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dc.contributor.authorChu, J
dc.contributor.authorGupta, A
dc.contributor.authorLivne, G
dc.date.accessioned2020-08-27T10:37:47Z
dc.date.issued2020-09-24
dc.description.abstractFrom October 2013, UK law and regulations (the Reform) require periodic binding shareholders’ approval of executive directors’ remuneration policy, as well as enhanced disclosure in remuneration reports. These requirements supplement an ongoing requirement for an annual nonbinding vote on compensation outcomes that are detailed in the remuneration report. Using a large sample of listed companies from 2010–2017 we investigate whether the Reform has affected pay levels, pay-performance sensitivity, the pay gap between the CEO and other employees, the amount of cash returned to shareholders, and dissent voting on the remuneration report. We find little evidence that the Reform has affected these variables in our sample firms. Using marketbased tests we find that market participants anticipated an improvement in corporate governance for some key dates before the Reform came into force. Taken together, the paper’s evidence suggests the Reform has not met its stated objectives.en_GB
dc.identifier.citationPublished online 24 September 2020en_GB
dc.identifier.doi10.1080/00014788.2020.1815515
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10871/122651
dc.language.isoenen_GB
dc.publisherTaylor & Francis (Routledge)en_GB
dc.rights.embargoreasonUnder embargo until 24 March 2022 in compliance with publisher policyen_GB
dc.rights© 2020 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
dc.subjectRemuneration Reportingen_GB
dc.subjectGovernance Disclosureen_GB
dc.subjectExecutive Remunerationen_GB
dc.subjectPay-performance Sensitivityen_GB
dc.subjectCorporate Governanceen_GB
dc.subjectBinding Say on Payen_GB
dc.titlePay regulation – is more better?en_GB
dc.typeArticleen_GB
dc.date.available2020-08-27T10:37:47Z
dc.identifier.issn0001-4788
dc.descriptionThis is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Taylor & Francis via the DOI in this recorden_GB
dc.identifier.journalAccounting and Business Researchen_GB
dc.rights.urihttp://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserveden_GB
dcterms.dateAccepted2020-08-24
rioxxterms.versionAMen_GB
rioxxterms.licenseref.startdate2020-08-24
rioxxterms.typeJournal Article/Reviewen_GB
refterms.dateFCD2020-08-27T09:21:05Z
refterms.versionFCDAM
refterms.panelCen_GB


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