Rethinking The Concept of ‘Hybrid Warfare’: A Revisionist Perspective

Abstract

The spectre of ‘hybrid warfare’ has haunted the Western world for nearly a decade. However, more than hybrid warfare itself, the widely held assumptions surrounding hybrid warfare make it seem extensively ominous. The Western conceptualisation of hybrid warfare rests on three main assumptions: 1) it is considered to be a weapon of anti-Western states, specifically Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea; 2) it is said to be a new type of conflict; 3) it is perceived as a versatile strategy that can be readily adopted by anti-Western powers in diverse geopolitical situations. These assumptions have led to the perception of hybrid warfare as a top security challenge for Western countries. Hence, while underestimating the risk of conventional warfare, the West has primarily focused on countering hybrid warfare actions. This thesis takes a critical look at this concept of hybrid warfare. It explores the foundations of the Western conceptualisation of hybrid warfare, addressing the following research question: To what extent is the Western conceptualisation of hybrid warfare based on empirically grounded assumptions? In addressing this question, the thesis will address the following research-sub questions: 1) Does the hybrid form of warfare solely apply to anti-Western states? 2) Is hybrid warfare truly a novel form of conflict? 3) Can hybrid warfare be readily adopted in diverse geopolitical situations, or are there specific conditions that lead states to adopt such a form of warfare? To explore these questions, this thesis conducts a comparative study of three case studies of hybrid warfare - Russian ‘ambiguous’ operations in Ukraine (2014-2022), Chinese destabilising activities against Taiwan (2016-onwards), and US indirect regime change efforts in Syria (2012-2017). Through an analysis of these case studies, the thesis concludes that the Western conceptualisation of hybrid warfare is influenced more by misconceptions or myths than empirically grounded realities. Furthermore, while exploring the validity of the assumptions on which ‘hybrid warfare’ is based, the thesis identifies a crucial gap in the field - the need for refining the concept itself. Recognising that hybrid warfare is an overly broad concept for theoretical analysis and defence policymaking, the thesis introduces a new taxonomy. Accordingly, the thesis classifies hybrid warfare into two sub-categories based on the nature of actions (disruptive vs. destructive) and primary targets of such actions: population-centric hybrid warfare and enemy-centric hybrid warfare. This new taxonomy is a significant step towards a more nuanced understanding of hybrid warfare, filling a crucial gap in the current literature.