Nozick's Real Argument for the Minimal State
Hyams, Keith
Date: 9 August 2004
Article
Journal
The Journal of Political Philosophy
Publisher
Blackwell Publishing
Publisher DOI
Abstract
Nozick is often interpreted as arguing that independents are entitled to protection by the Dominant Protective Agency (DPA) because the DPA infringes their right to punish those who violate their rights. Yet a closer look at Anarchy, State and Utopia reveals that Nozick actually rejects the very argument which is commonly attributed ...
Nozick is often interpreted as arguing that independents are entitled to protection by the Dominant Protective Agency (DPA) because the DPA infringes their right to punish those who violate their rights. Yet a closer look at Anarchy, State and Utopia reveals that Nozick actually rejects the very argument which is commonly attributed to him, and that he does so for good reason. However, I argue that Nozick’s replacement principle of compensation for disadvantage, meant to ground his real argument for independents’ entitlement to protection by the DPA, ought to be unacceptable to a libertarian. I end by suggesting an alternative to it, which I think remains faithful to basic libertarian principles.
Social and Political Sciences, Philosophy, and Anthropology
Faculty of Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences
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