Algeria as they did across the non-West, the old world had been one where life was both local and transnational. While the focus of living was grounded in the immediacy of known others, patterns of trade, governance and pilgrimage connected the lifeways of people across the Mediterranean and beyond. Critically, this space was assured by God, while the life of the nation state was directed by man. This secularity of the embryonic state has been curiously underestimated, perhaps because identifying the lacuna of religion in French archival sources depends on the recognition of their silences, rather than avowed programmes of action.

That which was destroyed was religious, whether we describe it as a Muslim or an Islamicate state. It was underwritten by quite distinct forms of ethics which stood in contradistinction to the morals of the new nation state. Where French governance was chiefly driven by the idea of beneficence (famously in the *mission civilisatrice*) and sometimes constrained by the brake of non-maleficence, in the Islamic state complementary ethics of justice and autonomy sat alongside the Hippocratic injunctions to do good and not to do harm.⁴³ As Ahmed Bey wrote:

What are we to understand of their ambitions for our country, if they pretend that they have come here to modernise, to create a culture of justice and to suppress barbarism? Today, we reply that we are sure that the barbarism and the injustice which they practice are more hateful and detestable than any all the injustice and barbarism that has ever been known here.⁴⁴

For the Bey, where France was good and driven by destiny, the Algerian state was just and humble before God. Life was directed in the discernment of that which God would view as just, and while human life was imperfect, the aspiration to justice was not.

The individual was also autonomous for her relationship with God was personal, while, curiously, the reorientation of the self towards a relationship with the state played out economically as much as it did theologically, for the 'invisible hand' of both the market and God were replaced in a schema of national governance.

Bennoune was quite right to assert that colonial capitalism was regressive in its primarily agrarian character, for the destruction of urban nodes of exchange eliminated both ways of life and the capacity of transnational markets to supply the needs of populations across vast spaces. The centre assumed control of that which had been decentred, with the imposition of feudalism on a Muslim polity in a form reminiscent of the shift that had taken place in the newly European Spain of the sixteenth century.⁴⁵

This compression of the space for life was doubly dispiriting for Ahmed Bey since the French were aided by the policies of the Ottomans, not only in their general quietism and loyalty to France over their own people, but also in the specific policies adopted by 'Ahmed, Pāshā of Tunis, who outlawed trade with Algerians, thus 'obliging them to trade with the infidel'.⁴⁶ This spatial constriction therefore aided the creation of the national market as one of the governing structures of the new state, encouraging a questioning of traditional Islamic approaches to the state.

Hava Lazarus-Hafeh has argued that 'the traditional Islamic attitude'⁴⁷ had assumed the relatively unquestioning support of believers for political authority. 'Jurists, administrators, philosophers, and authors', he contended, 'all presupposed the legitimacy of the state within which the Islamic community ran its course and treated it as no more than an administrative phenomenon.' 'No jurist', he added, had 'ever postulated an ideal Islamic state, even in the haziest

way, or elaborated an Islamic political theory'. This was the Khaldūnian separation of religious and political spheres, especially apparent in the quietism of the Sunni world.

The revolutionary qualities of the new world which the French brought to and made in Algeria, enumerated by writers such as Ahmed Bey and Hamdan Khodja, came precisely in the manner in which the new state moved beyond the boundaries of existing 'as no more than an administrative phenomenon'. For the first time, 'the Islamic community' was not able to 'run its course'; the flow of life, the natural order of things, was disrupted, and Algerians were forced to consider the nature of their governance and rulers afresh. Whereas, in the tradition, as Lazarus-Hafeh remarks, 'The ruler was of interest only in terms of his general attitude and moral stance', Algerians were now obliged to confront the idea that 'the Islamic system' of living was being dismantled by the state, engendering a moral catastrophe of a kind that could not have been attributable to any single ruler working within the Islamic system. Instead, as Khodja alleged, a 'system of extermination and ruination' was visited upon Algeria; a notion curiously confirmed by men such as Soult and Bugeaud who described their work of extermination as a 'system'.⁴⁸

Atemporal life was replaced by empire's futurity and its conquest of time. Systematic life was grounded in the idea of a world controlled by men, and its contestation encompassed those such as Ahmed Bey who wrote of the virtues of the traditional Islamicate way of being and those, such as the Amir Abd' al-Qādir⁴⁹, who sought to wrest control of the new state from French hands, initiating a debate on Islam and its relationship to the state which would course through all Muslim lands colonised or invaded by Europeans. From the work of Mohammad Abdu in late nineteenth-century Egypt, through to the writings of Maududi and others on the subcontinent, right through to Wael Hallaq's⁵⁰ twenty-first century interrogation of the notion that Islam can coexist with the state, the encounter in Algeria inaugurated a new cultural moment which would come to define Islamicate and European polities in the modern era.

This assault on indigenous Algerian modes of lived space and time tallies with the experience of other settler colonies at this moment, such as Australia, where the distinct fabric of Aboriginal

space-time, in which Dreamings were shared amongst peoples across a network of trade and cultural routes, was eliminated in coeval forms of spectacular and slow violence.⁵¹ The Dreamtime itself, as an overarching and shared temporal order, was thus threatened through the blocking of the spatial flow of knowledge in the world.

As we will see, the French assault on nature and markets in Algeria was motivated by a need to diminish the capacity of indigenous peoples to continue to live as autonomous agents. The colonist's frustration with such independent life is replayed over and over again with the commonplace description of tribes as being 'recalcitrant' across the mass of archival records from the period. To take one example, Soutt wrote to Bugeaud in February 1843 of the 'very severe punishment' meted out in the Kabylie, which had included the 'cruel extreme' of 'burning great numbers of villages', as well as 'destroying at least 20,000 fruit trees'.⁵² He hoped, nonetheless, 'that we will profit from such actions, even with those who have been recalcitrant till now'.⁵³ The temporal character of this instrumental assault on indigenous peoples was made plain in his concluding remarks that 'Since such terrible work preserves our own future, let us hope that similar forms of devastation will not always need to be inflicted upon those who make our following such paths inevitable!'

This note also points to a vital corrective in our understanding of the making of the colony which emanates from a reading of the archival record. When seen from a European perspective, much is made of the piecemeal and gradual manner in which French governance in Algeria evolved, following the shifting power relations of soldiers, administrators, merchants and settlers and the ways in which their positions were influenced by changes in the domestic polity. Most histories of the early colony focus on the persona of Governor General Maréchal Bugeaud – often in dramatic opposition to his native foe, the Āmir 'Abd al'Qādir – yet very few of them look in any detail at the extent to which a fully-rationalised military-political strategy was shared by metropolitan and colonial power centres.⁵⁴

This strategy was laid out, and developed, in thousands of letters and reports exchanged by Bugeaud and other generals with their governmental sponsor, Maréchal Soult, who served as Minister of War from 1830-34 and 1840-47, and as Prime Minister from 1832-34 and 1839-47.⁵⁵ As early as 1842, for instance, Bugeaud wrote to Soult that ‘serious warfare has now finished’, and in its place ‘the era of reorganization of this vast edifice has arrived’⁵⁶; this ‘vast edifice’ being the new state of which both men dreamed. Crucially, the huge size of the standing army – more than 100,000 men in 1840 (by contrast, there were never more than 20,000 British soldiers in the much larger settler colonial space of Australia) – gave it ‘unconstrained power’⁵⁷, and the capacity to realise its dreams. As Bugeaud was to write to Soult in July 1842, ‘We are not able to govern the Arabs and keep them in obedience through religious force or political sentiment. Force is therefore our principal form of government’.⁵⁸

The argument of this article therefore draws on this stock of under-researched evidence, looking to connect elite policymaking with the mundane practices of empire-making. When, in 1842, Soult wrote to General Bugeaud ‘Bit by bit, try to persuade the Arabs to accept our money’, he was ordering the enactment of a policy at a very local level, but this was also expressive of a conceptual ideal which had been forged in Paris and Algiers. At both levels, it was expressive of the idea of slow violence, for the acceptance of French currency by intractable tribes could be recorded as evidence of their definitive defeat, whilst more generally it conveyed the idea of social incorporation or capture for all time, for once you began to trade in the currency of your enemy, you lay at the mercy of their management of your affairs in something which became a national economy. Bugeaud’s Marxian insight into the symbolic power of money relations is mirrored across the thousands of routine and unremarkable sets of orders and notes which travelled around the nascent colony, in which we witness the spread of a cash nexus in which organic modes of exchange were replaced by the inorganic dominance of the monetary sign as economy replaced ecology.

Slow violence

The concept of slow violence requires a new analytic optic according to its originator, Rob Nixon.⁵⁹ He contrasts the 'immediacy' of conventional violence which lies in full view of the critic (and both victims and perpetrators), with forms of 'subterranean' violence whose effects might be just as devastating in spite of their being harder to perceive. Nixon's argument primarily pertains to forms of environmental destruction in the contemporary world, but his concept is arguably of broader historical value.

In the Algerian case, Nixon's stress on the way in which the consequences of violence are mediated upon peoples through the degradation of the ecologies which support their ways of life maps precisely onto the French aspiration to conquer through the elimination of traditional ways of living. Similarly, Nixon's idea that forms of slow violence can lie hidden because of their temporality (their effects may be postponed to the future) and their spatiality (they may only affect unseen others elsewhere) also seems to reflect the insights of environmental histories of nineteenth-century empire.⁶⁰

Much has been written about spectacular forms of immediate violence in the early Algerian colony⁶¹, yet almost no attention has been paid to those forms of slow violence which secured French control of a land and its people, along with the formation of a new state. In part this is because what became the French predominant military strategy – the *razzia* – combined both spectacular and slow forms of violence, often entailing massacring, but also including the colossal confiscation of goods and livestock (as many as 1.2 million sheep in a single raid), as well as the destruction of habitats and crops.⁶²

The *razzia* was judged by the French to be an acceptable form of warfare in Algeria; 'natural' in the sense that it accorded with the innate violence of the place (being notionally based on the Arabic *ghāzwa*⁶³), its people and their land, and in the manner in which it sought to impose European cultural and governmental control upon the harsh environment which sustained such

warring peoples. It was also presumed to be effective because it deployed violence in a communicative manner which purportedly made sense to the peoples of the Barbary Coast. The *razzia's* perfection lay in its timelessness in that it echoed historic forms of violence from the Maghreb, whilst destroying lives and livelihoods in its present, along with their future capacity for life.

Over time, the economic motive became imperative in such raids, for they combined the colonist's need to establish lines of communication and markets which could sustain the burdens imposed by the huge standing army, whilst at the same time degrading the ecological and economic capacity of France's enemies to live independent of imperial control. The amalgamation of such goals and strategies was made plain in a typical letter of June 1842 from Bugeaud to a commander in the field in which he laid out his goals for the campaigning season.⁶⁴ The Governor General began by setting out which territory the general ought to try to retain, focusing on the strategic town of Attlah, for if it was held 'it would offer security to the Metidja and the surrounds of Algiers, whilst opening up a degree of commerce which is so vital for this small town'. The mission's secondary aim was to 'introduce into Miliana and Médéa as much grain as possible, especially barley', with troops rewarded with the sum of 14 francs for every quintal (100lb) of barley and 20 francs for every quintal of wheat they brought to market. Such crops would not only sustain the army, but the control of their sale would help to establish an economic dominion, in a market in which prices could be reduced through the colonist's control of the supply of goods.

The degree to which the slow violence of the *razzia* was strategised and implemented across the colony is apparent in the ordinary records left behind by colonists, such as a report from the cercle d'Aumale from 15 July 1847. There, the local functionary, writing to his politico-military masters in Algiers, reported that 'the majority of the inhabitants have been able to pay their portion of the Zekkar tax'.⁶⁵ However, one tribe, the Beni Sala, were proving more obdurate. They had an 'undisciplined' 'character' and were not so 'submissive'. The occupier knew, nonetheless, that by

this point power lay in his hands. The tribe were 'constrained by the fear of seeing their harvests destroyed' (note here the indirect verbal formulation). For this reason, the French knew that they would hasten to take their grain to secret mountain redoubts, which they considered to be unseizable. 'The report', again using forms of language which denied human agency, 'foresees that, in order to stymy their wicked plans, it will be necessary to offer them a severe lesson' [de leur donner un leçon sévère].

Here, then, the overarching temporality of the razzia was again made plain: in order to make a future which avoided the traps of the past, instructive violence would need to be administered in the present. Once this had been undertaken, the cercle d'Aumale would be more like that of Boghar, which had reported to the central authorities in the same sequence of reports, remarking that there had been 'a notable increase in trade with the tribes of the south as compared with previous years'.⁶⁶

One of the distinctive features of the Algerian settler colonial case was the degree to which the control of marketplaces lay central to the French project of slow violence. Writing more generally, Wolfe notes that:

Whatever settlers may say— and they generally have a lot to say—the primary motive for elimination is not race (or religion, ethnicity, grade of civilization, etc.) but access to territory. Territoriality is settler colonialism's specific, irreducible element.⁶⁷

While this was as true of Algeria as it was of America or Australia, the settler colonial project in North Africa was predicated not on land seizures (which would come later), but on the destruction of traditional modes of exchange with their replacement by a 'national' marketplace for goods, established and controlled by the colonist. Territoriality in this context extended beyond the terrestrial to include a more encompassing conceptual idea of a space of exchange, in which the capacity for the sale and purchase of goods to provide life was managed by the state.

This strategy was based upon the stock of ethnographic observations sent by officers to their superiors, for, writing about the period before the Conquest, Elbaki Hermassi had observed that the marketplace was critical to the life of the peoples of the Maghreb:

Contrary to the stereotyped image of traditional society, neither the North African tribe nor the region could have existed with a closed economy. It was vitally necessary for the populations of both the north and the south to make regular visits to places of exchange. The Kabylia region, overpopulated and recalcitrant to central control, needed wheat products for subsistence; to that end it had to commercialize its oil and figs in the marketplaces of the Tell, and it became greatly dependent upon its relationship to this market. The tribes of the south also depended upon the market; there, they exchanged their wool, livestock and dates for grain and other items purchased in the fertile regions of the north. [...] The marketplace, strategic as it was for exchange, was also instrumental in cementing social relationships for an otherwise dispersed and fragmented population.⁶⁸

Mahfoud Bennoune noted the degree to which the French army saw the destruction and depopulation of urban centres as being critical to their military-economic goals, for such tactics also blunted the trading system of the entire country as urban markets ceased to function as efficient centres of exchange. As he noted, the population of Oran fell from 10,000 in 1830 to just 1,000 in 1832, while that of the capital halved in 1831.⁶⁹ The same was also true of the third-largest city in the region, as a colonial official had remarked in 1845:

Constantine is horrible to see; all buildings are falling in ruin, and half the houses that were there five years ago have been demolished. The indigenous population is in a terrifying state of misery and deprivation... by expelling the traders, by taking all sorts of violent measures, we have spread misery everywhere.⁷⁰

Reports of the success of such destructive policies were abundant across the period 1842-47 in which the submission of the Algerian as a producer was invariably paired with joyful descriptions

of the bounty enjoyed by French soldiers in the deserts or the mountains of the place soldiers called 'the land of thirst' ('le pays de la soif').⁷¹

Market control

Detailed accounts of the functioning of particular marketplaces can also help us to understand how the entry of indigenous peoples into national and international markets served to diminish both their physical capacity and their ability to exist in the new world of empire: the slow forms of oppression which, paired with the immediacy of the *razzia*, enjoined the demographic decline of the middle decades of the nineteenth century.⁷² They are also revealing of the manner in which the state replaced a state of being.

One such report described the marketplace of the main square of Mascara in June 1842, in which:

The Arabs who come to our markets have been spending a great deal of money in the square. At first, they frequented the Moorish cafes, and then they bought a great number of cottons, silks, Indian fabrics, handkerchiefs and other materials, before acquiring foodstuffs such as sugar, coffee, salt and pepper. In general they went on to export many of the goods acquired in the market via merchants from Oran or Mostaganem.⁷³

The writer went on to approvingly note that 'in general our markets are very busy', while in the last week it had been remarked that many more Arabs were in attendance than had been the case before. The manner in which this economic pacification could quickly morph into a tool of destitution was plain in the final section of the file in which it was reported that 'The Arabs receive a great deal of money for the farmyard animals which they hire to merchants who transport goods between Oran and Mostaganem'.

In fact, the accompanying statistics reveal, the market rate for such services had tumbled from 120 francs an animal in January, to 100F in February, a rapid decline to 80F, then 60F, then 40F in March, and 'now we pay only between 25F and 30F', with some rates falling as low as 20F. Even given the economic illiteracy of the age, we might ask how the writer of such a document could not understand that such a vertiginous fall in the value of indigenous assets evidently foretold an economic crisis. While it may have originally been the case that Arabs received 'a great deal of money' for such services, the writer does not reflect on how it had come to pass that the value of such animals had fallen sixfold in a matter of months. What was evidently key to him was the fact that 'now we pay only between 25F and 30F', for the alterity of the producer was lost in the joy of the consuming self, happy that the military-economic strategy of Soult and Bugeaud had so radically transformed the markets of the country in favour of the occupier.

The collapse in values at the market of Mascara in 1842 was mirrored in the movement of prices on a larger scale after the army's success in capturing the productive capacity of the country after 1845. Once the state was able to fix prices in the province of Algiers, the value of a metric quintal of wheat fell from 33 francs in 1856 to 22 francs in 1862, and 17.50 francs in 1865, while that of barley dropped from 19 francs to 13 francs to 9.50 francs across the same period. Indeed, Kitouni observes, this price setting constituted a form of 'double taxation', for a transaction charge was also applied to such trading, further enhancing the privation of local peoples, whilst from 1845 onwards taxes which had formerly been payable in goods were now demanded in monetary form, necessitating the sale of agricultural products at artificially low rates in markets and the added expense of incurring transport charges as goods were moved to designated trading centres.

More generally, Kitouni argues that historians have systematically underestimated the impact of French taxes (often invented using terminology in Arabic as a means of imputing a sheen of legitimacy to them— the *ashour*, *zakat*, *hokor*), fines, 'les tributs de guerre' and customs duties, and the degree to which they were conceived of as strategies of ruination.⁷⁴ The French had always

operated with an assumption that it was just that the costs of occupation should be shared between conqueror and conquered; a source, understandably, of as much resentment as almost any other feature of the annexation of Algeria.

Knowing the value of commodities was a step along the path to being able to control the cost of goods, which was a precondition of a form of economic domination in which the monopolization of the sources of life was a means of securing Algerian bodies as units of labour (or, more accurately, securing as many such units of labour as were needed in the new Algerian economy). This was, therefore, a modern form of war in the sense that local markets and forms of barter were irreversibly shifted into a hegemonic economy under the sign of money in which the French franc served as a cipher for all forms of value.

Bugeaud wrote to General Bedeau in May 1842, '4,800 piastres left here on the 24 April, bound for Tlemcen', as though he was speaking of the size of a fighting force.⁷⁵ And, as we have seen, local peoples had needed to be encouraged to use French money, in the knowledge that their use of such currency in their daily lives would symbolize their complete incorporation into the lifeworld of the colonist. As Aristide Gilbert reported from Algiers in 1831, the French systematically confiscated the goods and properties of local notables, such that 'the wretched owners, the majority of whom were expropriated without compensation, were reduced to begging [...] We imported a considerable volume of money into Algeria. It soon took the place of the local currency, which was declared not exchangeable.'⁷⁶ This, Bennoune notes, had the effect that 'Those who were spared were eventually ruined by inflation, which was aggravated by the introduction of French currency.'⁷⁷


Bugeaud went on to remind Bedeau that he and his men should only pay for transport and other services using French money and that they should insist that the local Jews did the same, 'under penalty of being chased away.'⁷⁸ It was imperative, moreover, that the Jews did not use Spanish currency and the Governor General recommended that an example be made of some of them to drive this message home.

France operated in both a moral and an economic sense with an overriding desire for completeness, reacting badly when this dream of absolute control was threatened. In a commercial sense, this included the dangers posed by the production of counterfeit money – as in the case of the discovery of a workshop in Mascara producing fake French and Spanish coins, which were ‘perfectly’ imitated⁷⁹ – to their awareness that their control of trade was far less complete than they would have wished.

Nonetheless, the colonist’s lack of awareness of what had been replaced through destruction is made plain in this remarkable graph from Élisée Reclus’ *Universal Geography* of 1885.⁸⁰

a very small part has hitherto been taken by Algeria itself. The land communications in the interior are also well developed, and in proportion to its population Algeria has more carriage roads than France. The stranger visiting the outskirts of Algiers and the other large towns, is surprised to find so many broad, well-kept

Fig. 147.—GROWTH OF THE FOREIGN TRADE OF ALGERIA SINCE 1830.



highways on the African continent, and the mental comparison which he makes with many European countries is to the advantage of the French colony

ROADS AND RAILWAYS.

In 1830 the only roads in the regency were the tracks of shepherds and their flocks, and the beaten paths of caravans along the streams and through the mountain gorges. But during the first years of the French occupation, one of the chief

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The figure shows the extent of the trade deficit which built up across the period 1830-85, but, far more importantly, it reveals that the French truly believed that their arrival marked a Year Zero in the history of the Algerian economy. In contradistinction to Hermassi's picture of local markets being connected to international networks of trade, for Reclus, Algeria had only entered the world in 1830; France had given Algeria her place in the world. This complete blindness as to the character of

Algerian society was of course mirrored in Orientalist binaries of a modern, scientific and technological European state arriving in a backward and unscientific native culture (given the lie in work by scholars such as Clancy-Smith⁸¹) and the fantasy of the *tabula rasa*, in which French generals and politicians dreamed that they might be able to inscribe a new world on the blank slate which was Algeria. As Moses and many others have observed, it was the idealism of this dream which often served as the wellspring of exterminatory ideas in print and in practice.

1847

Perhaps, then, we should look to 1847, rather than 1848, as marking a decisive moment in world history. Rather than focusing on failed European revolutions, we might consider the moment of victory of a transformative occupying force in Africa. Only the Sahara remained for France to conquer and the decades of frustration for the army, in which they had relentlessly sought to measure the population, the productive capacity of the land, the value of foods, prices across markets, and so on, were to be replaced by a world in which the costs of goods and services could now be fixed on a national level, with three-year plans setting prices for foodstuffs, the transport of goods and much else.⁸² To control prices was to control both production and consumption, to command the lives of the peoples of the country, and to impose an absolute sense of order onto territories which had been frustratingly chaotic and sufficiently porous that forms of life which worked against the interests of the military state could thrive and survive.

Rey-Goldzeiguer's work on the 1850s and '60s described the manner in which many of the impoverished peoples of Algeria were left with no options but to migrate to the cities once the conquest had been completed, to towns where they would invariably be broken as dispensable cogs in the machine of a monopoly capitalism established without the welfarist safeguards which would emerge in Europe.⁸³ As Bennoune wrote:

Once the capitalist mode of production was introduced into Algeria it subjected all the pre-existing socio-economic forms to the exigencies of capital accumulation for the benefit of the settlers, who, besides land capital, needed a free labour force. However, in order to work for the colonizers as share-croppers or wage-laborers, rural producers had to be expropriated; and the socio-economic organization of their respective communities had to be disintegrated and reorientated.⁸⁴

It is important to recognise that this movement of people and labour was far from an accidental consequence of empire, but was a strategic imperative for an army whose 'reorganization' of the 'vast edifice' of the nation depended on increasing productive capacity whilst reducing the costs of production.

We should not be surprised that a consequence of this economic hegemony was the inability of the ecology, environment and economy to provide for people in times of want. The margins of existence, in times of drought or other 'natural' disasters, were now controlled in a scientific fashion by the state with little interest in replicating the survival mechanisms which had been built into traditional ecologies. Silos of grain hidden in the mountains could not be countenanced in this new world⁸⁵, and as Ageron noted, glossed by Davis in his broader account of empire and capital's role in the creation of famines in the last decades of the nineteenth century, the value of goods and livestock actually tended to diminish at times when starvation was taking its hold on the population. While this may seem counterintuitive, for we would expect the cost of subsistence foodstuffs to rise at times when lives were threatened, colonial control of the economy had, as we have seen, been based upon the principle that the unit costs of labour and goods provided by the Indigènes should be relentlessly pushed down so as to make the colony 'pay for itself'.

As one report from the province of Oran had it in July 1847, 'the price of grains had reduced by a sensible amount' – for the consuming Self could never imagine the consequences of such shifts

in the market upon producing Others.⁸⁶ In situations such as the famines of the late 1860s, it therefore seems unsurprising to see rapid falls in the price of goats and other subsistence farm animals, for Algerians found themselves caught between a colonial economic system in which value was determined by low prices (with, as we have seen, rapid falls in value interpreted as being of universal benefit) and European traders and markets who were able to relentlessly exploit the need of people on the margins of life to sell the only goods they possessed.⁸⁷

French soldiers and administrators were in fact convinced that developments, and falls in prices, were a sign of an increasing harmony between them and Algerians. Another report of 1847 noted that 'tranquillity reigns right across the Province of Algiers', going on to note that 'the work of harvesting has finished amongst nearly all the tribes, while the markets are becoming better stocked with grains [...] Transactions between Arabs and Europeans are taking place with a sense of confidence in each other.'⁸⁸ Such accounts were absolutely assured of the benevolence of colonial rule and wilfully blind both as to how such a radical shift in markets had come about and how it might actually have been interpreted by those who were most affected by the arrival of this new world.

Conclusion

While it was true that the economy of colonial Algeria would be by no means static, in particular following the so-called 'victoire des colons' from 1870 onwards in which the interests of civilian colonists came to gain parity with the concerns of the army, it remains critical to understand how the structures of that colonial economy were made in the first decades after the invasion. The actions of the French army bear comparison with other European settler colonies, such as America and Australia, even if the Algerian example may have been unusual in the sense that programmes of killing were directly implemented for economic purposes by the army as a branch of the state,

whereas more complex negotiations between a distant metropole and the settlers of the frontier pertained in other cases. In Algeria the army on the ground did not aspire to eliminate all natives in the name of building a new economic world in north Africa (reviving the granary of Rome), but the logic of its desire to possess Algeria (and its markets) and Algerians (and their productive capacity), inevitability led to a substantial indigenous die-out in the country. In such a world, wars were fought over food, peace was proven by the entry of indigenous peoples into French markets, and their submission was believed to have been attained when Algerians held French coins to be arbiters of value in the world.

This was a project of creative destruction, yet colonial historians have rarely shown much interest in that which was replaced in this place. In establishing a centralised state which monitored and controlled both production and consumption, the French army destroyed modes of exchange which were expressive of powerful ideas of local independence and freedom, as well as the interconnectedness of peoples in the Islamicate world. As Hamdan Khodja and Ahmed Bey noted, its pillars were torn down by colonists who sought to replace worlds of autonomy and justice with the controlling, beneficent, hand of the state. This was as true in the seizure of mosques and waqf income in the earliest days of the Conquest as it was in the slower domination of flows of production, trade and consumption.

In their new world, women and men now interacted with each other in novel ways, for we might say that the Hegelian sense of *thymos* disappeared as Algerians became ghosts in their own land. Rather than the modern state conferring universal Platonic dignity, it removed a system of godly universal esteem and the lived manifestations of justice which served as the bases of society. Plato suggested that the thymotic urge – the desire of humans to look into the eyes of the Other and to see respect – drove political change, yet in imperial situations such as Algeria, it was the negation of such a culture of respect which was engineered by the colonial state. The aspiration of Algerians

therefore became the restoration of that which had been destroyed and its eventual re-enactment into a future world re-engineered by the settler colonial project of destruction and replacement.

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² 'Tâchez d'accoutumer peu à peu les Arabes à prendre notre argent.' Service Historique de la Défense, Vincennes (SHD) 1 H 82-2, letter from Governor General Bugeaud to General Bedeau, 5 May 1842.

³ The writing of this article was generously supported by a grant from the Gerda Henkel Foundation: Forging 'Algeria': Constructions of national space and nationhood in Algeria, 1830-50.

⁴ See forthcoming work by Steve Nutt on 'The post-Enlightenment idea of Universal Freedom and its informing of the Radical Decentralization and Democratization of Sovereign Violence in Settler Structural Invasion'.

⁵ Emmanuel Chuckwudieze, 'The Color of Reason: The idea of 'Race' in Kant's Anthropology', *Bucknell Review* 38 (1995): 200–41 (216).

⁶ See, especially, the work of Lynn Hunt, such as *The French Revolution and Human Rights: A Brief Documentary History* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1996), along with Sanje Perovic, *The Calendar in Revolutionary France: Perceptions of Time in Literature, Culture, Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

⁷ Hegel, G.W.F., *The Phenomenology of Mind*, 2nd edn, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1931); Kojève, Alexandre, *Introduction à la lecture de Hegel: Leçons sur la Phénoménologie de l'Esprit* (Paris: Gallimard, 1947); Edward Said, *Orientalism* (London: Penguin, 1978).

⁸ Ann Laura Stoler, *Along the Archival Grain: Epistemic Anxieties and Colonial Common Sense* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010).

⁹ Patrick Wolfe, 'Settler colonialism and the elimination of the native', *Journal of Genocide Research* 8-4 (2006): 387-409 (388). See also: Jennifer E. Sessions, *By Sword and Plow: France and the Conquest of Algeria* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011), especially 177-81.

¹⁰ A. Dirk Moses (ed), *Empire, Colony, Genocide: Conquest, Occupation, and Subaltern Resistance in World History* (New York: Berghahn, 2008), 24.

¹¹ Wolfe, 'Settler colonialism and the elimination of the native', 388.

¹² *Ibid.*, 388.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 388.

¹⁴ Frantz Fanon, *Les damnés de la terre* (Paris: François Maspéro, 1961); *Pour la révolution africaine: écrits politiques* (Paris: François Maspéro, 1964); *Peau Noire, Masques Blancs*, 2nd edn (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1965).

¹⁵ Abdelmajid Hannoum, *Violent Modernity: France in Algeria* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2010), 9.

¹⁶ Or 1844 in the case of: Benjamin Brower, *A Desert Named Peace: The Violence of France's Empire in the Algerian Sahara, 1844–1902* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009).

¹⁷ In contrast to the important, but much-critiqued, work of Olivier Le Cour Grandmaison: *Coloniser. Exterminer: Sur la guerre et l'état colonial* (Paris: Fayard, 2005). See: Gilbert Meynier and Pierre Vidal-Nacquet, 'Coloniser, exterminer: des vérités à bonne dire à l'art de la simplification idéologique', *Esprit* (December 2005): 162–177. See also Stephen Howe, 'Colonising and

exterminating: memories of imperial violence in Britain and France', *Histoire@politique*

(May/August 2011), available at:

http://www.histoire-politique.fr/documents/11/pistes/pdf/HP11_Howe_pdf_260510.pdf

Accessed 07.05.14

¹⁸ Hannoum, *Violent Modernity*, 175.

¹⁹ On Cavaignac's bringing a politics of repression back home from Algeria in 1848, see Frederick A. DeLuna, *The French Republic Under Cavaignac: 1848* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), 45.

²⁰ Or as Hannoum put it, 'The discourse of progress makes the natives into children who must be spanked when they misbehave – when they resist or reject colonialism and its violent practices (even then called modernity or civilization)', 18. See also: Abdelmajid Hannoum, 'Colonialism and knowledge in Algeria: The archives of the Arab Bureau', *History and Anthropology* 12-4 (2001): 343-79. Interesting critiques of Hannoum's binaries can be found in: Muriam Haleh Davis and Thomas Serres, review of *Violent Modernity*, <https://remmm.revues.org/7549?lang=en>, accessed 14.03.16; and in Paul Silverstein's review in *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 44-1 (2012): 199-201.

²¹ Gavin Murray-Miller, *Cult of the Modern: Trans-Mediterranean France and the Construction of French Modernity* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, forthcoming); Jean Guiart, *La Terre et le sang des morts: la confrontation entre blancs et noirs dans le Pacifique sud français* (Paris: Editions Anthropos, 1983).

²² Simon Schama, *Citizens: A Chronicle of the French Revolution* (London: Penguin, 1989).

²³ David Bell, *The First Total War: Napoleon's Europe and the Birth of Modern Warfare* (London: Bloomsbury, 2007). See also: Howard Caygill, *On Resistance: A Philosophy of Defiance* (London: Bloomsbury, 2013).

²⁴ This is not to say that such texts are not useful; simply that their claimed knowledge of both Self and Other ought to be questioned.

²⁵ Khodja, Hamdan, *Le Miroir: Aperçu historique et statistique sur la Régence d'Alger*

(Paris: Sindbad, 1985 [1833]).

²⁶ Effective critiques of what might be called the 'liberal delusion' of imperial politics at this moment can be found in the work of Jennifer Pitts and others: Alexis de Tocqueville, *Writings on empire and slavery*, ed. and intro. Jennifer Pitts (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000); Cheryl B. Welch, 'Colonial violence and the rhetoric of invasion: Tocqueville on Algeria', *Political Theory*, 31-2 (2003): 235–264; Tzvetan Todorov, 'Introduction: Tocqueville et la doctrine coloniale', in Alexis de Tocqueville, *De la colonie en Algérie* (Paris: Complexe, 1988), 9–34; Melvin Richter, 'Tocqueville on Algeria', *Review of Politics*, 25 (1963), 362–398; Duncan Bell, *Reordering the World: Essays on Liberalism and Empire* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016).

²⁷ Khodja, in Abdeljelil Temimi, *Le Beylik de Constantine et Hadj 'Ahmed Bey (1830-1837)* (Tunis: Publications de la Revue d'Histoire Maghrébine, 1978), 274.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 274.

²⁹ Endowed income tithed by Muslims for public and charitable social goods.

³⁰ Temmimi, *Le Beylik*, 228.

³¹ Temmimi, *Le Beylik*, 229. My italics in the text.

³² Particularly in scholarship which has concentrated on more conventional forms of military history and the progressive unfolding of a colonial world partly imagined through the 'mission civilisatrice', such as Charles-André Julien, *Histoire de l'Algérie contemporaine*, vol. 1, 2nd edition (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1979). More productive hints at the corrosive effect of war on local populations can be found in: Charles-Robert Ageron, *Histoire de l'Algérie contemporaine (1830-1970)* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1970), 19; and the entry on 'Économie algérienne' by Boualem Sansal, in Jeannine Verdès-Leroux (ed) *L'Algérie et la France* (Paris: Robert Laffont, 2009) 320-23 (322).

³³ Hugh Roberts, *Berber Government: The Kabyle Polity in Pre-Colonial Algeria* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2014) and Makilam, *The Magical Life of Berber Women in Kabylia* (Bern: Peter Lang, 2007), 253. This is not to advocate a division of indigenous peoples into distinct Arab and Berber identities, for just as Jonathan Wyrzten has shown in the later French incursion into Morocco, the moral and religious grounds of Maghrebi resistance to new forms of European rule transcended any forms of racial categorisation which invaders sought to impose upon them. Jonathan Wyrzten, 'Colonial State-building and the negotiation of Arab and Berber identity in Protectorate Morocco', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 43-2 (2001): 227-49.

³⁴ The terms 'Algeria' and 'Algerian' are used as shorthand; not to imply the existence of a coherent nation before 1830. As Bennison notes, it was to be 'Abd al-Qādir who would seek to mimic the Moroccan Sharifian state in his own imagining of an 'Algeria': Amira K. Bennison, *Jihad and its Interpretations in Pre-colonial Morocco: State-society relations during the French conquest of Morocco* (London: Routledge, 2002), 13.

³⁵ See Engin Isin, 'Ottoman waqfs as acts of citizenship', in *Held in Trust: Waqf in the Muslim World*, in Pascale Ghazaleh (ed), (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2011), 209-29.

³⁶ Benjamin Stora, *Histoire de l'Algérie coloniale (1830-1954)* (Paris: La Découverte, 1991), 25-26.

³⁷ Thomas Rid, 'Razzia: A Turning Point in Modern Strategy', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 21-4 (2009): 617-35 (625-27) and Albert de Broglie, "Une réforme administrative en Afrique, II," *Revue des Deux Mondes* 25- 1 (1 January 1860): 295–335 (300).

³⁸ Mahfoud Bennoune, *The Making of Contemporary Algeria, 1830-1987* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 3. See also: René Gallisot, *L'Économie de l'Afrique du Nord* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1969); Samir Amin, *L'Impérialisme et développement inégal* (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1976); A. Benachenhou, *Formation du sous-développement en Algérie: 1830-1962* (Algiers: OPU, 1976); André Nouschi, *Enquête sur le niveau de vie des populations rurales constantinoises de la conquête à 1919. Essai d'histoire économique et sociale* (Paris: PUF, 1961); and

the substantial body of work by Hildebert Isnard, such as ‘Les exploitations agricoles européennes en Algérie (essai de représentation cartographique)’, *Méditerranée* 1(1961),23-32. See also: Sylvie Thénault et al (eds), *Histoire de l’Algérie à la période coloniale* (Paris: La Découverte, 2012); John Ruedy, *Modern Algeria: The Origins and Development of a Nation* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005)

³⁹ Bennoune, *The Making of Contemporary Algeria*, 35.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 30-31.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 3.

⁴² Indeed, work already cited by Isin, along with Springborg, Mahmood and Massad eloquently makes the case that many features of modern democratic polities had deep roots in Islamic cultures: Patricia Springborg, ‘The Middle Eastern Origins of Liberal Institutions’ in Tim Niblock and Emma Murphy (eds), *Economic and Political Liberalization in the Middle East* (London: British Academic Press, 1993), 26-39; Saba Mahmood, *The Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005); Joseph Massad, *Islam in Liberalism* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2015).

⁴³ Alastair Campbell, “‘My Country Tis of Thee’ – The Myopia of American Bioethics’, *Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy*, 3 (2000): 195-98.

⁴⁴ Temmimi, *Le Beylik*, 230.

⁴⁵ L.P. Harvey, *Islamic Spain 1200-1500* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990) and *Muslims in Spain 1500-1614* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2005).

⁴⁶ Temmimi, *Le Beylik*, 270-71.

⁴⁷ Hava Lazarus-Hafeh, ‘Continuity and Innovation in Egyptian Islam: The ‘*Ulama* Vis-à-Vis the Militants’, in Shimon Shamir (ed), *Egypt from Monarchy to Republic* (New York: Westview Press, 1995), 173-80 (177).

⁴⁸ Service Historique de la Défense (hereafter SHD) 1 H 121, 10 August 1847.

⁴⁹ This article does not explore the notion that the new state was to a large extent a co-productin between an unwitting *jihādi* and a more sanguine European invader.

⁵⁰ Wael Hallaq, *The Impossible State: Islam, Politics and Modernity's Moral Predicament* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012).

⁵¹ T.G.H. Strehlow, *Songs of Central Australia* (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1970).

⁵² SHD 1 H 88, Soult to Bugeaud, 21 February 1843.

⁵³ SHD 1 H 88, Soult to Bugeaud, 21 February 1843.

⁵⁴ Benjamin Stora, *Histoire de l'Algérie coloniale (1830–1954)* (Paris: La Découverte, 2004), as well as Julien, *Histoire de l'Algérie* and Ageron, *Histoire de l'Algérie*. Important critiques of this narrative can be found in: Raphael Danziger, *Abd al-Qadir and the Algerians: Resistance to the French and Internal Consolidation* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1977), as well as the special issue on 'Abd al-Qādi, *Studia Islamica*, new edition, 2011-2.

⁵⁵ Remarkably, the only significant article which describes Soult as the 'architect' of Algerian policy dates from 1916: Christian Schefer, 'La "Conquête Totale" de l'Algérie (1839-1843) Valée, Bugeaud et Soult', *Revue d'Histoire des colonies françaises*, IV (1916): 19-76

⁵⁶ SHD 1 H 83-1, Bugeaud to Soult, 25 June 1842; 'la guerre serieuse est donc fini [...] 'L'époque de la réorgansisation de cette vaste édifice est arrivée'.

⁵⁷ Jacques Frémeaux, *La France et l'Algérie en guerre: 1830–1870, 1954–1962* (Paris: Economica, 2002), 216.

⁵⁸ 1 H 83-1, Bugeaud to Soult, 5 juillet 1842.

⁵⁹ Rob Nixon, *Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2013).

⁶⁰ Diana K. Davis, *Resurrecting the Granary of Rome: Environmental History and*

the French Colonial Expansion in North Africa (Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2007) and Mike Davis, *Late Victorian Holocausts: El Niño Famines and the Making of the Third World* (London: Verso, 2001).

⁶¹ William Gallois, *A History of Violence in the Early Algerian Colony* (London: Palgrave, 2013).

⁶² SHD 1 H 121, 2 July 1847 report from the Bureau Arabe of Constantine.

⁶³ E. Tyan, "Djihād" *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Second Edition. Edited by: P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E.

Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs. Brill Online, 2014,

http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/djihad-COM_0189,

accessed 07.05.14; David Cook, 'Jihad in Islam', *Encyclopædia Iranica*,

<http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/islam-in-iran-xi-jihad-in-islam>, accessed 07.05.14. See also

Patricia Crone, *God's Rule: Government and Islam* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 363-85.

⁶⁴ SHD 1 H 83-1, letter from Bugeaud , 9 June 1842.

⁶⁵ SHD 1 H 121, 15 July 1847, résumé of Bureaux arabes of the Province of Alger.

⁶⁶ SHD 1 H 121, 15 July 1847, résumé of Bureaux arabes of the Province of Alger.

⁶⁷ Wolfe, 'Settler Colonialism', 388.

⁶⁸ Bennoune, *The Making of Contemporary Algeria*, 23.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 36, 39.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 38.

⁷¹ Fr.Ducuing, *La Guerre de montagne (Navarre 1834-35 et Kabylie 1841-47)* (Paris: Hachette, 1868),

88. Kitouni (personal correspondence) notes that groups of itinerant traders would follow the army at this time, so as to establish informal markets where the spoils of war could be bought and sold after razzias had been completed.

⁷² Kamel Kateb, *Européens, "indigènes" et juifs en Algérie, 1830-1962* (Paris: Editions de l'Institut nationale d'études démographiques, 2001).

⁷³ SHD 1 H 82-2.

⁷⁴ All details here are from personal correspondence with Kitouni. His key work to date is *La Kabylie orientale dans l'histoire: Pays de Kutama et guerre coloniale* (Algiers: Casbah Editions, 2013), though a series of forthcoming essays will address the colonial economy more directly.

⁷⁵ SHD 1 H 82-2, letter from Bugeaud to Bedeau, 5 May 1842.

⁷⁶ Bennoune, *The Making of Contemporary Algeria*, 36.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ SHD 1 H 82-2, letter from Bugeaud to Bedeau, 5 may 1842.

⁷⁹ SHD 1 H 59, 2 December note.

⁸⁰ Algeria trade diagram from 1830-1885: Élisée Reclus, *The Universal Geography*; (London: J.S. Virtue & Co., 1885), vol 11, 329.

⁸¹ Julia Clancy-Smith, 'The Shaykh and his Daughter: Coping in Colonial Algeria', in Edmund Burke III and David N. Yaghoubian (eds), *Struggle and Survival in the Modern Middle East*, 2nd edn (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), 119–36 and Julia Clancy-Smith (ed), *North Africa, Islam and the Mediterranean World* (London:Routledge, 2001).

⁸² SHD 1 H 121. See especially: 'Marché pour les transports à effecture par mer sur la côte d'algérie en ce qui concerne les denrées et les objets des services des subsistances militaires et des fourrages'.

⁸³ Annie Rey-Goldzeiguer, *Le Royaume arabe: la politique algérienne de Napoléon III, 1861-1870* (Algiers: SNED, 1977).

⁸⁴ Bennoune, *The Making of Contemporary Algeria*, 60. See also 49.

⁸⁵ SHD 1 H 121, d'Arbouville to Governor General, 3 July 1847.

⁸⁶ SHD 1 H 121, Tellman to Minister, 13 July 1847.

⁸⁷ Annie Rey-Goldzeiguer, *Le Royaume arabe*.

⁸⁸ SHD 1 H 121, Tellman to Minister, 13 July 1847.