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dc.contributor.authorSchubert, S
dc.contributor.authorCaviola, L
dc.contributor.authorFaber, N
dc.date.accessioned2019-09-09T13:39:30Z
dc.date.issued2019-10-21
dc.description.abstractThe 21st century will likely see growing risks of human extinction, but currently, relatively small resources are invested in reducing such existential risks. Using three samples (UK general public, US general public, and UK students; total N = 2,507), we study how laypeople reason about human extinction. We find that people think that human extinction needs to be prevented. Strikingly, however, they do not think that an extinction catastrophe would be uniquely bad relative to near-extinction catastrophes, which allow for recovery. More people find extinction uniquely bad when a) asked to consider the extinction of an animal species rather than humans, b) asked to consider a case where human extinction is associated with less direct harm, and c) they are explicitly prompted to consider long-term consequences of the catastrophes. We conclude that an important reason why people do not find extinction uniquely bad is that they focus on the immediate death and suffering that the catastrophes cause for fellow humans, rather than on the long-term consequences. Finally, we find that d) laypeople—in line with prominent philosophical arguments—think that the quality of the future is relevant: they do find extinction uniquely bad when this means forgoing a utopian future.en_GB
dc.description.sponsorshipBerkeley Existential Risk Initiativeen_GB
dc.description.sponsorshipCentre for Effective Altruismen_GB
dc.description.sponsorshipJanggen-Poehn Stiftungen_GB
dc.description.sponsorshipSwiss Study Foundationen_GB
dc.description.sponsorshipOxford Martin School (Oxford Martin Programme on Collective Responsibility for Infectious Disease)en_GB
dc.identifier.citationVol. 9, article 15100en_GB
dc.identifier.doi10.1038/s41598-019-50145-9
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10871/38609
dc.language.isoenen_GB
dc.publisherNature Researchen_GB
dc.relation.urlhttps://osf.io/pd9ca/?view_only=4e9c55459b4746a4bc9dac2baa7c5ab4en_GB
dc.rights© 2019 The Author(s). Open Access. This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article’s Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article’s Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
dc.titleThe psychology of existential risk: Moral judgments about human extinctionen_GB
dc.typeArticleen_GB
dc.date.available2019-09-09T13:39:30Z
dc.identifier.issn2045-2322
dc.descriptionThis is the final version. Available on open access from Nature Research via the DOI in this recorden_GB
dc.descriptionData and materials availability: Reports of all measures, manipulations, and exclusions, and all data, analysis code, and experimental materials for all studies are available for download at: https://osf.io/pd9ca/?view_only=4e9c55459b4746a4bc9dac2baa7c5ab4en_GB
dc.identifier.journalScientific Reportsen_GB
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/en_GB
dcterms.dateAccepted2019-09-04
rioxxterms.versionVoRen_GB
rioxxterms.licenseref.startdate2019-09-04
rioxxterms.typeJournal Article/Reviewen_GB
refterms.dateFCD2019-09-07T22:57:34Z
refterms.versionFCDAM
refterms.dateFOA2019-11-12T14:55:14Z
refterms.panelAen_GB


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© 2019 The Author(s). Open Access. This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article’s Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article’s Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Except where otherwise noted, this item's licence is described as © 2019 The Author(s). Open Access. This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article’s Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article’s Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/