The Development and Use of Armoured Vehicles in the First World War, with special Reference to the Role of Winston Churchill

Abstract

Although their contribution in the Great War was limited, the use of armoured vehicles marked the commencement of significant changes in the nature of military operations. Late in the war, a report that was critical of Ministry management of tank production escaped the cloak of secrecy normally maintained by government departments. The report suggested Ministerial managerial standards fell well short of claims later made by Churchill. This raised the question of other possible failings and whether more might have been accomplished by Britain’s “secret weapon”. It therefore appeared appropriate to consider the development of armoured vehicles with a view to establishing whether there was any justification for the proposition that the nation might have allowed a greater war-time contribution by armoured vehicles to have escaped its grasp. Examination of military and Treasury files at the National Archives formed the core of the study. Transcripts of the hearings of the Royal Commission on Awards to Inventors, 1919/1920, were particularly relevant, these having received little attention in existing scholarship. Findings revealed poor management by Churchill’s Landships Committee in 1915 and later by the Ministry. The most significant finding was that inadequate briefing of the designers led to inappropriate specification for the first tanks. Many of the breakdowns associated with tanks in training and action at the Somme were predictable, the result of “old age”, exceeding of design life. Poor management by the Landships Committee appointed by Churchill had firstly slowed the design effort then provided a specification inappropriate to army requirements. The consequences of delays and faults for operations in the war, notably for the Battles of the Somme, are a matter of speculation, but could have been significant.