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dc.contributor.authorMorgan, J
dc.contributor.authorTumlinson, J
dc.contributor.authorVárdy, F
dc.date.accessioned2022-05-31T08:28:04Z
dc.date.issued2022-01-28
dc.date.updated2022-05-30T20:02:58Z
dc.description.abstractWe show that meritocracy, in the sense of accuracy of performance ranking, can be too much of a good thing: in contests with sufficiently homogeneous agents, it reduces output and is Pareto inefficient. In contests with sufficiently heterogeneous agents, discouragement and complacency effects further reduce the benefits of meritocracy. Perfect meritocracy may be optimal only for intermediate levels of heterogeneity.en_GB
dc.format.extent105414-
dc.identifier.citationVol. 201, article 105414en_GB
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2022.105414
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10871/129789
dc.identifierORCID: 0000-0002-0779-1701 (Tumlinson, Justin)
dc.language.isoenen_GB
dc.publisherElsevieren_GB
dc.rights.embargoreasonUnder embargo until 28 July 2023 in compliance with publisher policyen_GB
dc.rights© 2022 Elsevier Inc. This version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/  en_GB
dc.subjectContestsen_GB
dc.subjectTournamentsen_GB
dc.subjectMeritocracyen_GB
dc.subjectContest designen_GB
dc.titleThe limits of meritocracyen_GB
dc.typeArticleen_GB
dc.date.available2022-05-31T08:28:04Z
dc.identifier.issn0022-0531
exeter.article-number105414
dc.descriptionThis is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Elsevier via the DOI in this recorden_GB
dc.identifier.eissn1095-7235
dc.identifier.journalJournal of Economic Theoryen_GB
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Economic Theory, 201
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/  en_GB
dcterms.dateAccepted2022-01-12
rioxxterms.versionAMen_GB
rioxxterms.licenseref.startdate2022-01-28
rioxxterms.typeJournal Article/Reviewen_GB
refterms.dateFCD2022-05-31T08:25:38Z
refterms.versionFCDAM
refterms.dateFOA2023-07-27T23:00:00Z
refterms.panelCen_GB


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© 2022 Elsevier Inc. This version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/  
Except where otherwise noted, this item's licence is described as © 2022 Elsevier Inc. This version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/