Process epistemology in the COVID-19 era: rethinking the research process to avoid dangerous forms of reification
dc.contributor.author | Dupré, J | |
dc.contributor.author | Leonelli, S | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2022-03-10T10:57:58Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2022-03-07 | |
dc.date.updated | 2022-03-09T22:55:40Z | |
dc.description.abstract | Whether we live in a world of autonomous things, or a world of interconnected processes in constant flux, is an ancient philosophical debate. Modern biology provides decisive reasons for embracing the latter view. How does one understand the practices and outputs of science in such a dynamic, ever-changing world - and particularly in an emergency situation such as the COVID-19 pandemic, where scientific knowledge has been regarded as bedrock for decisive social interventions? We argue that key to answering this question is to consider the role of the activity of reification within the research process. Reification consists in the identification of more or less stable features of the flux, and treating these as constituting stable things. As we illustrate with reference to biological and biomedical research on COVID-19, reification is a necessary component of any process of inquiry and comes in at least two forms: (1) means reification (phenomena-to-object), when researchers create objects meant to capture features of the world, or phenomena, in order to be able to study them; and (2) target reification (object-to-phenomena), when researchers infer an understanding of phenomena from an investigation of the epistemic objects created to study them. We note that both objects and phenomena are dynamic processes and argue that have no reason to assume that changes in objects and phenomena track one another. We conclude that failure to acknowledge these forms of reification and their epistemic role in scientific inquiry can have dire consequences for how the resulting knowledge is interpreted and used. | en_GB |
dc.description.sponsorship | European Research Council (ERC) | en_GB |
dc.description.sponsorship | Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) | en_GB |
dc.identifier.citation | Vol. 12, article 20 | en_GB |
dc.identifier.doi | https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-022-00450-4 | |
dc.identifier.grantnumber | 324186 | en_GB |
dc.identifier.grantnumber | 335925 | en_GB |
dc.identifier.grantnumber | 101001145 | en_GB |
dc.identifier.grantnumber | EP/N510129/1 | en_GB |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10871/128994 | |
dc.identifier | ORCID: 0000-0002-7451-2127 (Dupré, John) | |
dc.language.iso | en | en_GB |
dc.publisher | Springer | en_GB |
dc.rights | © The Author(s) 2022. Open Access. This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article's Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article's Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/. | en_GB |
dc.subject | scientific practice | en_GB |
dc.subject | biology | en_GB |
dc.subject | models | en_GB |
dc.subject | data | en_GB |
dc.subject | knowledge | en_GB |
dc.subject | pandemic | en_GB |
dc.title | Process epistemology in the COVID-19 era: rethinking the research process to avoid dangerous forms of reification | en_GB |
dc.type | Article | en_GB |
dc.date.available | 2022-03-10T10:57:58Z | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1879-4912 | |
exeter.article-number | 20 | |
dc.description | This is the final version. Available on open access from Springer via the DOI in this record | en_GB |
dc.identifier.eissn | 1879-4920 | |
dc.identifier.journal | European Journal for Philosophy of Science | en_GB |
dc.relation.ispartof | European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 12(1) | |
dc.rights.uri | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ | en_GB |
dcterms.dateAccepted | 2022-01-30 | |
rioxxterms.version | VoR | en_GB |
rioxxterms.licenseref.startdate | 2022-03-07 | |
rioxxterms.type | Journal Article/Review | en_GB |
refterms.dateFCD | 2022-03-10T10:54:52Z | |
refterms.versionFCD | VoR | |
refterms.dateFOA | 2022-03-10T10:58:14Z | |
refterms.panel | C | en_GB |
refterms.dateFirstOnline | 2022-03-07 |
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