| dc.description.abstract | Since the Vanke takeover case appeared in China in 2016, there have been an increasing number of takeover cases which have occurred without sufficient regulations to guide the practice. The direction for further reforms of takeover law is, therefore, one of the most hotly debated topics. China is currently finding its own indigenous way in developing a takeover market and it is still an open question as to what takeover regulatory regime China should follow. The legality of certain issues related to takeovers in China, such as several financing models of takeovers and the various types of anti-takeover provisions, is still uncertain. In addition, there is no systematic analysis of the role of financial intermediaries in the Chinese takeover market – even though financial intermediaries are widely involved in takeovers. Since 2016, a new situation has developed in which several takeover cases have been conducted under the support of financial intermediaries. As a result, the stability of the entire financial market has been challenged, such as causing the rising systemic risk of shadow banking businesses involved in many hostile takeovers. The current takeover law in China is initially followed the UK model, although since 2006 there has been a significant deviation from the UK model. Within the UK market, financial intermediaries such as investment banks, asset management industries, and stock exchanges play an essential role in shaping and gatekeeping the market and takeover law. This research will focus on what China could learn from the UK Takeover Code and how China could adopt this model whilst keeping its own unique approach. This thesis will start by answering the questions as to whether China needs to develop an active market for corporate control and why Chinese takeover laws have gradually deviated from the UK model (chapters two and three). Chapters four and five will discuss the empirical studies on two cornerstone rules, the mandatory bid rule and the non-frustration rule, and this will be followed by providing empirical evidence for law reform proposals. Adequate financing sources decide the fate of takeovers. Due to the strict administrative restrictions on takeover loans provided by banks in China, the shadow banking system provides alternative solutions for takeover financing with higher systemic risks in the Vanke case and shows its potential for financing takeovers. Chapters six and seven will discuss how to regulate the shadow banking system and the asset management industry under the context of market for corporate control. The chapter eight will examine applications of FinTech in the market for corporate control. This chapter eight is based on the hypothesis that Securities Token Offerings (STOs) either partially or fully substitute traditional Initial Public Offerings (IPOs). The thesis will then conclude in the final stage. | en_GB |
