Implementation Failures as Learning Pathologies

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Abstract

In many ways, the study of implementation *is* the study of policy failure. After all, scholarly preoccupation with the causes of policy pathologies motivated the first wave of implementation studies in the post-war decades (Derthick 1972; Pressman and Wildavsky 1973). Examination of policy learning has followed a similar trajectory. The first (and now classic) studies linking learning and policy change were central to the serious efforts to create a systematic approach to policy sciences (Deutsch 1966; Heclo 1974; Lindblom 1965). Recent developments re-appraising policy learning, and in particular spotlighting its varieties and its limitations, enable a clearer connection with implementation fiascos (Howlett 2012; Dunlop and Radaelli 2013, 2018). New conceptualisations of policy learning point to the importance of scope conditions which render learning deep or shallow, functional or dysfunctional (Dunlop 2017). In this chapter, the implementation failure-policy learning nexus is explored at three analytical levels: micro level of individual policy actors; meso level of groups and organisational bodies; and finally, the macro, systemic level.

Keywords lesson-drawing, policy failure, policy fiascos, policy implementation, policy learning, policy pathologies

Introduction

The problem in policy-making is not one of learning scarcity. Rather, it is a question of whether or not policymakers are learning in the 'right mode' (Dunlop and Radaelli 2016). In dysfunctional contexts, learning links to policy failures. Examining failure through the lens of learning pathologies is not as bleak as it may sound! Diagnosing the causes of failure generates prescriptions for how policy-makers can learn from problems and learn to limit these. In this way, policy scientists might begin to fulfil the normative desire to improve policy design and performance that motivates both foundation literatures.

The public policy literature is replete with definitions of both implementation failures and policy learning (for example, Bennett and Howlett 1992; Dunlop 2017, 2018; Hupe and Hill 2016; May 1992; McConnell 2015; Newman and Head 2015). While it is clear that neither phenomena are monoliths, there are some areas where scholars broadly agree. First, context matters: the forms and severity of failures and learning types are functions of their socio-political context. And, as such they are incredibly dynamic. Context can be temporal as well as spatial of course. Reforms that are seen as a failure immediately after implementation may take time to bed in and deliver the successes originally envisaged (see for example, Lichtmannegger and Bach [2020] on the turnaround story of Austrian administrative reforms of three decades ago). This matters for public policy because it implies learning and policy change are possible but sometimes slow. This so lends impetus to prescriptive work focussed on designing better lesson-drawing in public administration. The second area of convergence concerns the breadth of the literature. Despite the western bias of so much of the public policy literature (Engeli, Allison and Montpetit 2018), the study of implementation failures and the limits of

learning is truly diverse. The chapter draws on a range of empirical cases that illustrates the nature of these challenges. The empirical studies are selected from a bibliographic search of the ISI Social Science Citation index on 25 February 2020 using the following criteria: topic=(implementation) 'and' topic=(failure) 'and' topic=(policy) for all years. This resulted in 2392 outputs. The results were then refined by publication type considering on articles (taking the number to 1903) and then refined further including two subject areas: 'Public Administration' 'or' 'Political Science'. This produced 171 articles. These articles and others considered to be classics form the basis for the empirical examples in this chapter.

With the definitional foundations laid, the rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. The implementation failure-policy learning nexus is explored at three analytical levels: micro level of individual policy actors; meso level of groups and organisational bodies; and finally, the macro, systemic level.

Implementation failures and learning at the individual level

Policy that is made in implementation is, in part, a function of the behaviour and beliefs of individual policy actors. Indeed, since the pioneering work of Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) and Lipsky (1980) over four decades ago, administrative action at the street level has been understood as central in the creation of policy outcomes. The focus here is on the impact of what is processed by the human mind on policy outcomes and on two particularly dominant themes in the literature: cognitive biases and normative values.

The cutting edge literature from behavioural economics suggests what humans are able to learn and process is determined by an automatic reliance on shortcuts. Since such heuristics are often out-dated, incomplete or simply plain wrong, what is learned is always partial in some ways. In public administration, this literature largely focusses on smart policy designs or 'nudges' that anticipate citizens' learning limitations (Kahneman 2011; Kahneman and Tversky 2000; John 2018; Thaler and Sunstein 2008; Thomann et al. 2018). The idea here is that policy design must accept the humans' 'fast' thinking and absence of deep reflection that accompanies most behaviour (Kahneman 2011). Yet, for these tools to produce social benefits that sustain over the long-term, nudges must be supported with more traditional policy tools – most obviously hard rules – that push citizens toward compliance in a more forceful way (see, for example, Moseley and Stoker 2015 on recycling nudges).

Bounded rationality is not simply something that mediates policy takers' understandings of course. Policy-makers are themselves subject to these same cognitive limitations (Dunlop and Radaelli 2015, 2016b). Indeed, it provides the universal backdrop that limits the vision and abilities of policy-makers at the 'top' who design policy, those in the middle and at the street-level (Cooper and Kitchener 2019; Dunlop and Radaelli 2016b).

Beyond the policy-takers and -makers, there is a range of policy shapers – stakeholders, interest groups, NGOs, policy entrepreneurs and professionals – who similarly have their own understandings of the policy aims and technologies. Given the importance of collaboration in governance, misunderstandings and miscommunications among or between any of these actors is a seedbed for poor policy design and consequently policy failure. Lindqvist's (2019) account of cultural policy in Sweden demonstrates how different actors' focus on different pieces of policy information resulted in layered misapprehensions that ultimately un-did the policy. For similar cases, see Chaney (2017) on the failure of human rights policy for the Roma in the former Yugoslav space and Zavoli and King (2020) on money laundering policies in the UK.

Mitigating such biases is not straightforward (assuming that it is possible at all). Mechanisms that are designed to check for bureaucrats' bias are rarely fool proof. Take for example the use of targets (a popular 'corrective' tool). Designed to discipline and reign in what were once popularly thought of as the rational maximising behaviours of public servants, targets are frequently repurposed by officials in ways that rarely benefit the organisation or citizen. These impulses to game targets – whether rational or irrational – have been empirically uncovered across the world (see for example Bevan and Hood [2006] on health service targets in the United Kingdom (UK) and Mu and De Jong [2018] on the Target Responsibility System (TRS) in China).

Of course, scholars of policy learning will not be surprised that such hierarchical tools rarely stimulate policy learning or slow thinking. Rather than attempt to get rid of biases using oversight, one promising approach is to heighten recognition of humans' inability to learn in the moment in slow and reflective ways is one of the core reasons that practitioner education courses (most obviously Masters in Public Administration [MPA]) deploy historical policy cases studies that reconstruct misperceptions and their impact on implementation (Goodman 2008). By recreating fora for reflective (and career-long) learning, the goal is to create warning triggers that can alert policy-makers in their future daily work. Such 'solutions' may not be a panacea and should be heavily caveated. The very fact of bureaucrats experience coupled with the power of existing cognitive shortcuts means that training interventions often have limited impacts (see for example Dunlop et al. [2015b] training experience with UK inspectors involved in delivering a better regulation innovation in local authorities).

Policy aims are often frustrated as the result not simply of cognitive limitations or misunderstandings but wilful political action. By placing normative values and ethics centre stage, scholars such as Lipsky (1980) and, more recently, Maynard-Moody and Musheno (2000) and Zacka (2017) illuminate that learning what is 'right' can clash with policy objectives. Before cognitive heuristics were 'discovered' in the policy sciences (John, 2016), the street-level bureaucracy (SLB) literature championed the importance of personally held values and ethics among public officials. Through their interactions with citizens, bureaucrats experience the very real human need to be responsive and empathetic. Through the nudge lens, bureaucrats' guiding motivation is to reduce cognitive dissonance but thinking in terms of values means dispensing with the notion that the bureaucrat is acting irrationally and that this can somehow be trained out of them. Rather, in this view, public servants are sentient beings motivated by more fundamental human desires to satisfy and professional ethic which sees the other person's point of view and sentience. The result need not be policy failure for the citizen or the bureaucrat but it can mean failure in the sense that policy becomes unhinged from its original design and intentions.

Deep and localised belief systems, borne out of professional experience on the ground, are the fuel for policy adaptation and sometimes distortion. Certainly, whether it is for good or ill, policy changes in the hands of sentient and often hard-pressed street level actors when policy 'rules in form' which come from the top and are visible become 'rules in use' in the hands of SLBs and which can be invisible (Wagenaar 2004, 2011; for empirical applications in the United States (US) and Denmark see Heidelberg, 2016 and Wimmelmann et al. 2018 respectively). Where policy designers presume their colleagues on the ground share their vision or disagreements are suppressed, they erect another barrier to successful implementation of complex policy initiatives.

Williams and Tobbell (2017) offer the case of local authority reforms of New Labour in the UK and the unanticipated impact of emotions which drove local chief executive officers to reshape policies on the basis of their own positions. Regardless of the actual design of policy, here policy failures were rooted in the very processes adopted by central government which (wrongly) assumed a neutral, technocratic reaction from local colleagues.

Bureaucrats' ideological values and social embeddedness can also be leveraged, of course. Take the case of China's one child policy. Part of its successful implementation was a direct function of the acquiescence and policy vigilance of local officials (Mattingly 2020). Similarly, policy-makers at the top may simply design policy which is deliberately ambiguous both to satisfy competing audiences and create confusion to avoid blame for any failures down the line (for another Chinese case see Zhan and Qin 2017).

The literature offers a ready supply of empirical cases illuminating the potential for human values and technological systems to speak across one another. Take the case of a public health intervention designed to notify general practice (GP) doctors in Scotland when women have been assessed by the police as at high risk of domestic abuse (Mackenzie et al. 2019). The aim is to provide protection to vulnerable populations by joining-up different agencies addressing the perennial issue of implementation gaps (Pressman and Wildavsky 1973; for a conceptual take on this classic issue see Adam et al [2019]). And yet, in this instance, the technological recording system was too complex and protocol proved too difficult to read. In short, the smart system failed to speak to the daily practices and values of both sets of professionals and resulted in the non-implementation of the intervention. Lapsley and Segato (2019) provide a similar take on technological complexity and implementation again in the National Health Service (NHS) in Scotland and Davis and Robin (2015) document how information and communication technologies (ICT) hindered the effectiveness of public sector organizational networks in New Orleans following Hurricane Katrina.

Implementation failures not only result from misunderstanding the values and professional identities of public officials. The views and experience of intended recipients of public services are often neglected. Such ignorance disproportionately affects disadvantaged or unpopular target populations. Sometimes such oversights are indeed that – unintended gaps in policy design (Schneider and Ingram 1993). For example, the failure in Western Australia to record the characteristics of domestic violence victims that seek compensation may result in failure to offer justice services that take into account the particular risks faced by women with diverse cultural and/or linguistic backgrounds (Phillips and Guthrie 2018). For similar empirical cases, see also Millar and Crosse (2018) on lone parents and workfare in Ireland or Bandara (2016) on poverty targeting programmes in Sri Lanka.

Yet, following Schneider and Ingram (1993), when such oversights are left undetected the result can be dysfunctions becoming wired into policy systems rendering them degenerative. Eubanks (2018) offers a sobering analysis of the impact of high-tech sorting and monitoring tools used in US welfare delivery, housing allocation and child protection systems. In each case, Eubanks captures the discriminatory (and in some cases life-threatening) consequences of digital management of some of America's most socially and economically vulnerable citizens. In this case, values are both the root of the problem and its potential solution. Starting with the problem, in some cases discriminatory values plugged into artificial intelligence (AI) algorithms – programmed at the top – operate to disadvantage particular groups in multiple ways. Here, human judgement and the experienced knowledge and values of SLBs stand as important correctives to the one-size fits all system. Yet, in a system of automatic decisions, such discretion is deliberately designed out despite being essential for both citizens' lives and to ensure machines learn the right lessons.

There are ways to harness values to avert, or learn from, implementation failures. In their fascinating study on coping with the consequences of genocide in Rwanda, and specifically designing accountability mechanisms, Kamuzinzi and Rubyusta (2019) trace how the traditional value system of setting personal standards – Imihigo – was used as a way to enable learning from failure in the public sector.

Implementation failures and learning in groups

Classic implementation studies, focussed on this group level of action, provide two major insights. Implementation failures result from: frailties in policy design and its application on the ground derived from weaknesses in organisational capacity (May 1992; O'Toole 2012), and a lack of consensus building among key groups (Bardach 1977; Majone and Wildavsky 1979). Again, the learning dimensions of each are explored in turn.

For policies to succeed, it must be possible to adapt them to varied and changing contexts. Coping with a dynamic context can be achieved in different ways. Most obviously, either this smartness gets designed-in upstream in the policy design phase or adaptation happens when policies are taken out 'on the road'. Such flexibility – which can be part of the policy at the start and/or part of the trial and error of implementation – requires learning-friendly bureaucracies. Public administration and management accounts of institutional learning and capacity building attribute policy failures to weakness a wide array of areas from absorbing new information to exploiting existing knowledge (for conceptual discussions see Bennett and Howlett 1992; Borrás 2011; Zahra and George 2002; for empirical applications see DiGiulio and Vecchi 2019 and Dunlop 2015 for empirical case studies of school buildings in Italy and health and safety policy in the UK). There various typologies of organisational capacity – see Howlett, Ramesh and Wu (2017) for a useful review.

Regardless of the precise type of capacity in question, the broader issue at stake concerns the extent to which a bureaucracy is in a 'ready to learn' state. Being learning-ready is not self-evident. Where the infrastructure or normative commitment to adapt to new developments is weak, the possibility that any learning will happen at all cannot be taken for granted. Argyris and Schön's (1978) path-breaking work on organizational learning offers a useful template of how to conceptualise the types and, crucially, the depths of learning that can be realistically expected to achieve in large, complex organizational structures. Specifically, they point to three levels of learning. In its most common form, policies are designed to enable 'single-loop learning' – that is, flexibility that allows changes to be made to the delivery mechanisms. Changes in policy tools or their settings (which equates with Peter Hall's first order policy beliefs [1993]) is possible at design and implementation stages. As an aside, it should be noted that some policy tools are easier to adjust than others, just as some tool mixes may be more prone to failure than others (see Howlett, Vince and del Piero 2017). Dunlop's (2010) study of European Union (EU) first generation biofuels offers a clear illustration of the single-loop logic at work. In 2008, new scientific evidence emerged demonstrating that the ambitious targets set to increase member states' use of plant-based fuels were too aggressive. Indeed the incentives so strong they led to an increase in CO_2 emissions, as land use changed in the global south to grow fuel for European vehicles! In this case, the targets were quickly reduced to reflect the new scientific evidence.

In this case, absolute implementation failure was averted – member states fell in line and adjusted to the new targets. Yet, the policy itself remained controversial since the central policy objective – to reduce CO_2 emissions using plant-based fuels – remained in place. And so, the deeper type of learning – 'double-loop' – did not occur. Fundamentally, in this case, the political complexity of EU policy-making coupled with the lack of political incentives to admit mistakes not just in policy design but in its central objectives left the policy programme on the same course (for more examples on the political imperatives that often fuel policy failure and make learning unattractive see Bird and Newman, 2017 on cases in Canada and Australia and Hinterleitner 2019 on Germany). Though this blame avoidance is often rooted in the activities of political elites it holds back public servants – disincentivising and

sometimes outright blocking attempts to learn in imaginative and deep ways (Meier et al. 2019; for the foundational work on this see Derthick 1972).

There is one last, and largely elusive, learning form outlined by Argyris and Schön (1978). 'In-deutero' learning is the deepest and, as such, rarest learning capacity. This describes the capacity to discern and build the conditions in which learning from failures takes place. The most celebrated examples of such initiatives are post-disaster public inquiries. That said, the limited value of such inquiries in the public sector is renowned (Stark 2019).

Two notes of caution should be added to the plea for enhanced learning capacity in public organizations. First, policy-makers may simply not value the payoffs in learning from failure. In this overtly political take on the problem, clear guidance and an appreciation of complexity are no substitute for timely political incentives. This danger of rationalising failure is enhanced in multi-actor settings where the blame shifting options are plentiful (see Brouwer et al. 2013 on member states' willingness to accept failures in the implementation of the EU Water Directive). De Franco et al. (2015) illustrate this point in their account of the slow and weak implementation of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) by the EU. Despite being rhetorically supportive of R2P, progress has been stymied by low bureaucratic commitment and willingness to ensure R2P fits with the EU's own priorities.

Alternatively, even where programmes are consciously designed to include room for adaptation, the sheer complexity of lesson drawing means such processes can ultimately be marginalised. This is exemplified by the Dutch experience in its National Collaboration Programme on Air Quality (NSL). Despite explicitly aiming to be adaptive and receptive to updates on the ground, the NSL failed to anticipate two major risks when implemented (Busscher et al. 2019). Similarly, Italian authorities struggled to learn on the job while implementing the EU's Water Framework Directive (Domorenok, 2017; for similar cases in different places see Vince, 2015 on Australia's Ocean Policy or Dong et al., 2014 on reform in China's healthcare system). Here, complex multi-level and multi-layered policy design made it too challenging to simultaneous gather, consolidate and apply lessons while delivering activities. In a similar vein, there are empirical studies pointing to the difficulty of building learning capacity with multi-sectoral policy programmes (for example, Nordbeck and Steurer 2016 on sustainable development) – where lessons may contradict according to sector – and cross-national policy initiatives (for example Quesada, 2014 for another EU case study comparing compliance failures in the Urban Waste Water Treatment Directive; Candel 2017 provides a wide review of integrated policies strategies).

Turning to a second recurring theme, implementation failure is frequently the result of failures in group politics. Where the wrong types of actors have been involved or cannot build a consensus lessons may be irrelevant. This brings us back to a fundamental point made in the recent policy learning literature –learning happens but it is not always a 'good thing' (Dunlop, 2017). For example, if the politics of policy design violate broader social expectations of consultation, the lessons generated by one group of policy actors – for example, interest groups and political factions – have not been balanced out by those generated by others. Take for example the various implementation failures associated with the UK's leaving the EU. Policy-making around Brexit did occur but political polarisation, cabinet disunity, the aggregation of party-political and parliamentary arenas, and the de-legitimation of expertise left the government dependent upon lessons generated by a small group of political actors in the ruling Conservative party. Learning involved a narrow range of participants producing a pathologically short-term approach to one of the most complex policy problems a government could face.

Zahariadis and Exadaktylos (2016) offer a similar account of Greek higher education reforms – documenting how successful policy entrepreneurship that got the reforms over the line in political terms (especially in the Greek parliament) actually sowed the seeds for implementation failure on the ground. Here, the actors who were critical for successful implementation – university managers, academic and the student body – had not been included in the coalition built to win political support and government attempted to push implementation through bargaining (rather than consensus) and coercion. With no stake in the outcome (essential to successful implementation of politically salient reforms [Patashnik 2008]) these groups resisted and adapted parts of the policy programme.

Implementation failures and learning at the systemic level

Two themes recur in the literature that exposes the relationship between implementation failures and learning at the macro level: the prevalence of learning-resistant policy trajectories and how lesson-drawing is mediated by states' self-identities that become culturally embedded. Before unpacking these, understanding the systemic level first requires a problematization of how states 'see' things or, perhaps more suitably, how societies mediate what and how states can imagine policy. Especially useful in this respect is the work of Donald A. Schön (1973) and James C. Scott (1999). These two very different thinkers are united by an interest in the state as a machine that fights to uphold policy legibility and stability. To see like a state is to reify and internalise a very narrow order of things (Scott 1999) characterised by a struggle to remain the same (what Schön calls 'dynamic conservatism') that prevents acknowledgement of the natural and logical reality that things go wrong (Schön 1973). This denial of the need to learn links to the recent policy regimes perspective on implementation failures that explores the feedback effects of governing arrangements and wider political dynamics on the legitimacy and durability of individual policies (May 2015). This systemic view moves us away from treating failure as an artefact of partial cognitive shortcuts used by individuals or flawed group processes that result in learning in the wrong mode. Thinking in terms of regimes demonstrates that policy implementation secures a political vision underpinned by socially constituted governing arrangements. What can be learned and what the state can 'see' is mediated – for bad and for good – by those politics and the institutions that enact them.

State behaviour and the policy actions that flow from that can become locked-in. The policy implications are that a logic of 'increasing returns' can result in ways of doing things and policy outcomes – good or bad – may also become self-perpetuating (Pierson 2000, 2004). This becomes problematic of course when there are aspects of the vision or story that are dysfunctional. The case of the EU provides a useful illustration. Though it is not a 'state', the EU is an entity that exhibits many of the practices of statecraft and indeed rehearses some of these routines more than some of its own member states do domestically! In some areas this approach has positive results – most celebratedly, countries' regulatory quality increases post-accession (see for example, Boheim and Friesenbichler 2016 on competition policy). Yet, advancing European integration through incomplete agreements, the resulting implementation gaps and variable geometry of the EU-27 has led some to argue that the EU has created the conditions for crises to emerge and, in so doing, the impetus for further agreements that deep integration (this recalls the proposition of EU founding father Jean Monnet who maintained 'Europe will be forged in crises, and will be the sum of the solutions adopted for those crises'). In this way, the EU is 'failing forward' (Jones et al., 2016). On asylum and migration policy, Scipioni (2018) demonstrates part of this logic in action and how policy failure risks becoming embedded in this part of the EU project (for an earlier account see Alink et al. 2001).

Where states' governance capacity is weak in structural ways, policy failure locked-in across the board can be the outcome. For example where repeated institutional failure and corruption have resulted in fissures in social capital, successful policy implementation which relies upon trusting relationships between street level bureaucrats and citizens is impossible (see Chavez 2018 for the case study of Mexico's problematic police-public relationships and the policy failures associated with that).

Such problems are often compounded by the fact that states with low quality of government are very often at the back of the queue for high and consistent support from international organizations. For example, Charron's (2016) analysis of EU Structural Fund distribution between 2007-2013 suggests that the level of transfers are a function of public sector quality – higher is better – and the level of autonomy enjoyed by a member states regions (again more is better since it ensures the presence of strong local infrastructure to ensure monies are spent).

That said, governance innovations can also be initiated as the result of weak capacity. The rise of so-called 'post-state governance' and particularly the push for participatory budgeting in some Latin American countries has been a reaction against the hierarchical political and administrative institutions that delivered major failures in welfare and economic policies since democratization (see Deubel 2013).

Trajectories of implementation failures need not derive from the state itself. Advances in technology for example, often provide the seeds for future problems in policy design as policymakers struggle to keep up with complex and unexpected innovations. Japan's prolonged economic turmoil since the 'lost decade' of the 1990s provides a clear example where world-leading innovation in the private sector saddled the country will all the problems of being the first mover – where experimentation makes the costs of policy learning high and repeated episodes of failure. Those countries following the trail blazed by Japan – most obviously the United States – enjoyed a far smoother experience (see Lipscy and Takinami 2013 for this case study).

The literature also reports a more ideational dimension capacity failures and the limited learning that may follow. Consider the phenomenon of infrastructures that are fundamentally designed to exclude certain groups and privilege others in order to realise a particular state identity. Eckhard's (2014) work on the United Nations (UN) mission's failure to implement policies on minority relations in Kosovo offers a salient illustration of what can happen where institutions lack political oversight and are free to exclude minority bureaucrats from working on affirmative policies. In this case, between 2001-2008, the municipal civil service drifted from its mandate to implement policies serving minority Serb and Roma communities. Such identities are not fixed of course, and learning can occur over time. Consider successive Australian governments' re-examination of past policies on indigenous land rights once seen as successful are now increasingly critical re-cast as policy failures (Perche 2011).

This ideational side of states' implementation failures occurs beyond the West of course. Sorace's (2015) powerful discussion of the Chinese Community Party's (CCP) failure to secure public approval for its reconstruction effort following the traumatic 2008 Sichuan earthquake provides a powerful account of what can result when the internal identity and capacity of a state is monopolised by one group, policy will always be vulnerable to implementation failures (no matter how much the preeminent group wants that policy to succeed).

Summary

Examining implementation failures as learning pathologies provides important insights into the cognitive, organisational and social barriers to learning that impede policy success. Taking first how learning and implementation failures intersect at the micro level. This concerns the role of individual policy elites and policy takers in policy failure and, specifically, how the nature of human learning mediates the translation of policy goals and design into action. Following this, there is the group or meso-level. This is the engine room of policy-making where experts, organised interests, social representatives and courts are the key learners shaping policy design and its implementation. With all these learning inputs, it is reasonable to ask why there is so much failure! Again, two themes recur in the literature. First, group processes often involve sub-optimal mixes of policy actors. Moreover, organizational capacity problems that led to failure in the first place can also inhibit the ability to draw lessons. Finally, the failure-learning nexus was examined against the wider backdrop of society, culture and institutions. Again, two themes dominate how implementation failures and learning intersect at the macro level: how learning resistant policy pathologies can become locked-in over time and, more ideationally, how states own self-identity can conditions their ability to learn from failure.

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