Natural History and Narrative Sympathy: the Children's Animal Stories of Edward Augustus Kendall (1775/6?—1842)

In the course of his adventures, Keeper, the canine protagonist of a once-famous novel by children's writer Edward Augustus Kendall, meets an angry herd of oxen.[1] With short, dramatic sentences focusing on Keeper's perceptions and fears, the narrative encourages readers to imagine themselves in his place: "They rushed furiously toward him. They lowered their heads as if in the act of butting. Keeper was now surrounded. Death seemed inevitable" (82). The dog manages to slip under one of the animals, and flees over a frozen pool, only to sink into breaking ice; by the time he struggles free, more cattle are waiting for him on the other side. After a few tense moments, he escapes to the next field through a gap in the hedge. Keeper now "fancie[s] himself safe", but further dangers are evidently round the corner (85).

In this scene, Kendall shows himself adept at the creation of what I am calling narrative sympathy: that is, a mode of fictional writing, increasingly common in the late eighteenth century, that encouraged readers to project themselves in imagination into another's situation, without losing sight of the distinction between self and other. Experimentation by novelists, from Fielding's indirect access to and sceptical analysis of "the secret Springs, various Windings, and perplexed Mazes" of human life,[2] to Richardson's use of the epistolary form to convey a sense of direct access to his

[1] Edward Augustus Kendall, *Keeper's Travels in Search of his Master* (London: E. Newbery, 1798). References are to this edition except where otherwise indicated. Little is known of Kendall's family background or personal life. His long literary career encompassed children's fiction, translations of French literature, an account of his travels in North America, proposals for social improvements, and extensive journalism. See Guy Arnold, "Kendall, Edward Augustus (1775/6—1842)",*Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/15344. I thank the Arts and Humanities Research Council for providing support for the project "Representing Animals in Late Eighteenth-century Britain: Natural History, Narrative Sympathy, and human and Aniaml Rights" of which this article is a part.

[2] Henry Fielding, *The History of the Life of the late Jonathan Wild the Great* [1743], ed. Hugh Amory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 7.

character's sensations, had opened up new avenues for exploring human mind in fiction. Novelists such as Burney, Radcliffe and Charlotte Smith were further developing the use of free indirect discourse and thought report to represent the mind at work, pointing the way to Austen's superb achievements early in the following century.

What immediately distinguishes Kendall from these writers is that the fictional experiences he asks his readers to engage in belong to the world of non-human animals. *Keeper's Travels* (1798), his most popular work, established the dog story as a central element of children's fiction,[3] while he treated small birds in a succession of short fictions: *The Sparrow* (1798), *The Crested Wren*, *The Canary Bird* (both 1799), and *The Swallow* (1800).[4] Kendall was not the first or only writer of the time to treat the experiences of fictional animals. Many of the period's large number of children's stories featured animal protagonists or contained significant discussion of animals, reflecting their roots in Aesopian tradition, a Lockean educational agenda that emphasized kindness to animals as the basis for learning benevolence to humanity, and the rapid dissemination of natural history in the age of Linnaeus and Buffon.[5] Dorothy Kilner pioneered the animal autobiography for children in *Life and*

[3] A precursor to Keeper can be found in the canine hero of Francis Coventry's *The History of Pompey the Little; or, the Life and Adventures of a Lap-Dog* ([1751]; London: Oxford University Press, 1974). Pompey, however, despite a few empathetic touches in the writing, is primarily the circulating object at the centre of a satiric it-narrative. His story was adapted for children as *Little Juba: or, the Adventures and Vicissitudes of a Lap Dog* (London: J. Harris, 1807). A few years after *Keeper's Travels* came the anonymous *Bob, the Spotted Terrier; or, Memoirs of the Dog of Knowledge* ([1801]; London: Whittingham and Arliss, Juvenile Library, Paternoster Row, n.d.).

[4] Kendall, *The Sparrow* (London: E. Newbery, 1798); *The Crested Wren* (London: E. Newbery, 1799); *The Canary Bird: A Moral Fiction. Interspersed with Poetry* (London: E. Newbery, 1799); *The Swallow: A Fiction. Interspersed with Poetry* (London: E. Newbery, 1800). References are to these editions.

[5] For an account of the new market in children's education and entertainment see J.H. Plumb, "The New World of Children", in Neil McKendrick, John Brewer and J.H. Plumb (eds), *The Birth of a Consumer Society: The Commercialization of Eighteenth-Century England* (London: Hutchinson, 1983), 286—315. For an account of the new children's literature as contributing to the spread through education of a rising middle-class ideology, see Andrew O'Malley, *The Making of the Modern Child: Children's Literature and Childhood in the Late Eighteenth Century* (New York and London: Routledge, 2003). For a full discussion of animals in children's fiction see Tess Cosslett, *Talking Animals in British Children's Fiction, 1786—1914* (Aldershot, Hampshire: Ashgate, 2006).

Perambulations of a Mouse (1783).[6] Thomas Day, Mary Wollstonecraft, John Aikin and Anna Letitia Barbauld wrote children's fiction in which animals featured. Perhaps the best known of children's animal stories was Sarah Trimmer's *Fabulous Histories* (1786), also known as the *History of the Robins,* which was widely read in the nineteenth century.[7] While all these writers argued for kindness to animals, and Kilner in particular paid attention to the sympathetic rendering of her animal protagonist's sensations, Kendall's work is distinguished by his unusually sustained and philosophical attention to the problems of writing a non-human animal's experience.

In this essay I argue that Kendall pioneered a distinctive kind of animal fiction, in which sympathetic engagement with a non-human animal character is not reducible to simple anthropomorphism. As we will see, he combined his narrative sympathy with a close attention to descriptions of animal behaviour and animal cognition in recent works of natural history, inviting his readers to understand his animal characters as representatives of particular species, as well as feeling, experiencing individuals. Tension between these two aspects of his animals is sometimes evident, but it would over-simplify to present it as a difference between emotionally engaged narrative writing and the detached attitude of scientific natural history. Rather, tensions between similarity and difference, engagement and detachment, are internal to the narrative strategies he adopts, the philosophy on which these strategies are based, and the natural history on which he draws.

To take the narrative strategies first: Kendall, as noted above, wrote at a time when novelists were experimenting with ways of representing mental states and actions. At their best they could move flexibly between creating the illusion of sharing

[6] Dorothy Kilner, *The Life and Perambulation of a Mouse.* 2 vols ([1783]; London, John Marshall, 1790).
[7] Sarah Trimmer, *Fabulous Histories. Designed for the instruction of children, respecting their use of animals* (London: T. Longman, and G.G.J. and J. Robinson; and J. Johnson, 1786).

a fictional character's sensations, and inviting the reader to maintain sufficient detachment to reflect on, perhaps laugh at or criticise, that same character's mental operations. They took part in the creation of readerly empathy described by critics such as Suzanne Keen and Alan Palmer. Palmer claims that "narrative fiction is, in essence, the presentation of fictional mental functioning", the creation of characters' mental worlds, into which readers have access through their exercise of empathy, "the power of entering into another's personality and imaginatively experiencing their experiences … an essential part of the reading process." [8] The modern term *empathy* now occupies some of the semantic ground claimed in the eighteenth century by *sympathy*;[9] in this essay, I use the term *narrative sympathy* in preference to *empathy* to highlight the novel's use of concepts of sympathy derived from Adam Smith, and to suggest a tension within narrative, mirroring that in Smith's account, between identification with and separation from the object of sympathy.

In his *Theory of Moral Sentiments* (1759), Adam Smith considers sympathy as the imaginative process by which we place ourselves in another's situation. Using the example of our sensations when we see "our brother" tortured "upon the rack", he writes that we cannot feel his pain through our own senses, but through an imaginative act: "by our imagination we place ourselves in his situation, we conceive ourselves enduring all the same torments, we enter as it were into his body, and become in some measure the same person with him, and thence form some idea of his sensations, and even feel something which, though weaker in degree, is not altogether unlike them."[10] A radical identification with the other is qualified by the phrases "as it

[8] Alan Palmer, *Fictional Minds* (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 2004), 5, 139. The narrative creation of empathy is most extensively discussed in Suzanne Keen, *Empathy and the Novel* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
[9] Keen, 4.
[10] Adam Smith, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, ed. Knud Haakonssen (Cambrdige: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 11, 12. References are to this edition.

were" and "in some measure", lending support to the view that for Smith, "sympathetic imagination does not dissolve the sense of separateness of either party".[11] At times, Smith seems to envisage sympathy as a projection of our own feelings rather than an appreciation of another's. Imagination makes us feel on others' behalf grief for a situation they cannot themselves appreciate, for example if they have lost their reason (15), or if they are dead (16). Our sympathy with the dead arises "from our lodging … our own living souls in their inanimated bodies, and thence conceiving what would be our emotions in this case" (16). At other points, in order to counter the charge that sympathy is a selfish principle, he insists on maintaining the distinction between the feelings of the one who sympathizes and those of the object of sympathy. When condoling with a parent who has lost a son, he is not merely (selfishly) considering how he himself would feel in that circumstance: "I consider what I should suffer if I was really you, and I not only change circumstances with you, but I change persons and characters. My grief … is entirely upon your account" (374). Paradoxically, the very continuance of the distinction between the two parties here depends on imagination's power *almost* to overcome difference by allowing the sympathizer to "change persons and characters" with his object. This notion of imaginative identification with another who remains separate enables Smith to account for a man's sympathy with a woman's pains in childbirth, "though it is impossible that he should conceive himself as suffering her pains in his own proper person and character" (374).

Smith's notion of the imagination as letting us enter "as it were" into another's character forms a philosophical basis for contemporary novelists' experiments in readerly affect. Since imaginative acts, not necessarily the sight of real

[11] Charles L. Griswold, Jr, "Imagination: Morals, Science, and Arts", in *A Cambridge Companion to Adam Smith*, ed. Knud Haakonssen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 22—56: 28.

others, are concerned, sympathy can easily extend to fictional characters. In 1785 the novelist and critic Clara Reeve applied Smithian concepts to the reading process when she defined the novel as a relation of events "such as may happen to our friend, or to ourselves," in so realistic a way that "we are affected by the joys or distresses of the persons in the story, as if they were our own."[12] What does Smithian imaginative sympathy mean, though, for Kendall's project of encouraging the child reader to be affected by the joys and distresses of dogs and birds? Smith himself, unlike his older contemporary Hume, does not discuss cross-species sympathy or sympathy in non-human animals. Whereas Hume's *Treatise of Human Nature* (1739) treats sympathy as an automatic transference of feeling from one body to another, exemplified in a dog's "howlings and lamentations" transferred to its fellows, and explicitly states that human sympathies can extend beyond our own species,[13] Smith, by concentrating on sympathy as a complex mental operation involving the postulation of hypothetical states, implies that it is an exclusively human activity. We might infer that the sympathy that can extend to imaginary characters might also extend to non-humans (at least fictional ones), but perhaps such a feeling would be, like sympathy with the dead in Smith's account, a case only of self-projection, "conceiving what would be *our* emotions." Such a conclusion is encouraged by considering Kendall's animal stories as part of the subgenre of "it-narratives" or "circulation novels", which related the adventures of bank-notes and guineas as well as dogs, cats and flies. Reviewers then, as well as scholars now, identified these narratives as a recognisable group in which animal and inanimate protagonists equally belonged, as non-human objects

[12] Clara Reeve, *The Progress of Romance* (Colchester, 1785), 1: 111. For a discussion of Reeve's formulation of narrative art as "reproduc[ing] the logic of Adam Smith's theory of sympathy", see Markman Ellis, *The Politics of Sensibility: Race, Gender and Commerce in the Sentimental Novel* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 16.
[13] David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge, 2nd ed. revised by P.H.Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), 2.2.12, 398; 3.2.1, 481. References are to this edition.

given a fictional human character for the purposes of entertainment or satire. [14] In an important discussion of eighteenth-century literary negotiations of sympathy for animals and slaves, Markman Ellis concludes that animal narrators, just like inanimate ones, function as substitute humans. It-narratives "no more try to think and feel like a dog or a pony than they do a wooden toy or a pincushion. … such narrators think and feel like humans." While contending that dogs think, feel, and may have self-awareness, he nevertheless denies that imaginative narrative can approach any understanding of their minds: "the project of writing as a dog is absurd, a contradiction in terms, a fictional construction, as the supposed act of translation between dog-think and human language is not possible, no more possible than it would be to understand how a piece of wood thinks. That this is an uncrossable abyss is clear."[15]

However, I suggest that Kendall's animal stories make a deliberate attempt to bridge what, according to one influential strand of eighteenth-century thought, was by no means an impassable gulf. In opposition to the view taken by some of Descartes' followers, that animals functioned as machines with neither reason nor feeling, a number of thinkers considered them to possess both capacities, if in simpler form than those of human beings. In his *Treatise*, David Hume argued from analogy that we must assume from the similarities of action between ourselves and other animals that their mental operations resemble ours.[16] He emphasized that animals have passions

[14] For eighteenth-century authors' awareness of the it-narrative as a distinct kind, and a contemporary reviewer's placing of the adventures of animal and inanimate characters in the same category, see Mark Blackwell, "Hackwork: It-narratives and Iteration", in Mark Blackwell, ed., *The Secret Life of Things: Animals, Objects, and It-Narratives in Eighteenth-Century England*. Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 2007, 187—217: 188, 210. For animal adventures as a significant part of the subgenre see Liz Bellamy, "It-Narrators and Circulation: Defining a Subgenre", in Blackwell, 117—145: 119.

[15] Markman Ellis, "Suffering Things: Lapdogs, Slaves, and Counter-Sensibility", in Blackwell, 92—113: 105.

[16] "We are conscious, that we ourselves … are guided by reason and design, and that 'tis not ignorantly nor casually we perform those actions, which tend to self-preservation, to the obtaining pleasure, and avoiding pain. When therefore we see other creatures … perform like actions, and direct them to like

like our own (2.1.12, 324—8; 2.2.12, 397—8). David Hartley concurred, and added that these similarities ought to prompt us to treat animals kindly.[17] Writers such as Humphrey Primatt in a 1776 treatise, and Thomas Young in a 1798 pamphlet praised in *Keeper's Travels* (iv), argued against cruelty to animals on the grounds of their susceptibility to pleasure and pain.[18] Several poets, notably James Thomson and William Cowper, invoked animals' feelings in order to arouse human sympathy for them.[19] Kendall drew on several aspects of this multi-faceted tradition. In the introduction to *The Sparrow,* he explains in his narrative theory, based on the comparison of feeling across species:

> In order that the child may understand the feelings of the creature, we propose that they should be compared with his own. With this intention we have, in the following pages, introduced a bird which, while we have attended to its nature and habits, we have, nevertheless, represented in such a manner that the child may consider him as a companion. We have sought to bring about an intimacy… We have endeavoured, also, to set the sensations of the *sparrow* before the reader in such a way that he may acknowledge their relationship with his own: and to describe the events so that the child may interest himself in them as if they had befallen himself. We believe that whenever the reader enters thus into the fable, it will secure for itself a more certain and lasting

---

ends, all our principles of reason and probability carry us with an invincible force to believe the existence of a like cause" (1.3.16,176).

[17] David Hartley, *Observations on Man, his Frame, his Duty and his Expectations* (London: S. Richardson, 1749), 1.415, 2.223.

[18] Humphrey Primatt, *A Dissertation on the Duty of Mercy and Sin of Cruelty to Brute Animals*, (London: R. Hett, 1776; rpt. in *Animal Rights and Souls in the Eighteenth Century*, ed. Aaron Garrett, Vol. 3, Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 2000); Thomas Young, *An Essay on Humanity to Animals*, (London: T. Cadell jun. and W. Davies, 1798).

[19] For a discussion of the importance of the poetic tradition in disseminating the anti-cruelty message, see David Perkins, *Romanticism and Animal Rights* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), chapters 3 and 5.

> influence than mere maxims can at any time obtain. An acquaintanceship is commenced: the relative situation of the parties is altered…
>
> To cultivate those sympathies upon which benevolence is grafted, by shewing, *ex exempla*, how nearly all other animals resemble ourselves in their wants, pleasures, and natural faculties, the following pages were written (x—xi).

Here the basis of Kendall's narrative technique in Smithian sympathy is clear. The bird is to become, in imagination, a "companion" related to the child and treated with "intimacy", and the child is intended to respond to the story's events "as if they had befallen himself". Yet the bird is not only an imaginary individual friend, but the representative of a species whose "nature and habits" differ from those of humans, and are the object of a lesson in natural history. The difference that co-exists with similarity is further discussed in Kendall's introduction to *The Swallow*. Here, he admits that his fiction involves the falsity of fable and the attribution of non-existent powers to birds, but hopes nevertheless to convey that truer, more naturalist understanding of animal life that he believes must lead to greater sympathy for them:

> the author frequently attributes faculties to his animals which would be useless in their sphere, and which suppose cultivation; here, assuredly, physical veracity is violated … it is chiefly, however, by bringing animals forward in their real character, (a character possessed of certain portions of perception and memory, and the capacity of comparing ideas and acting in consequence) by becoming a voice to the dumb, that the author hopes to promote *their* benefit (xiii—xiv).

In various ways, Kendall's stories attempt to convey what he calls the "real character" of animals. In *The Crested Wren* the bird protagonist, in fable fashion, has the power of speech, but uses it to explain differences between human and avian reasoning. With little idea of the future, the young birds have no worries when their family splits up: "We parted without design, and without troubling ourselves by the idea of eternal, or even long, separation" (30). In *Keeper's Travels,* the dog has no verbal language, but can express sorrowful feelings shared by human and non-human alike: "those mournful plainings that want no words to render them intelligible: that universal language which is every where understood, by the inhabitant of every region, and by all orders of beings" (6—7).

Jonathan Lamb has argued that the discourse of sympathy incorporated different degrees of attempt to identify with a radical, non-human, other; and that where fictional characters, from Swift's Gulliver in the eighteenth century to Coetzee's Elizabeth Costello in the twentieth, identify with the non-human, they indeed court absurdity, or the breakdown of language, as they approach "the obliteration of all differences in a species of sympathy that proclaims the identity of the subject and the object."[20] Such obliteration of difference is not Kendall's project. His attempts to convey an insight into how a non-human animal might feel correspond rather to what Lamb terms the third stage of a four-stage progression towards sympathetic identification, a stage he associates with Adam Smith's notion of the imagination as providing a bridge between different subjectivities.[21] We might think of Kendall as encouraging sympathy with his fictional animals by analogy, not

[20] Jonathan Lamb, "Gulliver and the Lives of Animals", in *Humans and Other Animals in Eighteenth-Century British Culture: Representation, Hybridity, Ethics*, ed. Frank Palmeri (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 169—77: 171.
[21] Lamb, 171.

with Smithian sympathy for the dead, where we impose what would be our own feelings on those who can no longer feel, but with Smith's account of a man's sympathy for a woman's childbirth pains. This cross-gender sympathy depends on a simultaneous sense of similarity (humans of both sexes have similar bodies and feel similar pains) and difference (a man cannot feel precisely those particular pains). Kendall extends the consideration of similarity and difference, applied by Smith to sympathy within the human species, outwards to encompass sympathies with other species. His stories attempt to find a fictional idiom for his understanding of non-human animal life: that in feeling and experience it is more similar to human existence than was usually acknowledged, and that the differences in perception and expression characteristic of particular species can be understood through a process of sympathetic engagement.

This attempt makes for a difference between Kendall's fiction and the typical it-narrative, which confers fictional personhood on its inanimate or non-human animal protagonists by the use of established narrative conventions for the presentation of human characters. Kendall tends to avoid or play down the most obviously and artificially humanizing of these conventions, such as introducing the protagonist through relating his or her genealogy. Keeper, unlike other fictional dogs such as Pompey the Little, or Bob, the Dog of Knowledge,[22] is given no ancestors, and the narrative plunges instead immediately into his experiences when, one market-day, he loses his master: "His misery increased every moment. …he stood, now, forlorn, stripped, helpless, and unprotected. …he frequently fancied that he saw the object of his search … he spent the greater part of the day in fruitless sallies" (3). It is true that

[22] Francis Coventry, *The Adventures of Pompey the Little* [1751], ed. Robert Adams Day (London: Oxford University Press, 1974); *Bob, the Spotted Terrier; or, Memoirs of the Dog of Knowledge* (London: Whittingham and Arliss, [1801]), 3—6.

in this attempt to convey the dog's feelings Kendall is dealing, in Ellis's words, with "fictional constructions;" but human minds in fiction are also constructions. Applying similar fictional techniques to the creation of human and non-human minds can have various results. It can be used, as Ellis suggests, to draw attention to the discrepancy between a narrator's ostensibly non-human viewpoint and its inevitably human characteristics;[23] or it may create an impression of similarity between the perspective and feelings of the human and the non-human animal. Kendall's fiction deploys fictional animal minds in both ways at different times, moving between the poles of similarity and difference in order to encourage awareness of and sympathy with the distinctive attributes of different species of animal.

His insight into non-human animals came from his knowledge of eighteenth-century natural history, including the works of Buffon, Thomas Pennant, William Smellie, and Bernadin de Saint Pierre, in whose work Kendall was particularly interested and whom he translated. Natural history feeds into most children's stories at this time, and Kendall presented himself as heir to Sarah Trimmer, Anna Letitia Barbauld, Thomas Percival, John Aikin, and Maria Edgeworth, who had replaced the stunting, withering educational books of an earlier age with truth, philosophy and "*familiarity with the foundations and discoveries of science*".[24] His own stories are distinguished by the extent to which they replace the fabulists' concern for the lessons for human behaviour to be derived from a metaphorical reading of animal lives with the teaching of natural history for its own sake and for the sake of its direct moral benefits. His concern for what he calls animals' "real character" as opposed to the fictional identities they are given in fable comes from his reading in Buffon's accounts of the morphology, characteristics and life-cycles of different species.

[23] Ellis, 105.
[24] Kendall, *Parental Education; or, Domestic Lessons: A Miscellany, Intended for Youth* (London: T. Hurst, 1803), vi.

Turning away from old fables of bird life such as the story of the wren flying at the eagle, characterized by his goldcrest narrator as the kind of unreliable tale peddled by magpies (*The Crested Wren*, 6), Kendall underpinned his narratives with the more accurate accounts of recent naturalists. The first chapter of *The Crested Wren* closely follows Buffon's account of a variety of wren species. [25] The crested wren of Kendall's title is Buffon's "Gold-Crested Wren", today commonly called a goldcrest (*regulus regulus*) and seen as closer to the warbler and tit families than to the wrens.[26] Thomas Pennant is cited on the migration of goldcrests from the Orkneys, and on the taxonomy of hyenas. [27] The narrative of *The Swallow* turns on the migration of swallows and martins, still a subject of controversy among eighteenth-century naturalists, who argued over whether the birds flew to other countries or hibernated in caves or at the bottom of lakes. Kendall, through the character of the moralizing naturalist Mr Aylesford, comes down, like Buffon, on the side of migration to other countries (87—92), though he hedges his bets by having one young swallow survive the English winter in a "torpid sleep" under a roof (47—8).[28]

Natural history informed Kendall's presentation of the much-debated issue of animal intelligence. Buffon is generally unwilling to ascribe reasoning powers such as the comparison of ideas to animals, and emphasises humanity's superior powers.[29]

---

[25] *The Crested Wren*, 1—13; George Louis Leclerc, comte de Buffon, *The Natural History of Birds. From the French of the Count de Buffon. Illustrated with engravings; and a preface, notes, and additions, by the translator*, 9 vols. (London: A. Strahan, and T Cadell; and J Murray, 1793), 5: 366—73. References are to this edition.

[26] Roger Peterson, Guy Montfort and P.A.D. Hollom, *A Field Guide to the Birds of Britain and Europe*, 3rd ed. (London: Collins, 1974), 226, 249.

[27] *The Crested Wren*, 134; *Keeper's Travels,* 197.

[28] See Buffon, *Natural History of Birds*, 6. 486—90 for a discussion of swallows' wintering habits which argues against the view that they could survive under water, concludes that swallows migrate to Africa for insects, but considers it "not absolutely impossible" that a few remain in Europe overwintering "torpid in hollow trees, and even in their nests" (469).

[29] See for example the discussion of the nature of animals in Buffon, *Natural History,General and Particular*, trans. William Smellie (Edinburgh: William Creech, 1780), where Buffon remarks that animals know nothing of the past or future, and in Cartesian fashion distinguishes animals, with only bodily organs, from man, whose immaterial soul means that he has a mind, not just a brain (3.299—300).

However, in the *Natural History of Birds*, it is reported that house sparrows "judiciously" alter their nesting habits according to situation, adding a roof when nesting in trees, but not when under cover. "Instinct discovers here a sort of reasoning, and at least implies a comparison of two small ideas" (3.438—9). Kendall repeats the story in *The Swallow* with a direct reference to Buffon (17). His own views are evidently influenced by those of William Smellie, whose *Philosophy of Natural History* opposes mechanistic accounts of animal behaviour, contending in Humean fashion that the operations of animal instinct add up to a mental activity differing only in degree, not in kind, from human reason.[30] Kendall cites Smellie on the similarity of animal and human minds in *The Swallow*. Commenting on the sparrows' clever nesting behaviour, he quotes directly from Smellie, providing a footnote to his source:

> Instances of the variableness of the habits of animals, of their docility and sagacity, have always been considered as *wonderful*; but this *wonder* is partly the effect of inattention; for, though man is unquestionably the chief of the animal creation, the other animals, according to the mental powers with which nature has endowed them, comparatively approach to or recede from the sagacity and genius of the human species. *The whole is a graduated scale of intelligence.** A philosopher should, therefore, contemplate and admire the whole; but should never be *surprised* at any partial exhibitions of the *general scene of intellect and animation.*

[30] See William Smellie, *The Philosophy of Natural History* (Edinburgh: Printed for the heirs of Charles Elliot; and C. Elliot and T. Kay, T. Cadell, and G.G.J. & J. Robinson, London, 1790), 156—7: "The notion that animals are machines, is perhaps too absurd to merit refutation. Though no animal is endowed with mental powers equal to those of man, yet there is not a faculty of the human mind, but evident marks of its existence are to be found in particular animals. Senses, memory, imagination, the principle of imitation, curiosity, cunning, ingenuity, devotion, or respect for superiors, gratitude, are all discoverable in the brute creation."

*See Smellie's Philosophy of Natural History' (20—1). [31]

Kendall presents natural history knowledge as the harmonious partner, indeed the source, of cross-species sympathy. His aim, he explains in the Advertisement to *The Swallow*, is "to cultivate the knowledge, and consequent love, of Nature" (sig. A1r). His bird stories draw on naturalists' work for their central picture of parental affections. Buffon remarks on swallows as having particularly strong parental feelings, and tells the story of a mother bird who flew through flames to get to her nestlings (6.497). Kendall cites Buffon as the authority for his description of birds that, their migration delayed by having to rebuild lost nests, die of cold (39), adding further emphasis on avian feeling: his martins fail to leave because they are pining for their lost young, and his swallows because they will not leave their weak brood (39, 45—6). *The Swallow*'s account of the "desolated" martin parents whose nestlings are stolen by the foolish boy Edmund Eager is preceded by an epigraph from Thomson's *Seasons* describing the mourning of a mother nightingale who finds her nest empty (22).[32] These lines were regularly quoted in support of kindness to animals; at the same time, they are evidence of the strong interest in natural history for which Thomson was praised.[33] Poetic feeling for birds' affections was understood to co-exist with scientific investigation of their characteristics.

[31] The quotation is from Smellie, *The Philosophy of Natural History*, 459. Kendall omits a phrase after "the other animals": "according to the number of instincts, or, which amounts to the same thing".
[32] From "Spring", lines 718—22: "Oft when, returning with her loaded Bill, /Th' astonish'd Mother finds a vacant Nest, /By the hard hand of unrelenting Clowns/ Robb'd, to the Ground the vain Provision falls;/ Her Pinions ruffle, and low-drooping scarce/ Can bear the Mourner to the poplar Shade." *The Seasons*, ed. James Sambrook (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), 36. References are to this edition.
[33] See John Aikin, *An Essay on the Application of Natural History to Poetry* (Warrington: W. Eyres for J.Johnson, 1777), 57: "it is in that truly excellent and original poem, Thomson's *Seasons*, that we are to look for the greatest variety of genuine observations in natural history, and particularly in that part of it which regards the animal creation."

However, the co-existence was sometimes an uneasy one, and Kendall's narrative creation of dog and birds as feeling individuals is sometimes at odds with his presentation of them as objects of scientific and philosophical knowledge. While his bird stories evoke sympathy for avian grief at the loss of young, he also remarks that a bird's death is (as a bereaved mother bird in *The Sparrow* says, with more than the usual narrative implausibility): "no evil: since it could only take away from us that of which we could never feel the loss" (73—4). This discrepancy is not so much the clash between a warmly engaged narrative sympathy and a coolly detached natural history as it is expressive of a tension within natural history itself. Natural historians, as Lorraine Daston has documented, were capable of developing strong attachments even to the individual insects that absorbed their prolonged close attention;[34] they also shot creatures in their thousands to build up a repository of knowledge. The subject of birds' parental feelings was one which roused their sympathies, and there were many accounts of the wonderful instinct of affection implanted in them to enable them to bring up their young. These probably influenced William Smellie, when asking to be sent avian specimens for a projected museum, to request that shooting take place out of the nesting season to reduce cruelty; but then his collector's instincts overpowered him, and he indicated his desire for eggs and nests containing young as well.[35]

Such contradictory attitudes in natural historians can perhaps be seen as symptomatic of a struggle between the anthropocentric assumptions that, like their contemporaries, they lived by, and the anti-anthropocentrism that was available at least as a theoretical attitude within the natural theology by which they were strongly influenced. Keith Thomas has described the gradual "dethronement of man" from his

[34] Lorraine Daston, "Attention and the Values of Nature in the Enlightenment", in *The Moral Authority of Nature*, ed. Lorraine Daston and Fernando Vidal (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 100—126, especially 109—19.
[35] Kerr, Robert Kerr, *Memoirs of the Life, Writings, and Correspondence of William Smellie* [1811], ed. Richard B. Sher (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1996), 2.68, 70.

self-appointed position at the centre of the world as one of the most significant philosophical innovations in modern Western thought.[36] Kendall provides amusing fables to underline the principle that, as the ornithologist John Ray had pointed out a century previously, the beasts were not created solely for man's benefit.[37] *The Canary Bird* contains a swallow who, seeing its own species as the centre of the universe, deplores the cruelty of hawks. Kendall catches the idiom of the fictional convention of the lady of false sensibility when his swallow avers that it could never eat a bird itself: "independently of the cruelty of the deed, I should nauseate the dish" (20). Immediately afterwards the swallow decides to eat a "terrified" beetle, unmoved by the beauty of its "brilliant verdigris" wings, despite having cited the beauty of swallows as a reason not to kill them (21). The dialogue in which the swallow claims that beetles are created for its use, while the beetle declares the same of the smaller insects it eats, offers an anthropomorphic satire on anthropocentrism, and a dig at the notion of a hierarchical scale of nature. "I grant you are a living thing," sneers the bird, "but, infinitely low in the scale of beings when compared with swallows" (44). Here, the satire on human pride works in the traditional fabular manner, animal actions standing metaphorically for human ones; but Kendall claims a double purpose in the fable's conclusion that no creature can be blamed for predatory behaviour. The swallow realises that "it is wrong to load any creature with reproach for doing what nature has directed. … in an enlarged point of view, a hawk is as innocent as a swallow" (47). The narrator explains that he intends to teach "a natural, as well as a moral, truth. … to prove that all are innocent, I prove that all are guilty" (48—9). Even the human self-centredness the narrative mocks is thus part of the natural order,

[36] Keith Thomas, *Man and the Natural World: Changing Attitudes in England 1500—1800* (London: Penguin Books, 1984), 165—6.
[37] John Ray, *The Wisdom of God manifested in the Works of the Creation* (London: Samuel Smith, 1691), 127—9.

a point further explicated in *The Swallow* by Mr Aylesford: "*every* species of creatures … evinces an obvious preference to its *own* kind … A *philosophic* mind will, in part, rise above this sensation, to which mankind, in common with brutes, is subject" (118—9).

As Kendall's swallow and beetle fable indicates, he is interested not only in the natural historians' discussion of species' identity and characteristics, but in a wider economy of nature. This is especially seen in his use of the work of Bernadin de Saint Pierre. When *The Sparrow*'s protagonist complains that birds are persecuted "like the poor outcast of India" (54), it is not just as two objects of pity that are united (a typical way of linking animals with the poor in contemporary children's fiction) but two possessors of natural wisdom. The "poor outcast" refers to the pariah in Bernadin de St Pierre's *La Chaumière indienne*, which Kendall had translated.[38] In this story of an English scientist travelling in search of enlightenment, the high-caste Brahmin is of no help but the "Indian Paria" is truly wise. "[R]ejected by society" he has "sought refuge in Nature", and made the transition recommended by natural theologians from loving nature to adoring its author (29, 28). The eponymous hero of *The Crested Wren* professes a similar creed. Surveying from his mountain top a panorama of hills and castles appearing like islands in the mist, he asks: "Than this prospect, what could present us with a more sublime idea of the power of the Deity [?]" (34). These are common ideas of the time, and Kendall draws on a wide range of writers in his praise of what Thomson, in "Autumn", called "NATURE! all-sufficient! over all!" (*The Seasons*, 200), but Bernadin is a particularly important source, especially of what might be called the proto-ecological thinking in Kendall's work. In Bernadin's first *Etude*, translated by Kendall, he explains that he cannot write a conventional natural

[38] Edward Augustus Kendall, *The Indian Cottage. Translated from the French of Monsieur de St. Pierre* ([1791]; Philadelphia: William Spotswood, 1794). References are to this edition.

history describing animals and plants by species because it is impossible to track the myriad, intricate interconnections between all living creatures which create the subject's real significance.[39] Kendal brings some of this appreciation into his children's stories. All parts of creation, he writes in *The Canary Bird*, are interdependent and necessary, and "the extinction of a single species of birds, would derange the economy of the world" (71). In *The Sparrow* he draws on Bernadin's Sixth *Etude* to argue that humans should beware of exterminating so-called pests. When the Prussian peasants killed all the sparrows for eating grain, the harvests were ruined by insects whose numbers had previously been controlled by birds(41—2).[40]

Kendall's children's stories, then, are infused with knowledge and ideas from various kinds of natural history. His combination of a natural historian's observation of animal life with narrative strategies designed to arouse sympathy produces, at times, a powerful imaginative rendition of animal sensation. The protagonist of *The Crested Wren* manages to describe and analyse its feelings when piled along with other birds in a bird-catcher's basket:

> One of my wings was under the whole weight of another; one of my feet was forced into the beak of a bird, who bit it in expiring, which I was not able to withdraw; and the nails of another bird pierced my breast. The sensations of

[39] Kendall, *Beauties of the Studies of Nature: Selected from the Works of Saint Pierre* (London, 1799 rpt. New York: H. Caritat, 1799). In the First Study, "Immensity of Nature", Bernadin explains that he thought to write a general history of nature but realised that he could not observe it all (43). In fact, he cannot even write a history of his own small strawberry plant growing in a pot in Paris, because of the bewildering variety of beautiful insects that visit it: "Plants are the habitations of insects, and one cannot give the real history of a city without speaking of its inhabitants" (46). On Bernadin see Malcolm Cook, *Bernadin de Saint-Pierre: A Life of Culture* (Legenda: Modern Humanities Research Association and Maney Publishing, 2006).

[40] See *Beauties of the Study of Nature*, 147—8. Here Bernadin de St Pierre and Kendall can be seen to anticipate a type of thought that Mark Turner, in his landmark study of nineteenth-century attitudes to animals, finds developing only in the 1860s: the appreciation of birds' role in preserving the balance of nature, which was emphasised by late nineteenth-century campaigners for protective legislation for birds. See *Reckoning with the Beast: Animals, Pain, and Humanity in the Victorian Mind* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980), 128.

> misery that I suffered were acute; but benevolent nature would not suffer them to be durable. There is a point at which every thing must stop; and pain and ruin have an end. In a little time my pulses seemed to cease; and by degrees a soft delirium took possession of what remained of life. In this state, the mind does not altogether invent new, but rather distorts, newly colours, and changes the places of real circumstances. The warm and downy feathers of the dead and dying were, in my weak imagination, the nest in which I was born; the cries of the sufferers lost the bitterness of their anguish, and were only the little plainings of my brothers and sisters, for the return of our father and our mother. My nerves grew paralized, and were no longer tortured by the pressure of sharp claws, which I now fancied to be only the little feet of my brother. I heard their noises again: I looked out from the nest: I saw the forest, the lake, the swans upon its surface, the bright rising sun: I, too, was hungry: I uttered a little cry; but nature soon ceased to want: I believed that our parents returned, and I was satisfied (55—7).

First-person narrative here combines philosophic observation with the "animals'-eye view" that Tess Cosslett has described in late eighteenth-century children's fiction.[41] *The Crested Wren* bears an epitaph from James Beattie's "Retirement", which asks "Solitude" to protect an old pilgrim: "O guard from harm his hoary head / And listen to his lore".[42] Kendall's altered version pleads instead for the reader to protect the goldcrest: "O! guard from harm his golden head, /And listen to his lore!" [43] This nicely encapsulates Kendall's technique of turning human into animal "lore". The

[41] Cosslett, *Talking Animals,* 5.
[42] James Beattie, "Retirement", in *Poems on Several Occasions* (Edinburgh: W. Creech, 1776), 47.
[43] *The Crested Wren,* title –page. On the verso is a note in which K draws attention to his alteration of the motto.

story's opening puts Buffon's words into the bird's mouth, closely following the natural historian's text but switching viewpoint. Buffon's favourable description of the netting of goldcrests: "In autumn they are fat, and their flesh is delicate: during that season they are commonly caught by means of the call. The public markets of Nuremberg are then well stocked with these little birds" (*Natural History of Birds*, 5: 370), becomes the crested wren's complaint that: "treachery frequently entraps us. Artificial calls invite us to the snare, and every autumn the shambles of Nuremberg are filled with gold-crested Wrens. Into this danger I was once betrayed" (*The Crested Wren*, 11). As well as Buffon's natural history, Kendall also uses some more fanciful accounts of bird behaviour, drawing on Johann Georg Keyssler for an account of a wild stork that believed a tame one responsible for the shooting of one of its fellows, and brought a group of its friends back on successive occasions over two years to attack and finally kill the tame bird. [44] The story was frequently cited in the period as an example of the brute creation's powers of understanding;[45] Kendall expands on this interpretation, using the anecdote as evidence that birds communicate among themselves, plan together, feel for each other, and have powerful memories (49).That this list of avian abilities is reeled off by a goldcrest responding to a sparrow's story shows the author enjoying the paradoxes inherent in his combination of talking-animal fable and natural history.

However, it is in the third-person narrative of *Keeper's Travels* that Kendall best develops his distinctive contribution to children's fiction, the creation of a

[44] *Travels through Germany, Bohemia, Hungary, Switzerland, and Lorraine. Translated from the second edition of the German* (London: A Linde and T Field, 1756—7), vol. I, 108—9; *The Crested Wren*, 40—50.
[45] See for example John Wesley, *A Survey of the Wisdom of God in the Creation* (Bristol: William Pine, 1763), 1.143; Oliver Goldsmith, *Essays and Criticisms* (London: J. Johnson, 1798), 2. 90—3; anon., *The Wonders of Nature and Art* (London: Newberry and Carnan, 1768), 2.186—8.

sympathetic imagining of animal consciousness. Thought report is extensively used to create an impression of the dog's mind and encourage reader empathy with his feelings. Particularly valued for its ability to render unspoken thoughts and unconscious and semi-conscious states of mind in humans,[46] thought report is especially useful for fictional animals because it obviates the need to attribute human language to the animal character. The narrative simultaneously invites the reader to feel along with Keeper and to understand his mind in a way he cannot himself. Aspects of mind controversial in their attribution to animals, such as hope, fear and intention, are easily, perhaps inevitably, given to a dog through whom a narrative is partly focalised. At the same time, the limitations of the dog's knowledge are dwelt on, adding to the impression that we are being given a window on the experience of a creature very different from ourselves:

> He ran hastily along, without stopping to notice any thing, resolved to seek the house of a friend of his master, on whom they had called during their journey. This was considerably out of the direct homeward way, but here he hoped to find his master; and if he should not, still it was to him the *only* road: because the utmost of his knowledge, correct and surprising as it was, could only help to trace back the very steps he had trodden before (13).

When Keeper is wounded by a gunshot the reader is invited not just to imagine his sufferings, but to do so with a canine body and mental perspective in view:

[46] Palmer, *Fictional Minds,* 54—61, 76—80.

> His sufferings increased his weariness, and overcome by their acuteness, he lay down under a hay-rick, and folded up his legs, curling his body round to protect himself from the blast. He would have slept, but the anguish he endured, denied him even a short respite from his sorrows. He lay pondering his condition: and if he *anticipated* no evils *to come,* the same ignorance of future events, which men sometimes inconsiderately envy, shut from him the *hope of deliverance* … (39—40)

We are invited into Keeper's mind when he is in danger of dying in the snow. In line with his species' reputation for fidelity, Keeper in delirium thinks only of his master:

> his wildered fancy cheered his expiring moments with the form, and features of his master. He fancied that this friend of his life was endeavouring to rescue him from his misery. He thought that his warm hand was on his neck. He thought that he dug away the perishing snow. The idea became still less distinct: he even thought himself relieved from his misery. He fancied himself in the arms of his master. He was happy. He was insensible (135—6).

In all this Kendall's story can be seen as a forerunner of the empathetic accounts of animal life in fiction by Ernest Thompson Seton in *Wild Animals I Have Known* (1898) and *Lives of the Hunted* (1901), [47] and Jack London in *The Call of the Wild* (1903) and *White Fang* (1906).[48] His choice of a dog as the subject of his most sustained attempt to render animal experience anticipates London's interest in the consciousness of dogs and wolves. *White Fang* has been described as an example of

[47] For a discussion of the representation of wild animals in Seton's stories see Cosslett, *Talking Animals,* 141—9.
[48] Jack London, *The Call of the Wild, White Fang and Other Stories*, ed. Andrew Sinclair (New York: Penguin, 1980).

the most thorough kind of narrative attempt to "reproduce something like the texture or content or shape of nonhuman thought … [in which] the narrating limits itself rigorously within the animal's natural and/or conventional sphere of interest and reference".[49] *Keeper's Travels* is an early, less fully developed, experiment in a similar kind of narration. In the attention it pays to its dog protagonist's body positions, it can even be seen as an early movement in the direction of the phenomenological approach to understanding animal experience recently developed by ethnologists such as Kenneth J Shapiro.[50] Kendall does not go so far as these later animal writers in trying to understand the world from a canine perspective – for example, Keeper's inner world is dependent on visual imagery, and there is no attempt in the 1798 text to render his sensations of smell – but his work does mark a new start in the fictional examination of animal mind.

Kendall later extended that examination in ways that illustrate the influence of developing conventions of nineteenth-century fictional realism on animal representation. For the fourteenth edition of *Keeper's Travels,* published in 1826, the author provided considerable revisions and additions, taking the original 190-page story to 374 pages. There are extended interpolated episodes involving human characters, and a long discussion of the treatment of animals. Some of the additions provide rather tortuous explanations for narrative events, as if Kendall is responding to charges that his dog ought, realistically, to have been able to find its way home. In many ways this additional material spoils the simplicity and immediacy of the earlier

[49] William Nelles, "Beyond the Bird's Eye: Animal Focalization", *Narrative*, 9/2 (2001), 188—94: 192.

[50] Shapiro, taking his pet dog as subject, attempts through observation of its body positions, its orientation in household space, and its behaviour to understand its viewpoint. He defines this as "an empirical phenomenological method designed for the investigation of nonhuman animals". Kenneth J. Shapiro, "A Phenomenological Approach to the Study of Nonhuman Animals", in *Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals*, ed. Robert W. Mitchell, Nicholas S. Thompson and H. Lyn Miles (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 277—95: 292.

version, but there are also some advances in Kendall's representation of animal experience. Natural history is more methodically applied, and Kendall characterises Keeper by his sense of smell. In the first edition, his master is lost by going "out of sight" (1), and the dog is "prevented by the multitude of people from seeing any person at a distance" (2). In 1826, he relies on his nose. When his master disappears, Keeper :

> instantly endeavoured to discover him again by the scent, yet he failed; partly, perhaps, because among so many different persons, the scent was first confused, and next entirely lost; and partly, also, perhaps, because Keeper being but a puppy, or, at most, but a very young dog, either his sense of smell was not so nice, or his habits of distinguishing, either by the nose or the eye, so experienced, and therefore so exact, as might have happened, had he, at the time of his misfortune, been arrived at a maturer age.[51]

Closer observation of canine behaviour is combined here with a hint of the Bildungsroman in the notion of young dog as maturing character. Equally, references to cross-species communication through body-language and sympathy, present in the first edition, are developed in 1826 with more circumstantial detail. Wounded, Keeper takes refuge in a cottage, with whose mistress he soon establishes a rapport:

> Trembling, not with present fear, but from his past ill-usage, and without moving from the couch which he had chosen, Keeper lifted his face to Nelly's, and his apology was instantly made, and mutual confidence inspired. Nelly

[51] *Keeper's Travels in Search of his Master,* 14th ed. (London: Baldwin, Cradock, and Joy, Paternoster-Row, 1826), 3. References to this edition appear parenthetically as "1826".

> was not afraid of a dog whose countenance told his benevolence, his humility, and his misery; and Keeper had no sooner caught the eyes of Nelly, than he felt that his appeal was allowed. Stooping down, and re-assuring him, by the tone of her voice, Nelly soon permitted herself to pat his head, and to endeavour to examine his wounds: but from this latter office the pain made him shrink, in a manner that forbade its continuance, while he licked, however, the hand that was thus beneficently extended to him (1826, 78—9).

This quiet reciprocal exchange presents the dog as a character integrated within a piece of early nineteenth-century sentimental domestic fiction.

By the 1820s thought report and free indirect discourse in fiction were much more extensively used, and the influence of recent narrative developments are clearly seen in the 1826 edition's much more expansive rendering of the dog's thoughts when he loses his master:

> Room was there for hope, and hope, therefore, was not long in returning. Had he finally lost his master through this very mistake of his person? Had he left him behind, when he idly thought that he saw him travelling before? Here were new subjects of alarm, but new occasions, also, for hope. In proportion as these thoughts shot across Keeper's mind, his howl of despair was exchanged for a bark of eagerness. His limbs equally with his voice, moved with his thoughts. … At first, confident in the new prospect of discovery which he had created, he ran with all his might; anon, inward misgivings slackened his pace. Then, hopes a second time revived, meditations on possibilities, thoughts of places yet unvisited, or believed to have been

> unvisited, or not examined with sufficient care; these brought his feet into a somewhat even, though generally hurried step, and it was amid this variety of feeling that Keeper regained the market-place (1826, 10—11).

Here, the rapid fluctuation of thought and feeling, the indirect rendition of the character's internal monologue, and the alignment of mental experience with bodily expression, are all features of the detailed narrative examination of human minds characteristic of early nineteenth-century fiction, and perfected especially in Austen. Indeed, Kendall's representations of Keeper's mind sometimes read like simpler versions of the multi-layered renditions of human thought and feeling in, for example, *Emma.* Keeper's ready access to renewed hope is not unlike Mr Weston's "sanguine temper", which "soon flies over the present failure, and begins to hope again",[52] while the dog protagonist shares with Emma herself the tendency to ask himself indirectly reported internal questions.[53] A succession of thoughts is said to have "shot across Keeper's mind", in rather the same way as the conviction that Mr Knightley must marry her "darted through" Emma (320). Keeper's inward fluctuations are expressed in changes of bodily movement: misgivings slacken his pace, revived hopes speed it up. A similar alignment of mental and physical activity occurs in *Emma* when she is agitated by the thought that she may have inadvertently promoted a marriage between Mr Knightley and Harriet: "How to understand it all! How to understand the deceptions she had been thus practising on herself, and living under! – The blunders, the blindness of her own head and heart! – she sat still, she walked about, she tried her own room, she tried the shrubbery" (323—4); and "what could be increasing Emma's

[52] Jane Austen, *Emma*, ed. James Kinsley with an Introduction by Adela Pinch (Oxford: Oxford World's Classics, 2003), 113. References are to this edition.
[53] See, for example, the torrent of questions in Emma's internal monologue after the revelation that Harriet has hopes of Mr Knightley's love (320—26).

wretchedness but the reflection never far distant from her mind, that it had been all her own work? … she was not able to refrain from a start, or a heavy sigh, or even from walking about the room for a few seconds" (332).

These comparisons are not offered in order to suggest the direct influence of Austen on Kendall, still less that his rendering of mental life approaches anywhere near the subtlety of her mediation between sympathetic engagement and detached comment. Rather, they indicate something of the direction in which fictional rendering of minds had moved by the time Kendall revised his work, and illustrate some of the techniques on which novelists after Austen were drawing. Kendall's achievement is to apply such techniques to the representation of a dog's mind, while carefully attending to its canine character. Keeper's questions to himself about how he lost his master may strike a modern reader as pure anthropomorphism, but if we take them as thought report's verbal representation of non-verbal mental activity, they are quite in line with Hume's view in the *Treatise* that dogs can reason simply and learn from experience (1.3.16, 177-8). Keeper's canine nature is equally evident in the howls and barks that shooting thoughts produce in him, as opposed to the reflections and speeches produced in Emma. (At the same time, the two authors' shared emphasis on the bodily movements sparked off by mental shifts can serve to remind us that Austen herself recognises an "animal" correspondence of mind and body in her human characters).

Kendall, then, drew on Humean analogies between human and non-human mental life, breaking down the barriers between them to establish a dog's potential to be a fictional character under realistic conventions while remaining a dog. In his hands, children's fiction was at the forefront of developing fictional technique at a time when novelists were deepening their approach to representing the mind. The

latest discoveries of natural historians played an important part in his narrative innovations. While the debate about animal mind continued, for readers of children's fiction it was settled in favour of the animals. Stories centring on animal experience and approaching animals as characters with all the new fictional resources developed for the creation of fictional mind in humans necessarily gave the impression that mind was an animal attribute too. In Kendall's work, this view was not conveyed with the obvious anthropomorphism of those later animal stories whose protagonists dress and live like humans, but with a combination of a natural historian's interest in the cognition and behaviour of different species, and a novelist's interest in rendering those characteristics with narrative sympathy.