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dc.contributor.authorRoberts, T
dc.contributor.authorOsler, L
dc.date.accessioned2022-09-27T08:50:31Z
dc.date.issued2023-01-17
dc.date.updated2022-09-27T06:31:30Z
dc.description.abstractWe introduce two concepts - social certainty and social doubt - that help to articulate a variety of experiences of the social world, such as shyness, self-consciousness, culture shock, and anxiety. Following Carel's (2013) analysis of bodily doubt, which explores how a person's tacit confidence in the workings of their body can be disrupted and undermined in illness, we consider how an individual's faith in themselves as a social agent, too, can be compromised or lost, thus altering their experience of what is afforded by the social environment. We highlight how a loss of bodily or social certainty can be scaffolded, shaped, and sustained by the environments in which one finds oneself. As such, we show how certain individuals might be more vulnerable to experiences of bodily and social doubt than others.en_GB
dc.identifier.citationPublished online 17 January 2023en_GB
dc.identifier.doi10.1017/apa.2022.40
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10871/130982
dc.identifierORCID: 0000-0002-6675-7060 (Roberts, Tom)
dc.language.isoenen_GB
dc.publisherCambridge University Pressen_GB
dc.rights© The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the American Philosophical Association. This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution and reproduction, provided the original article is properly cited.
dc.subjectphenomenologyen_GB
dc.subjectsocial experienceen_GB
dc.subjectdoubten_GB
dc.subjectcertaintyen_GB
dc.subjectanxietyen_GB
dc.titleSocial doubten_GB
dc.typeArticleen_GB
dc.date.available2022-09-27T08:50:31Z
dc.identifier.issn2053-4477
dc.descriptionThis is the final version. Available on open access from Cambridge University Press via the DOI in this recorden_GB
dc.identifier.eissn2053-4485
dc.identifier.journalJournal of the American Philosophical Associationen_GB
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/en_GB
dcterms.dateAccepted2022-09-26
dcterms.dateSubmitted2022-07-27
rioxxterms.versionVoRen_GB
rioxxterms.licenseref.startdate2022-09-26
rioxxterms.typeJournal Article/Reviewen_GB
refterms.dateFCD2022-09-27T06:31:33Z
refterms.versionFCDAM
refterms.dateFOA2023-05-04T09:59:38Z
refterms.panelCen_GB


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© The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the American Philosophical Association.
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution and reproduction, provided the original article is properly cited.
Except where otherwise noted, this item's licence is described as © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the American Philosophical Association. This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution and reproduction, provided the original article is properly cited.