Catastrophe Testimony: Bearing Witness to the Epistemological, Existential and Moral Chasm Between Survivors and the World

Abstract

Catastrophe testimony is the testimony of survivors of traumatic experiences involving deliberately inflicted physical and psychological violence. In this dissertation I examine the testimonies of survivors of rape, torture and imprisonment in Auschwitz and other concentration camps. My objective is to explore how such testimonies bear witness to the epistemological, existential and moral chasm between survivors and the world - those who have no lived experience of being the victim of such catastrophic experiences. In Part One of the dissertation, I describe the origins and theme of the dissertation, and my overall aims. in Part Two i explore the epistemological chasm, reviewing the 'classical' reductionist and anti-reductionist accounts of belief justification and knowledge creation, and more recent epistemic-agent centred accounts, notably Inference to the Best Explanation and Virtue Epistemology. I find none of these 'informational' accounts can be adapted to permit the evaluation of non-propositional testimonial content. the epistemological chasm thus equates to that part of what is revealed by testifiers in their testimony which cannot be be justifiably believed or become known through the application of accepted epistemic rules and practices. In Part three of the dissertation I begin my exploration of the existential and moral chasm between survivors and the world with a discussion of memory and especially episodic memory. I then consider specifically the evaluation of catastrophe testimony primarily by psychologists and psychotherapists, and also by historians and socio-political theorists. Finally, in Part four, which is the core of the dissertation, I examine how selected survivors see themselves and judge the world through their testimonies, and also how societies, and specifically perpetrator societies ,respond to their findings. Parts Three and Four of the dissertation enable me to delineate the nature and extent of the existential and moral chasms between survivors and the world. I conclude that the epistemological, existential and moral chasm between survivors and the world is a matter that should continue to concern us, but not a problem which can be solved.