Now showing items 1-18 of 18

  • Affective incorporation 

    Colombetti, Giovanna (Palgrave Macmillan, 2016-10-20)
    Classic and more recent phenomenological works provide rich accounts of our experience of the body and of its relation to the world. In this chapter I pull out one thread from this literature, focusing on the phenomenon ...
  • Appraising valence 

    Colombetti, Giovanna (Imprint Academic, 2005-08)
    ‘Valence’ is used in many different ways in emotion theory. It generally refers to the ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ character of an emotion, as well as to the ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ character of some aspect of emotion. After ...
  • Bodily feeling in depersonalisation: a phenomenological account 

    Colombetti, Giovanna; Ratcliffe, Matthew (2012)
    This paper addresses the phenomenology of bodily feeling in depersonalisation disorder. We argue that not all bodily feelings are intentional states that have the body or part of it as their object. We distinguish three ...
  • Emotion and ethics: an inter-(en)active approach 

    Colombetti, Giovanna; Torrance, Steve (Springer, 2009-12)
    In this paper we start exploring the affective and ethical dimension of what De Jaegher and Di Paolo (2007) have called ‘participatory sense-making’. In the first part, we distinguish various ways in which we are, and feel, ...
  • Enacting emotional interpretations with feeling 

    Colombetti, Giovanna; Thompson, Evan (Cambridge University Press, 2005-04)
    This commentary makes three points: (1) There may be no clear-cut distinction between emotion and appraisal “constituents” at neural and psychological levels. (2) The microdevelopment of an emotional interpretation contains ...
  • Enactive affectivity, extended 

    Colombetti, Giovanna (Springer, 2015-07-12)
    In this paper I advance an enactive view of affectivity that does not imply that affectivity must stop at the boundaries of the organism. I first review the enactive notion of “sense-making”, and argue that it entails that ...
  • Extending the Extended Mind: The Case for Extended Affectivity 

    Colombetti, Giovanna; Roberts, Tom (Springer, 2014-06-24)
    The thesis of the extended mind (ExM) holds that the material underpinnings of an individual’s mental states and processes need not be restricted to those contained within biological boundaries: when conditions are right, ...
  • From affect programs to dynamical discrete emotions 

    Colombetti, Giovanna (Taylor & Francis, 2009-08)
    According to Discrete Emotion Theory, a number of emotions are distinguishable on the basis of neural, physiological, behavioral and expressive features. Critics of this view emphasize the variability and context-sensitivity ...
  • Il corpo ed il vissuto affettivo: Verso un approccio “enattivo” allo studio delle emozioni 

    Colombetti, Giovanna; Thompson, Evan (Rosenberg & Sellier, 2008)
  • Psychopathology and the enactive mind 

    Colombetti, Giovanna (Oxford University Press, 2012-08-28)
    According to the ‘enactive’ approach in philosophy of mind and cognitive science, mental states are neither identical with, nor reducible to, brain activity. Rather, the mind is enacted or brought forth by the whole situated ...
  • Reply to Barrett, Gendron and Huang 

    Colombetti, Giovanna (Taylor & Francis, 2009-08)
  • Review of The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion 

    Colombetti, Giovanna (Imprint Academic, 2010)
  • Scaffoldings of the affective mind 

    Colombetti, Giovanna; Krueger, Joel (Taylor and Francis, 2014)
    In this paper we adopt Sterelny’s (2010) framework of the scaffolded mind, and its related dimensional approach, to highlight the many ways in which human affectivity (and not just cognition) is environmentally supported. ...
  • The Somatic Marker Hypotheses, and what the Iowa Gambling Task does and does not show 

    Colombetti, Giovanna (Oxford University Press, 2008-03)
    Damasio’s Somatic Marker Hypothesis (SMH) is a prominent neuroscientific hypothesis about the mechanisms implementing decision-making. This paper argues that, since its inception, the SMH has not been clearly formulated. ...
  • Some Ideas for the Integration of Neurophenomenology and Affective Neuroscience 

    Colombetti, Giovanna (Constructivist Foundations, 2013)
    Context • Affective neuroscience has not developed first-person methods for the generation of first-person data. This neglect is problematic, because emotion experience is a central dimension of affectivity. > Problem • I ...
  • Varieties of pre-reflective self-awareness: foreground and background bodily feelings in emotion experience 

    Colombetti, Giovanna (2011-02-14)
    How do we feel our body in emotion experience? In this paper I initially distinguish between foreground and background bodily feelings, and characterize them in some detail. Then I compare this distinction with the one ...
  • What language does to feelings 

    Colombetti, Giovanna (Imprint Academic, 2009-09)
    This paper distinguishes various ways in which language can act on our affect or emotion experience. From the commonsensical consideration that sometimes we use language merely to report or describe our feelings, I move ...
  • Why call bodily sense making "languaging"? 

    Colombetti, Giovanna (Frontiers, 2014)