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dc.contributor.authorHolroyd, J
dc.contributor.authorSweetman, J
dc.date.accessioned2016-01-07T08:54:30Z
dc.date.issued2016-03-31
dc.description.abstractThe term 'implicit bias' has very swiftly been incorporated into philosophical discourse. Our aim in this paper is to scrutinise the phenomena that fall under the rubric of implicit bias. The term is often used in a rather broad sense, to capture a range of implicit social cognitions, and this is useful for some purposes. However, we here articulate some of the important differences between phenomena identified as instances of implicit bias. We caution against ignoring these differences: it is likely they have considerable significance, not least for the sorts of normative recommendations being made concerning how to mitigate the bad effects of implicit bias.en_GB
dc.identifier.citationIn: Brownstein, M., and Saul, J., Implicit Bias and Philosophy, 2016, Vol. 1, reproduced by permission of Oxford University Press.en_GB
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10871/19147
dc.language.isoenen_GB
dc.publisherOxford University Pressen_GB
dc.relation.urlhttps://global.oup.com/academic/product/implicit-bias-and-philosophy-volume-1-9780198713241?cc=gb&lang=en&#en_GB
dc.rights.embargoreasonPublisher's policyen_GB
dc.rightsThis is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from OUP via the link in this record.
dc.titleThe Heterogeneity of Implicit Biasen_GB
dc.typeBook chapteren_GB
dc.contributor.editorBrownstein, M
dc.contributor.editorSaul, J
dc.identifier.isbn9780198713241
dc.relation.isPartOfPhilosophy and implicit bias: Metaphysics and epistemology
exeter.place-of-publicationNew York


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