The Problem of the 'Local' in Revolutionary Russia: Moscow Province, 1914-22

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Several excellent studies of the decentralization of power in Russia at the provincial level during the revolutionary period have argued that 'the periphery determines the centre' within a nuanced analysis of the interplay between provincial and national forces.[1] This relationship between the local and the centre was complex. On the one hand, the powerful centrifugal forces pushing provinces apart and permitting localism to flourish during this period were aided by central policies. On the other hand, these forces went far beyond the province, extending into the districts (*uezdy*), parishes (*volosti*) and urban boroughs (*raiony*) that made up Russia's rural and urban spaces. At every level, authorities exerted their independence from those above, whilst simultaneously struggling to combat the autonomous actions of those below.

This chapter explores the extent and impact of localism through a study of Moscow province, with an emphasis on the centrifugal forces operating *within* the province and *across* the revolutionary period. Russia's rulers had been struggling to balance centrifugal and centripetal forces within their vast empire for decades, and the pressures of war and revolution destroyed the uneasy equilibrium that they had achieved.[2] This chapter emphasizes how escalating tensions prior to 1914 had expanded during the war, contributing to the collapse of Tsarism. Revolution enabled localism to flourish and Moscow province had not only achieved a large degree of autonomy from the government in Petrograd by summer 1917, but *uezd* authorities had asserted their independence from provincial control, and the same process was underway in *volosti*.

Prioritizing the local was an essential part of building democracy for most ordinary people and had a fatal impact on the new Provisional Government's ability to govern effectively. The Bolsheviks' weaknesses exacerbated centrifugal tendencies, and the civil war was as much about restoring the authority of central government to recalcitrant localities as it was about military victories over political opponents. It took until 1922 for the equilibrium to be restored. Local Bolsheviks may have challenged the authority of the centre, but they shared its beliefs and policies. Their reliance on violence, moreover, led them to realize that unity and centralization would help them to consolidate Bolshevik power locally.

Whilst the city of Moscow has been the subject of some excellent studies, its looming presence over the surrounding province has encouraged scholars to look elsewhere for a 'typical' provincial experience of the revolution. The first Soviet historians of the period set the scene by focusing overwhelmingly on the city, with only passing mentions of the surrounding province.[3] There was some coverage in subsequent collections of documents,[4] but detailed studies remained focused on urban events, including prominent *uezd* towns and factories.[5] Western historians have also focused overwhelmingly on the city,[6] although some of the issues covered in this chapter have been examined effectively for other provinces.[7]

It is true that Moscow province was not an average province. It was relatively small in terms of size compared to others in European Russia, but it was the most densely populated. According to the 1897 census, the province covered roughly 33,271 square kilometres and contained 2,433,356 people, of which 1,042,629 (43%) lived in Moscow.[8] Moscow was the empire's second largest city, its ancient capital and the centre of patriotic sentiment.[9] The city made a 'stunning impression' on S. I. Kanatchikov, a peasant from Volokolamskii *uezd*, with its multi-storied buildings, brightly lit streets and numerous shops.[10] Even a scion of a prominent noble family and future member of the city's Duma, M. V. Golitsyn, recalled Moscow as very

distinct from provincial towns, with large streets, multi-storied buildings, trams, cars, telephones, electricity, and other modern amenities.[11] The opportunities for the consumption of material goods, and cultural and leisure activities, were matched only by St Petersburg.[12]

The size and importance of the city coloured the entire province, whilst the spread of industry to surrounding towns, such as Bogorodsk, Kolomna, Orekhovo-Zuevo, and Serpukhov, provided unusual opportunities, which were magnified by a relatively extensive railway network radiating out from Moscow. As a result, few peasants in the province were totally dependent on agriculture and there were strong urban-rural links. S. T. Semenov, a former peasant, recalled the lure of the bright lights to young and old alike, male and female, as factory labour or domestic service offered a path out of the village.[13] Even in Moskovskii *uezd*, where the proximity of the city encouraged dairy and market garden industries, 88% of families included someone working outside agriculture. In much of the province, the figure was over 95%.[14]

Nevertheless, there was wide diversity between *uezdy*. Taking Moscow out of the equation, Moskovskii and Bogorodskii *uezdy* accounted for 30% of the province's population with the three smallest *uezdy* – Mozhaiksii, Ruzskii and Vereiskii – accounting for only 12%. In 1899, Moskovskii *uezd* accounted for 39% of the total value of the property in the province with the next wealthiest *uezd*, Bogorodskii, lagging well behind with 13.3%. At the bottom, in the west of the province, Ruzskii, Volokolamskii and Mozhaiskii *uezdy* only made up 1.4-1.6% each.[15] The *uezd* capitals of Ruza and Volokolamsk, along with Bronnitsy and Vereia, were not served by railways and, for all their economic advantages, remained relatively remote and rural. Despite the presence of Moscow, the province was a diverse amalgamation of the industrial and the agricultural, the modern and the remote, all of which helped foster localism within it.

Tensions between central and regional government had been growing in Moscow in the early twentieth century, particularly after the restrictions placed on organs of local self-

government after 1905. Moscow's state-appointed prefect interfered in various issues, from policing to health care, and blocked numerous resolutions of the city duma, whilst the provincial zemstvo board clashed frequently with government ministries. One duma politician recalled notable anti-government sentiments surrounding the municipal elections of 1908,[16] whilst the elections of 1912 saw gains by liberals, who proposed the zemstvo activist, Prince G. E. L'vov, as mayor. The state rejected him and suggested alternative candidates. This was common at the time, but local politicians saw this intervention as an 'affront' to their authority.[17] A stalemate ensued; the duma would not select an acceptable alternative, whilst ministers felt that enforcing their candidate might prompt social unrest.[18] This standoff reflected the growing confidence and ambition of local elective authorities along with the state's increasing awareness of its limitations and the potential danger of conflict on political and social stability in the city.

Nonetheless, the organs of elective self-government in the province barely represented its inhabitants. In 1912, Moscow's duma was elected by 3,407 of the 9,431 people eligible (0.2% of the population). Those elected were businessmen (63%), professionals and intelligentsia (26%), and nobles, officers and agronomists (11%).[19] It was hardly surprising that people looked for alternative ways of participating in public life. The pre-war years, for example, saw a rapid growth in the numbers of unions and associations in Moscow involving all social groups.[20] These formed the heart of an expanding and vibrant civil society that provided an outlet for those discontented with tsarist Russia.

The zemstva were more representative; peasants formed 45.7% of the provincial board in 1912, up from 37.5% in 1906, and figures were better still in *uezd* zemstva, but propertied society was still disproportionately represented.[21] However, there had always been tensions between the provincial zemstvo and the city duma with the zemstvo alarmed at the expansion of the duma's influence over areas surrounding Moscow, whilst the duma resented the zemstvo's right to levy

taxes on the urban population and the city's lack of influence in the zemstvo. Moreover, there were longstanding tensions between provincial and *uezd* zemstva. The former had called for greater uniformity among *uezd* zemstva in terms of taxes, wages and financial transparency since the late nineteenth century. In addition, unlike other provinces, taxes from the city went to the provincial zemstvo not the city's *uezd* zemstvo. This provided the provincial zemstvo with the financial means to broaden its activities and subsidize *uezd* zemstva, but alienated local activists who resented the erosion of their independence that resulted from subsidies. Furthermore, they felt that money was wasted by the provincial zemstvo on unnecessary projects and often thought that it seemed to be a superfluous layer of bureaucracy.[22]

The First World War

The First World War placed huge pressures on the province, exacerbating existing tensions and creating new ones. Despite the mobilization of 25% of its workforce, Moscow's population rose from 1,617,700 in 1912 to 2,017,173 by February 1917.[23] This included 100,000 additional soldiers, thousands of injured military personnel, and 150,000 refugees. The latter alone cost the city 500,000 rubles a month.[24] Many of the small-scale firms that dominated the economy struggled to replace conscripted workers with the authorities prioritizing large-scale industry. By 1916, there were 39% more industrial workers in the province and 90% of workers were involved in defence-related work. The domination of the textile industry was overturned; whereas 37.7% of workers had been in textiles in 1913 compared to 15% in metallurgy, by 1917, 27.6% worked in metallurgy and 24% in textiles. The percentage of female and child workers increased, whilst wage rises failed to match inflation outside of the defence industries. The cost of food doubled between 1914 and 1916, and doubled again by February 1917.[25]

Unsurprisingly, conflicts intensified over pay, hours and conditions, whilst the increased mobility of workers and the growth in unions and societies fostered improved networks between factories, and between political parties and ordinary people. Socialists, in particular, demonstrated growing levels of organization and influence. The strike movement gathered pace and became more politicized. Statistics vary, but tens of thousands of workers were involved in strikes in 1915 alone.[26] In May 1915, Moscow suffered several days of ostensibly anti-German riots, but many attacks were on factory and shop owners, managers, foremen and technical workers, reflecting elements of class conflict.[27] As well as exposing inert and divided authorities, fearful of social disorder, the riots marked a turning point, with the period afterwards seeing a rapid rise in strikes and in public expressions of dissatisfaction with the war effort.[28]

As much of Moscow's textile industry was not actually in the city, but in the surrounding towns of Bogorodsk, Kolomna, Orekhovo-Zuevo, and Serpukhov (and many villages engaged in work for textile factories), working-class concerns and activism spread beyond Moscow. In addition, villages were hit hard as conscription left a shortage of labour, the long-standing absence of agricultural machinery was exacerbated as industry focused on the war, and the availability of manufactured goods declined. Living standards seemed to be falling due to higher taxes, the military requisition of horses, the price and shortage of crucial products (such as sugar), and the impact of inflation on the real value of the state aid (*paek*) provided to soldiers' wives, whilst death loomed large.[29] Subsistence riots, strikes and general unrest became common. Shortages of sugar, for instance, caused several days of rioting in Bogorodsk in October 1915, which prompted strikes involving 80,000 workers from nearby textile factories that continued into November. Similar confrontations were frequent in towns and villages across the province.[30]

In February 1915, the chairman of the Moscow Stock Exchange reported to the Ministry of Trade and Industry that provincial governors were taking economic decisions into their own

hands, resulting in every province 'turning into a sort of independent state'.[31] National economic unity disappeared as some areas received priority based on their perceived importance to the war. This was evident in food supply. Official procurement policies devolved responsibility to provincial agents, usually zemstva, and employed tactics – prioritizing the military, embargoes on selling grain and fixed prices – that operated on a province-by-province basis, encouraging provinces to focus on their own interests in the battle for scarce resources, from food supplies to transport. For agents, the military came first, then their own province, and then other provinces. This had severe implications for Moscow province, which relied on imported food supplies and was forced to search desperately as planned suppliers failed to deliver.[32]

These economic problems exacerbated tensions in the province. Banning trade between provinces prompted unrest in towns near provincial borders, such as Sergiev Posad,[33] and encouraged speculation.[34] The desire to defend local interests led Moscow's mayor to seek to restrict the tax paid by the city to the provincial zemstvo and ensure that what was paid was spent within the city.[35] Provincial organs quickly devolved responsibility for food procurement and transport to *uezd* zemstva, which also administered the *paek* and were at the frontline of popular unrest. This only encouraged *uezdy* to prioritize their interests over provincial ones. A meeting of provincial governors in 1916 noted discord between provincial and *uezd* zemstva, and a lack of capable personnel in *uezd* zemstva, although Moscow was apparently better than most.[36]

The vast majority of social groups and organizations continued to contribute enthusiastically to the war effort throughout. Muscovites played a leading role in establishing the All-Russian Union of Zemstva, the All-Russian Union of Towns (and a joint body, Zemgor), the War-Industries Committees and numerous charities. Yet the state viewed all this suspiciously, seeing any organization as posing a political threat; even expressions of national patriotism and unity exacerbated divisions between regional organizations and central power.[37] It is hardly

surprising, therefore, that by January 1916, Moscow newspaper columnists were debating whether the province (and Russia) would be better off with greater de-centralization.[38]

Despair at the inadequacies of the tsarist government and its unwillingness to countenance reform became more pronounced in Moscow as the war progressed. Moscow politicians were influential in the formation of a national progressive bloc in autumn 1915, a coalition of liberals and conservatives in the State Duma and State Council. It called for a 'ministry of confidence' that would see the appointment of acceptable ministers, greater accountability in government, and a shift of power to the State Duma. The call to devolve greater responsibilities to public organizations found support in Moscow's duma and zemstva.[39] The 1916 city duma elections took place under numerous 'left political slogans',[40] resulting in a liberal majority, sufficient for the state to annul the results and force the old duma to continue. Yet these were demands that all social groups sympathized with, even the Tsar's traditional supporters. Moscow's nobles led a campaign within their national body, the United Nobility, which resulted in a resolution of November 1916 echoing the bloc's demands.[41]

This all may have been just 'words, words and words', as a Moscow University professor despaired in his diary,[42] but these years saw a push towards local autonomy in the hope that it would pave the way for greater democracy. And Moscow province was far from unique in this respect. Some problems, such as industrial concerns and inflation, were greater in Moscow than elsewhere, as were pressures caused by expanding military and refugee populations, which all undoubtedly contributed to high levels of strikes and the unusually virulent anti-German riots in 1915. Yet these problems were present throughout Russia to a greater or lesser extent; the issues raised above were ones that all provinces were grappling to overcome and the rise of centrifugal forces across Russia helped to fatally weaken Tsarism.[43]

1917 in Moscow Province

The revolution started in Petrograd, but by the time news of Nicholas II's abdication and the formation of the Provisional Government had reached Moscow, various groups had already seized the initiative, which they proved unwilling to relinquish.[44] On 1 March, the Moscow Soviet of Workers' Deputies was formed, dominated by Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries (SRs), whilst a Soviet of Soldiers' Deputies followed on 4 March. Subsequent weeks saw soviets formed in the *raiony* of Moscow and *uezd* towns, representing workers, peasants or soldiers, or all three. On 27 May, the first provincial soviet was formed.[45] The other key organization in Moscow, the Committee of Public Organizations (CPO), was also formed on 1 March, chaired by N. M. Kishkin (Kadet). Within weeks, it expanded to include several hundred representatives from the Duma, zemstva, industry, business, military, education, health, cooperatives, railways, workers, lawyers, women, and clergy.[46] The CPO took the duma's powers over business, infrastructure, education, and other areas, and it sponsored similar committees in *raiony*. Comparable committees were established spontaneously in *uezd* towns, but were usually more democratic in that they were popularly elected by some means.

As in other provinces, the dual power system that dominated national politics during 1917 – the divide between government and soviets, representing a divide between the propertied and lower social groups – was not as obvious in Moscow. The soviet had twenty representatives on the CPO and *uezd* soviets were similarly represented on *uezd* committees. The CPO also mobilized unions and professional associations to ensure that important groups were represented. Its finance committee, for instance, included representatives from thirty groups, whilst thirty-six were represented on its transport committee.[47] This, in turn, encouraged more professional and

social groups to mobilize in the belief that their views would be heard. Societies, trade unions, factory committees and soldiers' committees all took on new authority.

Yet dual power retained an underlying presence, particularly in the difficulties faced by the CPO and the soviet in delineating spheres of activity. Ideally, soviets would deal with issues impinging on ordinary people's lives, whilst committees oversaw broader concerns, but key issues such as land and food supply fell into both categories. Moreover, the government's solution – forming land and food supply committees – only served to create more organs competing for power at provincial, *uezd* and *volost'* level. All were often paralysed by debate. Moscow's soviet saw heated arguments over contentious issues – the eight-hour working day, war, food supply – and resolutions often served to drive a wedge between workers, soldiers and peasants, and between socialists and ordinary people.[48]

These problems were exacerbated by the Provisional Government's failure to exert a strong, unifying force over provincial life. Its plans for local government were based on the duma and zemstva taking control once they had been re-elected on a democratic franchise.[49] Zemstva chairmen were appointed as provincial and *uezd* commissars to exert government power locally and oversee the activities of committees. However, the emphasis on the duma and zemstva clashed with popular preferences for committees and soviets, and the appointment of commissars challenged desires for local autonomy. The CPO removed the government's preferred candidates, instead electing Kishkin as Moscow's commissar and A. A. Eiler (Volokolamskii *uezd* zemstvo chairman) as provincial commissar. Similarly, *uezd* committees asserted their own authority and by late March all *uezd* commissars had either been elected by committees or approved by them. It was not so much that committees wanted different types of people – commissars remained *zemstva* activists at first – but they were determined to assert their authority.[50] The government continued to argue that it had the right to appoint those responsible for its policies, but at a

congress of Moscow provincial representatives on 10 May 1917, Eiler's deputy, E. A. Litkens, recognized the need to find a balance between supporting central authority and ensuring that such authority did not remove local initiative. A delegate from Klinskii *uezd* was less conciliatory – all questions should be solved locally; the government did not know the whole of Russia (and, by implication, Moscow did not know Moscow province) and it must consider the voices of the people. As Mark Baker has outlined in his chapter in this volume, a 'localist worldview' or 'villagism' characterized how people responded to the government's policies.[51]

Ultimately, most commissars felt responsible to the *uezd* committees that elected them, and not the government, particularly since many also served on other local bodies. The regular meetings of the province's *uezd* commissars saw individual commissars defend the interests of their *uezd*, leading to conflicts with each other and official policy. On 9 May, they even agreed not to implement unsuitable government orders without question;[52] what was unsuitable depended on how policies impacted on their *uezd*. In any case, *uezdy* usually enacted their own policies irrespective of the meetings' resolutions (a similar process occurred in *volosti* judging by the frequent complaints of unauthorized activities from *uezd* commissars). Moreover, most *uezdy* suffered frequent, disruptive changes of commissar (one was on its fourth by October), whilst Vereiskii *uezd* commissar remained out of contact for most of the year and no-one knew about events there beyond rumours of administrative chaos.[53] Similarly, a barrier existed between Moscow and its province, as commissars were unable to cover the province's most important city effectively. Although the commissar of Moskovskii *uezd* was a regular attendee of meetings and covered the city in his reports, the city's commissar, Kishkin, was not subject to Eiler's authority as provincial commissar and did not attend any meetings.

The chaotic nature of public finances encouraged localism further. Only ten of the province's fifteen main towns were collecting the full amount of taxes on the eve of 1917, with

three only managing 60%, and the situation deteriorated rapidly after the revolution.[54] The state struggled to find sufficient funds for local government; people stopped paying taxes, authorities could not enforce compliance, and inflation eroded the sums collected. Eiler appealed for people to pay taxes for the revolution, and sanctioned collections in *volosti* and a 'contribution' to fund the wages of local officials.[55] Most money, though, came from *uezd* initiatives, either utilizing the existing funds and tax-raising powers of the zemstva or issuing new taxes. From its conception, Volokolamskii *uezd* committee relied on a grant from the *uezd* zemstvo and a tax on firewood.[56] However, zemstva funds dried up as they struggled to collect taxes and a range of 'revolutionary' taxes emerged, varying in type and severity between and within *uezdy*. A tax on factory profits, for example, ranged between 5% and 28% in Bronnitskii and Zvenigorodskii *uezdy* respectively, whilst in Klinskii *uezd*, some land was taxed at four times the rate of other land.[57] Nevertheless, the rate of compliance was low in most areas and it was hardly surprising that what funds were collected usually remained within *volosti* and *uezdy* despite pressure from above.

A similar patchwork of practices can be seen in the key area of food supply. In March, only 600 wagons of supplies had arrived in the province, not the expected 1,700, fuelling shortages and inflation. Four *raiony* in Moscow were suffering 'acute' problems and several had problems, whilst Podol'skii *uezd* commissar claimed that costs had risen by 480% in his *uezd*.[58] Simmering discontent often erupted, as it did elsewhere (such as Kazan' and Nizhegorod as Sarah Badcock notes in this volume), particularly where the distribution networks were disorganized or lacked transparency. In Ozery (Kolomenskii *uezd*), shortages were compounded when a local mill broke down, but the authorities did not say this when they reduced the level of rations suddenly. Workers descended on the local cooperative, demanded that it release its reserves, and broke in when told there were none. The cooperative had just had a delivery that had not yet been distributed and this seemed to confirm workers' suspicions that grain was being concealed. Only

a concerted effort by various authorities prevented violence.[59] Yet most *uezdy* relied on these less transparent methods rather than following the example of Volokolamskii, which established a supply committee in each *volost'* with a delegate from every village.[60] The government's solution was to establish food supply committees, but these were slow to emerge and their reliance on peasant cooperation struggled in the face of the 'self-protection' (localism) practised to aid daily survival.[61]

Arguments over the *paek* also fuelled localism. *Uezd* commissars knew that it was major source of social unrest, as monthly inflation of over 10% reduced its real value and key groups were excluded.[62] A meeting of *uezd* commissars introduced greater transparency by transferring responsibility to *volost'* committees (rather than *uezd* zemstva) and vowed to give equal credit to children born out of wedlock, civil marriages, and families of all those involved in the war, even if not at the front. But arguments arose over the relative costs of living within the province as no one wanted their *uezd* deemed to require a lower *paek* than others. Eventually, they agreed that urban costs of living were higher than rural costs within *uezdy*, and that major towns were costlier than others. Three tiers emerged: Moscow, Bogorodsk, Pavlovskii Posad and Podol'sk; Kolomna, Sergiev Posad and Serpukhov; and everywhere else. The extent of local autonomy, however, makes it doubtful that everyone conformed and revisions were soon proposed.[63]

Against the backdrop of supply problems, inflation, insufficient state aid and ineffective policies, it is hardly surprising that social unrest continued to escalate in 1917. Overall, the level of rural unrest in Moscow province was lower than in other areas, such as the Black Earth region or the Volga, and differed between *uezdy*, with treble the incidences in Bronnitskii, Klinskii and Ruzskii *uezdy*, for example, than in Moskovskii, Vereiskii or Zvenigorodskii *uezdy* prior to July 1917.[64] The state's land committees often viewed peasant actions favourably to maintain influence locally, and were viewed suspiciously by landowners. Moscow's authorities placed

more faith in conciliatory chambers, which were designed to bring together all parties in the countryside – landowners, peasants and the state – to resolve disputes. Yet *uezdy* reacted differently; some embraced them, whilst others thought they increased peasant suspicions.[65] Either way, it was difficult to enforce their resolutions, whilst Eiler admitted that he did not know what actions *uezd* commissars were taking most of the time, as they did not bother to notify him.[66]

A similar situation existed in urban areas; the authorities fielded complaints from both sides, ranging from workers' protests about conditions and closures, to owners' protests about absenteeism and unreasonable demands. Strikes increased steadily and became more politicized. Moscow itself was more strike-prone than Petrograd, but the province was calmer than Petrograd province and, indeed, some other provinces.[67] Just as in rural areas, these complaints highlighted the lack of central authority. A complaint concerning the unauthorized seizure of a Moscow metal factory, for example, was first made to the Ministry of Trade and Industry who, lacking the means to enforce order, transferred it to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, who passed it to Eiler, who sent it to Kishkin, who gave it to the Committee of Workers of Moscow Industrial Region. The complaint was made on 1 June, took until 26 July to reach the committee, and nothing was heard until mid-August when the militia denied that there had been a seizure.[68]

The inability to enforce compliance at various levels was a major problem. Plans to create a militia as a revolutionary alternative to the tsarist-era police developed slowly. Some *uezdy* forged ahead, but there were financial problems, prompting disputes over whether each *uezd* should have the same number of personnel or if some, like Moskovskii, deserved more on higher wages, and there was a struggle over control. The provincial authorities had to accept the election of militiamen at *volost'* level, but tried to reserve the right to confirm these, set guidelines to foster quality, and appoint those heading the militia in each *uezd*. The initial results were

unpromising; by mid-April, the militia in Moskovskii *uezd* was uncontrollable, conducting illegal searches and arrests, whilst most *uezdy* lacked any kind of militia. Bogorodskii *uezd* was second only to Moskovskii in the size of its militia, due to its industrial importance, yet wages were half those in Serpukhovskii *uezd*. This affected the quality of personnel, with a reliance on injured soldiers or those on leave, leading to frequent turnover and poor training.[69] There was a militia in most Moscow *raiony* by mid-1917, but they lacked staff, arms and prison cells. Soldiers serving in the militia brought their own weapons and an independent workers' militia operated in workers' districts.[70] Public pressure often guided the militia's actions rather than the law.

The inability of authorities at every level to enforce their policies encouraged discontent, counter-revolutionary fears and popular radicalism. Just as *uezd* organs never felt that they received sufficient help from provincial authorities, the latter bemoaned the ineffectiveness of central government. Neither recognized the contradiction between their desire for autonomy and their complaints about the inability of higher authorities to resolve local problems. These problems and contradictions were not unique to Moscow province, and when replicated across Russia, they fatally undermined the Provisional Government's ability to govern.

This was reflected at the ballot box. The June elections to the city duma saw a majority (58%) for the SRs with 646,568 voting (about 190 times the number who voted in 1912 and 60% of the electorate). The Bolsheviks, in comparison, gained only 11.6% of the vote and the Kadets 16.8%. Two months later, though, only 378,962 voted in *raion* duma elections. Amid this growing disillusionment with elections, the SR share plummeted to 14%, whilst the Bolsheviks gained over 51% and the Kadets 26%, demonstrating the increasing radicalism of those who did vote and the broader polarization of politics. The Bolsheviks, unsurprisingly, usually did much better in large urban centres such as Moscow, but these trends, if less pronounced, are visible across Russia. The Bolsheviks' blunt message of peace, workers' control, redistribution of land,

and power to the soviets struck a chord with disillusioned voters.[71] They gained around 20% in elections in *uezd* towns in the province in late summer, but this masked huge variations, with significant results in larger towns such as Kolomna, Podol'sk and Orekhovo-Zuevo. Indeed, achieving 76% of the vote in Orekhovo-Zuevo may have been their best result in the country.[72] They also targeted the *volost'* zemstvo elections, printing articles on the campaign and sending agitators across the province, achieving better than expected results, even if peasants still favoured the SRs.[73] On 5 September, they had their first resolution supported by Moscow's soviet, prompting a reorganization that resulted in a Bolshevik chairman and a majority on its executive committee. A similar process occurred in Kolomna and elsewhere by late September into early October.[74] Further political change nationally seemed inevitable.

Moscow's October and Civil War

As in February, Moscow responded to Petrograd's lead during the October Revolution, but the Bolsheviks' seizure of power in the city was more prolonged and violent.[75] The situation in the province was also discouraging. Larger towns, such as Kolomna, heard about the revolution within days and acted quickly to establish soviet power, but rural towns were slower. Ruza, for example, only heard rumours for weeks. It had no party organization and soviet power was not established until December.[76] Again, as in February, the lack of guidance from the centre forced localities to rely on their resources and make their own revolutions, making it harder to re-establish central control in the long run.

The new power structure in the province only increased centrifugal forces. Local authority lay in the soviets and a provincial congress on 27 January 1918 traced the ideal scenario. Soviets would exist in all *uezdy* and *volosti*, headed by newly elected, Bolshevik-dominated executive

committees, taking powers held by zemstva and committees.[77] In reality, existing organs continued for months; even *uezd* commissars continued meeting until January 1918 at least, even if the individuals changed.[78] In some areas, zemstva resisted attempts by soviets to take over their activities; in other areas, there were problems with re-elections or it was difficult to create soviets without an existing party infrastructure amidst a peasant population. Some *uezdy* were far more organized than others; Podol'skii and Ruzskii, for instance, had seen ten *uezd* congresses by November 1918 compared to one in Moskovskii and two in Bronnitskii. Similar differences can be seen between *raiony* within Moscow,[79] and more emerged from the creation of five new *uezdy* by 1920. Ostensibly formed to help control towns with well-established significance (such as Sergiev Posad and Naro-Fominsk) or important industry (Orekhovo-Zuevo, Pavloskii Posad and Shchelkovo), it took time to establish administrative organs and allocate resources. Finally, existing divisions between the city and province persisted. In March 1918, Moscow was anointed as the new capital and seat of the government amid fears that Petrograd was vulnerable militarily. To quote one member, this transformed Moscow's soviet into the 'political centre' of Russia,[80] challenging the supremacy of the provincial soviet. Similarly, whilst the province had more official publications in 1919 than any other province, fifty-one of the fifty-seven were located in Moscow, a much worse urban-rural ratio than others.[81] Moreover, as soviets became increasingly overshadowed by parallel party organizations, Moscow's party organization was much better established and more influential than its provincial counterpart.

As 1918 progressed and soviets steadily prevailed over other organs, it remained *soviet* power in the province not Bolshevik power.[82] Whilst the Bolsheviks dominated at provincial and city level, as well as in *uezd* executive committees, often with 80% or more of members, it was a different picture in *volosti* where only 28% of executive committees were party or candidate members.[83] Most were categorized as non-party, middle-aged, male peasants. In some areas,

political diversity was clearer; in a *uezd* congress in Kolomna on 21 June 1918, fifty-six voted for a Bolshevik-sponsored resolution with thirty-five and thirty-four for Menshevik and SR alternatives respectively (and eight abstained). The arrest of a Menshevik member of the town's executive committee prompted widespread strikes.[84]

Within the Bolshevik party, there was a lack of reliable, experienced party workers throughout the period.[85] On the one hand, this exacerbated the inability of officials to impose their will on those below. Moscow's party committee struggled to impose its will on *raiony*, who in turn could barely control local cells. *Uezd* activists were often unwilling to follow provincial orders, arguing that policies must suit local needs, whilst simultaneously complaining that *volosti* ignored their orders. None knew about events beneath them.[86] Activists believed in defending their views on major questions and, for all that provincial leaders despaired, they adopted the same approach when dealing with national government. On the other hand, the lack of experienced workers made it difficult to staff the state organs needed to impose conformity. From July to November 1918, for example, the staffing crisis in Moscow's revolutionary tribunal was so critical that some proposed abolishing it altogether, despite the crucial role that tribunals were supposed to play in targeting the lack of discipline within the state apparatus as well as counter-revolution more broadly.[87]

All this mirrored the situation before October 1917 and the same factors continued to fuel centrifugal forces. One of the most fundamental was the struggle for finance; as Baker noted in this volume, peasants were simply not willing to fund soviets. A meeting of *raiony* in Moscow on 8 December 1917 declared that their finances were 'catastrophic' and they needed thirty million rubles for military matters, invalids, refugees, and hospitals, as well as for wages and fuel.[88] They appealed to the state, but the chief sources of money remained 'revolutionary' taxes and 'contributions'. These could now be justified ideologically if they targeted the non-working,

exploiting population. As Bogorodskii *uezd* soviet noted in June 1919, as only 28% of 'normal' taxes were collected, exceptional taxes were the only alternative.[89] The provincial authorities accepted that these funded everything from schools and hospitals to the wages of soviet employees.[90] Yet it reduced their control; local soviets declared new taxes, taxed produce (and thus all social groups), and retained the bulk of any money raised. And financial problems continued, such as the crisis that struck Kolomenskii *uezd* in 1922, forcing a reduction in soviet activity, including gathering fuel.[91] This affected Bolshevik support; one diarist, albeit a liberal professional, noted sarcastically that the authorities demanded 'only money, money, money' and only used it to produce decrees ordering further taxes and confiscations.[92]

Problems also continued in food supply. The Bolsheviks helped redistribute the land of former landowners, and extended price controls and rationing as part of a broader programme of expanding state control of the economy. Moscow adopted a modified version of a national four-tier ration system, which favoured the labouring population, in September 1918.[93] But supplies still fell and rations were rarely fulfilled. The state blamed resistance from rich peasants and created committees of poor peasants to harness class allies to aid food requisitioning, but these were unsuccessful and abandoned by late 1918. Instead, food detachments became common, which often seized food at gunpoint. Thousands were involved in these detachments, and joined thousands more Muscovites who were searching for food across the province and beyond, taking advantage of the city's position as a hub of the railway network. Despite attempts to close markets and clamp down on 'bag men' – those bringing supplies from the countryside – the authorities could not stop either, particularly as the situation worsened.[94] By late January 1921, thirty-three wagons of supplies were arriving daily in Moscow when the population needed a minimum of forty-four.[95]

In April 1921, the state reverted to a fixed tax to encourage trade as part of the broader New Economic Policy (NEP), which it hoped would reduce economic tensions and social unrest. Yet its impact was not immediate. In autumn 1921, Moscow's authorities were forced to launch a multi-faceted food 'campaign', which included requisitioning and quotas alongside lectures and meetings. There was a name-and-shame policy to combat local resistance. The quotas of products assigned to *uezdy* were published in newspapers alongside frequent progress reports showing which *uezdy* were on course to fulfil their quotas and which lagged behind. The differences could be sizeable; half a dozen *uezdy* had fulfilled their quota of rye when Naro-Fominskii had only reached 25% and Dmitrovskii 50%. The figures were usually left to speak for themselves, but sometimes *uezdy* were condemned directly, such as when Moskovskii *uezd* only fulfilled 13% of its potato quota.[96] It is hard to tell whether this approach worked; *uezdy* varied in their success depending on the product making it difficult to distinguish resistance from poor harvests. Nevertheless, a similar campaign in 1922 received less media coverage suggesting that the NEP was finally having an impact.[97]

The impact of food and fuel shortages, along with inflation, conscription, disease, and repression, led to de-urbanization. The population of Moscow fell from 2,017,173 in February 1917 to 1,028,218 in August 1920 (only Petrograd experienced sharper falls).[98] The numbers of industrial workers fell by 44% as over 70% of factories closed. Unemployment grew rapidly, although some found jobs in the expanding bureaucracy (a third of workers were in offices by 1920), leading to fluid occupational and social statuses. Wages increased 400 times from 1913-20, but prices increased 25,000 times. Output per worker in 1920 was only 25% of that in 1913, and absenteeism ranged between 25% and 80% across different industries as workers searched for food and fuel.[99] There were 40-50,000 unemployed elsewhere in the province by late July 1918, with Podol'sk, Serpukhov and Kolomna the worst affected.[100] The resulting exodus

eradicated workers as a significant group in some towns. Zvenigorod reverted back to a market town after its fledgling working classes fled back to the countryside.[101] It was not until autumn 1922 that a more positive picture of rising employment started to emerge.

As before, economic hardship fed social unrest. In May 1918, for example, six were killed in food riots in Pavlovskii Posad,[102] and whilst strikes did occur in 1918, there was a rapid increase of strikes in 1919-20, culminating in a powerful movement by 1920-1. Some disturbances turned violent, leading to the deaths of 200-300 soldiers in 1920 as well as many workers.[103] The state saw a direct link between food shortages and unemployment, and violence and opposition. In April 1918, a *volost'* in Mozhaiskii *uezd* voted in favour of transferring power to the Constituent Assembly, whilst there was a 'counter-revolutionary' mood across the *uezd*. A report for the *uezd* soviet in autumn 1918 suggested that 70% of people opposed soviet power. Whilst routinely noting the 'backwardness' of the population, the author was clear that food shortages, which had left 30,000 people starving, were the main problem.[104] 'Non-partyism' increased by 1921 as did conflict within the party, leading to a purge of the membership.[105]

The Bolsheviks struggled to combat this growing unrest. Reports on the militia contain the same complaints as 1917; insufficient personnel, finances and equipment, alongside poor training, rising levels of crime and disparities between *uezdy*. By October 1921, Moscow had 2,253 militiamen compared to 1,553 in the rest of the province; even here, numbers varied from 147 in Moskovskii *uezd* and 140 in Bogorodskii *uezd* to 31 in the newly-created Pavlovskii-Posadskii *uezd* and 57 in Vereiskii *uezd*.[106] Even the impact of the newly-created secret police or Cheka was initially limited in many places. In June 1918, for instance, the Cheka in Mozhaiskii *uezd* was formed from only three people.[107]

This unrest fed into debates within soviet and party organizations about the structure of power in the province and the rural-urban divide. Nationally, the state had pressed for greater

centralization from 1918 onwards. As the Commissariat of Internal Affair's official publication phrased it, all power to the localities may have helped the Bolsheviks to seize power, but a unified (hierarchical) authority was needed now that the state was in its 'construction' period to ensure united policies, tactics, plans and laws.[108] There were murmurs of agreement locally. In December 1918, a report on Mozhaiskii *uezd* noted that greater centralization might help maintain order and increase the impact of soviet power on people's lives. So far, the author noted, peasants had not seen any benefits locally, largely due to the ineffectiveness of local soviets.[109] At this stage, however, more people disagreed than agreed. On 27 December, the executive committee of Bronnitskii *uezd* soviet argued that centralization was already destroying the rights of ordinary workers and peasants.[110]

The Bolshevik rhetoric on local autonomy was certainly stronger than its predecessors, classing it as 'separatism' and blaming a lack of leadership from above. Authorities at all levels issued numerous decrees to assert control over those below, whilst Moscow soviet's presidium spent 26.5% of its time in 1922 on organizational-administrative issues – only the economy took more (31.3%) – while the figure was 66.2% for its executive committee.[111] There was greater scrutiny of reports on *uezd* meetings, troubleshooting trips into *uezdy* by provincial figures and *uezd* figures into *volosti*, and outsiders were appointed to bring impartial leadership to local posts.

By 1919-20, stronger links were being made between administrative divisions and social unrest, and more began to see centralism as crucial to consolidating Bolshevik power in the province. The driving force came from the provincial authorities, soviet and party, who stressed the benefits of greater unity on economic and personnel policies in various proposals made to city authorities in 1919.[112] In April 1920, the city's party committee agreed, prompting a plenary meeting on 11 June 1920 to finalize the proposals.[113] Reiterating the benefits of a united policy in areas such as the economy, particularly food supply, several supporters noted that just beyond the

city limits there was a lack of 'consciousness' among the peasantry, a lack of support for soviet power, and the worrying influence of rich peasants. Speakers highlighted a strong rural-urban divide founded on the belief that soviet power was for the workers, and argued that only a soviet that bridged the province and the city, bringing peasants together with workers, could help them 'march' together. Only a Menshevik dissented, repeating that centralization was destroying the democracy that made soviet power meaningful locally. The vast majority, however, supported unity.[114] Essentially, the city consumed the province with majorities in the presidium and the executive committee of the new united soviet.[115]

The move towards greater centralization was facilitated by the Bolsheviks' increasing willingness to enforce local compliance. The regime was far more willing than its predecessors to target its own officials. Moscow's Cheka arrested 42,878 people from December 1918 to January 1920, 62% of which were for speculation and 12% for crimes when holding an official post. Of those speculators arrested between 1 October 1919 and 1 June 1920, 25% were office workers, probably mostly bureaucrats.[116] Many crimes were transferred directly to courts, particularly revolutionary tribunals, and the legal system played a key role in helping regulate the state apparatus. A typical case on 11 July 1919 saw Bogorodskii *uezd* soviet criticize a *volost'* soviet for failing to fulfil orders and for chaotic work; it resolved to send a commission to resolve the problems and prosecute those responsible.[117] Frequent public trials, including of Cheka workers, emphasized that officials 'discrediting soviet power' were treated more harshly than most other criminals.[118] In the first half of 1919, 33% of cases investigated by Moscow's tribunal concerned abuse of duties; the same percentage was seen in 1920, before rising to almost 50% in 1921. Many other crimes also involved party members and officials. By 1920, a military tribunal was also active in the region, which investigated half as many cases again. The majority resulted in a prison sentence, but 5-7% of sentences were execution.[119] Local officials often resented these

measures but, as Stefan Karsch has also noted in this volume, they came to rely on the very same organs – the Cheka, tribunals and militia – and the use of violence to enforce their own authority locally, and in doing so, relied on the central authority and mechanisms of the state, strengthening them in the process.

By early 1921, Moscow's workers were contributing to nationwide unrest that saw peasant revolts in areas such as Tambov and the sailors' revolt at Kronstadt. On 23 February 1921, more than 10,000 workers participated in a protest march in the city, and there were strikes in major factories. Less than two months later, the NEP was approved, encouraging commerce and trade, and ending food requisitioning. In Moscow, the NEP marked the effective end of the civil war. Subsequent years saw shops reappear, living conditions improve, and population levels recover. Rural Russia remained under-governed, and Moscow province was no exception, but the equilibrium between centrifugal and centripetal forces that prevailed prior to 1914 was re-established.

The Bolsheviks achieved this because the nature of localism changed after October 1917. Despite conflict between province and city, province and *uezdy*, soviets and party organs, and so on, none offered any alternatives to Bolshevik power.[120] The multi-party democracy of 1917 disappeared, as did fundamental disagreements over political and social policies. Instead, united by a belief in Bolshevik power and its main policies, conflict was centred on localities defending their positions and autonomy, and debating whether localism aided or hindered the establishment of the new state. As local Bolsheviks increasingly had to rely on violence to hold on to power, they depended on the authorities above them at every level to help provide it. In doing so, it became evident to many local Bolsheviks that strengthening the central authority of the new state would help them to consolidate Bolshevik power locally and, despite the turmoil, coercion and centralization did seem to work.

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[1] To quote Donald J. Raleigh, *Experiencing Russia's Civil War: Politics, Society and Revolutionary Culture in Saratov, 1917-1922* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 15. See also Sarah Badcock, *Politics and the People in Revolutionary Russia: A Provincial History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) and Aaron B. Retish, *Russia's Peasants in Revolution and Civil War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

[2] David Saunders, 'Regional Diversity in the Later Russian Empire', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 6th series, no. 10 (2000), 143-63.

[3] See, for e.g., *Krasnaia Moskva 1917-1920 gg.* (Moscow: Izd-vo Moskovskogo soveta, 1920); and N. N. Ovsiannikov, ed., *Oktiabr'skoe vosstanie v Moskve* (Moscow: Gos. izd-vo Moskovskoe otdelenie, 1922).

[4] *Podgotovka i pobeda oktiabr'skoi revoliutsii v Moskve* (Moscow: Moskovskii rabochii, 1957); *Oktiabr' 1917 v Moskve i Moskovskoi gubernii* (Moscow: TsGAOR, 1957); and *Uprochenie sovetskoi vlasti v Moskve i Moskovskoi gubernii* (Moscow: Moskovskii rabochii, 1958).

[5] See *Istoriia Moskvy* (6 volumes, Moscow: Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1952-59). The best histories of the revolutionary period remain A. Ia. Grunt, *Moskva 1917-i. Revoliutsiia i kontrrevoliutsiia* (Moscow: Nauka, 1976) and V. A. Klimenko, *Bor'ba s kontrrevoliutsiei v Moskve, 1917-1920* (Moscow: Nauka, 1978). Moscow also serves as a prominent case study in I. I. Mints, *Istoriia velikogo oktiabria* (3 volumes, Moscow: Nauka, 1967-72), esp. I, 623-82 and III, 7-96, 191-306. A rare attempt to cover the province is Iu. S. Aksenov, 'Trudiashchiesia Moskovskoi gubernii v

boiakh za pobedu oktiabria', in *Ustanovlenie sovetskoi vlasti na mestakh v 1917-1918 godakh* (2 volumes, Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1959), II, 15-110. On a *uezd* town, see G. P. Efremtsev, *Pobeda sovetov v Kolomne* (Moscow: Moskovskii rabochii, 1957).

[6] The best studies are Timothy J. Colton, *Moscow: Governing the Socialist Metropolis* (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1995) and Richard Sakwa, *Soviet Communists in Power: A Study of Moscow during the Civil War, 1918-21* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1988). There are excellent studies of urban life by Mauricio Borrero, Diane Koenker, Kevin Murphy and Simon Pirani, all cited below. See also William J. Chase, *Workers, Society, and the Soviet State: Labor and Life in Moscow, 1918-1929* (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1987).

[7] As well n. 1 above, see Peter Holquist, *Making War, Forging Revolution: Russia's Continuum of Crisis, 1914-1921* (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 2002), N. N. Kabytova, *Vlast' i obshchestvo Rossiiskoi provintsii v revoliutsii 1917 goda* (Samara: Samarskii universitet, 2002), and Donald J. Raleigh, *Revolution on the Volga: 1917 in Saratov* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986).

[8] Kimitaka Matsuzato, 'The Concept of "Space" in Russian History: Regionalization from the Late Imperial Period to the Present', in Teruyuki Hara and Kimitaka Matsuzato, eds., *Empire and Society: Approaches to Russian History* (Sapporo: Slavic Research Centre, Hokkaido University, 1997), 208-09; *Krasnaia Moskva*, 51.

[9] See Richard Wortman, 'Moscow and Petersburg: The Problem of Political Center in Tsarist Russia, 1881-1914', in Sean Wilentz, ed., *Rites of Power: Symbolism, Ritual and Politics since the Middle Ages* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1985), 244-71.

[10] Reginald E. Zelnik, trans. and ed., *A Radical Worker in Tsarist Russia: The Autobiography of Semen Ivanovich Kanatchikov* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986), 7.

[11] M. V. Golitsyn, *Moi vospominaniia, 1873-1917* (Moscow: Russkii mir, 2007), 432.

[12] See Sally West, *I Shop in Moscow: Advertising and the Creation of a Consumer Culture in Late Imperial Russia* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2011); and Marjorie L. Hilton, *Selling to the Masses: Retailing in Russia, 1880-1930* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2012).

[13] S. T. Semenov, *Dvadtsat' piat' let v derevne* (Petrograd: Zhizn' i znanie, 1915), 5.

[14] Anita B. Baker, 'Deterioration or Development? The Peasant Economy of Moscow Province prior to 1914', *Russian History*, 5, 1 (1978), 13.

[15] D. N. Shipov, *Vospominaniia i dumy o perezhitom* (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2007), 650.

[16] M. M. Novikov, *Ot Moskvy do N'iu-iorka* (Moscow: Moskovskii gos. universitet, 2009), 107.

[17] Golitsyn, *Vospominaniia*, 444-6.

[18] Robert W. Thurston, *Liberal City, Conservative State: Moscow and Russia's Urban Crisis, 1906-14* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 79-83, 206-08.

[19] Thurston, *Liberal*, 61-3.

[20] See I. S. Rozental', *Moskva na pereput'e: Vlast' i obshchestvo v 1905-1914 gg.* (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2004).

[21] A. G. Vazhenin and P. V. Galkin, *Moskovskoe zemstvo v nachale XX veka* (Moscow: MGOU, 2004), 17.

[22] Shipov, *Vospominaniia*, 64-86; N. M. Mel'nikov, '19 let na zemskoi sluzhbe', *Rossiiskii arkhiv*, no. 17 (2008), 238.

[23] *Krasnaia Moskva*, 51.

[24] Colton, *Moscow*, 73; Thurston, *Liberal*, 192.

[25] Diane Koenker, *Moscow Workers and the 1917 Revolution* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), 23-6, 85-7.

[26] Leopold Haimson and Eric Brian, 'Labor Unrest in Imperial Russia during the First World War: A Quantitative Analysis and Interpretation', in Leopold Haimson and Giulio Sapelli, eds., *Strikes, Social Conflict and the First World War* (Milan: Fetrinelli, 1992), 407.

[27] Eric Lohr, *Nationalizing the Russian Empire: The Campaign Against Enemy Aliens during World War I* (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 2003), 31-54.

[28] Kevin Murphy, *Revolution and Counterrevolution: Class Struggle in a Moscow Metal Factory* (Oxford: Berghahn, 2005), 27-36.

[29] The term *paek* is used to mean a monetary food allowance throughout this chapter. It can refer to a food ration or an in-kind food allowance, but local officials only ever discussed it as a monetary allowance during this period in the sources used here.

[30] Barbara Alpern Engel, 'Not By Bread Alone: Subsistence Riots in Russia during World War I', *Journal of Modern History*, 69, 4 (1997), 696-721. Efremtsev discusses strikes in Kolomna in 1915-16 (*Pobeda*, 20-1).

[31] Cited in David Saunders, 'The First World War and the End of Tsarism', in Ian D. Thatcher, ed., *Reinterpreting Revolutionary Russia* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 63.

[32] Kimitaka Matsuzato, 'Interregional Conflicts and the Collapse of Tsarism: The Real Reason for the Food Crisis in Russia after the Autumn of 1916', in Mary Schaeffer Conroy, ed., *Emerging Democracy in Late Imperial Russia* (Niwot; University Press of Colorado, 1998), 243-300. See also Lars T. Lih, *Bread and Authority in Russia, 1914-1921* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990).

[33] F. V. Shlippe, 'Avtobiograficheskii zapiski', *Rossiiskii arkhiv*, no. 17 (2008), 140.

[34] *Moskovskiia vedomosti*, no. 5, 8 January 1916, 3.

[35] Golitsyn, *Vospominaniia*, 556-7.

[36] 'Soveshchanie gubernatorov v 1916 godu', *Krasnyi arkhiv*, no. 33 (1929), 150-1, 163.

[37] The bitterness of Zemgor activists remained evident in Tikhon Polner, *Russian Local Government during the War and the Union of Zemstvos* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1930), 84-8.

[38] *Moskovskiia vedomosti*, no. 5, 8 January 1916, 2-3; no. 12, 16 January 1916, 2.

[39] *Moskovskiia vedomosti*, no. 153, 4 July 1915, 4; no. 190, 19 August 1915, 3.

[40] Novikov, *Ot Moskvy*, 108.

[41] Tsentral'nyi istoricheskii arkhiv Moskvy (TsIAM), f. 4 (Moscow Noble Assembly), op. 3, d. 83, ll. 1-11 (report by the provincial marshal, P. A. Bazilevskii, 13 January 1917). For more details, see Matthew Rendle, *Defenders of the Motherland: The Tsarist Elite in Revolutionary Russia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 19-29.

[42] M. M. Bogoslovskii, *Dnevniki 1913-1919* (Moscow: Vremia, 2011), 75.

[43] For e.g., I. B. Belova, *Pervaia mirovaia voina i rossiiskaia provintsiia. 1914 – fevral' 1917 g.* (Moscow: AIRO-XXI, 2011), which focuses on Kaluga and Orel provinces, and Retish, *Russia's Peasants*, 22-63, on Viatka province.

[44] As was the case in most localities; see, for e.g., Kabytova, *Vlast' i obshchestvo*, 50-78.

[45] For detailed accounts of the February Revolution in Moscow, see E. N. Burdzhalov, *Vtoraia russkaia revoliutsiia: Moskva. Front. Periferiia* (Moscow: Nauka, 1971), 7-89; and Grunt, *Moskva*, 63-105.

[46] Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsi (GARF), f. 1788 (Ministry of Internal Affairs), op. 2, d. 114, ll. 77-78 (journal of CPO meeting, 16 March 1917).

[47] GARF, f. 1788, op. 2, d. 114, ll. 81, 117 (journals of CPO meetings, 16 March and 19 April 1917).

[48] Koenker, *Moscow Workers*, 106-29.

[49] Daniel Orlovsky, 'Reform during Revolution: Governing the Provinces in 1917', in Robert O. Crummey, ed., *Reform in Russia and the USSR* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1989), 100-25.

[50] TsIAM, f. 2340 (Moscow Provincial Commissar), op. 1, d. 2, l. 15 (list of *uezd* commissars, 7 April 1917); d. 107, ll. 38-39 (report on the activities of *uezd* commissars, 10 May 1917). Moscow was not unique. By late April, only 42% of provincial commissars initially appointed by the government remained in post and 40% of *uezd* commissars; I. A. Tropov, *Revoliutsiia i provintsiia: Mestnaia vlast' v Rossii (fevral' – oktiabr' 1917 g.)* (St Petersburg: Evropeiskii Dom, 2011), 102.

[51] TsIAM, f. 2340, op. 1, d. 107, ll. 42-44ob (minutes). The same issues occurred elsewhere: for e.g., see a debate in Smolensk's provincial council on 25-28 May 1917, reprinted in Michael C. Hickey, ed., *Competing Voices from the Russian Revolution* (Santa Barbara: Greenwood, 2011), 279-94. See also Hickey, 'Local Government and State Authority in the Provinces: Smolensk, February-June 1917', *Slavic Review*, 55, 4 (1996), 863-81; and the chapter by Sarah Badcock in this volume.

[52] TsIAM, f. 2340, op. 1, d. 106, l. 42 (minutes of a meeting of *uezd* commissars [hereafter minutes], 9 May 1917).

[53] TsIAM, f. 2340, op. 1, d. 106, ll. 38, 116-17 (minutes, 6 May and 9 September 1917).

[54] A. V. Mamaev, 'Krizis munitsipal'nykh finansov v Rossii v 1917 g.', *Voprosy istorii*, no. 2 (2010), 73.

[55] TsIAM, f. 2340. op. 1, d. 106, ll. 40, 42, 49, 71 (minutes, May and July 1917).

[56] *Izvestiia Volokolamskago uezdnago komissara*, no. 1, 1 April 1917, 2.

[57] TsIAM, f. 2340, op. 1, d. 106, ll. 77-80 (minutes, 29 July 1917).

[58] GARF, f. 1788, op. 2, d. 114, l. 46 (report by the city commissar's office to Kishkin, 18 March 1917); TsIAM, f. 2340, op. 1, d. 106, ll. 21, 32ob (minutes, 22 and 29 April 1917).

[59] GARF, f. 1791 (Central Militia Board), op. 2, d. 205, ll. 12-13 (letter from provincial commissar, 14 June 1917).

[60] TsIAM, f. 2340, op. 1, d. 106, ll. 20-21 (minutes, 22 April 1917)

[61] Lih, *Bread and Authority*, 66-81.

[62] Inflation figures are taken from the debates of local officials. A later attempt to quantify what was largely unquantifiable suggested that prices for some products rose by up to 1000% in 1916-17 compared to 1915-16, with pressures particularly acute in winter and spring. Rises in wages lagged well behind. See *Statisticheskii ezhegodnik g. Moskvy i Moskovskoi gubernii 1914-1923 gg. sostavlen statisticheskim otdelom Moskovskogo soveta. Vypusk I (Sel'skokhoziaistvennyi obzor Moskovskoi gubernii za 1916-1923 gg.)* (Moscow: Izdanie statisticheskogo otdela Moskovskogo soveta, 1925), 226-30, 234-8.

[63] TsIAM, f. 2340, op. 1, d. 106, ll. 15-16, 32-3 (minutes, 15 and 29 April 1917), 109 (resolution, mid-August 1917).

[64] D. V. Kovalev, *Podmoskovnoe krest'ianstvo v perelomnoe desiatiletie 1917-1927* (Moscow: Prometei, 2000), 133.

[65] TsIAM, f. 2340, op. 1, d. 106, ll. 22-23 (minutes, 22 April 1917).

[66] GARF, f. 1788, op. 2, d. 115, l. 31ob (letter from Eiler to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 24 July 1917).

[67] Diane P. Koenker and William G. Rosenberg, *Strikes and Revolution in Russia, 1917* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 312-14.

[68] GARF, f. 1791, op. 2, d. 205, ll. 28-29, 38, 59 (correspondence, June-August 1917).

[69] TsIAM, f. 2340, op. 1, d. 106, ll. 5-5ob, 10-12, 37 (minutes, 31 March, 15 April and 6 May), 58-61 (minutes of a meeting of *uezd* captains of the militia, 9 June); d. 107, l. 40 (report on the activities of *uezd* commissars, 10 May).

[70] GARF, f. 1791, op. 2, d. 203, ll. 13-14ob (reports from sub-*raiony* in Moscow, undated). These problems were typical; for e.g., see the minutes of a meeting of government and militia officials in Petrograd province on 27 September 1917, reprinted in O. A. Gavrilova, *Zemstvo i revoliutsiia. 1917 god v Petrogradskii gubernii* (St Petersburg: SPbGU, 2009), 232-43.

[71] An election poster is reprinted in *Podgotovka i pobeda oktiabr'skoi revoliutsii*, 311. The statistics on votes are taken from Grunt, *Moskva*, 160-2, 232-4. There are slightly different figures in William G. Rosenberg, 'The Russian Municipal Duma Elections of 1917: A Preliminary Computation of Returns', *Soviet Studies*, 21, 2 (1969), 131-63. His analysis of elections in numerous Russian towns suggests that Moscow's results reflected broader trends in popular opinion, even if more acutely and earlier than in most places.

[72] Aksenov, 'Trudiashchiesia Moskovskoi gubernii', 53-4; Rosenberg, 'Russian', 145.

[73] William G. Rosenberg, 'The Zemstvo in 1917 and its fate under Bolshevik Rule', in Terence Emmons and Wayne S. Vucinich, eds., *The Zemstvo in Russia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 399-402.

[74] Grunt, *Moskva*, 225-7; Efremtsev, *Pobeda*, 57.

[75] For details, see Grunt, *Moskva*, 297-349.

[76] V. Agal'tsev, 'V Ruze' and Smolenskii, 'V Kolomne', in Ovsiannikov, *Oktiabr'skoe vosstanie*, 145-51.

[77] GARF, f. R-393 (Commissariat of Internal Affairs), op. 3, d. 216, ll. 1-1ob (summary of congress).

[78] There are minutes from three of at least four meetings in GARF, f. R-393, op. 3, d. 216, ll. 298-304 (18 January 1918), 343-48 (15 December 1917); and d. 217, ll. 62-65ob (2-3 January 1918).

[79] *Vlast' sovetov*, no. 1, 13 January 1919, 12; *Krasnaia Moskva*, 669-70.

[80] B. L. Dvinov, *Moskovskii Sovet Rabochikh Deputatov 1917-1922. Vospominaniia* (New York: Inter-University Project on the History of the Menshevik Movement, 1961), 60.

[81] *Vlast' sovetov*, no. 2, 30 January 1919, 8.

[82] The same was true elsewhere; for e.g., Holquist, *Making War*, 141-2, and Retish, *Russia's Peasants*, 133.

[83] *Vlast' sovetov*, no. 2, 30 January 1919, 4; GARF, f. R-393, op. 3, d. 216, l. 361 (*volost'* statistics). The problem persisted: 70% of executive committee members were classed as non-party after *volost'* elections in autumn 1922 and 96% of ordinary soviet members; *Rabochaia Moskva*, no. 199, 6 October 1922, 1; no. 246, 1 December 1922, 9.

[84] GARF, f. R-393, op. 3, d. 224, ll. 270-70ob (report on a visit to Kolomenskii *uezd* soviet, 2 June 1918).

[85] For e.g., GARF, f. R-393, op. 5, d. 836, l. 22 (protocol of the executive committee of Moscow's city soviet, 23 December 1918 discussing the position in Zvenigorodskii *uezd*).

[86] For e.g., GARF, f. R-393, op. 3, d. 220, ll. 31ob, 40-40ob (minutes of the executive committee of Moskovskii *uezd* soviet, 30 July and 12-13 November 1918). Raleigh noted the same in Saratov; *Experiencing*, 112-21.

[87] Tsentral'nyi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Moskovskoi oblasti (TsGAMO), f. 4998 (Moscow Soviet's Department of Justice), op. 1, d. 13, ll. 5ob, 12ob-13, 16ob, 28ob, 51 (protocols of meetings of the justice department, 27 July, 7 August, 14 August, 4 September, 29 November 1918). See also GARF, f. R-393, op. 5, d. 836, ll. 39, 42 (protocols of the meeting of the soviet, 30 November 1918).

[88] GARF, f. R-393, op. 1, d. 30, ll. 15-16ob (resolutions from meetings of *raion* Duma, 8 December 1917 and presidium of Moscow city soviet, 9 December 1917).

[89] GARF, f. R-393, op. 13, d. 206, l. 43ob (minutes of executive committee of Bogorodskii *uezd* soviet, 5 June 1919).

[90] GARF, f. R-393, op. 3, d. 216, l. 334 (report on the activities of the presidium of Moscow soviet, 2 April 1918).

[91] *Rabochaia Moskva*, no. 100, 10 June 1922, 7; no. 161, 22 August 1922, 6.

[92] N. P. Okunev, *Dnevnik Moskvicha (1917-1924)* (Paris: YMCA Press, 1990), 169 (16 April 1918).

[93] M. I. Davydov, *Bor'ba za khleb. Prodovol'stvennaia politika Kommunisticheskoi partii i Sovetskogo gosudarstva v gody grazhdanskoi voiny (1917-1920)* (Moscow: Mysl', 1971), 184-5.

[94] For a contemporary report on inflation and speculation, see *Krasnaia Moskva*, 303-28. Also Mauricio Borrero, *Hungry Moscow: Scarcity and Urban Society in the Russian Civil War, 1917-1921* (New York: Peter Lang, 2003); and Peter Fraunholtz's chapter in this volume.

[95] Sakwa, *Soviet Communists*, 241.

[96] *Kommunisticheskii trud*, no. 428, 3 September 1921, 2-3; no. 443, 21 September, 1; no. 456, 6 October, 1; no. 467, 19 October, 1; no. 473, 26 October, 1; no. 477, 30 October, 1; no. 489, 15 November, 1; no. 515, 15 December, 1.

[97] See *Rabochaia Moskva* in August-October 1922.

[98] *Krasnaia Moskva*, 51-4.

[99] Sakwa, *Soviet Communists*, 38, 40, 80-1.

[100] GARF, f. R-393, op. 3, d. 216, l. 7 (report by Moscow's Commissar of Labour to a provincial congress of soviets, 26-27 July 1918).

[101] *Rabochaia Moskva*, no. 188, 23 September 1922, 7.

[102] GARF, f. R-393, op. 3, d. 222, ll. 117-18 (report on events by Bogorodskii *uezd* soviet, 31 May 1918).

[103] Sakwa, *Soviet Communists*, 94-5, 241-7.

[104] GARF, f. R-393, op. 3, d. 219, ll. 186-86ob (report on the information sub-department of Mozhaiskii *uezd* soviet, undated), 244 (letter from Korocharovskaia *volost'* soviet to Moscow regional soviet, 27 April 1918), 274 (letter from Mozhaisk's soviet to the Commissariat of Internal Affairs, 17 July 1918).

[105] As well as Sawka, *Soviet Communists*, Ch. 5, see Simon Pirani, *The Russian Revolution in Retreat: Soviet Workers and the New Communist Elite* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008), 92-110, 115-37.

[106] GARF, f. R-393, op. 28, d. 140, ll. 125-25ob (protocols of the presidium of Moscow soviet, 20 October 1921).

[107] GARF, f. R-393, op. 3, d. 219, l. 26 (minutes of executive committee of Mozhaiskii *uezd* soviet, 8 June 1918).

[108] *Vlast' sovetov*, no. 25, 7 November 1918, 23.

[109] GARF, f. R-393, op. 3, d. 219, l. 188 (report of the information sub-department of Mozhaiskii *uezd* soviet).

[110] GARF, f. R-393, op. 3, d. 217, l. 135 (protocol of executive committee of Bronnitskii *uezd* soviet).

[111] *Rabochaia Moskva*, no. 204, 12 October 1922, 3.

[112] See, for e.g., GARF, f. R-393, op. 5, d. 836, ll. 116-16ob (a discussion on economic unity in the provincial executive committee of the soviet, 14 February 1919).

[113] N. M. Aleshchenko, *Moskovskii sovet v 1917-1941 gg.* (Moscow: Nauka, 1976), 95.

[114] *Stenograficheskie otchety Moskovskogo Soveta Rabochikh i Krasnoarmeiskikh Deputatov*, no. 7 (1920), 109-114 (meeting of the plenum of the soviet, 11 June 1920) [a copy is in GARF, f. R-393, op. 23, d. 2, ll. 1-3ob].

[115] Colton, *Moscow*, 137; Aleshchenko, *Moskovskii sovet*, 96.

[116] *Krasnaia Moskva*, 631-3.

[117] GARF, f. R-393, op. 13, d. 206, l. 51 (protocols of the executive committee of Bogorodskii *uezd* soviet).

[118] See, for e.g., the 'show trial' of thirteen former Cheka personnel held in Kolomna on 1-11 October 1919; TsGAMO, f. 4612 (Moscow's Provincial Revolutionary Tribunal), op. 1, d. 96, ll. 10-11 (case summary), 96-256 (transcript of trial); and the trial of nine officials in Klin on 23-26 April 1921; TsGAMO, f. 4613 (Moscow's Revolutionary Tribunal), op. 2, d. 114, ll. 1-100ob (transcript of trial). These *fondy* contain numerous case files devoted to the crimes of officials.

[119] GARF, f. A-353 (Commissariat of Justice), op. 3, d. 156, l. 63ob (1919); op. 4, d. 111, ll. 180-5 (military tribunal); op. 4, d. 112, ll. 121-7 (1920); op. 5, d. 83, ll. 118-24 (1921) (statistics provided by the tribunal).

[120] This point is also made by Raleigh, *Experiencing*, 88-9, 105, 411.