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dc.contributor.authorDickinson, N
dc.date.accessioned2020-05-18T11:30:43Z
dc.date.issued2020-05-18
dc.description.abstractOne of the most important changes to legislative politics in the last century has been payment of ordinary legislators. Initially an aspect of broadening representation, politicians’ pay has more recently been related to professionalisation of parliamentary roles. As such, it also acts as a flashpoint for public distrust of the political class. In spite of its importance for central questions in political science, however, scholars have shown little sustained interest in the topic. While scholars have investigated some of the effects of varying pay levels on legislative bodies, no systematic account of legislative pay setting has emerged. In this context, this thesis makes both a theoretical and empirical contribution to the existing literature. First, it develops a theoretical framework to explain how variation in regulatory regimes for legislative pay affects the level, composition and dynamics of legislative compensation. The framework focuses on the role of reforms which take decisions on pay and allowances out of legislators’ hands – hypothesising that pay will be more transparent, but also higher, when politicians give up control. This framework is then analysed in the context of both comparative and longitudinal data on legislative compensation in a selection of countries, taking into account both legislators’ salaries, and less-visible earnings through allowances. Results emphasise the role of regulatory regimes in determining the composition of legislative pay in particular, while questioning previous accounts that associated more independent regulation with a constraining influence over the level of pay. Instead, the analysis indicates that politicians may often alienate decisions over their pay precisely in order to overcome democratic pressures which lead to excessive self-restraint. More broadly, the thesis contributes to accounts of how legislative work professionalised over the course of the twentieth century – becoming a full-time, professionally remunerated career for politicians.en_GB
dc.description.sponsorshipEconomic and Social Research Council (ESRC)en_GB
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10871/121076
dc.publisherUniversity of Exeteren_GB
dc.subjectParliamenten_GB
dc.subjectLegislaturesen_GB
dc.subjectSalariesen_GB
dc.subjectExpensesen_GB
dc.subjectPolitical Financeen_GB
dc.subjectProfessionalisation of Politicsen_GB
dc.subjectIndependent Regulationen_GB
dc.subjectEconomics of Politicsen_GB
dc.titleRemuneration for Representation: Legislative Pay in Comparative and Long Term Perspectiveen_GB
dc.typeThesis or dissertationen_GB
dc.date.available2020-05-18T11:30:43Z
dc.contributor.advisorBolleyer, Nen_GB
dc.contributor.advisorRadaelli, Cen_GB
dc.contributor.advisorKatz, Gen_GB
dc.publisher.departmentPoliticsen_GB
dc.rights.urihttp://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserveden_GB
dc.type.degreetitlePhD in Politicsen_GB
dc.type.qualificationlevelDoctoralen_GB
dc.type.qualificationnameDoctoral Thesisen_GB
exeter.funder::Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC)en_GB
rioxxterms.versionNAen_GB
rioxxterms.licenseref.startdate2020-05-18
rioxxterms.typeThesisen_GB
refterms.dateFOA2020-05-18T11:30:49Z


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