Ideas, coalitions and compromise: reinterpreting EU-ETS lobbying through discursive institutionalism

Abstract

Collective political action among divergent interest groups is not always easy. It requires coordination, compromise and, often, the persuasive action of a policy entrepreneur. Coalition strategies are often shaped by participants’ skill in mobilising ideas. Business-environmental coalitions – often considered ‘strange bedfellows’ – have proved to be important in emissions trading policy-making. In 2013, chronically low emissions prices meant that the EU’s climate policy flagship, the EU-ETS, was holed beneath the waterline. But, within two years and against the odds, ambitious reforms were agreed to steady the ship. Crucial to the rescue were the actions of a pro-ETS business lobby, orchestrated by environmentalists. We draw on thirty-two in-depth interviews to construct a discursive institutionalist account of collective interest representation in relation to the reforms. We highlight the ability of policy entrepreneurs to fashion a ‘change-but-no-change’ pro-reform narrative attractive to businesses, despite the fact that such discursive strategies risked marginalising alternative and more disruptive ideas.