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dc.contributor.authorThomson, CP
dc.contributor.authorMader, M
dc.contributor.authorMünchow, F
dc.contributor.authorReifler, J
dc.contributor.authorSchoen, H
dc.date.accessioned2023-08-04T09:42:56Z
dc.date.issued2023-11-06
dc.date.updated2023-08-03T15:36:33Z
dc.description.abstract• How strong is public support for Ukraine in Europe? Given reports that Russian President Vladimir Putin may be ‘playing for time’ in the hopes that weary publics will demand an end to supporting Ukraine, this is an important question. • In February 2023, we conducted a survey of public attitudes in ten major European countries: France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Finland, Sweden, Italy and Spain. • Our findings suggest that Europeans are (almost) unanimous in blaming Russia for the war and strongly in favour of standing by Ukraine in its war effort. • Only minorities of respondents are of the opinion that Ukraine should be urged to accept territorial losses that could help end the war, or that economic sanctions against Russia should be lifted. Even in countries where support for Ukraine is lower (Hungary and Italy), or among more sceptical groups, we typically find a majority or plurality on Ukraine's side (or, at worst, we find only a small majority are pro-Russia). • Regarding NATO, there is no widespread appetite for increasing its presence in eastern Europe (except in Poland and Estonia), and even less support for Ukraine joining the alliance. At least in the eyes of the public, fighting a war in Ukraine is perceived as a goal in itself that does not necessarily elicit broader changes to existing security alliances like NATO. • Looking ahead, if the gap between the expectations audiences had for the Ukrainian counter-offensive and what it actually delivers is too great, we would expect public support for Ukraine in the conflict to weaken overall. • If governments wish to keep support levels high, we recommend targeting communications to reach groups we have found to be less supportive. This could include utilizing non-traditional media platforms to reach younger audiences, or members of populist right-wing groups.en_GB
dc.description.sponsorshipVolkswagen Foundationen_GB
dc.identifier.citationVol. 99 (6), pp. 2485–2500en_GB
dc.identifier.doi10.1093/ia/iiad241
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10871/133703
dc.identifierORCID: 0000-0001-8220-5082 (Thomson, Catarina)
dc.language.isoenen_GB
dc.publisherOxford University Press / The Royal Institute of International Affairsen_GB
dc.rights© The Author(s) 2023. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Royal Institute of International Affairs. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted reuse, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
dc.subjectUkraine waren_GB
dc.subjectPublic opinionen_GB
dc.subjectNATOen_GB
dc.subjectDomestic politicsen_GB
dc.subjectCold War legaciesen_GB
dc.titleEuropean public opinion: united in supporting Ukraine, divided on the future of NATOen_GB
dc.typeArticleen_GB
dc.date.available2023-08-04T09:42:56Z
dc.identifier.issn0020-5850
dc.descriptionThis is the final version. Available on open access from Oxford University Press via the DOI in this recorden_GB
dc.identifier.eissn1468-2346
dc.identifier.journalInternational Affairsen_GB
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/en_GB
dcterms.dateAccepted2023-08-03
dcterms.dateSubmitted2023-07-04
rioxxterms.versionVoRen_GB
rioxxterms.licenseref.startdate2023-08-03
rioxxterms.typeJournal Article/Reviewen_GB
refterms.dateFCD2023-08-03T15:36:35Z
refterms.versionFCDAM
refterms.dateFOA2023-12-19T10:12:26Z
refterms.panelCen_GB


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© The Author(s) 2023. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Royal Institute of International Affairs. This is 
an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted reuse, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work 
is properly cited.
Except where otherwise noted, this item's licence is described as © The Author(s) 2023. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Royal Institute of International Affairs. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted reuse, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.