Remuneration for Representation: Legislative Pay in Comparative and Long Term Perspective
Dickinson, N
Date: 18 May 2020
Publisher
University of Exeter
Degree Title
PhD in Politics
Abstract
One of the most important changes to legislative politics in the last century has been payment of ordinary legislators. Initially an aspect of broadening representation, politicians’ pay has more recently been related to professionalisation of parliamentary roles. As such, it also acts as a flashpoint for public distrust of the political ...
One of the most important changes to legislative politics in the last century has been payment of ordinary legislators. Initially an aspect of broadening representation, politicians’ pay has more recently been related to professionalisation of parliamentary roles. As such, it also acts as a flashpoint for public distrust of the political class. In spite of its importance for central questions in political science, however, scholars have shown little sustained interest in the topic. While scholars have investigated some of the effects of varying pay levels on legislative bodies, no systematic account of legislative pay setting has emerged. In this context, this thesis makes both a theoretical and empirical contribution to the existing literature. First, it develops a theoretical framework to explain how variation in regulatory regimes for legislative pay affects the level, composition and dynamics of legislative compensation. The framework focuses on the role of reforms which take decisions on pay and allowances out of legislators’ hands – hypothesising that pay will be more transparent, but also higher, when politicians give up control. This framework is then analysed in the context of both comparative and longitudinal data on legislative compensation in a selection of countries, taking into account both legislators’ salaries, and less-visible earnings through allowances. Results emphasise the role of regulatory regimes in determining the composition of legislative pay in particular, while questioning previous accounts that associated more independent regulation with a constraining influence over the level of pay. Instead, the analysis indicates that politicians may often alienate decisions over their pay precisely in order to overcome democratic pressures which lead to excessive self-restraint. More broadly, the thesis contributes to accounts of how legislative work professionalised over the course of the twentieth century – becoming a full-time, professionally remunerated career for politicians.
Doctoral Theses
Doctoral College
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