European Renewable Energy Governance under the Hammer: Interrogating the Rise and Rise of the RES Auction

Abstract

As a renewable energy pioneer, the EU is a laboratory for policy instrument evolution and innovation. Following many years of debate about the relative merit of feed-in tariffs and tradable green certificates for promoting renewable electricity expansion in Europe, there is a new instrument in town. The renewable energy support (RES) auction has rapidly become the instrument of choice, de facto mandated by the European Commission under state-aid law. RES auctions are now the main instrument in many European countries. A common explanation for the adoption of RES auctions by EU member states is that the Commission requires their implementation under state-aid law, and member states acquiesced. This paper casts a critical eye over this “coercive Commission” explanation by constructing an account of the transition to auctions in Germany and Spain, each titans of EU renewable energy. By focussing on the necessary conditions for the coercive Commission argument – institutional compatibility and supportive domestic interest constituencies – we provide a qualified account of Commission action in this area and show a more dynamic and strategic approach to RES policy instrument harmonisation. We conclude by suggesting that future research may usefully examine the implications of a pan-European system of centrally coordinated auctions for the long-term future in of RES policy in the EU.