Social doubt
dc.contributor.author | Roberts, T | |
dc.contributor.author | Osler, L | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2022-09-27T08:50:31Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2023-01-17 | |
dc.date.updated | 2022-09-27T06:31:30Z | |
dc.description.abstract | We introduce two concepts - social certainty and social doubt - that help to articulate a variety of experiences of the social world, such as shyness, self-consciousness, culture shock, and anxiety. Following Carel's (2013) analysis of bodily doubt, which explores how a person's tacit confidence in the workings of their body can be disrupted and undermined in illness, we consider how an individual's faith in themselves as a social agent, too, can be compromised or lost, thus altering their experience of what is afforded by the social environment. We highlight how a loss of bodily or social certainty can be scaffolded, shaped, and sustained by the environments in which one finds oneself. As such, we show how certain individuals might be more vulnerable to experiences of bodily and social doubt than others. | en_GB |
dc.identifier.citation | Published online 17 January 2023 | en_GB |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1017/apa.2022.40 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10871/130982 | |
dc.identifier | ORCID: 0000-0002-6675-7060 (Roberts, Tom) | |
dc.language.iso | en | en_GB |
dc.publisher | Cambridge University Press | en_GB |
dc.rights | © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the American Philosophical Association. This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution and reproduction, provided the original article is properly cited. | |
dc.subject | phenomenology | en_GB |
dc.subject | social experience | en_GB |
dc.subject | doubt | en_GB |
dc.subject | certainty | en_GB |
dc.subject | anxiety | en_GB |
dc.title | Social doubt | en_GB |
dc.type | Article | en_GB |
dc.date.available | 2022-09-27T08:50:31Z | |
dc.identifier.issn | 2053-4477 | |
dc.description | This is the final version. Available on open access from Cambridge University Press via the DOI in this record | en_GB |
dc.identifier.eissn | 2053-4485 | |
dc.identifier.journal | Journal of the American Philosophical Association | en_GB |
dc.rights.uri | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ | en_GB |
dcterms.dateAccepted | 2022-09-26 | |
dcterms.dateSubmitted | 2022-07-27 | |
rioxxterms.version | VoR | en_GB |
rioxxterms.licenseref.startdate | 2022-09-26 | |
rioxxterms.type | Journal Article/Review | en_GB |
refterms.dateFCD | 2022-09-27T06:31:33Z | |
refterms.versionFCD | AM | |
refterms.dateFOA | 2023-05-04T09:59:38Z | |
refterms.panel | C | en_GB |
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Except where otherwise noted, this item's licence is described as © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the American Philosophical Association.
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution and reproduction, provided the original article is properly cited.