dc.contributor.author | Dupré, John | en_GB |
dc.contributor.department | University of Exeter. At the time of publication, the author was at Stanford University. | en_GB |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-02-04T11:45:51Z | en_GB |
dc.date.accessioned | 2011-01-25T10:54:27Z | en_GB |
dc.date.accessioned | 2013-03-20T15:51:14Z | |
dc.date.issued | 1990-12 | en_GB |
dc.description.abstract | In an earlier paper (Dupré 1984), I criticized a thesis sometimes defended by theorists of probabilistic causality, namely, that a probabilistic cause must raise the probability of its effect in every possible set of causally relevant background conditions (the "contextual unanimity thesis"). I also suggested that a more promising analysis of probabilistic causality might be sought in terms of statis- tical relevance in a fair sample. Ellery Eells (1987) has defended the contextual unanimity thesis against my objections, and also raised objections of his own to my positive claims. In this paper I defend and amplify both my objections to the contextual unanimity thesis and my constructive suggestion. | en_GB |
dc.identifier.citation | 57(4), pp.690-698 | en_GB |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1086/289588 | en_GB |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10036/48433 | en_GB |
dc.language.iso | en | en_GB |
dc.publisher | University of Chicago Press | en_GB |
dc.relation.url | http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/289588 | en_GB |
dc.subject | probabilistic causality | en_GB |
dc.subject | contextual unanimity thesis | en_GB |
dc.subject | probability | en_GB |
dc.subject | cause and effect | en_GB |
dc.title | Probabilistic causality: a rejoinder to Ellery Eells | en_GB |
dc.type | Article | en_GB |
dc.date.available | 2009-02-04T11:45:51Z | en_GB |
dc.date.available | 2011-01-25T10:54:27Z | en_GB |
dc.date.available | 2013-03-20T15:51:14Z | |
dc.identifier.issn | 0031-8248 | en_GB |
dc.description | © 1990 The Philosophy of Science Association | en_GB |
dc.identifier.journal | Philosophy of Science | en_GB |