Just How Testimonial, Epistemic, Or Correctable Is Testimonial Injustice?
dc.contributor.author | Auerback, R | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-12-06T14:18:44Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2021-11-21 | |
dc.date.updated | 2021-12-06T11:53:35Z | |
dc.description.abstract | In her book Epistemic Injustice: Power & the Ethics of Knowing, Miranda Frickerargues that there is a distinctly epistemic kind of injustice, which she calls testimonial injustice, resulting from identity-prejudicial credibility deficit – identity prejudic causing a hearer to give a deflated level of credibility to a speaker’s word. Sheargues that testimonial injustice is correctable through hearers developing a capacity for self-correcting for it within a virtue-epistemological framework. In this essay, I examine Fricker’s argument, and conclude that Fricker’s exposition of identity-prejudicial credibility deficit is sound, but that she has not demonstrated either that testimonial injustice is a distinctly testimonial phenomenon or that identity-prejudicial credibility deficit is a distinctly epistemic phenomenon, or how a virtue-epistemic framework might be successfully employed as a corrective methodology. I further suggest that her conception of testimony as distinctly evidential is too narrow to be applied to everyday instances of identity-prejudicial credibility deficit, and should be reconfigured within a broader framework. | en_GB |
dc.format.extent | 1-18 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Published online 21 November 2021 | en_GB |
dc.identifier.doi | https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2021.1997394 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10871/128037 | |
dc.language.iso | en | en_GB |
dc.publisher | Routledge | en_GB |
dc.rights | © 2021 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http:// creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. | en_GB |
dc.subject | testimony | en_GB |
dc.subject | prejudice | en_GB |
dc.subject | injustice | en_GB |
dc.subject | virtue theory | en_GB |
dc.title | Just How Testimonial, Epistemic, Or Correctable Is Testimonial Injustice? | en_GB |
dc.type | Article | en_GB |
dc.date.available | 2021-12-06T14:18:44Z | |
dc.identifier.issn | 0967-2559 | |
dc.description | This is the final version. Available on open access from Routledge via the DOI in this record | en_GB |
dc.identifier.eissn | 1466-4542 | |
dc.identifier.journal | International Journal of Philosophical Studies | en_GB |
dc.relation.ispartof | International Journal of Philosophical Studies | |
dc.rights.uri | https:// creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ | en_GB |
rioxxterms.version | VoR | en_GB |
rioxxterms.licenseref.startdate | 2021-11-21 | |
rioxxterms.type | Journal Article/Review | en_GB |
refterms.dateFCD | 2021-12-06T14:15:14Z | |
refterms.versionFCD | VoR | |
refterms.dateFOA | 2021-12-06T14:18:59Z | |
refterms.panel | D | en_GB |
refterms.dateFirstOnline | 2021-11-21 |
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Except where otherwise noted, this item's licence is described as © 2021 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http:// creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.