Is it costly to deceive? People are adept at detecting gossipers’ lies but may not reward honesty
Fonseca, MA; Peters, K
Date: 4 October 2021
Journal
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
Publisher
Royal Society
Publisher DOI
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Abstract
The possibility that gossipers may share dishonest reputational information is a key challenge
to claims that gossip can shore up cooperation in social groups. It has been suggested that
imposing social costs on dishonest gossipers should increase the honesty of these reputational
signals. However, at present, there is little evidence ...
The possibility that gossipers may share dishonest reputational information is a key challenge
to claims that gossip can shore up cooperation in social groups. It has been suggested that
imposing social costs on dishonest gossipers should increase the honesty of these reputational
signals. However, at present, there is little evidence of people’s willingness to impose costs
on dishonest gossipers; there is also little evidence of their ability to detect gossipers’ lies in
the first place. This paper aims to shed light on people’s abilities to detect dishonest gossip
and their treatment of those who share it. To do this, we report the results of two trust game
studies using the strategy method (Study 1) and repeated interactions in the lab (Study 2). We
show that in an environment where gossipers tell spontaneous lies people are more inclined
to believe honest than dishonest gossip. We also show that people are more likely to treat
favourably gossipers they believe to be honest, but that this does not always result in more
favourable treatment for gossipers who were actually honest. We discuss the implications for
the potential utility of social sanctions as a tool for securing honesty.
Management
Faculty of Environment, Science and Economy
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