Normativity, system-integration, natural detachment and the hybrid hominin
dc.contributor.author | Moss, L | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-06-22T09:42:44Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2020-06-19 | |
dc.description.abstract | From a subjective point of view, we take the existence of integrated entities, i.e., ourselves as the most unproblematic given, and blithely project such integrity onto untold many “entities” far and wide. However, from a naturalistic perspective, accounting for anything more integral than the attachments and attractions that are explicable in terms of the four fundamental forces of physics has been anything but straightforward. If we take it that the universe begins as an integral unity (the singularity referred to as “the cosmic egg”) and explodes into progressive stages of internal detachment, then we can also fathom the idea that eddies of relative detachment becoming increasingly integral. Helmuth Plessner made a powerful case for the onset of “positionality” constituting one of the major transitions in nature. Surely, the emergence of “entities” (i.e., life-forms) that position themselves in relation to their surround marks a decisive transition in relative levels of detachment and some would say “autonomy.” It would follow, with no less force, that where and when entities can be seen to be normatively integrated, and indeed to be the agents of their own normativity, that another threshold of detachment has been crossed. The paper introduces and explores the idea that normativity, embedded in a wide-ranging theory of natural detachment, can be considered an emergent force of nature that is requisite to accounting for levels of integration beyond that which is explicable in terms of the four fundamental forces of physics. Following this line of enquiry, we argue that the first expression of a fully, normatively-integrated life-form is neither a spoken language user nor for that matter an individual but rather the neoteny-based, Homo erectus Group. In so doing we claim to have made an inroad into embedding the force of normativity into a wide-ranging naturalist framework, to have provided philosophical anthropology with a new (post-individualist) point of departure, and at least playfully, to have given some naturalistic grist to Hegel’s proclamation that spirit (Geist) is the truth of nature. | en_GB |
dc.identifier.citation | Published online 19 June 2020 | en_GB |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1007/s11097-020-09682-2 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10871/121573 | |
dc.language.iso | en | en_GB |
dc.publisher | Springer | en_GB |
dc.rights | Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article's Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article's Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/. | en_GB |
dc.subject | Normativity | en_GB |
dc.subject | Detachment | en_GB |
dc.subject | Hybrid hominin | en_GB |
dc.subject | System integration | en_GB |
dc.subject | Homo erectus | en_GB |
dc.subject | Plural-self awareness | en_GB |
dc.subject | Cerebral asymmetry | en_GB |
dc.subject | Mimesis | en_GB |
dc.title | Normativity, system-integration, natural detachment and the hybrid hominin | en_GB |
dc.type | Article | en_GB |
dc.date.available | 2020-06-22T09:42:44Z | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1568-7759 | |
dc.description | This is the final version. Available from the publisher via the DOI in this record. | en_GB |
dc.identifier.journal | Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences | en_GB |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ | en_GB |
dcterms.dateAccepted | 2020 | |
rioxxterms.version | VoR | en_GB |
rioxxterms.licenseref.startdate | 2020-06-19 | |
rioxxterms.type | Journal Article/Review | en_GB |
refterms.dateFCD | 2020-06-22T09:36:20Z | |
refterms.versionFCD | VoR | |
refterms.dateFOA | 2020-06-22T09:42:47Z | |
refterms.panel | C | en_GB |
refterms.depositException | publishedGoldOA | |
refterms.depositExceptionExplanation | https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-020-09682-2 |
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Except where otherwise noted, this item's licence is described as Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article's Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article's Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.